STATE OF NEW MEXICO

ENERGY, MINERALS AND NATURAL RESOURCES DEPARTMENT OIL CONSERVATION COMMISSION

IN THE MATTER OF THE HEARING CALLED BY THE OIL CONSERVATION COMMISSION FOR THE PURPOSE OF CONSIDERING:

CASE NO. 11,838

APPLICATION OF PREMIER OIL AND GAS, INC., TO HAVE A WELLBORE OF ITS INCLUDED) IN THE AVALON (DELAWARE) UNIT OPERATED BY EXXON COMPANY, USA, EDDY COUNTY, NEW MEXICO

ORIGINAL

REPORTER'S TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS

COMMISSION HEARING

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BEFORE: LORI WROTENBERY, CHAIRMAN WILLIAM J. LEMAY, COMMISSIONER JAMI BAILEY, COMMISSIONER

Oil Conservation Division

April 9th, 1998

Santa Fe, New Mexico

This matter came on for hearing before the Oil Conservation Commission, LORI WROTENBERY, Chairman, on Thursday, April 9th, 1998, at the New Mexico Energy, Minerals and Natural Resources Department, Porter Hall, 2040 South Pacheco, Santa Fe, New Mexico, Steven T. Brenner, Certified Court Reporter No. 7 for the State of New Mexico.

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* * *

WHEREUPON, the following proceedings were had at 9:36 a.m.:

CHAIRMAN WROTENBERY: Okay, the next case on our agenda is Case 11,838. This is the Application of Premier Oil and Gas, Inc., to have a wellbore of its included in the Avalon (Delaware) Unit operated by Exxon Company, USA, in Eddy County, New Mexico.

We're here today upon the Application of Premier Oil and Gas, Inc., to hear this case de novo pursuant to the provisions of Rule 1220, and as I understand it, this hearing will be limited today to oral arguments regarding the dismissal of the case at the Division level.

Who do we have here making appearances?

MR. KELLAHIN: Yes, ma'am, I'm Tom Kellahin of the Santa Fe law firm of Kellahin and Kellahin, appearing on behalf of the Applicant, Premier Oil and Gas.

MR. BRUCE: Commissioner Wrotenbery, Jim Bruce of Santa Fe, representing Exxon Corporation.

MR. CARR: May it please the Commission, my name is William F. Carr with the Santa Fe law firm Campbell, Carr, Berge and Sheridan. We represent Yates Petroleum Corporation in this matter.

CHAIRMAN WROTENBERY: Okay. With that, I understand from talking to Lyn a little bit earlier this morning that we don't have any particular time limits or

special format for this type of oral argument, so at this point, Tom, if you'd like to proceed.

MR. KELLAHIN: Thank you.

This case represents an opportunity for the Commission to give guidance to us in the industry that present statutory unitization cases before you.

There have been, since the Act was adopted, relatively few statutory unitization cases. And even fewer of those have resulted in contested disputes resolved either at the Division level or at the Commission level.

You had on your docket this morning three such cases.

There is the Premier case, which we'll describe in a moment, and there was continued from the docket today two other cases.

There was a case filed by Gillespie and Crow to modify a statutory unitization order that had been issued by the Division to make changes in the West Lovington-Strawn Unit.

In addition, there was another case involving that same unit, the West Lovington-Strawn Unit. It was an Application by Yates and Hanley for an amendment to that statutory unitization Order, seeking to expand it in a remarkably different way than Gillespie and Crow were proposing.

I was involved in the Hanley cases and Gillespie-Crow cases, and when that case was originally decided as a statutory unit, I was absolutely convinced that we were done with that deal. I would have told you then that we had adjudicated a number of those issues and they were resolved.

By the actions of Mr. Carr and Mr. Bruce as attorneys for the respective parties in those cases, I have come to re-examine the Statutory Unitization Act, and quite frankly, I'm not sure we're ever done with the management and the supervision by this Commission pursuant to statutory unitization, and let me explain why.

There are few instances in your jurisdiction where you have the police powers of the State of New Mexico to involuntarily commit interest owners to involvement in a statutory unit over their objection.

One instance is compulsory pooling. We are well familiar with that process where parties are involuntarily committed to a spacing unit.

In a large global context, statutory unitization is the same kind of critter, except we're compelling someone to participate in a statutory unit that's more large in scope and process.

And when we examine what the Commission does under statutory unitization and exercising the police

powers of the state, there are some things in the Statute that I had not paid attention to earlier, and they involve the continuing jurisdiction of this agency concerning issues of dispute over those statutory units. In addition, there is statutory authority for you to exercise that continuing jurisdiction.

I have a presentation so that I can refresh your recollection about what we were doing back in December of 1995 when Exxon and Yates came before you asking to have this particular Avalon Unit statutorily unitized, and if you'll give me a moment I'll set up the displays and we can look at the picture.

CHAIRMAN WROTENBERY: I certainly need to have my memory refreshed.

MR. LEMAY: You have a memory?

(Laughter)

2.3

MR. KELLAHIN: I want to distribute to the Commission and the participants a briefing folder I've put together so I can help you visualize our position.

In the binder, in the pocket part, there is a foldout which will help you visualize, I think, the basic pattern of the ownership in the unit. I have put a colored copy up on the large display board.

Exxon's project was a plan which included the concept of adding some buffer tracts around an original

project area defined for waterflood purposes.

The Premier tracts are identified on the handout in the shaded area. They are identified with, in addition to well symbols involved, the FV-3 and the FV-1.

Behind Tab Number 2, I think it is, you'll find some colored -- I'm sorry, you have -- I believe it's Tab Number 1 that's got the color displays. There's a display numbered Exxon Exhibit 25. This is the waterflood project. This is what they were originally trying to do.

You can see the waterflood pattern with the injection wells shown with the arrows, and it is a slightly irregular plan where they were picking up existing wellbores they could utilize for injection and for production, and it had this particular configuration that you can see on the display.

Their plan was to also have committed to the unit during waterflood project phase a buffer area. Surrounding the entire unit is a series of linked 40-acre tracts which constitute what has been described as the buffer area.

In the buffer area there are also some well location symbols, which were going to be utilized once the project was converted into a ${\rm CO_2}$ project.

