NEW MEXICO OIL CONSERVATION DIVISION 1 2 STATE LAND OFFICE BUILDING STATE OF NEW MEXICO 3 Docket No. 3-93 4 5 Case No. 10658 6 7 8 IN THE MATTER OF: 9 10 The Application of Mewbourne Oil Company for compulsory pooling Eddy County, New Mexico 11 12 **BEFORE:** EXAMINER MICHAEL E. STOGNER 13 14 January 21, 1993 15 16 REPORTED BY: 17 DEBORAH O'BINE 18 Certified Shorthand Reporter for the State of New Mexico 19 20 21 8 1993 22 OIL CONSERVATION DIVISION 23 24 25

APPEARANCES 1 2 FOR THE NEW MEXICO OIL CONSERVATION DIVISION: 3 ROBERT G. STOVALL, ESQ. 4 General Counsel State Land Office Building 5 Santa Fe, New Mexico 87504-2088 6 7 FOR MEWBOURNE OIL COMPANY: HINKLE, COX, EATON, COFFIELD & HENSLEY 8 500 Marquette Avenue, NW 9 Albuquerque, New Mexico BY: JAMES G. BRUCE ESQ. 10 11 FOR DEVON ENERGY CORPORATION: 12 CAMPBELL, CARR, BERGE & SHERIDAN 13 110 N. Guadalupe Santa Fe, New Mexico 87501 14 BY: WILLIAM F. CARR, ESQ. 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25

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1 EXAMINER STOGNER: Call next case, No. 2 10658. 3 Application of Mewbourne Oil MR. STOVALL: 4 Company for compulsory pooling, Eddy County, New 5 Mexico. EXAMINER STOGNER: Call for appearances. 6 7 Mr. Examiner, my name is Jim MR. BRUCE: 8 Bruce from the Hinkle Law Firm in Santa Fe, 9 representing the Applicant. Any other appearances? 10 EXAMINER STOGNER: MR. CARR: May it please the Examiner, my 11 name is William F. Carr with the Santa Fe law firm of 12 Campbell, Carr, Berge & Sheridan. I represent Devon 13 14 Energy Corporation. I do not intend to call a 15 witness. MR. STOVALL: Mr. Examiner, if I'm not 16 mistaken, Mr. Bruce is not going to call a witness 17 18 today because there is a preliminary matter to be 19 addressed. 20 MR. BRUCE: Well, it depends on the ruling in the preliminary matter. 21 MR. STOVALL: Mr. Carr, do you care to make 22 23 your motion? MR. CARR: May it please the Examiner, at 24 25 this time Devon Energy Corporation moves that the

application of Mewbourne in this case be dismissed.

And initially I would like to offer certain exhibits which Mr. Bruce and I have stipulated can be admitted. They are marked Devon Exhibits A through D and consist of certain agreements that we contend, Devon contends, establish the relationship of the parties. These are copies of the documents that were provided to the Division yesterday, and I would move their admission.

EXAMINER STOGNER: Are there any objections?

MR. BRUCE: No, I do not have any objections.

EXAMINER STOGNER: Exhibits A through E will be admitted into evidence, Devon's Exhibits A through E.

MR. CARR: Mr. Examiner, with your permission I'd like to speak to my motion.

EXAMINER STOGNER: Please.

MR. CARR: Devon Energy seeks dismissal of its interests in the west half of Section 35 from this pooling application. The basis for our motion is, very simply stated, we have reached agreement for the development of this acreage with Mewbourne. We submit to you the reason we are here is that because instead

of performing their obligations under our contractual relationship, Mewbourne stands before you trying to change the deal.

We all are familiar with the pooling provisions in the Oil and Gas Act, but before a party can obtain an order of pooling the interest of another, there is a condition set forth in the statute that I think is important to focus on. It's in Section 70-2-17(c), and it talks about owners being able to voluntarily combine their lands, and then it goes into pooling language, and it states, and I quote "Where, however, such owners have not agreed to pool their interests," and then it goes on and sets forth the pooling provisions.

