1	PUBLIC HEARING
2	STATE OF NEW MEXICO
3	OIL CONSERVATION COMMISSION
4	
5	Pecos Hall, 1st Floor, Wendell Chino Building
6	1220 S. Saint Francis Drive
7	Santa Fe, New Mexico
8	
9	IN THE MATTER OF:
10	PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO 19.15.2, 19.15.5
	19.15.8, 19.15.9 and 19.15.25 NMAC
11	
12	
13	
1 4	TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS
14	Naccombaca 4 2025
15	November 4, 2025
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17	
	HEARD BEFORE:
18	
	HEARING OFFICER FELICIA ORTH
19	
20	COMMISSION MEMBERS:
21	ALBERT CHANG, Chair
	GREGORY BLOOM, Member (virtual)
22	DR. WILLIAM AMPOMAH, Member
23	
	COUNSEL TO THE COMMISSION:
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	MR. ZACHARY SHANDLER, ESQ.
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                                           Page 3
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1	I N D E X
2	PAGE
3	TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS6
4	THE WITNESSES
5	CALDER EZZELL
	Cross-Examination by Ms. Fox45
6	Cross-Examination by Mr. Hall60
	Cross-Examination by Mr. Biernoff84
7	Cross-Examination by Ms. Suazo107
	Redirect Examination by Mr. Cloutier109
8	Examination by Commissioner Ampomah110
	Examination by Commissioner Bloom115
9	
	MARK MURPHY
10	Direct Examination by Ms. Tripp128
	Cross-Examination by Ms. Fox
11	Cross-Examination by Mr. Tremaine169
1.0	Cross-Examination by Mr. Moor
12	Redirect Examination by Mr. Tripp202
13	Examination by Commissioner Ampomah203
13	Examination by Commissioner Bloom225 ROBERT ARSCOTT
14	Direct Examination by Mr. Cloutier235
15	Direct Examination by Mr. Cloudlei233
16	
17	
18	
19	
20	
21	
22	
23	
24	
25	
	Page 4

1	I N D E X (Cont'd)
2	PAGE
3	
	ADMITTED EXHIBITS
4	IPANM Cantrell Exhibits 37, 38 and 3943
5	IPANM Cancrell Exhibits 37, 36 and 3943
	IPANM Exhibit 4543
6	
7	OCD Exhibit 34127
,	Arscott Direct and Rebuttal Testimony, IPANM
8	Exhibits through 9 and 29 through 36238
9	
10	TRANSCRIPT CERTIFICATE285
11	
12	
13	
14	
15	
16 17	
18	
19	
20	
21	
22 23	
24	
25	
	Page 5

1	(On the record at 9:00 a.m.)
2	TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS
3	HEARING OFFICER ORTH: All righty. Good
4	morning. We are on the 12th day of hearing in OCC
5	24683 on well plugging and financial assurance. My
6	name is Felicia Orth, hearing officer appointed by
7	the Commission.
8	We have come to another public comment
9	opportunity. I do see three names on the list for
10	this morning. Just a few things about public
11	comment. I will ask you to spell your first and last
12	name. I will ask you, pursuant to Commission rules,
13	to swear or affirm to tell the truth.
14	And I will ask you to keep your comments
15	to three minutes. If you have more to say to the
16	board, please put those comments in writing and send
17	them to Sheila Apodaca, the Commission administrator.
18	So do we have Bob McGonigle on the
19	platform? Mr. McGonigle, can you unmute yourself?
20	MR. MCGONIGLE: Can you hear me now?
21	HEARING OFFICER ORTH: Yes. Thank you.
22	Would you spell your first and last name for the
23	transcript, please.
24	MR. MCGONIGLE: My name is Robert McGonigle.
25	It's R-O-B-E-R-T. My last name is M-C, capital

1	G-O-N-I-G-L-E.
2	HEARING OFFICER ORTH: Thank you. Do swear
3	or affirm to tell the truth?
4	MR. MCGONIGLE: I do swear, so help me God.
5	HEARING OFFICER ORTH: Thank you. I will
6	start your time.
7	MR. MCGONIGLE: Good morning. And, again,
8	thank you for letting me speak at this Commission
9	today. My name is Bob McGonigle. I'm a native of
10	Las Cruces, New Mexico.
11	My mother's family goes back to the
12	mid-1800s here in the Mesilla Valley. Actually, my
13	great-grandfather, born in Mesilla, was able to
14	obtain a physician's license. His name was Anthony
15	Montero. They called him Mateo. He was known as a
16	stagecoach doctor because he was able to obtain a
17	physician's license. He actually worked on Billy the
18	Kid in Mesilla in the late 1800s.
19	But as for me, I'm a graduate of NMSU.
20	I'm a retired small business owner of an independent
21	insurance agency called McGonigle Insurance, here in
22	Las Cruces. I spent about 40 years in the business.
23	And my father actually started here as an Allstate
24	agent in 1955.
25	But we're here today to talk about the

1	oil industry, which provides three essentials of
2	life: food, water, and shelter. The industry
3	provides direct revenue to my state, which helps fund
4	teachers, first responders, infrastructure, food,
5	water, and home heating.
6	The oil and gas industry employs over
7	15 percent of New Mexico's population. This helps
8	the growth of our gross domestic product. Also,
9	these employees spend their paychecks right here in
10	New Mexico.
11	As a retired small business owner who
12	employed seven to ten people, I want to keep small
13	business in New Mexico strong. My small business
14	would not have survived being overregulated and
15	assessed, such as the oil industry would be required
16	to pay.
17	Education, travel expenses are a common
18	cost of small business, not to mention insurance
19	costs. The oil and gas well owners already have a
20	big expense, especially commercial general liability
21	insurance. Liability insurance protects small
22	business owners and me. It would pay should the oil
23	rig operation have a mishap. It would pay bodily
24	injury, death, or property damage caused by their
25	operations. Plus, it's not getting any cheaper to

1	pay for the cost of insurance.
2	The oil industry does not want to cause
3	any harm to anyone and already are taking precautions
4	as they do not want any claims. Regulators want to
5	charge an additional assurance fee, which I don't
6	understand when they're already paying insurance
7	fees insurance premiums, I should say. As the
8	insurance policy premium and adding more assessments,
9	testing regulations will not be beneficial for
10	New Mexico. And New Mexico depends on oil and gas
11	revenue. And adding additional overhead to this
12	industry would most definitely cause a decline in our
13	GDP.
14	But I want to thank the Commission for
15	your understanding that oil and gas production needs
16	to remain high here in New Mexico. I want to thank
17	you again for your time.
18	HEARING OFFICER ORTH: Thank you,
19	Mr. McGonigle.
20	Next we have Candy Ezzell. Would you
21	unmute yourself, Ms. Ezzell. I think I can hear you.
22	SENATOR EZZELL: Good morning. My name is,
23	yes, my name is Candy Spence Ezzell, C-A-N-D-Y,
24	E-Z-Z-E-L-L.
25	HEARING OFFICER ORTH: Thank you. Do you
	Page 9

1	swear or affirm to tell the truth?
2	SENATOR EZZELL: Yes, I do.
3	HEARING OFFICER ORTH: Thank you. Please go
4	ahead.
5	SENATOR EZZELL: Again, my name is Candy
6	Spence Ezzell. I am a rancher, I am a farmer and I'm
7	a New Mexico State Senator representing District 32
8	in Chaves and Eddy counties.
9	This is an attempt to end-run the
10	legislative process. In the 2024 session, House Bill
11	133 tried to do much of what these proposed rule
12	changes would do. House Bill 133 and the two
13	committee substitutes were rejected by the
14	legislature. You cannot amend legislation by
15	regulation.
16	This Commission is charged with
17	preventing waste, and the adoption of these
18	amendments will cause waste. The applicants are not
19	trying to protect the taxpayers of New Mexico, as
20	they claim. Instead, this is a scheme to achieve:
21	Leave it in the ground.
22	In 1959, the New Mexico Legislature had
23	the wisdom to create the oil and gas conservation tax
24	in order to have the industry fund its regulators.
25	In 1977, the New Mexico Legislature had

1	the wisdom to create the reclamation fund, which is
2	funded by the conservation tax. Unfortunately, not
3	all of the conservation tax goes to its intended use.
4	The oil and gas industry pays over \$100
5	million a year in conservation tax. Applicants argue
6	that the industry should clean up its own mess. If
7	we used the conservation tax for its intended
8	purpose, industry would be cleaning up its own mess.
9	Thank you for the chance to be able to
10	speak to you all today.
11	HEARING OFFICER ORTH: Thank you, Senator
12	Ezzell.
13	Next we have Jonny Heins. Mr. Heins.
14	MR. HEINS: Yes. Jonny Heins, J-O-N-N-Y,
15	H-E-I-N-S.
16	HEARING OFFICER ORTH: Do you swear or
17	affirm to tell the truth?
18	MR. HEINS: I do.
19	HEARING OFFICER ORTH: Thank you very much.
20	Go ahead.
21	MR. HEINS: Commissioners, thank you for the
22	opportunity to provide comments. My name is Jonny
23	Heinz and I'm the vice president of corporate affairs
24	at Permian Resources Operating, LLC.
25	Permian Resources is the seventh largest
	Page 11

1	oil and gas operator in New Mexico based on barrels
2	of oil equivalent produced per day, paying nearly
3	half a billion dollars annually in state taxes and
4	royalties with approximately 1,250 producing wells
5	operated by our company in the state of New Mexico,
6	all of which are in Eddy and Lea counties.
7	Permian Resources opposes WELC's
8	rulemaking petition. As one of the state's top oil
9	and gas operators and benefactors to the state's
10	economy, for the following reasons, we are extremely
11	concerned about the near-term and long-term impacts
12	these unprecedented changes sought by WELC would
13	create.
14	First, as noted in NMOGA and IPANM's
15	motion to dismiss, the proper avenue for such reforms
16	is through legislation, not a regulatory rulemaking
17	proceeding. Simply put, substantive changes to the
18	Oil and Gas Act should not be made without
19	legislative input.
20	Various bills have been proposed at the
21	legislature over the past several years, seeking to
22	increase bonding requirements and restrict well
23	transfers, and each has failed. This rulemaking is a
24	transparent attempt by WELC to circumvent the
25	legislative process, where they and other

1	environmental organizations have previously failed to
2	find traction for their initiatives.
3	Second, Permian Resources and other
4	New Mexico operators already pay substantial taxes
5	each year that go into the oil and gas reclamation
6	fund, which was established by the legislature for
7	the explicit purpose of plugging and reclaiming
8	orphaned wells.
9	The OCD currently has over \$60,000 [sic]
LO	in the reclamation fund and should deploy these funds
L1	for their intended purpose.
L2	Third, the considerable and unnecessary
L3	increases to statewide bonding requirements proposed
L4	by WELC will have the unintended consequence of
L5	creating more orphan wells in the state. \$150,000
L6	bonds on individual wells will drive smaller,
L7	independent operators out of business, thereby
L8	increasing the number of orphaned wells throughout
L9	the state, eliminating quality jobs and reducing
20	taxes and royalties that would otherwise be paid to
21	the state.
22	Last, and perhaps most importantly to
23	our company, the proposed rulemaking changes would
24	grant OCD the extraordinary authority to deny well
25	transfers in the event an applicant is out of
	Page 13

1	compliance with federal and state oil and gas laws
2	and regulations.
3	While we are confident that the current
4	OCD staff will not abuse this new authority, the
5	language as currently proposed in WELC's petition
6	could be broadly interpreted by future OCD staff to
7	deny almost any proposed well transfer. Regulatory
8	certainty is critical for all businesses. And
9	creating a new subjective framework for denying well
LO	transfers is untenable, especially when applied to
L1	the industry that is most critical for the New Mexico
L2	state economy.
L3	For these reasons, we urge you to deny
L4	WELC's petition. WELC and other environmental
L5	organizations are free to pursue their sweeping
L6	reforms through legislative processes. Allowing them
L7	to implement drastic policy changes through the back
L8	door of a rulemaking proceeding is a dangerous
L9	precedent and would be catastrophic for the state's
20	economy. Thank you.
21	SENATOR EZZELL: Thank you, Mr. Heins.
22	Next we have Melissa Troutman.
23	MS. TROUTMAN: Yes. Good morning.
24	HEARING OFFICER ORTH: Hello. Would you
25	spell your first and last name, please.

MS. TROUTMAN: Sure. It's M-E-L-I-S-S-A,
T-R-O-U-T-M-A-N.
HEARING OFFICER ORTH: Do swear or affirm to
tell the truth?
MS. TROUTMAN: I do.
HEARING OFFICER ORTH: Please go ahead.
MS. TROUTMAN: Good morning, Chair and
Commissioners. My name is Melissa Troutman and I
represent the Permian Basin Coalition, which is a
group of over 20 organizations dedicated to reducing
the pollution and other harms from intensified oil
and gas operations in the Permian.
Our organizations include staff and
members and volunteers who live and work and recreate
in the Permian. And I'm here today to strongly
support the proposed bonding and cleanup rule changes
on behalf of the coalition.
Those of us who have lived in oil
country know what the industry means to communities.
But we also see the mess that some companies are
leaving behind, abandoned wells, leaking equipment,
and pollution that's creeping closer and closer to
people and their homes and water supplies.
Right now, oil and gas companies are
making billions off the land, but when the wells

1	deteriorate or stop producing, too many are walking
2	away. And they can because even where there are
3	protective laws in place, like the spill rule,
4	penalties and fines are so rarely issued that it
5	costs them nothing to just pollute and walk away.
6	They leave behind aging, leaking infrastructure, and
7	it's New Mexicans living in the front lines, mostly,
8	who are left paying for it and assuming risk.
9	Members of our coalition have been
10	monitoring well sites in Loco Hills and other parts
11	of the Permian for years, and often, the same older,
12	non- or low-producing wells are leaking. The
13	equipment is so corroded that the tanks and the
14	joints have collapsed, and we've witnessed many
15	recurring spills, some of which are never cleaned up.
16	For example, a company named Poco
17	Resources has several aging and dilapidated well
18	sites in Loco Hills that were observed leaking in
19	2023, 2024, and again, just a few weeks ago on
20	October 9th. Oil and waste fluids pooled inside the
21	unlined containment of two tank batteries, also
22	around a spurting leak in a flow line, and around the
23	wellhead of a partially dismantled pump jack that
24	clearly has not operated in years.
25	I've included photos, photo evidence and

1	GPS coordinates of this spill, these spills in my
2	written version of these comments, so that will be
3	added to the record for anyone who wants to take a
4	look.
5	Over 700 wells have already been flagged
6	for public cleanup in New Mexico, but more than 4,000
7	are at risk of being abandoned and orphaned soon.
8	And we are concerned that these spill sites of Poco
9	Resources are among them.
10	Oil and gas lobbyists want us to believe
11	that the reclamation fund can replace corporate
12	responsibility, but the fund holds just 66 million,
13	while state data shows that New Mexico's cleanup
14	liability ranges between 700 million and 1.8 billion.
15	That means the public could be on the
16	hook for over a billion dollars in cleanup costs,
17	while oil and gas companies walk away with the
18	profits off of natural resources that are owned by
19	everybody.
20	Moreover, the number of abandoned wells
21	will increase as oil and gas production slows, and we
22	need to be prepared for that inevitability.
23	Families in Loving and across
24	southeastern New Mexico are surrounded by pipelines
25	in their backyards, frac sites down the road. And

1	they've been left to live in a toxic cloud, whether
2	they know it or not, while corporations walk away
3	with the profits. And we can't let this continue.
4	These rule updates are commonsense fixes
5	to the problem of an unfair system. They require
6	bonding of \$150,000 per high risk or inactive well.
7	That's still less than the total cleanup cost. They
8	stop bad actors from inheriting wells they can't
9	afford to clean up. And they close the loophole that
10	lets companies call wells "temporarily abandoned" for
11	eight years or more with no action and no cleanup.
12	HEARING OFFICER ORTH: Ms. Troutman, please
13	wrap up.
14	MS. TROUTMAN: Sure. If you drill it, you
15	clean it. That's the promise we need these rules to
16	enforce. So we encourage you to vote to adopt these
17	long overdue bonding reforms. Thank you.
18	HEARING OFFICER ORTH: Thank you very much.
19	Next we have Liliana Castillo.
20	MS. CASTILLO: Can you hear me?
21	HEARING OFFICER ORTH: Yes, I can now.
22	Thank you. Would you please spell your first and
23	last name.
24	MS. CASTILLO: Liliana, L-I-L-I-A-N-A,
25	Castillo, C-A-S-T-I-L-L-O.

1	HEARING OFFICER ORTH: Do swear or affirm to
2	tell the truth?
3	MS. CASTILLO: I do.
4	HEARING OFFICER ORTH: Thank you. I'll
5	start your time.
6	MS. CASTILLO: Thank you. Good morning,
7	Commissioners. Thank you so much for your service
8	and the opportunity to give public comment today.
9	I'm one of the many New Mexicans who
10	believe oil and gas operators, regardless of size,
11	should be held responsible for cleaning up after
12	themselves. Some small operators claim that if
13	bonding is increased, they'll walk away from their
14	wells.
15	That argument is quite concerning. Does
16	that mean that they never intended to clean up after
17	themselves to begin with, despite that responsibility
18	being part of what they agreed to when they bought a
19	well or drilled a new well? This argument to me is
20	exactly why these reform are urgently needed.
21	Bonding is about prevention. It's how
22	we make sure wells don't get abandoned in the first
23	place. Because once they do, the cleanup costs
24	skyrocket and the risks to our health and water
25	grows.

1	In addition, we can keep hearing that
2	the reclamation fund should be, you know, handling
3	this issue. But here's the truth. The reclamation
4	fund is only part of the solution. We need both a
5	robust reclamation fund and right-size bonding.
6	Right-size bonding ensures the state has sufficient
7	funds funded by oil and gas corporations when
8	corporations walk away from their plugging
9	responsibilities. The reclamation fund is a backup
LO	if the state doesn't have enough funding for plugging
L1	and cleanup. We need both.
L2	A broken plugging system makes it even
L3	more important to get bonding right now. A broken
L4	system only amplifies the risk when bonds are
L5	insufficient. We cannot afford to underfund risk,
L6	especially when the cost of inaction falls on our
L7	communities.
L8	If we wanted to scale up the reclamation
L9	fund, it would require, in my mind, a completely new
20	significant fee on industry, rather than just
21	shuffling around tax revenues. That would result in
22	pulling dollars away from other public needs, like
23	schools and healthcare, just to clean up oil and gas
24	wells that corporations should be responsible for.
25	Bottom line is, if you drill it, you

1	clean it 100 percent of the time at your own expense.
2	That's what we expect as New Mexicans. Regulators
3	should not need to chase companies down to fulfill
4	this responsibility.
5	Please adopt these reforms and make sure
6	the people who profit from drilling also pay for
7	cleanup. Thank you.
8	HEARING OFFICER ORTH: Thank you,
9	Ms. Castillo.
10	Next we have Roland Glenn.
11	MR. GLENN: Good morning.
12	HEARING OFFICER ORTH: Good morning. Would
13	you spell your first and last name, please.
14	MR. GLENN: Yes. My first name is Roland
15	R-O-L-A-N-D, last name Glenn, G-L-E-N-N.
16	HEARING OFFICER ORTH: Do you swear or
17	affirm to tell the truth?
18	MR. GLENN: Yes, I do.
19	HEARING OFFICER ORTH: I'll start your time.
20	Thank you.
21	MR. GLENN: Good morning, Commissioners.
22	Thank you for your time this morning.
23	Like I said earlier, my name is Roland
24	Glenn. I hold a master's degree as a geological
25	engineer. I retired out of Colorado and moved down
	Page 21

here to New Mexico for a little peace of mind. I
retired back in 2017. I'd like to slow down here
away from the oil field here in New Mexico. I enjoy
the beautiful scenery.
The oil field does support many
different kinds of jobs, especially here in my
community, such as the plastic injection molding
company, semi-truck drivers, the power industry here
in New Mexico. It brings a constant charge to the
electrical grid. It also helps, like I said, the
plastic molding injection company, which supports
roughly 150 jobs here Rio Communities.
And if these regulations continue to go
through, the loss of experienced workers and the
tragedy for the State of New Mexico, for many
different reasons, such as the loss of income for
schools and other state jobs, would be detrimental to
the State of New Mexico. So I'm asking you to
consider the effect on the State of New Mexico that
we all call home.
I truly thank you for your time and your
consideration.
HEARING OFFICER ORTH: Thank you, Mr. Glenn.
Now we have Kendra. I don't know the
last name.

1	MS. PINTO: Thank you. It's Kendra Pinto.
2	HEARING OFFICER ORTH: Hello. Would you
3	spell your first and last name, please.
4	MS. PINTO: K-E-N-D-R-A, P-I-N-T-O.
5	HEARING OFFICER ORTH: Do you swear or
6	affirm to tell the truth? Hello? I think you've
7	re-muted yourself, Ms. Pinto.
8	Sheila, can you send her a prompt that
9	she can unmute herself again?
10	MS. PINTO: There we go. It turned off on
11	me when I was talking.
12	HEARING OFFICER ORTH: Okay. Do you swear
13	or affirm to tell the truth?
14	MS. PINTO: I do.
15	HEARING OFFICER ORTH: I'll start your time.
16	MS. PINTO: Thank you. My name is Kendra
17	Pinto and I'm the Four Corners indigenous community
18	field advocate and a certified optical gas imaging
19	thermographer with Earthworks. I grew up on the
20	Navajo Nation surrounded by oil and gas development.
21	This work is personal to me. I've seen
22	the impacts of these operations my whole life on the
23	land, the air and the people who live near them.
24	Last month, I joined my colleague, Mandy
25	Sackette, on a field trip to the San Juan Basin. We

- 1	
1	visited dozens of oil and gas sites to document
2	pollution and see firsthand what's happening in this
3	aging and declining oil infrastructure. What we
4	found is deeply troubling. What I always find,
5	having done thermography work for four years, is
6	deeply troubling.
7	So many of these wells are old, drilled
8	in the early '90s, and poorly maintained.
9	Communities have to live with that, the smells, the
LO	noise and the health risk, while companies often walk
L1	away as production in the San Juan Basin continues to
L2	decline.
L3	Last week my colleague Mandy mentioned
L4	the low producing Hilcorp site that is less than 900
L5	feet from Dzilthnaodithle Community School. I have
L6	visited that site several times and we have filed a
L7	total of three complaints, yet it still has
L8	continuous emissions from three different sources on
L9	site.
20	There's another Hilcorp site near
21	Herfano that is 0.6 miles from the Hanaa Dli
22	Community School that has three points of continuous
23	emissions. We filed a complaint last month.
24	These sites aren't isolated incidents.
25	They're part of a pattern, low-producing, neglected

1	wells that keep polluting long after the profits have
2	dried up. We reported multiple emissions to the
3	New Mexico Environmental Department, and what I see
4	in the field clearly makes it clear the system is not
5	working.
6	You've heard a lot about the potential
7	impacts on small operators, but really, when wells
8	like these are left to decline without proper
9	oversight or bonding, it's my community, my neighbors
10	and my family that pay the price.
11	Oil wells leak toxic chemicals like
12	benzene and hydrogen sulfide into our air and water
13	and pose a threat to everyone living in close
14	proximity. And most of us who live on tribal lands
15	do live in close proximity.
16	This rule is not about punishing small
17	operators. It's about fairness and accountability
18	and protecting human lives and communities. Every
19	company that drills in New Mexico should be prepared
20	to take full responsibility for its wells. Our
21	communities deserve to breathe clean air and
22	taxpayers shouldn't be left holding the bill when
23	industry fails to act.
24	Please adopt this rule to protect our
25	land, our people and our climate. Thank you.