There's also in the binder a copy of Exxon

Exhibit 28. This is what Exxon planned to do with the unit

at the point in time that the project ever was converted to

carbon dioxide flooding.

The testimony at the original hearing was that the buffer tracts, including Premier's tract along that section, were not going to receive any benefit from waterflooding, nor was the unit going to derive any benefit from the utilization of the buffer tracts for waterflooding purposes.

What the plan was going to be was that eventually, at some unforeseeable time in the future, when the project was ever determined to be feasible for waterflood purposes, Exxon would then expand the project area and include those buffer tracts and the wells involved.

The issue for you this morning is whether or not Premier gets a hearing with regards to the VF-1 (sic) well.

Now, the VF-1 well is located at a position that's comparable to this position on the waterflood/ CO_2 project map. You can see at some point in time in the future this location is going to be utilized as a producing well for the CO_2 project.

In terms of the present case, this case was filed back in the summer of 1997. You can see from the briefing book I have organized it in such a way that the first information you have in front of you is Premier's response to the Motion to Dismiss.

Premier asked to have the VF-1 well included as an amendment to the statutory unitization. That application was met by a Motion to Dismiss, filed by Exxon and Yates.

In response to the Motion to Dismiss, I have prepared for Premier this response that you have in front of you.

Now, if you have not had an opportunity to review this or read it, it represents my best effort then and best effort now to explain to you what Premier's position was with regards to this addition of this wellbore.

This matter has been pending before the

Commission for some time, and then finally in February, I

think it is, Exxon and Yates have filed supplemental briefs

with you just prior to one of those hearings, and I asked

the matter be continued to give me a chance to read those

briefs.

I found nothing in the material they provided you that caused me to want to change my position or opinions that I've described for you in writing in terms of our response, and that's what you have before you.

In 1995, the Commission was dealing with the issue of compelling these tracts to be added into the unit. Premier is a Roswell company, composed of Ken Jones and his mom. They were the only opponents to the inclusion of

these tracts. Ken desired to have the tracts left out, and that was what we litigated before the Commission back in December of 1995, was the inclusion of the tracts.

The Commission has decided to include those tracts. Ken argued that it was premature to have those tracts included in a waterflood for which he received no benefit, and that it was too speculative to have them included in the CO₂ project for which it had not yet been determined whether it was going to be feasible or practicable. He lost on those issues.

When the Division acted on this case and dismissed Ken's application, and we filed for a de novo case before the Commission, one of the issues was whether or not there was an express statutory authority for the Division to act on a statutory unit case that had been cited by it.

And in Yates' and Exxon's brief, they referred to the Armijo vs. Save 'N Gain case. And they cited "for the proposition that in New Mexico, in the absence of an express grant of authority, the power of an administrative agency to reconsider a final decision exists only where the statutory provisions creating the agency indicate a legislative intent to permit the agency to carry into effect such power."

Premier agrees with that case and that summary.

What we find in looking at Exxon's and Yates' brief is, they stop short of telling you where you, in fact, have that specific authority. To aid you, you'll find behind Exhibit Tab Number 2 a copy of the Statutory Unitization Act.

Again, in exercising the police powers of the State of New Mexico, there are at least three of these subdivisions in the Act, one of which is of particular importance.

The first one is 70-7-3, and it talks about vesting the Division with the jurisdiction, authority and the power to do, make and enforce such orders and such things necessary to carry out and effectuate the purposes of the Act.

And then in 70-7-7, it talks about the order providing for unitizations, et cetera, shall be reasonable and equitable, and under J it says, such additional provisions as may be appropriate.

But what's important to me, and I hope to you, is 70-7-9. If you turn over to page 66 of the Act, you'll see what they're saying. It says "Amendment of plan of unitization."

And when you read the statutory authority that you have for issuing orders that provide amendments to prior orders, I cannot read this to limit your action to

only those instances where you're adding additional acreage to an existing unit. I find no such limitation in this Act that would preclude you from resolving disputes as we now have with Exxon concerning the addition of the FV-3 well.

If it is to be read as a limitation so that you exercise only your authority in those instances where the amendment of the order is to add or subtract acreage, if that's how you read it, then we lose.

If you read it, as I do, as to be broader than that, then you give Ken Jones and his mom a forum to resolve and hear this dispute, under statutory -- under a voluntary waterflood, without the jurisdiction of the Commission. My recourse in resolving such a dispute is going to be to go to District Court.

However, when you've used your police powers under statutory unitization, my position is, primary jurisdiction lies with this agency, and my first recourse is with you to resolve a dispute as such we have with Exxon over this wellbore.

Behind Tab 3 is another issue. My opponents argue that having issued an order, it was an adjudication as to the issues we actually discussed -- having the acreage, distribution of hydrocarbon pore volume, participation formulas -- that they say we adjudicated those issues, and we also adjudicated anything -- other

possible thing we might have thought of or brought before you.

My position is to the contrary. I say that the statute gives you continuing jurisdiction, and the Commission, in fact, has admitted, as my opponents have, that you retain jurisdiction to resolve such issues as I'm about to describe.

For example, behind Tab 3 is a copy of the Commission counsel's brief before the New Mexico Supreme Court. As you may know, Premier has appealed this case. It's now pending decision before the New Mexico Supreme Court. And in the brief, Ms. Hebert refers to, on page 11, that the Commission's "Jurisdiction of this cause is retained for entry of such further orders as the Commission may deem necessary." And she describes it as saying, "In this manner any unanticipated development...can be taken into consideration...at a later date..." by the Commission.

My position is, this is an unanticipated development for which your counsel has admitted you have jurisdiction.

In addition, my position is, Yates has admitted this as well. If you flip to the next page, you'll find Yates' Motion to Dismiss, filed in August of 1997. And turning to page 3, which I've copied and highlighted for you, Mr. Carr cites an Illinois case from 1936 and says in

reliance on that case that "The Division can only reopen a case to consider an new [sic] issue within its jurisdiction that was not decided in the original hearing".

last month, you'll find on page 4, in the third line, they admit that Premier is raising a new issue. It's highlighted for you on the third -- fourth line down on page 4. I take that as an admission that they recognize that this Commission made no conscious decision to talk about the exclusion of the FV-1 wellbore, and it's a new issue.