Here, if we look at Exhibits A, which is entitled an Agreement, and Exhibit B, which is entitled Operating Contract Covering Operation and Development of Lease Acreage, we see that in this case the parties have agreed to pool their interests. They have agreed as to how their interests in this tract are to be developed. And, accordingly, the threshold condition for the exercise of pooling authority cannot be met.

Very briefly, if we look to relevant facts, we have an operating contract. It covers 200 acres in

the west half of Section 35. These are all the acres that Devon owns an interest in in the proposed spacing unit.

The parties now are just Mewbourne and Devon. And if we look at Exhibit B, the third "whereas," we note that it says, "Whereas subject to the terms, covenants, and conditions hereinafter set forth, the parties hereto have agreed upon the operation and development of said lease acreage hereunder for the joint account of the parties herein."

If we go to Exhibits C and D, we see that the acreage in this particular tract has been made subject to the agreement which is marked Exhibit B.

Our position, very simply, is we have an agreement that is still in effect. It expressly provides what happens when a party proposes a well, how costs are paid and shared, and what circumstances we are only billed and required to pay interest. It sets forth how we are required to pay in advance if the operator so desires.

On page 8 it talks about the drilling of wells, and it expressly provides how the situation is handled when one party proposes a well and the other does not desire to participate. It even sets a risk

penalty, a risk penalty I might note which is less than what Mewbourne is seeking in this pooling application.

The bottom line is we have an agreement. We have, however, agreed on terms that are more favorable to Devon than what they might have obtained from you with a pooling order, and so Mewbourne wants to walk the deal. The agreement, as I noted, covers all of our interest in the west half of 35. The agreement talks and covers acreage not wells, but, again, it should be noted that the well Mewbourne is proposing is on the contract acreage.

If you look at these contracts and reflect on the initial contract or agreement, Exhibit A, and compare it to Exhibit B, you will see that this contractual arrangement is the vehicle by which Mewbourne acquired its interest in these properties in the first place. They don't say they don't have an interest in these properties. They want to honor part of their contract, not all of it. We submit they have no right to a pooling order because we voluntarily agreed.

After our meeting yesterday, we received another operating agreement from Mewbourne. I would submit to you, Mr. Examiner, this last-minute new

document underscores the poverty of Mewbourne's case.

In their transmittal letter to you and to Mr. Stovall,
they contend that this new agreement, and I quote,
"shows the intent of the original parties."

They also include from the supplemental or subsequent Joint Operating Agreement that the parties had agreed or that course of conduct shows that they want to have supplemental agreements or that these agreements are required, and I quote, "where land outside the operating contract lands are included in a well unit."

We submit to you what they have produced is an irrelevant document. They have come forward with a subsequent operating agreement, and they're asking all of us to speculate as to why it was executed.

I challenge the statements in Mr. Bruce's transmittal letters. These are not the original parties. Amoco was an original party. Hondo was not. And Yates' interests are in fact strangers to these contracts. They've offered to you as an evidence of party intent contracts involving different parties and different lands. All we have here is a subsequent agreement, and there is certainly no dispute of any kind that parties to agreement voluntarily want to change or amend that agreement.

Under basic principles of contract law, they may do it.

And here when we have not only the interests that are covered by this contract by third parties, certainly they have the right, but the bottom line here is no matter what they did there, we have new parties here and a relationship defined by a contract which nobody is suggesting to you is not in full force and effect.

Mr. Bruce will tell you in his transmittal letter that the supplemental agreement was required where there were lands outside the operating contract and where they're included in the spacing unit. I would submit in that regard, it would be interesting to look at the application which they have filed in this case. They seek approving of the west half of 35, and they say they need to pool it because there's some noncontract lands in that acreage.