1	HEARING OFFICER ORTH: Thank you, Ms. Pinto.
2	Next we have Blythe Maunders.
3	MS. MAUNDERS: Hello.
4	HEARING OFFICER ORTH: Hello. Would you
5	spell your first and last name please.
6	MS. MAUNDERS: Sure. It's B-L-Y-T-H-E,
7	M-A-U-N-D-E-R-S.
8	HEARING OFFICER ORTH: Do swear or affirm to
9	tell the truth?
10	MS. MAUNDERS: I do.
11	HEARING OFFICER ORTH: Thank you. Go ahead.
12	MS. MAUNDERS: Hello. My name is Blythe
13	Maunders. I'm a concerned citizen. I'm here in
14	support of our public lands and a more responsible
15	use of New Mexicans tax dollars.
16	The oil industry, which makes millions
17	of dollars in profit each year, should be held
18	accountable for cleaning up the wells they leave once
19	they're done profiting from the land.
20	I'm speaking in support of the
21	New Mexico Oil Conservation Commission's new bonding
22	and cleanup rules to hold the oil industry
23	accountable for cleaning up their mess.
24	It's a shame in Mexicans even have to
25	make these comments trying to get the wealthy oil

1	industry to do the bare minimum, by cleaning up their
2	wells.
3	If New Mexicans are paying to clean up
4	the mess from the oil industry, are we really
5	profiting from having them here in the first place?
6	These new rules will ensure that corporations, not
7	communities, pay to plug their wells. Thank you.
8	HEARING OFFICER ORTH: Next we have Kelly
9	Francisco. Would you spell your first and last name,
10	please.
11	MS. FRANCISCO: Yes. Kelly, K-E-L-L-Y,
12	Francisco, F-R-A-N-C-I-S-C-O.
13	HEARING OFFICER ORTH: And do you swear or
14	affirm to tell the truth?
15	MS. FRANCISCO: I do.
16	HEARING OFFICER ORTH: Thank you. Go ahead.
17	MS. FRANCISCO: Good morning, Chair and
18	Commission. My name is Kelly Francisco and I'm
19	speaking as a resident of New Mexico and a concerned
20	citizen of the Navajo Nation in strong support of the
21	proposed bonding rule changes.
22	I believe that no matter the size of an
23	oil or gas operator they should clean up after
24	themselves. That's the law, their responsibility,
25	and it is just common sense.

1	Right now, there are nearly 700 wells
2	that oil and gas corporations have abandoned and
3	another 4,400 that could be abandoned in the future,
4	which threatens our health and drinking water unless
5	we make them clean up.
6	New Mexico's are paying the price when
7	corporations walk away from their responsibilities.
8	Nearly 100 million in public funds have been used to
9	clean up abandoned wells in just the last five years.
10	That's money that could have gone to our schools, our
11	roads, and our clean energy future.
12	The truth is, most wells in New Mexico
13	are owned by wealthy corporations that can afford to
14	do the right thing. If a corporation can't afford to
15	clean up, then maybe they shouldn't be drilling in
16	the first place. Fair rules make a fair playing
17	field. Responsible operators already plug their
18	wells. This rule will make sure the rest do, too.
19	Thank you.
20	HEARING OFFICER ORTH: Thank you,
21	Ms. Francisco.
22	Next we have Brian Sweeney.
23	MR. SWEENEY: Morning.
24	HEARING OFFICER ORTH: Good morning. Would
25	you spell your first and last name please.

1	MR. SWEENEY: B-R-I-A-N, S-W-E-E-N-E-Y.
2	HEARING OFFICER ORTH: Thank you. Do you
3	swear or affirm to tell the truth?
4	MR. SWEENEY: Yes.
5	HEARING OFFICER ORTH: Thank you, go ahead.
6	MR. SWEENEY: Good morning, Chair and
7	Commissioners. I want to speak in favor of the
8	proposed bonding rule changes because I'm a big fan
9	of fairness.
LO	The law requires oil and gas companies
L1	to plug wells when they're done with them, and
L2	there's a growing problem of companies not following
L3	that law. Bankruptcy has become an irresponsible
L4	part of the business plan.
L5	But if you make a mess, you should clean
L6	it up a hundred percent of the time. This is not
L7	grade school and 95 percent is not an A. 95 percent
L8	in this case results in 702 abandoned wells in
L9	New Mexico, with over 4,000 about to be abandoned at
20	a cost of \$700 million to \$1.6 billion of public
21	money. That is not right.
22	Non-plugged wells present risks to
23	public health, clean water, and the environment, so
24	they should be plugged. The law says that the
25	companies who have profited from these wells should

pay to close them up and clean up the area.

When people rent apartments, they have to put down a security deposit proportional to the costs to repair any damage. For decades, oil and gas companies have put down bonds that don't come close to covering plugging and cleanup costs, causing the very expensive and growing abandoned-well problem. This is the wealthiest industry in the history of the world. They can afford to follow the law.

People in this hearing have complained that the reclamation fund is adequate for that purpose, but at \$66 million, it doesn't come close to covering the \$700 million to \$1.6 billion price tag for plugging. That fund was created, quote, for use by the Oil Conservation Division in carrying out the provisions of the Oil and Gas Act. That is to say, not just plugging wells. So that fund is too small to address the problem. The reason that fund is growing is because New Mexico received federal money for plugging that if we didn't use it, we would lose it.

Don't be distracted by the oil and gas industry's many deflections. They want to talk about anything but how inherently fair it is to require adequate bonding and how unfair it is for the state

1	to use hundreds of millions of dollars of public
2	money to pay to cleanup industry's messes that
3	companies have profited from. Cleaning up after
4	yourself is a cost of doing business, not a public
5	liability. Thank you.
6	HEARING OFFICER ORTH: Thank you,
7	Mr. Sweeney.
8	Do we have anyone else on the platform
9	would like to offer let's see, Robert Briani.
LO	Sheila, do you see the RB there?
L1	MS. APODACA: Yes, I'm admitting him right
L2	now.
L3	HEARING OFFICER ORTH: If you called the
L4	platform using your phone, you can raise your hand by
L5	dialing star 5, by the way.
L6	Mr. Briani, can you unmute yourself?
L7	Mr. Briani may have stepped away. Mr. Briani, if you
L8	can hear me, you have permission to unmute. You're
L9	not unmuted. Perhaps you could submit your comments
20	and writing, or perhaps you could join us Thursday
21	morning when we are certain we will have another
22	public comment session.
23	Sheila, do you want to unmute
24	the 575-993 number? I don't know who this is.
25	MS. APODACA: I've given them the

1	permissions to unmute themselves.
2	HEARING OFFICER ORTH: Okay. Let's see. I
3	think unmute on the phone.
4	Oh, I think you're unmuted. Can you
5	hear me?
6	MR. PATTERSON: Yes, I can hear you. Can
7	you hear me?
8	HEARING OFFICER ORTH: Yes, now I can.
9	Would you tell us your name and spell it for the
10	transcript, please.
11	MR. PATTERSON: Yes. David Patterson,
12	D-A-V-I-D, P-A-T-T-E-R-S-O-N.
13	HEARING OFFICER ORTH: Thank you. Do you
14	swear or affirm to tell the truth?
15	MR. PATTERSON: I do.
16	HEARING OFFICER ORTH: All right. I'll
17	start your time.
18	MR. PATTERSON: Thank you for the
19	opportunity to speak to this Commission. It's been
20	fascinating listening to all the comments.
21	Mine is that I would like to say my
22	grandfather was the most influential person in my
23	life. He had a fifth grade education. He lived
24	through a Great Depression and two World Wars and had
25	some strong views that were developed out of those

1	life experiences. One was that you don't waste
2	anything and the other one was that if you make a
3	mess, you clean it up. I had to apologize for some
4	of the messes I created as a rebellious teen and I
5	had to clean them up.
6	Sadly, we do not live in such a simple,
7	naive world. Everyone on this Commission knows that
8	fossil fuels over the past 250 years have brought
9	some of the greatest advancements civilization has
10	ever known. I love the quality of life that fossil
11	fuels have provided.
12	Everyone on this Commission also knows
13	that we, collectively, have made a mess and we know
14	we must clean up the mess. We also know that the
15	fossil fuel companies have known since at least 1986
16	from reports by their own scientists that continuing
17	to burn these fuels would heat the atmosphere. Their
18	response has been to spread disinformation instead of
19	just being honest. Sadly, that's why this Commission
20	exists, to make sure these companies clean up their
21	mess.
22	We know that methane and other toxic
23	gases are leaking from oil and gas wells all over
24	New Mexico, around the country, and around the world.
25	We can't make everyone clean up their mess, but we

1	can do it in New Mexico.
2	The job description for the director of
3	the Oil Conservation Division says, in part, it
4	enforces the state's oil and gas statutes, ensures
5	abandoned wells are properly plugged, and that the
6	land is properly restored once production activities
7	are completed.
8	I think my grandfather with his fifth
9	grade education refined everything into one sentence,
10	"If you make a mess, clean it up." Thanks again for
11	the chance to speak today. Let's clean it up.
12	HEARING OFFICER ORTH: Thank you very much,
13	Mr. Patterson.
14	I see Mr. Briani has raised his hand
15	again. Let's see if he's able to unmute himself this
16	time.
17	Mr. Briani, it might help to press
18	control-shift-M to unmute.
19	I believe there are some folks in the
20	room.
21	Again, Mr. Briani, I'm sorry that you're
22	not able to unmute yourself at your end.
23	But we do have some folks in the room,
24	and I'm going to turn to them. Yes, ma'am, in the
25	white cap. Right over here. You would share your

1	first and last name.
2	MS. BROOKINS: Lura Brookins, L-U-R-A,
3	B-R-O-O-K-I-N-S.
4	HEARING OFFICER ORTH: Thank you. Do you
5	swear or affirm to tell the truth?
6	MS. BROOKINS: I'm sorry?
7	HEARING OFFICER ORTH: Do you Swear or
8	affirm to tell the truth?
9	MS. BROOKINS: I still didn't understand.
10	HEARING OFFICER ORTH: Do you swear or
11	affirm to tell the truth?
12	MS. BROOKINS: Oh yes.
13	HEARING OFFICER ORTH: Thank you. Go ahead.
14	I'll start your time.
15	MS. BROOKINS: Being a resident for Santa Fe
16	for 30 years as a landscape designer, artist, I've
17	become an ardent protector of our beautiful
18	landscape. I've also come to see that we citizens of
19	our land must speak now to defy corporate misuse of
20	our land or resources and our precious water.
21	Without adequate remediation we're
22	witnessing cynical disregard of our land and waters.
23	The oil and gas industries have also avoided their
24	obligation to clean up the damages they inflicted on
25	our land.

2.5

Increasing number of wells have expired and temporarily abandoned and others are out of compliance. That can mean a possible 1.6 billion cost for this state to plug and remediate orphaned wells in the future. These costs must be borne or shared by the operators of these wells to pay for the cleanup. It has been their profit to capture our oil resources using our scarce water.

We need guaranteed assurances from these oil and gas companies that they will honor and guarantee environmental safeguards to protect our waters and land and to set up funds for all cleanup costs. There needs to be guardrails to hold these companies accountable for damages and remedial costs. It is our land, our air, and our sacred water that must be protected.

I would like to close with a quote from N. Scott Momaday, a member of the Kiowa tribe, a poet and novelist and resident of Santa Fe, who passed last year, from his book Earthkeeper. "We humans must revere the Earth, for it is our well-being. Always the Earth grants us what we need. If we treat the Earth with kindness, it will treat us kindly. If we give our belief to the Earth, it will believe in us. There is no better blessing than to be believed

1	in. There are those who believe that the Earth is
2	dead. They are deceived. The Earth is alive. It is
3	possessed of spirit. Consider the holy tree. It can
4	be allowed to thirst. It can be cut down. Worst of
5	all, it could be denied our faith and our belief.
6	But if we speak to it, we pray it will thrive."
7	Thank you.
8	HEARING OFFICER ORTH: Thank you
9	Ms. Brookins.
10	Is there anyone else in the room who
11	would like to offer public comment during this
12	session? We're certain we will have another session
13	this Thursday morning at 9:00.
14	Your first and last name, please.
15	MS. TSOSIE-HARVEY: Alicia Tsosie-Harvey.
16	HEARING OFFICER ORTH: And would you spell
17	that.
18	MS. TSOSIE-HARVEY: A-L-I-C-I-A, T-S-O-S-I-E
19	dash H-A-R-V-E-Y.
20	HEARING OFFICER ORTH: Thank you. Do you
21	swear or affirm to tell the truth?
22	MS. TSOSIE-HARVEY: Yes.
23	HEARING OFFICER ORTH: I'll start your time.
24	MS. TSOSIE-HARVEY: Good morning, Chair,
25	Commissioners. My name is Alicia Tsosie-Harvey, and

1	I'm speaking on behalf of Concerned Citizens of
2	New Mexico and the Navajo Nation and as a
3	representative of Dine Care and in strong support to
4	the proposed bonding rule changes.
5	I believe that no matter the size of an
6	oil or gas operator, they should clean up after
7	themselves. That's the law and their responsibility.
8	I have firsthand witnessed the lasting
9	impacts of oil and gas corporations on and near the
10	Navajo Nation. Right now, there are nearly 700 wells
11	that oil and gas corporations have abandoned and
12	others that could be abandoned in the future, which
13	threatens our health and drinking water unless we
14	make them clean up.
15	Please vote to adopt stronger bonding
16	rules. Let's protect our air, water, and land and
17	make sure no one gets to profit while leaving the
18	rest of us with a mess. Thank you.
19	HEARING OFFICER ORTH: Thank you.
20	Anyone else in the room? Yes. Come on
21	up. Your first and last name, please.
22	MS. ANTONIO: My name is Cheyenne Antonio.
23	C-H-E-Y-E-N-N-E, Antonio, A-N-T-O-N-I-O.
24	HEARING OFFICER ORTH: And do you swear or
25	affirm to tell the truth?

1	MS. ANTONIO: I swear.
2	HEARING OFFICER ORTH: Thank you.
3	MS. ANTONIO: Good morning, Chair,
4	Commissioners. My name is Cheyenne Antonio and I am
5	speaking on the behalf of the Check Board Navajo
6	Nation community and also with Dine Care in support
7	of the proposed bonding rule changes.
8	I heard the argument that we shouldn't
9	be changing bonding requirements because our
10	well-plugging system is broken, but I think that is
11	exactly backwards. Within the community that I'm
12	from, there are idle wells, sleeping wells. It's
13	crazy that wells can be asleep, idle and abandoned.
14	And we do see leaks in our desert area where I live
15	in the checker board region.
16	The reclamation fund is there for
17	emergencies. Not for the corporations to rely on as
18	a backup plan when they walk away. If we don't fix
19	the bonding system now, the problem only gets bigger
20	and more expensive. And you can ask impacted
21	communities for those systems and see if it works,
22	because it doesn't.
23	The rule is about preventing the future
24	risk of more abandoned wells. If we require fair
25	bonding now, we don't need to drain public funds

1	later. That's not just smart government, it's basic
2	risk management. A broken system doesn't mean we
3	wait to act. It means we act now to keep things from
4	getting worse.
5	Please adopt the proposed rules and
6	protect my future, the checkerboard area of
7	New Mexico and the Navajo Nation for our future.
8	Thank you.
9	HEARING OFFICER ORTH: Thank you,
10	Ms. Antonio. Is there anyone else in the room who
11	would like to offer public comment during this
12	session? No? All right.
13	I saw one more person on the platform,
14	Sheila. I think GH, perhaps? Gene Harbaugh.
15	Mr. Harbaugh, can you unmute yourself?
16	Control-shift-M might work. No? All right.
17	And Mr. Briani has I'm sorry if I'm
18	mispronouncing your name, Briani has his hand up,
19	so we'll try one more time.
20	MR. BRYANT: Good morning, Commissioners.
21	HEARING OFFICER ORTH: Oh, good morning.
22	Would you state and spell your first and last name,
23	please.
24	MR. BRYANT: Okay. My name is Robert
25	Bryant, spelled R-O-B-E-R-T, B-R-Y-A-N-T.

1	HEARING OFFICER ORTH: Thank you. Do you
2	swear or affirm to tell the truth?
3	MR. BRYANT: I do.
4	HEARING OFFICER ORTH: Thank you. I'll
5	start your time.
6	MR. BRYANT: My name is Robert Bryant. I
7	reside in Corrales, Mexico with my wife, Karen, who
8	is a retired RN, and she is a second-generation
9	New Mexican. And we have four children, six
10	grandchildren and six great grandchildren.
11	I was from Virginia originally and I
12	served in the U.S. Navy over 30 years, and then I
13	became a New Mexico State Trooper. I retired from
14	there. I was stationed at Kirtland Air Force Base,
15	went into the Navy. When I retired, I had a rental
16	business at one time in Corrales which sold because
17	of irritants with tenants.
18	And my reason for keeping the oil and
19	gas industry growing in the U.S. is, number one, it's
20	national security. At this point, we are buying oil
21	from countries that are not friendly to us and they
22	can shut off supply at any time.
23	The cost of fuel has raised prices for
24	everything from groceries to clothing and everyday
25	items. And it's because of shipping with the oil

1	prices for semis. People are losing jobs as
2	businesses are shutting down due to the high cost of
3	fuel. And people can't afford to put fuel in their
4	vehicles to go to work anymore. It's either food or
5	gas.
6	And cutting back on or curtailing
7	drilling in New Mexico also cuts out many needed jobs
8	in New Mexico and also revenues from oil and gas for
9	education in New Mexico.
10	When the wells are shut down, it takes
11	time and money to re-drill. And the communities in
12	the drilling areas are struggling economically and
13	it's stressing our agricultural industry due to the
14	cost of fuel.
15	Thank you, Commissioners, for listening
16	to me this morning.
17	HEARING OFFICER ORTH: Thank you,
18	Mr. Bryant.
19	Anyone else at all on the platform? I
20	don't see any other hands.
21	We will go back to our technical case
22	then. Mr. Ezzell would you join us up at the front.
23	MR. CLOUTIER: Madam Hearing Officer, while
24	Mr. Ezzell is taking the stand, IPANM has Exhibits
25	37, 38 and 39, which were sponsored by Mr. Cantrell,

1	who we withdrew as a witness. We just ask that those
2	three exhibits be treated as part of his written
3	public comment which was his former testimony.
4	Second we have IPANM Exhibit 45, which I
5	used in cross-examining Mr. Powell. We will not be
6	using it in our case.
7	And the declaration of Ms. Johnson,
8	which is 45, simply authenticates certain documents.
9	We received in the request for the department, and we
10	move the admission of Exhibit 45.
11	HEARING OFFICER ORTH: All right. I'll
12	pause for a moment in the event there are objections
13	to the Cantrell Exhibits 37, 38 and 39, with them
14	becoming public comment. No?
15	All right. They're admitted.
16	(Admitted: IPANM Cantrell Exhibits 37,
17	38 and 39.)
18	HEARING OFFICER ORTH: And now Exhibit 45,
19	this documented receipt of documents through IPRA.
20	Any objections?
21	All right. Exhibit 45 is admitted.
22	(Admitted: IPANM Exhibit 45.)
23	HEARING OFFICER ORTH: Thank you
24	Mr. Cloutier.
25	MR. TREMAINE: Madam Hearing Officer as
	Page 43

1	another housekeeping and threshold matter. I did
2	just circulate this morning to all of the parties
3	proposed OCD Rebuttal Exhibit 34. I'm sure people
4	have not had a chance to review that yet. It
5	directly rebuts the testimony which arose on
6	cross-examination by Mr. Armstrong yesterday.
7	I think it's imperative for the
8	Commission to see this. I'm happy to take it up at a
9	later time. I just want it on the record that we
10	need to discuss that. I will be moving for its
11	admission. I do think it is appropriate as rebuttal
12	or surrebuttal as the point made by Mr. Armstrong
13	only came up yesterday afternoon.
14	I do have alternative bases that I
15	believe would achieve its admission, but I prefer not
16	to get into those if not necessary.
17	HEARING OFFICER ORTH: All right. Let's
18	take that up when we have finished with Mr. Ezzell.
19	All right. So when we broke last night,
20	Mr. Ezzell had completed his testimony. And we move
21	now to cross-examination, which is limited to 45
22	minutes. And we'll start with Ms. Fox or Mr. Tisdel.
23	MS. FOX: Thank you, Madam Hearing Officer.
24	I have a few questions for Mr. Ezzell.
25	THE WITNESS: Good morning.

1	MS. FOX: Good morning.
2	CALDER EZZELL,
3	having first been previously
4	duly sworn, testified as follows:
5	CROSS-EXAMINATION
6	BY MS. FOX:
7	Q. Mr. Ezzell, my name is Tannis Fox. I'm a
8	lawyer with Western Environmental Law Center, and I
9	represent applicants in this proceeding.
10	In your testimony yesterday,
11	Mr. Cloutier referred you to a part of the definition
12	of underground waste in Section 70-2-3A of the Oil and
13	Gas Act, which includes the language I'm showing on
14	the screen, that when operating or producing of any
15	well or wells in a manner to reduce which requires
16	when operating or producing of any well or wells in a
17	manner to reduce or tend to reduce the total quantity
18	of crude petroleum oil or natural gas ultimately
19	recovered from any pool.
20	You relied on this language, correct?
21	A. Yes, Madam.
22	Q. And Mr. Cloutier asked you something to the
23	effect of how much waste is allowed under the statute,
24	and you said zero waste, correct?
25	A. Yes, madam.