If, in fact, it's a new issue, then I'm entitled to an evidentiary hearing so that we can talk about, either to you or one of your Hearing Examiners, whether it's arbitrary for Exxon to exclude this wellbore, or whether it is not.

If you'll look behind Tab 4, we can talk about whether the Commission made a conscious choice to do anything about excluding this wellbore. Here is the Order. It goes on for 19 pages. It is detailed, it is intricate, it is involved, it highlights all the disputed issues, and there is not a specific finding anywhere in that Order where this Commission dealt with the exclusion of the FV Number 1 well. It is simply not in there.

The only way you can reach a conclusion that it

was somehow adjudicated is to follow the analogy that Exxon and Yates are advancing. They are saying that when this Order -- by boilerplate, quite frankly -- incorporated by reference the unit operating agreement, that that was a conscious decision by you to approve the inclusion of certain specified listed wellbores, and thereby, by omission, a conscious decision to exclude the FV-1.

Let's see how we went about that.

This is the 500-and-something pages of transcript. These are the two Exxon technical books.

These are the Yates exhibits. This is the unit operating agreement. There's the unit agreement. And this stack and that stack, that's the case.

Buried in this pile, Exhibit 3, which is 128 pages, somewhere in here in Exhibit "H", is the list of wellbores.

If you'll turn behind Exhibit 5, Tab 5, let's talk about the opportunity for the Commission to have made a conscious decision about the wellbore list. I've copied for you out of the transcript the cover sheet, and I've turned, first of all, your attention to page 29.

This is the examination by Mr. Bruce of Mr.

Thomas, their expert witness, who is sponsoring Exhibit 3, which is the unit operating agreement. And he asks him to identify it, which he does. Exhibit 2 is the unit

agreement. Bottom of the page, he's talking about the operating agreement, Exhibit 3, and goes over to page 30, and it is nothing more than a perfunctory identification of that 128-page document. There is no discussion in there about the wellbore issue.

When you take time to take apart the operating agreement, which I've done for you -- If you'll turn the page you'll find the cover sheet in the presentation book; it says Exhibit 3, the operating agreement. And as you work your way through the index, you come to various articles that deal with the wellbore list.

You can find -- it's under Article 2, it's listed as 2.1.5, it says Exhibit "H". It says nothing more than that; it identifies it as an exhibit to the document.

If you turn beyond that and find page 10 of the operating agreement, you get to Article 10, and it talks about the wellbore. And it simply says nothing more than Exhibit "H" may be amended to add or to delete wells.

Well, we've gone to Exxon and we've asked them to add the FV-1 wellbore to the unit, and they have refused.

So the document itself has a provision in it for amending, to add and subtract wells. The fact that the FV-1 wellbore is not on the list was taken of no consequence to Ken Jones. I'm not sure he even consciously thought about it.

And we would like to have an evidentiary hearing, because at that hearing, then, he could come and testify why his point of reference was a presumption, a reasonable and fair presumption that the FV-1 well was going to be included in the unit.

We get to that point by looking behind Exhibit 6.

Tab 6 is what I characterize an unanticipated development concerning this wellbore.

Prior to the Commission hearing in December of 1995, if you allow us to have a hearing, Ken Jones will come with his mom and testify that they assume that both their wellbores would be included in the unit. That was their presumption prior to coming to the hearing. At that point in time the FV-1 well was a -- had a small gas production in the Bone Springs. It was still producing.

But his assumption, with prior communications with Exxon, is that it would be included. He continued with that assumption, in which Terry Payne at the hearing before you in December of 1995 included the two wellbores in his technical analysis. In fact, the FV-1 well was extensively used as a data point to determine pore volume.

And then in November of 1995, which I've included behind this little summary sheet, is the fact that Exxon's advised Premier to come forward with wellbores.

When you look at the specifics of the statutory

unitization Order, you find some discussion about costing and valuing wellbores, but that really is an issue of unimportance to this matter. The valuation is not being disputed, and how you go about testing the well is not being disputed. What we're talking about is the exclusion of the well.

After the Commission hearing, then in March of 1997, Premier formally requests Exxon to include the FV-1 well in the unit. The problem with this is that the voting procedures absolutely preclude us from having any chance for inclusion. Exxon controls 72 percent; they're opposed to inclusion. Yates has got a sufficient percentage to oppose us, which they do.

And so if we follow what the agreement says for inclusion, there's no way to get it included unless you take jurisdiction over and decide that the exclusion is arbitrary. We simply want a hearing on that issue of whether or not it's arbitrary and whether or not this Commission will use its jurisdiction authority to add that wellbore to the list of wellbores.

We get to that point by looking at the Exhibit B, which is the Exxon letter to Ken Jones of April 24th, 1997, and I've highlighted for you their written response to him which triggered our Application to you.

It says, "With regard to the inclusion of" the

"FV-1 well, the wells that are to be included in the Unit are listed on Exhibit 'H'." It says, "Since it does not appear that the FV-1 well would add any value to the Unit, I do not believe that working interest owners would approve its acquisition at this time."

So therein lies our dispute, is, one, whether the Commission has jurisdiction at this point in time to simply do something about these disputes, or whether or not your decision back in December of 1995 simply precluded us from having this matter dealt for -- in front of you.

We don't think it matters that the FV-1 well was not on the list. I think it simply misdirects your attention from what is a more serious problem, is, when you approve these statutory unitizations, are you now assigning to that operator such extensive control and authority that matters like this are now beyond your jurisdiction to do anything about? Does the approval of this unit agreement by reference amount to a conscious decision by the Commission that this wellbore can only be added at the absolute and sole discretion of Exxon?

They take the position that it adds no value, but we would like to have a hearing to have them explain to us why they can take the tract into the unit, and yet the wellbore that they propose to have located on this very tract to aid them in the CO₂ project phase cannot be the

FV-1 well.

Mr. Bruce in his response says, Well, the wellbore is 990 from the east boundary, and somehow that is to make a difference. Well, if it is, let's bring his experts in here and have them talk about that and not hear from a lawyer; let's see what the engineer makes sense of that. The FV-3 well is only 330 from the boundary. It got in.