They also seek the pooling of the northwest quarter. The northwest quarter is 100 percent governed by this contract. In all formations, in all depths, it is contract acreage.

If their argument, as they state in the transmittal letter, is true, and that the parties think there is a secondary or new agreement required

for noncontract lands, it doesn't apply to the northwest quarter or any formation developed on 160 because that is all contract lands, and they don't assert that this contract is not in full force and effect as to that.

party run in at the last moment with a new contract, a new deal, and say, "Look at what the custom is of prior parties," they're, in essence, abandoning any argument they can make that in fact the existing contract governs this situation. They've thrown that aside. They say, "Well, look what we intended." They're scrambling to find custom or intent. And I submit that is virtually an admission that the contract itself would not authorize the compulsory pooling and part of the lands are not within the spacing unit -- part of the lands of the spacing unit are not under the contract.

In essence, Mr. Stogner, what they create is a fiction because what they're asking us to do now, I guess, is say that the custom that previous parties to this agreement adopted was that there's some sort of horizontal segregation. There's some confusion, I would submit, they're trying to hoist on us to subvert the intent of our agreement. They say -- and I think

all we have to do is see how absurd what they say actually is. It's just that, accept it as true for a moment. If that is true, look at the consequences they're trying to advance in this particular case. If a well was drilled pursuant to a pooling order, and there's a 200 percent penalty, that means if the well after the fact is successful in the Morrow, then perhaps we are subject to a 200 percent penalty. If, however, they're not successful in the Morrow and complete in the spacing unit on 160 acres, then I guess we're under the contract, and we're not pooled, and we have a different risk penalty.

If they complete in the Morrow, do we pay all the costs of the well in the contract-covered intervals in those that they now contend are not, or do we not? And when do we pay? Do we guess up front whether they're going to complete the well on 160 or 320?

The bottom line is, their position is a fiction. It's absurd. They're trying to avoid our agreement. We have an agreement with them for the development of this acreage. It expressly covers everything they're asking you to address with a pooling order. They have failed to meet the threshold requirement for a pooling order, and their application

must be dismissed.

MR. STOVALL: Let me do one thing for the record before we start. I think the examiner admitted Devon Exhibits A through E, and I think they are only through D. Is that correct Mr. Carr?

MR. CARR: That's correct. I'm sorry.

EXAMINER STOGNER: I misunderstood you.

That's Exhibits A through D, not E.

MR. STOVALL: Let me do one thing before you start, Mr. Bruce, just to make sure we've got the context of the case straight. Now, it is with respect to Exhibits A through D, you, both parties stipulate that the lands that are covered are the northwest quarter and the northwest of the southwest quarter?

MR. BRUCE: Southwest quarter are covered by the operating contract.

MR. STOVALL: And you stipulate to -- now,

I assume that both parties here derive their interests
through Pan-American and through Malco?

MR. BRUCE: Yes, Mr. Examiner. Mewbourne is the successor in interest to Pan-American, and Devon is the successor in interest to Malco.

I would like to point out one thing or two things, if I could, preliminary to my argument is Mewbourne recognizes that as to the northwest quarter

and the northwest quarter of the southwest quarter, the 1958 operating contract applies to that land. And as I indicated to you yesterday, Mr. Stovall, we would like to dismiss the application as to any 40-, 80- or 160-acre units.

MR. STOVALL: So noted, Mr. Examiner. We dismiss the application with respect to 160 or for any wells or spacing units within the northwest quarter.

MR. BRUCE: We are only seeking to pool 320-acre units.

Secondly, I would like to point out that the original parties to the operating contract are Pan-American Petroleum Corporation and Malco Refineries, Inc. That's Exhibit B.