1	Q. In order to comply with the standard of zero
2	waste, does that mean that an operator must produce a
3	well to its very last hydrocarbon, without regard to
4	the economics of that well?
5	A. No, madam.
6	Q. And why is that?
7	A. Because no well ever produces the last
8	molecule of hydrocarbon. You cannot recover
9	100 percent of the oil or gas in a reservoir.
10	Q. Then under your
11	A. Hopefully we will have the technology to
12	later with the help of New Mexico Tech.
13	Q. Then under your formulation, that waste
14	means zero waste, does that mean that the operator
15	must produce a well to the very last hydrocarbon that
16	that operator can produce without regard to well
17	economics, that is physically possible,
18	technologically possible to produce?
19	A. No. There is an economic limit, and we all
20	know that.
21	Q. And what's that economic limit?
22	A. When a well is no longer capable of
23	producing in paying quantities. And of course that
24	varies from operator to operator.
25	Q. In your testimony yesterday, you raised
	Page 46

1	concerns about applicant's proposed provisions in
2	19.15.9.8 and 19.15.9.9 regarding operator
3	registration and change of operator, correct? And
4	that citation at the beginning for operator
5	registration
6	A. Yes.
7	Q has an incorrect 1 at the very end. I
8	don't know how that popped up, but there it is.
9	Anyway, you gave testimony on these
10	provisions yesterday, correct?
11	A. I don't believe I did give testimony on it.
12	It's in my direct, in my written.
13	Q. You gave testimony on it when you were
14	discussing slide 38 in your
15	A. I don't know what
16	Q. Do you want me to pull it up for you? Let's
17	see here.
18	A. Oh, yes, have, I did give testimony.
19	Because, if I remember correctly, I was concerned with
20	the unresolved adjudications.
21	Q. And applicants at OCD propose in these
22	provisions that the operator be required to provide
23	certain information to OCD prior to registration or
24	well transfer, correct?
25	A. Yes.

1	Q. And part of that information is a
2	certification by the authorized official of the
3	operator that the operator, as you noted, does not
4	have unresolved adjudicated orders or unresolved
5	settlement agreements for any state or federal
6	violations in any domestic jurisdiction, correct?
7	A. That's what it says, yes, ma'am.
8	Q. Yesterday, and maybe this is just mistaken
9	testimony, but yesterday you testified that the OCD
LO	doesn't have authority to require another state to
L1	provide that authority to OCD, correct? That was your
L2	testimony?
L3	A. Yes, it was.
L4	Q. But doesn't this provision provide that it's
L5	the authorized official from the operator that
L6	provides the information to OCD, not another state?
L7	A. So the authorized official is intended to be
L8	a representative of the entity that wants to be the
L9	operator?
20	Q. Correct. And the operator registration
21	provision, it says the certification by an authorized
22	official that the new operator is not blah, blah,
23	blah.
24	A. Right.
25	Q. S refers to the authorized official of the
	Page 48

1	operator, correct?
2	A. Correct.
3	Q. Yesterday, you testified that applicants in
4	OCD's proposals at 19.15.8.9A NMAC, which I have up on
5	the screen for you, regarding financial assurance,
6	attempts to require operators to, quote, bond just to
7	negotiate acquisition, correct? That was from your
8	slide 40?
9	A. Repeat your question, please.
LO	Q. You testified regarding this provision that
L1	it was requiring operators to, quote, bond just to
L2	negotiate acquisition, correct?
L3	A. Yes.
L 4	Q. So do you appreciate that this provision was
L5	the subject of a motion to dismiss filed by IPANM and
L6	NMOGA and to dismiss this particular provision on the
L7	ground that it regulates the sale of wells between
L8	operators?
L9	A. Yes.
20	Q. And are you aware that IPANM and NMOGA made
21	this argument in their motion to dismiss, even though
22	Peter Morgan, our expert, explained in both his direct
23	and rebuttal testimony that the intent of the redline
24	language was simply to clarify current OCD practice
25	and simply require financial assurance prior to
	Page 49

to proceeding with any proposed acquisition is

25

1	chilling on the freedom to exchange properties.
2	Q. But you understand that the intent of this
3	is to clarify current practice and just require
4	financial assurance to be in place before an operation
5	begins, correct?
б	A. Then take the word "acquisition" out.
7	Q. Well, the hearing officer interesting you
8	say that about wordsmithing this, because this
9	language was offered by your counsel and the hearing
10	officer are you aware that the hearing officer in
11	her recommendation asked applicants at OCD to address
12	this language in their presentations?
13	A. I have not been involved with anything other
14	than my direct testimony.
15	Q. Okay. Well, I have the hearing
16	officer's language up here and she suggested that
17	applicants and OCD be asked to address the suggested
18	insertions by the moving parties. And are you aware
19	that we did exactly that through Mr. Morgan's
20	testimony and exhibit? And she asked us to do that to
21	attempt to avoid the wordsmithing that I think was
22	just going on right now.
23	A. That's what we do.
24	Q. She asked us to address that and that we
25	submitted the proposed language, the language proposed
	Page 51

1	by IPANM as Exhibit 88 through Mr. Morgan's testimony.
2	Are you aware of all that?
3	A. No. As I say, I have not been involved in
4	any of the procedural aspects of this, especially
5	not I'm a transactional lawyer. I can't spell
6	motion to dismiss.
7	Q. Well, I guess this wasn't as easy a fix as
8	we were led to believe.
9	In your surrebuttal testimony, you
10	disagreed with Mr. Alexander's testimony that
11	virtually all inactive wells were reactivated within
12	eight years, correct?
13	A. Yes.
14	Q. And you testified yesterday something to the
15	effect of, "I don't know what he based that
16	representation on, " correct?
17	A. That is correct.
18	Q. So are you familiar with applicant's Exhibit
19	13, which shows that 99 and this was an exhibit
20	developed by the Environmental Defense Fund, which
21	shows that 99.5 percent of reactivations of inactive
22	wells occur within eight years of activity?
23	A. That's what it says. Yes.
24	Q. Are you familiar with this exhibit at all?
25	A. No, Ma'am.

1	Q. So you don't have any data to the contrary,
2	correct?
3	A. Only in my personal experience with helping
4	clients for secondary recovery units.
5	Q. So you have anecdotal experience, but you
6	don't have any data looking at the whole of
7	reactivations and inactive wells over
8	A. No ma'am, I do not.
9	Q. Correct? And you don't have a basis to
10	dispute the data before you in applicant's Exhibit 13,
11	correct?
12	A. Not without studying it independently.
13	Q. Okay. I'm going to bring up your slide 5
14	from your surrebuttal. Now, yesterday you
15	testified now slide 5 from your surrebuttal is up,
16	Mr. Ezzell. And yesterday you testified that federal
17	wells are no longer exempt from the Commission
18	requirements for financial assurance because
19	applicants and OCD had proposed to delete a reference
20	in this section here to 19.15.8.9A, correct?
21	A. Can you put them up on the same screen.
22	Q. I can't do two screens, but this is your
23	slide that you testified from yesterday, where you
24	stated that because of the deletion of 19.15.8.9A in
25	this section, that that deleted the exemption for

1	federal wells from OCD rules for financial assurance.
2	MR. CLOUTIER: I think Ms. Fox is
3	overstating the testimony. I think he testified that
4	it eliminated for the wells that are subject to
5	Subparagraph E, not all wells.
6	MS. FOX: For federal wells.
7	MR. CLOUTIER: For federal wells that would
8	be subject to Subparagraph E.
9	MS. FOX: So you think his testimony was
10	that inactive and TA federal wells are exempted.
11	MR. CLOUTIER: Are not exempted
12	MS. FOX: Are not exempted.
13	MR. CLOUTIER: because of the strike.
14	That, I think, was the intent of the testimony.
15	MS. FOX: Fair enough.
16	BY MS. FOX:
17	Q. Do you do you agree with your counsel's
18	A. That's the way I interpret
19	Q. Maybe wait till I finish my question.
20	A. Sorry.
21	Q. Yeah. It's hard for the court reporter. I
22	don't mind so much, but the court reporter does.
23	A. Absolutely.
24	Q. Okay. So you agree with what your counsel
25	just said in terms of what your testimony is, correct?
	Page 54

1	A. Yes.
2	Q. Okay. So can we stop sharing and go back to
3	my slides.
4	Okay. So the provision that you
5	referred to where the federal well exemption lives is
6	19.15.8.9A, correct? That's what you said in your
7	slide? This is the provision that exempts
8	federally essentially exempts federal wells from
9	the Commission's rules on financial assurance,
10	correct?
11	A. Yes. The language, unless the well is
12	covered by a federally required FA.
13	Q. And you see that that language has not been
14	proposed to be deleted by applicants or OCD, correct,
15	the language that exempts federal wells from the
16	state's financial assurance requirements?
17	A. That is correct. But the proposed amendment
18	deletes the reference to that. And I think that is
19	problematic.
20	Q. Do you think that reference was deleted just
21	in order to clarify that all wells in inactive and TA
22	status, not just those that have been TA status under
23	two years are subject to that particular financial
24	assurance requirement in Subpart E? Isn't that what
25	that language why that language was deleted?
	Dago 55

1	Because the language exempting federal wells is left
2	unchanged.
3	A. That may be how it was intended. I don't
4	think it was done very artfully.
5	Q. We can agree to disagree on that.
6	Yesterday you testified in surrebuttal
7	that Mr. Morgan was incorrect that OCD can release a
8	bond if a well is no longer deemed a marginal well,
9	correct?
10	A. Yes.
11	Q. And you cited to the Oil and Gas Act at
12	70-2-14A for that proposition, correct?
13	A. Probably.
14	Q. Let me read it to you. You'll probably
15	recognize it. That provision provides all financial
16	assurance shall remain in force until released by the
17	Oil Conservation Division, blah, blah, blah.
18	A. Right. But that goes to the issue of
19	whether a bond is cancelable. And I think Mr. Morgan
20	said it was, that they are, and I disagree.
21	Look at the OCD bond form.
22	Q. Mr. Morgan testified that the bonds are not
23	cancelable and that that makes good policy sense.
24	A. Releasable
25	Q. Isn't that correct?

1	A. Releasable and cancelable are the same to
2	me.
3	Q. Let me just continue here.
4	A. I keep forgetting
5	Q. In support
6	A I don't' get to ask the questions.
7	Q. Okay. But you don't recall his testimony in
8	support of the idea that surety bonds should be
9	non-cancellable? You don't recall that testimony?
10	A. No.
11	Q. Okay. But your testimony yesterday was that
12	he was wrong, that you that OCD can release a bond
13	if a well is no longer in marginal status. That was
14	your testimony yesterday, correct?
15	A. Yes.
16	Q. Okay.
17	A. And I stand by that.
18	Q. But looking at the Commission's rules at
19	19.15.8.12, which I have up here, doesn't it clearly
20	state in those rules that financial assurance can be
21	removed if it's covered by another financial assurance
22	that the Division has approved so that an operator can
23	replace financial assurance if needed?
24	A. But doesn't the statute say that the
25	financial assurance cannot be released until the well

1	has been plugged, since that was the condition upon
2	which the financial assurance was entered into and
3	issued?
4	Q. But that wouldn't preclude the Commission
5	from passing rules that says that a financial
6	assurance needs to be replaced, for whatever reason.
7	The financial assurance requirements could go up.
8	They could go down. An operator might want to use a
9	different company for financial assurance. That
10	provision in the statute doesn't preclude OCD from
11	approving replacement financial assurance, correct,
12	which is what this provision allows?
13	A. I would agree with that.
14	Q. And so then isn't it also true that
15	applicants specifically, specifically for marginal
16	wells, don't applicants and OCD propose that an
17	operator, and this is the second language down here
18	A. Okay.
19	Q on that slide, that an operator with a
20	marginal well or wells must annually review the number
21	of marginal wells that that operator has and shall
22	update the one-well plugging financial assurance of
23	May 1st of each year? Isn't that what applicants and
24	OCD propose?
25	A. Yes. But, again, I don't like the language
	Page 58

1	because it implies to me that the only thing they can
2	do is add marginal wells to their list and come up
3	with more bonding, rather than saying that there's
4	nothing in that language that what if an operator
5	plugs one of the marginal wells? Then he should be
6	able to take that off the list, right?
7	Q. This language says that it doesn't say
8	that the number of wells is it only applies when
9	wells are increased. It says that the operator shall
10	update the one-well plugging financial assurance after
11	an annual review of the number of wells.
12	So it's neutral as to whether the number
13	of wells increases or decreases, correct?
14	A. It has no express language that it covers
15	both, and that's what I'd like to see.
16	Q. And you're aware, because this is
17	highlighted language, that this is language that was
18	negotiated with Oxy, correct?
19	A. No. I have no idea what was negotiated with
20	Oxy.
21	MS. FOX: That's all the questions I had,
22	Ms. Ezzell. Thank you very much for your testimony.
23	THE WITNESS: Thank you, ma'am. Nice to
24	meet you.
25	MS. FOX: You, too.

1	HEARING OFFICER ORTH: Thank you, Ms. Fox.
2	Mr. Tremaine?
3	MR. HALL: It's going to be Mr. Hall, Madam
4	Hearing Officer.
5	HEARING OFFICER ORTH: Thank you.
6	MR. HALL: Thank you.
7	CROSS-EXAMINATION
8	BY MR. HALL:
9	Q. Good morning, Mr. Ezzell. Good morning. My
10	name's Michael Hall. I don't think we've had occasion
11	to meet. I'm a lawyer with the Oil Conservation
12	Division. How are you this morning?
13	A. I am well. How are you.
14	Q. Good. I wanted to respond, first of all, to
15	your gratitude. It's Mr. Tremaine that you should
16	thank for pointing out that you had cited a statute
17	that doesn't exist.
18	A. No, it exists. I just misquoted it.
19	Q. Well, I guess we'll have a chance to explore
20	that a little bit. Let me go ahead and ask you about
21	that. Are you saying that the statute you cited is
22	law in New Mexico?
23	A. Yes.
24	Q. Okay. Well, let's go ahead and just start
25	there. I'm looking at and I'll pull it up. This
	Page 60

1	is page 3, the bottom of page 3 of your rebuttal.
2	A. Yes.
3	Q. And would you agree it continues on to page
4	4?
5	A. Yes, sir.
6	Q. Okay. And I'm going to highlight some
7	language here. You would agree that that part is
8	operative law in New Mexico?
9	A. Yes.
10	Q. So you think the statute states shall be set
11	by rule at amounts not to exceed
12	A. No.
13	Q \$50,000?
14	A. No, I corrected that in my mea culpa errata
15	statement yesterday. It is the blanket bond for those
16	wells cannot be less than \$50,000.
17	Q. I understand. I just took what you had said
18	as quibbling over whether that's a real statute or
19	not. Would agree that parts of it are real and parts
20	of it aren't, correct?
21	A. The printed version or
22	Q. The printed version, yes, sir.
23	A. Look, I really don't care. I amended it to
24	make it correct.
25	Q. Okay. And you would agree you're under oath
	Page 61

1	here today?
2	A. Correct.
3	Q. And so you're under obligation to continue
4	with your amendments and not claim that this is the
5	law? Because it's actually the opposite of that
6	provision, isn't it?
7	A. Until I corrected it, yes.
8	Q. Okay. Now, in what capacity are you
9	testifying here today?
10	A. I am here because I am the only witness that
11	is a licensed attorney in New Mexico.
12	Q. Are you here as a partner of Mr. Cloutier?
13	Are you here as a witness? Are you here
14	A. I am here as a witness. And it's not
15	Cloutier, it's Cloutier.
16	Q. Mr. Cloutier is your partner, correct?
17	A. Yes.
18	Q. And so you are profiting from representation
19	of IPANM in this matter?
20	A. I will admit to that. Although I want to
21	say you haven't seen our firm's compensation plan.
22	Q. Nor do I want to. I'm simply exploring
23	possible bias here. The gentleman is a gentleman, so
24	are you. But you are profiting as an attorney and a
25	witness in this matter? I just want that to be clear.

1	Is that right?
2	A. Yes.
3	Q. Okay. Now, yesterday you made several
4	references to standard JOAs. A JOA and a COPAS
5	agreement, those are contracts, correct?
6	A. Yes.
7	Q. They are easily modified, changed, or left
8	in place?
9	A. Yes.
10	Q. Your familiarity is because people need a
11	lawyer to look at those and change them, correct?
12	A. Exactly.
13	Q. The form almost never works as it stands,
14	right?
15	A. I would disagree with that.
16	Q. Okay.
17	A. I mean, the AAPL took great pride in each of
18	its forms, so that it could be executed without
19	alteration. They did, however, in each of them have
20	an Article 15, which is blank on the form and allows
21	people to make any additional amendments that they
22	want.
23	Q. And in your experience, these are
24	arm's-length transactions between sophisticated
25	parties, correct?

1	A. Normally. Although, with the in the
2	wells that I've participated in, there's not a lot of
3	room for negotiation because the lay operator wants to
4	have the language that the operator likes. And so, if
5	there is Oxy and XTO, yeah, there's a lot of
6	arm's-length negotiation. But for a shoe clerk going
7	in to a drilling deal, you pretty much it's take it
8	or leave it.
9	Q. Correct me if I'm wrong. Your testimony,
10	the crux of your testimony about JOAs and COPAS is
11	that it's going to cause a lot of problems, correct?
12	A. My testimony was that I don't think that
13	under any of those forms, an operator can pass along
14	the cost of the financial assurance.
15	Q. However, that's something an operator or
16	anyone else who's a party to those contracts could
17	have contemplated, correct?
18	A. No. Because every non-operator in the world
19	will swear on a Bible that bonding costs should be
20	covered by administrative overhead.
21	Q. I see. So there's disagreement in the
22	industry about the effect of these agreements?
23	A. I don't know that there's disagreement
24	because I don't know that operators none of my
25	operators have ever attempted to pass along the cost

1	of bonding.
2	Q. But my question is really simple. A
3	provision to contemplate bonding and how those risks
4	and costs are borne by the parties to the contract,
5	that's always been possible, hasn't it?
6	A. Always.
7	Q. Now, I'm going to jump around just a touch.
8	Did I hear you claim that an operator has to have more
9	than zero percent property interest in a well
10	yesterday? That's what I wrote down, and if that's
11	not what I heard
12	A. No. An operator can have no interest.
13	Q. Okay.
14	A. If they're contract operators or under the
15	JOAs, I think I gave the example of an operator
16	resigning but being forced to continue to operate the
17	well.
18	Q. Fair enough. And an operator may or may not
19	own a property interest, a mineral interest, et
20	cetera, correct?
21	A. Or leasehold. Yes.
22	Q. So the idea that regulating operators
23	necessarily regulates property interest would be
24	incorrect, wouldn't it?
25	A. If an operator owned no interest in the real
	Page 65

1	property, then I would agree with that. But if an
2	operator owned any interest, then I stand by it.
3	Q. And once again, that's an agreement between
4	the parties as they see fit, correct?
5	A. Yes.
6	Q. And so the corollary to that is is it
7	your claim that New Mexico does not have the right,
8	OCD does not have the right to regulate operators and
9	who can be an operator?
LO	A. I think it is OCD's job to regulate
L1	operators, but I don't think it's their job to choose
L2	who gets to be one.
L3	Q. Well, who would do that?
L4	A. Well, I'm a free-market guy. I think you
L5	have the right to enter into a business and fail.
L6	Q. Sure. So you think extremely
L7	non-compliant I don't think of some Cano. You
L8	think Cano should be an operator and OCD should have
L9	no say in that because of your free market beliefs?
20	A. Well, in hindsight. But we did allow to be
21	an operator and we did accept their bonds, and so they
22	were. It turns out they were lousy.
23	Q. Do you think, as you sit here today, OCD
24	should have no right to regulate Cano, for instance,
25	as an operator?

1	A. I think they have the right to regulate and
2	enforce, but not to pick who isn't worthy. It's not
3	like an operator has to apply for a permit to be an
4	operator.
5	Q. Well, they do, don't they?
6	A. Well, they do, but not to be able to even
7	enter into a negotiation to buy a property. That's
8	just not the OCD's business.
9	Q. You do some work in Texas oil and gas; is
LO	that right?
L1	A. No.
L2	Q. Are you familiar with the language Ms. Fox
L3	put up about acquisition of operatorship? Does that
L4	comport with your understanding of what the railroad
L5	commission does in Texas?
L6	A. I'm not licensed in Texas, and I've never
L7	even participated in oil.
L8	Q. What is problematic about that language?
L9	A. As I've already stated, I think it is
20	chilling on the free exchange of real property
21	interest.
22	Q. You would agree that that proposed rule does
23	not, in any way, inhibit or regulate the transfer of
24	real property? It only regulates who may be an
25	operator, correct?

1	A. I didn't say it regulated. I said it
2	chilled the free-market ability to enter into
3	negotiations to potentially buy properties.
4	Q. You have to read some language in there
5	about owning property for that to be accurate, though,
6	correct?
7	A. Say that again, please.
8	Q. Sure. You have to read some language that's
9	not there in the rule for that to be regulating real
LO	property.
L1	A. No, I don't think you have to imply any
L2	language. I think it says you can't you have to
L3	promise not to even negotiate the acquisition of a
L 4	property unless you posted a bond.
L5	Q. Of operatorship, not property, correct? It
L6	doesn't say property?
L7	A. But it still has the chilling effect on the
L8	free exchange of real property interest.
L9	Q. At any rate, the rule says what it does,
20	right? It doesn't say property; can we at least agree
21	on that?
22	A. The word "property" is not in it.
23	Q. Thank you. Now, in some of your testimony,
24	is it your position that OCD has not considered depth
25	in these proposed rules, depth of wells?

1	A. Yes. There is nothing in it that in the
2	proposed rules that refers back to the statute which
3	says the OCD shall consider these things.
4	It's just the proposed rules say here's
5	the amount of the blanket, here's the amount of the
6	single well. The only remaining discretion that the
7	rules give to the OCD is on the blanket bonds not to
8	be less than 50,000 and on a single-well bond for an
9	active well that has to be in an amount equal to the
10	cost of plugging.
11	Q. It says consider the depth, correct?
12	A. Yes.
13	Q. It doesn't say you have to you have to
14	make financial assurance attached to depth. This says
15	that should be a factor considered. Can we agree on
16	that?
17	A. Yeah. That is what the statute requires.
18	Q. And you surrebutted Mr. Powell's
19	testimony was part of that testimony that you heard
20	that it was considered and it wasn't found to be
21	correlated to depth wasn't correlated to plugging
22	costs in the manner that age did, for instance?
23	A. Would you restate that.
24	Q. Sure. Did you hear Mr. Powell say that
25	depth was considered, but it did not really correlate
	Page 69

1	to the cost of plugging?
2	A. I heard I heard that. I disagree with
3	it.
4	Q. Sure. So, at any rate, we agree that it was
5	considered?
6	A. I don't know that it was considered in the
7	manner required by the statute. You cannot say a 900
8	foot San Andres well is going to need \$150,000 bond.
9	That's just reality of the business.
10	Q. But my question was, would you agree it was
11	considered, Mr. Powell's testimony makes clear it was
12	considered? You don't agree with how he considered
13	it, but it was considered. Can we at least agree on
14	that?
15	A. I will agree that he claims it was
16	considered.
17	Q. Fair enough.
18	A. Isn't it fun?
19	Q. Much like you claim it wasn't, right?
20	A. Yeah.
21	Q. Now, speaking of the statute, you would
22	agree that it's OCD's costs that bonding needs to
23	cover, not industry's, correct?
24	A. That's the way it's written, and I think
25	that's the biggest problem with it in the beginning.
	Page 70

1	The OCD they've got wonderful experts, but industry
2	can plug any well cheaper than the OCD.
3	Q. But an orphaned well hasn't been plugged,
4	correct, by industry?
5	A. That's right. And I would love to see the
6	reclamation fund be adequately funded and then have
7	the OCD have the ability to say
8	Q. Fair enough. Would you agree to just answer
9	my questions? Only at 45 minutes. I know you'll have
LO	your opportunities to say what you think should happen
L1	with the reclamation fund.
L2	A. You can't blame me for trying to kill your
L3	time.
L4	Q. Well, I kind of do blame you for that.
L5	Now, your testimony also stated that
L6	reclamation was part of the 163,000 average costs for
L7	OCD's well plugging. Do you still maintain that.
L8	A. I don't know that I said that.
L9	Q. Okay. Well, we can pull it up.
20	A. Because I don't I don't agree with that
21	number in the first place.
22	Q. All right. Okay. Can you see the top of
23	the page there? Could you read that paragraph for me,
24	please?
25	A. Starting with fourth.

