GW-185

H2S Plan

DATE: 03.07.11



Susana Martinez Governor

Brett F. Woods, Ph.D. Acting Cabinet Secretary

Daniel Sanchez Acting Division Director Oil Conservation Division



March 3, 2011

Ms. Jennifer Knowlton, PE Agave Energy Company 105 South Fourth Street Artesia, NM 88210

RE: H2S CONTINGENCY PLAN - AGAVE DAGGER DRAW PROCESSING PLANT AND THE METROPOLIS DISPOSAL #1 WELL GW-153

Ms. Knowlton:

The Oil Conservation Division (OCD) has completed its review of Agave Energy Company's *H2S Contingency Plan - Agave Dagger Draw Processing Plant and The Metropolis Disposal #1 Well* submitted as a draft on April 5, 2010 and submitted as a final document on December 20, 2010. Agave is required to submit this Hydrogen Sulfide Contingency Plan, pursuant to 19.15.11.9A NMAC, because operations at Agave's Dagger Draw Gas Plant and its acid gas injection well (Metropolis Disposal Well) could result in the release of a potentially hazardous volume of hydrogen sulfide which might impact a public road. Agave's contingency plan specifies how it will alert and protect the public in accordance with the Subsections B through I of 19.15.11.9 NMAC.

On February 16, 2011, OCD met with Agave and Geolex to discuss technical issues. On February 17, 2011, Agave brought its Acid Gas Injection (AGI) application for authorization to inject to a hearing before an OCD hearing examiner (Case 14601). Agave requested permission to inject acid gas into its Metropolis Disposal #001 Well (API No. 30-015-31905). The well is located in Section 36, Township 18 South, Range 25 East, NMPM, in Eddy County, New Mexico.

Following the technical meeting of February 16, 2011, Agave submitted a revised H2S Contingency Plan via email to OCD on February 23 and February 25, 2011. On March 1, 2011, OCD provided Agave with a final review and on March 2, 2011, Agave made the requested final revisions.

Ms. Knowlton Page 2 of 2

OCD hereby approves Agave's H2S Contingency Plan dated March 1, 2011. OCD thanks Agave and Geolex for their cooperation during this review process. Please contact Mr. Leonard Lowe at (505) 476-3492 if you have any questions.

Sincerely,

Glenn von Gonten Acting Environmental Bureau Chief

Cc: Richard Ezeanyim, OCD Leonard Lowe, OCD Carl Chavez, OCD Randy Dade, OCD Julie Guiterrez, Geolex





March 3, 2011

Glenn von Gonten Environmental Bureau Senior Hydrologist State of New Mexico Oil Conservation Division 1220 South St. Francis Drive Santa Fe, New Mexico 87505

Dear Mr. von Gonten,

Per our conversations, enclosed is a disk that contains electronic copies of the Agave Dagger Draw Gas Processing Plant Hydrogen Sulfide Contingency Plan. Also enclosed is a bound hard copy of the same report.

Thanks for your assistance with this. As always, let me know if you have any questions.

Sincerely,

Juni W

Julie W. Gutierrez

xc: Jennifer Knowlton, Agave (3 hard copies enclosed)



From: Sent: To: Subject: VonGonten, Glenn, EMNRD Thursday, March 03, 2011 4:27 PM Lowe, Leonard, EMNRD FW:

From: Julie W. Gutierrez [mailto:jwg@geolex.com] Sent: Thursday, March 03, 2011 4:02 PM To: VonGonten, Glenn, EMNRD Subject: RE:

Thanks very much, Glenn. We are delighted.

Best regards,

Julie

Julie W. Gutiérrez Geolex, Inc[®] 500 Marquette Avenue, NW Suite 1350 Albuquerque, NM 87102 505-842-8000 Ext. 101 505-842-7380 Fax

PRIVILEGED & CONFIDENTIAL

This message and attachment(s) contain confidential information belonging to the sender which is intended for the sole use of the individual(s) or entity named above. If you receive this message in error, you are hereby notified that any disclosure, copying, distribution, resending, forwarding or taking of any action in reliance on the contents of this email and/or any attachment(s) is strictly prohibited. If you have received this message in error, please notify the sender via return email and permanently delete this message and any attachment(s) from any computer(s).

From: VonGonten, Glenn, EMNRD [mailto:Glenn.VonGonten@state.nm.us]
Sent: Thursday, March 03, 2011 3:42 PM
To: Jennifer Knowlton; Julie W. Gutierrez; Lowe, Leonard, EMNRD
Subject:

Jennifer,

Here is OCD's approval for the Dagger Draw GP/Metropolis Well H2S Contingency Plan of March 1, 2011. The hard copy will go out tomorrow in the mail.

Glenn

H₂S Contingency Plan

r.

- 1. 2. 2.

.

- 44

100

-

1

1

1

Agave Dagger Draw Processing Plant and the Metropolis Disposal #1 Well



Agave Energy Company 105 South 4th Street

Artesia, NM 88210 (575-748-4555)

March 1, 2011

TABLE OF CONTENTS

		Page
1. Ir [A	ntroduction API RP-55 7.1]	1
II. S [A	cope API RP-55 7.2]	1
III. F [A	Plan Availability API RP-55 7.3]	1
IV.	 Emergency Procedures. [NMAC 19.15.11.9.B(2)(a)][API RP-55 7.4 a.] A. Responsibilities and Duties of Personnel During an Emergency B. Immediate Action Plan C. Telephone Numbers and Communication Methods D. Location of Residents, Roads, and Medical Facilities E. Evacuation Routes, Muster Areas, and Road Block Locations F. Monitoring Equipment, Alarm Systems, Safety Equipment, and Supplies 	1
V. (Characteristics of Hydrogen Sulfide (H₂S), Sulfur Dioxide (SO₂), and Carbon Dioxide (CO₂) [NMAC 19.15.11.9.B(2)(b)][API RP-55 7.4 b.] A. Characteristics of Hydrogen Sulfide (H₂S) B. Sulfur Dioxide (SO₂) C. Carbon Dioxide (CO₂) D. Radii of Exposure (ROE) 	12
VI.	 Facility Description, Maps, and Drawings [AC [19.15.11.9.B(2)(c)][API RP-55 7.4 c.]. A. Dagger Draw Processing Plant B. Metropolis Disposal #1 Well C. Map of Plant and Well 	17
VII.	 Training and Drills [NMAC 19.15.11.9.B(2)(d)][API RP-55 7.4 d.] A. Responsibilities and Duties of Essential Personnel B. On-site or Classroom Drills C. Notification and Training of Residents on Protective Measures in Emergency Situations D. Training and Attendance Documentation E. Briefing of Public Officials on Evacuation and Shelter in Place Plans 	. 19
VIII.	 Coordination with State Emergency Plans [NMAC 19.15.11.9.B(2)(e)] A. Oil Conservation Division B. New Mexico State Police 	20
IX.	Plan Activation [NMAC 19.15.11.9.C][API RP-55 7.4 d.] A. Activation Levels B. Events that Could Lead to a Release	. 20

. . .

and a c

- 20 bu

a la juli

Ser Street

ديوهم وشعب

44 mm

......

A

**; ~ * *

ii

X. Submission of H2S Contingency Plans 21 A. Submission 21

- A. SUDINISSION
- B. Retention
- C. Inventory

MAPS AND FIGURES

Map 1 Agave Dagger Draw Plant Facilities Locations

Map 2 General Diagram of Agave Dagger Draw Gas Plant and Location of Pipeline Connecting Plant with Metropolis Disposal #1 Well

Figure 1 Photos of Pipeline

APPENDICES

- Appendix A Facility Maps and Drawings
 - Map A-1: Facility Map
 - Map A-2: Alarms and Monitors, Dagger Draw Active Equipment
 - Map A-3: Safety and Fire Equipment, Dagger Draw Active Equipment
 - Map A-4: Evacuation Router, Dagger Draw Active Equipment
 - Map A-5: Proposed Perimeter Alarms
 - Map A-6: Metropolis Disposal #1 Well

Appendix B – Response Flow Diagram

- Appendix C ROE Calculations
 - Map C-1: Facility, Pipeline and Well Site ROE
- Appendix D Muster Areas and Evacuation Routes Map D-1: Evacuation Routes to Muster Areas

Appendix E – Distribution List

OPERATOR QUICK REFERENCE GUIDE

Dagger Draw Processing Plant Level 1 Response FOR PLANT OR WELLHEAD ALARMS

H₂S Detected Greater than 10 ppm H₂S Intermittent Audible Alarm and flashing amber lights



- Evacuate visitors from plant to designated Muster Area
- Notify Agave Management
- Assign operators to suit up in SCBA
- Check Computer for location of H_2S alarm
- Notify all entities in the 500 ppm ROE when perimeter monitors reach 10 ppm H₂S
- Wearing SCBA attempt to locate and repair leak
- Rotate Operators in 15 minute shifts
- If H₂S levels exceed 10 ppm H₂S in emergency muster area relocate to alternate muster area

If H₂S levels exceed 20 ppm H₂S proceed to Level II response

CALL 911 for death or Injury for emergency assistance

Once resolved and monitored levels in plant are less than 10 ppm H₂S return to plant and continue to monitor

Location of Facilities

Agave Dagger Draw Processing Plant (See Map 1)

Go south of Artesia, NM on Hwy 285 approximately 9 miles to County Road 38 (Kincaid Ranch Road). Turn right (west) on Kincaid Ranch Road and go approximately 2.8 miles to Pipeline Road. Turn right (north) and go 0.2 miles to the Dagger Draw Gas Plant Office. Physical address is 278 Pipeline Road, Artesia, NM 88210.

Section 25-Township 18S-Range 25E

1.22.20

Metropolis Disposal #1 Well (See Map 1)

Go south of Artesia, NM on Hwy 285 approximately 9 miles to County Road 38 (Kincaid Ranch Road). Turn right (west) on Kincaid Ranch Road and go 2.6 miles (just past the Agave Field Office). Turn left (south) on dirt lease road and go approximately 0.6 miles then turn left (east) and go 0.2 miles to the Metropolis Disposal #1 Well. Section 36-Township 18S-Range 25E

Emergency Trailer – Atoka Facility Location (See Map 1)

From Artesia, drive south on Highway 285 to County Road 39. Turn east and drive approximately 2 miles. The facility is on the south side of the road in NW/NE Sec 14 18S 26 E. See F. 6. (Page 9) for a detailed list of Emergency Trailer contents. The trailer can serve as a mobile resource center or Incident Command Center.

I. Introduction

[API RP-55 7.1]

The Agave Dagger Draw Processing Plant is a natural gas processing plant which handles and/or generates hydrogen sulfide (H₂S) and/or sulfur dioxide (SO₂). This H₂S contingency plan was created to outline procedures that are to be followed in the event of an H₂S release that occurs at the plant, the acid gas well, or on the acid gas pipeline. The response plan is the same regardless of where the release takes place. This plan complies with the New Mexico Oil Conservation Division (OCD) Rule 11. The plan and operation of the Dagger Draw Plant also conform to standards set forth in API RP-55 "Recommended Practices for Oil and Gas Producing and Gas Processing Plant Operations Involving Hydrogen Sulfide" as well as API RP-49 "Recommended Practice for Drilling and Well Servicing Operations Involving Hydrogen Sulfide." The Dagger Draw Plant does not have any storage tanks in which hydrogen sulfide or other gas or gas products are stored, and thus, API regulations and OCD regulations (specifically 19.15.11.12.E NMAC) relative to those types of storage are not applicable for this plant. While there are no known residences or businesses within the 100 ppm radius of exposure (ROE) other than the Agave Dagger Draw Processing Plant, Agave has committed to provide notice to nearby property owners outside of the ROE as detailed in Section C. 4. (Page 6) and Appendix E in the case of an unintended release.

II. Scope

[API RP-55 7.2]

This contingency plan is specific to the Agave Dagger Draw Gas Processing Plant and acid gas injection system. This plan contains procedures to provide an organized response to an unplanned release from the plant, well site and pipeline connecting them and outlines procedures that would be followed to alert and protect any members of the public, residents in surrounding areas and/or contractors working on or around the plant in the event of an unplanned release. All operations shall be performed with safety as the primary goal. Any part of the operation that might compromise the safety of personnel will cease until the operation can be re-evaluated and the proper engineering controls implemented.

III. Plan Availability

[API RP-55 7.3]

This contingency plan shall be available to all personnel responsible for implementing any portion of the plan. Copies of the plan will be distributed to the following agencies: New Mexico Oil Conservation Division (OCD), New Mexico Department of Public Safety, Local Emergency Planning Committee (LEPC), Artesia Fire Department, Atoka Fire Department, Artesia Police Department, and Eddy County Sheriff's Department. The Plan will be available at the following Agave Energy Company locations: Dagger Draw Processing Plant, the Artesia Field Office, Emergency Response Trailer at Atoka (Map 1) and the Agave Main Office in Artesia.

IV. Emergency Procedures

[NMAC 19.15.11.9.B(2)(a)] [API RP-55 7.4 a] [29 CFR 1910.1200]

A. Responsibilities and Duties of Personnel during an Emergency

1. Plant Manager or designee will serve as the Incident Commander (IC); is responsible for training operators assigned to the plant, contractors and visitors on the implementation of this plan; and will maintain communication with Agave management and residents within the radius of exposure (ROE).

2. Plant Supervisor or designee will serve as the Incident Commander (IC) in the absence of the Plant Manager; is responsible for training and supervising plant operators on the implementation of this plan, will maintain accountability of all contractors and visitors; and will maintain communication with the plant manager and Agave management.

3. Plant Operators will perform operations in accordance with this safety plan; assist in the accountability and evacuation of visitors and contractors to designated muster areas; and keep the plant supervisor and manager informed on the repair progress.

4. Essential Agave Personnel will be familiar with the procedures in this plan and assist plant operators in assisting with the implementation of this plan in a safe manner.

5. Visitors and contractors on site will be familiar with safety alarms and signals at the Dagger Draw Gas Processing Plant and the acid gas injection system; and adhere to instructions of Plant Operators and other Agave personnel in evacuation of the facilities.

B. Immediate Action Plan

1. The following outlines the Immediate Action Plan that is illustrated by the response flow diagram in Appendix B. This is to be used when responding to an H_2S release. Response levels are the same for a release at the plant or the acid gas well. Additional or long term response actions will be determined on a case-by-case basis, if needed, once the Incident Command Center (ICC) and System (ICS) are established following the immediate response.

Level Alarms		Actions
1	Intermittent	1. The audible signal for a Plant emergency and evacuation is an intermittent alarm
	audible alarm	and yellow lights (repeating off/on) activated when levels of H ₂ S of 10 ppm or
	sounded	greater are detected. In addition, a flashing yellow light or beacon will be activated
1	and/or	at 10 ppm or greater of H_2S . The audible alarm and flashing yellow lights are
	flashing	redundant systems which function independently of one another so that should one
	yellow lights	system fail, the other would remain active. These systems incorporate back-up
	activated for	battery capabilities as recommended in API RP 55 which insure their operation in
	H ₂ S at 10	the event of a power failure. A computer in the control room and in the Plant
	ppm or	Supervisor office establishes which H ₂ S monitor has activated the alarm and/or
	greater.	flashing yellow beacon, be it a plant monitor or well monitor. At the initial sound of
		the intermittent alarm or the flashing yellow beacon, assigned operators will put on
		a 30 minute self-contained breathing apparatus (SCBA). (There are a maximum of
		four operators at the plant at any one time, and at least seven SCBA devices are
		located where they are accessible to the operators.) All other personnel in the
		Plant complex or well site shall immediately evacuate the Plant or well site to the
		closest Emergency Assembly Area (see Appendix D, Map D-1). If H_2S
		concentrations are 10 ppm or greater, then personnel will evacuate to a designated
		Muster Area determined by the incident Commander (IC) (see Appendix D, Map D-
		(SCRA) will first help any nervous in distrong events to the Emergenery
		(SCDA), will first help any persons in distress evacuate to the Emergency
		Assembly Area. If deenied necessary by the Flant Manager of Flant Supervisor,
		designated by the Plant Manager or Supervisor
		2 All entities within the 100 ppm radius of impact (ROE) will be notified (by
		telephone) of a release if the perimeter alarms are activated at 10 nnm H-S or
		areater. Notification will be done by personnel designated by the Plant Manager or
		his designee. The nature of the release and status of containment will be
		conveyed. Businesses will be advised to report the incident to employees working
		near the Plant and to alert any third party contractors or service companies
		working in the Plant vicinity or imminently scheduled to work in the vicinity of the
		release. All should be instructed to leave the area and not to enter/re-enter area
		until further notice. It should be noted that at the time of submission of this
		plan there are no known occupants, businesses or residences within the 100
		ppm ROE; however, Agave personnel will make a visual inspection of the
		ROE area to insure that no individuals are seen inside the ROE, and if any
		are observed, they will be advised to immediately evacuate to the designated
		Muster Area, described above.
		3. Wearing the self-contained breathing apparatus (SCBA), the operator(s) will
		all all only the cause of the release. The Π_2 is levels at the Emergency Assembly Area will be monitored with a band hold or personal monitor and with the fixed
		monitor and with a hand held of personal monitor and with the fixed
		4 The Incident Commander (IC) will set up secondary re-entry team(s) with 30
		minute self-contained breathing apparatus (SCRA) to re-enter and resolve the
		situation Re-entry will occur in 15 minute shifts at the direction of the Incident
		Commander (IC) until the problem is resolved or the emergency shut down (ESD)
		is activated. If H ₂ S levels in the Emergency Assembly Areas exceed 10 nnm H ₂ S
		evacuate to alternate Emergency Assembly Area and continue to monitor
		Emergency Assembly Area with personal or handheld H ₂ S monitors. If evacuation
		to Muster Area occurs, road blocks will be established near the Muster Areas on
		Kincaid and Pipeline Road. If release is resolved and monitored levels in the Plant
		are less than 10 ppm H ₂ S, personnel may re-enter the Plant. The Oil Conservation
		Division (OCD) shall be notified within four hours of any release that activates the
		Plan. If the release is not resolved and H ₂ S levels continue to increase, Level II
		Response is indicated.

ł

1

i

2

;

Levels	Alarms	Actions
ll	Intermittent	1. The intermittent alarm and red flashing lights indicate the detection of H ₂ S greater
	audible alarm	than or equal to 20 ppm. (Flashing yellow lights indicate a H2S release of 10 ppm or
	sounded	greater and they will change to red for a release of 20 ppm or greater.) The audible
	and/or	alarm and flashing red lights are redundant systems which function independently of
Í	flashing red	one another so that should one system fail, the other would remain active. These
	lights	systems incorporate back-up battery capabilities as recommended in API RP 55
	activated for	which insure their operation in the event of a power failure. A control panel in the
r	H ₂ S greater	Plant supervisor's office establishes which H ₂ S monitor has activated the alarm and
	than 20 ppm	or flashing red beacon, be it a plant monitor or a well monitor. At the initial sound of
		the intermittent alarm or observance of the flashing red beacons, the operators will
		exit to the Emergency Assembly Area specified by the Plant Manager or his
		designee. All personnel in the Plant complex will put on emergency escape packs
		located throughout the plant, or at the well location and evacuate, using the
		evacuation routes to the Emergency Assembly Area (see Appendix A, Maps A-4
		and A-6 and Appendix D, Map D-1) and then to the Muster Area (see Appendix D,
		Map D-1) specified by the Plant Manager or designee. At the assembly area, the
		Plant Manager or designee may assign operators to put on a 30 minute self-
}		contained breathing apparatus (SCBA). Local emergency response service providers
		will be contacted by Plant Manager or designee. See Section F. 4. (Page 11) for a
		listing of respirator equipment.
		2. All other entities within the 100 ppm radius of impact (ROE) will be contacted by
		phone and notified of release and asked to evacuate when a <u>perimeter monitor</u> reads
		contacted by phone and notified of release. The nature of the release and status of
		containment will be conveyed. Depending on release status and prevailing wind
		conditions some entities within the 100 nnm radius of impact (ROE) may be asked
		to shelter in place or evacuate. Notifications will include but are not limited to the
		following:
		a) Other entities within the 100 ppm radius of impact (ROE), depending on release
		status and prevailing wind conditions, will be asked to shelter in place. Those
		entities will be instructed to close any windows and shut off any air
		conditioning/heating until further notice. In addition, they will be instructed to
		contact other employees/residents not currently present and instruct them not to
		enter/reenter the area until further instruction.
		b) If a perimeter monitor is activated, the LEPC and law enforcement will be
		contacted by phone and notified of the release and status of containment. The
		Incident Commander (IC) will assign personnel notification responsibility.
1		It should be noted that at the time of submission of this plan there are no
1 I		known occupants, businesses or residences within the 100 ppm ROE;
		insure that no individuals are seen inside the ROF and if any are observed
		they will be advised to immediately evacuate to the designated Muster Area
		described above.
		3. Operator(s) with 30 minute self-contained breathing apparatus (SCBA) will assess
		the release and attempt to resolve it. If after 45 minutes on scene there is no
		resolution, the operator(s) will notify the Plant Manager to determine if the
		emergency shut down (ESD) should be activated.
		4. If monitored H ₂ S levels at Muster Area exceed 10 ppm, evacuate to an alternate
		Muster Area. If deemed necessary, local emergency response service providers will
		be contacted by the Incident Commander (IC).
		a) Re-entry will occur in full self-contained breathing apparatus (SCBA) and in 15
		minute shifts at the direction of the IC until IC determines problem has been
		resolved or emergency shut downs (ESDs) are activated.
L		b) If release is resolved and monitored levels of H ₂ S in the Plant are less than 10

14**7** - 1

- **1**

.

The star

Saturda .

W. Start

1 m 2

an. A.

.

ł

 ppm, personnel may return to Plant. The Oil Conservation Division (OCD) shall be notified within four hours of any release that activates the Plan. All entities previously notified will be informed that the release has been resolved and advised of the current monitored H₂S levels at the Plant. c) No resolution requires activation of Level III Response with notifications and reporting as per Plan. If the release is not resolved and/or H₂S levels continue to increase, Level III Response is indicated. d) Monitoring will continue after problems are abated, at the direction of the Plant Manager. 5. Initiate and maintain a Chronological Record of Events log.

J

ŀ

ŀ

2 A.

1

Level	Alarms	Actions	
	Intermittent	1. If H ₂ S is at 20 ppm or greater and repair efforts at Level II have	
	audible alarm	unsuccessful, worst case scenario, and/or catastrophic release have occurred, then	
	sounded	a Level III response will be implemented.	
	and/or	2. Road blocks will be set up near the Muster Areas on Kincaid Road and Pipeline	
	flashing red	Road (see Appendix D, Map D-1).	
1	lights	3. All personnel shall have evacuated to a designated Muster Areas. Evacuation of	
	activated for	all entities within the 500 ppm radius of impact (ROE) will have been confirmed.	
	catastrophic	Implement full H ₂ S Plan with all notifications and public agency involvement.	
	release; fire;	Notifications to all entities within the 100 ppm radius of impact (ROE) will include the	
	or explosion	nature of the release and status of containment. Notifications will include but are not	
		limited to the following:	
	ESD alarm is	a) All businesses within the 100 ppm radius of impact (ROE) will be instructed to	
	a continuous	immediately alert all company personnel, third party contractors and/or services	
	siren with red,	companies working in the area, and those imminently scheduled to work in the	
	amber, and	area, of the release and evacuation status of the Plant. They will be instructed to	
	blue lights that	immediately leave and/or not enter/reenter the area within the roadblocks until	
	flash	further instruction.	
		b) All other entities (including private residents) within the 100 ppm radius of	
		impact (ROE) will be instructed to immediately shelter in place, if appropriate	
		based on the source of the release and the wind direction. I nose entitles will be	
		further notice in addition they will be instructed to contact other	
		further notice. In addition, they will be instructed to contact other	
		further instruction	
		c) The Incident Commander (IC) will make the decision based on, but not limited	
		to H.S concentration and wind direction whether a safe evacuation can be	
		implemented and recommend an evacuation route	
		It should be noted that at the time of submission of this plan there are no	
		known occupants businesses or residences within the 100 npm ROF	
		however. Agave personnel will make a visual inspection of the ROE area to	
		insure that no individuals are seen inside the ROE, and if any are observed.	
		they will be advised to immediately evacuate to the designated Muster Area,	
		described above.	
		4. If escaping vapors have ignited, the vapors should be allowed to continue to burn	
		unless the fire endangers personnel, other property, or other equipment.	
		5. When applicable, maintain communication with the Plant Manager, or his	
		designee, to keep him up-to-date of the situation and the action taken prior to his	
		arrival at the location.	
		Initiate and maintain a Chronological Record of Events log.	
1		7. Within one hour after the activation of the H ₂ S Plan, begin agency notifications by	
		calling Oil Conservation Division (OCD) and National Response Center (NRC).	
		8. Establish media staging area adjacent to Muster Area 2 and direct all media to it.	
		9. Once resolved and monitored levels in the Plant and at Muster Area are less than	
		10 ppm, roadblocks will be removed, and all entities within the 100 ppm radius of	
		Impact (ROE) will be allowed to return. All entities previously notified will be informed	
		that the release has been resolved and advised of the current monitored H_2S levels.	
		10. Monitoring will continue after problems are abated, at the direction of the Plant	
		ivianager	
1		11. Agency reports to be submitted as required.	

Į I

2 1

Į.,

Í

. . .

1

C. Telephone Numbers and Communication Methods

1.	Emergency	Services

.

ł.

AGENCY	TELEPHONE #
Artesia Fire Department	(575) 946-5050
Atoka Fire Department	(575) 946-5050
Artesia Police Department	(575) 746-5000
Eddy County Sheriff	(575) 887-7551
Carlsbad Police Department	(575) 885-2111
State Police (HMER)	
District 3 Roswell	(575) 827-9312
Sub District 3 Carlsbad	(575) 885-3138
Sub District 3 Hobbs	(575) 827-9320
Ambulance Services	
Artesia	(575) 746-5050
Carlsbad	(575) 885-2111
Hospitals	
Artesia General	(575) 748-3333
Carlsbad Medical Center	(575) 887-4100
Veterinarians	
Artesia Animal Clinic	(575) 748-2042
Livingston Animal Clinic	(575) 746-6167
Helicopter Services	
Lifeguard (Albuquerque)	1-800-633-5438
Southwest Medivac (Hobbs)	1-800-242-6199
AeroCare (Lubbock)	1-800-627-2376
Air Med (El Paso)	(915) 772-1449

2. Government Agencies

AGENCY	TELEPHONE #
Oil Conservation Division (OCD)	(505) 476-3440
	(575) 748-1283
US BLM	(575) 887-6544
Local Emergency Planning Committee (LEPC)	(575) 887-9511
National Response Center (NRC)	1-800-424-8802

3. Operators and Contractors

COMPANY	TELEPHONE #
CVE	(575) 746-3571
PVT	(575) 748-1241
DCP Midstream	(800) 435-1679
Chevron/West Texas Pipeline Company	(800) 762-3404
Transwestern Pipeline	(281) 714-2265
Yates Petroleum Corporation	(575) 748-1471

4.	Pub	olic

2.4.9

Name	Address	TELEPHONE #
David and Diana Wilson	80 West Kincaid Ranch Road	(575) 457-2309
Raul and Delilah Baeza	193 West Kincaid Ranch Road	(575) 308-3195
Efrin and Maria Baeza	179 West Kincaid Ranch Road	(575) 513-0471
Christine Baeza	175 West Kincaid Ranch Road	(575) 457-2585

5. Agave Internal Call List

NAME	TITLE	Office #	Cell #
J.B. Smith	President	(575) 748-4414	(575) 365-8517
Rusty Nasta	Operations Manager	(575) 748-4523	(575) 626-7971
Ivan Villa	Engineering Supervisor	(575) 748-4528	(575) 365-4888
Jennifer Knowlton	Environmental Engineer	(575) 748-4528	(505) 238-3588
Robert Moorhead	Plant Manager/South Mechanical	(575) 748-6815	(575) 365-4840
	Supervisor		
Gary Greenwood	Plant Supervisor	(575) 748-8414	(575) 365-6794
Mark Smith	PSM Coordinator/Plant Operator	(575) 748-8410	(575) 365-5053
Dustin McNeely	Plant Operator	N/A	(575) 703-5493
Justin Troublefield	Plant Operator	N/A	(575) 365-7503
Glen Blake	Regulatory Coordinator	(575) 748-4546	(575) 626-8168
Bill Johnson	South Measurement Supervisor	(575) 748-6816	(575) 365-4615
Jason Fuentes	South Pipeline Supervisor	(575) 748-4518	(575) 365-8939

6. Agave Energy Company will use 2-way radios and telephones to communicate internally. Telephone will be used for external communication. Land lines and high speed internet access are available at the plant office.

D. Location of Nearby Residences, Roads, and Medical Facilities

- The following residences are located within the ROE of the:
 a) Plant None
 b) Metropolis Disposal #1 Well None
 c) Pipeline None
- 2. The following roads are located within the ROE:a) Kincaid Ranch Roadb) Pipeline Road
- 3. There are no medical facilities located within the ROE.
- 4. It should be noted that at the time of submission of this plan there are no known occupants, businesses or residences within the 100 ppm ROE; however, Agave personnel will make a visual inspection of the ROE area to insure that no individuals are seen inside the ROE, and if any are observed, they will be advised to immediately evacuate to the designated Muster Area, described above.

E. Evacuation Routes, Emergency Assembly Area, Muster Areas, and Road Block Locations

1. Evacuation Routes, Emergency Assembly Area, and Muster Areas are depicted on Maps A-4 and A-6 in Appendix A and Map D-1 in Appendix D.

2. Pre-planned road block locations are designated near the muster areas on Pipeline Road and Kincaid Ranch Road and are depicted on Map D-1 in Appendix D. Each location will have pre-positioned, portable road barriers with lights. The locations will have flashing lights and warning signs. If the release is sufficient to require evacuation to muster areas, then roadblocks near the muster areas on Kincaid Ranch Road and Pipeline Road to the west and north of the facility, respectively, will be established. The Incident Commander (IC) will designate a representative to staff each of the two roadblocks. If deemed necessary by the Incident Commander (IC), the State or Local Police will be asked to assist with maintaining the roadblocks.

3. Emergency lights on the Muster Area signs will be activated by any <u>perimeter alarm</u> of 10 ppm or greater H_2S or Level III activation.

F. Monitoring Equipment, Alarm Systems, Safety Equipment, and Supplies Available

1. EMERGENCY SHUTDOWN SYSTEM (ESD): There are (8) ESD manual stations located at various points in the facility. See Maps A-2 and A-3 in Appendix A. The Plant ESD can be activated at any time by any employee or at the direction of the Incident Commander (IC). If any of the perimeter H_2S sensors at the plant detect a concentration of 10 ppm or higher the Plant ESD is automatically activated.