Under Exhibit D, which Mr. Carr submitted, it specifically states that Malco Refineries, Inc., has changed its name to Hondo Oil and Gas Company. Therefore, with respect to the letter I sent to the parties yesterday, as I think everyone knows, Pan-American became Amoco, and under these very documents, Malco became Hondo. So the operating agreement I submitted to Mr. Carr and to the Division yesterday was signed by Hondo and by Amoco, who are the original parties to the 1958 agreement.

MR. STOVALL: And Devon's interest is

derived from Hondo; is that correct?

MR. BRUCE: That's correct. Any other questions, Mr. --

MR. STOVALL: No, I just wanted to make sure that we understood -- yes, there is one other. Sorry. All of Devon's interest is in the northwest and the northwest of the southwest?

MR. BRUCE: That's correct.

MR. STOVALL: They have no interest in the rest of the 320-acre proposed spacing unit?

MR. BRUCE: That's correct.

Mr. Examiner, the pooling statute which Mr. Carr referred to, Section 70-2-17 (c) provides that when two or more separately owned tracts are embraced in a well spacing unit and the parties have not agreed to pool their interest, then the Division may issue a compulsory pooling order.

In this case, we have two tracts in fact.

The northeast quarter of the southwest quarter and the south half of the southwest quarter, Section 35, are owned by Mewbourne. And the northwest quarter and the northwest quarter of the southwest quarter of Section 35 are owned one half by Mewbourne, successor in interest to Amoco, and one half by Devon, the successor in interest to Malco or Hondo.

The essential point is that the operating contract does not cover the entire spacing unit.

Thus, there is no single operating agreement covering the 320-acre unit for Mewbourne's proposed Morrow test well.

The original parties to the 1958 operating contract, Amoco and Hondo, have recognized that it doesn't apply to well units which include land outside the 1958 contract pursuant to the 1984 operating agreement, which I submitted to both parties yesterday. Since the operating contract doesn't cover the entire west half of Section 35, it can't govern operations for the proposed well. Because Devon has not committed its interest to the entire unit, compulsory pooling is proper, and Mewbourne requests that it be allowed to proceed with its case.

Furthermore, I think it's been used many times by this Division or it's been proposed to this Division, there's a simple method for apportioning well costs under COPAS Bulletin No. 2. So I think that is a nonissue with respect to this case. But because there is no agreed-upon operating agreement for the west half of Section 35, we believe that we are entitled to proceed to pool Devon and would request that we be allowed to present our case today.

MR. STOVALL: Mr. Bruce, may I ask you -Mr. Carr, you're most anxious to speak?

MR. CARR: Very briefly. By dismissing their application as to the northwest quarter, I submit to you Mewbourne acknowledges the contract is in full force and effect. When Mr. Bruce says original parties have evidenced their intent, he's asking us to reach conclusions for which there is no foundation or no basis other than to take a leap of faith with him because what we also have is the Yates' interest. They're total strangers to this agreement.

Why the parties entered this contract, we do not know. Perhaps they shouldn't have and should have come in here and force pooled Yates, but they didn't. But the bottom line is it's irrelevant because we don't know. It's different parties and different lands. And what they come in here and argue to you is, "Well, my gosh, if we don't do something here, there won't be an operating agreement governing the acreage."

Well, if they ignore our contract and force pool us, there will be no operating agreement governing the acreage anyway. And, furthermore, what we've got here is a situation where the only party who has an interest not governed by this contract now is

Mewbourne itself. They have joined the same operating agreement and honor their contractual commitments to us. And then they come in here and they say, "Well, gosh, you know, we need to come in here and pool so all the lands are together."

Well, I would suggest you look at page -- I believe it's 8 of the contract. It talks about when one party proposes a well on contract acreage and the others don't join, it says you then have certain procedures you go through. You propose it. If you don't participate, you have your costs withheld and 150 percent risk penalty. So it's all covered by the contract. And to come in here now and try and use this Division to subvert our contract and to sidestep its contractual obligations in the contract which is the vehicle by which it acquired this property is simply outrageous.