1	Q. Yes sir.
2	A. "Fourth, the proposal is based on a supposed
3	average of OCD's cost to plug, abandon, and reclaim
4	individual oils. Under the Oil and Gas Act, only
5	'plugging' costs can be considered."
6	Q. Do you still maintain you didn't say that?
7	A. No. I put it in my direct testimony.
8	Q. Would you like to change that testimony?
9	A. No.
LO	Q. You do think that part of the 163,000 was to
L1	reclaim wells?
L2	A. I don't know anything about the 163,000
L3	other than what's been said here. I also know that if
L4	you look at the annual reports from the department to
L5	the legislature and the governor, and this was in
L6	Morgan's testimony, I guess, from 2019 to 2024, the
L7	OCD extended 15.5 million to plug 93 wells
L8	Q. So
L9	A at an average cost
20	Q let me ask you a different way. What is
21	the basis for your statement that the proposal is
22	based on a supposed average of OCD's cost to plug,
23	abandon, and reclaim individual wells?
24	A. Well, the word "supposed" is was there
25	because

1	Q. What's your basis for that statement, sir,
2	in your testimony?
3	A. The basis for it is that the Oil and Gas Act
4	does not talk about reclamation costs in the financial
5	assurance.
6	Q. What evidence makes you think that the
7	proposal is based upon that?
8	A. Because that's the figure that the
9	applicants have been using, that it is 163,000 and
10	that it's etched in stone and it doesn't matter on the
11	depth of the well or the age of the well or anything
12	else.
13	Q. Would you agree that that 163,000, the
14	testimony is solely that that is plugging cost and not
15	a reclamation cost?
16	A. Yes.
17	Q. You'd dispute that?
18	A. No. You asked me if I agreed. Now you're
19	killing your time.
20	Q. Okay. Now we're going to get to the part
21	where your statute that had parts that don't exist,
22	and some of your testimony relies on that as opposed
23	to just single words.
24	Do you maintain that under the proposed
25	definitions, marginal wells will be bonded at

1	300 percent, the maximum amount authorized by statute?
2	A. No. That's the minimum amount as we're
3	going back to what I've already corrected.
4	Q. Well, 300 percent is incorrect, too, isn't
5	it?
6	A. Oh, I don't think so.
7	Q. Okay. That's 300 percent of the minimum
8	amount?
9	A. This is just
10	Q. We can take that whole sentence.
11	A. Three times 50 is 150.
12	Q. Do you agree that when you make the maximum
13	TA 50,000 instead of the minimum 50,000, the entire
14	crux of this entire paragraph changes?
15	A. It doesn't matter other than I mean, the
16	statute is what the statute is.
17	Q. I very much agree with that.
18	A. The fact that we got the wrong word on the
19	page does not change the statute. It does not make
20	the statute not exist.
21	Q. The statute does exist, just not as you
22	stated it in your rebuttal testimony, correct?
23	A. It exists as I stated in my correction to
24	typographical errors.
25	Q. Just so the record is clear, your testimony
	Page 74

1	is based upon that faulty understanding of the
2	statute, correct?
3	A. No.
4	Q. It's not?
5	A. My testimony is based on the statute.
6	Q. Okay. The statute I cited in your rebuttal
7	testimony, correct?
8	A. The statute as in the book.
9	Q. Okay. Now, down here on page 9, line 18
10	A. Of what? Oh, okay.
11	Q. Of your rebuttal testimony. Would you agree
12	that you don't know why the legislature did or did not
13	take actions?
14	A. Because they could agree on the parties
15	couldn't agree on what the proponents of House Bill
16	133 could not agree. And anytime the industry tried
17	to comment, it was basically flatly ignored. The fact
18	that
19	Q. Well
20	A there were two I'm talking.
21	The fact that there were two committee
22	substitutes, one in energy, one in
23	Q. Well, hold on. You're talking, but you're
24	not answering my question. My question should be yes
25	or no. Do you agree that you don't know why the

1	legislature did or did not act a certain way, that
2	you're not the arbiter of that?
3	A. No. But I was there and witnessing it, and
4	they didn't act
5	Q. Would you agree that
6	A because it was a bad bill?
7	Q. Would you agree
8	MR. CLOUTIER: Mr. Hall keeps interrupting
9	the witness. He's entitled to answer, even if
10	Mr. Hall wants a yes or no.
11	HEARING OFFICER ORTH: All right. So,
12	Mr. Ezzell, if you would please bring more focus to
13	the question that's being asked. And, Mr. Hall,
14	please don't step on the end of his sentences.
15	BY MR. HALL:
16	Q. At any rate, it could have been that the
17	legislature, like the LFC, thought that the statutes
18	weren't necessary because the rules already allowed
19	what's happening here today, for instance, correct?
20	A. I cannot speak to that. I do not know.
21	Q. Fair enough. That's what I wanted us to
22	agree on.
23	Okay. I'm going to go to a couple of
24	comments in your surrebuttal. If I can find it.
25	Excuse me.

1	Mr. Ezzell, now, on your surrebuttal,
2	it's slide 10, and I'll pull it up here in a sec. But
3	would you agree that based on 180 days of production,
4	this proposed rule is not requiring low producers to
5	simply plug? It's requiring low producers to produce
6	or take appropriate actions.
7	A. I don't understand why the 180 days comes
8	into your question, so
9	Q. Well, would you agree that the definition
10	of proposed definition of marginal will includes
11	both days of production and volumes?
12	A. Yes.
13	Q. Okay. And I believe your testimony was that
14	these rules are going to require people to plug wells?
15	A. I think it will, that is the effect. Yes.
16	Q. And so
17	A. It won't require them to. It will force
18	them to.
19	Q. What's the difference between forcing and
20	requiring?
21	A. Requiring is a regulatory action or a legal
22	action. Forcing is a businessman making a decision
23	that he's got to plug.
24	Q. Well, at any rate, an operator producing
25	less than 180 days could go above 180 and that well
	Page 77

wouldn't be marginal, correct?
A. That is correct.
Q. There was some discussion about a release of
financial assurance. Would you agree the Oil and Gas
Act does allow and, in fact, requires OCD to release
bonds at the appropriate time, and not only in the
event that they're plugged?
A. That's the only time the statute says that
the OCD can release a bond, is after the plugging has
been performed according to the rules then in effect.
HEARING OFFICER ORTH: Mr. Hall, you still
have 15 minutes. But I'm wondering if this would be
a good time for a break.
MR. HALL: Whatever pleases the Commission
is fine with me.
HEARING OFFICER ORTH: All righty. Let's
come back at 11:00. And, again, you have 15 minutes
left.
(Recess held from 10:50 to 11:00 a.m.)
HEARING OFFICER ORTH: All right. When we
broke, Mr. Hall had 15 minutes left of his 45.
Go ahead, Mr. Hall.
MR. HALL: Thank you, Madam Hearing Officer.
BY MR. HALL:
Q. Ezzell, I think we were starting to talk
Page 78

1	about financial assurance a little bit. Is it your
2	contention that OCD cannot release a bond unless a
3	well is plugged?
4	A. I believe that's what the statute says.
5	Q. Okay. Which statute?
6	A. The Oil and Gas Act.
7	Q. Just wondering if you had one in mind,
8	because I think what you're talking about is 70-2-14
9	relating to financial assurance?
10	If I could, I'm going to highlight this
11	last sentence there and ask if you could please read
12	that.
13	A. The Oil Conservation Division shall release
14	financial assurance when it is satisfied that the
15	conditions of the financial assurance have been fully
16	performed.
17	Q. So that doesn't mention plugging, does it?
18	A. Not directly, No.
19	Q. Okay. So is there another statute that
20	you're getting that you're referring to?
21	A. Well, on a plugging bond, that is the
22	condition of the financial assurance, is that the well
23	be plugged.
24	Q. Right. But that wasn't my question, was it?
25	I didn't limit that to the plugging bonds. I said

1	bonds. And so if you'd like to correct your
2	understanding, that's fine?
3	A. My understanding of what.
4	Q. Do you still stand by your statement that a
5	bond can only be released in the event a well is
6	plugged? That was my question, and you said yes, that
7	that's what the statute requires. So I'm asking
8	A. And of a condition of the bond was the
9	plugging of the well
10	Q. Okay. Did you understand my question? Just
11	please pay attention to my question. It does not have
12	the words "plugging bond." Okay?
13	A. That is correct.
14	Q. All right. My question is, do you maintain
15	that OCD can only release a bond of any kind in the
16	event that a well is plugged?
17	A. They can only release a plugging bond after
18	the well has been plugged. What other bonds are you
19	talking about?
20	Q. Do you maintain can OCD release a bond
21	when a well is transferred amongst operators?
22	A. The bond is generally transferred in the
23	well. I guess I think the OCD probably has the
24	authority to enter into a new bond if the selling
25	party was under a blanket bond and the buying party
	Page 80

1	was going to be a one-well bond. That would require a
2	new bond.
3	Q. Did you understand my question?
4	A. I think I answered your question.
5	Q. Does OCD release bonds when operatorship of
6	a well is transferred?
7	A. They have the authority to, especially if
8	the bond is not transferred.
9	Q. And so that's an example of a bond being
10	released even when a well is not being plugged,
11	correct?
12	A. It's not so much being released, as it is
13	being replaced.
14	Q. Do you agree this highlighted sentence here
15	does not say anything about plugging?
16	A. I agree.
17	Q. Okay. So would you agree that in the event
18	a marginal well rule is passed, that if the conditions
19	of that bond are satisfied, regardless of plugging, it
20	can be released? Reading that line right there, that
21	would be compliant with that statutory authority?
22	A. If it is a plugging bond.
23	Q. Would you agree with that okay?
24	Now, Ms. Fox asked you a little bit
25	about waste. I think your testimony focused on

1	underground waste. Would you agree with that?
2	A. No.
3	Q. I'm sorry, I didn't understand?
4	A. No.
5	Q. No, that's not what you focused on?
6	A. Economic waste, the drilling of unnecessary
7	wells, specifically underground waste in caused by
8	premature plugging. But no, there is more than one
9	definition of waste.
10	Q. My question was, you would agree your
11	testimony focused on underground waste, correct?
12	A. I talked about economic waste as well.
13	Q. Well, let's just pull it up. 70-2.3,
14	correct, that's the waste statute you're referring to
15	and citing there?
16	A. That's the definition of underground waste,
17	yes.
18	Q. And so you have to point to me in your
19	testimony, and I'm happy to shift it around, where you
20	talked about all these other kinds of waste.
21	A. I talked about the economic waste and the
22	drilling of unnecessary wells yesterday in my live
23	testimony, not in my written.
24	Q. Do you agree the statute also defines
25	surfaced waste?

1	A. Oh, yeah.
2	Q. Do you agree that excess production beyond
3	the reasonable market demand may be waste?
4	A. Yes.
5	Q. Are you aware that unauthorized venting or
6	flaring of natural gas is prohibited as waste?
7	A. Yes.
8	Q. Are you aware that 60 percent of orphaned
9	wells observed by OCD are venting natural gas?
10	A. I cannot answer that.
11	Q. Do you have any reason to dispute that?
12	A. I assume I could confirm it with independent
13	research, but
14	Q. Do you have any reason to dispute that, sir?
15	A. I have no reason to dispute it or agree with
16	it.
17	Q. So that would be 60 percent of orphaned
18	wells are wasteful, committing waste under the
19	statute, correct, if
20	A. Correct.
21	Q that percentage is correct?
22	A. Yes.
23	Q. And so you would agree that waste is a
24	little more complicated than just produce all you can,
25	wouldn't you?

1	A. Oh, absolutely.
2	MR. HALL: I'll pass the witness.
3	Thank you, Mr. Ezzell.
4	HEARING OFFICER ORTH: Thank you, Mr. Hall,
5	Mr. Biernoff or Mr. Moore.
6	MR. BIERNOFF: Good morning, Madam Hearing
7	Officer. Ari Biernoff here for the commissioner of
8	public lands and the State Land Office.
9	CROSS-EXAMINATION
10	BY MR. BIERNOFF:
11	Q. Good morning, Mr. Ezzell?
12	A. How are you.
13	Q. I'm well. How are you today?
14	A. Good. Thanks.
15	Q. Okay. I wanted to just follow up on some of
16	Mr. Hall's questions?
17	You're not testifying in this proceeding
18	on behalf of the Hinkle Law Firm, are you, Mr. Ezzell?
19	A. No. I'm testifying on behalf of IPANM.
20	Q. Okay. You're not speaking as a
21	representative of Hinkle, you're giving your own
22	personal opinion; is that right?
23	A. Yes.
24	Q. Okay. You're not here on behalf of any
25	particular client of you or your firm, are you?

1	A. I am here on behalf of IPANM, of which I am
2	a member.
3	Q. Okay. Not any particular oil and gas
4	operator or producer?
5	A. No.
6	Q. Okay. Just wanted to clear that up?
7	You've talked in your oral testimony and
8	also written in your pre-filed testimony about joint
9	operating agreements. And you've provided a lot of
10	detail on specific forms that the American Association
11	of Professional Landmen have developed, right?
12	A. Yes.
13	Q. Generally speaking, who are the parties to a
14	joint operating agreement?
15	A. The operators and the non-operators.
16	Q. The OCD is not a party to joint operating
17	agreements, right?
18	A. No.
19	Q. The OCD does not approve or disapprove joint
20	operating agreements, right?
21	A. No, it does not.
22	Q. Okay. And the OCD as a non-party is not
23	bound by the terms of joint operating agreements,
24	right?
25	A. Absolutely. Correct.

1	Q. Okay. In your written testimony, your
2	direct testimony, you make an observation that I want
3	to review and discuss with you. This is from page 46
4	of your written direct testimony?
5	You state that: On an overall basis,
6	this. And I think you're referring to beneficial use
7	is a brand-new legal concept as applied to oil and gas
8	wells and operations. Beneficial use is a concept
9	that is used and well developed in water law in
10	New Mexico and other western states. It has never
11	been a concept in oil and gas law in New Mexico
12	statutes, regulations, common law, or contracts. And
13	that's the end of the quote.
14	Do you stand by that testimony,
15	Mr. Ezzell?
16	A. I think the term "beneficial use" is in the
17	administrative code for maybe the definition of an
18	inactive well. I can't remember. But I think the
19	term "beneficial use" or "beneficial purpose" appears
20	somewhere.
21	Q. Okay. And, in fact, the term beneficial use
22	is in statute, isn't it?
23	A. I could not point you to the statute other
24	than the water law.
25	Q. The term beneficial use is in the Oil and
	Page 86

1	Gas Act, section 70-2-3, isn't it?
2	A. Probably.
3	Q. Do you want to look at it together?
4	A. I don't have it in front of me, but I
5	believe you.
6	Q. Okay. And it's also, I think you noted, in
7	NMAC provisions, in Title 19, Chapter 15, regulatory
8	provisions that apply to the OCD, right?
9	A. Yes.
10	Q. Okay. Thank you. Mr. Ezzell, in your
11	written direct testimony, you state the following.
12	This is from page 50 of your testimony: We all know
13	the handful of operators out there who are giving
14	industry a bad name in this regard. There must be
15	other regulatory means of cracking down on these
16	abuses. End of the quote?
17	Mr. Ezzell, how many operators are out
18	there, approximately, giving industry a bad name in
19	New Mexico?
20	A. I couldn't put a number on it.
21	Q. Okay. You used the phrase "a handful." How
22	many is that, more or less?
23	A. I can't give it a number.
24	Q. Mr. Ezzell, if there were 50 or 100 bad
25	operators flagrantly out of compliance with OCD rules

1	and perhaps other obligations, would you consider that
2	to be just a handful?
3	A. If there were a hundred, probably no, I
4	wouldn't consider that a handful.
5	I use that term just to say that most of
6	industry is responsible, and that there should be a
7	better way than to punish good operators with this
8	rule. There should be a better way to get the
9	enforcement done on the bad operators.
LO	Q. Okay. Well, so before we move on from this
L1	point, I know you said that you don't think 100 would
L2	be a handful. Do you think 50 is a handful? Would
L3	you consider that to be a handful?
L 4	A. Yeah, probably. I think there was testimony
L5	there's over 600 operators in the state. I don't
L6	know. I don't know that for a fact. I thought there
L7	was testimony to that somewhere.
L8	Q. Okay. It doesn't trouble you if there's in
L9	the neighborhood of 8 or 10 percent or more operators
20	in New Mexico who are out of compliance with OCD
21	rules?
22	A. Well, it troubles me. But that's why we
23	have the OCD and they have the enforcement powers they
24	do to get 'em.
25	Q. Okay. Good, good. Well, that's good to
	Page 88

1	hear. The passage that I read from your direct ends
2	with the following statement: There must be other
3	regulatory means of cracking down on these abuses?
4	What are those other regulatory means?
5	Have you given any thought to that?
6	A. Well, all the tools that the OCD has in the
7	toolbox. The notice of violations. You know, you can
8	get the attorney general to go after them. You've got
9	a lot OCD has lots of tools to regulate the
10	industry.
11	Q. Is claiming bonds, financial assurance held
12	by non-compliant operators, one of those tools?
13	A. It should be. I don't know how often it's
14	done. I think there's been testimony that it's
15	problematic to get them collected.
16	Q. Okay. Well, do you happen to know how many
17	clients of the Hinkle law firm, your law firm, have
18	had their bonds pulled by the State Land Office for
19	their pervasive environmental non-compliance? Do you
20	know what that number is?
21	A. I have no idea.
22	Q. Okay. Mr. Ezzell, do you support additional
23	legislative appropriations to give OCD the ability to
24	develop additional alternative means of cracking down
25	on the abuses that you describe committed by a

1	minority of oil and gas operators on page 50 of your
2	direct testimony?
3	MR. CLOUTIER: Objection. Vague.
4	HEARING OFFICER ORTH: What was vague about
5	it? I'm sorry.
6	MR. CLOUTIER: He's asking about legislation
7	solutions generally. There's no specific legislation
8	that Mr. Ezzell is being asked whether he supports
9	or assuming this is even remotely relevant. But I
10	think he's entitled to know what the proposal is that
11	he's supposed to support or not support.
12	HEARING OFFICER ORTH: Mr. Biernoff, I
13	thought you described it, which was to get OCD more
14	resources. But if you want to be a little more
15	specific, perhaps Mr. Ezzell can answer it.
16	Q. Well, so I'm not a legislator. I know that
17	we have at least one legislator who was on the call,
18	on the hearing this morning, who happens to be married
19	to Mr. Ezzell. And so I'm not in that position. I
20	don't introduce legislation. I did think the question
21	was clear and I'll restate it?
22	BY MR. BIERNOFF:
23	Q. Mr. Ezzell, you reference other regulatory
24	means of cracking down on abuses by bad operators.
25	And I'm asking you, do you support additional

resources through the legislature for OCD to identify
and implement alternative regulatory means of cracking
down on the abuses that you've referenced?
A. I think in your original question you said
appropriations, and I don't necessarily agree with
just appropriating money. I would support
legislation, and hope I get a chance to in January, I
would support legislation that uses the conservation
fund and funds the reclamation fund and not a dime is
diverted to the general fund, which is what the
legislature did years ago to balance the budget.
I think the conservation fund needs to
be used for its intended purpose, and that's funding
the OCD and funding the reclamation fund.
Q. Mr. Ezzell, are you in favor of, do you
support additional FTE, that is additional staff for
the Oil Conservation Division, to develop and
implement other regulatory means of cracking down on
operators' abusive conduct?
MR. CLOUTIER: Objection. Relevance.
MR. BIERNOFF: Madam Hearing Officer.
HEARING OFFICER ORTH: Go ahead,
Mr. Biernoff.
MR. BIERNOFF: Yeah, I think it's very
appropriate, since Mr. Ezzell has mentioned that
Page 91

1	there are alternatives to dealing with the bad
2	operator problem, to explore what those might be, and
3	that's what I'm doing here.
4	HEARING OFFICER ORTH: That's what I
5	thought. Please go ahead.
6	A. It's not my job or my place to tell the OCD
7	how to do their business. I assume that the director
8	knows the capabilities of his staff. And if they are
9	not enforcing compliance because they don't have
10	enough staff, they need to hire more people. And
11	that's what
12	Q what I'm asking you
13	A the budget is.
14	Q. Mr. Ezzell, I'm asking you if you would
15	support such an effort, since you have identified
16	alternatives to this proposed rule. You're saying you
17	don't support the rule. I think we've all heard you
18	loud and clear on that score. And you're saying
19	you recognize that there's a bad operator problem, and
20	you're saying there's alternatives. So I'm asking
21	you, would you support additional staff resources for
22	OCD to implement your proposed alternatives?
23	A. If I were a litigator, I'd say asked and
24	answered. But I think I just answered that.
25	Yes, if the OCD cannot do the compliance

1	it wants to because of lack of staff, they need to get
2	more staff.
3	Q. And you would support such an effort; is
4	that right?
5	A. I just said that, yes.
6	Q. Okay. Good. Now it's been asked and
7	answered?
8	Mr. Ezzell, let's keep moving through
9	your direct testimony. I'm not going to read all of
10	it because there's a lot of text. But on page 56, you
11	are discussing the ability of OCD to consider
12	regulatory violations by operators in other
13	jurisdictions. And now I'll start reading it.
14	As written, these provisions seem to
15	suggest that the Division in the first instance is
16	empowered to decide whether the applicant or proposed
17	new operator is out of compliance with some other
18	state's or federal law. The suggested provisions do
19	not require that, for instance, state or federal
20	regulatory agency charged with enforcing those laws
21	have found the applicant or new operator to be out of
22	compliance, just that they are out of compliance.
23	I do not know of any expertise within
24	the Division, and would be surprised if it existed, to
25	interpret another state's laws and regulations or most

1	federal oil and gas laws and regulations. I also
2	question what resources would have to be devoted to
3	that issue.
4	Okay. I have a few questions for you
5	about that testimony. And The first is, is it your
6	position here in this proceeding that the oil
7	conservation Division should ignore compliance
8	violations that a particular operator, a New Mexico
9	operator, may have encountered in another state or
10	with the United States government?
11	A. I think that is certainly a factor that the
12	OCD could consider. But the way the proposed rule is
13	written, it does not address the severity of the
14	violation, whether the violation has been corrected.
15	That's the problem I had with the unresolved
16	adjudications issue that we talked about yesterday.
17	Yeah, I absolutely think that it is
18	within OCD's interest to investigate. But I don't
19	think it's in the OCD's purview to be able to just
20	thumbs up or thumbs down someone that wants to do
21	business in New Mexico.
22	Q. Well, let's explore that a little bit
23	further. You said that it's a factor that's
24	reasonably considered by OCD, the compliance or
25	non-compliance of companies in other states or with