When any one of the eight (8) manual stations is activated, the system will be shutdown and the natural gas inlets and outlets will be blocked. The operators are also able to auto close the one (1) main block valve on the incoming gas line to the Plant. Activating these should allow the plant to avoid a Level III response. The Incident Commander (IC) can send trained personnel to designated off-site manual block valves. There are also various methods to shut down gas flow at the various wellheads and incoming gathering lines. These can and would be evaluated on a case by case basis.

Designated employees will have remote access to the plant controls including ESD capabilities.

2. PLANT ALARMS, VISIBLE BEACONS & WIND INDICATORS: Colored beacons, horns, and wind direction indicators are located in various locations throughout the Plant and are indicated in Appendix A on Maps A-2, A-3, and A-6.

The audible signal for an emergency response and Plant evacuation is a repeating intermittent alarm that sounds at H_2S concentrations of 10 ppm or greater. The alarm will remain intermittent when the concentration of the H_2S release is 20 ppm or higher. At the initial sound of this intermittent alarm, the plant operators will evacuate to the emergency assembly area put on a self-contained breathing apparatus (SCBA) and all personnel in the plant complex shall immediately proceed in a safe manner to the Emergency Assembly Areas as prescribed by the Emergency Action Plan.

A flashing red beacon signifies an H_2S release of 20 ppm or higher and all personnel in the plant complex shall immediately proceed in a safe manner to the Emergency Assembly Area located outside of the plant office. If this area is not determined to be safe, all will move to designated Muster Area. Evacuation routes and Muster Areas are indicated on the map in Appendix A, on Map A-4 and A-6 as well as Appendix D, on Map D-1.

A routine process alarm will cause a horn to sound. This horn sound is used to alert the plant Operator to return to the Control Room. No emergency response or evacuation is required when this horn sounds.

Wind direction indicators are installed throughout the plant. At least one wind direction indicator can be seen at any location within the Plant complex, as well as from any point on the perimeter of the plant. There are ten (10) windsocks located in the Plant.

3. GAS DETECTION EQUIPMENT: The Plant uses a Smart Sensor SystemTM fixed plant H₂S Sensors. These sensors are a fixed point monitoring system used to detect the presence of hydrogen sulfide in ambient air. The yellow flashing beacon is activated at H₂S concentrations of 10 ppm or greater. The horn is activated with an intermittent alarm at H₂S concentrations of 10 ppm or greater. The lights change to red at 20 ppm H₂S and the horn remains intermittent. The fixed hydrogen sulfide monitors are strategically located throughout the Plant to detect an uncontrolled released of hydrogen sulfide. The Plant operators are able to monitor the H₂S level of all the Plant sensors on the control monitor located in the control room and the Dagger Draw Plant Field Office. In addition, select employees can access this information remotely. These sensors are located on the plot plan in Appendix A, Maps A-2 and A-3. These sensors all have to be acknowledged and will not clear themselves. This requires immediate action for any occurrence or malfunction. The Plant sensors have battery backup systems and are calibrated monthly.

RedlineTM wireless H₂S detectors with battery backup systems are installed along the perimeter of the plant and the perimeter of the acid gas disposal well. Perimeter H₂S detectors report to the Redline monitor every five minutes to confirm detector functionality. Once H₂S gas is detected, the H₂S detectors report to the monitor every five seconds. The detectors will go into alarm at H₂S values of 10 ppm and above. Redline H₂S head unit locations are depicted on Map A-5 and A-6 in Appendix A.

Handheld gas detection monitors are available to plant personnel to check specific areas and equipment prior to initiating maintenance or work on the process equipment. There are 3 handheld monitors and each individual is assigned a personal H₂S monitor. The handheld gas detection devices are Industrial Scientific ITX 3-gas detectors and BW Gas Alert Micro 5 4-way monitors. The detectors have sensors for oxygen, LEL (explosive hydrocarbon atmospheres), hydrogen sulfide, and carbon dioxide. They indicate the presence of H₂S with a beeping sound at 10 ppm. The beeps change in tone as H₂S increases to 20 ppm. The personal monitors are set to alarm (beep) at 10 ppm with the beeps becoming closer together as the H₂S concentration increases to 20 ppm. Both the handheld and personal monitors have digital readouts of H₂S ppm concentration.

a) The compressor building has two methane sensors; one sends a call out at 30% lower explosive limit (LEL); the second shuts the compressors down at 50% lower

explosive limit (LEL). The methane sensors are visual and audible alarms. The compressor building also is equipped with fire eyes that will also shut the units down. The four product pumps also have LEL sensors.

4. RESPIRATORS: The facility has seven (7) 30 minute self-contained breathing apparatus (SCBA) respirators and six (6) 5 minute escape packs strategically located throughout the Plant. There are also five (5) emergency packs with supplied air lines distributed throughout the plant. The respirator locations are identified in Appendix A on Maps A-3 and A-6. All Plant personnel are certified to use the self-contained breathing apparatus (SCBA) respirators and emergency packs.

5. FIRE FIGHTING EQUIPMENT: The Plant personnel are trained only for insipient stage fire fighting. The fire extinguishers located in the Plant process areas, compressor buildings, process buildings, and company vehicles are typically a 20# ABC dry chemical fire extinguisher. See Appendix A, Maps A-3 and A-6 for locations. The Plant does not have a fire water system, only a utility water system that is not designed for fire fighting.

6. EMERGENCY RESPONSE TRAILER AND EQUIPMENT: Agave Energy Company has an Emergency Response Trailer located at the Atoka Facility (Map 1; Map D-2 Appendix D). This is located outside all radii of exposure (ROE) from the facility along the pipeline to the well.

Driving Directions: From Artesia, drive south on Highway 285 to County Road 39. Turn east and drive approximately 2 miles. The facility is on the south side of the road in the NW/NE Sec 14 18S 26 E. See Map D-2 in Appendix D. The trailer can serve as a mobile resource center or Incident Command Center.

a) EMERGENCY RESPONSE TRAILER CONTENTS

- 2 wind socks / wind direction indicators w/poles & spares
- 1 110 volt generator, portable w/wheels
- 4 5-gas sensor ambient monitors (O₂, SO₂, LEL, CO, H₂S) with automatic air pumps (15 sec per foot) and data logging capability
- 1 calibration unit for monitors
- 5 intrinsically safe communication radios & chargers, 32 channel with capability to be programmed to fire service and police channels
- 4 20# stored pressure, ABC class Fire Extinguishers
- 4 4500 Grade D breathing air cylinders, regulator, low pressure alarm, and hose reel w/ 300 ft hose (total) and correct quick disconnects.
- 1 stretcher
- 1 20-person First Aid Kit with burn gel packets
- 4 30-minute SCBA's
- 4 work unit SCBA's
- 2 lights, mounted on each rear of trailer for night operations
- 2 hand cleaner for decontamination of petroleum products.
- 3 traffic Control Kits
- 1 emergency flare gun for lighting uncontrollable hazardous gases
- 2 full body harness and 150' X 2 lifelines
- 2 "Hazardous Area" "Do Not Enter" signs / barricades

- 2 burn gel blankets
- 1 set of maps and Emergency Response Plans
- 4 temporary use Nomex Fire retardant clothing (2-LG & 2-XLG)

7. TRAFFIC CONTROL KIT CONTENTS

- 3 electronic road flares
- 1 28" stop sign paddle
- 4 reflective traffic control vests
- 2 emergency signal wands
- 1 emergency Response Guidebook

8. FIRST AID EQUIPMENT LOCATIONS:

- a) First Aid Kits are located at the following locations:
- Lab
- Office
- b) Eye Wash stations are located at the following locations:
- Lab
- Office

9. PERSONAL H₂S MONITORS: All Agave personnel assigned to the Plant and associated field personnel are issued personal H₂S monitors.

10. SIGNS and MARKERS: The Plant has warning signs indicating the presence of " H_2S /Poisonous Gas" and high pressure gas at the entrance to the Plant. Emergency response phone numbers are posted at the entrance to the Plant. Signs are located at the Plant gate entrance indicating that all visitors are to sign in.

V. Characteristics of Hydrogen Sulfide (H₂S), Sulfur Dioxide (SO₂) and Carbon Dioxide (CO₂) [NMAC 19.15.11.9.B(2)(b)] [API RP-55 7.4 b.]

A. Hydrogen Sulfide (H₂S): Hydrogen Sulfide (H₂S): The proposed inlet gas streams into the Plant will contain a maximum of 7,600 ppm (or 0.76 mole percent) of hydrogen sulfide based on data generated from the sampling of the inlet gas at least daily. Hydrogen sulfide is a colorless, toxic and flammable gas, and has the odor of rotten eggs. Hydrogen sulfide gas is heavier than air. Hydrogen sulfide presents a significant health hazard by paralyzing the respiratory system resulting in serious injury or death.

Hydrogen Sulfide Properties and Characteristics		
CAS No.	7783-06-4	
Molecular Formula	H₂S	
Molecular Weight	34.082 g/mol	
Ceiling Concentration	20 ppm (OSHA)	
Ceiling Peak Concentration	50 ppm (OSHA)	
Threshold Limit Value (TLV)	15 ppm (ACGIH)	
Time Weighted Average (TWA)	10 ppm (NIOSH)	
Short Term Exposure Level (STEL)	15 ppm (ACGIH)	
Immediately Dangerous to Life or Health (IDLH)	100 ppm	
Specific Gravity Relative to Air (Air=1.0)	1.189	
Boiling Point	-76.5F	

Freezing Point			-121.8F
Vapor Pressure			396 psia
Autoignition Temperature			518F
Lower Flammability Limit			4.3%
Upper Flammability Limit			46.0%
Stability			Stable
pH in water			3
Corrosivity			Reacts with metals, plastics, tissues and nerves
	Physic	ical Effects of Hydrogen Sulfide	
Concentration			
ppm	%	Physical Effects	
1	0.00010	Can be smelled (rotten egg odor)	
10	0.0010	Obvious & unpleasant odor; Permissible exposure level; safe	
		for 8 hour exposure	
20	0.0020	Acceptable ceiling concentration	
50	0.0050	Loss of sense of smell in 15 minutes	
100	0.0100	Immediately dangerous to life and health(IDLH) loss of sense	
		of smell in 3-15 minutes; stinging in eyes & throat; Altered	
		breathing	
200	0.0200	Kills smell rapidly; stinging in eyes & throat	
500	0.0500	Dizziness; l	Jnconscious after short exposure; Need artificial

respiration

Unconscious quickly; death will result if not rescued promptly

Instant unconsciousness; followed by death within minutes

0.0700

0.1000

700

1000

utanda in .

10⁻⁰-5 (30⁶)

يم من من

小学

计量字

A Longton -

- - -

the second s

-

Sulfur Dioxide (SO₂): Sulfur dioxide is produced as a by-product of H_2S combustion at the flare. The flare unit receives the residual hydrogen sulfide and carbon dioxide stream that is routed from the amine unit. It is colorless, transparent, and is non-flammable, with a pungent odor associated with burning sulfur. Sulfur dioxide is heavier than air, but will be picked up by a breeze and carried downwind at elevated temperatures. Sulfur dioxide can be extremely irritating to the eyes and mucous membranes of the upper respiratory tract.

Sulfur Dioxide Properties & Characteristics		
CAS No.		7446-09-5
Molecular Formula		SO ₂
Molecular Weight		64.07 g/mol
Permissible Exposure Limit (PEL)		5 ppm(OSHA)
Time Weighted Average (TWA)		2 ppm(ACGIH)
Short Term Exposure Level (STEL)		5 ppm(ACGIH)
Immediately Dangerous to Life and Heal	th (IDLH)	100 ppm
Specific Gravity Relative to Air (Air = 1.0)	2.26
Boiling Point		14°F
Freezing Point		-103.9°F
Vapor Pressure		49.1 psia
Auto ignition Temperature		N/A
Lower Flammability Limit		N/A
Upper Flammability Limit		N/A
Stability		Stable
Corrosivity		Could form an acid rain in aqueous solutions
Physical Effects of Sulfur Dioxide		
Concentration	Effect	
1 ppm	Pungent odor, may cause respiratory changes	
2 ppm	Permissible exposure limit; Safe for an 8 hour exposure	
3-5 ppm	Pungent o	dor; normally a person can detect sulfur
	dioxide in	this range
5 ppm	Short Tern	n Exposure Limit (STEL); Safe for 15 minutes
	of exposure	
12 ppm	Throat irritation, coughing, chest constriction, eyes tear	
	and burn	
100 ppm	Immediately Dangerous To Life & Health (IDLH)	
150 ppm	So irritating that it can only be endured for a few minutes	
500 ppm	Causes a sense of suffocation, even with first breath	
1,000 ppm	Death may result unless rescued promptly.	

84 - 1 - 1 - 4

-40 K.

Sidda Sa

Anna.

神し

, 19. m

ىلى ئەربارلارىيە ئەربارلارىيە

the star

11 M

1. A. A.

1 T T T

12.00

B. Carbon Dioxide (CO₂): The proposed inlet streams into the Plant will contain a maximum of 383,100 ppm (or 38.31 mole percent) of carbon dioxide based on data generated from the sampling of the inlet gas at least daily. Carbon dioxide gas is colorless, odorless and non-flammable and is heavier than air.

Carbon Dioxide Properties & Characteristics		
CAS No.		124-38-9
Molecular Formula		CO ₂
Molecular Weight		44.010 g/mol
Time Weighted Average (TWA)		5,000 ppm
Short Term Exposure Level (ST	EL)	30,000 ppm
Immediately Dangerous to Life	and Health (IDLH)	40,000 ppm
Specific Gravity Relative to Air (Air = 1.0)		1.5197
Boiling Point		-109.12°F
Freezing Point		-69.81°F
Vapor Pressure		830 psia
Autoignition Temperature		N/A
Lower Flammability Limit		N/A
Upper Flammability Limit		N/A
Stability		Stable
pH in Saturated Solution		3.7
Corrosivity		dry gas is relatively inert & not
		corrosive; can be corrosive to
		mild steels in aqueous solutions
Physical Effects of Carbon Dioxide		
Concentration	Effect	
1.0 %	Breathing rate increases slightly	
2.0 %	Breathing rate increases to 50% above normal level.	
	Prolonged exposure can cause headache, tiredness	
3.0 %	Breathing rate increases to twice normal rate and	
	becomes labored. Weak narcotic effect. Impaired	
	hearing, headache, increased blood pressure and pulse	
	rate	
4-5%	Breathing increases to approximately four times normal	
	rate, symptoms of intoxi	cation become evident, and slight
5 10 %	Choracteristic sharp ad	ar noticeable. Many Johard
5 - 10 78	broathing boodcobe visual impoirment and ringing in the	
	ears Indoment may be impaired followed within minutes	
	by loss of consciousness	
10 – 100 %	Linconsciousness occurs more rapidly above 100/ level	
	Prolonged exposure to high concentrations may	
	eventually result in deat	h from asphyxiation

a summer

محمودة كالمتراجع

1

ڭ ئەت. م

م المالية

بالمعادمة. هو

- -

عديد جرود

frank program

ب هسترهمه

an a ch

مىڭىڭ ب

ACOA

N. K.

1. 1. 1. 1. 1. 1.

Che same

1. 4 . a.

C. Radii of Exposure (ROE) [NMAC 19.15.11.7.K]

The basis for worst case scenario calculations is as follows:

- The hydrogen sulfide content of the inlet natural gas stream into the Agave Dagger Draw Gas Plant is variable, ranging upwards to 7,600 parts per million (ppm) or 0.76 mole percent. In reality, the actual H₂S concentration that the plant processes will be much less than this.
- The inlet gas H_2S concentration of 0.76 mole percent was determined using a massbalance approach, an analysis of 60.8 mole percent H_2S in the acid gas stream and a maximum acid gas flow rate of 0.5 MMSCFD. It is assumed that the amine system removes 100% of the H_2S from the inlet gas.
- The plant has a maximum daily (24 hour) processing volume of 40 MMSCF.
- The worst case scenario radius of exposure (ROE) also assumes an uncontrolled instantaneous release from the area around either the Metropolis Disposal #1 Well, the amine still at the facility and/or at any point along the pipeline connecting the two of the above referenced volume and concentration. Because the Plant is a throughput process plant, it is impossible that the entire 24 hour-throughput volume of the Plant could be released instantaneously as is assumed in the worst case scenario calculations of the ROE. However, to comply with NMAC 19.15.11, that assumption is the worst case scenario in the formulas/calculations provided here.

It should further be noted that the reason this rate, used as worst case, could not be released over a 24 hour period is the Plant's emergency shutdown (ESD) systems would be activated. The emergency shutdown (ESD) would prevent the flow of gas into the Plant in the event of an emergency. See Appendix C and Map C-1 for more information.

The formulas for calculating the two radius of exposure (ROE) are as follows:

100 ppm Radius of Exposure Calculation (as per 19 NMAC 15.11.7.K.1):

X=[(1.589)(hydrogen sulfide concentration)(Q)]

500 ppm Radius of Exposure Calculation (as per 19 NMAC 15.11.7.K.2):

X=[(0.4546)(hydrogen sulfide concentration)(Q)]

Where:

X = radius of exposure in feet

"hydrogen sulfide concentration" = the decimal equivalent of the mole or volume fraction of hydrogen sulfide in the gaseous mixture

Q = Escape rate expressed in cubic feet per day (corrected for standard conditions of 14.73 psi absolute and 60 degrees Fahrenheit)

Amine	Unit (F	Facility)	
			4040

500-ppm ROE	1648 feet
100-ppm ROE	3606 feet

Pipeline

500-ppm ROE	1648 feet
100-ppm ROE	3606 feet

Acid Gas Disposal Well

500-ppm ROE	1648 feet
100-ppm ROE	3606 feet

The ROE for the facility, pipeline and well are shown on Map C-1 of Appendix C. This ROE pattern is designed to include the 100 and 500 ppm radii for a potential worst case failure at any point in the system from the facility at the north to the well to the south.

VI. Facility Description, Maps, and Drawings [NMAC 19.15.11.9.B(2)(c)] [API RP-55 7.4 c.]

A. Dagger Draw Processing Plant Description of Operations- The primary function of the plant is to remove H_2S and CO_2 from sour field gas so that the gas can meet pipeline specifications. The plant has been designated a primary Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) Code of 1311. The operation of the Agave Dagger Draw Gas Plant is intended to process 40 MMSCFD of gas. The facility is authorized to operate continuously (8,760 hr/yr) at design maximum capacity processing rates. The gas will be treated to remove acid gas components, dehydrated to remove water and processed to remove heavy (liquid) hydrocarbons from the gas stream. Several plant systems will be involved to perform these functions.

The amine unit is designed to remove acid gas components (carbon dioxide, hydrogen sulfide and mercaptans) from the natural gas stream. These components are removed from the natural gas because they are corrosive, hazardous to health, and reduce the heating value of the natural gas stream. In addition, the carbon dioxide can freeze in the cryogenic unit forming dry ice and forcing the shutdown of the facility. This is known as the gas sweetening process. The acid gas removed by the amine unit will be disposed of by either acid gas injection into a disposal well or by incinerating in a flare. The preferred method of disposal will be to compress the gas and inject it into the well. Under emergency situations, the gas will be flared to prevent the emission of lethal hydrogen sulfide to atmosphere.

The glycol dehydration unit will receive approximately 40.0 MMSCFD of treated gas (sweet) from the amine unit and reduce the water content of the gas by circulating triethylene glycol (TEG). Molecular sieve dehydration is used upstream of the cryogenic processes to achieve a -150°F dew point. The process uses two molecular sieve vessels with one vessel in service absorbing moisture from the gas stream and the other vessel in the regeneration mode.

The cryogenic unit is designed to liquefy natural gas components from the sweet, dehydrated inlet gas by removing work (heat) from the gas by means of the turbo expander. The cryogenic unit recovers natural gas liquids (NGL) by cooling the gas stream

to extremely cold temperatures (-150°F) and condensing components such as ethane, propane, butanes and heavier hydrocarbons. Once the sweet, dry gas exits the cryogenic unit, it needs to be recompressed to approximately 800 to 1200 psi before the gas is sent to the main transportation pipeline. This is accomplished with two 2500 horsepower electric drive compressors.

The hot oil system in the plant is used to provide heat to certain processes within the facility. The system will circulate approximately 600 GPM of hot oil and deliver 15.5 MMBTU/hr to other processes.

B. Metropolis Disposal #1 Well Description of Operations- The low pressure (< 10 psig), acid gas stream from the amine unit is routed to the acid gas compressor. The stream is then subject to a series of compression and cooling cycles, thus dehydrating and compressing the acid gas stream to the required injection pressure of approximately 1100-1600 psig which is well under the maximum allowable working pressure for the pipeline of 2350 psig. The high pressure acid gas stream then flows through a 2" stainless steel pipeline to the injection well site. At this point, the stream is introduced into the well.

There are a number of safeguards designed to prevent leaks or overpressure of the system. The acid gas compressor is equipped with multiple pressure transmitters. These transmitters monitor compressor suction and discharge pressures and are programmed to shut the acid gas system down when the pressures fall outside a pre-programmed operating range. As an additional safeguard, the compressor panel is also equipped with high and low pressure shutdowns for each stage of compression that will shut the compressor down when pressures reach preset high and low pressure set points.

As shown on Map 2, the acid gas pipeline runs from the Agave Dagger Draw Plant in a southwesterly direction, crosses Kincaid Ranch Road at the plant boundary and continues southwesterly along a gravel road for approximately 3680 feet. The pipeline then turns east along the Metropolis Disposal #1 Well access road for an additional 900 feet to the wellhead. South of Kincaid Ranch Road, the pipeline and well are entirely contained within Section 36, Township 18 South, Range 25 East. This land is owned by the State of New Mexico. Agave Energy has the following three Rights-of-Way from the State of New Mexico in this section for the pipeline: R18068, R17745 and R17949. The Metropolis Disposal #1 Well Site is covered under Yates Petroleum Company Oil Leases VO-6141-0000 and E1-0165-0001. The pipeline is buried at a depth of 6-1/2 feet for its entire length and is marked, as required, with permanent surface markers. (See Map 2 and Figure 1)

The acid gas pipeline is constructed from 2" inch 304 stainless steel tubing consistent with NACE standards for sour gas service. The pipeline has been designed with a maximum allowable working pressure of 2350 psig. In order to assure the safety of the pipeline system, the acid gas pipeline is contained within a 6" SDR 11 polyethylene pipeline (rated at 100 psig) which is swept from the wellhead location to the main plant with pure "sweet" gas for leak detection purposes., This "sweet" gas stream flows through the annulus between the 6" and 2" pipelines at a preset pressure of 5 psig and flow rate sufficient to continuously be monitored by a DelmarTM H₂S gas analyzer. This sweet gas stream is monitored continuously for H₂S and over/ under pressure. If any one variable falls outside the narrow predetermined operating range, the automatic safety valves are activated, the acid gas compressor is shut down and the acid gas stream is routed to the flare.

The injection string within the well is also constructed with multiple safety features which include L80 FX FJ 2 7/8" corrosion resistant tubing stabbed into a Halliburton 13-20# permanent packer, made of Incoloy® 925 with fluorel elements set at 9,857 ft and an automated Halliburton subsurface safety valve also made of Incoloy[®] 925, set at 250 ft. Incoloy[®] 925 is a nickel-iron chromium alloy that is resistant to corrosion and pitting. This valve is designed to isolate and automatically shut in the injection well if a leak occurs along the acid gas pipeline or at the surface of the well. The annular space between the tubing and the production casing above the packer is filled with diesel which is designed to allow the pressure in the annular space to be monitored and recorded continuously. If a pressure excursion outside of the narrow predetermined operating range occurs, the acid gas compressor is shut down and the automatic safety valves at the pipeline inlet (located at the plant) and at the wellhead are automatically closed preventing any escape of acid gas. The acid gas stream would then be routed to the flare until the problem with the well is corrected and the system can be safely re-started. These redundant systems are compliant with API RP 55 and API RP 49, various applicable NACE standards for sour service and current best management practices.

C. Map of Plant and Metropolis Disposal #1 Well

See Appendix A, Map A-1

VII. Training and Drills

[NMAC 19.15.11.9.B(2)(d)] [API RP-55 7.4 d]

A. Responsibilities and Duties of Essential Personnel

1. Personnel responsible for implementing this plan shall be trained on their duties and responsibilities related to this plan during the annual on-site or table top training exercises.

2. Plant Orientation Training - All Plant personnel, visitors, and contractors must attend a Plant overview orientation prior to obtaining permission to enter the Plant. A refresher course on this training is required annually for all persons. This training also complies with the requirements of the Agave Energy Company Process Safety Management Program and Procedures Manual.

B. On-site or Classroom Drills

Agave Energy Company may use table top exercises as well as hands on emergency response training methods. Agave Energy Company shall conduct a table top exercise annually at a minimum.

C. Notification and Training of Others on Protective Measures in Emergency Situations

While at the time of submission of this plan there are no residences or businesses within the 100 ppm ROE, nearby residents who live outside of the ROE will be invited to participate in and/or observe annual drills, where they will be briefed on notification, evacuation, and shelter in place options such as closing windows and shutting off any air conditioning/heating until they are notified that it is safe.

D. Training and Attendance Documentation

All training and drills will be documented. Documentation shall include sign in sheets, synopsis of the training conducted, and an after action review of the training.

E. Briefing of Public Officials on Evacuation and Shelter in Place Plans

Local law enforcement, first responders, and fire personnel will also be invited to participate and/or observe annual drills, as well as being briefed on notification, evacuation, and shelter in place plans.

VIII. Coordination with State Emergency Plans [NMAC 19.15.11.9.B(2)(e)]

A. Oil Conservation Division (OCD)

1. Oil Conservation Division (OCD) will be notified with an automatic email to the District II office advising of the activation of the H_2S Contingency Plan if any of the alarms are activated at 10 ppm H_2S or greater. In the event of a power failure, a phone call will be made within four hours. All subsequent paperwork will be filed in a timely fashion.

B. New Mexico State Police/ New Mexico Hazardous Materials Emergency Response Plan

1. The New Mexico State Police are responsible for overall scene management and coordination of all resources. A designated Emergency Response Officer (ERO) will establish the National Interagency Incident Management System (NIIMS) Incident Command System (ICS) as the Incident Commander (IC) and be responsible for management of all response resources on scene. Off-scene coordination of response resources will be handled through designated Headquarters Emergency Response Officers. Law enforcement-related activities will be coordinated by State Police.

IX. Plan Activation

[NMAC 19.15.11.9.C] [API RP-55 7.4 d]

A. Activation Levels

Level I– Intermittent alarm sounded and/or flashing amber beacons activated for H_2S greater than or equal to 10 ppm

Level II – Intermittent alarm sounded and/or flashing red beacons activated for H_2S greater than or equal to 20 ppm

Level III—Catastrophic release; fire; explosion; a continuous release of maximum volume for 24 hours; or NMAC 19.15.11: mandatory activation of indication of 100 ppm in any defined public area; 500 ppm at any public road; or 100 ppm at a distance greater than 3000 feet from the site or the release. Because the 100 ppm radius of impact (ROE) boundary is greater than 3000 feet from the site of release, a Level III response would occur before the escape of the 24 hour release volume.

B. Events that Could Lead to a Release of H₂S

- Inlet and plant piping failure
- Amine still failure
- Flange/gasket leaks on inlet and plant piping
- Flange/gasket leaks on the acid gas compressor
- Flange/gasket leaks at metropolis disposal well
- Failure of acid gas pipeline
- Valve packing
- Seal failure on acid gas compressor
- Failure of flare to ignite during Plant emergency blow down

X. Submission of H₂S Contingency Plans [NMAC 19.15.11.9.D]

A. Submission

1. Agave Energy Company will submit the H_2S Contingency Plan to the Oil Conservation Division (OCD).

B. Retention

1. Agave Energy Company shall maintain a copy of the contingency plan in the Main Office at 105 South 4th Street in Artesia, NM. The plan shall be readily accessible for review by the Oil Conservation Division (OCD) upon request.

C. Inventory

1. Agave Energy Company will file an annual inventory of wells, facilities and operations for which plans are on file with the Oil Conservation Division (OCD), to the Local Emergency Planning Committee (LEPC) and the State Emergency Response Commission as per NMAC 19.15.11.

2. The inventory shall include the name, address, telephone number, and point of contact for all operations in which plans are on file.

MAPS AND FIGURES

MAP 1: Agave Dagger Draw Plant Facilities Locations

- MAP 2: General Diagram of Agave Dagger Draw Gas Plant and Location of Pipeline Connecting Plant with Metropolis Disposal #1 Well
- FIGURE 1: Photos of Pipeline

......

1

I





Map 2: General Diagram of Agave Dagger Draw Gas Plant and Location of Pipeline Connecting the Plant with the Metropolis Disposal #1 Well. Please note that the former Agave Energy Facility located immediately south of the Dagger Draw Gas Processing Plant is an inactive, unmanned facility.



Figure 1: Photos of Pipeline Connecting Agave Energy's Dagger Draw Gas Plant With Metropolis Disposal #1 well. A) Acid Gas Compressed at the Gas Plant is Introduced to a 2" Stainless Steel Pipeline Surrounded by a 6" Polyethylene Pipe. Pipeline Integrity is Monitored Using a Stream of Sweet Natural Gas in the Volume Between the Two Pipes. B) Outside of the Fenced in Areas at the Plant and Wellhead, the Pipeline is Buried and Clearly Marked. C) The Pipeline Rises Above Ground and Connects to the Production Tree at the Metropolis Disposal #1 Wellhead

APPENDIX A – Facility Maps

Map A-1: Facility Map

and the second

an fabrillen an in de

101 + 110

State and and

ana kana

101 BO. 10

-utersonales

PACE AN

a by and to a

a and a

an .- 01 a

T STRAND

a a maiph

San di tan

an interesting

1.00 (100 - 100) 1.00 - 100 - 100 - 100 - 100 - 100 - 100 - 100 - 100 - 100 - 100 - 100 - 100 - 100 - 100 - 100 - 100 - 100 - 100

- Map A-2: Alarms and Monitors, Dagger Draw Active Equipment
- Map A-3: Safety and Fire Equipment, Dagger Draw Active Equipment
- Map A-4: Evacuation Router, Dagger Draw Active Equipment
- Map A-5: Proposed Perimeter Alarms
- Map A-6: Metropolis Disposal Well


 -















Appendix B – Response Flow Diagrams

1

Agave H₂S Contingency Plan



LEVEL I RESPONSE

LEVEL II RESPONSE





Appendix C - Radius of Exposure Calculations

Map C-1 Radius of Exposure

r.

4

.

1

1

4 - 1 - 2 - 4

, 140 V

Agave H2S Contingency Plan

APPENDIX C-RADIUS OF EXPOSURE CALCULATIONS

The basis for worst case scenario calculations is as follows:

- The hydrogen sulfide content of the inlet natural gas stream into the Agave Dagger Draw Gas Plant is variable, ranging upwards to 7,600 parts per million (ppm) or 0.76 mole percent. In reality, the actual H₂S concentration that the plant processes will be much less than this.
- The inlet gas H₂S concentration of 0.76 mole percent was determined using a massbalance approach, an analysis of 60.8 mole percent H₂S in the acid gas stream and a maximum acid gas flow rate of 0.5 MMSCFD. It is assumed that the amine system removes 100% of the H₂S from the inlet gas.