So I just want a chance to talk to somebody that can be an impartial tribunal to decide this issue and see if it comes in or not. I'm most uncomfortable in taking the solution that Exxon gives us, which is, you can't have it in.

We think under the case law of New Mexico, the statutory authority of this Commission and the orders and judgments made by this agency, that you have, in fact, the authority to give us a hearing, and we've described to you behind Exhibit Tab 7 the kinds of things that we would like to inquire into about why this wellbore cannot now be added to a project for a CO₂ phase that it has not even begun.

Thank you, Madame Chairman. That concludes my position in this matter.

CHAIRMAN WROTENBERY: Thank you, Mr. Kellahin.

Any questions?

MR. LEMAY: Is the form such we can ask the

lawyers a question?

MS. HEBERT: Sure.

MR. LEMAY: Tom, why didn't Premier raise the issue of the FV-1 wellbore at the original hearings? Are you saying that they just kind of overlooked it, or they assumed it was going to be in, even though it wasn't in -- specifically listed in the operating agreement?

MR. KELLAHIN: Well, let me answer you in two steps.

If your decision is based upon whether it could have been raised, and because it wasn't we can't have a hearing, well, then, I lose, because it could have been raised. It's there, someone could find it.

Ken's focus was not on the wellbore list. His assumptions with Exxon was that it would be added. He didn't pay any attention to the fact that it wasn't on there. His point of view at that Commission hearing was, I don't want my tracts in here at all, and that was his attention.

And his conduct with Exxon was such that he was led to believe that both his wellbores were going in, so he didn't think it was disputed.

MR. LEMAY: But you're not saying he couldn't have raised the issue had he felt strongly about it at the time?

MR. KELLAHIN: No, I'm not saying that.

MR. LEMAY: Other issues were raised, certainly.

That could have been raised.

MR. KELLAHIN: He could have raised that issue, yes, sir. And the reason he didn't raise it is, he was under the presumption that it was going to be added anyway. So he didn't think it was something to fight over, because there was no fight.

MR. LEMAY: How can you -- What kind of a presumption is that if it's not in the operating agreement to take it in? I mean, how -- either didn't read the operating agreement, or he made a mistake or --

MR. KELLAHIN: Well, it could be either of -- any of those things. And if that's significant to you, then he doesn't get a hearing because it was there to find and he didn't find it. In hindsight, now, it's an issue that could have been raised. And if you believe that he should have then, then he can't do it now.

MR. LEMAY: That's all I have. Thank you.

CHAIRMAN WROTENBERY: I guess just in following up a little bit on Bill's question, I noticed in the Commission's decision -- this was what you had provided in Tab 4, the Commission's Order in the unitization case -- there is, on page 6, some discussion about Premier's FV-3. Could you explain -- I mean, obviously the specific

wellbore, FV-3, was discussed at some length in the hearing on the unitization.

MR. KELLAHIN: Yes, ma'am.

CHAIRMAN WROTENBERY: If that was the case, why was there no discussion of the FV-1?

MR. KELLAHIN: Okay, the FV-3 well was a critical piece of data for the geologists in defining the vertical limits of the pay section in relation to the Yates well to the south. So they were focused on the data that wellbore represented in calculating pore volume, and they were not focusing on whether the wellbore was going to be physically in or out of the unit in terms of the CO₂ project.

So the reference here is to the technical data about whether or not the activity conducted in the FV-3 well was an indication that it had potential Delaware production. The FV-3 well had been re-entered prior to the hearing in an effort to see if they could actually produce oil out of the Delaware.

They never got to the disputed zone, and so they had -- each side had to go back and look at the technical data, and there was some indication when Getty had this wellbore, that there was a waterflow. And if you took one strategy, the waterflow was attributed to the Delaware, which meant that that particular 40-acre tract didn't have contributing pore volume that was hydrocarbon-bearing, and

therefore you could exclude or give less value to the 1 2 Premier tract. The other argument was, the waterflow had come 3 from a different source. 4 5 And that's the nature of the dispute. It had 6 nothing to do with whether the wellbore was in or out. 7 COMMISSIONER BAILEY: I do have a question. 8 Behind Tab 5, the operating agreement --9 MR. KELLAHIN: Yes, ma'am. 10 COMMISSIONER BAILEY: -- page 12, Article 11, Wellbores --11 12 MR. KELLAHIN: Yes. 13 COMMISSIONER BAILEY: -- does the FV-1 meet all, 14 each and every, criteria for use of a well? 15 MR. KELLAHIN: Yes, ma'am. Back in -- I believe 16 it was September of last year, recognizing that this was a 17 dispute with Exxon, Exxon still afforded Ken the 18 opportunity to have both the FV-1 and the FV-3 tested for mechanical integrity. They both technically qualified 19 20 under this provision. So they meet the standards for inclusion. 21 22 MS. HEBERT: May I ask --23 CHAIRMAN WROTENBERY: Sure. 24 MS. HEBERT: Mr. Kellahin --25 MR. KELLAHIN: Yes, ma'am.

1 MS. HEBERT: -- is your answer the same as the 2 Commissioner's question as to why this wasn't brought up in your Motion for Rehearing in the Premier case? 3 MR. KELLAHIN: Yes, ma'am. 4 That's right. 5 MS. HEBERT: And when did you file this first amended Application? I couldn't find it anywhere. 6 7 MR. KELLAHIN: The first amended Application was 8 filed as an exhibit to our response to the Motion to 9 Dismiss, and it will appear as, I think, Exhibit -- It 10 appears as Exhibit D to the brief in response to the Motion to Dismiss, and it's also -- a separate copy is attached 11 12 behind Exhibit Tab 7 to the briefing book. 13 MS. HEBERT: Thank you. 14 CHAIRMAN WROTENBERY: Anything else, Mr. Kellahin? 15 16 Thank you, Mr. Kellahin. 17 Mr. Bruce? 18 May it please the Commission, I'm MR. BRUCE: 19 going to discuss the -- primarily the factual issues. Mr. 20 Carr will discuss the legal principles involved in our 21 position. 22 For your benefit, Commissioner Wrotenbery, I'll 23 go into just a couple of minutes of background on this 24 unit. 25 My written argument starts off for the first 20

seconds just like Mr. Kellahin's did, then we diverge substantially.