MR. STOVALL: I'd like to go back. Let's deal with the 1984 agreement first. By what interpretation or analysis do you make any inference that this agreement has any impact on the subject lands, Mr. Bruce?

MR. BRUCE: As I said, Mr. Stovall, I think it's showing the intent of the parties. If facts are as Mr. Carr says they are, then why did Hondo ever

sign this agreement?

MR. STOVALL: This covers different lands, does it not? Are the lands which are the subject of this application subject to the 1984 agreement?

MR. BRUCE: No, no. This is just an evidence of the intent of the parties, Mr. Stovall.

MR. STOVALL: I'm not sure I understand what that intent is that you're saying that it's evidence of. First, are we stipulating to the existence of the 1984 agreement? Do we have a problem with marking and identifying that?

MR. CARR: Yes, I do. It's irrelevant.

Unless there is a foundation that's laid for this -
Mr. Bruce is saying why did Hondo join. The bottom

line is we don't know why Hondo joined. We don't know
why anyone did. We don't have anyone who can tell us
why these parties and some complete stranger decided
not to force pool but sign an agreement. And I

object. It's irrelevant. There's no foundation for
it. And absent that, it should be inadmissible.

MR. BRUCE: Under the operating contract, the southwest quarter of Section 11, 18 South, 27 East, is subject to this operating contract.

MR. STOVALL: Okay. Please refer to it by exhibit so we know what we're --

MR. BRUCE: Exhibit B. And the southeast quarter of Section 11 is not subject to the --

MR. STOVALL: To Exhibit B?

MR. BRUCE: It is not subject to Exhibit B.

Now, if -- why would Hondo have to sign this 1984 operating agreement if its lands were subject to the 1958 operating contract? And I believe there is a Morrow well. I don't have the exact name of it.

MR. STOVALL: Let me ask you this. If that's a different land, and part of those lands were not subject -- let's follow that line of reasoning through. You're saying now which part of the lands of Section 11 were subject to the Exhibit B? The quarter section --

MR. BRUCE: The southwest quarter.

Actully, the southwest quarter of Section 11 and I

believe all of section -- or the east half of Section

15.

MR. STOVALL: Were subject to Exhibit B?
MR. BRUCE: Yes.

MR. STOVALL: Now, if you go to the 1984 agreement, that indicates that, I believe -- Exhibit A to the 1984 agreement, which has not yet been marked, refers to the southeast-northeast-southwest of Section

11; is that correct, and the east half 1 southeast-southwest-southeast and northwest -- so it 2 covers all of the south half of Section 11; is that 3 4 correct? 5 MR. BRUCE: The 1984 agreement? 6 MR. STOVALL: The 1984 agreement. MR. BRUCE: Yes, the south half of Section 7 8 11. 9 MR. STOVALL: Now, it appears to me, just looking at the face of the document, without trying to 10 do any sort of interpretation, that Yates Petroleum 11 was a party in interest, or the Yates group of 12 companies were parties in interest in the southeast 13 quarter of Section 11 which was not subject to the 14 15 original operating agreement. MR. BRUCE: That's correct. 16 MR. STOVALL: Would that not explain why 17 they would enter into a new operating agreement 18 covering all of those lands with a different party? 19 20 MR. BRUCE: But why would Hondo have to 21 sign? MR. STOVALL: Because they've got new lands 22 and new parties which are not subject to the old 23 I guess I'm asking you -agreement. 24

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MR. BRUCE:

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In this very case, we have new

lands which are not subject to the 1958 operating agreement.

MR. STOVALL: But not new parties. My question to you would be -- let me ask you the question now.

MR. BRUCE: Okay.

MR. STOVALL: If that were their intent, why would they not go and include some of the other lands that were subject to the old agreement and cover all of the lands?

MR. BRUCE: I presume this was just for specific well proposals. I guess I'm having a hard time, you know, what if it was Company X that owned the northeast of the southwest quarter and the south half of the southwest quarter in the case today, Case 10658? Would we then have an argument that we needed to pool or we needed a new operating agreement?