The plant has a maximum daily (24 hour) processing volume of 40 MMSCF.

• The worst case scenario radius of exposure (ROE) also assumes an uncontrolled instantaneous release from the area around either the Metropolis #1 Well, the amine still at the facility and at any point along the pipeline connecting the two of the above referenced volume and concentration. Because the Plant is a throughput process plant, it is impossible that the entire 24 hour-throughput volume of the Plant could be released instantaneously as is assumed in the worst case scenario calculations of the ROE. However, to comply with NMAC 19.15.11, that assumption is the worst case scenario in the formulas/calculations provided here.

It should further be noted that the reason this rate, used as worst case, could not be released over a 24 hour period is the Plant's emergency shutdown (ESD) systems would be activated. The emergency shutdown (ESD) would prevent the flow of gas into the Plant in the event of an emergency. See Appendix C and Map C-1 for more information.

The formulas for calculating the two radius of exposure (ROE) are as follows:

100 ppm Radius of Exposure Calculation (as per 19 NMAC 15.11.7.K.1):

X=[(1.589)(hydrogen sulfide concentration)(Q)]

500 ppm Radius of Exposure Calculation (as per 19 NMAC 15.11.7.K.2):

X=[(0.4546)(hydrogen sulfide concentration)(Q)]

Where:

X = radius of exposure in feet

"hydrogen sulfide concentration" = the decimal equivalent of the mole or volume fraction of hydrogen sulfide in the gaseous mixture

Q = Escape rate expressed in cubic feet per day (corrected for standard conditions of 14.73 psi absolute and 60 degrees Fahrenheit)

ROE Inside the Plant

The escape rate (Q) is the maximum daily rate of the gaseous mixture produced or handled or the best estimate thereof. For releases inside the Agave Dagger Draw Gas Plant, the Company is using for contingency planning purposes an "escape rate" equal to the maximum inlet gas volume of 40,000 MCFD. The (actual) inlet gas volume at the Plant will be somewhat variable and is continuously metered. The Plant records daily inlet gas volumes and prepares a daily volume report. The assumed 40,000 MCFD inlet gas volume has been selected as the "escape rate" because it is the highest anticipated inlet volume that the Plant would handle under its proposed operations and is considered worst case interpretation of the volume of gas.

It should be noted that the plan will remain effective as long as the processed volume and H_2S content equate to the same or smaller ROE.

Previous monitoring data indicated variable inlet concentrations of hydrogen sulfide, but concentration will not exceed 7,600 ppm or .76 mole percent. Therefore, 7,600 ppm or .76 mole percent has been used in the worst case scenario operations for contingency planning purposes.

Using: Q = 40,000,000 H₂S conc = 7,600 ppm or .76 mole%

500-ppm RADIUS OF EXPOSURE CALCULATION

 $X = [(0.4546)^{*}(H_{2}S \text{ concentration})^{*}(\text{gas volume } (Q))]^{0.6258}$ $X = [(0.4546)^{*}(7,600^{*}.000001)^{*}(40,000,000)]^{0.6258}$

X = 1648 feet = 500-ppm ROE

100-ppm RADIUS OF EXPOSURE CALCULATION

 $X = [(1.589)^{*}(H_2S \text{ concentration})^{*}(\text{gas volume})]$ X = [(1.589)^{*}(7,600^{*}.000001)^{*}(40,000,000)]

X = 3606 feet = 100-ppm ROE

ROE Along the Pipeline and At the Injection Well

The escape rate (Q) is the best estimate of the maximum daily flow rate of the acid gas. For releases inside the Agave Dagger Draw Gas Plant, the Company is using for contingency planning purposes an "escape rate" equal to the 500 MCFD. The assumed 500 MCFD acid gas volume has been selected as the "escape rate" because it is the highest anticipated gas volume that the Plant would handle under its proposed operations and is considered the worst case interpretation of the volume of gas.

It should be noted that the plan will remain effective as long as the processed volume and H_2S content equate to the same or smaller ROE.

Previous monitoring data indicated variable inlet concentrations of hydrogen sulfide, but concentration will not exceed 608,000 ppm or 60.8 mole% at the inlet. Therefore, 608,000 ppm or 60.8 mole percent has been used in the worst case scenario operations for contingency planning purposes. Again, Agave does not measure the H_2S concentration in the acid gas stream; rather the concentration is calculated based on the inlet conditions.

Using: Q = 500,000

 H_2S conc = 608,000 ppm or 60.8 mole%

500-ppm RADIUS OF EXPOSURE CALCULATION

 $X = [(0.4546)^{*}(H_2S \text{ concentration})^{*}(gas \text{ volume } (Q))]$ X = [(0.4546)^{*}(608,000^{*}.000001)^{*}(500,000)]

X = 1648 feet = 500-ppm ROE

100-ppm RADIUS OF EXPOSURE CALCULATION

 $X = [(1.589)*(H_2S \text{ concentration})*(gas \text{ volume})]^{1/2}$

X = [(1.589)*(608,000*.000001)*(500,000)]

X = 3606 feet = 100-ppm ROE



APPENDIX D – Muster Areas, Evacuation Routes

Map D-1: Evacuation Routes to Muster Areas

1. 10

1. A. 4

..6.1

14.42

1.00

.....

7

وتنعششت

a con

Map D-2: Atoka Facility– Safety Trailer Location





Map 2: General Diagram of Agave Dagger Draw Gas Plant and Location of Pipeline Connecting the Plant with the Metropolis Disposal #1 Well. Please note that the former Agave Energy Facility located immediately south of the Dagger Draw Gas Processing Plant is an inactive, unmanned facility. **APPENDIX E – H₂S Contingency Plan Distribution List**

Agave H₂S Contingency Plan

.

.

.

APPENDIX E – H₂S Contingency Plan Distribution List

New Mexico Oil Conservation Division 1301 West Grand Avenue Artesia, NM 88210-1729

New Mexico Department of Public Safety

4207 W 2nd Street Roswell, NM 88201-8857

Local Emergency Planning Committee

324 S Canyon Street, Suite B Carlsbad, NM 88210

Artesia Fire Department

309 North 7th Street Artesia, NM 88210-1913

Atoka Fire Department

2611 South 13th Street Artesia, NM 88210-9333

Eddy County Sheriff's Department

Eddy County Courthouse 102 N. Canal Carlsbad, NM 88220

Dagger Draw Plant

278 Pipeline Road Artesia, NM 88210

Agave Main Office

105 South 4th Street Artesia, NM 88210



HINKLE, HENSLEY, SHANOR & MARTIN, L.L.P. Attorneys at law

218 MONTEZUMA SANTA FE, NEW MEXICO 87501 505-982-4554 (FAX) 505-982-8623

WRITER:

Gary W. Larson, Partner glarson@hinklelawfirm.com

January 25, 2011

VIA HAND DELIVERY

Glenn von Gonten Oil Conservation Division 1220 S. St. Francis Drive Santa Fe, NM 87505

Re: Agave Energy Company/Case No. 14601

Dear Glenn:

Enclosed is Agave Energy Company's H2S Contingency Plan for the Dagger Draw Processing Plant and Metropolis Disposal #1 Well, which is dated December 20, 2010.

Thank you for your attention to this matter.

Sincerely, aron Gary W. Larson

GWL:js Encl.

H₂S Contingency Plan

Agave Dagger Draw Processing Plant and the Metropolis Disposal #1 Well



Agave Energy Company

. جۇرىشى 1

105 South 4th Street Artesia, NM 88210 (575-748-4555)

December 20, 2010

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Pag I. Introduction [API RP-55 7.1]	ge 1
II. Scope [API RP-55 7.2]	1
III. Plan Availability [API RP-55 7.3]	1
 IV. Emergency Procedures	1
 V. Characteristics of Hydrogen Sulfide (H₂S), Sulfur Dioxide (SO₂), and Carbon Dioxide (CO₂) [NMAC 19.15.11.9.B(2)(b)][API RP-55 7.4 b.]. A. Characteristics of Hydrogen Sulfide (H₂S) B. Sulfur Dioxide (SO₂) C. Carbon Dioxide (CO₂) D. Radii of Exposure (ROE) 	10
 VI. Facility Description, Maps, and Drawings <pre>[AC [19.15.11.9.B(2)(c)][API RP-55 7.4 c.]</pre>	14
 VII. Training and Drills [NMAC 19.15.11.9.B(2)(d)][API RP-55 7.4 d.] A. Responsibilities and Duties of Essential Personnel B. On-site or Classroom Drills C. Notification and Training of Residents on Protective Measures in Emergency Situations D. Training and Attendance Documentation E. Briefing of Public Officials on Evacuation and Shelter in Place Plans 	16
 VIII. Coordination with State Emergency Plans [NMAC 19.15.11.9.B(2)(e)] A. Oil Conservation Division B. New Mexico State Police 	16
 IX. Plan Activation [NMAC 19.15.11.9.C][API RP-55 7.4 d.] A. Activation Levels B. Events that Could Lead to a Release 	17

•

. î.

6 - 1 - N

5 ‡

ŧ.

X. Submission of H₂S Contingency Plans

- A. Submission
- B. Retention
- C. Inventory

MAPS AND FIGURES

- Map 1 Agave Dagger Draw Plant Facilities Locations
- Map 2 General Diagram of Agave Dagger Draw Gas Plant and Location of Pipeline Connecting Plant with Metropolis Disposal #1 Well

Figure 1 Photos of Pipeline

APPENDICES

Appendix A – Facility Maps and Drawings

- Map A-1: Facility Map
- Map A-2: Alarms and Monitors, Dagger Draw Active Equipment
- Map A-3: Safety and Fire Equipment, Dagger Draw Active Equipment
- Map A-4: Evacuation Router, Dagger Draw Active Equipment
- Map A-5: Proposed Perimeter Alarms
- Map A-6: Metropolis Disposal #1 Well

Appendix B – Response Flow Diagram

Appendix C – ROE Calculations

Map C-1: Facility, Pipeline and Well Site ROE

Appendix D – Muster Areas and Evacuation Routes Map D-1: Evacuation Routes to Muster Areas

Appendix E – Distribution List

Agave H₂S Contingency Plan

OPERATOR QUICK REFERENCE GUIDE

Dagger Draw Processing Plant Level 1 Response FOR PLANT OR WELLHEAD ALARMS

H₂S Detected Greater than 10 ppm H₂S Intermittent Audible Alarm and flashing amber lights

- Evacuate to Emergency Assembly Area
- Evacuate visitors from plant to designated Muster Area
- Notify Agave Management
- Assign operators to suit up in SCBA
- Check Computer for location of H₂S alarm
- Notify all entities in the 500 ppm ROE when perimeter monitors reach 10 ppm H₂S
- Wearing SCBA attempt to locate and repair leak
- Rotate Operators in 15 minute shifts
 If H₂S levels exceed 10 ppm H₂S in
- emergency muster area relocate to alternate muster area

If H₂S levels exceed 20 ppm H₂S proceed to Level II response



Once resolved and monitored levels in plant are less than 10 ppm H₂S return to plant and continue to monitor

Location of Facilities

Agave Dagger Draw Processing Plant (See Map 1)

Go south of Artesia, NM on Hwy 285 approximately 9 miles to County Road 38 (Kincaid Ranch Road). Turn right (west) on Kincaid Ranch Road and go approximately 2.8 miles to Pipeline Road. Turn right (north) and go 0.2 miles to the Dagger Draw Gas Plant Office. Physical address is 278 Pipeline Road, Artesia, NM 88210.

Section 25-Township 18S-Range 25E

Metropolis Disposal #1 Well (See Map 1)

Go south of Artesia, NM on Hwy 285 approximately 9 miles to County Road 38 (Kincaid Ranch Road). Turn right (west) on Kincaid Ranch Road and go 2.6 miles (just past the Agave Field Office). Turn left (south) on dirt lease road and go approximately 0.6 miles then turn left (east) and go 0.2 miles to the Metropolis Disposal #1 Well. Section 36-Township 18S-Range 25E

Emergency Trailer – Atoka Facility Location (See Map 1)

From Artesia, drive south on Highway 285 to County Road 39. Turn east and drive approximately 2 miles. The facility is on the south side of the road in NW/NE Sec 14 18S 26 E.

I. Introduction

[API RP-55 7.1]

The Agave Dagger Draw Processing Plant is a natural gas processing plant which handles and/or generates hydrogen sulfide (H_2S) and/or sulfur dioxide (SO_2). This H_2S contingency plan was created to outline procedures that are to be followed in the event of an H_2S release that occurs at the plant, the acid gas well, or on the acid gas pipeline. The response plan is the same regardless of where the release takes place. This plan complies with the New Mexico Oil Conservation Division (OCD) Rule 11. This plan also conforms to API RP-55.

II. Scope

[API RP-55 7.2]

This contingency plan is specific to the Agave Dagger Draw Gas Processing Plant and acid gas injection system. This plan contains procedures to provide an organized response to an unplanned release from the plant, well site and pipeline connecting them.

III. Plan Availability

[API RP-55 7.3]

This contingency plan shall be available to all personnel responsible for implementing any portion of the plan. Copies of the plan will be distributed to the following agencies: New Mexico Oil Conservation Division (OCD), New Mexico Department of Public Safety, Local Emergency Planning Committee (LEPC), Artesia Fire Department, Atoka Fire Department, Artesia Police Department, and Eddy County Sheriff's Department. The Plan will be available at the following Agave Energy Company locations: Dagger Draw Processing Plant, the Artesia Field Office, Emergency Response Trailer at Atoka (Map 1) and the Agave Main Office in Artesia.

IV. Emergency Procedures

[NMAC 19.15.11.9.B(2)(a)] [API RP-55 7.4 a]

A. Responsibilities and Duties of Personnel during an Emergency

1. Plant Manager or designee will serve as the Incident Commander (IC); is responsible for training operators assigned to the plant, contractors and visitors on the implementation of this plan; and will maintain communication with Agave management and residents within the radius of exposure (ROE).

2. Plant Supervisor or designee will serve as the Incident Commander (IC) in the absence of the Plant Manager; is responsible for training and supervising plant operators on the implementation of this plan, will maintain accountability of all contractors and visitors; and will maintain communication with the plant manager and Agave management.

3. Plant Operators will perform operations in accordance with this safety plan; assist in the accountability and evacuation of visitors and contractors to designated muster areas; and keep the plant supervisor and manager informed on the repair progress.

4. Essential Agave Personnel will be familiar with the procedures in this plan and assist plant operators in assisting with the implementation of this plan in a safe manner.

5. Visitors and contractors on site will be familiar with safety alarms and signals at the Dagger Draw Gas Processing Plant and the acid gas injection system; and adhere to instructions of Plant Operators and other Agave personnel in evacuation of the facilities.

Agave H₂S Contingency Plan

in gro

December 20, 2010

B. Immediate Action Plan

- 14- C

200 A. 93.

2.2.4.

5-2 Sc.

St. A. IS

Ma B M

2643

20.00

2.00

a deres

.

a galant

49.45.32

1.21

وهستموه

1. The following outlines the immediate action Plan that is illustrated by the response flow diagram in Appendix B. This is to be used when responding to an H_2S release. Response levels are the same for a release at the plant or the acid gas well. Additional or long term response actions will be determined on a case-by-case basis, if needed, once the Incident Command Center (ICC) and System (ICS) are established following the immediate response.

Level	Alarms	Actions
I	Intermittent	1. The audible signal for a Plant emergency and evacuation is an intermittent alarm
	audible alarm	and yellow lights (repeating off/on) activated when levels of H ₂ S of 10 ppm or
	sounded	greater are detected. In addition, a flashing yellow light or beacon will be activated
	and/or	at 10 ppm or greater of H ₂ S. A computer in the control room and in the Plant
ļ	flashing	Supervisor office establishes which H ₂ S monitor has activated the alarm and/or
	yellow lights	flashing yellow beacon, be it a plant monitor or well monitor. At the initial sound of
	activated for	the intermittent alarm or the flashing yellow beacon, assigned operators will put on
	H₂S at 10	a 30 minute self-contained breathing apparatus (SCBA) and all other personnel in
ł .	ppm or	the Plant complex or well site shall immediately evacuate the Plant or well site to
	greater.	the Emergency Assembly Area. If H ₂ S concentrations are 10 ppm or greater, then
		personnel will evacuate to a designated Muster Area determined by the Incident
{		Commander (IC) (see Appendix D). The operators, upon suit up with the self-
		contained breathing apparatus (SCBA), will first help any persons in distress
1		evacuate to the Emergency Assembly Area. If deemed necessary by the Plant
1		Manager or Plant Supervisor, local emergency response service providers will be
1		contacted by Plant personnel designated by the Plant Manager or Supervisor.
		2. All entities within the 500 ppm radius of impact (ROE) will be notified (by
		telephone) of a release if the perimeter alarms are activated at 10 ppm H ₂ S or
		greater. Notification will be done by personnel designated by the Plant Manager or
		his designee. The nature of the release and status of containment will be
		conveyed. Businesses will be advised to report the incident to employees working
		near the Plant and to alert any third party contractors or service companies
		working in the Plant vicinity or imminently scheduled to work in the vicinity of the
		release. All should be instructed to leave the area and not to enter/re-enter area
		until further notice. Operators will put on self-contained breathing apparatus
l l		(SCBA).
		3. Wearing the self-contained breathing apparatus (SCBA), the operator(s) will
}		attempt to fix the cause of the release. The H ₂ S levels at the Emergency Assembly
		Area will be monitored with a hand held or personal monitor and with the fixed
		monitor.
		4. The incident Commander (IC) will set up secondary re-entry team(s) with 30 minute and a set of the set of
		minute self-contained breathing apparatus (SCBA) to re-enter and resolve the
Ì		Situation. Re-entry will occur in 15 minute shifts at the direction of the incident
		is activated. If H S levels in the Emergency Assembly Areas evened 10 nom H S
{		is activated. If H_2 levels in the Emergency Assembly Areas exceed to ppm H_2 S, averaging to the alternate Emergency Assembly Areas and continue to manifer
		Evacuate to alternate Emergency Assembly Area and continue to monitor
1		Emergency Assembly Area with personal or handheid Π_2 3 monitors. If evacuation to Muster Area occurs, road blocks will be established poor the Muster Areas on
		Kingsid and Pingling Read. If release is received and manifered levels in the Plant
1		are less than 10 nnm H.S. norsennel may re-enter the Diant. The Oil Concernation
	· ·	are less than to ppm π_2 s, personner may re-enter the Plant. The Oli Conservation Division (OCD) shall be polified within four hours of any release that estimates the
1		Division (OCD) shall be notified within four nours of any release that activates the
		Fight in the release is not resolved and \square_2 5 levels continue to increase, Level 2 Response is indicated

2

ſ	Levels	Alarms	Actions	
	II	Intermittent	1. The intermittent alarm and red flashing lights indicate the detection of H ₂ S greater	
		audible alarm	than or equal to 20 ppm. (Flashing yellow lights indicate a H2S release of 10 ppm or	
		sounded	greater and they will change to red for a release of 20 ppm or greater.) A control	
		and/or	panel in the Plant supervisor's office establishes which H ₂ S monitor has activated the	
		flashing red	alarm and or flashing red beacon, be it a plant monitor or a well monitor. At the initial	
		lights	sound of the intermittent alarm or observance of the flashing red beacons, the	
		activated for	operators will exit to the Muster Area designated by the Plant Manager or his designed. Other personnel in the Plant semplex will put on emergency escence packs.	
		than 20 nnm	located throughout the plant, or well location and evacuate along with the operators	
		than 20 ppm	using the evacuation routes to the Emergency Assembly Area and then to the Muster	
ł			Area (see Appendix D) designated by the Plant Manager or designee. At the	
			assembly area, the Plant Manager or designee will assign operators to put on a 30	
l			minute self-contained breathing apparatus (SCBA). Local emergency response	
			service providers will be contacted by Plant Manager or designee.	
			2. All other entities within the 100 ppm and 500 ppm radius of impact (ROE) will be	
			contacted by phone and notified of release and asked to evacuate when a perimeter	
			monitor reads 10 ppm H2S or greater . All entities within the 100 ppm radius of	
			impact (ROE) will be contacted by phone and notified of release. The nature of the	
			release and status of containment will be conveyed. Depending on release status	
			(POE) may be asked to sholter in place or evenuete. Notifications will include but	
			are not limited to the following:	
1			a) Other entities within the 100 ppm radius of impact (ROE) depending on release	
			status and prevailing wind conditions, will be asked to shelter in place. Those	
			entities will be instructed to close any windows and shut off any air	
			conditioning/heating until further notice. In addition, they will be instructed to	
			contact other employees/residents not currently present and instruct them not to	
			enter/reenter the area until further instruction.	
			b) If a <u>perimeter monitor</u> is activated, the LEPC and law enforcement will be	
1			contacted by phone and notified of the release and status of containment. The	
			 Consistent Commander (IC) will assign personner notification responsibility. Consistent State (SCBA) will assess 	
			the release and attempt to resolve it if after 45 minutes on scene there is no	
ł			resolution, the operator(s) will notify the Plant Manager to determine if the	
			emergency shut down (ESD) should be activated.	
			4. If monitored H ₂ S levels at Muster Area exceed 10 ppm, evacuate to an alternate	
		· ·	Muster Area. If deemed necessary, local emergency response service providers will	
			be contacted by the Incident Commander (IC).	
			a) Re-entry will occur in full self-contained breathing apparatus (SCBA) and in 15	
			minute shifts at the direction of the IC until IC determines problem has been	
ł			b) If release is resolved and monitored levels of H ₂ S in the Plant are less than 10	
			ppm_personnel may return to Plant. The Oil Conservation Division (OCD) shall be	
			notified within four hours of any release that activates the Plan. All entities	
			previously notified will be informed that the release has been resolved and	
			advised of the current monitored H ₂ S levels at the Plant.	
			c) No resolution requires activation of full H ₂ S Plan with notifications and reporting	
			as per Plan. If the release is not resolved and/or H_2S levels continue to increase,	
			Level 3 Kesponse is indicated.	
ļ			u) workering will continue after problems are abated, at the direction of the Plant.	
l		L		

1.00

Sec. 2

S. T. S.

7755

Siver S

100

. 10% E.

3 27.2 C

المستيا فالجنان

2.28 8.0

4.02.64

. 2 mg . . .

Sec.

1.1.1

- - - - - - - - -

Sec. B. A.

A. S. C. C.

- grad

3

Level	Alarms	Actions		
111	Intermittent	1. If H_2S is at 20 ppm or greater and repair efforts at Level 2 have been		
· .	audible alarm	unsuccessful, worst case scenario, and/or catastrophic release have occurred, then		
	sounded	implement a Level 3 response.		
	and/or	2. Road blocks will be set up near the Muster Areas on Kincaid Road and Pipeline		
	flashing red	Road.		
	lights	3. All personnel shall have evacuated to a designated Muster Areas. Evacuation of		
	activated for	all entities within the 500 ppm radius of impact (ROE) will have been confirmed.		
	catastrophic	Implement full H_2S Plan with all notifications and public agency involvement.		
	release; fire;	Notifications to all entities within the 100 ppm radius of impact (ROE) will include the		
	or explosion	nature of the release and status of containment. Notifications will include but are not		
	ESD alarm in	a) All businesses within the 100 nem radius of impact (POE) will be instructed to		
	2 continuous	a) All businesses within the 100 pph radius of impact (NOL) will be instructed to immediately alert all company personnel, third party contractors and/or services		
	siren with red	companies working in the area, and those imminently scheduled to work in the		
	amber and	area of the release and evacuation status of the Plant. They will be instructed to		
	blue lights that	immediately leave and/or not enter/reenter the area within the roadblocks until		
	flash	further instruction.		
		b) All other entities (including private residents) within the 100 ppm radius of		
		impact (ROE) will be instructed to immediately shelter in place, if appropriate		
		based on the source of the release and the wind direction. Those entities will be		
		instructed to close any windows and shut off any air conditioning/heating until		
		further notice. In addition, they will be instructed to contact other		
		employees/residents not currently present to not enter/reenter the area until		
		further instruction.		
		c) The Incident Commander (IC) will make the decision based on, but not limited		
		to, H_2S concentration and wind direction, whether a safe evacuation can be		
		implemented, and recommend an evacuation route.		
		4. If escaping vapors have ignited, the vapors should be allowed to continue to burn		
		unless the fire endangers personnel, other property, or other equipment.		
		5. When applicable, maintain communication with the Plant Manager, of his designed to keep him up to dote of the situation and the action taken prior to his		
		arrival at the location		
		6 Initiate and maintain a Chronological Record of Events log		
		7. Within one hour after the activation of the H ₂ S Plan begin agency notifications by		
		calling Oil Conservation Division (OCD) and National Response Center (NRC).		
		8. Establish media staging area adjacent to Muster Area 2 and direct all media to it.		
		9. Once resolved and monitored levels in the Plant and at Muster Area are less than		
		10 ppm, roadblocks will be removed, and all entities within the 100 ppm radius of		
		impact (ROE) will be allowed to return. All entities previously notified will be informed		
		that the release has been resolved and advised of the current monitored H ₂ S levels.		
	· · ·	10. Monitoring will continue after problems are abated, at the direction of the Plant		
		Manager		
	[11. Agency reports to be submitted as required.		

a silica

1.2.2

Ser.

100

S. Line Law

THE .

な湯

1. Q. ...

. فالمستحدثة و

مو طور

" Tak Sur

44.84

المالط والمحال

Mar .. Sala

S. Carter

. se getter

A. 2.

Sec. Sec.

and the second

4

.

C. Telephone Numbers and Communication Methods

1		Emergen	cy Sen	vices
---	--	---------	--------	-------

4

* * *

S. 1.1.

Star Barre

2.3.21

Sec.

5. 2. 30

144.61

A. 4. 18.

South . . .

28434

W 12 4. 5.

1.12.6

البياقي كالمنا

1. 2. A.C.

. Jages .

- A freedor

the second

AGENCY	TELEPHONE #
Artesia Fire Department	(575) 946-5050
Atoka Fire Department	(575) 946-5050
Artesia Police Department	(575) 746-5000
Eddy County Sheriff	(575) 887-7551
Carlsbad Police Department	(575) 885-2111
State Police (HMER)	
District 3 Roswell	(575) 827-9312
Sub District 3 Carlsbad	(575) 885-3138
Sub District 3 Hobbs	(575) 827-9320
Ambulance Services	
Artesia	(575) 746-5050
Carlsbad	(575) 885-2111
Hospitals	
Artesia General	(575) 748-3333
Carlsbad Medical Center	(575) 887-4100
Veterinarians	
Artesia Animal Clinic	(575) 748-2042
Livingston Animal Clinic	(575) 746-6167
Helicopter Services	
Lifeguard (Albuquerque)	1-800-633-5438
Southwest Medivac (Hobbs)	1-800-242-6199
AeroCare (Lubbock)	1-800-627-2376
Air Med (El Paso)	(915) 772-1449

2. Government Agencies

AGENCY	TELEPHONE #
Oil Conservation Division (OCD)	(505) 476-3440
	(575) 748-1283
US BLM	(575) 887-6544
Local Emergency Planning Committee (LEPC)	(575) 887-9511
National Response Center (NRC)	1-800-424-8802

3. Operators and Contractors

COMPANY	TELEPHONE #
CVE	(575) 746-3571
PVT	(575) 748-1241
DCP Midstream	(800) 435-1679
Chevron/West Texas Pipeline Company	(800) 762-3404
Transwestern Pipeline	(281) 714-2265
Yates Petroleum Corporation	(575) 748-1471

4	P	ubl	lic
-т.		~ ~	

Name	Address	TELEPHONE #
David and Diana Wilson	80 West Kincaid Ranch Road	(575) 457-2309
Raul and Delilah Baeza	193 West Kincaid Ranch Road	(575) 308-3195
Efrin and Maria Baeza	179 West Kincaid Ranch Road	(575) 513-0471
Christine Baeza	175 West Kincaid Ranch Road	(575) 457-2585

5. Agave Internal Call List

NAME	TITLE	Office #	Cell #
J.B. Smith	President	(575) 748-4414	(575) 365-8517
Rusty Nasta	Operations Manager	(575) 748-4523	(575) 626-7971
Ivan Villa	Engineering Supervisor	(575) 748-4528	(575) 365-4888
Jennifer Knowlton	Environmental Engineer	(575) 748-4528	(505) 238-3588
Robert Moorhead	Plant Manager/South Mechanical	(575) 748-6815	(575) 365-4840
	Supervisor	' 	
Gary Greenwood	Plant Supervisor	(575) 748-8414	(575) 365-6794
Mark Smith	PSM Coordinator/Plant Operator	(575) 748-8410	(575) 365-5053
Dustin McNeely	Plant Operator	N/A	(575) 703-5493
Justin Troublefield	Plant Operator	N/A	(575) 365-7503
Glen Blake	Regulatory Coordinator	(575) 748-4546	(575) 626-8168
Bill Johnson	South Measurement Supervisor	(575) 748-6816	(575) 365-4615
Jason Fuentes	South Pipeline Supervisor	(575) 748-4518	(575) 365-8939

6. Agave Energy Company will use 2-way radios and telephones to communicate internally. Telephone will be used for external communication.

D. Location of Nearby Residences, Roads, and Medical Facilities

- 1. The following residences are located within the ROE of the: a) Plant - None

 - b) Metropolis Disposal #1 Well None
 - c) Pipeline None
- 2. The following roads are located within the ROE:
 - a) Kincaid Ranch Road
 - b) Pipeline Road

3. There are no medical facilities located within the ROE.

E. Evacuation Routes, Emergency Assembly Area, Muster Areas, and Road Block Locations

1. Evacuation Routes, Emergency Assembly Area, and Muster Areas are depicted on Map D-1 in Appendix D.

2. Pre-planned road block locations are designated near the muster areas on Pipeline Road and Kincaid Ranch Road and are depicted on Map D-1 in Appendix D. Each location will have pre-positioned, portable road barriers with lights. The locations will have flashing lights and warning signs. If the release is sufficient to require evacuation to muster areas, then roadblocks near the muster areas on Kincaid Ranch Road and Pipeline Road to the west and north of the facility, respectively, will be established. The

Incident Commander (IC) will designate a representative to staff each of the two roadblocks. If deemed necessary by the Incident Commander (IC), the State or Local Police will be asked to assist with maintaining the roadblocks.

3. Emergency lights on the Muster Area signs will be activated by any <u>perimeter alarm</u> of 10 ppm or greater H₂S or Level III activation.

F. Monitoring Equipment, Alarm Systems, Safety Equipment, and Supplies Available 1. EMERGENCY SHUTDOWN SYSTEM: There are (8) ESD manual stations located at various points in the facility. See Maps A-2 and A-3 in Appendix A. The Plant ESD can be activated at any time by any employee or at the direction of the Incident Commander (IC).