1	respect to the federal government. And then you also
2	said, but it's not something that OCD should give a
3	thumbs up or thumbs down?
4	Help me understand that gap between it
5	being a factor, non-compliance in other jurisdictions
6	being a factor, but not being something that OCD can
7	take any action on.
8	A. Well, to the extent that the OCD is
9	determining a bond amount on the blanket, on the
10	plugging bond for the TA wells, then I would think the
11	OCD would certainly want to investigate the operator's
12	history elsewhere.
13	I do not want to see a situation created
14	when all of our environmentalist friends will start
15	running around the country trying to find violations
16	so they can turn them into the OCD to get OCD to try
17	to come down on somebody.
18	Q. Mr. Ezzell, is it your view that anyone who
19	wants to operate oil and gas wells in the State of
20	New Mexico should be allowed to do so regardless of
21	their compliance track record?
22	A. If they are adequately bonded, yes. As I
23	told Mr. Hall, I'm a free-market guy and I don't
24	think you know, bad operators will be bad operators
25	and they will fail. But I don't think that the

1	government should be able to say, "You cannot do
2	business, this business, in our state."
3	Q. Okay. So just to be clear, an operator like
4	Cano Petro that leaves behind scores or more of
5	inactive wells, if it comes back from bankruptcy or
6	finds new venture funding, can resume operating in
7	New Mexico from your point of view, that's not a
8	problem?
9	A. If they are adequately bonded and the OCD
10	has the ability to enforce their compliance rules,
11	then yes
12	Q. Well, so
13	A they should be.
14	Q. Okay. And I'm sorry for interrupting you.
15	I didn't realize you were still answering?
16	Mr. Ezzell, what does adequate bonding
17	look like for a company like Cano Petro? Your
18	testimony from a minute ago is that a company that's
19	left behind a very large number of inactive wells
20	unplugged should still be allowed to operate as long
21	as there's adequate financial assurance. So, what is
22	adequate?
23	A. 250,000 statewide bond, or just the bonds
24	that are in the statute.
25	Q. Okay. A \$250,000 statewide bond. Cano
	Page 96

1	Petro operated scores of wells, and let's say that it
2	wants to do so again. And you're aware of what
3	average plugging costs are, according to your own
4	testimony and other IPANM witnesses' testimony, right?
5	A. I have learned that there is no agreement on
6	average plugging costs. But I know that the 250,000
7	bond would not cover all of the Cano wells.
8	But if they came back well, they're
9	not going to come back into the state because you guys
10	would be able to do your enforcement against them.
11	And so I don't really think that that's a good example
12	to use.
13	Q. Well, do you have another example in mind of
14	an operator who has left behind a large number, and
15	let's say for purposes of discussion, we're talking
16	about a few dozen or more inactive wells unplugged and
17	their sites unremediated? Do you have an alternative
18	example that you'd like to discuss?
19	A. Well, in that situation, again, we've
20	already discussed the fact that the conservation tax
21	has been collected from even the bad operators,
22	because you can't dodge the tax that is withheld
23	basically at the wellhead.
24	And so, if that money were used as it
25	was intended, there would be adequate funding to cover

Τ	the type of wells you're talking about when an
2	operator disappears.
3	Q. Okay. So I just want to make sure that I
4	understand you, Mr. Ezzell. Whether we're talking
5	about Cano Petro or another non-operator, if you think
6	of an example, let me know. I will do the same?
7	Whether we're talking about Cano or somebody else, a
8	company, as you see it, can leave behind a
9	multi-million dollar compliance problem, reconstitute
LO	or emerge from bankruptcy or find new investment,
11	return to active operations in New Mexico, operate
12	scores of wells or more, and that's okay as long as
L3	there's a \$250,000 bond in place because money is
L4	collected through the tax that you described? The
L5	conservation tax that you referenced will pick up the
16	difference? Is that right?
L7	A. I think that is the best scheme. I think it
18	is unfortunate that situations like Cano even occurred
L9	in the first place, because they just all of their
20	wells didn't just become out of compliance overnight.
21	And that's why I have testified that I
22	would support the OCD in vigorously enforcing the
23	rules. And I think the rules that we have in place
24	now are adequate.
25	Q. Well, okay, thank you. That was actually a
	Page 98

1	question I had for you and you've answered it. So
2	thank you for reading my mind?
3	We can look at page 58 of your direct
4	testimony and you state the following: If this
5	Commission determines it has the authority to adopt
6	such a policy, and in parentheses, and I do not think
7	it does, and agrees that some risk-based approach is
8	needed, arbitrary numbers like 15 percent marginal
9	wells do not assess any risk. That can only be done
10	by looking at individual operators. That's the end of
11	the quoted passage.
12	My question for you, Mr. Ezzell, is do
13	you support OCD undertaking an analysis of the risk
14	profile of individual operators? You say here that
15	can only be done by looking at individual operators.
16	Do you support that kind of an operator-by-operator
17	individualized analysis?
18	A. On existing operators or prospectives?
19	Q. Let's start with existing operators. Do you
20	support an analysis of individual operator's risk,
21	compliance history, whatever else you have in mind
22	when you say that a risk-based approach is possible?
23	A. So I'm sorry. I thought you were through.
24	Q. Go ahead and answer?
25	A. If the OCD is doing its job and has the
	Page 99

1	manpower to do its job, then that is already
2	occurring. That's what they do. That's an assessment
3	of the risk. They look you know, the field
4	inspectors do what they do. They go and inspect.
5	And if it is a minor violation,
6	generally fixed with a phone call. If it's more
7	serious, then hopefully the OCD is able to pursue it.
8	And that operator will not turn into a Cano.
9	Q. But, again, to be clear, your view is that
10	\$250,000 is the most that any operator, regardless of
11	compliance behavior, that's the most that they should
12	be required to bond with OCD, right?
13	A. That's what the statute says.
14	Q. But I'm asking you about what your view is
15	of what's adequate. Because we've been talking about
16	what's adequate. Is \$250,000 adequate for any
17	operator?
18	A. I think yes.
19	Q. Okay. And would you, Mr. Ezzell, would you
20	support you mentioned manpower as a consideration.
21	If OCD needed additional staff resources to undertake
22	this very granular risk assessment, would you support
23	OCD receiving those additional resources from the
24	legislature?
25	A. As I've already stated, I would support them
	Page 100

1	that they reset receipt of those additional funds from
2	the use of the conservation tax. Everybody has said
3	that time and time again that the oil and gas industry
4	needs to clean up its own mess. The oil and gas
5	industry by paying the conservation tax for the life
6	of a productive well is repaying a fund to clean up
7	its mess.
8	Q. And what if there's not enough okay,
9	Mr. Ezzell. What if there's not enough money in the
10	fund to pick up and cover the cost of outstanding
11	plugging, remediation and reclamation activities?
12	We heard in public comment this morning
13	from one commenter who said that there's a significant
14	shortfall Between what's in the fund and what's needed
15	to actually do the work. If there is such a shortfall
16	Let's assume the commenter is right for the time
17	being, what then? Where do those additional resources
18	come from?
19	MR. CLOUTIER: Madam Hearing Officer, I ask
20	that the witness be allowed to complete his answer
21	before Mr. Biernoff interrupt and pose a new
22	question.
23	HEARING OFFICER ORTH: All right. Thank
24	you.
25	Go ahead, Mr. Ezzell.

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1	A. The only gas industry pays over \$100 million
2	a year in conservation tax. If it all was funneled to
3	pay for the operations of the OCD and to fund the
4	reclamation fund, that's over a billion dollars in ten
5	years. The
6	Q. Okay. Mr. Ezzell, you're not
7	A. There's plenty
8	Q answering my last question?
9	A. There's plenty of money.
10	Q. Mr. Ezzell, you've made this point several
11	times, and it's not responsive to my question, so I am
12	going to need to interrupt you. And I'm going to
13	remind you of what my actual question was and ask you
14	to answer it?
15	My question was, assume for the
16	moment I'm not asking you to agree that it's true,
17	but assume for the discussion that what the commenter
18	this morning said is true, and that there is indeed a
19	shortfall between what is available in the fund and
20	the total cost of addressing inactive wells,
21	remediation that needs to be done, et cetera, cleanup.
22	How does the shortfall get filled? Where does that
23	money come from?
24	A. I think I've answered that.
25	HEARING OFFICER ORTH: I haven't heard an
	Page 102

1	answer, Mr. Ezzell.
2	A. I want it to come from the collection of the
3	conservation tax and the appropriate use I don't
4	want to dime of the conservation tax going to the
5	general fund, which is what's happening to it now.
6	That's why there is a shortfall.
7	If the shortfall continues the
8	conservation tax is collected every month. And the
9	reason the result of having a shortfall will not be
LO	that wells won't get plugged and sites remediated. It
L1	will just mean they won't get that done as fast. It
L2	will cause a delay.
L3	Q. I want to make sure I understand your
L4	answer. Are you testifying, Mr. Ezzell, that money
L 5	that should be going to well-plugging and spill
L6	remediation and related activities is instead from the
L7	conservation tax that's collected, is instead going to
L8	the general fund, and you believe that to be a
L9	problem? Is that your testimony?
20	A. That is my testimony.
21	Q. Okay. Mr. Ezzell, on page 58 of your direct
22	testimony, you're discussing the 15 percent threshold.
23	That's the context. And here's the statement that you

In my testimony already, I have described

situations why an operator might want to have inactive

24

25

wells or marginal wells in their portfolio because of future development plans?

2.1

2.4

Do you have any idea, do you have either a precise number or an approximate number of how many of the oil and gas companies that are out of compliance with OCD rules who have made this argument? Do you have any idea of the number or, let's say, the percentage of oil and gas companies who say in response to a compliance demand, "We have future development plans for these wells"?

- A. I have no idea how many or what percentage.
- Q. Okay. Do you have, you reference here -- I don't know if you have a specific company in mind, because you go on to say, I'll quote: You may be looking at an operator with a very strong balance sheet and has a significant portion of highly productive wells in its portfolio, but has marginal wells for reasons of, for instance, forming a unit. That operator does not seem to pose any danger of default to the State of New Mexico. End of the quote.

Do you have a specific operator or operators in mind, that is, when you refer to companies that have a lot of inactive or marginal wells, but that don't seem to pose a risk to the state? Who are you thinking of there?

1	and I agree that that's a significant can be a
2	significant piece of information. Do you think a
3	company's and operator's balance sheets should be made
4	public so that OCD or other parties who have a vested
5	interest in whether that company operates here in
6	New Mexico have an understanding of the company's
7	financial strength?
8	A. Well, in the public companies, it already is
9	published in annual reports, things like that. As far
10	as a small independent, I do not think that the public
11	should be able to see their balance sheets or
12	financial information.
13	Q. What about the OCD?
14	A. Same answer. No.
15	Q. So if the balance sheet is a secret that
16	only the operator and its investors, if there is any
17	debt to know about, how can oil conservation Division
18	or any other interested party determine whether an
19	operator with a lot of inactive or marginal wells has
20	a strong balance sheet or doesn't?
21	A. Well, that's where the discretion in
22	enforcement would come in, because if they have all
23	these inactive wells, the OCD has the tools to cite
24	them for violations. And you will almost immediately
25	know their financial capability if they comply with

1	the enforcement actions or pay their fines on time,
2	whatever is done. The OCD will know that.
3	MR. BIERNOFF: Okay. Mr. Ezzell, I
4	appreciate your time and your testimony today.
5	Madam Hearing Officer, I don't have any
6	more questions for Mr. Ezzell this morning.
7	HEARING OFFICER ORTH: Thank you very much,
8	Mr. Biernoff.
9	Let's see. I don't believe we have
10	Ms. Nanasi with us.
11	Mr. Maxwell is at the polls today.
12	Mr. Rankin, do you have questions?
13	MR. RANKIN: Nothing for me. Thank you,
14	Madam Hearing Officer.
15	HEARING OFFICER ORTH: All right. EOG is
16	monitoring.
17	Mr. Suazo, do you have questions?
18	MR. SUAZO: Just a couple of questions,
19	Madam Hearing Officer.
20	CROSS-EXAMINATION
21	BY MR. SUAZO:
22	Q. Mr. Ezzell, good morning?
23	A. Good morning.
24	Q. Mr. Biernoff with the land office asked you,
25	and don't let me misstate your testimony, but I think
	Page 107

1	generally speaking, you stated that generally, you're
2	not opposed to bonds in excess of \$250,000 for certain
3	operators that are problematic under the blanket bond
4	structure, correct?
5	A. Yes.
6	MR. HALL: Objection. Leading.
7	HEARING OFFICER ORTH: Yeah. Please avoid
8	that, Mr. Suazo.
9	MR. SUAZO: I'll move on.
10	BY MR. SUAZO:
11	Q. But it is your testimony in this proceeding
12	that the Commission and the Division do not have the
13	statutory authority to increase bonds beyond 250,000
14	correct?
15	MR. HALL: Objections. Leading.
16	HEARING OFFICER ORTH: Would you turn those
17	into questions.
18	BY MR. SUAZO:
19	Q. I'm confirming his testimony, what he said?
20	And he can say yes or no.
21	HEARING OFFICER ORTH: That's true.
22	A. I do not think that the Division or the
23	Commission has the authority to increase bonds outside
24	of the limitations of the Oil and Gas Act.
25	Q. And to do that, your testimony is an act of

1	the legislature would be required, correct?
2	A. Yes.
3	MR. SUAZO: No further questions.
4	HEARING OFFICER ORTH: All right. Thank
5	you.
6	Mr. Cloutier, do you have redirect?
7	MR. CLOUTIER: Just a couple, Madam Hearing
8	Officer. If we could pull up the Alexander exhibit.
9	Was it 13? Ms. Tripp, if she could have authority
10	share. All right. We'll go with this question
11	first. OK. There we go.
12	REDIRECT EXAMINATION
13	BY MR. CLOUTIER:
14	Q. There's a sentence below the phrase: Years
15	before return to activity. Can you read that
16	sentence?
17	A. The one beginning with histogram.
18	Q. Yes, sir?
19	A. Histogram of length of time inactive prior
20	to return to activity, across a sample of wells that
21	reactivated following 12 plus months of no production.
22	Q. Do you know what that sample of wells was
23	that Mr. Alexander used?
24	A. I have no idea.
25	Q. Did you hear Mr. Alexander testify that he
	Page 109

1	knew what the sample of wells was?
2	A. I did not hear that testimony.
3	Q. Thank you. Now if we could just go to the
4	statute that Mr. Hall was asking you about?
5	You see the highlighted language at the
6	top talks about the instruments of financial assurance
7	being conditioned that the well be plugged in
8	abandoned?
9	A. That is correct.
10	Q. Do you understand section 70-2-14 to require
11	any other sort of bonding besides the financial
12	assurance for plugging and abandoning a well?
13	A. No. It is just plugging bonds.
14	MR. CLOUTIER: All right. That's all my
15	questions, Madam Hearing Officer.
16	HEARING OFFICER ORTH: All right. Thank
17	you, Mr. Cloutier.
18	Commissioner Ampomah, do you have
19	questions of Mr. Ezzell.
20	COMMISSIONER AMPOMAH: Yes, I do have a few.
21	EXAMINATION
22	BY COMMISSIONER AMPOMAH:
23	Q. Mr. Ezzell, thanks so much for your
24	testimony today. So I'm Dr. Ampomah from New Mexico
25	Tech. So I do have a few questions for you. So if we
	Page 110

1	can bring up your slides, your direct slides. And
2	I'll start from slide Number 5. Yeah, right there?
3	So in here, you're talking about
4	let's put aside whether the Commission do not have
5	authority.
6	A. Right.
7	Q. I mean, the lawyers will take care of that.
8	Yeah. So in here, you describe the factors that need
9	to be considered when the Commission or the OCD is
10	more or less making a rule for a bond or financial
11	assurance. Can you tell the Commission how you will
12	quantify the cost associated with the age of the well?
13	A. The age of the well will directly affect the
14	cost to plug, and it also will directly affect the
15	ease with which plugging can occur. Because older
16	wells are more likely to suffer from corrosion and all
17	sorts of other types of damage. Until you get into
18	one and I'm not an engineer, so I don't know why
19	I'm telling this to you, because you know way better
20	than I do, but you don't know whether rods are parted,
21	you don't know whether there are holes in the casing.
22	But with older wells, that's more likely than with
23	newer ones.
24	Q. Yeah. So let's go to slide number 7 and
25	then I'll ask you, can you provide to the Commission

1	the range of age of wells, you know, the range of age
2	of wells that you will classify as a high risk?
3	A. Are you asking the age.
4	Q. Yes. Age range. Because you said newer and
5	then older. Now, when you say newer and older, what
6	is the range for the older which you were saying that
7	those could be a high risk that we should pay more
8	attention to?
9	A. I've not really given that much thought.
10	But I would say if the well was drilled before 1970,
11	then it's probably going to have a much greater chance
12	of being a high risk.
13	Q. So you can see how difficult the
14	Commission's job is, right? Because when all these
15	three factors are provided and if we have to more or
16	less quantify them and use that to come up with a
17	single number or, let's say, risk-based, you can
18	imagine how difficult that is?
19	So 1970, then you're saying that a well
20	that has probably been in operation for about 55
21	years?
22	A. Yes.
23	Q. One witness from my IPANM I believe said 40
24	years?
25	A. Like I said, it's not something that I had
	Dage 112

1	given much thought to. But I'm happy that I was that
2	close to what IPANM said.
3	Q. So let's go to slide Number 28. Yeah, so
4	slide Number 28, my question to you is, so you're
5	saying that everyone you know: If produce to avoid
6	bonding?
7	Now, your first point, you're saying
8	everyone, including state, gets less revenue over life
9	of the world?
LO	Have you done independent analysis to
L1	support this claim, or is just based on a hypothetical
L2	situation?
L3	A. I have not done any independent analysis.
L4	That is just my opinion based on my experience.
L5	Q. Based on your experience. Okay. So there
L6	has been a lot of discussions, even with regards to
L7	the marginal wells, if the Commission can consider
L8	some exceptions to the marginal wells?
L9	In your testimony, you describe how,
20	let's say, if a well is producing and the commodity
21	price is so low, you made an argument whether the well
22	is going to produce or not.
23	Now, can you quantify the impact of
24	economics, let's say, can you give some suggestions
25	with regards to how that description of the commodity

1	prices can be incorporated as an exception into the
2	marginal definition?
3	A. In general, I think that other royalty
4	owners, state, federal, fee, understand that they will
5	benefit more if production is decreased in times of
6	poor price and brought back on later.
7	I mean, that's been manifested by we
8	had a statute that is no longer I don't know if
9	it's statute or not, but we had a policy in New Mexico
10	on state trust lands that it was decided that they
11	would rather, in low price environments, they would
12	rather have the revenue later, even though it would
13	cause hardship up front.
14	A stripper well royalty rate is the
15	federal effort to continue to produce. We have
16	similar activity in New Mexico where you can apply to
17	the land commissioner to reduce your rate if your
18	wells are approaching uneconomic status.
19	So I think it is in everybody's interest
20	to get all the production you can out of every
21	wellbore, especially in times when yeah, I kind of
22	lost my train of thought.
23	Q. I think I'm good. I think your point is
24	well made. So you believe that the Commission can
25	include something in terms of economics to give OCD
	Page 114

1	the flexibility to make that determination when that
2	instance happens?
3	A. I would not disagree with that. Yeah.
4	COMMISSIONER AMPOMAH: Thank you for your
5	time. No for the questions.
6	HEARING OFFICER ORTH: Thank you.
7	Commissioner Bloom, do you have
8	questions?
9	COMMISSIONER BLOOM: I do, Madam Hearing
LO	Officer. Thank you.
L1	EXAMINATION
L2	BY COMMISSIONER BLOOM:
L3	Q. Good morning. It's still just morning here
L 4	for a little bit longer, Mr. Ezzell. Thank you for
L5	your time on the stand today?
L6	I love history and appreciated hearing
L7	from you on the development of JPAs over the decades.
L8	I heard something similar at the annual conference of
L9	the National Association of Petroleum Accountants in
20	Dallas this year, and this filled in some of the other
21	pieces. So I appreciated that.
22	I also just wanted to thank you and your
23	family for your service to the state. I know that
24	having a state legislator in the family is a sacrifice
25	of time and money.