As Tom said, in New Mexico you can force pool interest owners into a particular well unit. Under our compulsory pooling statutes, under the Statutory Unitization Act, you can also force interest owners into a unit covering all or part of a pool, provided that 75 percent of the working interest owners and 75 percent of the royalty interest owners voluntarily agree to unitization.

That's what we're here about today, the Avalon Unit.

As you can imagine, when you're dealing with poolwide unitization, with dozens and dozens of working interest and royalty interest owners, this process can take quite some time. In this particular case, discussions among the interest owners first began in 1991 and continued for several years.

In 1994 through early 1995, there were numerous working interest owner meetings, phone calls, correspondence and other contacts discussing the shape of the unit, the waterflood project, the CO₂ project and the tract participation factors.

I don't know if I want to dig out the particular -- Well, it's right on top. Exxon Exhibit 7,

this is merely the correspondence, and most of it is from 1994 and 1995. Premier was involved in these discussions. Premier had numerous phone conferences with the Exxon project manager.

In early 1995, the unit agreement and the unit operating agreement were sent to Premier, as well as the other interest owners, and Exxon applied for a hearing to approve statutory unitization. Unitization was considered by the Division at a two-day hearing in Hobbs, in June of 1995. It was again considered by the Commission at a two-day hearing in December of 1995. Since then it's been on appeal to the District Court and the Supreme Court.

Yet Premier now says that the issue of the FV-1 well's inclusion in the unit was never considered. I think that's nonsense.

Let's look first at this plat Mr. Kellahin handed out. This was part of the Exxon technical report, Exhibit 10.

Mr. Kellahin says, Hah, how could you expect anyone to know everything that's in this report?

Go through the testimony of the engineers, and there were four different engineers who testified through these four hearings. They read this report in detail. So did their geologists.

That's how -- Commissioner Wrotenbery, you asked

about the discussion of the FV-3 well. There was, in the record, probably hours -- a couple of hours of testimony at each hearing, just on the FV-3 well. Why? Because somewhere in this technical report -- and there's a big plat that goes along with it -- Premier was attributed -- I forget the exact figure. It might have been 55 feet of pay in the Delaware. That's buried somewhere in this technical report. They dug that out, they contested that for hours on end.

Furthermore, looking at this plat, you can see up here in the southeast quarter of the northwest quarter of Section 25 the FV-1 well. That well is 990 feet from the east line of Section 25. I'll get to that in a moment, but remember that number, 990 feet.

As far as I'm concerned, all you have to do to determine whether the FV-1 well was considered is to look at two or three exhibits submitted at the hearing. And one is Exxon Exhibit 3, the unit operating agreement. Mr. Kellahin's included certain portions of it in his materials.

Article 10.1.1 of that agreement says, "All wells listed on Exhibit 'H' and associated well equipment shall be delivered..." to the unit. It lists 40 wells on mine.

I've highlighted the Premier FV State Well Number 3.

Clearly, that's the only Premier well that's listed. This

isn't so hard to find.

Premier had this document for months before the Commission hearing. It had it, it read it. The document's intent is clear. This well was never considered for inclusion in the unit.

The second exhibits, Mr. Kellahin put them up on the board. I've handed you -- Or, attached to Exxon's supplemental Motion are the same two exhibits. On mine I've noted Section 25. If you look at that, down in the southeast quarter of the southeast quarter -- Exhibit 25 is a map of the waterflood project -- you can see that Premier's FV-3 well is listed, or is identified. It certainly doesn't show the FV-1 well on there.

Exhibit 28, similar map for the CO₂ project. On my map that I submitted to the Commission, I hand wrote on there the approximate location of the FV-1 well. I wrote it in because it's not on that map. It clearly wasn't considered part of the CO₂ project. This map wasn't buried in anything, this was handed out at the Commission hearing. It wasn't attached to anything else; it was a separate exhibit.

The reason the FV-1 well is not in the unit is because it does not fit into the pattern for the ${\rm CO}_2$ flood. This issue was discussed by all three engineers who testified at the hearing before the Commission on December

of 1995. The wells on the outside of the unit are about 660 feet off the east line of Section 25, or Section 36 immediately below that.

At the hearing, Premier's engineer said, Why not move these wells to 990 feet? His position was that that way more reserves would be attributed to Premier's tract, and thus it would get a bigger participation percentage in the unit.

That was specifically rebutted by Mr. Boneau, who's sitting here today, who said you would lose injection and recovery and efficiency by moving the wells the extra 330 feet.

I've cited to the record in my Motion what all of the engineers testified at length about why or why not the wells -- the outer ring of wells should not be 990 feet away. That's why I dispute Mr. Kellahin's statement that the FV-1 well is a comparable position to the well placement on Exhibit 28. It is not at a comparable position, and this was discussed at the hearing.

I mean, they were clearly aware of the FV-1 well.

I went and dug out Mr. Kellahin's proposed order to the

Commission. Page 14, paragraph 27, he specifically makes

reference to the FV-1 well in discussing why he thought or

why Premier thought that Exxon's geology and apportionment

of waterflood reserves was wrong. They discussed it here.

They knew about it.

In short, the FV-1 well was at issue in the hearings before the Division and the Commission and cannot be raised at this time. This Application should be dismissed.

At that I would pass this on to Mr. Carr. I would also ask, so that there is a record before this body, that the Commission take notice of the exhibits and testimony presented before the Commission in Cases 11,297 and 11,298, de novo.

MR. CARR: May it please the Commission, at the beginning of his argument Mr. Kellahin noted that these motions and your ruling in this case today provide you with an opportunity to provide guidance as to how reservoirs can be statutorily unitized.

I would also point out that your ruling on these motions can also create confusion and can undermine efforts to put units together under the Statutory Unitization Act.

I believe you know, or soon will learn, that every time Mr. Kellahin comes before you, he has a pretty good argument. We've come to expect that.

But the problem, I submit, with the argument here today is that it is designed more to confuse the issue presented by the Motion to Dismiss than, in fact, to address it.

Now, Mr. Bruce has reviewed for you various bits of information on the hearing, and it establishes, I submit, that the FV Number 1 well was, in fact, an issue in the original proceeding.