When any one of the eight (8) manual stations is activated, the system will be shutdown and the natural gas inlets and outlets will be blocked. The operators are also able to auto close the one (1) main block valve on the incoming gas line to the Plant. Activating these should allow the plant to avoid a Level 3 response. The Incident Commander (IC) can send trained personnel to designated off-site manual block valves. There are also various methods to shut down gas flow at the various wellheads and incoming gathering lines. These can and would be evaluated on a case by case basis.

Designated employees will have remote access to the plant controls including ESD capabilities.

2. PLANT ALARMS, VISIBLE BEACONS & WIND INDICATORS: Colored beacons, horns, and wind direction indicators are located in various locations throughout the Plant and are indicated in Appendix A on Maps A-2, A-3, and A-6.

The audible signal for an emergency response and Plant evacuation is a repeating intermittent alarm that sounds at H_2S concentrations of 10 ppm or greater. The alarm will remain intermittent when the concentration of the H_2S release is 20 ppm or higher. At the initial sound of this intermittent alarm, the plant operators will evacuate to the emergency assembly area put on a self-contained breathing apparatus (SCBA) and all personnel in the plant complex shall immediately proceed in a safe manner to the Emergency Assembly Areas as prescribed by the Emergency Action Plan.

A flashing red beacon signifies an H₂S release of 20 ppm or higher and all personnel in the plant complex shall immediately proceed in a safe manner to the Emergency Assembly Area located outside of the plant office. If this area is not determined to be safe, all will move to designated Muster Area. Evacuation routes and Muster Areas are indicated on the map in Appendix A, on Map A-4 and A-6 as well as Appendix D, on Map D-1.

A routine process alarm will cause a horn to sound. This horn sound is used to alert the plant Operator to return to the Control Room. No emergency response or evacuation is required when this horn sounds.

Wind direction indicators are installed throughout the plant. At least one wind direction indicator can be seen at any location within the Plant complex, as well as from any point on the perimeter of the plant. There are ten (10) windsocks located in the Plant.

1

7

3. GAS DETECTION EQUIPMENT: The Plant uses a Smart Sensor System fixed plant H_2S Sensors. These sensors are a fixed point monitoring system used to detect the presence of hydrogen sulfide in ambient air. The yellow flashing beacon is activated at H_2S concentrations of 10 ppm or greater. The horn is activated with an intermittent alarm at H_2S concentrations of 10 ppm or greater. The lights change to red at 20 ppm H_2S and the horn remains intermittent. The fixed hydrogen sulfide monitors are strategically located throughout the Plant to detect an uncontrolled released of hydrogen sulfide. The Plant operators are able to monitor the H2S level of all the Plant sensors on the control monitor located in the control room and the Dagger Draw Plant Field Office. In addition, select employees can access this information remotely. These sensors are located on the plot plan in Appendix A, Maps A-2 and A-3. These sensors all have to be acknowledged and will not clear themselves. This requires immediate action for any occurrence or malfunction. The Plant sensors are calibrated monthly.

Redline wireless H_2S detectors are installed along the perimeter of the plant and the perimeter of the acid gas disposal well. Perimeter H_2S detectors report to the Redline monitor every five minutes to confirm detector functionality. Once H_2S gas is detected, the H_2S detectors report to the monitor every five seconds. The detectors will go into alarm at H_2S values of 10 ppm and above. Redline H_2S head unit locations are depicted on Map A-5 and A-6 in Appendix A.

Handheld gas detection monitors are available to plant personnel to check specific areas and equipment prior to initiating maintenance or work on the process equipment. There are 3 handheld monitors and each individual is assigned a personal H₂S monitor. The handheld gas detection devices are Industrial Scientific ITX 3-gas detectors and BW Gas Alert Micro 5 4-way monitors. The detectors have sensors for oxygen, LEL (explosive hydrocarbon atmospheres), hydrogen sulfide, and carbon dioxide. They indicate the presence of H₂S with a beeping sound at 10 ppm. The beeps change in tone as H₂S increases to 20 ppm. The personal monitors are set to alarm (beep) at 10 ppm with the beeps becoming closer together as the H₂S concentration increases to 20 ppm. Both the handheld and personal monitors have digital readouts of H₂S ppm concentration.

a) The compressor building has two methane sensors; one sends a call out at 30% lower explosive limit (LEL); the second shuts the compressors down at 50% lower explosive limit (LEL). The methane sensors are visual and audible alarms. The compressor building also is equipped with fire eyes that will also shut the units down. The four product pumps also have LEL sensors.

4. RESPIRATORS: The Plant has 30 minute self-contained breathing apparatus (SCBA) respirators and 5 minute escape packs strategically located throughout the Plant. The respirator locations are identified in Appendix A on Maps A-3 and A-6. All Plant personnel are certified to use the self-contained breathing apparatus (SCBA) respirators.

5. FIRE FIGHTING EQUIPMENT: The Plant personnel are trained only for insipient stage fire fighting. The fire extinguishers located in the Plant process areas, compressor buildings, process buildings, and company vehicles are typically a 20# ABC dry chemical fire extinguisher. See Appendix A, Maps A-3 and A-6 for locations. The Plant does not have a fire water system, only a utility water system that is not designed for fire fighting.

6. EMERGENCY RESPONSE TRAILER AND EQUIPMENT: Agave Energy Company has an Emergency Response Trailer located at the Atoka Facility (Map 1; Map D-2 Appendix D). This is located outside all radii of exposure (ROE) from the facility along the pipeline to the well.

Driving Directions: From Artesia, drive south on Highway 285 to County Road 39. Turn east and drive approximately 2 miles. The facility is on the south side of the road in the NW/NE Sec 14 18S 26 E. See Map D-2 in Appendix D. The trailer can serve as a mobile resource center or Incident Command Center.

a) EMERGENCY RESPONSE TRAILER CONTENTS

- · 2 wind socks / wind direction indicators w/poles & spares
- 1 110 volt generator, portable w/wheels
- 4 5-gas sensor ambient monitors (O₂, SO₂, LEL, CO, H₂S) with automatic air pumps (15 sec per foot) and data logging capability
- 1 calibration unit for monitors
- 5 intrinsically safe communication radios & chargers, 32 channel with capability to be programmed to fire service and police channels
- 4 20# stored pressure, ABC class Fire Extinguishers
- 4 4500 Grade D breathing air cylinders, regulator, low pressure alarm, and hose reel w/ 300 ft hose (total) and correct quick disconnects.
- 1 stretcher
- 1 20-person First Aid Kit with burn gel packets
- 4 30-minute SCBA's
- 4 work unit SCBA's
- 2 lights, mounted on each rear of trailer for night operations
- 2 hand cleaner for decontamination of petroleum products.
- 3 traffic Control Kits
- 1 emergency flare gun for lighting uncontrollable hazardous gases
- 2 full body harness and 150' X 2 lifelines
- 2 "Hazardous Area" "Do Not Enter" signs / barricades
- 2 burn gel blankets
- 1 set of maps and Emergency Response Plans
- 4 temporary use Nomex Fire retardant clothing (2-LG & 2-XLG)

7. TRAFFIC CONTROL KIT CONTENTS

- 3 electronic road flares
- 1 28" stop sign paddle
- 4 reflective traffic control vests
- 2 emergency signal wands
- 1 emergency Response Guidebook

8. FIRST AID EQUIPMENT LOCATIONS:

- a) First Aid Kits are located at the following locations:
- Lab
- Office
- b) Eye Wash stations are located at the following locations:
- Lab
- Office

9

9. PERSONAL H_2S MONITORS: All Agave personnel assigned to the Plant and associated field personnel are issued personal H_2S monitors.

10. SIGNS and MARKERS: The Plant has warning signs indicating the presence of " H_2S /Poisonous Gas" and high pressure gas at the entrance to the Plant. Emergency response phone numbers are posted at the entrance to the Plant. Signs are located at the Plant gate entrance indicating that all visitors are to sign in.

V. Characteristics of Hydrogen Sulfide (H₂S), Sulfur Dioxide (SO₂) and Carbon Dioxide (CO₂) [NMAC 19.15.11.9.B(2)(b)] [API RP-55 7.4 b.]

A. Hydrogen Sulfide (H₂S): Hydrogen Sulfide (H₂S): The proposed inlet gas streams into the Plant will contain a maximum of 7,600 ppm (or 0.76 mole percent) of hydrogen sulfide based on data generated from the sampling of the inlet gas at least daily. Hydrogen sulfide is a colorless, toxic and flammable gas, and has the odor of rotten eggs. Hydrogen sulfide gas is heavier than air. Hydrogen sulfide presents a significant health hazard by paralyzing the respiratory system resulting in serious injury or death.

Hydrogen Sulfide Properties and Characteristics				
CAS No.			7783-06-4	
Molecular Formula			H ₂ S	
Molecular Weight			34.082 g/mol	
Ceiling Concentration			20 ppm (OSHA)	
Ceiling Peak Concentration	۱		50 ppm (OSHA)	
TLV			15 ppm (ACGIH)	
TWA			10 ppm (NIOSH)	
STEL			15 ppm (ACGIH)	
IDLH			100 ppm	
Specific Gravity Relative to	Air (Air=1	.0)	1.189	
Boiling Point			-76.5F	
Freezing Point			-121.8F	
Vapor Pressure			396 psia	
Autoignition Temperature			518F	
Lower Flammability Limit			4.3%	
Upper Flammability Limit			46.0%	
Stability			Stable	
pH in water			3	
Corrosivity			Reacts with metals, plastics, tissues and nerves	
	Physic	al Effects of	f Hydrogen Sulfide	
Concentration				
Ppm	%		Physical Effects	
1	0.00010	Can be smelled (rotten egg odor)		
10	0.0010	Obvious & unpleasant odor; Permissible exposure level; safe		
· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·		for 8 hour exposure		
20	0.0020	Acceptable ceiling concentration		
50	0.0050	Loss of sense of smell in 15 minutes		
100	0.0100	Immediately dangerous to life and health(IDLH) loss of sense		
		of smell in 3-15 minutes; stinging in eyes & throat; Altered		
		breathing		
200	0.0200	Kills smell rapidly; stinging in eyes & throat		

Agave H₂S Contingency Plan

25.023

2.2.2

3.40

1.89

2000 2

- star

Sec. And

December 20, 2010
500	0.0500	Dizziness; Unconscious after short exposure; Need artificial
		respiration
700	0.0700	Unconscious quickly; death will result if not rescued promptly
1000	0.1000	Instant unconsciousness; followed by death within minutes

B. Sulfur Dioxide (SO₂): Sulfur dioxide is produced as a by-product of H₂S combustion at the flare. The flare unit receives the residual hydrogen sulfide and carbon dioxide stream that is routed from the amine unit. It is colorless, transparent, and is non-flammable, with a pungent odor associated with burning sulfur. Sulfur dioxide is heavier than air, but will be picked up by a breeze and carried downwind at elevated temperatures. Sulfur dioxide can be extremely irritating to the eyes and mucous membranes of the upper respiratory tract.

Sulfur Dioxide Properties & Characteristics									
CAS No.		7446-09-5							
Molecular Formula		SO ₂							
Molecular Weight		64.07 g/mol							
PEL		5 ppm(OSHA)							
TWA		2 ppm(ACGIH)							
STEL 5 ppm(ACGIH)									
IDLH		100 ppm							
Specific Gravity Relative to Air (Air = 1.0)	2.26							
Boiling Point		14°F							
Freezing Point		-103.9°F							
Vapor Pressure		49.1 psia							
Auto ignition Temperature		N/A							
Lower Flammability Limit		N/A							
Upper Flammability Limit		N/A							
Stability		Stable							
Corrosivity		Could form an acid rain in aqueous solutions							
Physica	Effects of	Sulfur Dioxide							
Concentration		Effect							
1 ppm	Pungent o	dor, may cause respiratory changes							
2 ppm	Permissibl	e exposure limit; Safe for an 8 hour exposure							
3-5 ppm	Pungent o	odor; normally a person can detect sulfur							
	dioxide in this range								
5 ppm	Short Term Exposure Limit (STEL); Safe for 15 minutes								
	of exposur	posure							
12 ppm	I hroat irrit	ritation, coughing, chest constriction, eyes tear							
100	and burn								
150 ppm		a that it can only be and red for a farmerianter							
	So irritatin	g that it can only be endured for a few minutes							
500 ppm	Causes a	sense of suffocation, even with first breath							
1,000 ppm	Death may	result unless rescued promptly.							

Agave H₂S Contingency Plan

C. Carbon Dioxide (CO₂): The proposed inlet streams into the Plant will contain a maximum of 383,100 ppm (or 38.31 mole percent) of carbon dioxide based on data generated from the sampling of the inlet gas at least daily. Carbon dioxide gas is colorless, odorless and non-flammable and is heavier than air.

Carbon	Dioxide Properties & Ch	aracteristics
CAS No.	· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·	124-38-9
Molecular Formula	•	CO ₂
Molecular Weight		44.010 g/mol
TWA	· · ·	5,000 ppm
STEL	·· · · · ·	30,000 ppm
IDLH	<u>_</u>	40,000 ppm
Specific Gravity Relative to Air	1.5197	
Boiling Point		-109.12°F
Freezing Point		-69.81°F
Vapor Pressure		830 psia
Autoignition Temperature		N/A
Lower Flammability Limit	· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·	N/A
Upper Flammability Limit		N/A
Stability	· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·	Stable
pH in Saturated Solution		3.7
Corrosivity		dry gas is relatively inert & not corrosive; can be corrosive to mild steels in aqueous solutions
Ph	ysical Effects of Carbon	Dioxide
Concentration		Effect
1.0 %	Breathing rate increase	es slightly
2.0 %	Breathing rate increase Prolonged exposure ca	es to 50% above normal level.
3.0 %	Breathing rate increase	es to twice normal rate and
	becomes labored. We hearing, headache, inc rate	ak narcotic effect. Impaired reased blood pressure and pulse
4 – 5 %	Breathing increases to rate, symptoms of intox choking may be felt	approximately four times normal kication become evident, and slight
5 – 10 %	Characteristic sharp or breathing, headache, v ears. Judgment may b by loss of consciousne	lor noticeable. Very labored isual impairment, and ringing in the e impaired, followed within minutes ss
10 – 100 %	Unconsciousness occu Prolonged exposure to eventually result in dea	rs more rapidly above 10% level. high concentrations may th from asphyxiation

12

- (Bare

Service -

- Stores

1. N. S.

and the second

A. 8. 4

1.02.3

24, 25

Sec. 8.

12.00

· 29

* V. 6

1. 1. 3 ge

1.4

2.2.5

المراجع الم

- E . S.S.

D. Radii of Exposure (ROE) [NMAC 19.15.11.7.K]

The basis for worst case scenario calculations is as follows:

- The hydrogen sulfide content of the inlet natural gas stream into the Agave Dagger Draw Gas Plant is variable, ranging upwards to 7,600 parts per million (ppm) or 0.76 mole percent. In reality, the actual H₂S concentration that the plant processes will be much less than this.
- The inlet gas H_2S concentration of 0.76 mole percent was determined using a massbalance approach, an analysis of 60.8 mole percent H_2S in the acid gas stream and a maximum acid gas flow rate of 0.5 MMSCFD. It is assumed that the amine system removes 100% of the H_2S from the inlet gas.
- The plant has a maximum daily (24 hour) processing volume of 40 MMSCF.
- The worst case scenario radius of exposure (ROE) also assumes an uncontrolled instantaneous release from the area around either the Metropolis Disposal #1 Well, the amine still at the facility and/or at any point along the pipeline connecting the two of the above referenced volume and concentration. Because the Plant is a throughput process plant, it is impossible that the entire 24 hour-throughput volume of the Plant could be released instantaneously as is assumed in the worst case scenario calculations of the ROE. However, to comply with NMAC 19.15.11, that assumption is the worst case scenario in the formulas/calculations provided here.

It should further be noted that the reason this rate, used as worst case, could not be released over a 24 hour period is the Plant's emergency shutdown (ESD) systems would be activated. The emergency shutdown (ESD) would prevent the flow of gas into the Plant in the event of an emergency. See Appendix C and Map C-1 for more information.

The formulas for calculating the two radius of exposure (ROE) are as follows:

100 ppm Radius of Exposure Calculation (as per 19 NMAC 15.11.7.K.1):

X=[(1.589)(hydrogen sulfide concentration)(Q)]

500 ppm Radius of Exposure Calculation (as per 19 NMAC 15.11.7.K.2):

X=[(0.4546)(hydrogen sulfide concentration)(Q)]

Where:

X = radius of exposure in feet

"hydrogen sulfide concentration" = the decimal equivalent of the mole or volume fraction of hydrogen sulfide in the gaseous mixture

Q = Escape rate expressed in cubic feet per day (corrected for standard conditions of 14.73 psi absolute and 60 degrees Fahrenheit)

Agave H₂S Contingency Plan

Amine Unit (F	Facility)
500-ppm ROE	1648 feet
100-ppm ROF	3606 feet

 $n \alpha$	In	^
 ue:		e
 		-
-		

500-ppm ROE	1648 feet
100-ppm ROE	3606 feet

Acid Gas	Disposal Well
500-ppm ROE	1648 feet

The ROE for the facility, pipeline and well are shown on Map C-1 of Appendix C. This ROE pattern is designed to include the 100 and 500 ppm radii for a potential worst case failure at any point in the system from the facility at the north to the well to the south.

3606 feet

VI. Facility Description, Maps, and Drawings [NMAC 19.15.11.9.B(2)(c)] [API RP-55 7.4 c.]

100-ppm ROE

A. Dagger Draw Processing Plant Description of Operations- The primary function of the plant is to remove H_2S and CO_2 from sour field gas so that the gas can meet pipeline specifications. The plant has been designated a primary Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) Code of 1311. The operation of the Agave Dagger Draw Gas Plant is intended to process 40 MMSCFD of gas. The facility is authorized to operate continuously (8,760 hr/yr) at design maximum capacity processing rates. The gas will be treated to remove acid gas components, dehydrated to remove water and processed to remove heavy (liquid) hydrocarbons from the gas stream. Several plant systems will be involved to perform these functions.

The amine unit is designed to remove acid gas components (carbon dioxide, hydrogen sulfide and mercaptans) from the natural gas stream. These components are removed from the natural gas because they are corrosive, hazardous to health, and reduce the heating value of the natural gas stream. In addition, the carbon dioxide can freeze in the cryogenic unit forming dry ice and forcing the shutdown of the facility. This is known as the gas sweetening process. The acid gas removed by the amine unit will be disposed of by either acid gas injection into a disposal well or by incinerating in a flare. The preferred method of disposal will be to compress the gas and inject it into the well. Under emergency situations, the gas will be flared to prevent the emission of lethal hydrogen sulfide to atmosphere.

The glycol dehydration unit will receive approximately 40.0 MMSCFD of treated gas (sweet) from the amine unit and reduce the water content of the gas by circulating triethylene glycol (TEG). Molecular sieve dehydration is used upstream of the cryogenic processes to achieve a -150°F dew point. The process uses two molecular sieve vessels with one vessel in service absorbing moisture from the gas stream and the other vessel in the regeneration mode.

The cryogenic unit is designed to liquefy natural gas components from the sweet, dehydrated inlet gas by removing work (heat) from the gas by means of the turbo expander. The cryogenic unit recovers natural gas liquids (NGL) by cooling the gas stream

to extremely cold temperatures (-150°F) and condensing components such as ethane, propane, butanes and heavier hydrocarbons. Once the sweet, dry gas exits the cryogenic unit, it needs to be recompressed to approximately 800 to 1200 psi before the gas is sent to the main transportation pipeline. This is accomplished with two 2500 horsepower electric drive compressors.

The hot oil system in the plant is used to provide heat to certain processes within the facility. The system will circulate approximately 600 GPM of hot oil and deliver 15.5 MMBTU/hr to other processes.

B. Metropolis Disposal #1 Well Description of Operations- The low pressure (< 10 psig), acid gas stream from the amine unit is routed to the acid gas compressor. The stream is then subject to a series of compression and cooling cycles, thus dehydrating and compressing the acid gas stream to a pressure of approximately 1150 psig. The high pressure acid gas stream then flows through a 2" stainless steel pipeline to the injection well site. At this point, the stream is introduced into the well.

There are a number of safeguards designed to prevent leaks or overpressure of the system. The acid gas compressor is equipped with multiple pressure transmitters. These transmitters monitor compressor suction and discharge pressures and are programmed to shut the acid gas system down when the pressures fall outside a pre-programmed operating range. As an additional safeguard, the compressor panel is also equipped with high and low pressure shutdowns for each stage of compression that will shut the compressor down when pressures reach preset high and low pressure set points.

As shown on Map 2, the acid gas pipeline runs from the Agave Dagger Draw Plant in a southwesterly direction, crosses Kincaid Ranch Road at the plant boundary and continues southwesterly along a gravel road for approximately 3680 feet. The pipeline then turns east along the Metropolis Disposal #1 Well access road for an additional 900 feet to the wellhead. South of Kincaid Ranch Road, the pipeline and well are entirely contained within Section 36, Township 18 South, Range 25 East. This land is owned by the State of New Mexico. Agave Energy has the following three Rights-of-Way from the State of New Mexico in this section for the pipeline: R18068, R17745 and R17949. The Metropolis Disposal #1 Well Site is covered under Yates Petroleum Company Oil Leases VO-6141-0000 and E1-0165-0001. The pipeline is buried at a depth of 6-1/2 feet for its entire length and is marked, as required, with permanent surface markers. (See Map 2 and Figure 1)

The acid gas pipeline is constructed from 2" inch 304 stainless steel tubing. The pipeline has been designed with a maximum allowable working pressure of 2350 psig. Historical injection pressures average 1150 psig. For leak detection purposes, the 2" acid gas line has been encased in 6" SDR 11 polyethylene pipe. A "sweet" gas stream flows through the annulus between the 6" and 2" pipelines at a preset pressure and flow rate. This sweet gas stream is monitored continuously for H₂S and over/ under pressure. If any one variable falls outside the predetermined operating range, the acid gas compressor is shut down and the acid gas stream is routed to the flare.

Safeguards for the acid gas injection well consist of a subsurface safety valve. This valve is designed to isolate and shut in the injection well if a leak occurs along the acid gas pipeline or at the surface of the well.

C. Map of Plant and Metropolis Disposal #1 Well

See Appendix A, Map A-1

VII. Training and Drills

[NMAC 19.15.11.9.B(2)(d)] [API RP-55 7.4 d]

A. Responsibilities and Duties of Essential Personnel

1. Personnel responsible for implementing this plan shall be trained on their duties and responsibilities related to this plan during the annual on-site or table top training exercises.

2. Plant Orientation Training - All Plant personnel, visitors, and contractors must attend a Plant overview orientation prior to obtaining permission to enter the Plant. A refresher course on this training is required annually for all persons. This training also complies with the requirements of the Agave Energy Company Process Safety Management Program and Procedures Manual.

B. On-site or Classroom Drills

Agave Energy Company may use table top exercises as well as hands on emergency response training methods. Agave Energy Company shall conduct a table top exercise annually at a minimum.

C. Notification and Training of Others on Protective Measures in Emergency Situations

Affected residents will be invited to participate and/or observe annual drills, as well as being briefed on notification, evacuation, and shelter in place plans.

D. Training and Attendance Documentation

All training and drills will be documented. Documentation shall include sign in sheets, synopsis of the training conducted, and an after action review of the training.

E. Briefing of Public Officials on Evacuation and Shelter in Place Plans

Local law enforcement, first responders, and fire personnel will also be invited to participate and/or observe annual drills, as well as being briefed on notification, evacuation, and shelter in place plans.

VIII. Coordination with State Emergency Plans [NMAC 19.15.11.9.B(2)(e)]

A. Oil Conservation Division (OCD)

1. Oil Conservation Division (OCD) will be notified with an automatic email to the District II office advising of the activation of the H_2S Contingency Plan if any of the alarms are activated at 10 ppm H_2S or greater. In the event of a power failure, a phone call will be made within four hours. All subsequent paperwork will be filed in a timely fashion.

B. New Mexico State Police/ New Mexico Hazardous Materials Emergency Response Plan

1. The New Mexico State Police are responsible for overall scene management and coordination of all resources. A designated Emergency Response Officer (ERO) will establish the National Interagency Incident Management System (NIIMS) Incident Command System (ICS) as the Incident Commander (IC) and be responsible for management of all response resources on scene. Off-scene coordination of response resources will be handled through designated Headquarters Emergency Response Officers. Law enforcement-related activities will be coordinated by State Police.

Agave H₂S Contingency Plan

IX. Plan Activation

200

[NMAC 19.15.11.9.C] [API RP-55 7.4 d]

A. Activation Levels

Level 1 – Intermittent alarm sounded and/or flashing amber beacons activated for H_2S greater than or equal to 10 ppm

Level 2 – Intermittent alarm sounded and/or flashing red beacons activated for H_2S greater than or equal to 20 ppm

Level 3 –Catastrophic release; fire; explosion; a continuous release of maximum volume for 24 hours; or NMAC 19.15.11: mandatory activation of indication of 100 ppm in any defined public area; 500 ppm at any public road; or 100 ppm at a distance greater than 3000 feet from the site or the release. Because the 100 ppm radius of impact (ROE) boundary is greater than 3000 feet from the site of release, a Level 3 response would occur before the escape of the 24 hour release volume.

B. Events that Could Lead to a Release of H₂S

- Inlet and plant piping failure
- Amine still failure
- Flange/gasket leaks on inlet and plant piping
- Flange/gasket leaks on the acid gas compressor
- Flange/gasket leaks at metropolis disposal well
- Failure of acid gas pipeline
- Valve packing
- Seal failure on acid gas compressor
- Failure of flare to ignite during Plant emergency blow down

X. Submission of H₂S Contingency Plans [NMAC 19.15.11.9.D]

A. Submission

1. Agave Energy Company will submit the H₂S Contingency Plan to the Oil Conservation Division (OCD).

B. Retention

1. Agave Energy Company shall maintain a copy of the contingency plan in the Main Office at 105 South 4th Street in Artesia, NM. The plan shall be readily accessible for review by the Oil Conservation Division (OCD) upon request.

C. Inventory

1. Agave Energy Company will file an annual inventory of wells, facilities and operations for which plans are on file with the Oil Conservation Division (OCD), to the Local Emergency Planning Committee (LEPC) and the State Emergency Response Commission as per NMAC 19.15.11.

2. The inventory shall include the name, address, telephone number, and point of contact for all operations in which plans are on file.

MAPS AND FIGURES

MAP 1: Agave Dagger Draw Plant Facilities Locations

MAP 2: General Diagram of Agave Dagger Draw Gas Plant and Location of Pipeline Connecting Plant with Metropolis Disposal #1 Well

FIGURE 1: Photos of Pipeline

3.8

WB4 - 22.8

1. 1. N. 1.

. The

1.4

R. 12

A ranks

يو کيسي يو. د Agave H₂S Contingency Plan





1

Map 2: General Diagram of Agave Dagger Draw Gas Plant and Location of Pipeline Connecting the Plant with the Metropolis Disposal #1 Well





Figure 1: Photos of Pipeline Connecting Agave Energy's Dagger Draw Gas Plant With Metropolis Disposal #1 well. A) Acid Gas Compressed at the Gas Plant is Introduced to a 2" Stainless Steel Pipeline Surrounded by a 6" Polyethylene Pipe. Pipeline Integrity is Monitored Using a Stream of Sweet Natural Gas in the Volume Between the Two Pipes. B) Outside of the Fenced in Areas at the Plant and Wellhead, the Pipeline is Buried and Clearly Marked. C) The Pipeline Rises Above Ground and Connects to the Production Tree at the Metropolis Disposal #1 Wellhead

APPENDIX A – Facility Maps

- Map A-1: Facility Map
- Map A-2: Alarms and Monitors, Dagger Draw Active Equipment
- Map A-3: Safety and Fire Equipment, Dagger Draw Active Equipment
- Map A-4: Evacuation Router, Dagger Draw Active Equipment
- Map A-5: Proposed Perimeter Alarms
- Map A-6: Metropolis Disposal Well





0.10

SECURITY PENCE 103 South SECURITY PENCE 103 South MAGAV GAS I AGA GAS I GAS I GA	RECOLICT PLAP COOLA PLT PRODUCT PLAP COOLA PLT PRODUCT PLAP COOLA PLT PRODUCT PLAP COOLA PLT ALARM PRODUCT PLAP COOLA PLT ALARM PLT	 H2S DECTECTION PIDEL MAR BUILDING #2 PIDEL MAR BUILDING #3 PIDEL MAR AVALYTING #3 ACTO GAS COMPRESSOR WEST #11 AR COMPRESSOR WEST #11 AR COMPRESSOR BUILDING #15 POWER DISTRIBUTION AREA #16 PLARE FIFRACK H2S DETECTION WISCAL & AUDIRLE #3 ANNYE AREA #16 PLARE FIFRACK MARTE PREACK MARTE PREACK MARTE PREACK
E ENERGY COMPANY Fourth Street, Arrana, New Mexico 88210 VE DAGGER DRAW PROCESSING PLANT Alarms & Monitors	UAS DETECTORS LEL. 30 COMPRESSOR BUILDING 304 LEL. 50 COMPRESSOR BUILDING 354 UND 50CK	ESD *1 LAB *2 CATE *2 PREPACK *1 PREPA

MAP A-2



27K02 (\$238	Cars Tarkes	APPEOLE B	A NO	DRATTING TRA	f		7	SECURI																			
WALL NA	DATE :1/24/2	DATE LIDEN	DATE HISSES	DATE HOWE	ĮĮ		1	Y FENCE	SCBA	ESC APP	BREAT	FD-D1		#13 DRY	#12 DRY	#11 DRY	#10 DRY	S DRY	#S DRY	#7 DRY	A BO Se	ACDDA -	A MIT Ca	#2 DRY	#I DRY	503	17
RANG # 25	TON NAMES .: WI	BETHN D	CONNEY- HODY	STATE NEW BOX	GASI	AGA		AGAV 105 Seuth		PACK	ING AR	NORTH COMP	FIRE DETEC	#26 CO2	#25 CO2	#24 CO2	#23 DRY	#22 DRY	#21 DRY	#20 DRY	alg DRY	A du sir	AND QIA	#15 DRY	#14 DRY	DRY 🌑	RE EXTINGU
ACTIVITY OF A CONTRACT OF A	THE Edubilient	Ein Entiment	natri a	are Cofety &	PROCESSING PLANT	VE DAGGER DRAW		E ENERGY COMPANY Fourth Street, Artesia, New Mexico 88210	EYE WASH STATION	FIRST AID KIT	FIRST AID	RESSOR D1 RESSOR D2	TOR	#39 CO2	#38 DRY	#37 DRY	#36 FOAM	#35 DRY	#34 ROAM	#13 DRY WHEEL UNIT	#32 FOAM WHEEL UNIT	and they	929C02	#28 DRY	#27 CO2	FOAM	ISHERS



0.10

Miles





APPENDIX B – Response Flow Diagrams

Agave H₂S Contingency Plan

NAME OF THE

1. St. 1.

3. 13 . -

14. A.A.

+ 27 +

· · · · ·

* ***

morentes

rein iften s

5 mg 2 mg

all water

منابعه مريدا

مشيد يشقد

State of

S. Cardense



LEVEL I RESPONSE

Agave H₂S Contingency Plan

2.2.2

2.10



LEVEL II RESPONSE

Agave H₂S Contingency Plan



A. 88.

34.42

APPENDIX C - Radius of Exposure Calculations

Map C-1 Radius of Exposure

1. S. 20

1.200

「大学」

S.