MR. STOVALL: Let me ask -- Mr. Carr, let me ask you this question. Is Devon agreeing to the well under the terms of what you propose as the existing operating agreement?

MR. CARR: Yes. We believe they should perform under this contract, yes. And when we sit here and say, well, why would they sign and why wouldn't they and what if, that's what you get into

when you don't have a foundation, when you don't have any evidence by the party. You must assume that burden.

My question is, why ask why? What we've gotten to is the point, very frankly, where you can't come in here and avoid the fact that you can't lay a proper foundation with speculation on the part of counsel. I can do that, too. I can say, "Well, my guess is that they avoided force pooling Yates. So that's why." But it doesn't mean anything. You've got to have a competent witness. I'm not competent on that. Mr. Bruce isn't competent on that. Instead of asking why, we need to say, can you lay a proper foundation? And if you can't, we're not admitting it.

MR. STOVALL: I guess I have a problem, Mr. Bruce. The premise of your argument is that there is no agreement covering the west half of Section 35, which is the subject acreage. Devon is stating that they are subject to an operating agreement, and that operating agreement provides for the drilling of the well. Mewbourne is proposing a well, and it owns the only lands -- it owns and controls the only lands not subject to the operating agreement. Are you saying Mewbourne is force pooling itself into the well?

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We think we need to force

No.

MR. BRUCE:

pool Devon into a 320-acre unit.

MR. STOVALL: If Devon is agreeing to a well under the terms of an existing agreement that covers all of Devon's land within the proration unit, why does Devon need to be force pooled?

MR. BRUCE: We think this operating contract only applies to wells that would be completed on 40- or 160-acre units.

MR. STOVALL: What in the terms -- in the language of the agreement -- at this point I'm inclined to agree with Mr. Carr, that the 1984 operating agreement is entirely different lands, and it includes a different party, and I can speculate as to a different set of reasons why they'd adopt that, and therefore at the moment I would like to omit that from the discussion because I don't think it's helpful.

What in the language of Exhibits A through -- really, A and B are the substantive agreements. C and D are the ones that expand the agreement to include the subject lands.

MR. BRUCE: Yes.

MR. STOVALL: Looking at the face of the agreement, what language causes you to say that it cannot -- additional lands owned by one of the

parties, as it is in this case, cannot be brought into a unit governed by the end, and that the land of the other party cannot be subject to the agreement?

MR. BRUCE: I think I'm relying more on the statute which provides for pooling when two or more lands are contained in the well unit. I guess I'm having trouble because if, say, the lands other than -- excluding the northwest quarter and the northwest quarter of the southwest quarter, suppose those lands were owned by OXY or Exxon or someone like that, not by Mewbourne, but they had agreed to commit their interest, would an entirely new operating agreement be required? Apparently, based on this 1984 agreement, yes.

MR. STOVALL: Would it be required or would it be appropriate or possible for the parties to enter into a new agreement? I don't think the 1984 agreement says it's required, and I think that the "what if" that you've thrown into this thing is a condition that doesn't exist in this case, and I think it clouds the issue. I mean, the issue is very simply that Mewbourne is proposing a well. It owns interests presumably in all of the west half; is that correct?

MR. BRUCE: That's correct.

MR. STOVALL: It varies between the

contract area and outside the contract area in the west end?

MR. BRUCE: That's correct, Mr. Stovall.

MR. STOVALL: And Devon owns an interest within the contract area in the west half and has said, "Fine, we've got a contract with you. You proceed to drill the well, and we agree to do it under the terms of that contract."

MR. BRUCE: That's the issue, Mr. Examiner.