But I would like to focus for a minute with you on the procedural aspects of this matter, because I submit, and it is Yates' belief, that if proper procedures are followed, it is clear that Premier cannot now raise this issue and that you, this Commission, may not now consider this matter.

And I think it's important in the midst of all of these facts and everything strewn all over the floor, I think it's important to, in the midst of all of this, recognize that at the core there are several very simple facts which will control the disposition of the Motion to Dismiss. They are these:

First, in Order Number R-10,460-B, this

Commission approved the Avalon-Delaware Unit. And in your findings, you determined that the proposed unit was fair.

I think it's Finding 27, addresses credits that are given to owners for investments in wells. And you found that the unit agreement and the unit operating agreement provided for unitization on terms that were fair, reasonable and equitable.

And then you incorporated by reference the unit

operating agreement and the unit agreement, and it contained a list of unit wells, and the FV-1 well was not on that list. It was not included. And it isn't something that everyone forgot, that popped up just recently, because as Mr. Bruce pointed out, in his proposed order Mr. Kellahin makes reference to the FV-1 well. It was part of the prior proceeding. It was not something that was overlooked.

But recognizing that you once determined the unitization effort was fair, now we have a new Application, and we now assert that unless this well is included, well, the prior Order, the unitization, is not fair to Premier. And I would submit to you that you subscribe to that position. Every issue that properly comes before working interest owners at a working interest owner meeting can become an issue brought to this Commission if you are not satisfied with the Commission's original determination that a unit plan is fair to the owners in the unitized land.

I think it's also important to keep in mind as you consider this Motion the procedure path this dispute has followed.

Following the entry of the Order, we found this particular unit plan fair. Mr. Kellahin filed for Premier an Application for rehearing. That was denied.

And at that point in time, this Order, from an

administrative agency point of view, became fine. And under our statutory scheme it was subject, then, to review only by the courts. And they took it to court. It was reviewed by the District Court, and the Commission was affirmed. And he appealed it to the Supreme Court, and it has been briefed and it has been argued.

And now, 21 months after you found this unit plan to be fair, confronted with what appears to be a very unsuccessful appeal, Premier wants to start over. They want to come back, they want to come to you.

And I would submit that it doesn't make any difference what the evidence says at this point in time, it doesn't make any difference whether the unit agreement provides standards for including a well and this well was not included, because the fact of the matter is, they cannot now have you — they cannot come forward with this and bring this issue to you, because they simply failed to exhaust their administrative remedy.

Now, the Oil and Gas Act contains procedures which govern the appeals of Commission decisions. And the key piece in this whole scheme, for our purposes today, is the Application for rehearing.

If you, like Premier, come to the Commission and you're dissatisfied with the order entered by the Commission, you have 20 days to file an application for

rehearing.

And the Oil and Gas Act provides that that application for rehearing shall set forth the respects in which the order is deemed to be erroneous. You set out the things you think are wrong when you file your application for rehearing. They filed it, they did not raise this issue.

They have raised it in the proposed order, but they didn't raise it in the application for rehearing.

They have a right to raise it then. But as to this issue, they failed to exhaust administrative remedy. They participated in the hearing, they failed to raise the issue, and Premier cannot bring that issue to you now.

Now, what is your role in this regard? Do you have, as the Oil Commission, authority to reconsider at this date the fairness of the Avalon-Delaware Unit? I don't think there's any way you can cast this particular new application as anything but a challenge to the original Commission order approving the unit.

The fact of the matter is that in New Mexico, this Commission, like other administrative agencies, has no authority to reopen and reconsider a matter.

And I guess we are in agreement on one thing. We both believe that Armijo vs. Save 'N Gain is the critical case in defining what your role is when you try to -- are

asked to revisit a final order.

And in that case, our Court of Appeals in 1989 noted that you have no inherent right to reopen and consider a final administrative position. It was at that time that Mr. Kellahin pointed out that I dug back into ancient history and cited a 1936 case. I would note that some cases over time become stale, and some you continue to cite because they're right.

And in that Illinois case, the court recognized that there is a real distinction between a matter reserved -- being ruled on later, and an order that has been entered covering and adjudicating all matters at issue.

And in this case, we submit you found the unit was fair, and it includes everything Mr. Kellahin has strewn all over the floor before you here today.

Now, it notes that -- Armijo vs. Save 'N Gain notes that the only power to reconsider a final order is in those circumstances where you are given authority to revisit the order by statute.

Our statute isn't silent about whether you can revisit an order. If you go to the Division and you're dissatisfied, you go de novo, you have a de novo hearing before the Commission. If you're dissatisfied with the Commission, you file your application for rehearing. And

those are the only times the Division may reconsider a final order, absent some new, some new fact, that wasn't before you the first time around.

Mr. Kellahin wants to draw analogies to the Gillespie-Crow matter. We all know what that is. That wasn't a well in a unit agreement that we talked about, we just forgot to raise in our Application for rehearing.

application to expand the unit because of new data based on the drilling of its three new wells. They don't compare. They have known, in fact. They've waited 21 months. You do not have the authority to reopen the final Order that you entered approving this unit.

What they're trying to do is to mount a collateral attack on the prior order. A collateral attack is a challenge, directly or indirectly, on an order other than an attack authorized by statute. You have to have change of conditions. We simply don't have that here.

But they go back to this argument of continuing jurisdiction. They say, Well, you said you had continuing jurisdiction, so you certainly can reopen and revisit the issues. And I submit you can't, that's wrong.

Mr. Kellahin always cringes when I recite this quote. It's one of my favorites. And he's not the only one who always forgets. This -- We all stray from a very

fundamental principle, and that is, as our Supreme Court announced in the *Continental* decision, the Oil Conservation Commission is a creature of statute. And your powers are expressly defined and limited by the Oil and Gas Act.

We don't just, every time something comes in, treat it as if it were a brand-new world and what's fair is fair. We go back to the Act and say, What are you charged with doing? And the Oil and Gas Act, there is nowhere in that statute, anything, which authorizes you to reopen and consider a final order unless there is a new fact that is now raised before you, and this fact was raised before.

And this principle, this finality aspect of the Commission and Division orders, is important. It's important to an orderly regulatory process, or if not, we'd continually reopen and reconsider matters, and there would be no point in the administrative process where you really would know that agency review was over, and you probably should take the matter to court.