1

1. Cal .

 $\Sigma_{\rm eq} = 2^{2}$

40.21

Sec.26

has Press

1000

1.4.8.2

1. A. 1.

S. And S.

Y. 2

20.25

Agave H2S Contingency Plan

December 14, 2010

APPENDIX C-RADIUS OF EXPOSURE CALCULATIONS

The basis for worst case scenario calculations is as follows:

- •The hydrogen sulfide content of the inlet natural gas stream into the Agave Dagger Draw Gas Plant is variable, ranging upwards to 7,600 parts per million (ppm) or 0.76 mole percent. In reality, the actual H₂S concentration that the plant processes will be much less than this.
- The inlet gas H_2S concentration of 0.76 mole percent was determined using a massbalance approach, an analysis of 60.8 mole percent H_2S in the acid gas stream and a maximum acid gas flow rate of 0.5 MMSCFD. It is assumed that the amine system removes 100% of the H_2S from the inlet gas.

The plant has a maximum daily (24 hour) processing volume of 40 MMSCF.

• The worst case scenario radius of exposure (ROE) also assumes an uncontrolled instantaneous release from the area around either the Metropolis #1 Well, the amine still at the facility and at any point along the pipeline connecting the two of the above referenced volume and concentration. Because the Plant is a throughput process plant, it is impossible that the entire 24 hour-throughput volume of the Plant could be released instantaneously as is assumed in the worst case scenario calculations of the ROE. However, to comply with NMAC 19.15.11, that assumption is the worst case scenario in the formulas/calculations provided here.

It should further be noted that the reason this rate, used as worst case, could not be released over a 24 hour period is the Plant's emergency shutdown (ESD) systems would be activated. The emergency shutdown (ESD) would prevent the flow of gas into the Plant in the event of an emergency. See Appendix C and Map C-1 for more information.

The formulas for calculating the two radius of exposure (ROE) are as follows:

100 ppm Radius of Exposure Calculation (as per 19 NMAC 15.11.7.K.1):

X=[(1.589)(hydrogen sulfide concentration)(Q)]

500 ppm Radius of Exposure Calculation (as per 19 NMAC 15.11.7.K.2):

 $X = [(0.4546)(hydrogen sulfide concentration)(Q)]^{(0.6258)}$

Where:

X = radius of exposure in feet

"hydrogen sulfide concentration" = the decimal equivalent of the mole or volume fraction of hydrogen sulfide in the gaseous mixture

Q = Escape rate expressed in cubic feet per day (corrected for standard conditions of 14.73 psi absolute and 60 degrees Fahrenheit)

Agave H₂S Contingency Plan

ROE Inside the Plant

......

The escape rate (Q) is the maximum daily rate of the gaseous mixture produced or handled or the best estimate thereof. For releases inside the Agave Dagger Draw Gas Plant, the Company is using for contingency planning purposes an "escape rate" equal to the maximum inlet gas volume of 40,000 MCFD. The (actual) inlet gas volume at the Plant will be somewhat variable and is continuously metered. The Plant records daily inlet gas volumes and prepares a daily volume report. The assumed 40,000 MCFD inlet gas volume has been selected as the "escape rate" because it is the highest anticipated inlet volume that the Plant would handle under its proposed operations and is considered worst case interpretation of the volume of gas.

It should be noted that the plan will remain effective as long as the processed volume and H_2S_1 content equate to the same or smaller ROE.

Previous monitoring data indicated variable inlet concentrations of hydrogen sulfide, but concentration will not exceed 7,600 ppm or .76 mole percent. Therefore, 7,600 ppm or .76 mole percent has been used in the worst case scenario operations for contingency planning purposes.

Using: Q = 40,000,000 H₂S conc = 7,600 ppm or .76 mole%

500-ppm RADIUS OF EXPOSURE CALCULATION

 $X = [(0.4546)^{*}(H_2S \text{ concentration})^{*}(\text{gas volume } (Q))]$ X = [(0.4546)^{*}(7,600^{*}.000001)^{*}(40,000,000)]

X = 1648 feet = 500-ppm ROE

100-ppm RADIUS OF EXPOSURE CALCULATION

 $X = [(1.589)^{*}(H_2S \text{ concentration})^{*}(gas \text{ volume})]$

 $X = [(1.589)^{*}(7,600^{*}.000001)^{*}(40,000,000)]^{*}$

X = 3606 feet = 100-ppm ROE

ROE Along the Pipeline and At the Injection Well

The escape rate (Q) is the best estimate of the maximum daily flow rate of the acid gas. For releases inside the Agave Dagger Draw Gas Plant, the Company is using for contingency planning purposes an "escape rate" equal to the 500 MCFD. The assumed 500 MCFD acid gas volume has been selected as the "escape rate" because it is the highest anticipated gas volume that the Plant would handle under its proposed operations and is considered the worst case interpretation of the volume of gas.

It should be noted that the plan will remain effective as long as the processed volume and H_2S content equate to the same or smaller ROE.

Previous monitoring data indicated variable inlet concentrations of hydrogen sulfide, but concentration will not exceed 608,000 ppm or 60.8 mole% at the inlet. Therefore, 608,000 ppm or 60.8 mole percent has been used in the worst case scenario operations for contingency planning purposes. Again, Agave does not measure the H₂S concentration in the acid gas stream; rather the concentration is calculated based on the inlet conditions.

Using: Q = 500.000

 H_2S conc = 608,000 ppm or 60.8 mole%

500-ppm RADIUS OF EXPOSURE CALCULATION

 $X = [(0.4546)^{*}(H_2S \text{ concentration})^{*}(\text{gas volume}(Q))]$ $X = [(0.4546)^{*}(608,000^{*}.000001)^{*}(500,000)]$

X = 1648 feet = 500-ppm ROE

100-ppm RADIUS OF EXPOSURE CALCULATION

 $X = [(1.589)^*(H_2S \text{ concentration})^*(gas \text{ volume})]^{0.6258}$ $X = [(1.589)^*(608,000^*.000001)^*(500,000)]^{0.6258}$

X = 3606 feet = 100-ppm ROE



APPENDIX D – Muster Areas, Evacuation Routes

Map D-1: Evacuation Routes to Muster Areas

12.24

10,223,02

2.2.2

and a

1. 2 Cal.

Ares

Same in

5. T. S.

2.40.2

1. 1. Leve

1. S. 20

Sec. 2.

書いた

25.2.2

all way

All and

19.

Map D-2: Atoka Facility– Safety Trailer Location

Agave H₂S Contingency Plan

and the term of the second second





APPENDIX E – H₂S Contingency Plan Distribution List

Agave H₂S Contingency Plan

TABLE D-1

OPERATORS WITHIN ONE MILE RADIUS OF AGAVE METROPOLIS DISPOSAL #1 WELL

 Agave Energy Co 105 South Fourth Street Artesia, NM 88210

- 10⁰ -

Section .

Since 20

1.50

ALC: NOT

. "P."

THE .

a street of

مينيانين بي م

Sec. 2

مۇ يەۋىن ۋ

28 Par

Sug into

14 × 1

mark from

 Yates Petroleum Corporation 105 South Fourth Street Artesia, NM 88210

TABLE D-2

SURFACE OWNERS WITHIN ONE MILE RADIUS OF AGAVE METROPOLIS DISPOSAL #1 WELL

Section 36, Township 18 South, Range 25 East

State of New Mexico State Land Office 310 Old Santa Fe Trail P. O. Box 1148 Santa Fe, NM 87504

Section 35, Township 18 South, Range 25 East

Thomas & Wanda Wilson David & Diana Wilson 235 N. Lake Rd. Artesia, NM 88210

2.58

12

1.32

and the

لإغريم ألحقه

a state of

Sec. 1

To a de

Sec.

· 12.2.

10.20

.

Section 26, Township 18 South, Range 25 East

Agave Energy Company P. O. Box 92108 Austin, TX 78709

Yates Petroleum Corporation 207 S. 4th Street Artesia, NM 88210

Section 25, Township 18 South, Range 25 East

Sharbro Oil Company, LTD P. O. Box 840 Artesia, NM 88211

Woodward Trust Jeri & Dale Woodward 4748 Elder Avenue Seal Beach, CA 90740

Yates Petroleum Corporation 105 S. 4th Street Artesia, NM 88210 Small square in SE/4 on map .57 acre tract in SE/4

SE/4 Less & Except a .57 acre tract

E/2 SE/4

W/2 SE/4

2.17 acre tract in SW/4 Tract 104-25.7 on map

All

All

TABLE D-2 SURFACE OWNERS

13.25

1000

Chinese State

المشكرة

44.522

1. . 6.8

30.0

10 - W.

一部です

And the second

ALL IN

or a strate

200

Agave Energy Company 25.38 acre tract in SW /4 P. O. Box 92108 Tract 104-25.8 on map Austin, TX 78709 Yates Petroleum Corporation SW/4 less & except 207 S. 4th Street 2 above tracts Artesia, NM 88210 Section 30, Township 18 South, Range 26 East Yates Petroleum Corporation SW/4207 S. 4th Street Artesia, NM 88210 Section 31, Township 18 South, Range 26 East Efren & Maria Baeza N/2 N/2 314 N. 14th Artesia, NM 88210 Thomas & Wanda Wilson S/2 NW/4; E/2 SW/4 David & Diana Wilson 235 N. Lake Rd. Artesia, NM 88210 Blanche Widaman NW/4 SW/4 Wells Fargo Bank Industry Consulting Group Inc. P. O. Box 810490 Dallas, TX 75381 H. D. Larsen N/2 SW/4 SW/4 % Greta Edington $1715 - 20^{\text{th}}$ Street Gering, NE 69341

Ronald Metcalf P. O. Box 37 South Valley Road Palmer Lake, CO 80133 S/2 SW/4 SW/4

Page 2

TABLE D-2SURFACE OWNERS

Section 6, Towhnship19 South, Range 26 East Jim & Sandra Hazelwood 10 acre tract in Lot 3 P. O. Box 507 Troy, MT 59935 Pitch Energy Corporation & 10 acre tract in Lot 3 & Yates Petroleum Corporation All Lot 4 P. O. Box 304 Artesia, NM 88211 Lot 5 Dwight M. Lee % Cindy McDermid 11177 Captains Cove Drive Soddy-Daisy, TN 37379 Section 1, Township 19 South, Range 25 East Thomas & Wanda Wilson S/2; S/2 NE/4; NE/4 NE/4 David & Diana Wilson 235 N. Lake Rd. Artesia, NM 88210 Glenn R. Fuller NW/4 18495 Starduster Drive Nevada City, CA 95959 Section 1, Township 19 South, Range 25 East (continued) B. E. Spencer Trust Lot 2 First National Bank P. O. Drawer AA Artesia, NM 88211 Section 2, Township 19 South, Range 25 East Thomas & Wanda Wilson All David & Diana Wilson 235 N. Lake Rd. Artesia, NM 88210

Page 3



Figure D-1 Approximate Locations of Surface Owners Within One Mile of Agave Metropolis Disposal #1 Well
TABLE D-3

LEASE HOLDERS WITHIN ONE MILE RADIUS OF AGAVE METROPOLIS DISPOSAL #1 WELL

1. Yates Petroleum Corporation 105 S. 4th Street Artesia, NM 88210 (575) 748-1741

S. A.S.

Art and a second

Part of

5 T. S.

Part and

120

13 mil

6:30

Section 36-Township18S-Range 25E NE/4; SW/4 NW/4; SE/4 NW/4; NW/4 NW/4; NE/4 NW/4; NE/4 SE/4

Section 35-Township 18S-Range 25E S/2; N/2

Section 26-Township 18S-Range 25E SE/4

Section 25-Township18S-Range 25E SW/4; SE/4

Section 30-Township 18S-Range 26E SW/4

Section 31-Township 18S-Range 26E W/2

Section 6-Township 19S-Range 26E N/2

Section 2-Township 19S-Range 25E N/2

Section 1-Township19S-Range 25E S/2 NE/4; E/2 SE/4 Lease #VO-6141-0000 Lease # E1-0165-0001

(Yates, Abo, Myco and Marbob all hold leases)

Table D-3 Lease Holders

.a.

10.00

8-2- E.

1. S. S.

大学院

2. Chase Oil Corporation P. O. Box 1767 Artesia, NM 88210 (575) 746-9853

> Section 36-Township 18S-Range 25E; SW/4; NW/4 SE/4; SW/4 SE/4; SE/4 SE/4

Section 1-Township 19S-Range 25E NE/4 NE/4; W/2 SW/4; NW/4; W/2 SE/4; E/2 SW/4

3. Marbob Energy Corporation P. O. Box 227 Artesia, NM 88211

Section 1-Township 19S-Range 25E S/2 NE/4; E/2 SE/4

4. DMD LLC P.O. Box 300 Artesia, NM 88211 (575) 746-2953

> Section 1-Township 19S-Range 25E NE/4 NE/4; W/2 SW/4

5. Abo Petroleum Corporation 105 S. 4th Street Artesia, NM 88210

> Section 1-Township 19S-Range 25E S/2 NE/4; E/2 SE/4

6. Myco Industries, Inc. 105 S. 4th Street Artesia, NM 88210

Section 1-Township 19S-Range 25E S/2 NE/4; E/2 SE/4 Lease #VO-8443-0000

(DMD LLC also has a lease on this tract)

(Yates, Abo, Myco and Marbob all hold leases)

(Chase Oil also has a lease on this tract)

(Yates, Abo, Myco and Marbob all hold leases)

(Yates, Abo, Myco and Marbob all hold leases)

TABLE D-4

MINERAL OWNERS OF ONLY UNLEASED TRACT WITHIN ONE MILE RADIUS OF AGAVE METROPOLIS DISPOSAL #1 WELL

Section 1-Township 18S-Range 25E NW/4 NE/4

 B. E. Spencer Trust First National Bank
 P. O. Drawer AA Artesia, NM 88211

and and

Can the

10 mg

1. S. C. L.

1

- Wyatt A. Hartman
 W. B. Hickey
 Rt. #1 Box 181-A
 Chattahoochee, FL 32324
- Roy Hartman % Letha J. Hartman, 11025 Larkwood Apt. # 1701 Houston, TX 77096
- Margaret J. Carter 2032 Medusa Way Sacramento, CA 95825
- William Harold Robinson % Margaret J. Carter 2032 Medusa Way Sacramento, CA 95825
- Frances M. Mohr % Margaret J. Carter 2032 Medusa Way Sacramento, CA 95825

- 7. Spitler Family Trust
 % Homer Edward Spitler & Mildred Ilene Spitler
 30315 Santa Fe Street Hemet, CA 92343
- Martha Jane Ford 3520 Roselawn Glendale, CA 91208
- 9. Parrish Family Trust
 % James Paul Parrish & Carole D.
 Parrish
 1702 Paloma Avenue
 Glendale, CA 91208

TABLE D-5

RESIDENCES AND BUSINESS FACILITIES WITHIN ONE MILE RADIUS OF AGAVE METROPOLIS DISPOSAL #1 WELL

Section 31, Township 18 South, Range 26 East

N/2 N/2; Residences

1. Efren & Maria Baeza, 179 West Kincaid Ranch Road, Artesia, NM (Physical Address)

2. Raul and Delilah Baeza, 193 West Kincaid Ranch Road, Artesia, NM (Physical Address)

3. Christine Baeza, 175 West Kincaid Ranch Road, Artesia, NM (Physical Address)

Mailing Address: 314 N 14th Street, Artesia, NM 88210

Section 25, Township 18 South, Range 25 East

 Yates Petroleum Corporation 105 S. 4th Street Artesia, NM 88210 2.17 acre tract in SW/4; (tract 104-25.7 on map) Office & Warehouse

 Agave Energy Corporation P. O. Box 92108 Austin, TX 78709

Section 26, Township 18 South, Range 25 East

 Agave Energy Corporation P. O. Box 92108 Austin, TX 78709 .57 acre tract in SE/4 (tract 104-26.2 on map) Compressor Station

SE/4; Four Warehouse Buildings

25.38 acre tract in SW/4

(tract 104-25.8 on map)

Gas Processing Plant

 Yates Petroleum Corporation 207 S. 4th Street Artesia, NM 88210

Section 35, Township 18 South, Range 25 East

E/2; Home and Barns

 David Wilson
 80 West Kincaid Ranch Rd., Artesia, NM (Physical Address) Mailing Address: 235 N. Lake Rd., Artesia, NM 88210

OTHER AGENCIES REQUIRING NOTICE

 US Bureau of Land Management Carlsbad Field Office
 620 East Greene Street Carlsbad, NM 88220-6292

10. New Mexico State Land Office (included in notice to surface owners within one mile radius)

APPENDIX E – H₂S Contingency Plan Distribution List

New Mexico Oil Conservation Division 1301 West Grand Avenue Artesia, NM 88210-1729

New Mexico Department of Public Safety 4207 W 2nd Street Roswell, NM 88201-8857

Local Emergency Planning Committee 324 S Canyon Street, Suite B Carlsbad, NM 88210

Artesia Fire Department

100

124.34

N

distant.

1.1

A 396.4

5 (T.S.C.R.)

product ages

Arrente

ا دساليناه

20.02

Sara are

309 North 7th Street Artesia, NM 88210-1913

Atoka Fire Department 2611 South 13th Street

Artesia, NM 88210-9333

Eddy County Sheriff's Department

Eddy County Courthouse 102 N. Canal Carlsbad, NM 88220

Dagger Draw Plant

278 Pipeline Road Artesia, NM 88210

Agave Main Office

105 South 4th Street Artesia, NM 88210





H₂S Contingency Plan

Agave Dagger Draw Processing Plant and the Metropolis Disposal #1 Well



Agave Energy Company

105 South 4th Street Artesia, NM 88210 (575-748-4555)

December 20, 2010

FLL DORLOTS LAND FORM O(WOS) L' CLOSER?

GW-185 GA GW-53 GP GW-125 CS





TABLE OF CONTENTS

	Page
I. Introduction [API RP-55 7.1]	. 1
II. Scope [API RP-55 7.2]	. 1
III. Plan Availability [API RP-55 7.3]	. 1
 IV. Emergency Procedures	1
 V. Characteristics of Hydrogen Sulfide (H₂S), Sulfur Dioxide (SO₂), and Carbon Dioxide (CO₂) [NMAC 19.15.11.9.B(2)(b)][API RP-55 7.4 b.]. A. Characteristics of Hydrogen Sulfide (H₂S) B. Sulfur Dioxide (SO₂) C. Carbon Dioxide (CO₂) D. Radii of Exposure (ROE) 	10
VI. Facility Description, Maps, and Drawings [AC [19.15.11.9.B(2)(c)][API RP-55 7.4 c.] A. Dagger Draw Processing Plant B. Metropolis Disposal #1 Well C. Map of Plant and Well	14
 VII. Training and Drills [NMAC 19.15.11.9.B(2)(d)][API RP-55 7.4 d.] A. Responsibilities and Duties of Essential Personnel B. On-site or Classroom Drills C. Notification and Training of Residents on Protective Measures in Emergency Situations D. Training and Attendance Documentation E. Briefing of Public Officials on Evacuation and Shelter in Place Plans 	16
VIII. Coordination with State Emergency Plans [NMAC 19.15.11.9.B(2)(e)] A. Oil Conservation Division B. New Mexico State Police	16
 IX. Plan Activation [NMAC 19.15.11.9.C][API RP-55 7.4 d.] A. Activation Levels B. Events that Could Lead to a Release 	17



A

,

DRAFT

X. Submission of H₂S Contingency Plans

B. Retention

C. Inventory

MAPS AND FIGURES

- Map 1 Agave Dagger Draw Plant Facilities Locations
- Map 2 General Diagram of Agave Dagger Draw Gas Plant and Location of Pipeline Connecting Plant with Metropolis Disposal #1 Well

Figure 1 Photos of Pipeline

APPENDICES

Appendix A – Facility Maps and Drawings

- Map A-1: Facility Map
- Map A-2: Alarms and Monitors, Dagger Draw Active Equipment
- Map A-3: Safety and Fire Equipment, Dagger Draw Active Equipment
- Map A-4: Evacuation Router, Dagger Draw Active Equipment
- Map A-5: Proposed Perimeter Alarms
- Map A-6: Metropolis Disposal #1 Well

Appendix B – Response Flow Diagram

Appendix C – ROE Calculations

Map C-1: Facility, Pipeline and Well Site ROE

Appendix D – Muster Areas and Evacuation Routes Map D-1: Evacuation Routes to Muster Areas

Appendix E – Distribution List





OPERATOR QUICK REFERENCE GUIDE

Dagger Draw Processing Plant Level 1 Response FOR PLANT OR WELLHEAD ALARMS





Agave H₂S Contingency Plan



Location of Facilities

Agave Dagger Draw Processing Plant (See Map 1)

Go south of Artesia, NM on Hwy 285 approximately 9 miles to County Road 38 (Kincaid Ranch Road). Turn right (west) on Kincaid Ranch Road and go approximately 2.8 miles to Pipeline Road, Turn right (north) and go 0.2 miles to the Dagger Draw Gas Plant Office. Physical address is 278 Pipeline Road, Artesia, NM 88210.

Section 25-Township 18S-Range 25E

Metropolis Disposal #1 Well (See Map 1)

Go south of Artesia, NM on Hwy 285 approximately 9 miles to County Road 38 (Kincaid Ranch Road). Turn right (west) on Kincaid Ranch Road and go 2.6 miles (just past the Agave Field Office). Turn left (south) on dirt lease road and go approximately 0.6 miles then turn left (east) and go 0.2 miles to the Metropolis Disposal #1 Well. Section 36-Township 18S-Range 25E

Emergency Trailer – Atoka Facility Location (See Map 1)

From Artesia, drive south on Highway 285 to County Road 39. Turn east and drive approximately 2 miles. The facility is on the south side of the road in NW/NE Sec 14 18S 26 E.





I. Introduction

[API RP-55 7.1]

The Agave Dagger Draw Processing Plant is a natural gas processing plant which handles and/or generates hydrogen sulfide (H_2S) and/or sulfur dioxide (SO_2). This H_2S contingency plan was created to outline procedures that are to be followed in the event of an H_2S release that occurs at the plant, the acid gas well, or on the acid gas pipeline. The response plan is the same regardless of where the release takes place. This plan complies with the New Mexico Oil Conservation Division (OCD) Rule 11. This plan also conforms to API RP-55.

II. Scope

[API RP-55 7.2]

This contingency plan is specific to the Agave Dagger Draw Gas Processing Plant and acid gas injection system. This plan contains procedures to provide an organized response to an unplanned release from the plant, well site and pipeline connecting them.

III. Plan Availability

[API RP-55 7.3]

This contingency plan shall be available to all personnel responsible for implementing any portion of the plan. Copies of the plan will be distributed to the following agencies: New Mexico Oil Conservation Division (OCD), New Mexico Department of Public Safety, Local Emergency Planning Committee (LEPC), Artesia Fire Department, Atoka Fire Department, Artesia Police Department, and Eddy County Sheriff's Department. The Plan will be available at the following Agave Energy Company locations: Dagger Draw Processing Plant, the Artesia Field Office, Emergency Response Trailer at Atoka (Map 1) and the Agave Main Office in Artesia.

IV. Emergency Procedures

[NMAC 19.15.11.9.B(2)(a)] [API RP-55 7.4 a]

A. Responsibilities and Duties of Personnel during an Emergency

1. Plant Manager or designee will serve as the Incident Commander (IC); is responsible for training operators assigned to the plant, contractors and visitors on the implementation of this plan; and will maintain communication with Agave management and residents within the radius of exposure (ROE).

2. Plant Supervisor or designee will serve as the Incident Commander (IC) in the absence of the Plant Manager; is responsible for training and supervising plant operators on the implementation of this plan, will maintain accountability of all contractors and visitors; and will maintain communication with the plant manager and Agave management.

3. Plant Operators will perform operations in accordance with this safety plan; assist in the accountability and evacuation of visitors and contractors to designated muster areas; and keep the plant supervisor and manager informed on the repair progress.

4. Essential Agave Personnel will be familiar with the procedures in this plan and assist plant operators in assisting with the implementation of this plan in a safe manner.

5. Visitors and contractors on site will be familiar with safety alarms and signals at the Dagger Draw Gas Processing Plant and the acid gas injection system; and adhere to instructions of Plant Operators and other Agave personnel in evacuation of the facilities.





B. Immediate Action Plan

1. The following outlines the immediate action Plan that is illustrated by the response flow diagram in Appendix B. This is to be used when responding to an H_2S release. Response levels are the same for a release at the plant or the acid gas well. Additional or long term response actions will be determined on a case-by-case basis, if needed, once the Incident Command Center (ICC) and System (ICS) are established following the immediate response.

Level	Alarms	Actions
<u> </u>	Intermittent	1. The audible signal for a Plant emergency and evacuation is an intermittent alarm
	audible alarm	and yellow lights (repeating off/on) activated when levels of H ₂ S of 10 ppm or
	sounded	greater are detected. In addition, a flashing yellow light or beacon will be activated
	and/or	at 10 ppm or greater of H_2S . A computer in the control room and in the Plant
	flashing	Supervisor office establishes which H ₂ S monitor has activated the alarm and/or
	yellow lights	flashing yellow beacon, be it a plant monitor or well monitor. At the initial sound of
	activated for	the intermittent alarm or the flashing yellow beacon, assigned operators will put on
	H_2S at 10	a 30 minute self-contained breathing apparatus (SCBA) and all other personnel in
	ppm or	the Plant complex or well site shall immediately evacuate the Plant or well site to
	greater.	the Emergency Assembly Area. If H_2S concentrations are 10 ppm or greater, then
		personnel will evacuate to a designated Muster Area determined by the incident
		Commander (IC) (see Appendix D). The operators, upon suit up with the self-
		contained breatning apparatus (SCBA), will first neip any persons in distress
		evacuate to the Emergency Assembly Area. If deemed necessary by the Plant
		manager of Plant Supervisor, local emergency response service providers will be
		2. All entities within the 500 ppm radius of impact (POE) will be patified (by
		2. All entities within the 500 ppin radius of impact (ROL) will be notified (by
		greater. Notification will be done by personnel designated by the Plant Manager or
		his designee. The nature of the release and status of containment will be
		conveyed Businesses will be advised to report the incident to employees working
		hear the Plant and to alert any third party contractors or service companies
		working in the Plant vicinity or imminently scheduled to work in the vicinity of the
		release All should be instructed to leave the area and not to enter/re-enter area
		until further notice. Operators will put on self-contained breathing apparatus
		(SCBA).
		3. Wearing the self-contained breathing apparatus (SCBA), the operator(s) will
		attempt to fix the cause of the release. The H ₂ S levels at the Emergency Assembly
		Area will be monitored with a hand held or personal monitor and with the fixed
		monitor.
		4. The Incident Commander (IC) will set up secondary re-entry team(s) with 30
		minute self-contained breathing apparatus (SCBA) to re-enter and resolve the
	(situation. Re-entry will occur in 15 minute shifts at the direction of the Incident
		Commander (IC) until the problem is resolved or the emergency shut down (ESD)
		is activated. If H_2S levels in the Emergency Assembly Areas exceed 10 ppm H_2S ,
		evacuate to alternate Emergency Assembly Area and continue to monitor
		Emergency Assembly Area with personal or handheld H ₂ S monitors. If evacuation
		to Muster Area occurs, road blocks will be established near the Muster Areas on
		Kincaid and Pipeline Road. If release is resolved and monitored levels in the Plant
1	1	are less than 10 ppm H ₂ S, personnel may re-enter the Plant. The Oil Conservation
		Division (OCD) shall be notified within four hours of any release that activates the
		Plan. If the release is not resolved and H_2S levels continue to increase, Level 2
	1	L Response is indicated



DRAFT

Leveis	Alarms	Actions		
II Intermittent audible alarm sounded and/or flashing red lights activated for H ₂ S greater than 20 ppm II Intermittent alarm and sound of activated for H ₂ S greater than 20 ppm Iocated th using the Area (see assembly minute se service pr 2. All othe contacted monitor re impact (R release a and preva (ROE) ma are not lim a) Othe status entities conditio contact b) If a contact he release asombly minute set are not lim a) Othe status entities conditio contact he release and preva (ROE) ma are not lim a) Othe status entities conditio contact he release asombly minute set are not lim are not lim a) Othe status entities conditio contact he release and preva (ROE) ma are not lim a) Othe status entities conditio contact he release and preva (ROE) ma are not lim a) frac contact he release and preva (ROE) ma are not lim a) Othe status entities conditio contact he release and preva (ROE) ma are not lim a) Othe status entities conditio contact he release and preva (ROE) ma are not lim a contact he release and preva (ROE) ma are not lim a contact a contact he release and preva (ROE) ma are not lim a contact a		 Actions 1. The intermittent alarm and red flashing lights indicate the detection of H₂S greater than or equal to 20 ppm. (Flashing yellow lights indicate a H2S release of 10 ppm or greater and they will change to red for a release of 20 ppm or greater.) A control panel in the Plant supervisor's office establishes which H₂S monitor has activated the alarm and or flashing red beacon, be it a plant monitor or a well monitor. At the initial sound of the intermittent alarm or observance of the flashing red beacons, the operators will exit to the Muster Area designated by the Plant Manager or his designee. Other personnel in the Plant complex will put on emergency escape packs located throughout the plant, or well location and evacuate along with the operators using the evacuation routes to the Emergency Assembly Area and then to the Muster Area (see Appendix D) designated by the Plant Manager or designee. At the assembly area, the Plant Manager or designee will assign operators to put on a 30 minute self-contained breathing apparatus (SCBA). Local emergency response service providers will be contacted by Plant Manager or designee. 2. All other entities within the 100 ppm and 500 ppm radius of impact (ROE) will be contacted by plone and notified of release and asked to evacuate when a <u>perimeter monitor</u> reads 10 ppm H2S or greater . All entities within the 100 ppm radius of impact (ROE) will be contacted by phone and notified of release. The nature of the release and status of containment will be conveyed. Depending on release status and prevailing wind conditions, some entities within the 100 ppm radius of impact (ROE) may be asked to shelter in place or evacuate. Notifications will include but are not limited to the following: a) Other entities within the 100 ppm radius of impact (ROE), depending on release status and prevailing wind conditions, will be asked to shelter in place. Those entities will be instructed to close any windows and shut off any air conditioning/heating		
		service providers will be contacted by Plant Manager or designee.		
		contacted by phone and notified of release and asked to evacuate when a <u>perimeter</u> <u>monitor</u> reads 10 ppm H2S or greater . All entities within the 100 ppm radius of		
		impact (ROE) will be contacted by phone and notified of release. The nature of the release and status of containment will be conveyed. Depending on release status		
		and prevailing wind conditions, some entities within the 100 ppm radius of impact (ROE) may be asked to shelter in place or evacuate. Notifications will include but		
		are not limited to the following:		
		status and prevailing wind conditions, will be asked to shelter in place. Those		
		entities will be instructed to close any windows and shut off any air		
		conditioning/neating until further notice. In addition, they will be instructed to contact other employees/residents not currently present and instruct them not to		
		b) If a <u>perimeter monitor</u> is activated, the LEPC and law enforcement will be		
		contacted by phone and notified of the release and status of containment. The Incident Commander (IC) will assign personnel notification responsibility.		
		3. Operator(s) with 30 minute self-contained breathing apparatus (SCBA) will assess the release and attempt to resolve it. If after 45 minutes on scene there is no resolution the operator(s) will notify the Plant Manager to determine if the		
		emergency shut down (ESD) should be activated.		
		4. If monitored H_2S levels at Muster Area exceed 10 ppm, evacuate to an alternate Muster Area. If deemed necessary, local emergency response service providers will be contracted by the local energy of C_2 .		
		 a) Re-entry will occur in full self-contained breathing apparatus (SCBA) and in 15 minute shifts at the direction of the IC until IC determines problem has been received or emergency shut downs (ESDs) are estivated. 		
		b) If release is resolved and monitored levels of H_2S in the Plant are less than 10		
		ppm, personnel may return to Plant. The Oil Conservation Division (OCD) shall be notified within four hours of any release that activates the Plan. All entities		
		previously notified will be informed that the release has been resolved and advised of the current monitored H ₂ S levels at the Plant		
		c) No resolution requires activation of full H_2S Plan with notifications and reporting as per Plan. If the release is not resolved and/or H_2S levels continue to increase.		
		Level 3 Response is indicated. d) Monitoring will continue after problems are abated, at the direction of the Plant		
[Manager.		