MR. STOVALL: And am I correct in surmising that perhaps the reason that Mewbourne doesn't want to drill under this contract is it is -- provides a more favorable deal to Devon than it believes should be --

MR. BRUCE: Well, that's what Mr. Carr has asserted, and certainly the penalty is less but --

MR. STOVALL: If you've got an agreement to participate, why is Mewbourne unwilling to operate under -- Devon has said, "We'll participate under the agreement we have." Why is Mewbourne unwilling to say, "Okay, let's go ahead and drill the well. We'll commit the rest of our acreage to this unit and drill the well"?

MR. BRUCE: I guess then you come into questions about are they fully committed to a 320-acre unit?

1	MR. STOVALL: Have they signed an AFE?		
2	MR. BRUCE: They haven't signed anything.		
3	MR. STOVALL: Is there a nonconsent		
4	provision in the agreement? Is there language for		
5	non		
6	MR. BRUCE: In the '58 contract, there is a		
7	nonconsent provision. I believe it's Article IX.		
8	MR. CARR: It's Article IX, pages 8 and 9,		
9	and that's where the 150 percent penalty would apply.		
10	MR. STOVALL: Is this a federal lease?		
11	MR. BRUCE: There are federal leases		
12	involved. I don't know the makeup of		
13	MR. STOVALL: So what is necessary to		
14	communitize or to consolidate the acreage is a		
15	communitization agreement; is that correct?		
16	MR. BRUCE: I think one will be required		
17	regardless.		
18	MR. STOVALL: And the communitization		
19	agreement is a federal form that basically dictates		
20	the terms of that but does not cover operating		
21	provisions; is that correct?		
22	MR. BRUCE: It contains no operating		
23	provisions. It merely protects the federal lessee so		
24	that production is allocated among the federal leases.		
25	MR. STOVALL: Is Devon willing to sign such		

a communitization agreement?

MR. CARR: I believe we are, yes.

MR. STOVALL: I'm not sure that that requisite requirement of lack of agreement has been met, and I think that where I'm coming from and my advice to the Division would be that it is only where it is clearly met that the state is not going to impose, nor use its police authority under the forced pooling statute to force parties into agreement -- it should refrain from doing so where there is evidence of agreement.

It comes up under lots of different circumstances, but it appears to me that in this case there is a document which governs the relationship of the parties. And the only lands which are not subject to that agreement are owned by the party proposing the well. So I'm not sure how -- given the feeling the Commission should not, in effect, go beyond an agreement. If there's an agreement, the Commission shouldn't use its police authority to force a party into a well.

Given that the party sought to be pooled says, "We're willing to participate in whatever way subject to the agreement we already have," I don't know whether we've got the authority to tell them,

"No, you can't participate under the agreements you've got, and we're going to use our authority to do something different."

And I guess it's not clear to me why, as a practical matter, why Mewbourne seeks to say this agreement is not an agreement. That's not in the record, and I guess you don't have to answer it because I'm not sure it makes any difference. As you well know in forced pooling contracts, the Division does not evaluate in any context the merits of an agreement as such. The relative -- even in terms of offers, in terms of what may be ridiculous offers, if there have been good faith negotiations, we don't evaluate offers, but in this case I'm not sure that's even the issue.

Mr. Examiner, I would suggest at this point, unless the parties have anything further that they wish to add to this, that it's a normal break time anyway. Let's take a break and -- unless you have any questions and wish further discussion?

EXAMINER STOGNER: Not with either one of these at this time. Let's take a 20-minute recess at this point.

(Thereupon, a recess was taken.)

EXAMINER STOGNER: Let's resume this

hearing.

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MR. STOVALL: Mr. Examiner, I think I'd make a recommendation at this point. Because we're going to the fundamental issue of whether or not to even have a forced pooling case, the determination from the bench by the examiner is not appropriate. I think it has to come from a director. recommend we do is leave this -- let's take the case under advisement. I think leave the record open for a At the end of that week, the Division will week. either issue an order determining that there is an agreement, and, therefore, no basis for a forced pooling, or issue an order determining that in fact the agreement does not apply, and setting the case for hearing on the next hearing docket in two weeks.