But see, Premier ignores this aspect of finality.

They want you to follow them in a situation where you can forever come back.

And I submit that if you follow Premier, many cases will be like this one, an endless barrage of new applications, new issues, new claims about, in this case, a unit, new claims about matters that, in fact, were

addressed by you and decided by you in an order that you determined this unit plan was fair, was reasonable and was equitable, and, I submit, procedural. They cannot raise this issue procedurally. You may not now reopen and reconsider.

1.3

1.7

For that reason, Yates Petroleum Corporation asks you to dismiss the Application.

CHAIRMAN WROTENBERY: Any questions?

MR. LEMAY: Yeah, one I would like each one of the lawyers to answer, if they could, briefly, if possible.

I guess starting with you, Mr. Carr, would you define, if you could, unanticipated development? What does that mean to you?

MR. CARR: An unanticipated development is something that doesn't spring from the record. In the Gillespie-Crow matter an unanticipated development was the drilling of two wells immediately offsetting the unit that were in the reservoir. It was inconsistent with the prior geologic interpretation.

An unanticipated development is not the fact that you thought your wells should be in, you didn't raise it, and 21 months later you would like to bring it back to the Commission and start the process over.

MR. LEMAY: Mr. Bruce?

MR. BRUCE: I don't know that I have much to add

to what Bill said.

I think you have to look at new developments and not what existed for years and years. In the hearing I specifically asked Mr. Jones, the owner of Premier, about the FV-1 well, and he discussed that it was producing in the Bone Spring and that he had extra plans for that well. So that was brought up specifically on the record.

MR. LEMAY: I guess what I'm getting at, it's not -- and defining development with development, would that be a new well, new information, a new fact, or an overlooked situation? Would all those qualify, in your definition? Something overlooked, would that qualify?

MR. BRUCE: Well, it certainly wasn't overlooked by Exxon. You know, if every party -- If there was a fact that no one knew of, then, you know, an old fact could be an unanticipated development. But Exxon and Yates and the other interest owners certainly knew of the FV-1 well out there.

MR. CARR: This process only works if we do our job when we come to you. If we can just say we overlooked something and start our process over after the unit has been up and running for two years, there is no finality, there is no end to this process.

MR. LEMAY: So you would scratch overlooked as far as --

I would scratch that, absolutely. MR. CARR: 1 2 Overlooked? No. 3 MR. LEMAY: Okay. MR. CARR: Unknown, yes. 4 MR. LEMAY: Would you define that, if you could, 5 Tom? 6 7 I'd be delighted to. MR. KELLAHIN: Unanticipated development, Mr. LeMay, is when 8 9 Exxon's project manager represents to Ken Jones that when 10 he stops using this wellbore as a Bone Springs well it can 11 be added to the unit; it's totally unanticipated when they 12 change their mind and refuse now to put it in the unit. 13 That is an unanticipated development. 14 That may be an example in your mind, MR. LEMAY: 15 but would you consider something overlooked as -overlooked, a new well, new information, a new fact? 16 17 you include all of those? 18 MR. KELLAHIN: Absolutely. And it comes under 19 your continuing jurisdiction and your specific statutory 20 authority under 70-7-9 to amend these orders. 21 MR. LEMAY: So something overlooked would be an 22 unanticipated development in your definition? 23 MR. KELLAHIN: It may be expensive, it may be time-consuming, it may involve effort for the Commission to 24 25 supervise statutory unitization cases, they may be a

nuisance to you. But it's an incredibly responsible thing you do when you exercise the police powers of the State of New Mexico and take somebody's property when they don't want to be in this unit. You have continuing jurisdiction to resolve these issues, and I'm sorry it may be a nuisance, but we have to have some forum to resolve these.

CHAIRMAN WROTENBERY: Mr. Carr, did you have something you wanted to add?

MR. CARR: You know, everyone always casts stones at the lawyers because that's -- all the engineers and geologists don't trust us.

But let me tell you that there are some legal principles that come into play when you start talking about representations prior to the entry of a contract.

The unit agreement is a contract. And the prior conversations are merged into the four corners of that agreement. The agreement does not represent the F-1 well.

And prior discussions between employees of this company do not change the fact that what is in the agreement is what's controlled, and those prior negotiations are merged into it, any more than if anyone in this room was trying to sell their house and their realtor said something that was inconsistent with the terms of the contract. Once the contract is signed, those prior representations do not override the agreement.

1 This unit agreement defined the unit, mapped out how it was going to be operated, and it identified the 2 wells that were going to be unit wells. It did not 3 identify this. And prior discussions, years before, between company employees, or company employees with Mr. Jones, 6 7 don't change the fact that it was not in, and it was approved in that format, and the well is not included, it 8 9 wasn't included then, and they knew it. They can't raise it now. 10 11 MR. KELLAHIN: May I respond? Very quickly. 12 CHAIRMAN WROTENBERY: Very quickly. 13 MR. KELLAHIN: The operating agreement specifically allows these Schedule H wells to be amended. 14 15 It's not the omission originally from the list; it's the 16 circumstance that's changed where Exxon has shown a 17 willingness to add the well, pursuant at least to that amendment provision, and now tells us no. 18 19 We're not asking you to reinvent the wheel here; 20 just force them to do what they said they would. 21 Could I ask a question? MS. HEBERT: 22 CHAIRMAN WROTENBERY: Yes, sure. 23 MS. HEBERT: Mr. Carr, could I ask you a 24 question? 25 MR. CARR: Yes.