DRAFT

Level	Alarms	Actions
	Intermittent	1. If H ₂ S is at 20 ppm or greater and repair efforts at Level 2 have been
	audible alarm	unsuccessful, worst case scenario, and/or catastrophic release have occurred, then
	sounded	implement a Level 3 response.
	and/or	2. Road blocks will be set up near the Muster Areas on Kincaid Road and Pipeline
	flashing red	Road.
	lights	3. All personnel shall have evacuated to a designated Muster Areas. Evacuation of
	activated for	all entities within the 500 ppm radius of impact (ROE) will have been confirmed.
	catastrophic	Implement full H_2S Plan with all notifications and public agency involvement.
	release; fire;	Notifications to all entities within the 100 ppm radius of impact (ROE) will include the
	or explosion	nature of the release and status of containment. Notifications will include but are not
		Imited to the following.
	ESD alarmis	a) All businesses within the 100 ppm radius of impact (ROE) will be instructed to immediately alort all company personnel, third party contractors and/or services
	siren with red	companies working in the area, and those imminently scheduled to work in the
	amber and	area, of the release and evacuation status of the Plant. They will be instructed to
	blue lights that	immediately leave and/or not enter/reenter the area within the roadblocks until
	flash	further instruction.
		b) All other entities (including private residents) within the 100 ppm radius of
		impact (ROE) will be instructed to immediately shelter in place, if appropriate
		based on the source of the release and the wind direction. Those entities will be
		instructed to close any windows and shut off any air conditioning/heating until
		further notice. In addition, they will be instructed to contact other
		employees/residents not currently present to not enter/reenter the area until
		further instruction.
		c) The Incident Commander (IC) will make the decision based on, but not limited
		to, H_2S concentration and wind direction, whether a safe evacuation can be
		Implemented, and recommend an evacuation route.
		4. If escaping vapors have ignited, the vapors should be allowed to continue to burn uplose the fire endangers personnel, other preperty, or other equipment
		5 When applicable maintain communication with the Plant Manager or his
		designee to keen him un-to-date of the situation and the action taken prior to his
		arrival at the location
		6. Initiate and maintain a Chronological Record of Events log.
		7. Within one hour after the activation of the H ₂ S Plan, begin agency notifications by
		calling Oil Conservation Division (OCD) and National Response Center (NRC).
		8. Establish media staging area adjacent to Muster Area 2 and direct all media to it.
		9. Once resolved and monitored levels in the Plant and at Muster Area are less than
		10 ppm, roadblocks will be removed, and all entities within the 100 ppm radius of
		impact (ROE) will be allowed to return. All entities previously notified will be informed
		that the release has been resolved and advised of the current monitored H ₂ S levels.
		10. Monitoring will continue after problems are abated, at the direction of the Plant
		Manager
		11. Agency reports to be submitted as required.



C. Telephone Numbers and Communication Methods

1. Emergency Services

AGENCY	TELEPHONE #
Artesia Fire Department	(575) 946-5050
Atoka Fire Department	(575) 946-5050
Artesia Police Department	(575) 746-5000
Eddy County Sheriff	(575) 887-7551
Carlsbad Police Department	(575) 885-2111
State Police (HMER)	
District 3 Roswell	(575) 827-9312
Sub District 3 Carlsbad	(575) 885-3138
Sub District 3 Hobbs	(575) 827-9320
Ambulance Services	
Artesia	(575) 746-5050
Carlsbad	(575) 885-2111
Hospitals	
Artesia General	(575) 748-3333
Carlsbad Medical Center	(575) 887-4100
Veterinarians	
Artesia Animal Clinic	(575) 748-2042
Livingston Animal Clinic	(575) 746-6167
Helicopter Services	
Lifeguard (Albuquerque)	1-800-633-5438
Southwest Medivac (Hobbs)	1-800-242-6199
AeroCare (Lubbock)	1-800-627-2376
Air Med (El Paso)	(915) 772-1449

2. Government Agencies

AGENCY	TELEPHONE #
Oil Conservation Division (OCD)	(505) 476-3440
	(575) 748-1283
US BLM	(575) 887-6544
Local Emergency Planning Committee (LEPC)	(575) 887-9511
National Response Center (NRC)	1-800-424-8802

3. Operators and Contractors

COMPANY	TELEPHONE #
CVE	(575) 746-3571
PVT	(575) 748-1241
DCP Midstream	(800) 435-1679
Chevron/West Texas Pipeline Company	(800) 762-3404
Transwestern Pipeline	(281) 714-2265
Yates Petroleum Corporation	(575) 748-1471



DRAFT

4. Public		
Name	Address	TELEPHONE #
David and Diana Wilson	80 West Kincaid Ranch Road	(575) 457-2309
Raul and Delilah Baeza	193 West Kincaid Ranch Road	(575) 308-3195
Efrin and Maria Baeza	179 West Kincaid Ranch Road	(575) 513-0471
Christine Baeza	175 West Kincaid Ranch Road	(575) 457-2585

5. Agave Internal Call List

NAME	TITLE	Office #	Cell #
J.B. Smith	President	(575) 748-4414	(575) 365-8517
Rusty Nasta	Operations Manager	(575) 748-4523	(575) 626-7971
Ivan Villa	Engineering Supervisor	(575) 748-4528	(575) 365-4888
Jennifer Knowlton	Environmental Engineer	(575) 748-4528	(505) 238-3588
Robert Moorhead	Plant Manager/South Mechanical	(575) 748-6815	(575) 365-4840
	Supervisor		
Gary Greenwood	Plant Supervisor	(575) 748-8414	(575) 365-6794
Mark Smith	PSM Coordinator/Plant Operator	(575) 748-8410	(575) 365-5053
Dustin McNeely	Plant Operator	N/A	(575) 703-5493
Justin Troublefield	Plant Operator	N/A	(575) 365-7503
Glen Blake	Regulatory Coordinator	(575) 748-4546	(575) 626-8168
Bill Johnson	South Measurement Supervisor	(575) 748-6816	(575) 365-4615
Jason Fuentes	South Pipeline Supervisor	(575) 748-4518	(575) 365-8939

6. Agave Energy Company will use 2-way radios and telephones to communicate internally. Telephone will be used for external communication.

D. Location of Nearby Residences, Roads, and Medical Facilities

- 1. The following residences are located within the ROE of the:
 - a) Plant -- None
 - b) Metropolis Disposal #1 Well None
 - c) Pipeline None
- 2. The following roads are located within the ROE:
 - a) Kincaid Ranch Road
 - b) Pipeline Road
- 3. There are no medical facilities located within the ROE.

E. Evacuation Routes, Emergency Assembly Area, Muster Areas, and Road Block Locations

1. Evacuation Routes, Emergency Assembly Area, and Muster Areas are depicted on Map D-1 in Appendix D.

2. Pre-planned road block locations are designated near the muster areas on Pipeline Road and Kincaid Ranch Road and are depicted on Map D-1 in Appendix D. Each location will have pre-positioned, portable road barriers with lights. The locations will have flashing lights and warning signs. If the release is sufficient to require evacuation to muster areas, then roadblocks near the muster areas on Kincaid Ranch Road and Pipeline Road to the west and north of the facility, respectively, will be established. The Incident Commander (IC) will designate a representative to staff each of the two roadblocks. If deemed necessary by the Incident Commander (IC), the State or Local Police will be asked to assist with maintaining the roadblocks.

3. Emergency lights on the Muster Area signs will be activated by any <u>perimeter alarm</u> of 10 ppm or greater H_2S or Level III activation.

F. Monitoring Equipment, Alarm Systems, Safety Equipment, and Supplies Available 1. EMERGENCY SHUTDOWN SYSTEM: There are (8) ESD manual stations located at various points in the facility. See Maps A-2 and A-3 in Appendix A. The Plant ESD can be activated at any time by any employee or at the direction of the Incident Commander (IC).

When any one of the eight (8) manual stations is activated, the system will be shutdown and the natural gas inlets and outlets will be blocked. The operators are also able to auto close the one (1) main block valve on the incoming gas line to the Plant. Activating these should allow the plant to avoid a Level 3 response. The Incident Commander (IC) can send trained personnel to designated off-site manual block valves. There are also various methods to shut down gas flow at the various wellheads and incoming gathering lines. These can and would be evaluated on a case by case basis.

Designated employees will have remote access to the plant controls including ESD capabilities.

2. PLANT ALARMS, VISIBLE BEACONS & WIND INDICATORS: Colored beacons, horns, and wind direction indicators are located in various locations throughout the Plant and are indicated in Appendix A on Maps A-2, A-3, and A-6.

The audible signal for an emergency response and Plant evacuation is a repeating intermittent alarm that sounds at H_2S concentrations of 10 ppm or greater. The alarm will remain intermittent when the concentration of the H_2S release is 20 ppm or higher. At the initial sound of this intermittent alarm, the plant operators will evacuate to the emergency assembly area put on a self-contained breathing apparatus (SCBA) and all personnel in the plant complex shall immediately proceed in a safe manner to the Emergency Assembly Areas as prescribed by the Emergency Action Plan.

A flashing red beacon signifies an H_2S release of 20 ppm or higher and all personnel in the plant complex shall immediately proceed in a safe manner to the Emergency Assembly Area located outside of the plant office. If this area is not determined to be safe, all will move to designated Muster Area. Evacuation routes and Muster Areas are indicated on the map in Appendix A, on Map A-4 and A-6 as well as Appendix D, on Map D-1.

A routine process alarm will cause a horn to sound. This horn sound is used to alert the plant Operator to return to the Control Room. No emergency response or evacuation is required when this horn sounds.

Wind direction indicators are installed throughout the plant. At least one wind direction indicator can be seen at any location within the Plant complex, as well as from any point on the perimeter of the plant. There are ten (10) windsocks located in the Plant.



3. GAS DETECTION EQUIPMENT: The Plant uses a Smart Sensor System fixed plant H_2S Sensors. These sensors are a fixed point monitoring system used to detect the presence of hydrogen sulfide in ambient air. The yellow flashing beacon is activated at H_2S concentrations of 10 ppm or greater. The horn is activated with an intermittent alarm at H_2S concentrations of 10 ppm or greater. The lights change to red at 20 ppm H_2S and the horn remains intermittent. The fixed hydrogen sulfide monitors are strategically located throughout the Plant to detect an uncontrolled released of hydrogen sulfide. The Plant operators are able to monitor the H2S level of all the Plant sensors on the control monitor located in the control room and the Dagger Draw Plant Field Office. In addition, select employees can access this information remotely. These sensors all have to be acknowledged and will not clear themselves. This requires immediate action for any occurrence or malfunction. The Plant sensors are calibrated monthly.

Redline wireless H_2S detectors are installed along the perimeter of the plant and the perimeter of the acid gas disposal well. Perimeter H_2S detectors report to the Redline monitor every five minutes to confirm detector functionality. Once H_2S gas is detected, the H_2S detectors report to the monitor every five seconds. The detectors will go into alarm at H_2S values of 10 ppm and above. Redline H_2S head unit locations are depicted on Map A-5 and A-6 in Appendix A.

Handheld gas detection monitors are available to plant personnel to check specific areas and equipment prior to initiating maintenance or work on the process equipment. There are 3 handheld monitors and each individual is assigned a personal H₂S monitor. The handheld gas detection devices are Industrial Scientific ITX 3-gas detectors and BW Gas Alert Micro 5 4-way monitors. The detectors have sensors for oxygen, LEL (explosive hydrocarbon atmospheres), hydrogen sulfide, and carbon dioxide. They indicate the presence of H₂S with a beeping sound at 10 ppm. The beeps change in tone as H₂S increases to 20 ppm. The personal monitors are set to alarm (beep) at 10 ppm with the beeps becoming closer together as the H₂S concentration increases to 20 ppm. Both the handheld and personal monitors have digital readouts of H₂S ppm concentration.

a) The compressor building has two methane sensors; one sends a call out at 30% lower explosive limit (LEL); the second shuts the compressors down at 50% lower explosive limit (LEL). The methane sensors are visual and audible alarms. The compressor building also is equipped with fire eyes that will also shut the units down. The four product pumps also have LEL sensors.

4. RESPIRATORS: The Plant has 30 minute self-contained breathing apparatus (SCBA) respirators and 5 minute escape packs strategically located throughout the Plant. The respirator locations are identified in Appendix A on Maps A-3 and A-6. All Plant personnel are certified to use the self-contained breathing apparatus (SCBA) respirators.

5. FIRE FIGHTING EQUIPMENT: The Plant personnel are trained only for insipient stage fire fighting. The fire extinguishers located in the Plant process areas, compressor buildings, process buildings, and company vehicles are typically a 20# ABC dry chemical fire extinguisher. See Appendix A, Maps A-3 and A-6 for locations. The Plant does not have a fire water system, only a utility water system that is not designed for fire fighting.

6. EMERGENCY RESPONSE TRAILER AND EQUIPMENT: Agave Energy Company has an Emergency Response Trailer located at the Atoka Facility (Map 1; Map D-2 Appendix D). This is located outside all radii of exposure (ROE) from the facility along the pipeline to the well.

Driving Directions: From Artesia, drive south on Highway 285 to County Road 39. Turn east and drive approximately 2 miles. The facility is on the south side of the road in the NW/NE Sec 14 18S 26 E. See Map D-2 in Appendix D. The trailer can serve as a mobile resource center or Incident Command Center.

a) EMERGENCY RESPONSE TRAILER CONTENTS

- 2 wind socks / wind direction indicators w/poles & spares
- 1 110 volt generator, portable w/wheels
- 4 5-gas sensor ambient monitors (O₂, SO₂, LEL, CO, H₂S) with automatic air pumps (15 sec per foot) and data logging capability
- 1 calibration unit for monitors
- 5 intrinsically safe communication radios & chargers, 32 channel with capability to be programmed to fire service and police channels
- 4 20# stored pressure, ABC class Fire Extinguishers
- 4 4500 Grade D breathing air cylinders, regulator, low pressure alarm, and hose reel w/ 300 ft hose (total) and correct quick disconnects.
- 1 stretcher
- 1 20-person First Aid Kit with burn gel packets
- 4 30-minute SCBA's
- 4 work unit SCBA's
- 2 lights, mounted on each rear of trailer for night operations
- 2 hand cleaner for decontamination of petroleum products.
- 3 traffic Control Kits
- 1 emergency flare gun for lighting uncontrollable hazardous gases
- 2 full body harness and 150' X 2 lifelines
- 2 "Hazardous Area" "Do Not Enter" signs / barricades
- 2 burn gel blankets
- 1 set of maps and Emergency Response Plans
- 4 temporary use Nomex Fire retardant clothing (2-LG & 2-XLG)
- 7. TRAFFIC CONTROL KIT CONTENTS
 - 3 electronic road flares
 - 1 28" stop sign paddle
 - 4 reflective traffic control vests
 - 2 emergency signal wands
 - 1 emergency Response Guidebook
- 8. FIRST AID EQUIPMENT LOCATIONS:
 - a) First Aid Kits are located at the following locations:
 - Lab
 - Office
 - b) Eye Wash stations are located at the following locations:
 - Lab
 - Office

9. PERSONAL H₂S MONITORS: All Agave personnel assigned to the Plant and associated field personnel are issued personal H₂S monitors.

10. SIGNS and MARKERS: The Plant has warning signs indicating the presence of " H_2S /Poisonous Gas" and high pressure gas at the entrance to the Plant. Emergency response phone numbers are posted at the entrance to the Plant. Signs are located at the Plant gate entrance indicating that all visitors are to sign in.

V. Characteristics of Hydrogen Sulfide (H₂S), Sulfur Dioxide (SO₂) and Carbon Dioxide (CO₂) [NMAC 19.15.11.9.B(2)(b)] [API RP-55 7.4 b.]

A. Hydrogen Sulfide (H₂S): Hydrogen Sulfide (H₂S): The proposed inlet gas streams into the Plant will contain a maximum of 7,600 ppm (or 0.76 mole percent) of hydrogen sulfide based on data generated from the sampling of the inlet gas at least daily. Hydrogen sulfide is a colorless, toxic and flammable gas, and has the odor of rotten eggs. Hydrogen sulfide gas is heavier than air. Hydrogen sulfide presents a significant health hazard by paralyzing the respiratory system resulting in serious injury or death.

Hydrogen Sulfide Properties and Characteristics				
CAS No.			7783-06-4	
Molecular Formula			H ₂ S	
Molecular Weight			34.082 g/mol	
Ceiling Concentration			20 ppm (OSHA)	
Ceiling Peak Concentration	ו		50 ppm (OSHA)	
TLV			15 ppm (ACGIH)	
TWA			10 ppm (NIOSH)	
STEL			15 ppm (ACGIH)	
IDLH			100 ppm	
Specific Gravity Relative to	Air (Air=1	.0)	1.189	
Boiling Point			-76.5F	
Freezing Point			-121.8F	
Vapor Pressure			396 psia	
Autoignition Temperature			518F	
Lower Flammability Limit			4.3%	
Upper Flammability Limit			46.0%	
Stability			Stable	
pH in water			3	
Corrosivity	/ Reacts with metals, plastics, tissues and ne			
	Physic	al Effects of	f Hydrogen Sulfide	
Concentration		·····		
Ppm	%	Physical Effects		
11	0.00010	Can be smelled (rotten egg odor)		
10 0.0010 Obvious & 1			unpleasant odor; Permissible exposure level; safe	
for 8 hour e			xposure	
20	0.0020	Acceptable ceiling concentration		
50	0.0050	Loss of sense of smell in 15 minutes		
100 0.0100 Immediately			y dangerous to life and health(IDLH) loss of sense	
of smell in 3			3-15 minutes; stinging in eyes & throat; Altered	
breathing				
200 0.0200 Kills smell rapidly: stinging in eves & throat			apidly: stinging in eyes & throat	





500	0.0500	Dizziness; Unconscious after short exposure; Need artificial respiration
700	0.0700	Unconscious quickly; death will result if not rescued promptly
1000	0.1000	Instant unconsciousness; followed by death within minutes

B. Sulfur Dioxide (SO₂): Sulfur dioxide is produced as a by-product of H_2S combustion at the flare. The flare unit receives the residual hydrogen sulfide and carbon dioxide stream that is routed from the amine unit. It is colorless, transparent, and is non-flammable, with a pungent odor associated with burning sulfur. Sulfur dioxide is heavier than air, but will be picked up by a breeze and carried downwind at elevated temperatures. Sulfur dioxide can be extremely irritating to the eyes and mucous membranes of the upper respiratory tract.

Sulfur Dioxide Properties & Characteristics			
CAS No.		7446-09-5	
Molecular Formula		SO ₂	
Molecular Weight		64.07 g/mol	
PEL		5 ppm(OSHA)	
TWA		2 ppm(ACGIH)	
STEL		5 ppm(ACGIH)	
IDLH		100 ppm	
Specific Gravity Relative to Air (Air = 1.0))	2.26	
Boiling Point		14°F	
Freezing Point		-103.9°F	
Vapor Pressure		49.1 psia	
Auto ignition Temperature		N/A	
Lower Flammability Limit		N/A	
Upper Flammability Limit		N/A	
Stability		Stable	
Corrosivity		Could form an acid rain in aqueous solutions	
Physical Effects of Sulfur Dioxide			
Concentration	· .	Effect	
1 ppm	Pungent o	dor, may cause respiratory changes	
2 ppm	Permissible exposure limit; Safe for an 8 hour exposure		
3-5 ppm Pungent o		dor; normally a person can detect sulfur	
dioxide in the second s		this range	
5 ppm Short Terr		n Exposure Limit (STEL); Safe for 15 minutes	
of exposu		e	
12 ppm Throa		I froat irritation, coughing, chest constriction, eyes tear	
100			
100 ppm	Immediately Dangerous To Life & Health (IDLH)		
	So irritating that it can only be endured for a few minutes		
500 ppm Causes a sense of suffocation, even with first brea		sense of suffocation, even with first breath	
1,000 ppm Death may result unless rescued promptly.		result unless rescued promptly.	



C. Carbon Dioxide (CO₂): The proposed inlet streams into the Plant will contain a maximum of 383,100 ppm (or 38.31 mole percent) of carbon dioxide based on data generated from the sampling of the inlet gas at least daily. Carbon dioxide gas is colorless, odorless and non-flammable and is heavier than air.

Carbon E	Dioxide Properties & Ch	aracteristics
CAS No.		124-38-9
Molecular Formula		CO ₂
Molecular Weight		44.010 g/mol
TWA		5,000 ppm
STEL		30,000 ppm
IDLH		40,000 ppm
Specific Gravity Relative to Air (Air = 1.0)		1.5197
Boiling Point		-109.12°F
Freezing Point	· · ·	-69.81°F
Vapor Pressure	· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·	830 psia
Autoignition Temperature	· ·	N/A
Lower Flammability Limit		N/A
Upper Flammability Limit		N/A
Stability	· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·	Stable
pH in Saturated Solution		3.7
Corrosivity		dry gas is relatively inert & not corrosive; can be corrosive to mild steels in aqueous solutions
Phy	sical Effects of Carbon	Dioxide
Concentration	Effect	
1.0 %	Breathing rate increases slightly	
2.0 %	Breathing rate increases to 50% above normal level. Prolonged exposure can cause headache, tiredness	
3.0 %	Breathing rate increases to twice normal rate and	
	becomes labored. Wea	ak narcotic effect. Impaired
	hearing, headache, incl rate	reased blood pressure and pulse
4 – 5 %	Breathing increases to approximately four times normal rate, symptoms of intoxication become evident, and slight choking may be felt	
5 – 10 %	Characteristic sharp odor noticeable. Very labored	
	breathing, headache, visual impairment, and ringing in the ears. Judgment may be impaired, followed within minutes by loss of consciousness	
10 – 100 %	Unconsciousness occurs more rapidly above 10% level. Prolonged exposure to high concentrations may eventually result in death from asphyxiation	



D. Radii of Exposure (ROE) [NMAC 19.15.11.7.K]

The basis for worst case scenario calculations is as follows:

- •The hydrogen sulfide content of the inlet natural gas stream into the Agave Dagger Draw Gas Plant is variable, ranging upwards to 7,600 parts per million (ppm) or 0.76 mole percent. In reality, the actual H₂S concentration that the plant processes will be much less than this.
- •The inlet gas H_2S concentration of 0.76 mole percent was determined using a massbalance approach, an analysis of 60.8 mole percent H_2S in the acid gas stream and a maximum acid gas flow rate of 0.5 MMSCFD. It is assumed that the amine system removes 100% of the H_2S from the inlet gas.
- The plant has a maximum daily (24 hour) processing volume of 40 MMSCF.
- •The worst case scenario radius of exposure (ROE) also assumes an uncontrolled instantaneous release from the area around either the Metropolis Disposal #1 Well, the amine still at the facility and/or at any point along the pipeline connecting the two of the above referenced volume and concentration. Because the Plant is a throughput process plant, it is impossible that the entire 24 hour-throughput volume of the Plant could be released instantaneously as is assumed in the worst case scenario calculations of the ROE. However, to comply with NMAC 19.15.11, that assumption is the worst case scenario in the formulas/calculations provided here.

It should further be noted that the reason this rate, used as worst case, could not be released over a 24 hour period is the Plant's emergency shutdown (ESD) systems would be activated. The emergency shutdown (ESD) would prevent the flow of gas into the Plant in the event of an emergency. See Appendix C and Map C-1 for more information.

The formulas for calculating the two radius of exposure (ROE) are as follows:

100 ppm Radius of Exposure Calculation (as per 19 NMAC 15.11.7.K.1):

X=[(1.589)(hydrogen sulfide concentration)(Q)]

500 ppm Radius of Exposure Calculation (as per 19 NMAC 15.11.7.K.2):

X=[(0.4546)(hydrogen sulfide concentration)(Q)]

Where:

X = radius of exposure in feet

"hydrogen sulfide concentration" = the decimal equivalent of the mole or volume fraction of hydrogen sulfide in the gaseous mixture

Q = Escape rate expressed in cubic feet per day (corrected for standard conditions of 14.73 psi absolute and 60 degrees Fahrenheit)

Amine Unit (Facility)

500-ppm ROE	1648 feet
100-ppm ROE	3606 feet

Pipeline

500-ppm ROE	1648 feet
100-ppm ROE	3606 feet

Acid Gas Disposal Well

500-ppm ROE	1648 feet
100-ppm ROE	3606 feet

The ROE for the facility, pipeline and well are shown on Map C-1 of Appendix C. This ROE pattern is designed to include the 100 and 500 ppm radii for a potential worst case failure at any point in the system from the facility at the north to the well to the south.

VI. Facility Description, Maps, and Drawings [NMAC 19.15.11.9.B(2)(c)] [API RP-55 7.4 c.]

A. Dagger Draw Processing Plant Description of Operations- The primary function of the plant is to remove H_2S and CO_2 from sour field gas so that the gas can meet pipeline specifications. The plant has been designated a primary Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) Code of 1311. The operation of the Agave Dagger Draw Gas Plant is intended to process 40 MMSCFD of gas. The facility is authorized to operate continuously (8,760 hr/yr) at design maximum capacity processing rates. The gas will be treated to remove acid gas components, dehydrated to remove water and processed to remove heavy (liquid) hydrocarbons from the gas stream. Several plant systems will be involved to perform these functions.

The amine unit is designed to remove acid gas components (carbon dioxide, hydrogen sulfide and mercaptans) from the natural gas stream. These components are removed from the natural gas because they are corrosive, hazardous to health, and reduce the heating value of the natural gas stream. In addition, the carbon dioxide can freeze in the cryogenic unit forming dry ice and forcing the shutdown of the facility. This is known as the gas sweetening process. The acid gas removed by the amine unit will be disposed of by either acid gas injection into a disposal well or by incinerating in a flare. The preferred method of disposal will be to compress the gas and inject it into the well. Under emergency situations, the gas will be flared to prevent the emission of lethal hydrogen sulfide to atmosphere.

The glycol dehydration unit will receive approximately 40.0 MMSCFD of treated gas (sweet) from the amine unit and reduce the water content of the gas by circulating triethylene glycol (TEG). Molecular sieve dehydration is used upstream of the cryogenic processes to achieve a -150°F dew point. The process uses two molecular sieve vessels with one vessel in service absorbing moisture from the gas stream and the other vessel in the regeneration mode.

The cryogenic unit is designed to liquefy natural gas components from the sweet, dehydrated inlet gas by removing work (heat) from the gas by means of the turbo expander. The cryogenic unit recovers natural gas liquids (NGL) by cooling the gas stream



to extremely cold temperatures (-150°F) and condensing components such as ethane, propane, butanes and heavier hydrocarbons. Once the sweet, dry gas exits the cryogenic unit, it needs to be recompressed to approximately 800 to 1200 psi before the gas is sent to the main transportation pipeline. This is accomplished with two 2500 horsepower electric drive compressors.

The hot oil system in the plant is used to provide heat to certain processes within the facility. The system will circulate approximately 600 GPM of hot oil and deliver 15.5 MMBTU/hr to other processes.

B. Metropolis Disposal #1 Well Description of Operations- The low pressure (< 10 psig), acid gas stream from the amine unit is routed to the acid gas compressor. The stream is then subject to a series of compression and cooling cycles, thus dehydrating and compressing the acid gas stream to a pressure of approximately 1150 psig. The high pressure acid gas stream then flows through a 2" stainless steel pipeline to the injection well site. At this point, the stream is introduced into the well.

There are a number of safeguards designed to prevent leaks or overpressure of the system. The acid gas compressor is equipped with multiple pressure transmitters. These transmitters monitor compressor suction and discharge pressures and are programmed to shut the acid gas system down when the pressures fall outside a pre-programmed operating range. As an additional safeguard, the compressor panel is also equipped with high and low pressure shutdowns for each stage of compression that will shut the compressor down when pressures reach preset high and low pressure set points.

As shown on Map 2, the acid gas pipeline runs from the Agave Dagger Draw Plant in a southwesterly direction, crosses Kincaid Ranch Road at the plant boundary and continues southwesterly along a gravel road for approximately 3680 feet. The pipeline then turns east along the Metropolis Disposal #1 Well access road for an additional 900 feet to the wellhead. South of Kincaid Ranch Road, the pipeline and well are entirely contained within Section 36, Township 18 South, Range 25 East. This land is owned by the State of New Mexico. Agave Energy has the following three Rights-of-Way from the State of New Mexico in this section for the pipeline: R18068, R17745 and R17949. The Metropolis Disposal #1 Well Site is covered under Yates Petroleum Company Oil Leases VO-6141-0000 and E1-0165-0001. The pipeline is buried at a depth of 6-1/2 feet for its entire length and is marked, as required, with permanent surface markers. (See Map 2 and Figure 1)

The acid gas pipeline is constructed from 2" inch 304 stainless steel tubing. The pipeline has been designed with a maximum allowable working pressure of 2350 psig. Historical injection pressures average 1150 psig. For leak detection purposes, the 2" acid gas line has been encased in 6" SDR 11 polyethylene pipe. A "sweet" gas stream flows through the annulus between the 6" and 2" pipelines at a preset pressure and flow rate. This sweet gas stream is monitored continuously for H₂S and over/ under pressure. If any one variable falls outside the predetermined operating range, the acid gas compressor is shut down and the acid gas stream is routed to the flare.