1	I've come in front of your wife before,
2	and as you know, she is thorough and tough?
3	A. Welcome to my world.
4	Q. Mr. Ezzell, did you read the, much discussed
5	here, LFC report that was part of the applicant's
6	pre-hearing statement?
7	A. No, I did not.
8	Q. Okay. I'll read you something from it. It
9	says, quote: The Federal Environmental Protection
10	Agency estimates annual methane emissions from the
11	nation's inactive and unplugged oil and gas wells are
12	comparable to adding an additional two million
13	gas-powered cars to the road. End quote?
14	Is that methane a wasted resource?
15	A. Yes.
16	Q. We heard from the OCD, and you and Mr. Hall
17	discussed this as well, but the OCD has said that
18	60 percent of inactive wells in New Mexico leak
19	methane. Is that fugitive methane a waste?
20	A. Yes.
21	Q. Does the OCC regulate waste?
22	A. Yes.
23	Q. Does proper plugging stop methane leakage in
24	waste?
25	A. Proper plugging would stop leaks, yes.
	Page 116

1	Q. And would it stop the waste that is
2	associated with fugitive methane emissions?
3	A. Yes.
4	Q. Mr. Ezzell, the LFC study goes on to say the
5	following, quote: A 2011 study by the Groundwater
6	Protection Council, an organization whose members are
7	state groundwater regulators, found inactive and
8	unplugged wells responsible for 22 percent of oil and
9	gas-related groundwater contamination incidents in
LO	Ohio and 14 percent in Texas over a 16-year study
L1	period. Improperly plugged or unplugged wells have
L2	also been implicated in surface contamination
L3	incidents, including recently near the Texas/New
L4	Mexico border, where the wells have served as conduits
L 5	for large leaks of produced water and hydrocarbons.
L6	Unplugged or improperly plugged wells can also leak
L7	gases, including hydrogen sulfide, which is toxic and
L8	highly corrosive, and methane, which is both a potent
L9	greenhouse gas and explosive. End quote?
20	Mr. Ezzell, it's my understanding that
21	the OCC is also charged with protecting the
22	environment, water and public health. Do you agree
23	with that?
24	A. Yes.
25	Q. I just wanted to get through some of these
	Page 117

1	manting about door the OCC by a the shift of
1	questions about does the OCC have the ability to and
2	the authority to regulate here. And of course I
3	believe given issues of methane waste and threats to
4	the environment, public health and water, that we do?
5	Mr. Ezzell, I believe that your
6	rebuttal spends time looking at the relationship
7	between the OCC and the legislature. Correct?
8	A. Yes.
9	Q. When I looked at the first document filed in
10	this case, I see June of 2024. That's when the
11	applicants made their application. Does that sound
12	right to you?
13	A. Yes.
14	Q. So that was last year, about 16 months ago.
15	And during that time, from mid January to mid March of
16	this year, 2025, the state had a 60-day legislative
17	
_ ,	session, correct?
18	session, correct? A. Yes.
18	A. Yes.
18 19	A. Yes. Q. So our legislators had six months to
18 19 20	A. Yes. Q. So our legislators had six months to introduce a bill on this topic, if they'd chosen,
18 19 20 21	A. Yes. Q. So our legislators had six months to introduce a bill on this topic, if they'd chosen, correct?
18 19 20 21 22	A. Yes. Q. So our legislators had six months to introduce a bill on this topic, if they'd chosen, correct? A. Yes.
18 19 20 21 22	A. Yes. Q. So our legislators had six months to introduce a bill on this topic, if they'd chosen, correct? A. Yes. Q. So the legislature could have, for example,

1	setting any new bonding levels; is that right?
2	A. That is correct, they could have.
3	Q. The legislature did not legislate in this
4	area in 2025, did it?
5	A. No.
6	Q. The three commissioners here were designated
7	by the governor and/or her administration; in my case,
8	the commissioner of public lands. Would you agree
9	that these two duly elected officials, the governor
LO	and the commissioner of public lands can pass their
L1	administrations to pursue rulemaking?
L2	A. Yes, they can.
L3	Q. And that our duties include rulemaking on
L 4	the OCC?
L5	A. The Oil and Gas Act gives the OCD and the
L6	OCC limited authority to do rulemakings, I agree.
L7	Q. Do you also agree or have knowledge that the
L8	public has the right to petition the OCC to do
L9	rulemaking?
20	A. I don't know where that authority comes
21	from, but I agree with the public.
22	Q. Yes. That's the basis, of course, of the
23	applicants coming from the public and doing this?
24	And would you agree that they have the
25	right to do this, regardless of what the legislature
	Page 119

1	is doing?
2	A. Yeah, they have the right to do anything.
3	They're not restricted by the legislature at all.
4	Q. Yes. Thank you. You mentioned the land
5	office and the permanent fund in your surrebuttal.
6	And yeah, I agree with you, sir, that land grant
7	permanent fund moneys can't be spent directly on well
8	plugging and reclamation?
9	But my initial comments were meant to be
10	more along the lines that the land office has worked
11	for over 100 years to generate funds for its
12	beneficiaries, and that ultimately money for the
13	beneficiaries in the state. And it would be unfair
14	and unjust for the state to have to spend a large
15	percentage of that sum on cleaning up orphaned and/or
16	unplugged, inactive wells throughout the state. Does
17	that make sense?
18	A. I agree with that wholeheartedly. That's
19	why I would like to see the conservation fund used for
20	its intended purpose.
21	Q. Mr. Ezzell, are you aware of the Land
22	Office's land maintenance fund?
23	A. Generally, yeah. I know there is one. I
24	have no idea how it's funded or how it's spent.
25	Q. Yeah. So this gets kind of arcane. But the

1	land grant permanent fund, as you know, collects the
2	royalties from oil and gas for the state and it's
3	invested by the state investment council. And then
4	the legislature can spend 6 percent of the five-year
5	rolling average?
6	The land maintenance fund is money that
7	comes in from renewable resources. That includes
8	renewable energy, rights-of-ways, and oil and gas
9	lease sales. We can continue leasing land as leases
10	come back to us. And so that money goes into the
11	maintenance fund, and it's immediately distributed to
12	the beneficiaries.
13	This year, we're four months into the
14	fiscal year, and we've already earned close to half a
15	billion dollars for this fund. Do you know that the
16	State Land Office has a reclamation fund that takes
17	money from the maintenance fund to clean up messes on
18	state trust land?
19	A. That is my understanding, yes.
20	Q. The land office will continue to spend
21	beneficiary money to clean up messes made by its
22	lessees, correct?
23	A. Yes.
24	Q. Would you agree with me if I told you that
25	the land grant permanent fund is somewhere between \$34

1	billion and \$36 billion today, somewhere in that area?
2	A. Yes.
3	Q. Are you aware of the Center for Applied
4	Research's 2021 bonding financial assurances gap
5	study?
6	A. No, I am not.
7	Q. I believe applicants may have mentioned that
8	or the VERTEX study that went into it in their
9	prehearing statement?
10	But that study by the Center for Applied
11	Research said that in 2021, there was a bonding gap of
12	\$5 billion on state trust lands. So today we have
13	inflation and the higher inflation we have seen in the
14	oil patch, I think, then higher, higher than
15	certainly higher than the other inflation elsewhere.
16	I believe we are looking at a bonding
17	gap of probably closer to \$7 billion. You compare the
18	\$7 billion to \$35 billion and that would be about
19	20 percent or one-fifth of everything that the
20	permanent fund has done over the past hundred years;
21	is that right?
22	A. That's correct.
23	Q. So this is where my concerns come from with
24	the relationship to the permanent fund and the
25	liabilities that are out there. So I just wanted to

1	spend a little time on that?
2	I think just lastly, I believe you're
3	aware that the land office has instituted, right about
4	four years ago, an accountability and enforcement
5	program to get orphan wells and inactive wells P&A'd
6	on state trust land. Are you aware of that?
7	A. Yes, I am.
8	Q. I think you may have represented some
9	companies that have been involved with the land office
L O	related to some of these issues, correct?
L1	A. Not to plugging, no.
L2	Q. Unrelated to their bonds?
L 3	A. I have been involved in a case where a
L 4	couple of state leases were terminated. And the
L 5	reason for the termination being that the lessee had
L6	not posted a surface damage bond as required by the
L7	statute. The statute and the State Land Office regs
L8	say that that damage bond is supposed to be posted
L9	prior to the lessee doing anything on the lease. And
20	in the case I was in, that portion of the lease had
21	never been drilled, and the lessee had never set foot
22	on it.
23	Q. Okay. Okay. But
24	A. Yeah, I
25	Q. Yeah, sorry. Go ahead. I didn't want to
	Dage 123

1	cut you off?
2	A. Oh, no. I was through.
3	Q. Yeah. I think as you know, as well, the
4	commissioner asked us to review all 6,000 leases at
5	the time on state trust land, to see if they were
6	bonded. And we found that about on-eighth, some 800
7	wells, were not bonded. And I think as you know,
8	ultimately we only canceled less than a couple dozen.
9	And we worked with companies and gave some people a
10	little bit extra time to actually get their binding in
11	place?
12	If you don't know if you've seen any of
13	the news releases or stories in the press. But, you
14	know, we've had to work with and sometimes sue
15	operators and lessees on state trust land to get them
16	to plug what is now 750 wells P&A'd under this
17	program. Are you aware of that?
18	A. Not the number, I did not know that.
19	Q. Are you aware that we still have maybe that
20	many wells left to get cleaned up on state trust land?
21	A. I did not know that, but I do not dispute
22	it.
23	COMMISSIONER BLOOM: Mr. Ezzell, thank you
24	for your time. I don't have any further questions
25	for you.

1	HEARING OFFICER ORTH: All right. Thank
2	you, Commissioner Bloom.
3	So, Chair Chang, we are past time when
4	we usually take a lunch.
5	CHAIR CHANG: I do not have any questions
6	anyway.
7	HEARING OFFICER ORTH: You do not. All
8	right.
9	CHAIR CHANG: So there you go.
10	HEARING OFFICER ORTH: So we can excuse
11	Mr. Ezzell, it sounds like. Thank you very much,
12	Mr. Ezzell.
13	Let's come back at 1:15 from lunch.
14	(Lunch recess held from 12:11
15	to 1:15 p.m.)
16	HEARING OFFICER ORTH: Ms. Tripp, are you
17	calling the next witness?
18	MS. TRIPP: Madam Hearing Officer, I believe
19	we may need to address the surrebuttal exhibit from
20	OCD, if we need to do that. We planned to do it
21	before lunch but did not get to it.
22	HEARING OFFICER ORTH: Was that OCD exhibit
23	34, I believe, surrebuttal for Armstrong.
24	MS. TRIPP: Yes, Madam Hearing Officer. And
25	so I know that the surrebuttal has been filed in

1	response to Mr. Armstrong's testimony during
2	cross-examination yesterday.
3	Mr. Armstrong was able to speak with his
4	staff again to clarify I think there was a
5	miscommunication or misunderstanding. So it's our
6	position first that the objection the objection
7	was not made during his cross-examination, but we're
8	not opposed to withdrawing or otherwise addressing
9	the record.
10	MR. CLOUTIER: Yeah, we're not going to rely
11	on that testimony for any purpose in this rulemaking,
12	Madam Hearing Officer. And we stipulate to the
13	admission of the exhibit, if that's what OCD wants to
14	do. And Mr. Tremaine and I visited, but if there's
15	some other suggestion that they have, I'm happy to
16	listen to it.
17	MR. TREMAINE: I really appreciate the
18	meaning of the minds on this from Ms. Tripp and
19	Mr. Cloutier.
20	I do have to quibble because I did
21	object to the foundation of his statement, but it was
22	to Commissioner Ampomah. So just for clarity in the
23	record, we're not fighting over that or the result.
24	I don't think it matters whether the
25	exhibit comes in. What I want for the Commission is
	Page 126

if they have questions about OCD's instructions
related to production reporting, that they're able to
take notice of OCD's instructions, which are on the
website and referenced in that e-mail.
So if it's beneficial to the Commission,
we'll admit it. No need to belabor the point with
the stipulation.
HEARING OFFICER ORTH: All righty. I mean
it does seem like the kind of thing the Commission
could take notice of and so it would not usually be
objectionable as an exhibit either, just for
convenience sake.
Are there objections to OCD 34? No?
All right. Let's admit it. It'll just make it more
convenient, I think, for the Commission to refer to
it.
MR. TREMAINE: Thank you.
(Admitted: OCD Exhibit 34.)
HEARING OFFICER ORTH: Mr. Cloutier, are you
going to call your next witness?
MS. TRIPP: Madam Hearing Officer, IPANM
calls Representative Mark Murphy to the stand.
HEARING OFFICER ORTH: All right, thank you.
Representative, would you please spell your first and
Representative, would you prease speri your rirbe and

1	THE WITNESS: Yes, Madam Commissioner. My
2	name is Mark, M-A-R-K, Murphy, M-U-R-P-H-Y. I'm
3	president of Strata Production Company and also
4	providing comments on behalf of IPANM.
5	HEARING OFFICER ORTH: Thank you. Do you
6	swear or affirm to tell the truth?
7	THE WITNESS: I did.
8	HEARING OFFICER ORTH: Thank you.
9	Go ahead, Ms. Tripp.
10	MARK MURPHY,
11	having first been duly sworn, testified as follows:
12	DIRECT EXAMINATION
13	BY MS. TRIPP:
14	Q. Representative Murphy, if you could just
15	introduce yourself to the Commission, tell us about
16	your education and experience?
17	A. Sure. I served in a number of capacities,
18	and with respect currently, I'm president of Strata
19	Production Company, which was formed in 1988 by my
20	former father-in-law and business partner, Frank
21	Morgan, who has since passed.
22	It began with a small volume of or a
23	small number of low-volume producing wells, also known
24	as stripper wells. At the time we had eight
25	employees. They had eight employees. I purchased the

1	majority of the company in 1991, and we're now at 23
2	employees.
3	We made 11 field discoveries. That
4	early stripper production basically allowed us to
5	begin an exploration and leasing effort that led to
6	those Delaware, primarily Delaware Formation
7	discoveries, but also Bone Spring, Wolfcamp and deep
8	oil and gas.
9	We currently are operating some 15
10	well around 20,000 acres, 15,000, which is the main
11	project in Eddy County. Strata drilled the first
12	lateral well, long-reach lateral in 1990. We drilled
13	the first permitted horizontal well in the state in
14	2001.
15	We currently operate 72 wells. At the
16	time of this, we're actually up to 75 now. We've got
17	an active drilling program going. And so we're
18	pleased to report that that's happening.
19	Experience in New Mexico I think is the
20	next slide perhaps. It says I'm fourth generation in
21	the oil and gas industry. I am a fourth generation
22	producer, second generation for New Mexico.
23	Grandfather, great grandfather were very
24	active in the early east Texas boom and the
25	discoveries in Arkansas, northern Louisiana, and so
	discoveries in Arkansas, northern hourstana, and so

1 forth. During the 1920s my father remembers an 2 early -- well, actually early '30s, very vividly 3 staying on top of the Gardner Denver store in Kilgore, Texas, because his uncle ran that store. 4 5 And so I have 40 years of experience in 6 operations, geoscience, management. We've actively acquired and divested properties. I've served as a 8 board member and past officer and I'm a current board 9 member of IPANM and past officer, president of IPANM; past treasurer and board of directors of New Mexico 10 11 Oil and Gas Association; industry advisor to Mexico 12 Tech Petroleum Recovery Research Center; served as 13 project manager for numerous joint national laboratory 14 university of private company partnerships. 15 I've also served as an advisor to the 16 United States Department of Energy, secretary of

I've also served as an advisor to the United States Department of Energy, secretary of energy under the Clinton administration, that was Hazel O'Leary; informally under the George H.W. Bush administration, with Michael T. Halbouty and later Admiral Watkins. And then lastly, under the Clinton administration, with Hazel O'Leary. I've also served as an advisor to the United States Department of Interior, Secretary of Interior Manuel Lujan, during the Bush administration.

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I've led Strata for the past 34 years

1	and I've testified numerous times in front of both the
2	U.S. House and Senate energy committees, primarily.
3	I think now maybe to concerns.
4	Q. Well, I also wanted to you mentioned how
5	many wells that Strata is operating. Does Strata also
6	plug wells?
7	A. We do plug wells. According to numbers that
8	I've looked at, we plugged 38 wells.
9	Q. And so have you had a chance to review the
LO	proposed rules in this proceeding?
L1	A. I have.
L2	Q. Okay. And do you have any concerns with
L3	those?
L 4	A. I have quite a few concerns with them. The
L5	proposed rule really ignores that 95 percent of the
L6	wells are plugged by industry. The other 5 percent
L7	are paid for and essentially plugged by industry. So
L8	we plug 100 percent of the wells. We may pay private
L9	contractors 100 percent or 95 percent, but we pay the
20	state the other 5 percent, and then they pay
21	contractors.
22	So this notion that we're not plugging
23	the wells, we're not cleaning up our messes, is simply
24	incorrect. It's just not factually correct, and it
25	shouldn't continue to be stated in these proceedings,

1 because it's not right. 3. 2 And so, you know, when we contribute to the conservation fund, that fund kicks off some 100-3 to \$130 million a year. Between the Senate and the 4 5 House process during the legislative session, the OCD 6 makes a budget request, and that's typically somewhere in the \$20 to \$25 million range. That's all they can 8 spend. And the reason is mainly because of 9 procurement issues and process issues. I break this into a three-legged stool. 10 11 We've got payment to plug the wells. That's not a 12 problem. You've got hundreds of millions of dollars 13 coming in; over \$630 million that's been swept in the 14 last five years into the general fund. So payment is 15 not the problem. Procurement's the problem and 16 process is the problem. 17 This notion -- somebody said this morning, and I take real issue with it, that this is 18 19 not grade school and 95 percent isn't a passing grade. 20 I would say this. We're not asking for 2.1 95 percent. We plug 100 percent. And so my question to the WELC people and to this Commission and so forth 22 is, how many times does industry have to pay for this? 23 2.4 We post our individual well bonds, and then we plug our wells. And for those in the 25 Page 132

1	industry, either through misfortune or bad actors or
2	bad intentions or whatever else, leave a portion of
3	wells behind.
4	And those of us that are good operators,
5	we pay for those, too. Although it's really paid
6	through the oil coming from those wells. Every well,
7	in essence, is paying for some amount of its own
8	plugging. But as an industry, we pay for it all. So
9	I really would like to make that point.
10	The single-well bonding, \$150,000, will
11	not solve this problem because it's not a funding
12	problem. And it also, I think, shifts the analysis
13	from a traditional analysis of, okay, what is the
14	proper bonding amount, whether you do it by individual
15	wells or you do it by tiers of wells or whatever, to
16	an economic analysis?
17	And it's an arbitrary economic analysis.
18	They basically are proposing, I believe, 750 BOE per
19	year and 180 days as being outside the realm of
20	marginal.
21	In my experience, I can show you
22	2,000-foot wells that will not make money at 750. And
23	I can show you 7,000-foot wells right now in my
24	portfolio that do. And so when you shift this
25	analysis over to where the OCD and the OCC is now

1 supposed to make this risk assessment, it's really 2 arbitrary. It's very, very arbitrary. Because at the end of the day, it's really, as Mr. Ezzell commented 3 before, that the standard in the industry has always 4 5 been paying quantities and the economics of the 6 operator. And they make that decision. 7 And if that is taken over by an outside 8 party, I can quarantee you there will be waste. And I 9 also guarantee you there will be takings. Because you'll prematurely force wells to be plugged, which 10 11 will hurt the state beneficiaries and also hurt the 12 owners of those wells. So these arbitrary limits make 13 no sense to me. The reality is, OCD is ill-equipped to 14 15 plug wells. They've demonstrated that. And that's 16 not necessarily through their own fault. It's because 17 of the procurement procedures in some cases and what I call process. The ability -- in some cases they have 18 19 it -- in my opinion, have not expeditiously used the 20 tools they've had. In other cases, they haven't used the tools at all. They've tried to collect a few 2.1 22 bonds. We're told it costs more than it's worth. 23 But they haven't, to my experience or 2.4 knowledge, really utilized the court systems to the

Page 134

degree that they have to pursue these bad operators.

25

1	Now there's some testimony this morning
2	on who are the bad actors and how many are there and
3	who are they. Well, as a state legislator, I have the
4	benefit of hearing a lot of information from the OCD.
5	And from last week's testimony, during the water and
6	natural resources committee, we were told, and we've
7	been told many times, we know who, OCD knows who are
8	the bad actors.
9	Ten companies are causing 80 to 90 of
10	the problem. I've heard it time and time again. And
11	so go after those ten. You've got legal avenues. If
12	you need additional powers from the legislature, I can
13	tell you the industry would support those, as long as
14	they're reasonable and constrained so you don't begin
15	getting into taking private property rights.
16	But I believe that everybody wants to
17	solve this problem. I believe the regulators want to
18	solve this problem, but they're approaching it from a
19	payment standpoint and not from a process of
20	procurement standpoint.
21	And at the end of the day, bonds don't
22	plug wells, operators do. And that's what we have to
23	remember, is that we shouldn't throw the baby out with
24	the bath water. And that is really critical.
25	I have a couple other points, and one is

1	the TA limits. Now, early in my career I've been
2	involved in numerous secondary and tertiary well,
3	secondary recovery projects primarily, and also have
4	looked at EOR projects, tertiary primarily CO2
5	projects.
6	These are very, very complicated and
7	long-term projects to put together. And for those of
8	you that don't understand the process, let me give you
9	a quick explanation. Somebody goes in and discovers a
10	field. Well, most likely, they're not going to own
11	that entire field. There's going to be multiple
12	leases. There's going to be fee leases, federal
13	leases, state leases. The field is developed and it
14	goes through its primary production phase.
15	Not all that happens at the same time.
16	In other words, not all those wells are coming online
17	and producing the same volumes and the same in
18	complete sync. So towards the end, towards the point
19	where the field is becoming marginally economic across
20	the board, the negotiations are usually started
21	amongst the operators and the owners of that field to
22	see if there's anything else that can be done.
23	Now, let's keep in mind you know, I
24	heard keep in mind what the New Mexico oil reservoirs
25	generally look like. Very few are water driven.

There's some exceptions, but they're solution gas
drive, and they lend themselves very well to pressure
projects, such as waterflooding and CO2 flooding. And
when the well reaches that end of its primary life, it
still has somewhere between -- depending upon the
nature of the reservoir, somewhere between probably 60
and 80 percent of the original oil in place is still
there.

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And if we don't go after that oil, we've wasted it. And this is the problem with the policy, is that the best way to clean up an old oil field is to make it a new oil field. And if you go from primary recovery to secondary recovery, all of that infrastructure is replaced, the production comes back up to state. Many times secondary recovery projects perform as well as the primary production. And you can sometimes get one to two times the amount of oil you got on primary.

So the problem is, and this relates to the TA portion of it, the eight-year hard TA. I have been involved in the formation of secondary recovery units that took in excess of ten years. My father started them, my sister and I and others picked them up, and some of them went on 12 or 15 years. And it is a very laborious and difficult process because you

1	have to get a lot of people together, you got to form
2	an operating committee, there's always discussions
3	about who is going to operate, what's the formula
4	going to be for unitizations. You know, all of these
5	things. And that those meetings occur many times over
б	years and over multiple management changes.
7	So the idea of a hard deadline to a TA
8	is I think really going to be policy-wise very, very
9	bad for the state. And let me give you some
10	perspective on this.
11	I was born in 1959. My father and
12	family came to Artesia, New Mexico, in 1960s. He
13	implemented the first commercial water flood project
14	in New Mexico. I implemented the first horizontal
15	drilling project in New Mexico. The only reason I'm
16	here is because he was here. And he came in and he
17	formed these secondary recovery projects that added
18	hundreds of millions of dollars and billions of
19	dollars to the state.
20	
21	The Grayburg Jackson field, for example,
22	between Artesia and Loco Hills and Maljamar is one
23	that he was responsible for flooding on behalf of
24	Newmont Mining Corporation, a company we don't even
25	hear about around here.