Armijo was a worker's compensation MS. HEBERT: 1 2 case --MR. CARR: Yes. 3 MS. HEBERT: -- and I don't think they had 4 5 anything to deal with like 70-7-9, and --MR. CARR: -- which is? 6 MS. HEBERT: -- and that's the "Amendment of Plan 7 of Unitization". 8 9 MR. CARR: Yes. If Premier is just wanting to come 10 MS. HEBERT: in and explain why now it's appropriate that the FV-3 well 11 be included, isn't it up to the Division and the Commission 12 13 to either look at what the evidence is and say, Well, no, 14 this is nothing new, and we're not going to --15 MR. CARR: Well --16 MS. HEBERT: -- include it, or, Yes, you've brought us something new, and it does seem appropriate now. 17 18 MR. CARR: It does seem to me that if you do that, we will have an endless parade of working interest 19 20 owners, dissatisfied with one determination after another, 21 to this Commission. I would submit that there are certain things that 22 23 you approve, i.e., the fairness of the unit and the unit plan, and there are other things that then are carried out 24 by the operators and the parties to these contracts. 25

I would also submit that when we look at 70-7-9, the section you cited, concerning the amendment of a plan of unitization, these agreements of a plan of unitization, and it says "An order providing for unit operations be amended by an order made by the division in the same manner and subject to the same conditions as" the "original order", and that before you get into that, you'd have to go back to the rest of the statute and see if it was properly proposed and all the conditions set forth in seventy-seven point seven have been met, and I think you're stretching and stepping far beyond the intent of the statute.

MR. BRUCE: Ms. Hebert, could I add something?

The provision I quoted before, Article 10.1.1,

does contain a provision about adding wells to Exhibit "H".

Now, what Premier is here saying is that it hasn't been included and it now wants you to compel Exxon to include it, without changing the language of the unit agreement.

What they're actually asking you to do is to override the unit agreement that you've already found to be fair and reasonable. Their Application is not termed an amendment of the plan of unitization. They just want to abrogate that provision of the unit operating agreement.

And just their Application alone is faulty, because if they're going to -- What they really want is to amend the unit operating agreement, and if they want to do

that, then I think they need to propose it to the working interest owners and take procedures and the steps that Mr.

Carr just mentioned.

CHAIRMAN WROTENBERY: Mr. Kellahin, would you

like to take a few minutes to respond and Itll give the

like to take a few minutes to respond, and I'll give the same opportunity to Mr. Carr and Mr. Bruce?

MR. KELLAHIN: I don't want to be -CHAIRMAN WROTENBERY: Do you have anything to
add?

MR. KELLAHIN: No, ma'am, I don't want to be repetitive about what I've argued to you. I've set forth in my memorandum as best I can articulate this position in writing to you. I'll respond to questions as best I can.

Ms. Hebert in her brief to the Supreme Court said there is an opportunity to have this issue addressed as an unanticipated development. I've looked at your orders, all of them. I find that you always put continuing jurisdiction language in there. If it's not to mean something let's take it out, because it confuses me.

But after practicing before this Commission for almost 30 years, I have come to realize something very simple, that there's nothing simple, there's no case that seems to be over. We revisit all of these.

And that's the burden and the challenge for all of us, is to go back into these matters and make equity and

fair judgments so that these parties can have a fair opportunity.

Statutory unitizations are very complicated, they're expensive, they're unusual. We're still fleshing out the details of how to manage them from a regulatory point of view.

So what are we to do? How do we ever get this issue resolved? If you have simply given Exxon a blank check when you passed on this operating agreement, what am I to do?

Thank you.

CHAIRMAN WROTENBERY: Mr. Carr? Mr. Bruce?

MR. CARR: All I would note is that I would

submit there is a distinction between giving an operator a

blank check when you've approved the unit plan and as a

contract it details how operations will be conducted. I

don't think that's what you have done, and I don't think

that's what statutory unitization is.

But I think the danger is, if you follow Mr.

Kellahin's line of reasoning in which you don't approve the plan and authorize statutory unitization, you, in fact, become co-operator of the unit, and I think that would be a disaster.

CHAIRMAN WROTENBERY: Thank you. I think at this point, then, I'll entertain a motion to close this session

1 pursuant to the provisions of the State's Open Meetings Act so that the Commission can deliberate on this matter. 2 MR. LEMAY: So move. 3 COMMISSIONER BAILEY: Second. 4 CHAIRMAN WROTENBERY: Then we will go into closed 5 session here and ask the audience to step out of the room. 6 7 We will come back into open session at the conclusion of our deliberations. 8 9 (Off the record at 10:48 a.m.) 10 (The following proceedings had at 11:15 a.m.) 11 CHAIRMAN WROTENBERY: We'll come back into open 12 session at this point, and I'll note for the record that 13 the only matter that the Commission discussed in our closed 14 session was the Premier Application. That's Case Number 15 11,838. 16 And at this point I'll entertain a motion. 17 MR. LEMAY: Madame Chair, I move that the Commission dismiss the Application filed in Case Number 18 19 11,838, based on the fact that Premier did not raise the FV-1 well issue at the original hearing or application for 20 21 rehearing, and that the Commission did approve the Avalon 22 Unit agreement at those hearings and found all elements of 23 the agreement to be fair. 24 COMMISSIONER BAILEY: I second the motion. 25 CHAIRMAN WROTENBERY: Is there any discussion on

1	the motion?
2	Not hearing any discussion, all in
3	MS. HEBERT: Excuse me. Was it your intent that
4	it was the FV-1's omission from the unit plan
5	MR. LEMAY: Yes.
6	MS. HEBERT: that could have been raised?
7	MR. LEMAY: Yeah, the fact that the FV-1 wellbore
8	issue was not raised, and therefore it was omitted.
9	Discussion of it was omitted.
10	CHAIRMAN WROTENBERY: Okay, all in favor of the
11	motion say aye.
12	COMMISSIONER BAILEY: Aye.
13	MR. LEMAY: Aye.
14	CHAIRMAN WROTENBERY: Aye.
15	Any opposed, no?
16	With that, we conclude our action on that case.
17	I will confirm in writing the Commission's action on this
18	case.
19	(Thereupon, these proceedings were concluded at
20	11:17 a.m.)
21	* * *
22	
23	
24	
25	

CERTIFICATE OF REPORTER

STATE OF NEW MEXICO)
) ss.
COUNTY OF SANTA FE)

I, Steven T. Brenner, Certified Court Reporter and Notary Public, HEREBY CERTIFY that the foregoing transcript of proceedings before the Oil Conservation Commission was reported by me; that I transcribed my notes; and that the foregoing is a true and accurate record of the proceedings.

I FURTHER CERTIFY that I am not a relative or employee of any of the parties or attorneys involved in this matter and that I have no personal interest in the final disposition of this matter.

WITNESS MY HAND AND SEAL April 13th, 1998.

STEVEN T. BRENNER

CCR No. 7

My commission expires: October 14, 1998