Safeguards for the acid gas injection well consist of a subsurface safety valve. This valve is designed to isolate and shut in the injection well if a leak occurs along the acid gas pipeline or at the surface of the well.





C. Map of Plant and Metropolis Disposal #1 Well

See Appendix A, Map A-1

VII. Training and Drills

[NMAC 19.15.11.9.B(2)(d)] [API RP-55 7.4 d]

A. Responsibilities and Duties of Essential Personnel

1. Personnel responsible for implementing this plan shall be trained on their duties and responsibilities related to this plan during the annual on-site or table top training exercises.

2. Plant Orientation Training - All Plant personnel, visitors, and contractors must attend a Plant overview orientation prior to obtaining permission to enter the Plant. A refresher course on this training is required annually for all persons. This training also complies with the requirements of the Agave Energy Company Process Safety Management Program and Procedures Manual.

B. On-site or Classroom Drills

Agave Energy Company may use table top exercises as well as hands on emergency response training methods. Agave Energy Company shall conduct a table top exercise annually at a minimum.

C. Notification and Training of Others on Protective Measures in Emergency Situations

Affected residents will be invited to participate and/or observe annual drills, as well as being briefed on notification, evacuation, and shelter in place plans.

D. Training and Attendance Documentation

All training and drills will be documented. Documentation shall include sign in sheets, synopsis of the training conducted, and an after action review of the training.

E. Briefing of Public Officials on Evacuation and Shelter in Place Plans

Local law enforcement, first responders, and fire personnel will also be invited to participate and/or observe annual drills, as well as being briefed on notification, evacuation, and shelter in place plans.

VIII. Coordination with State Emergency Plans

[NMAC 19.15.11.9.B(2)(e)]

A. Oil Conservation Division (OCD)

1. Oil Conservation Division (OCD) will be notified with an automatic email to the District II office advising of the activation of the H_2S Contingency Plan if any of the alarms are activated at 10 ppm H_2S or greater. In the event of a power failure, a phone call will be made within four hours. All subsequent paperwork will be filed in a timely fashion.

B. New Mexico State Police/ New Mexico Hazardous Materials Emergency Response Plan

1. The New Mexico State Police are responsible for overall scene management and coordination of all resources. A designated Emergency Response Officer (ERO) will establish the National Interagency Incident Management System (NIIMS) Incident Command System (ICS) as the Incident Commander (IC) and be responsible for management of all response resources on scene. Off-scene coordination of response resources will be handled through designated Headquarters Emergency Response Officers. Law enforcement-related activities will be coordinated by State Police.

IX. Plan Activation

[NMAC 19.15.11.9.C] [API RP-55 7.4 d]

A. Activation Levels

Level 1 – Intermittent alarm sounded and/or flashing amber beacons activated for H_2S greater than or equal to 10 ppm

Level 2 – Intermittent alarm sounded and/or flashing red beacons activated for H_2S greater than or equal to 20 ppm

Level 3 –Catastrophic release; fire; explosion; a continuous release of maximum volume for 24 hours; or NMAC 19.15.11: mandatory activation of indication of 100 ppm in any defined public area; 500 ppm at any public road; or 100 ppm at a distance greater than 3000 feet from the site or the release. Because the 100 ppm radius of impact (ROE) boundary is greater than 3000 feet from the site of release, a Level 3 response would occur before the escape of the 24 hour release volume.

B. Events that Could Lead to a Release of H₂S

- Inlet and plant piping failure
- Amine still failure
- Flange/gasket leaks on inlet and plant piping
- Flange/gasket leaks on the acid gas compressor
- Flange/gasket leaks at metropolis disposal well
- Failure of acid gas pipeline
- Valve packing
- Seal failure on acid gas compressor
- Failure of flare to ignite during Plant emergency blow down

X. Submission of H₂S Contingency Plans

[NMAC 19.15.11.9.D]

A. Submission

1. Agave Energy Company will submit the H₂S Contingency Plan to the Oil Conservation Division (OCD).

B. Retention

1. Agave Energy Company shall maintain a copy of the contingency plan in the Main Office at 105 South 4th Street in Artesia, NM. The plan shall be readily accessible for review by the Oil Conservation Division (OCD) upon request.

C. Inventory

1. Agave Energy Company will file an annual inventory of wells, facilities and operations for which plans are on file with the Oil Conservation Division (OCD), to the Local Emergency Planning Committee (LEPC) and the State Emergency Response Commission as per NMAC 19.15.11.

2. The inventory shall include the name, address, telephone number, and point of contact for all operations in which plans are on file.



MAPS AND FIGURES

MAP 1: Agave Dagger Draw Plant Facilities Locations

- MAP 2: General Diagram of Agave Dagger Draw Gas Plant and Location of Pipeline Connecting Plant with Metropolis Disposal #1 Well
- FIGURE 1: Photos of Pipeline







Map 2: General Diagram of Agave Dagger Draw Gas Plant and Location of Pipeline Connecting the Plant with the Metropolis Disposal #1 Well



Figure 1: Photos of Pipeline Connecting Agave Energy's Dagger Draw Gas Plant With Metropolis Disposal #1 well. A) Acid Gas Compressed at the Gas Plant is Introduced to a 2" Stainless Steel Pipeline Surrounded by a 6" Polyethylene Pipe. Pipeline Integrity is Monitored Using a Stream of Sweet Natural Gas in the Volume Between the Two Pipes. B) Outside of the Fenced in Areas at the Plant and Wellhead, the Pipeline is Buried and Clearly Marked. C) The Pipeline Rises Above Ground and Connects to the Production Tree at the Metropolis Disposal #1 Wellhead

APPENDIX A – Facility Maps

- Map A-1: Facility Map
- Map A-2: Alarms and Monitors, Dagger Draw Active Equipment
- Map A-3: Safety and Fire Equipment, Dagger Draw Active Equipment
- Map A-4: Evacuation Router, Dagger Draw Active Equipment
- Map A-5: Proposed Perimeter Alarms
- Map A-6: Metropolis Disposal Well












APPENDIX B – Response Flow Diagrams



LEVEL I RESPONSE



LEVEL II RESPONSE



Agave H₂S Contingency Plan

LEVEL III RESPONSE





APPENDIX C - Radius of Exposure Calculations

Map C-1 Radius of Exposure



Agave H2S Contingency Plan

December 14, 2010

APPENDIX C-RADIUS OF EXPOSURE CALCULATIONS

The basis for worst case scenario calculations is as follows:

- •The hydrogen sulfide content of the inlet natural gas stream into the Agave Dagger Draw Gas Plant is variable, ranging upwards to 7,600 parts per million (ppm) or 0.76 mole percent. In reality, the actual H₂S concentration that the plant processes will be much less than this.
- •The inlet gas H_2S concentration of 0.76 mole percent was determined using a massbalance approach, an analysis of 60.8 mole percent H_2S in the acid gas stream and a maximum acid gas flow rate of 0.5 MMSCFD. It is assumed that the amine system removes 100% of the H_2S from the inlet gas.

The plant has a maximum daily (24 hour) processing volume of 40 MMSCF.

• The worst case scenario radius of exposure (ROE) also assumes an uncontrolled instantaneous release from the area around either the Metropolis #1 Well, the amine still at the facility and at any point along the pipeline connecting the two of the above referenced volume and concentration. Because the Plant is a throughput process plant, it is impossible that the entire 24 hour-throughput volume of the Plant could be released instantaneously as is assumed in the worst case scenario calculations of the ROE. However, to comply with NMAC 19.15.11, that assumption is the worst case scenario in the formulas/calculations provided here.

It should further be noted that the reason this rate, used as worst case, could not be released over a 24 hour period is the Plant's emergency shutdown (ESD) systems would be activated. The emergency shutdown (ESD) would prevent the flow of gas into the Plant in the event of an emergency. See Appendix C and Map C-1 for more information.

The formulas for calculating the two radius of exposure (ROE) are as follows:

100 ppm Radius of Exposure Calculation (as per 19 NMAC 15.11.7.K.1):

(0.6258) X=[(1.589)(hydrogen sulfide concentration)(Q)]

500 ppm Radius of Exposure Calculation (as per 19 NMAC 15.11.7.K.2):

X=[(0.4546)(hydrogen sulfide concentration)(Q)]

Where:

X = radius of exposure in feet

"hydrogen sulfide concentration" = the decimal equivalent of the mole or volume fraction of hydrogen sulfide in the gaseous mixture

Q = Escape rate expressed in cubic feet per day (corrected for standard conditions of 14.73 psi absolute and 60 degrees Fahrenheit)

ROE Inside the Plant

The escape rate (Q) is the maximum daily rate of the gaseous mixture produced or handled or the best estimate thereof. For releases inside the Agave Dagger Draw Gas Plant, the Company is using for contingency planning purposes an "escape rate" equal to the maximum inlet gas volume of 40,000 MCFD. The (actual) inlet gas volume at the Plant will be somewhat variable and is continuously metered. The Plant records daily inlet gas volumes and prepares a daily volume report. The assumed 40,000 MCFD inlet gas volume has been selected as the "escape rate" because it is the highest anticipated inlet volume that the Plant would handle under its proposed operations and is considered worst case interpretation of the volume of gas.

It should be noted that the plan will remain effective as long as the processed volume and H_2S content equate to the same or smaller ROE.

Previous monitoring data indicated variable inlet concentrations of hydrogen sulfide, but concentration will not exceed 7,600 ppm or .76 mole percent. Therefore, 7,600 ppm or .76 mole percent has been used in the worst case scenario operations for contingency planning purposes.

Using: Q = 40,000,000 H₂S conc = 7,600 ppm or .76 mole%

500-ppm RADIUS OF EXPOSURE CALCULATION

 $X = [(0.4546)^{*}(H_2S \text{ concentration})^{*}(gas \text{ volume } (Q))]^{0.6258}$ $X = [(0.4546)^{*}(7,600^{*}.000001)^{*}(40,000,000)]^{0.6258}$

X = 1648 feet = 500-ppm ROE

100-ppm RADIUS OF EXPOSURE CALCULATION

 $X = [(1.589)^{*}(H_2S \text{ concentration})^{*}(gas \text{ volume})]_{0.6258}^{0.622}$ $X = [(1.589)^{*}(7,600^{*}.000001)^{*}(40,000,000)]$

X = 3606 feet = 100-ppm ROE

ROE Along the Pipeline and At the Injection Well

The escape rate (Q) is the best estimate of the maximum daily flow rate of the acid gas. For releases inside the Agave Dagger Draw Gas Plant, the Company is using for contingency planning purposes an "escape rate" equal to the 500 MCFD. The assumed 500 MCFD acid gas volume has been selected as the "escape rate" because it is the highest anticipated gas volume that the Plant would handle under its proposed operations and is considered the worst case interpretation of the volume of gas.

It should be noted that the plan will remain effective as long as the processed volume and H_2S content equate to the same or smaller ROE.

Previous monitoring data indicated variable inlet concentrations of hydrogen sulfide, but concentration will not exceed 608,000 ppm or 60.8 mole% at the inlet. Therefore, 608,000 ppm or 60.8 mole percent has been used in the worst case scenario operations for contingency planning purposes. Again, Agave does not measure the H_2S concentration in the acid gas stream; rather the concentration is calculated based on the inlet conditions.

Using: Q = 500,000

H₂S conc = 608,000 ppm or 60.8 mole%

500-ppm RADIUS OF EXPOSURE CALCULATION

 $X = [(0.4546)^{*}(H_{2}S \text{ concentration})^{*}(\text{gas volume}(Q))]$ $X = [(0.4546)^{*}(608,000^{*}.000001)^{*}(500,000)]$

X = 1648 feet = 500-ppm ROE

100-ppm RADIUS OF EXPOSURE CALCULATION

 $X = [(1.589)^{*}(H_{2}S \text{ concentration})^{*}(gas \text{ volume})]^{0.6258}$ $X = [(1.589)^{*}(608,000^{*}.000001)^{*}(500,000)]$

X = 3606 feet = 100-ppm ROE



MAP C-1

1648 Ft (500 ppm)
 3606 Ft (100 ppm)
 AMINE STIEL
 METROPOLIS WELL HEAD
 ACID GAS PIPELINE





APPENDIX D – Muster Areas, Evacuation Routes

Map D-1: Evacuation Routes to Muster Areas

Map D-2: Atoka Facility- Safety Trailer Location





APPENDIX E – H₂S Contingency Plan Distribution List

Agave H₂S Contingency Plan

APPENDIX E – H₂S Contingency Plan Distribution List

New Mexico Oil Conservation Division 1301 West Grand Avenue

Artesia, NM 88210-1729

New Mexico Department of Public Safety 4207 W 2nd Street Roswell, NM 88201-8857

Local Emergency Planning Committee

324 S Canyon Street, Suite B Carlsbad, NM 88210

Artesia Fire Department

309 North 7th Street Artesia, NM 88210-1913

Atoka Fire Department

2611 South 13th Street Artesia, NM 88210-9333

Eddy County Sheriff's Department

Eddy County Courthouse 102 N. Canal Carlsbad, NM 88220

Dagger Draw Plant

278 Pipeline Road Artesia, NM 88210

Agave Main Office

105 South 4th Street Artesia, NM 88210

H2S Contingency Plan

Agave Dagger Draw Processing Plant and the Metropolis Disposal Well

Agave Energy Company

105 South 4th Street Artesia, NM 88210 (575-748-4555)

April 5, 2010

	Page
l. Introduction [API RP-55 7.1]	1
II. Scope [API RP-55 7.2]	1
III. Plan Availability [API RP-55 7.3]	1
 IV. Emergency Procedures [NMAC 19.15.11.9.B(2)(a)][API RP-55 7.4 a.]. A. Responsibilities and Duties of Personnel During an Emergency B. Immediate Action Plan C. Telephone Numbers and Communication Methods D. Location of Residents, Roads, and Medical Facilities E. Evacuation Routes, Muster Areas, and Road Block Locations F. Monitoring Equipment, Alarm Systems, Safety Equipment, and Supplies A 	1 Available
 V. Characteristics of Hydrogen Sulfide (H2S) and Sulfur Dioxide (SO2) [NMAC 19.15.11.9.B(2)(b)][API RP-55 7.4 b.]. A. Characteristics of Hydrogen Sulfide (H2S), Sulfur Dioxide (SO2) B. Radii of Exposure (ROE) 	10
VI. Facility Description, Maps, and Drawings [NMAC [19.15.11.9.B(2)(c)][API RP-55 7.4 c.] A. Dagger Draw Processing Plant B. Metropolis Disposal Well C. Map of Plant and Well	13
VII. Training and Drills [NMAC 19.15.11.9:B(2)(d)][API RP-55 7.4 d.]. A. Responsibilities and Duties of Essential Personnel B. On-site or Classroom Drills	14
 C. Notification and Training of Residents on Protective Measures in Emerge D. Training and Attendance Documentation E. Briefing of Public Officials on Evacuation and Shelter in Place Plans 	ncy Situations
VIII. Coordination with State Emergency Plans [NMAC 19.15.11.9.B(2)(e)]. A. Oil Conservation Division B. New Mexico State Police	15
 IX. Plan Activation [NMAC 19.15.11.9.C][API RP-55 7.4 d.] A. Activation Levels B. Events that Could Lead to a Release 	15

TABLE OF CONTENTS



X. Submission of H₂S Contingency Plans

[NMAC 19.15.11.9.D]......16

- A. Submission
- B. Retention
- C. Inventory

APPENDICES

Appendix A – Facility Maps and Drawings

- Map A-1: Facility Map
- Map A-2: Alarms and Monitors, Dagger Draw Active Equipment
- Map A-3: Safety and Fire Equipment, Dagger Draw Active Equipment
- Map A-4: Evacuation Router, Dagger Draw Active Equipment
- Map A-5: Proposed Perimeter Alarms
- Map A-6: Metropolis Disposal Well

Appendix B – Response Flow Diagram

- Appendix C ROE Calculations
 - Map C-1: Amine Still ROE
 - Map C-2: Wellsite ROE
- Appendix D Muster Areas and Evacuation Routes Map D-1: Evacuation Routes to Muster Areas
 - wap D-1: Evacuation Routes to Muster Area

Appendix E – Distribution List

OPERATOR QUICK REFERENCE GUIDE

Dagger Draw Processing Plant Level 1 Response FOR PLANT OR WELLHEAD ALARMS



Agave H₂S Contingency Plan

Location of Facilities

Agave Dagger Draw Processing Plant

Go south of Artesia, NM on Hwy 285 approximately 9 miles to County Road 38 (Kincaid Ranch Road). Turn right (west) on Kincaid Ranch Road and go approximately 2.8 miles to Pipeline Road. Turn right (north) and go 0.2 miles to the Dagger Draw Gas Plant Office. Physical address is 278 Pipeline Road.

Section 25-Township 18S-Range 25E

Metropolis Acid Gas Disposal Well

Go south of Artesia, NM on Hwy 285 approximately 9 miles to County Road 38 (Kincaid Ranch Road). Turn right (west) on Kincaid Ranch Road and go 2.6 miles (just past the Agave Field Office). Turn left (south) on dirt lease road and go approximately 0.6 miles then turn left (east) and go 0.2 mile to the Metropolis Disposal Well. **Section 36-Township 18S-Range 25E**

Emergency Trailer – Menefee Location

From intersection of Main Street and 13th Streer in Artesia, go south on South 13th Street for approximately 2.3 miles. Turn west and go approximately 0.1 miles to location.





I. Introduction [API RP-55 7.1]

The Agave Dagger Draw Processing Plant is a natural gas processing plant which handles and/or generates hydrogen sulfide (H2S) and/or sulfur dioxide (SO2). This H2S contingency plan was created to outline procedures that are to be followed in the event of an H2S release that occurs at the plant, the acid gas well, or on the acid gas pipeline. The response plan is the same regardless of where the release takes place. This plan complies with the New Mexico Oil Conservation Division (OCD) Rule 11. This plan also conforms to API RP-55.

II. Scope

[API RP-55 7.2]

This contingency plan is specific to the Agave Dagger Draw Gas Processing Plant and acid gas injection system. This plan contains procedures to provide an organized response to an unplanned release from the plant or well site.

III. Plan Availability

[API RP-55 7.3]

This contingency plan shall be available to all personnel responsible for implementing any portion of the plan. Copies of the plan will be distributed to the following agencies: New Mexico Oil Conservation Division (OCD), New Mexico Department of Public Safety, Local Emergency Planning Committee (LEPC), Artesia Fire Department, Atoka Fire Department, Artesia Police Department, and Eddy County Sheriff's Department. The Plan will be available at the following Agave Energy Company locations: Dagger Draw Processing Plant, the Artesia Field Office, and the Agave Main Office in Artesia.

IV. Emergency Procedures

[NMAC 19.15.11.9.B(2)(a)] [API RP-55 7.4 a]

A. Responsibilities and Duties of Personnel during an Emergency

1. Plant Manager or designee will serve as the Incident Commander (IC); is responsible for training operators assigned to the plant, contractors and visitors on the implementation of this plan; and will maintain communication with Agave management and residents within the radius of exposure (ROE).

2. Plant Supervisor or designee will serve as the Incident Commander (IC) in the absence of the Plant Manager; is responsible for training and supervising plant operators on the implementation of this plan, will maintain accountability of all contractors and visitors; and will maintain communication with the plant manager and Agave management.

3. Plant Operators will perform operations in accordance with this plan safely; assist in the accountability and evacuation of visitors and contractors to designated muster areas; and keep the plant supervisor and manager informed on the repair progress.

4. Essential Agave Personnel will be familiar with the procedures in this plan and assist plant operators in assisting with the implementation of this plan in a safe manner.

5. Visitors and contractors on site will be familiar with safety alarms and signals at the Dagger Draw Gas Processing Plant and the acid gas injection system; and adhere to instructions of Plant Operators and other Agave personnel in evacuation of the facilities.

B. Immediate Action Plan

1. The following outlines the immediate action Plan that is illustrated by the response flow diagram in Appendix B. This is to be used when responding to an H2S release. <u>Response levels are the same for a release at the plant or the acid gas well.</u> Additional or long term response actions will be determined on a case-by-case basis, if needed, once the Incident Command Center and System is established following the immediate response.

Level	Alarms	Actions
	Intermittent	1. The audible signal for a Plant emergency and evacuation is an intermittent alarm
	audible alarm	and yellow lights (repeating off/on) activated when levels of H2S of 10 ppm or
	sounded	greater are detected. In addition, a flashing yellow light or beacon will be activated
	and/or	at 10 ppm or greater of H2S. A computer in the control room and in the Plant
	flashing	Supervisor office establishes which H2S monitor has activated the alarm and/or
	yellow lights	flashing yellow beacon, be it a plant monitor or well monitor. At the initial sound of
	activated for	the intermittent alarm or the flashing yellow beacon, assigned operators will put on
	H2S at 10	a 30 minute self contained breathing apparatus (SCBA) and all other personnel in
	ppm or	the Plant complex or well site shall immediately evacuate the Plant or well site to
	greater.	the Emergency Assembly Area. If H2S concentrations are 10 ppm or greater, then
		personnel will evacuate to a designated Muster Area determined by the Incident
		Commander (IC) (see Appendix D). The operators, upon suit up with the self
		contained breathing apparatus (SCBA), will first help any persons in distress
		evacuate to the Emergency Assembly Area. If deemed necessary by the Plant
		Manager or Plant Supervisor, local emergency response service providers will be
		contacted by Plant personnel designated by the Plant Manager or Supervisor.
		2. All entitles within the 500 ppm radius of impact (ROE) will be notified (by
		telephone) of a release if the perimeter alarms are activated at 10 ppm H2S or
		big designed. The nature of the release and statue of centermant will be
		ans designee. The nature of the release and status of containment will be
		bear the Plant and to alort any third party contractors or convice companies
	All States	working in the Plant vicinity or imminently scheduled to work in the vicinity of the
		release All should be instructed to leave the area and not to enter/re-enter area
/*:		until further notice. Operators will put on self contained breathing apparatus
/ 1 jan 1 ja		(SCBA)
	N	3. Wearing the self-contained breathing apparatus (SCBA) the operator(s) will
		attempt to fix the cause of the release. The H2S levels at the Emergency Assembly
		Area will be monitored with a hand held or personal monitor and with the fixed
		monitor
		4. The Incident Commander (IC) will set up secondary re-entry team(s) with 30
		minutes self contained breathing apparatus (SCBA) to re-enter and resolve the
		situation. Re-entry will occur in 15 minute shifts at the direction of the Incident
		Commander (IC) until the problem is resolved or the emergency shut down (ESD)
		is activated. If H2S levels in the Emergency Assembly Areas exceed 10 ppm H2S,
		evacuate to alternate Emergency Assembly Area and continue to monitor
		Emergency Assembly Area with personal or handheld H2S monitors. If evacuation
		to Muster Area occurs, road blocks will be established near the Muster Areas on
		Kincaid and Pipeline Road. If release is resolved and monitored levels in the Plant
		are less than 10 ppm H2S, personnel may re-enter the Plant. The Oil Conservation
		Division (UCD) shall be notified within four hours of any release that activates the
		Plan. If the release is not resolved and H2S levels continue to increase, Level 2
] .		Response is indicated.

Alarms	Actions
Alarms Intermittent audible alarm sounded and/or flashing red lights activated for H2S greater than 20 ppm	 Actions 1. The intermittent alarm and red flashing lights indicate the detection of H2S greater than or equal to 20 ppm. (Flashing yellow lights indicate a H2S release of 10 ppm or greater and they will change to red for a release of 20 ppm or greater.) A control panel in the Plant supervisor's office establishes which H2S monitor has activated the alarm and or flashing red beacon, be it a plant monitor or a well monitor. At the initial sound of the intermittent alarm or observance of the flashing red beacons, the operators will exit to the Muster Area designated by the Plant Manager or his designee. Other personnel in the Plant complex willputton emergency escape packs located throughout the plant, or well location and evacuate along with the operators using the evacuation routes to the Emergency Assembly Area and then to the Muster Area (see Appendix D) designated by the Plant Manager or designee. At the assembly area, the Plant Manager or designee will assign operators to put on a 30 minute self contained breathing apparatus (SCBA). Local emergency response service providers will be contacted by Plant Manager or designee. 2. All other entities within the 100 ppm and 500 ppm radius of impact (ROE) will be contacted by phone and hotified of release. All entities within the 100, ppm radius of impact (ROE) will be contacted by phone and hotified of release. The henature of the release and status of containment will be conveyed. Depending on release status and prevailing wind conditions, some entities within the 100 ppm radius of impact (ROE) will be contacted to shelter in place or evacuate. Notifications will include but are not limited to the following: a) Other entities within the 100 ppm radius of impact (ROE), depending on release status and prevailing wind conditions, will be asked to shelter in place. Those entities will be instructed to close any windows and shut off any air conditioning/heating wind conditons, will be asked to shelter in place. Those entities within t
	 advised of the current monitored H2S levels at the Plant. c) No resolution requires activation of full H2S Plan with notifications and reporting as per Plan. If the release is not resolved and/or H2S levels continue to increase, Level 3 Response is indicated. d) Monitoring will continue after problems are abated, at the direction of the Plant Manager.
	Alarms Intermittent audible alarm sounded and/or flashing red lights activated for H2S greater than 20 ppm

	Level	Alarms	Actions
f	111	Intermittent	1. For H2S at 20 ppm or greater and repair efforts at Level 2 unsuccessful, worst
		audible alarm	case scenario, and/or catastrophic release have occurred then implement a Level 3
		sounded	response. 2 Read blocks will be set up near the Muster Areas on Kinsaid Read and Pineline.
		flashing red	Z. Road blocks will be set up hear the Muster Areas on Kincald Road and Fipeline Road
		lights	3. All personnel shall have evacuated to a designated Muster Areas. Evacuation of
		activated for	all entities within the 500 ppm radius of impact (RQE) will have been confirmed.
		catastrophic	Implement full H2S Plan with all notifications and public agency involvement.
		release; fire;	Notifications to all entities within the 100 ppm radius of impact (ROE) will include the
		or explosion	nature of the release and status of containment. Notifications will include but are not
			limited to the following:
		ESD alarm is	a) All businesses within the 100 ppm radius of impact (ROE) will be instructed to
		a continuous	immediately alert all company personnel, third party contractors and/or services
		siren with red,	companies working in the area and mose imminently scheduled to work in the
		blue lights that	immediately leave and/or not enter/reenter the area within the roadblocks until
		flash	further instruction.
			b) All other entities (including private residents) within the 100 ppm radius of
			impact (ROE) will be instructed to immediately shelter in place, if appropriate
			based on the source of the release and the wind direction. Those entities will be
			instructed to close any windows and shut off any air conditioning/heating until
			further notice. In addition, they will be instructed to contact other
			employees/residents not currently present to not enter/reenter the area until
			c) The Incident Commander (C) will make a summary judgment, based on but not
			limited to H2S concentration and wind direction whether a safe evacuation can be
			implemented, and recommend an evacuation route.
			4. If escaping vapors have ignited, the vapors should be allowed to continue to burn
			unless the fire endangers personnel, other property, or other equipment.
			5. When applicable, maintain communication with the Plant Manager, or his
		¥	designee, to keep him up-to-date of the situation and the action taken prior to his
			C Initiate and maintain a Chronological Record of Events log
			7 Within one hour after the activation of the H2S Plan, begin agency notifications by
			calling Oil Conservation Division (OCD) and National Response Center (NRC).
	la la		8. Establish media staging area adjacent to Muster Area 2 and direct all media to it.
			9. Once resolved and monitored levels in the Plant and at Muster Area are less than
	Ý	a second	10 ppm, roadblocks will be removed, and all entities within the 100 ppm radius of
		There is a state of the second state of the se	impact (ROE) will be allowed to return. All entities previously notified will be informed
			that the release has been resolved and advised of the current monitored H2S levels.
			10. Monitoring will continue after problems are abated, at the direction of the Plant Manager
			11. Agency reports to be submitted as required.
L			27
		Ň	

1

C. Telephone Numbers and Communication Methods

1. Emergency Services

AGENCY	TELEPHONE #]
Artesia Fire Department	(575) 946-5050	
Atoka Fire Department	(575) 946-5050	
Artesia Police Department	(575) 746-5000	
Eddy County Sheriff	(575) 887-7551	
Carlsbad Police Department	(575) 885-2111	
State Police (HMER)		
District 3 Roswell	(575) 827-9312	
Sub District 3 Carlsbad	(575) 885-3138	
Sub District 3 Hobbs	(575)827-9320	
Ambulance Services	N.	
Artesia	(575) 746-5050	
Carlsbad	<u>(575) 885-2111</u>	
Hospitals		X.
Artesia General	(575) 748-3333	Ť
Carlsbad Medical Center	(575) 887-4100	
Veterinarians		
Artesia Animal Clinic	📐 (575) 748-2042	
Livingston Animal Clinic	(575) 746-6167	
Helicopter Services		
Lifeguard(Albuquerque)	1-800-633-5438	
Southwest Medivac(Hobbs)	1-800-242-6199	
AeroCare(Lubbock)	1-800-627-2376	
Air Med(El Paso)	(915) 772-1449	

2. Government Agencies

	AGENCY	TELEPHONE #
A	Oil Conservation Division (OCD)	(505) 476-3440
		(575) 748-1283
	US BLM	(575) 887-6544
An an and a second s	Local Emergency Planning Committee (LEPC)	(575) 887-9511
	National Response Center (NRC)	1-800-424-8802

3. Operators and Contractors

Santa Santa Mandalatar	
COMPANY	TELEPHONE #
CVE	(575) 746-3571
PVT	(575) 748-1241
DCP Midstream	(800) 435-1679
Chevron/West Texas Pipeline Company	(800) 762-3404
Transwestern Pipeline	(281) 714-2265
Yates Petroleum Corporation	(575) 748-1471



4. Public

Name	Address	TELEPHONE #
David and Diana Wilson	80 West Kincaid Ranch Road	(575) 457-2309
Raul and Delilah Baeza	193 West Kincaid Ranch Road	(575) 308-3195
Efrin and Maria Baeza	179 West Kincaid Ranch Road	(575) 513-0471
Christine Baeza	175 West Kincaid Ranch Road	(575) 457-2585

5. Agave Internal Call List

NAME	TITLE	Office #	Cell #
J.B. Smith	President	(575)748-4414	(575)365-8517
Rusty Nasta	Operations Manager	(575)748-4523	(575)626-7971
Ivan Villa	Engineering Supervisor	(575)748-4528	(575)365-4888
Jennifer Knowlton	Environmental Engineer	(575)748-4528	(505)238-3588
Robert Moorhead	Plant Manager/South Mechanical	(575)748-6815	(575)365-4840
	Supervisor		
Gary Greenwood	Plant Supervisor	(575)748-8414	(575)365-6794
Mark Smith	PSM Coordinator/Plant Operator	(575)748-8410	(575)365-5053
Dustin McNeely	Plant Operator	N/A	(575)703-5493
Justin Troublefield	Plant Operator	N/A	(575)365-7503
Glen Blake	Regulatory Coordinator	(57/5)748-4546	(575)626-8168
Bill Johnson	South Measurement Supervisor	(575)748-6816	(575)365-4615
Jason Fuentes	South Pipeline Supervisor	(575)748-4518	(575)365-8939

6. Agave Energy Company will use 2-way radios and telephones to communicate internally. Telephone will be used for external communication.