If that's the case, is that an appropriate date for hearing, if there's going to be a hearing on the merits? We can do it for two or four.

MR. BRUCE: Initially continue it for two weeks, if that's --

MR. STOVALL: And recognizing that in the intervening time, there will be an order issued of some sort making a determination. And that order may be dispositive of the case, at which time the matter will be dropped from the docket?

MR. CARR: Sure.

MR. BRUCE: One thing I would ask, depending if the Division does determine that dismissal is appropriate, I would request that the findings be restricted to such an extent that there be no determination of the application of the contract between the parties because I think that's a matter for the courts to decide. The extent of the contract and its effect between two parties I think is a matter for the courts to decide.

MR. STOVALL: I don't think I understand what you're requesting, Mr. Bruce.

MR. BRUCE: Well, I would request that if the case is dismissed that it be limited just to the facts before the court -- before the Division as to whether compulsory pooling is proper, and that it doesn't go on to adjudicate rights of the parties under the operating contract.

MR. STOVALL: Oh no, but it would have to be on the basis -- if it's dismissed, it would have to be on the basis that there is an agreement between the parties that governs -- there is not sufficient disagreement to give rise to a pooling action under the statute. So we can't completely ignore whether there is or is not an agreement, but we won't go to

interpretation of the agreement. Is that what you're

MR. BRUCE: That's what I -- I believe that's a matter for the court.

MR. STOVALL: The issue is simply whether or not there is an agreement between the parties that would govern the drilling of this well sufficient to eliminate the requisite disagreement, failure to agree under the forced pooling statutes. It will be short and sweet.

MR. CARR: All I would request is that the order be entered far enough in advance of the hearing date so that if we are going to have a pooling hearing, we would have time to finalize our preparation of the case. We would move it address penalty election periods, risk penalty, allocation of cost between zones, and also attempt to negotiate with Mr. Bruce whether or not we should go forward before an examiner or directly to the Commission and consolidate this with our appeal that is currently pending of the forced pooling order on the east half of the section.

MR. STOVALL: I think the intent is to issue an order by the end of next week, say by Friday we would hopefully have an order out, and we would fax

it to both attorneys. Does that give you sufficient 1 2 time? You always have the option, I guess, to continue. 3 EXAMINER STOGNER: Our intention is to get 4 an order out next week. If undue circumstances --5 after all, the Legislature is in session, and a lot of 6 7 undue circumstances can arise at any time in a 8 particular case. With that, the record will remain open in 9 this case pending an order. 10 11 MR. STOVALL: The case is officially continued to the 4th. 12 EXAMINER STOGNER: Essentially, yes. 13 MR. STOVALL: Recognizing that an order may 14 be issued in the intervening time that will dismiss 15 it. 16 Thank you, Mr. Stogner. 17 MR. CARR: EXAMINER STOGNER: Thank you, Mr. Carr, Mr. 18 Bruce. 19 I do hereby certify that the foregoing is 20 a complete record of the proceedings in the Examiner hearing of Case No. 10658 21 heard by me of 1 Taphan 1993. 22 <u>></u>, Examiner 23 Oil Conservation Division 24 25

CERTIFICATE OF REPORTER

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STATE OF NEW MEXICO

) ss.

COUNTY OF SANTA FE)

I, Deborah O'Bine, Certified Shorthand
Reporter and Notary Public, HEREBY CERTIFY that I
caused my notes to be transcribed under my personal
supervision, and that the foregoing transcript is a
true and accurate record of the proceedings of said
hearing.

I FURTHER CERTIFY that I am not a relative or employee of any of the parties or attorneys involved in this matter and that I have no personal interest in the final disposition of this matter.

WITNESS MY HAND AND SEAL, January 25, 1993.

DEBORAH O'BINE CCR No. 63