Τ	So that technology basically allowed a
2	second life to that field, to all those fields,
3	decades and decades of life, and hundreds and hundreds
4	of millions of dollars to the state.
5	Now, many of those fields have since
6	declined. They are probably very good tertiary
7	candidates, CO2 candidates. We have CO2 sources, and
8	yet there's no real policy push to try to get that.
9	Now, one of the reasons is that we've
10	seen the dominance of capital flow to the shale
11	revolution since about 2015. There was a slide that
12	was put up, and maybe we can address it later, on this
13	eight-year life, and I can tell you that once you read
14	the disclaimers at the bottom, you need to discount
15	that slide. But let me give you another point.
16	If that slide was taken at a point in
17	time, which it has to be, and then looked back, you
18	would not see any secondary recoveries or tertiary
19	recovery projects in this period. If that point, zero
20	was taken in, I don't know, either 1965, '75, or '85,
21	you would see a huge number in that 10- and 12-,
22	15-year period.
23	So, from a first glance, I haven't
24	talked to the analyst about this, but from my first
25	glance, I don't believe this is telling you, the
	Page 139

1 policymakers, and deciders what they're telling you 2 it's telling you. Right? 3 And so, this is what's going to happen, in my opinion, from 50 years of prospective in the oil 4 5 and gas industry. We have gone through now -- we are now going through a major shale boom. These wells are 6 going to decline, and they are going to recover less 8 crude in place than previous reservoirs because 9 they're naturally tight reservoirs. However, that leaves us a huge resource to go after, right? 10 11 And there's only the beginnings of a 12 discussion about how to do that, because this is going 13 to be -- it's a technological challenge that the 14 industry has not ever met before. 15 When secondary recovery was originally 16 initiated, it was pretty well understood. There were 17 basically two types of patterns, line drive and five spot. And there's other alternatives to that, but 18 19 those were the typical ones utilized in New Mexico. 20 So, a lot of the question now is going 2.1 to become, how do we basically utilize horizontal wells for enhanced recovery, and what do we do with 22 23 this? And if we don't preserve those well bores in 24 that production, we're going to leave -- there's even going to be a bigger waste. So, there's the 25

1 challenge, but there's also the opportunity. 2 Now, we have some 27,000 stripper wells, and we've heard testimony that they don't really mean 3 much, right? That they don't contribute much here, 4 5 they don't contribute much there, we're maybe talking 6 about 8 million, 10 million. The problem with the analysis is that it only considers taxes, right, 8 production taxes, a fraction of the economic value 9 that these wells contribute to the society. And the other part, which is typically 10 11 two to three times that much, is the royalties. And 12 yet it still doesn't -- it also doesn't take into 13 account the 3,000 jobs it supports, the fact that those payments go to local vendors. The economic 14 15 impact of these wells and the companies that operate 16 them is huge to this state. So, don't be misled by 17 the LFC report that says this is nothing. 18 And speaking of the LFC report, the LFC report is one that I've studied in some detail. And 19 20 the reason I have is because it is so inherently flawed. And I will start off by telling you about my 2.1 22 experience with the LFC report. 23 In late May, I was approached by members of the New Mexico Oil and Gas Association and IPANM as 2.4 a member of the state legislature. As has been 25

1	mentioned here, I represent District 59, Roswell,
2	Chaves County. And they had heard a rumor, that LFC
3	had developed a report and that the report calls for
4	massively increased bonding. And they had arranged
5	for a meeting with director Sallee of the LFC. And
6	the director gave them very limited information, only
7	said that it was something that they were looking at,
8	but it mainly had to do with procurement and bonding
9	processes.
10	They weren't satisfied with that, so
11	they came to me and asked me to arrange a meeting with
12	him. And so I called him. He came over to my office
13	on June 3rd. And I'll read you my notes from that
14	meeting.
15	No member requested an internal LFC
16	group looking at the looking for this. It was an
17	internal LFC group that was concerned about the inflow
18	of federal plugging and abandonment dollars. The
19	federal plugging and abandonment dollars were the
20	dollars that were allocated either through the
21	Investment Recovery Act or the Inflation Reduction
22	Act. I don't care which one, but it's been mentioned
23	here.
24	He told me that it was some \$90 million,
25	which is consistent with my understanding, and that it

1	was allocated, I believe what he told me, over a
2	three-year period.
3	But they were getting concerned because
4	they couldn't meet the standards. They can't meet the
5	standards and that the money might get cut off. And
6	so that was the purpose the standards of the
7	federal grants, right? That was the purpose of the
8	study, as it was stated to me.
9	And I said, "Director Sallee," I said,
10	"this seems to me to be a procurement issue. I mean,
11	if you're talking about not being able to meet these
12	standards, it's because you're not plugging wells fast
13	enough or you're not plugging them right."
14	And he goes, "Well, there's a number of
15	issues."
16	And so I took it to mean that they
17	weren't plugging them fast enough. And the reason I
18	took that is I also had conversations in D.C. where
19	people were beginning to voice that perhaps the
20	program wasn't as robust as it should be, could it be
21	expanded.
22	I then said, "Well, this doesn't really
23	add up from what I've heard on the street, because
24	I've heard about all this increased bonding."
25	And he said, "Well, there is a portion
	Page 143

1	of the report that deals with that. We're pretty
2	concerned about one-barrel-a-day wells."
3	And I said, "Why are you concerned about
4	one-barrel-a-day wells? What's the threshold there?"
5	He goes, "Well, there's just a lot of
6	one-barrel-a-day wells out there, and we're concerned
7	about them."
8	And I said, "Well, let's talk about
9	that."
10	And he said, "I'm sorry, I can't talk to
11	you about it anymore until the LFC reviews our study
12	and approves our findings."
13	And so I got no more information.
14	Now, I had known a little bit about the
15	money that was available to the state; I believe it
16	was back in either I want to say 2022, but it could
17	have been as early as 2021, whenever those acts were
18	passed and it was clear that there was money in there
19	for the state to plug wells.
20	And when we heard about that, it was,
21	okay, if there's really this big, large volume of
22	wells out there that need to be plugged, why aren't
23	they getting plugged? Well, the OCD can't seem to
24	plug more than about 50 of them a year. There's been
25	some times that they could, but that's generally the

1 number. 2 And so I thought of it as an incredible business opportunity. Because if the OCD is saying 3 that there's all these wells need to be plugged, most 4 5 of which are federal, I think this body understands 6 that, there's very few state that the state is going to be responsible for, and there's federal dollars to 8 do it -- I know from experience that we have trouble 9 even scheduling P&A operations. There is, you know, greatly limited --10 11 there's not very many contractors that do this. 12 ones that do it for the state are almost all in the 13 northwest. We have principally two in the southeast that will do this. 14 15 And so me and several of my company 16 people contacted -- and I don't recall who it was. Ιt 17 was dealing with the OCD plugging issue. But there was a gentleman there and he basically explained. 18 19 I said, "We understand that there's 20 going to be all this money coming in to plug all these 2.1 wells. How are you going to deal with that?" 22 And he said, "Well, we're still evaluating it. But we plan to just give these wells 23 24 out in groups of small numbers, five, ten, 25 at a time," which is a real problem if you're if you're 25

1 trying to build a company off of plugging a lot of 2 wells. Right? 3 And so one of the things that we looked at was standing up a plugging company, and started 4 5 designing very high tech, self-contained rigs that 6 would do this quickly, cheaply and effectively. 7 But when it became clear that the procurement issues were not going to change, that we 8 9 might or might not -- if we got a contract, it's going to be very small. And that's fine. But at least if 10 11 you have the chance at a big contract, you have a 12 chance. And just decided that it -- that, combined with the fact of how they were being bid out. 13 In my business, we have what's called an 14 15 authority for expenditure, AFE. It's just basically a 16 budget. It basically says we're going to spend X, Y 17 and Z going through these wells, you know, so much for drilling, so much for this. So it's a line item. 18 19 For example, the top line item is 20 usually the most expensive and it would probably be a pulling unit or plugging rig, right? And there will 21 22 be a price for that. And then we'd have another one 23 that would say cement and rental tools and all the 24 various categories of equipment, materials, supervision, all the things that we need. 25

1	Well, what the procurement officer
2	explained to us is that they would basically pick and
3	choose. So you might get the rig on one well and the
4	trailer on the other and the lights and the porta
5	potty on the other. But you weren't getting a turnkey
6	operation to turn even that one well into a plugged
7	well, much less 100, when they're stating that there's
8	thousands to be plugged.
9	So there's a procurement issue here.
LO	And I think industry would love to see that solved.
L1	Now, the role of the independent
L2	operator. Now, it's been mentioned that 60 percent of
L3	the production in 2024 was by eight companies. Okay?
L4	I would venture that seven, and possibly all eight of
L5	those companies were not New Mexico producers 15 years
L6	ago.
L7	XTO re-entered the basin when we sold
L8	them our NAS project. Chevron, Exxon, Oxy, all of the
L9	major companies left New Mexico in the late 1980s and
20	early 1990s. They returned through acquisition in the
21	shale boom. So when people sit here and say, well, we
22	really don't need independents because we have eight
23	companies are producing 60 percent of the production.
24	Well, guess what? Those eight probably wouldn't have

been here without the independent.

25

1	I've talked about what our company does.
2	We also have been very involved, and I suspect we can
3	get into this when we talk about some of the
4	individual wells that my company operates, but not
5	only have we been very involved in exploration and new
6	plays, as have other witnesses in front of you.
7	You heard from my friend, Jeff Harvard.
8	His dad, Lee Harvard, was a well-known exploration
9	geologist and made numerous discoveries. Jeff is now
10	second generation. And while he has operations, as I
11	do, in New Mexico, I don't think either one of us
12	anticipate that we'll have very many more.
13	You heard from the Hannigans, Michael
14	Hannigan, he's a second generation. His father was
15	very involved, and also his brother Robert and son
16	Rob.
17	And so you're seeing an exodus of
18	companies like mine, and I think from a policy
19	standpoint, you really need to ask, not only what does
20	the impact have today, but what will impact will it
21	have five years from now, ten years from now.
22	We've also been, as I've described,
23	really interested in the new technology that has
24	implemented horizontal drawing. And one very
25	underutilized one and one I'm very familiar with

Τ	because of my work at New Mexico Tech, is CO2. But
2	some of that work needs to be done in terms of how do
3	we utilize these resources to maximize production and
4	prevent waste, and now a new type of geometry, if you
5	will, with respect to wells.
6	The other thing that we do, and I think
7	this is critical for people to understand, is during
8	the down times and the exits of the majors, we
9	maintain the infrastructure. Now, the pipes may not
10	be as full as they are during boom times, but they
11	still have crude oil and natural gas running through
12	them, and they're being maintained. The electrical
13	lines, the road systems, but also the company
14	infrastructure.
15	It's not Chevron that's paying Baker
16	Hughes to log their wells at low prices. It's not
17	Exxon that's paying Halliburton. Those shops and
17 18	Exxon that's paying Halliburton. Those shops and those offices and those yards, as we call them in many
18	those offices and those yards, as we call them in many
18 19	those offices and those yards, as we call them in many cases in the oil field, are there because the
18 19 20	those offices and those yards, as we call them in many cases in the oil field, are there because the independents are still using them. And then when
18 19 20 21	those offices and those yards, as we call them in many cases in the oil field, are there because the independents are still using them. And then when things ramp back up, those yards typically ramp back
18 19 20 21 22	those offices and those yards, as we call them in many cases in the oil field, are there because the independents are still using them. And then when things ramp back up, those yards typically ramp back up. But we preserve them, and that's critically

1	a little more difficult than that.
2	Q. Representative Murphy, while we're speaking
3	about independent operators, what is it about the
4	proposed rules and how do they disproportionately
5	impact independents or smaller operators when it comes
6	to financial assurance burdens?
7	A. Well, I think that the entry into the
8	business, any time that you create obstacles of entry
9	into a business through regulation, it's difficult;
10	it's going to discourage business, right?
11	And so if you have a relatively new
12	operating company with not a lot of history coming in,
13	it's going to be very difficult for them to get surety
14	bonds.
15	Now, my company is very well
16	established. We have 40-year relationships. So, you
17	know, it's not necessarily going to be my company
18	that's going to be impacted, but it sure could have
19	been. And in the early days, it would have.
20	And the main thing is, is that I think
21	it ties up a lot of unnecessary capital that could
22	better be utilized for either redevelopment of the
23	field, a new exploration idea, or something else.
24	I think that these I think what's
25	going to happen is from my experience, the security
	Page 150

1	market is rapidly exiting the financial assurances
2	realm, and all natural resources, but particularly in
3	oil and gas. The bonds are getting much tougher to
4	get. They're getting more expensive. They're getting
5	more restrictive.
6	And so the small operator, in many
7	cases, is either going to have to pay a much higher
8	rate, or if they can even get a bond, or they're going
9	to have to put up cash. And in my experience, that's
10	generally what has to happen. Or letter of credit,
11	which is the same thing.
12	Q. Thank you. And I think you hit on it
13	earlier, but if you could expand on the reclamation
14	fund and the conservation tax and how those two things
15	work together.
16	A. Sure. You know, it's been well described
17	about how the conservation tax is collected and then a
18	forcing us into a reclamation fund. And the
19	reclamation fund, stated here, is actually is 60
20	is as stated 66 million.
21	Last week at Water and Natural
22	Resources, we were told it's 76 million. So in the
23	last few months, it's gone up almost 20 percent. So
24	it's grown \$10 million in just a matter of months.
25	Senator Pat Woods made a really

1	interesting statement. He sits on Senate finance
2	during last week's committee meeting, and he said, you
3	know, "We only send to the OCD what they can spend."
4	And that's been my experience, too. I don't sit on
5	finance, but that's simply what I've seen as a
6	legislator.
7	And their request is typically as a
8	matter and last week, OC requested said their
9	request was going to be for another \$21 million, the
10	same as the year before, about the same as the year
11	before.
12	That doesn't tell me that they're going
13	to plug any more wells, and the fund has grown. And
14	so I think there's some real attention that ought to
15	be given there as to why that's occurring. Why send
16	more money to an agency that can't spend what they
17	have? So let's collectively figure out how to fix
18	that.
19	Over about 80 to 90 percent of that
20	fund is swept into the general fund because the
21	legislature can't see it effectively utilized. Since
22	2019 about just shy of \$400 million has been
23	collected. The numbers I have seen is that has
24	been collected and swept. Excuse me. The numbers I
25	typically see on any given year average reach between

1 100- and \$137 million that the industry pays on this 2 tax, and the OCD spends about 20. 3 So when there's testimony to the fact that these are taxpayer dollars, they're not. The oil 4 5 and gas industry has paid these in for a specific purpose, and they are not being utilized for that 6 purpose. And I see no reason to raise more money for 8 an agency that can't spend what they've got. 9 Now, what I would do and what I'm 10 working on currently is making sure that that's 11 protected better than it has been in the past. And 12 just as I -- along with -- just as there was 13 bipartisan legislation introduced last session regarding this issue, there's going to be bipartisan 14 15 legislation, assuming it makes the governor's call 16 this session, on this issue. And it's going to have 17 protection mechanisms in there that will make it much more difficult for that to happen and for that fund to 18 build as it was intended. 19 20 And the last bullet point I think is one that was raised, and that is that we would see -- I 2.1 22 think in -- we calculate in ten years it'll be a 23 billion dollars. I think it'll be a billion and seven probably, but that's my personal opinion. 2.4 25 Q. Have you had a chance to look at any of the

1	orphaned wells statistics or the abandoned wells
2	information that's presented in this rulemaking? Do
3	you have any opinions?
4	A. I have. And I understand there's about 350
5	orphaned wells that need to be plugged. I think
6	there's some 1,450, something that totals up to 1,350
7	perhaps, totals up to 1,700 that are federal wells.
8	Now, those federal wells are, of course,
9	being plugged with federal dollars, so they don't
10	impact the state dollars. They're given that's
11	part of the grant money and other money that routinely
12	comes to the state and has for decades from the
13	federal government, who contracts with the state to
14	plug those federal wells.
15	So there's a relatively small number. I
16	know it was mentioned today about Cano, and it'll
17	probably be discussed some more. But my recollection
18	of this, and it's totally a recollection, is of those
19	299 wells or so that Cano operated, only a very small
20	fraction were state and fee wells. The vast majority
21	of those were federal wells. So once again, they're
22	not going to fall on the state taxpayer.
23	So at 150,000 we need about 52 million
24	to plug those 349. I think I rounded to 350, excuse
25	
ر ک	me. And we currently have 75 in the fund with a

1	hundred plus coming in every year.
2	MS. TRIPP: Thank you. And that concludes
3	Mr. Murphy's direct testimony. We do have some
4	points to raise on surrebuttal, Mr. Murphy I'm
5	sorry, Representative Murphy.
6	HEARING OFFICER ORTH: Thank you.
7	BY MS. TRIPP:
8	Q. And so Exhibit 82 of the applicant's,
9	Mr. Adam Peltz, he explained in response to your
10	testimony, this is at page 2, lines 5 through 21, that
11	any number of steps can be taken to avoid increased
12	bonding for an operator. And he provided examples
13	like plugging idle wells, or simply producing more
14	than 180 days, or reducing an operator's populations
15	of idle and marginal wells to below the 15 percent
16	threshold.
17	Do you see any problems with these three
18	recommended approaches and the effect of the proposed
19	rules on operators?
20	A. I do. And let me comment. I've read
21	Mr. Peltz's testimony, and I noted that he really
22	focused on about the last four or five years that he's
23	been looking at this issue.
24	Now, I've always been told it takes
25	about 10,000 hours to master anything; that's about

Т	ten years of work. So I'm going to forgive him
2	because he only has about half of that work in.
3	I've got about four times that amount of
4	that work in. And so I'll tell you, the first one has
5	to do the secondary recovery projects where you're
6	plugging idle wells. I think I went through that
7	example on TA status. And my recommendation there
8	would be that the OCD keep its existing TA status of
9	five years, that you allow at least another TA status.
10	Because I can tell you, it's going to take ten years,
11	and you probably need some discretion beyond that.
12	So this eight-year hard number is very
13	problematic in my opinion. It's going to take a long
14	time to get not only a lot of these projects
15	developed, but also unitized and up and running.
16	And so let's just call that effect on
17	secondary and tertiary recovery projects. Reduced
18	populations of idle and marginal wells to below the
19	15 percent threshold. Well, you can't always produce
20	a well in 180 days. And the reason being is that
21	these wells see I started my career as a
22	roustabout. I was hoeing weeds and working the
23	shovel. The next promotion up there is a relief
24	pumper. And after that you go to the pumper.
25	And so as a relief pumper, one of the

1	things that you've learned is that every well almost
2	has its own personality. You can have a well right
3	here and if you produce it three hours a day, it'll
4	make the most production. You have a well right next
5	to it and you can shut that well in for five days and
6	produce it for two days. And that's the way it makes
7	the most production.
8	Now, people will say, "That doesn't make
9	any sense to me. I mean, these wells are in the same
10	field and they're close together and everything else."
11	Well, that's because everybody thinks this is a big
12	pool of oil, and it's not.
13	There's the thing called heterogeneity
14	in the rock. And that means that different areas of
15	the rock react differently and the fluids in them
16	react differently. Some maybe more fractured, some
17	may be more naturally permeable. So that's the answer
18	to that, is that's another hard deadline that, from a
19	practical standpoint, makes no sense.
20	I could shut a gas well in for 200 days
21	and make more gas in a month than I would if I
22	produced it every day. So that's just the reality of
23	the world that we live in.
24	Let's see here. And the last one,
25	reduce populations below the 15 percent threshold.

1	Well, I think the only way to do that is to either
2	plug or divest. And once again, if you plug
3	prematurely, you're wasting. And divesting of a
4	single, low-volume well is probably not practical.
5	And then once again, I think they tied back to a
6	15 percent threshold, which is, in my opinion, like
7	the two-barrel a day, as arbitrary as you can get.
8	Let's say you have a company that has a
9	number of high volume wells and all of a sudden they
10	hit this threshold and they've got to put up this bond
11	for every well. That makes no sense to me. So these
12	are arbitrary, and that's a problem.
13	And I think the biggest problem that
14	independent operators, and I suspect all operators in
15	the state, have is regulatory certainty. And we've
16	seen none of that in this state in a long, long time.
17	And that's why you're seeing the and that's why
18	you're seeing some of the reaction to this proposal.
19	Q. So Mr. Peltz, at pages 15 to 16, he also
20	referenced House Bill 133 as a multi-stakeholder
21	process in the fall of 2023 and raised in the 2024
22	legislative session. Were you familiar with that
23	effort?
24	A. I was very familiar with that effort. I
25	wasn't directly involved in negotiations, but as one

1	of the gray hairs in the room, I was consulted a lot
2	from IPANM and NMOGA's position about what sort of
3	things might make sense.
4	And, you know, some of the factors
5	that well, some were discussed this morning. But
6	let me just characterize that as, those negotiations
7	were probably some of the most frustrating I've ever
8	seen in either policy, regulatory or business because
9	the OCD and the other parties would consistently move
10	the goal post.
11	Come in, we'd explain something, and we
12	would say, okay, all right, well, how about this, this
13	might work for these operators, let's try this. We'd
14	put that forward.
15	Okay, we'll consider it. And then the
16	next week, the next two weeks, wherever the next
17	meeting came up, not only had they rejected our
18	proposal, they'd moved their proposal even further as
19	being more punitive.
20	And sometimes after a while of that, you
21	get really frustrated and say, what's the point,
22	right? What's the point?
23	And I'll tell you the other time that it
24	happened, and this is probably what will explain a
25	lot, is during the methane. Industry showed up to the

1	methane rule, negotiated in good faith, had negotiated
2	a number of exemptions. And let me tell you, let me
3	start with this. We were told that the methane rule
4	was designed to only target the biggest emitters, we
5	got to take care of the big problems first. We're not
6	worried about the little guys. We want to take care
7	of this. We want to do that.
8	And so we came up with a series, both on
9	an operator-based basis and a production-based basis,
LO	that we provide some exceptions, be able to provide a
L1	little more time to comply, to do all of these things.
L2	The majority of those were accepted and
L3	in the draft until the final draft. The environmental
L4	community went to the OCD, convinced them that they
L5	shouldn't have the exceptions, and they were deleted.
L6	Now, that is not good faith negotiation.
L7	That is not fair rulemaking. That is not the
L8	development of good policy. And when I talk about
L9	policy, I have some experience there at the national
20	level and some at the state level, too. And you don't
21	take and author a report against an industry without
22	ever consulting them.
23	When I talked to Mr. Sallee and asked
24	for input in or some questions into this report and
25	was told they couldn't talk about because the findings

1	weren't quite finished, what, we know from Mr. Peltz's
2	testimony, he was in the LFC in April working on this
3	report.
4	So you have no industry input to this
5	report and you've got the environmental community
6	basically writing it. Wild Earth Guardians was
7	allowed in there, from what I've been told. I know
8	for a fact. Mr. Peltz swear to it in his own
9	testimony. In April he made presentations and began
10	working on this report. No industry input.
11	Now, you cannot take a report like this,
12	in my opinion, and create good policy.
13	Q. Thank you, Representative Murphy. I just
14	have one more question, and this is in response to
15	Mr. Purvis as Exhibit 74, page 51, lines 5 through
16	page 53, line 6.
17	And he referred to your testimony
18	regarding the effects of these proposed rules on small
19	operators and the state to be a common trope. And he
20	used Exhibit 79 which reflected that 90 percent or
21	something of production produced by 10 percent of the
22	top operators. Do you have any response to that?
23	A. Somewhat. I guess what I would say is that
24	you don't get that 97 percent without the small
25	operator starting to play, or, you know, whatever it

may be, whether it's exploration, the new technology. 1 2 And I think that's part of the problem, is that many of the young staff that are involved in 3 the development of not only the report I just 4 mentioned, but also in the discussions regarding this policy, have never seen a downtime. They've only 6 known the booms. 8 If you have primarily been involved in 9 analysis and worked on this since 2015, you've never known what it looked like in 1986 or '87 or the early 10 11 '90s or any of the downtime. And so it's really easy 12 to sit here and say, "Well, geez, you know, we got to 13 pin these few small" -- "big operators. Let's toss everybody aside." Well, what happens when they leave? 14 15 You'll have no industry left. 16 And then finally, he's talked about --17 talking about production. And I think at one point peaking and so forth. And I know that it's difficult 18 19 for people to sometimes come up with empirical data. 20 But I can tell from Mr. Peltz's testimony and other 21 testimonies that they really only need to look at one place to understand how this industry works and to get 22 a really good historical perspective on it. 23 24 A good friend of mine, Pulitzer winning prize author, Dan Yergin, has written a series of 25 Page 162

1	books. The first one is called "The Prize," and it
2	talks about the oil and gas industry from the 1850s up
3	until about the early 1990s. That will show you
4	historically how this industry works, being the
5	independence going back all the way to Oil Creek in
6	1859 in Pennsylvania. It wasn't a big guy that made
7	the discovery, it was a small guy. And every one of
8	the discoveries after that were small independent
9	companies.
10	The big companies, John D. Rockefeller
11	and Standard Oil and so forth, acquired those
12	companies. And then at some point, they had to divest
13	of it. But it's difficult for someone with so little
14	experience in the industry and such a limited
15	perspective to really be able to understand this. But
16	hopefully my testimony today will be helpful to the
17	Commission to understand some of it.
18	MS. TRIPP: Thank you Representative Murphy.
19	That completes his direct testimony and
20	surrebuttal. I'll proffer his direct testimony for
21	admission to the record.
22	HEARING OFFICER ORTH: Thank you, Ms. Tripp
23	and Representative Murphy.
24	I'll pause for a moment in the event
25	there are objections.