D. Location of Nearby Residences, Roads, and Medical Facilities

- 1. The following residences are located within the ROE of the:
 - a) Plant --- None
 - b) Metropolis Acid Gas Well None

2. The following roads are located within the ROE:

- a) Kincaid Ranch Road
- b) Pipeline Road

3. There are no medical facilities located within the ROE.

E. Evacuation Routes, Emergency Assembly Area, Muster Areas, and Road Block Locations

1. Evacuation Routes, Emergency Assembly Area, and Muster Areas are depicted on Map D-1 in Appendix D.

2. Pre-planned road block locations designated near the muster areas on Pipeline Road and Kincaid Ranch Road and are depicted on Map D-1 in Appendix D. Each location will have pre-positioned, portable road barriers with lights. The locations will have flashing lights and warning signs.

3. Emergency lights on the Muster Area signs will be activated by any <u>perimeter alarm</u> of 10 ppm or greater H2S or Level III activation.

F. Monitoring Equipment, Alarm Systems, Safety Equipment, and Supplies Available 1. EMERGENCY SHUTDOWN SYSTEM: There are (8) ESD manual stations located at various points in the facility. See Maps A-2 and A-3 in Appendix A. The Plant ESD can be activated at any time by any employee or at the direction of the Incident Commander (IC).

When any one of the eight (8) manual stations is activated, the system will be shutdown and the natural gas inlets and outlets will be blocked. The operators are also able to auto close the one (1) main block valve on the incoming gas line to the Plant. Activating these should allow the plant to avoid a Level 3 response. The Incident Commander (IC) can send trained personnel to designated off-site manual block valves. There are also various methods to shut down gas flow at the various wellheads and incoming gathering lines. These can and would be evaluated on a case by case basis.

Designated employees will have remote access to the plant controls including ESD capabilities.

2. PLANT ALARMS, VISIBLE BEACONS & WIND INDICATORS: Colored beacons, horns, and wind directions indicators are located in various locations throughout the Plant and are indicated in Appendix A on Maps A-2, A-3, and A-6.

The audible signal for an emergency response and Plant evacuation is a repeating intermittent alarm that sounds at H2S concentrations of 10 ppm or greater. The alarm will remain intermittent when the concentration of the H2S release is 20 ppm or higher. At the initial sound of this intermittent alarm, the plant operators will evacuate to the emergency assembly area put on a self contained breathing apparatus (SCBA) and all personnel in the plant complex shall immediately proceed in a safe manner to the Emergency Assembly Areas as prescribed by the Emergency Action Plan.

A flashing red beacon signifies an H2S release of 20 ppm or higher and all personnel in the plant complex shall immediately proceed in a safe manner to the Emergency Assembly Area located outside of the plant office. If this area is not determined to be safe, all will move to designated Muster Area. Evacuation routes and Muster Areas are indicated on the map in Appendix A, on Map A-4 and A-6 as well as Appendix D, on Map D-1.

A routine process alarm will cause a horn to sound. This horn sound is used to alert the plant Operator to return to the Control Room. No emergency response or evacuation is required when this horn sounds.

Wind direction indicators are installed throughout the plant. At least one wind direction indicator can be seen at any location within the Plant complex, as well as, from any point on the perimeter of the plant. There are ten (10) windsocks located in the Plant.

3. GAS DETECTION EQUIPMENT: The Plant uses a Smart Sensor System fixed plant H2S Sensors. These sensors are a fixed point monitoring system used to detect the presence of hydrogen sulfide in ambient air. The yellow flashing beacon is activated at H2S concentrations of 10 ppm or greater. The horn is activated with an intermittent alarm at H2S concentrations of 10 ppm or greater. The lights change to red at 20 ppm H2S and the horn remains intermittent. The fixed hydrogen sulfide monitors are strategically located throughout the Plant to detect an uncontrolled released of hydrogen



sulfide. The Plant operators are able to monitor the H2S level of all the Plant sensors on the control monitor located in the control room and the Dagger Draw Plant Field Office. In addition, select employees can access this information remotely. These sensors are located on the plot plan in Appendix A Maps A-2 and A-3. These sensors all have to be acknowledged and will not clear themselves. This requires immediate action for any occurrence or malfunction. The Plant sensors are calibrated monthly.

Redline wireless H2S detectors are installed along the perimeter of the plant and the perimeter of the acid gas disposal well. Perimeter H2S detectors report to the Redline monitor every five minutes to confirm detector functionality. Once H2S gas is detected, the H2S detectors report to the monitor every five seconds. The detectors will go into alarm at H2S values of 10 ppm and above. Redline H2S head unit locations are depicted on Map A-5 and A-6 Appendix A.

Hand held gas detection monitors are available to plant personnel to check specific areas and equipment prior to initiating maintenance or work on the process equipment. There are 3 handheld monitors and each individual is assigned a personal H2S monitor. The hand held gas detection devices are Industrial Scientific ITX 3-gas detectors and BW Gas Alert Micro 5 4- way monitors. The detectors have sensors for oxygen, LEL (explosive hydrocarbon atmospheres), hydrogen sulfide, and carbon dioxide. They indicate the presence H2S with a beeping sound at 10 ppm. The beeps change in tone as H2S increases to 20 ppm. The personal monitors are set to alarm (beep) at 10 ppm with the beeps becoming closer together as the H2S concentration increases to 20 ppm. Both the hand held and personal monitors have digital readouts of H2S ppm concentration.

a) The compressor building has two methane sensors; one sends a call out at 30% lower explosive limit (LEL); the second shuts the compressors down at 50% lower explosive limit (LEL). The methane sensors are visual and audible alarms. The compressor building also is equipped with fire eyes that will also shut the units down. The four product pumps also have LEL sensors.

4. RESPIRATORS: The Plant has 30 minute self contained breathing apparatus (SCBA) respirators and 5 minute escape packs strategically located throughout the Plant. The respirator locations are identified in Appendix A on Maps A-3 and A-6. All Plant personnel are certified to use the self contained breathing apparatus (SCBA) respirators.

5. FIRE FIGHTING EQUIPMENT: The Plant personnel are trained only for insipient stage fire fighting. The fire extinguishers located in the Plant process areas, compressor buildings, process buildings, and company vehicles are typically a 20# ABC dry chemical fire extinguisher. See Appendix A Maps A-3 and A-6 for locations. The Plant does not have a fire water system, only a utility water system that is not designed for fire fighting.

6. EMERGENCY RESPONSE TRAILER AND EQUIPMENT: Agave Energy Company has an Emergency Response Trailer located at the Menefee location. This is located outside all radii of exposure (ROE).

Driving Directions: From intersection of Main Street and 13th Street in Artesia, go south on South 13th Street for approximately 2.3 miles. Turn west and go approximately 0.1

miles to location. See Map D-2 in Appendix D. The trailer can serve as a mobile resource center or Incident Command Center.

a) EMERGENCY RESPONSE TRAILER CONTENTS

- · 2 wind socks / wind direction indicators w/poles & spares
- 1 110 volt generator, portable w/wheels
- 4 5-gas sensor ambient monitors (O₂, SO₂, LEL, CO, H₂S) with automatic air pumps (15 sec per foot) and data logging capability
- 1 calibration unit for monitors
- 5 intrinsically safe communication radios & chargers, 32 channel with capability to be programmed to fire service and police channels
- 4 20# stored pressure, ABC class Fire Extinguishers
- 4 4500 Grade D breathing air cylinders, regulator, low pressure alarm, and hose reel w/ 300 ft hose (total) and correct quick disconnects.
- 1 stretcher
- 1 20-person First Aid Kit with burn gel packets
- 4 30-minute SCBA's
- 4 work unit SCBA's
- 2 lights, mounted on each rear of trailer for night operations
- 2 hand cleaner for decontamination of petroleum products.
- 3 traffic Control Kits
- 1 emergency flare gun for lighting uncontrollable hazardous gases
- 2 full body harness and 150' X 2 lifelines
- 2 "Hazardous Area" "Do Not Enter" signs / barricades
- 2 burn gel blankets
- 1 set of maps and Emergency Response Plans
- 4 temporary use Nomex Fire retardant clothing (2-LG & 2-XLG)

7. TRAFFIC CONTROL KIT CONTENTS

- 3 electronic road flares
- 1 28" stop sign paddle
- 4 reflective traffic control vests
- 2 emergency signal wands
- 1 emergency Response Guidebook

8. FIRST AID EQUIPMENT LOCATIONS:

a) First Aid Kits are located at the following locations:

• Lab

- Office
- b) Eye Wash stations are located at the following locations:
- Lab
- Office

9. PERSONAL H2S MONITORS: All Agave personnel assigned to the Plant and associated field personnel are issued personal H2S monitors.

10. SIGNS and MARKERS: The Plant has warning signs indicating the presence of "H2S/Poisonous Gas" and high pressure gas at the entrance to the Plant. Emergency



response phone numbers are posted at the entrance to the Plant. Signs are located at the Plant gate entrance indicating that all visitors are to sign in.

V. Characteristics of Hydrogen Sulfide (H2S) and Sulfur Dioxide(SO2) [NMAC 19.15.11.9.B(2)(b)] [API RP-55 7.4 b.]

A. Characteristics of Hydrogen Sulfide (H2S), Sulfur Dioxide (SO2)

1. Hydrogen Sulfide (H2S): The proposed inlet gas streams into the Plant will contain a maximum of 10,000 ppm (or 1.0 mole percent) of hydrogen sulfide based on data generated from the sampling of the inlet gas at least daily. Hydrogen sulfide is a colorless, toxic and flammable gas, and has the odor of rotten eggs. Hydrogen sulfide gas is heavier than air. Hydrogen sulfide presents a significant health hazard by paralyzing the respiratory system resulting in serious injury or death.

Hydrogen Sulfide Properties and Characteristics				
CAS No.			7783-06-4	
Molecular Formula			H2S	
Molecular Weight			34.082	
Ceiling Concentration			20 ppm (OSHA)	
Ceiling Peak Concentration			50 ppm (OSHA)	
TLV			15 ppm (ACGIH)	
TWA		Million.	10 ppm (NIOSH)	
STEL			15 ppm (ACGIH)	
IDLH			100 ppm	
Specific Gravity(air=1.0)			1.189	
Boiling Point	- Anno		-76.5F	
Freezing Point			-121.8F	
Vapor Pressure			396 psia 🐨	
Autoignition Temperature			518F	
Lower Flammability Limit	Summer State		4.3%	
Upper Flammability Limit			46.0%	
Stability			Stable	
pH in water			3	
Corrosivity			Reacts with metals, plastics, tissues and nerves	
	Physic	al Effects of l	Hydrogen Sulfide	
Concentration				
ppm 🔛	% 🔪		Physical Effects	
1	.00010	Can be smell	led (rotten egg odor)	
1.0	0.0010	0 Obvious & unpleasant odor; Permissible exposure level; safe		
		for 8 hour exp	posure	
20	0.0020	Acceptable c	eiling concentration	
50	0.0050	Loss of sense of smell in 15 minutes		
100	0.0100	Immediately dangerous to life and health(IDLH) loss of sense		
	of smell in 3-15 minutes; stinging in eyes & throat; Altered			
		breathing		
200	0.0200	Kills smell rap	pidly; stinging in eyes & throat	
500	0.0500	Dizziness; Ur	nconscious after short exposure; Need artificial	
		respiration		
700	0.0700	Unconscious	quickly; death will result if not rescued promptly	
1000	0.1000	Instant uncon	sciousness; followed by death within minutes	





2. Sulfur Dioxide (SO2): Sulfur dioxide is produced as a by-product of H2S combustion at the flare. The flare unit receives the residual hydrogen sulfide and carbon dioxide stream that is routed from the amine unit. It is colorless, transparent, and is nonflammable, with a pungent odor associated with burning sulfur. Sulfur dioxide is heavier than air, but will be picked up by a breeze and carried downwind at elevated temperatures. Sulfur dioxide can be extremely irritating to the eyes and mucous membranes of the upper respiratory tract.

	Sulfur Dioxide Properties & Characteristics					
	CAS No.	7446-09-5				
	Molecular Formula	SO2				
	Molecular Weight	64.07				
	PEL	5 ppm(OSHA)				
	TWA	2 ppm(ACGIH)				
	STEL	5 ppm(ACGIH)				
	IDLH	100 ppm				
	Specific Gravity (air = 1.0)	2.26				
	Boiling Point	14°F				
	Freezing Point	-103.9°F				
	Vapor Pressure 🛛 🐘	49.1 psia				
	Auto ignition Temperature 🛛 🔪	N/A				
	Lower Flammability Limit	N/A				
	Upper Flammability Limit	N/A				
	Stability	Stable				
	Corrosivitý	Could form an acid rain in aqueous				
		solutions				
	Physical	Effects of Sulfur Dioxide				
	Concentration	Effect				
	1 ppm	Pungent odor, may cause respiratory changes				
	2 ppm	Permissible exposure limit; Safe for an 8 hour exposure				
	3-5 ppm	Pungent odor; normally a person can detect				
		sulfur dioxide in this range				
Ŵ	5 ppm	Short Term Exposure Limit (STEL); Safe for 15				
Ň	12 2	Throat irritation, coughing, cheat constriction				
	12 ppm	eves tear and burn				
	100 ppm	Immediately Dangerous To Life & Health				
		(IDLH)				
	150 ppm	So irritating that it can only be endured for a				
		few minutes				
	500 ppm	Causes a sense of suffocation, even with first				
		breath				
	1,000 ppm	Death may result unless rescued promptly.				



B. Radii of Exposure (ROE)

[NMAC 19.15.11.7.K]

The basis for worst case scenario calculations is as follows:

- 10,000 parts per million (ppm) or 1.0 mole percent of hydrogen sulfide in the inlet natural gas stream into the Agave Dagger Draw Gas Plant. In reality, the actual H2S concentration that the plant processes will be much less than this. However, this is the design basis for the plant and associated equipment.
- A maximum daily (24 hour) processing volume of 40 MMCF
- The worst case scenario radius of exposure (ROE) also assumes an uncontrolled instantaneous release from the area around either the Metropolis Well or the amine still of the above referenced volume and concentration. Because the Plant is a throughput process plant there is no actual way that the entire throughput volume of the Plant could be released instantaneously as is assumed in the worst case scenario calculations of the ROE; however, to comply with NMAC 19.15.11, that assumption is the worst case scenario in the formulas/calculations provided here.
- The amine system will remove 100% of the H2S from the inlet gas. Agave does not measure the acid gas stream; rather using a mass-balance approach, Agave calculates that the resulting acid gas stream will be 40% or 0.4 mole percent H2S and 0.5 MMscfd.
- It should further be noted that the reason this rate, used as worst case, could not be released over a 24 hour period is the Plant's emergency shutdown (ESD) systems would be activated. The emergency shutdown (ESD) would prevent the flow of gas into the Plant in the event of an emergency. See Appendix C and Maps C-1 and C-2 for more information.

The formulas for calculating the two radius of exposure (ROE) are as follows:

100 ppm Radius of Exposure Calculation (as per 19 NMAC 15.11.7.K.1):

X=[(1.589)(hydrogen sulfide concentration)(Q)]

500 ppm Radius of Exposure Calculation (as per 19 NMAC 15.11.7.K.2):

X=[(0.4546)(hydrogen sulfide concentration)(Q)]

Where:

Agave H₂S Contingency Plan

X = radius of exposure in feet

"hydrogen sulfide concentration" = the decimal equivalent of the mole or volume fraction of hydrogen sulfide in the gaseous mixture

Q = Escape rate expressed in cubic feet per day (corrected for standard conditions of 14.73 psi absolute and 60 degrees Fahrenheit)



1. 1. 1. 1.	

			Amine	Uni	it	
-	-	-				

1001 1000
4282 feet

Acid Gas Disposal Well

500-ppm ROE	1268 feet
100-ppm ROE	2775 feet
	india.

VI. Facility Description, Maps, and Drawings [NMAC 19.15.11.9.B(2)(c)] [API RP-55 7.4 c.]

A. Dagger Draw Processing Plant Description of Operations- The primary function of the plant is to remove H2S and CO2 from sour field gas so that the gas can meet pipeline specifications. The plant has been designated a primary Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) Code of 1311. The operation of the Agave Dagger Draw Gas Plant is intended to process 40 MMscfd of gas. The facility is authorized to operate continuously (8,760 hr/yr) at design maximum capacity processing rates. The gas will be treated to remove acid gas components, dehydrated to remove water and processed to remove heavy (liquid) hydrocarbons from the gas stream. Several plant systems will be involved to perform these functions.

The amine unit is designed to remove acid gas components (carbon dioxide, hydrogen sulfide and mercaptans) from the natural gas stream. These components are removed from the natural gas because they are corrosive, hazardous to health, and reduce the heating value of the natural gas stream. In addition, the carbon dioxide can freeze in the cryogenic unit forming dry ice and forcing the shut down of the facility. This is known as the gas sweetening process. The acid gas removed by the amine unit will be disposed of by either acid gas injection into a disposal well or by incinerating in a flare. The preferred method of disposal will be to compress the gas and inject it into the well. Under emergency situations, the gas will be flared to prevent the emission of lethal hydrogen sulfide to atmosphere.

The glycol dehydration unit will receive approximately 40.0 MMSCFD of treated gas (sweet) from the amine unit and reduce the water content of the gas by circulating triethylene glycol (TEG). Molecular sieve dehydration is used upstream of the cryogenic processes to achieve a -150°F dew point. The process uses two molecular sieve vessels with one vessel in service absorbing moisture from the gas stream and the other vessel in the regeneration mode.

The cryogenic unit is designed to liquefy natural gas components from the sweet, dehydrated inlet gas by removing work (heat) from the gas by means of the turbo expander. The cryogenic unit recovers natural gas liquids (NGL) by cooling the gas stream to extremely cold temperatures (-150°F) and condensing components such as ethane, propane, butanes and heavier. Once the sweet, dry gas exits the cryogenic unit, it needs to be recompressed to approximately 800 to 1200 psi before the gas is sent to the main transportation pipeline. This is accomplished with two 2500 horsepower electric drive compressors.

The hot oil system in the plant is used to provide heat to certain processes within the facility. The system will circulate approximately 600 GPM of hot oil and deliver 15.5 MMBTU/hr to other processes.

B. Metropolis Disposal Well Description of Operations- The low pressure (< 10 psig), acid gas stream from the amine unit is routed to the acid gas compressor. The stream is then subject to a series of compression and cooling cycles, thus dehydrating and compressing the acid gas stream to a pressure of approximately 1150 psig. The high pressure acid gas stream then flows through a 2" stainless steel pipeline to the injection well site. At this point, the stream is introduced into the well.

There are number of safe guards designed to prevent leaks or overpressure of the system. The acid gas compressor is equipped with multiple pressure transmitters. These transmitters monitor compressor suction and discharge pressures and are programmed to shut the acid gas system down when the pressures fall outside a pre-programmed operating range. As an additional safeguard, the compressor panel is also equipped with high and low pressure shutdowns for each stage of compression that will shut the compressor down when pressures reach preset high and low pressure set points.

The acid gas pipeline is constructed from 2" inch 304 stainless steel tubing. The pipeline has been designed with a maximum allowable working pressure of 2350 psig. Historical injection pressures average 1150 psig. For leak detection purposes, the 2" acid gas line has been encased in 6" SDR 11 polyethylene pipe. A "sweet" gas stream flows through the annulus between the 6" and 2" pipelines at a preset pressure and flow rate. This sweet gas stream is monitored continuously for H2S and over/ under pressure. If any one variable falls outside the predetermined operating range, the acid gas compressor is shut down and the acid gas stream is routed to the flare.

Safeguards for the acid gas injection well consist of a subsurface safety valve. This valve is designed to isolate and shut in the injection well if a leak occurs along the acid gas pipeline or at the surface of the well.

C. Map of Plant and Metropolis Well

See Appendix A, Map A-1

VII. Training and Drills

[NMAC 19.15.11.9.B(2)(d)] [API RP-55 7.4 d]

A. Responsibilities and Duties of Essential Personnel

1. Personnel responsible for implementing this plan shall be trained on their duties and responsibilities related to this plan during the annual on-site or table top training exercises.

2. Plant Orientation Training - All Plant personnel, visitors, and contractors must attend a Plant overview orientation prior to obtaining permission to enter the Plant. A refresher course on this training is required annually for all persons. This training also complies with the requirements of the Agave Energy Company Process Safety Management Program and Procedures Manual.

B. On-site or Classroom Drills

1. Agave Energy Company may use table top exercises as well as hands on emergency response training methods. Agave Energy Company shall conduct a table top exercise annually at a minimum.




C. Notification and Training of Others on Protective Measures in Emergency Situations

1. Affected residents will be invited to participate and/or observe annual drills, as well as being briefed on notification, evacuation, and shelter in place plans.

D. Training and Attendance Documentation

1. All training and drills will be documented. Documentation shall include sign in sheets, synopsis of the training conducted, and an after action review <u>of the training</u>.

E. Briefing of Public Officials on Evacuation and Shelter in Place Plans

1. Local law enforcement, first responders, and fire personnel will also be invited to participate and/or observe annual drills, as well as being briefed on notification, evacuation, and shelter in place plans.

VIII. Coordination with State Emergency Plans [NMAC 19.15.11.9.B(2)(e)]

A. Oil Conservation Division (OCD)

1. Oil Conservation Division (OCD) will be notified with an automatic email to the District II office advising of the activation of the H2S Contingency Plan if any of the alarms are activated at 10 ppm H2S or greater. In the event of a power failure, a phone call will be made within four hours. All subsequent paperwork will be filed in a timely fashion.

B. New Mexico State Police/ New Mexico Hazardous Materials Emergency Response Plan

1. The New Mexico State Police are responsible for overall scene management and coordination of all resources. A designated Emergency Response Officer (ERO) will establish the National Interagency Incident Management System (NIIMS) Incident Command System (ICS) as the Incident Commander (IC) and be responsible for management of all response resources on scene. Off-scene coordination of response resources will be handled through designated Headquarters Emergency Response Officers. Law enforcement-related activities will be coordinated by State Police.

IX. Plan Activation

[NMAC 19.15.11.9.C] [API RP-55 7.4 d]

A. Activation Levels

Level 1 – Intermittent alarm sounded and/or flashing amber beacons activated for H2S greater than or equal to 10 ppm

Level 2 – Intermittent alarm sounded and/or flashing red beacons activated for H2S greater than or equal to 20 ppm

Level 3—Catastrophic release; fire; explosion; a continuous release of maximum volume for 24 hours; or NMAC 19.15.11: mandatory activation of indication of 100 ppm in any defined public area; 500 ppm at any public road; or 100 ppm at a distance greater than 3000 feet from the site or the release. Because the 100 ppm radius of impact (ROE) boundary is greater than 3000 feet from the site of release, a Level 3 response would occur before the escape of the 24 hour release volume.



B. Events that Could Lead to a Release of H2S

- Inlet and plant piping failure
- Amine still failure
- Flange/gasket leaks on inlet and plant piping
- Flange/gasket leaks on the acid gas compressor
- Flange/gasket leaks at metropolis disposal well
- Failure of acid gas pipeline
- Valve packing
- Seal failure on acid gas compressor
- Failure of flare to ignite during Plant emergency blow down

X. Submission of H2S Contingency Plans [NMAC 19.15.11.9.D]

A. Submission

1. Agave Energy Company will submit the H2S Contingency Plan to the Oil Conservation Division (OCD).

B. Retention

1. Agave Energy Company shall maintain a copy of the contingency plan in the Main Office at 105 South 4th Street in Artesia, NM. The plan shall be readily accessible for review by the Oil Conservation Division (OCD) upon request.

C. Inventory

1. Agave Energy Company will file an annual inventory of wells, facilities and operations for which plans are on file with the Oil Conservation Division (OCD), to the Local Emergency Planning Committee (LEPC) and the State Emergency Response Commission as per NMAC 19.15.11.

2. The inventory shall include the name, address, telephone number, and point of contact for all operations in which plans are on file.



APPENDIX A – Facility Maps

Map A-1: Facility Map

- Map A-2: Alarms and Monitors, Dagger Draw Active Equipment
- Map A-3: Safety and Fire Equipment, Dagger Draw Active Equipment
- Map A-4: Evacuation Router, Dagger Draw Active Equipment
- Map A-5: Proposed Perimeter Alarms
- Map A-6: Metropolis Disposal Well





LEVEL I RESPONSE



LEVEL II RESPONSE



 If H2S levels exceed 20 ppm and repair efforts are unsuccessful, worst case scenario and/or catastrophic release have occurred then implement Level 3 response

Agave H₂S Contingency Plan



APPENDIX C-RADIUS OF EXPOSURE CALCULATIONS

The basis for worst case scenario calculations is as follows:

• 10,000 parts per million (ppm) or 1.0 mole percent of hydrogen sulfide in the inlet natural gas stream into the Agave Dagger Draw Gas Plant. In reality, the actual H2S concentration that the plant sees will be much less than this. However, this is the design basis for the plant and associated equipment.

•A maximum daily (24 hour) processing volume of 40 MMCF.

•The worst case scenario radius of exposure (ROE) also assumes an uncontrolled instantaneous release from the area around either the Metropolis Well or the amine still of the above referenced volume and concentration. Because the Plant is a throughput process plant there is no actual way that the entire throughput volume of the Plant could be released instantaneously as is assumed in the worst case scenario calculations of the ROE; however, to comply with NMAC 19.15.11, that assumption is the worst case scenario in the formulas/calculations provided here.

•The amine system will remove 100% of the H2S from the inlet gas. Agave does not measure the acid gas stream; rather using a mass-balance approach, Agave estimates that the resulting acid gas stream will be 40% or 0.4 mole percent H2S and 0.5 MMscfd.

It should further be noted that the reason this rate, used as worst case, could not be released over a 24 hour period is the Plant's emergency shutdown (ESD) systems that would be activated. The ESD would prevent the flow of gas into the Plant in the event of an emergency.

The formulas for calculating the two ROEs are as follows:

100 ppm Radius of Exposure Calculation (as per 19 NMAC 15.11.7.K.1):

X=[(1.589)(hydrogen sulfide concentration)(Q)]

500 ppm Radius of Exposure Calculation (as per 19 NMAC 15.11.7.K.2):

X=[(0.4546)(hydrogen sulfide concentration)(Q)]

Where:

X = radius of exposure in feet

"hydrogen sulfide concentration" = the decimal equivalent of the mole or volume fraction of hydrogen sulfide in the gaseous mixture

Q = Escape rate expressed in cubic feet per day (corrected for standard conditions of 14.73 psi absolute and 60 degrees Fahrenheit)



ROE Inside the Plant

The escape rate (Q) is the maximum daily rate of the gaseous mixture produced or handled or the best estimate thereof. For releases inside the Agave Dagger Draw Gas Plant, the Company is using for contingency planning purposes an "escape rate" equal to the maximum inlet gas volume of 40,000 MCFD. The (actual) inlet gas volume at the Plant will be somewhat variable and is continuously metered. The Plant records daily inlet gas volumes and prepares a daily volume report. The assumed 40,000 MCFD inlet gas volume has been selected as the "escape rate" because it is the highest anticipated inlet volume that the Plant would handle under its proposed operations and is considered worst case interpretation of the volume of gas.

It should be noted that the plan will remain effective as long as the processed volume and H2S content equate to the same or smaller ROE.

Previous monitoring data indicated variable inlet concentrations of hydrogen sulfide, but concentration will not exceed 10,000 ppm or 1.0 mole percent. Therefore, 10,000 ppm or 1.0 mole percent has been used in the worst case scenario operations for contingency planning purposes.

Using: Q = 40,000,000 H2S conc = 10,000 ppm or 1.0 mole%

500-ppm RADIUS OF EXPOSURE CALCULATION

 $X = [(0.4546)^{*}(H2S \text{ concentration})^{*}(gas \text{ volume } (Q))]^{0.6258}$ $X = [(0.4546)^{*}(10,000^{*}.000001)^{*}(40,000,000)]^{0.6258}$

X = 1957 feet = 500-ppm ROE

100-ppm RADIUS OF EXPOSURE CALCULATION

 $X = [(1.589)^{*}(H2S \text{ concentration})^{*}(gas \text{ volume})]^{0.6258}$ $X = [(1.589)^{*}(10,000^{*}.000001)^{*}(40,000,000)]^{-}$

X = [(1.569) (10,000 .000001) (40,000,000)

X = 4282 feet = 100-ppm ROE



ROE At the Injection Well

The escape rate (Q) is the best estimate of the maximum daily rate of the acid gas. For releases inside the Agave Dagger Draw Gas Plant, the Company is using for contingency planning purposes an "escape rate" equal to the 500 MCFD. The actual acid gas rate is not metered. However, using a mass-balance approach, Agave calculates the daily volume of the acid gas stream based on the inlet gas stream which is continuously metered. The assumed 500 MCFD acid gas volume has been selected as the "escape rate" because it is the highest anticipated gas volume that the Plant would handle under its proposed operations and is considered worst case interpretation of the volume of gas.

It should be noted that the plan will remain effective as long as the processed volume and H2S content equate to the same or smaller ROE.

Previous monitoring data indicated variable inlet concentrations of hydrogen sulfide, but concentration will not exceed 400,000 ppm or 40 mole% at the inlet. Therefore, 400,000 ppm or 40 mole% has been used in the worst case scenario operations for contingency planning purposes. Again, Agave does not measure the H2S concentration in the acid gas stream; rather the concentration is calculated based on the inlet conditions.

Using: Q = 500,000

H2S conc = 400,000 ppm or 40 mole%

500-ppm RADIUS OF EXPOSURE CALCULATION

 $X = [(0.4546)^{*}(H2S \text{ concentration})^{*}(gas \text{ volume } (Q))]^{0.6258}$

 $X = [(0.4546)^{*}(400,000^{*}.000001)^{*}(500,000)]$

X = 1268 feet = 500-ppm ROE

100-ppm RADIUS OF EXPOSURE CALCULATION

 $X = [(1.589)^{*}(H2S \text{ concentration})^{*}(gas \text{ volume})]_{0.6258}^{0.6258}$

 $X = [(1.589)^{*}(400,000^{*}.000001)^{*}(500,000)]$

X = 2775 feet = 100-ppm ROE







APPENDIX D – Muster Areas, Evacuation Routes

- Map D-1: Evacuation Routes to Muster Areas
- Map D-2: Menefee Safety Trailer Location







APPENDIX E – H2S Contingency Plan Distribution List

New Mexico Oil Conservation Division New Mexico Department of Public Safety Local Emergency Planning Committee Artesia Fire Department Atoka Fire Department Artesia Fire Department Eddy County Sheriff's Department Dagger Draw Plant Agave Main Office