1	MS. TRIPP: I apologize, Madam Hearing
2	Officer, also submitting his demonstrative slides.
3	HEARING OFFICER ORTH: All right. Thank
4	you. Another moment. All right. They're admitted.
5	MS. FOX: I'm sorry, Madam Hearing Officer.
6	Were you offering your demonstratives as
7	exhibits? I thought they were demonstratives. That
8	was my understanding. That's what I'm asking.
9	MR. CLOUTIER: Some have, for the record.
10	MS. FOX: Yeah, that's not my understanding.
11	HEARING OFFICER ORTH: All right.
12	MS. FOX: We did not add ours on that.
13	HEARING OFFICER ORTH: To Mr. Cloutier's
14	point, I think some haven't and some haven't.
15	All right. They're admitted. Thank
16	you.
17	(Admitted: IPANM Murphy Direct
18	Testimony and Demonstrative slides.)
19	HEARING OFFICER ORTH: Let's see, Ms. Fox,
20	do you have questions of Representative Murphy?
21	MS. FOX: Yes. Thank you, Madam Hearing
22	Officer.
23	CROSS-EXAMINATION
24	BY MS. FOX:
25	Q. Hello Representative Murphy. My name is
	Page 164

1	Tannis Fox. I'm a lawyer with Western Environmental
2	Law Center and I represent applicants in this
3	proceeding.
4	You had stated in your testimony that
5	you thought there were about 350 wells that OCD is
6	online to plug; is that correct?
7	A. That's the number, as I understand it, yes.
8	Q. And I know you're very familiar with the LFC
9	report, and in that report, on page 4, LFC says
LO	currently, OCD has oh, and also you said most of
L1	the wells something to the effect of that most of
L2	the wells that need to be plugged are federal wells,
L3	something along that line, correct?
L 4	A. I believe the numbers I understand
L5	there's 1700 wells that are slated to be plugged. 350
L6	are state and fee, and 1350 then would be federal. So
L7	the vast majority of them, about a quarter state,
L8	three-quarters federal.
L9	Q. Okay. Well, let me read to you from the LFC
20	report and ask what you think about that. So on page
21	4, LFC says, currently, OCD has plugging authority for
22	roughly 700 wells on state and private, that is, fee
23	lands. The state likely will need to plug an
24	additional 1400 inactive wells, for which OCD has not
25	yet pursued plugging authority. On top of that, there

1	are more than 3,000 wells on state or private land
2	producing extremely small quantities of oil and gas,
3	whose expected cleanup costs far exceed their
4	predicted future revenues, increasing their risk of
5	being orphaned.
6	And so isn't it correct that the LFC
7	report is identifying wells for which OCD has
8	authority or may need authority to be plugged for
9	wells on state and private lands and not federal
LO	lands?
L1	A. It is true. But my point is that no matter
L2	how many wells that is, there's ample funding to plug
L3	those wells. But perhaps that's another discussion.
L4	Please continue.
L5	Q. No, and you had estimated that there are 350
L6	wells that OCD needs to plug. But my point is that
L7	LFC is estimating there are approximately 5,000 on
L8	state and federal land; is that correct?
L9	A. They're estimating that, but I take issue
20	with it. So there is the wells that we know that they
21	have authority to plug, those we know.
22	Q. Those 700.
23	A. And the other is pure speculation. Because
24	industry has historically plugged 95 percent of the
25	wells, and we don't need a perspective LFC study to

1	try to say, "Well, this might happen."
2	We have 100 years of history, Ms. Fox,
3	in this state of operators plugging wells. And we
4	plug 95 percent of them. So for them to come in and
5	say, "Oh, there may be all these others," the history
6	doesn't support. That is pure speculation.
7	Q. And just to correct the record on
8	Mr. Peltz's testimony, so, Mr. Peltz did you hear
9	his testimony or only read his testimony?
10	A. I read all of it, heard some of it.
11	Q. And so, if you heard some of it, you might
12	recall that LFC contacted him in April and he gave a
13	presentation to LFC in May. Is that correct?
14	A. That is correct.
15	Q. And that was the extent of his involvement
16	with the LFC report, correct? He didn't, quote,
17	unquote, write the report, help write the report,
18	correct? He never testified that he had any
19	involvement in writing the report, only that he gave a
20	presentation to LFC. Correct?
21	A. The reason that's correct in terms of the
22	written testimony. But the reason that I believe
23	there were multiple meetings is I confronted director
24	Sallee over that issue, and he would not deny it.
25	So in terms of your written testimony,

1	I'm reading it, it says he was contacted in April,
2	producing a well, gave a presentation in May, and then
3	has also worked comprehensively with the applicants
4	through this process.
5	But I was it was at least intimated
6	to me that there were multiple meetings, not only with
7	the Environmental Defense Fund, but with other WELC
8	participants.
9	Q. Well, the only testimony we have before you
10	is Mr. Peltz's, and that is that he was contacted in
11	April and gave a presentation in May; is that correct?
12	A. That's correct.
13	Q. And then, did you hear Mr. Peltz's testimony
14	that he specifically asked LFC if industry was being
15	requested to participate in the analysis, and LFC said
16	that industry was? Did you hear that testimony from
17	him?
18	A. I did not hear that testimony. But he was
L9	misled.
20	MS. FOX: Thank you for your testimony.
21	THE WITNESS: Thank you.
22	HEARING OFFICER ORTH: Mr. Tremaine or
23	Mr. Hall.
24	MR. TREMAINE: Mr. Tremaine. Thank you, and
25	Madam Hearing Officer.
- 1	

1	review that OCD plugged. So I just wanted to clarify
2	that.
3	A. Not federal wells, by the way.
4	Q. Well, we're going to get to that. We'll get
5	there.
6	The 5 percent number is after a review
7	of how many wells were plugged pursuant to the state's
8	orphan plugging program, whether that's the rec fund
9	or something else, right?
LO	A. Correct.
L1	Q. Okay. Would you agree that there's
L2	approximately 63,000 wells in New Mexico right now?
L3	A. That's my understanding.
L4	Q. So you have represented some different
L5	numbers. But, you know, if the status quo of 5
L6	percent of wells getting plugged pursuant to a state
L7	plugging program persists, we're looking at about
L8	3,150 wells that would be plugged on the program based
L9	on the existing portfolio of active and producing
20	wells. Would you agree?
21	A. I would agree with that.
22	Q. Okay. Just a few minutes ago, you clarified
23	that you and I don't want to misstate your
24	testimony representative, but I want to paraphrase
25	here. I think you said that the production thresholds

1	for either marginal wells or the presumption of no
2	beneficial use or both were arbitrary. Is that
3	accurate?
4	A. It is.
5	Q. Okay. So you're testifying that production
6	thresholds as a definition or the criteria to define
7	different categories of wells is not acceptable or
8	appropriate?
9	A. I believe it's arbitrary. I don't think
10	it's reflective of the reality. And I can tell you,
11	when I saw that number, I pulled our production. We
12	have four wells that might fall in that number,
13	depending upon what period you average. Both were
14	less than, I think both were, or excuse me, four were
15	all in the 700 BOE range. Those wells would not
16	meet well, they produced more than 180 days, so it
17	wasn't an "and," right?
18	But under that definition, you would
19	say, okay, these are we have two federal wells, two
20	state wells, part of a ten-well package, ten-well
21	field. Those four would qualify from a production
22	standpoint as being marginal, yet they are not
23	marginal. They make money every well, make money
24	every month, yeah.
25	Q. I understand.

1	don't know all the
2	Q. Well it's TRD, so it's New Mexico, and it's
3	under New Mexico Statutes Annotated 7-29B-2L(1) and
4	(2), which defines, for the purposes of tax
5	incentives, in certain instances for stripper wells,
6	that stripper wells are defined as those wells
7	producing less than ten BOE per day.
8	A. And I'm sorry, I'm not an attorney, but the
9	citation you're making, is that under the Oil and Gas
L O	Act?
L1	Q. No, sir. It's under the tax code.
L2	A. Okay. Well, I
L3	Q. I can show it to you, but I'm not going to
L 4	belabor it.
L 5	A. Okay. I'm not a tax expert, so that would
L6	be a waste of time.
L 7	Q. Just trying to get the distinction of that.
L8	It's a common use in New Mexico to define categories
L9	of wells. Thank you.
20	Representative, do you agree that
21	legislatively approved funds in the reclamation fund,
22	specific to plugging expenditures, have increased
23	substantially from approximately \$3.5 million in
24	Fiscal Year 20 to almost 18 million in Fiscal Year 25?
25	A. Yeah, I think I've seen numbers similar to

1	that. I'll say I can't swear to those numbers, but
2	the trend is probably right.
3	Q. And would you agree with me that OCD's
4	related expenditures for well plugging have kept pace
5	with those approvals?
6	A. I'm sorry. Repeat that.
7	Q. Would you agree that OCD's expenditures for
8	well plugging through use of the reclamation fund have
9	kept pace with those approvals in their respective
10	fiscal years?
11	A. So what you're saying, is OCD
12	proportionately plugging the same number of wells
13	relative to the dollars? Has their plugging program
14	grown along with the resources that were available?
15	Q. That's one paraphrase, sure, yes.
16	A. Okay. Then yes, I would agree with that.
17	But they seem to be capped at that level.
18	Q. Representative, can we agree that OCD should
19	focus its enforcement efforts on those operators that
20	are substantially out of compliance?
21	A. Yes.
22	Q. Okay. On page 12, lines 8 through 10 of
23	your direct testimony, you testified that New Mexico
24	does not have an orphaned well problem. I want to
25	make that as a foundational statement. Do you agree?
	Page 174

1	A. I'm sorry. On page 12?
2	Q. Page 12, lines 8 through 10.
3	A. Yes, I agree. That's my testimony.
4	Q. And do agree that, in part, you support that
5	statement by pointing out that New Mexico does not
6	have a definition of "orphaned well"?
7	A. Yes.
8	Q. Okay. And further, Representative, you
9	distinguish inactive wells from orphaned wells?
10	A. Yes.
11	Q. Would you agree with me that once a well has
12	been inactive for more than 12 months, it must be
13	plugged within 90 days, according to OCD's current
14	rule?
15	A. I don't know the answer to that.
16	Q. Okay. Do you dispute it?
17	A. I would, in a sense. Because I think
18	there's other I mean I think we've had wells that
19	have gone longer than that, either because we had
20	it may not have been under temporary abandoned status,
	To may not have been under competaty abandoned beacaby
21	but we we had a retrievable bridge plug in there
21 22	
	but we we had a retrievable bridge plug in there
22	but we we had a retrievable bridge plug in there and so maybe it did go a period. Maybe we were
22 23	but we we had a retrievable bridge plug in there and so maybe it did go a period. Maybe we were talking to the OCD inspector about why we were doing

1	that just from a practical experience standpoint. I
2	don't have any way to dispute what the rule says, but
3	I can only describe what happens.
4	Q. Okay. So you're testifying that there could
5	be reasons why there would either be enforcement
6	discretion or perhaps wells placed in approved
7	temporary abandonment or something else that's going
8	on.
9	A. Sure.
LO	Q. Okay. Can I show you the existing rule?
L1	Looks like I have lost permission to share screen. If
L2	I could request that again, I'll come back to this.
L3	Representative, would you agree that OCD
L4	may issue what's called a notice of violation, under
L5	the existing rule, for any wells that are required to
L6	be plugged by the rule, but the operator has failed to
L7	plug them?
L8	A. I would agree with that, yes.
L9	Q. So, Representative Murphy, I just want to
20	highlight here that 19.15.25.8B states that the
21	operator shall either properly plug and abandon a well
22	or place the well in approved temporary abandonment in
23	accordance with 19.15.25 NMSA within 90 days after.
24	And here it says, under (2), a determination that a
25	well is no longer usable for beneficial purposes or

1	(3), a period of one year in which a well has been
2	continuously active.
3	So, I just wanted to clarify, as a
4	foundation for my question, that under the existing
5	rule, that requirement exists, notwithstanding the
6	clarifications or exceptions that you highlighted.
7	Would you agree?
8	A. Sure. I would.
9	Q. Okay. Thank you. So, Representative, if
10	the division issues a notice of violation and brings
11	an enforcement action for inactive wells, do you know
12	generally what happens to the wells that are
13	referenced in that notice of violation?
14	A. Only generally.
15	Q. Would you agree that it's possible that they
16	could be plugged by the operator?
17	A. I would.
18	Q. They could also be plugged by a third party?
19	A. Yes.
20	Q. And they could be plugged by the Division?
21	A. Correct.
22	Q. Have you reviewed any of OCD's inactive well
23	NOVs or settlements?
24	A. No. I think only the ones that may have
25	been in the media. But no, I've not gone into the OCD
	Page 177

1	records.
2	Q. Okay. So as you sit here today, are you
3	able to testify as to a percentage or number of the
4	wells that, after the necessary enforcement action,
5	end up getting plugged by the Oil Conservation
6	Division?
7	A. Do I know that percentage?
8	Q. That's not my question.
9	A. No.
10	Q. And similarly, again, not to belabor the
11	point, but likewise, you wouldn't be able to testify
12	as to the number or percentage of wells after a
13	necessary enforcement action that are plugged by a
14	third party, pursuant to a plugging demand made by
15	another agency, such as the State Land Office or BLM?
16	A. No, I don't know those percentages. But I
17	guess I would have to say that whatever they are,
18	those funds are being provided by the reclamation fund
19	to plug. Just as the 3,100 wells that you mentioned
20	earlier, some potentially \$450 million in a worst
21	case, would also be plugged by the reclamation fund.
22	And it would generate enough money to do that in less
23	than four years.
24	Q. So, I understand the distinction,
25	Representative Murphy, but I have to ask, is it within
	Page 178

1	this Commission's power to increase the appropriation
2	from the reclamation fund for use by the Division?
3	A. It is not. But it is within the power of
4	the Commission to direct the OCD to request a higher
5	budget amount. And if they can demonstrate that that
6	budget amount would be utilized, they would get it.
7	Q. Thank you. Thank you for that.
8	Representative, did you hear the
9	testimony of deputy director Brandon Powell?
10	A. No.
11	Q. You were traveling, I take it.
12	A. I believe I was, yeah.
13	Q. Okay. So have you had an opportunity to see
14	what is listed and admitted into the record as OCD
15	Surrebuttal Exhibit No. 33? Have you seen it?
16	A. You know, I believe I've seen a version of
17	this somewhere, yes.
18	Q. Okay. And this is a list of all operators.
19	And this is in the records, so there's no attempt at
20	trickery here, Representative. But Mr. Powell
21	testified that he pulled this list and it represents
22	operators who have submitted no production reports
23	since August of 2024.
24	So I guess what I'm getting at here is
25	that, according to Mr. Powell's data and testimony, we
	Page 179

1	have 113 operators and 2,318 wells for which there is
2	no production reported for over a year?
3	Will you accept that as a premise?
4	A. Sure.
5	Q. Okay. And so based on my earlier questions
6	in our discussion about the current rule, 100 percent
7	of these wells are out of compliance. Do you accept
8	that? Okay. And so
9	A. Sure.
10	Q every and as a caveat here, I just
11	want to be clear about what the record says and what
12	it doesn't. This includes federal wells and this
13	includes some operators that are already on OCD's
14	master reference spreadsheet. Okay? So it is
15	over-representative of what OCD may take enforcement
16	actions for. Nevertheless, there's still close to 100
17	operators on here who are 100 percent non-compliant.
18	Representative, would you dispute
19	Mr. Powell's testimony that approximately 40 percent
20	of inactive wells are what OCD classifies as private
21	wells?
22	A. No, I wouldn't dispute that. I assume he
23	means they're on private lands.
24	Q. Yes, private lands or private minerals or
25	both. Okay. Thank you.

1	A. Yeah. And by "private lands," that's what I
2	meant.
3	Q. Private. Then we're good, yeah.
4	I want to show you all right. So
5	there's been a lot of discussion about the reclamation
6	fund, and I just want to clarify here, particularly
7	with your experience as a representative, that when we
8	look at what the reclamation fund may be used for,
9	that the statute indicates, in part, that the Division
10	may use the reclamation fund for the purposes of
11	employing the necessary personnel to survey and
12	abandon wells, well sites and associated production
13	facilities, and preparing plans for administering and
14	performing the plugging of abandoned wells that have
15	not been plugged or that have been improperly plugged,
16	and for the restoration and remediation of abandoned
17	well sites and associated production facilities that
18	have not been properly restored and remediated.
19	So just, as a foundation. So,
20	Representative, do you agree that the reclamation fund
21	may be used to plug and abandon both wells and
22	associated production facilities?
23	A. Yes.
24	Q. And it may be used for surface reclamation
25	and remediation activities, correct?
	Page 181

1	A. Yes.
2	Q. Okay. I also want to point you down here
3	to I'm going to highlight the section here, and
4	among other things, 70-2-38B states that the Division
5	may order wells plugged and well sites and associated
6	production facilities restored and remediated on
7	federal lands, on which there are no bonds running to
8	the benefit of the state, in the same manner and in
9	accordance with the same procedure as with wells
LO	drilled on state and fee land, including using funds
L1	from the oil and gas reclamation fund to pay the cost
L2	of plugging.
L3	So, Representative, is my understanding
L 4	of the legislature's language and intent here that OCD
L5	may order wells plugged and may plug wells, regardless
L6	of their surface or mineral type, if they exist within
L7	the geographical boundaries of the state of
L8	New Mexico?
L9	A. Once again, I'm no lawyer, but that's the
20	way it appears to read, yes.
21	Q. And I just want to be clear that we just
22	talked about remediation and reclamation. Is it
23	consistent with your understanding that neither the
24	petitioner nor OCD are proposing to base financial
25	assurance for the single-well financial assurance on

1	either reclamation or remediation costs?
2	A. That was not clear to me, actually.
3	Q. Okay. If I clarify that to you and the
4	record reflected that the average cost proposed to the
5	Commission was based solely on wellbore plugging,
6	would you accept that?
7	A. Yeah, I would accept that in the sense that
8	if you tell me that they only plugged the wells and
9	didn't do the reclamation, then I have no reason to
10	dispute that. But I would still reject the premise
11	that an arbitrary \$150,000 bond is the way to cure
12	this problem. But, proceed.
13	Q. Okay. Would you also agree that, similarly,
14	reclamation and remediation of associated production
15	facilities is not factored into that average wellbore
16	plugging cost?
17	A. I've heard testimony to that effect. But
18	I'd also add that the cost of plugging federal wells
19	has historically and remediation has historically
20	been reimbursed to the state.
21	Q. Okay. Yes. Understood. Thank you,
22	Representative.
23	So I want to, I'm going to backtrack a
24	little bit here, just loop back. So I had asked you
25	about 70-2-38B. In your direct testimony, you also

1	distinguish the orphan well problem by pointing out
2	that many of the inactive wells are federal. But
3	we've just gone over the statute, so I just want to
4	see if we can reach an agreement that those federal
5	wells are actually potentially orphaned and are a
6	problem under the use of the reclamation fund. Would
7	you agree with that?
8	A. I would agree that well, here is where I
9	think you have to make the distinction.
10	OCD may very well have the authority to
11	go plug those wells, and it sounds like they do, and
12	they should. What the difference is, when I make the
13	distinction, I'm talking about who pays for it, right?
14	And if it's a state or fee, then a state or fee well
15	is typically paid for with the reclamation fund. But
16	apparently, even if it's a federal well and the
17	federal government didn't pay for it, the reclamation
18	fund would pay for that too.
19	But historically, and we know recently,
20	the state has received as much as \$90 million to plug
21	federal wells. So that's where I am.
22	Q. Okay. Thank you, Representative.
23	Representative Murphy, are you aware
24	that OCD does and has, in fact, engaged in plugging of
25	federal wells by either agreement or consultation with

A. It's my understanding that the vast majority of federal wells are plugged by OCD under contract with the BLM, or some sort of arrangement. Q. So I want to distinguish here. So there's would you agree that there are different sources of funding which OCD can use to plug, quote, unquote, orphaned wells, including the state reclamation fund, the bipartisan infrastructure law grants, and more specific, discrete grants from the Bureau of Land Management? Would you agree with that A. Yes, I would. Q. I believe the ones that you were referring to just now were specific wells that were plugged using OCD contractors, after the BLM had called federal bonds and then awarded that to the OCD for plugging by agreement or contract. I'm not sure which. But by agreement, OCD plugged those wells using that more discrete grant. Is that accurate? A. I don't know the details. I understand there's federal dollars, including the 90 million,	
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Of the target makes the design of the control of th	
that are going to this issue. That's the only point	: I
will make.	
Q. Yeah, and that's the distinction,	
Representative Murphy, that I'm trying to make.	
Page 185	
Page 185	

1	Because you had testified that the BIL grant money may
2	be used on federal wells. So, have you reviewed the
3	specific terms of the BIL grants?
4	A. I have not. I was only familiar with it
5	from my conversations with Mr. Sallee.
6	Q. Okay.
7	A. And some media reports.
8	Q. Okay. If I told you that that was
9	inconsistent with the legal analysis and the
10	understanding of the Division, that those BIL grant
11	funds may only be used on non-federal wells, would
12	that change your concern or your testimony?
13	A. No, it really wouldn't. Because money is
14	fungible, right? I mean, if they gave you \$90 million
15	to plug whatever wells, you've got \$137 every year to
16	plug the rest of them.
17	So once again, I mean, coming back to
18	this as being a revenue or payment, as I say, funds
19	problem, it just doesn't wash with me. And the reason
20	being is, I think the proof is in the pudding. You've
21	got a \$75 million balance you can't spend, and you've
22	got \$100 million a year that also you can't spend.
23	And I apologize, Mr. Tremaine. I mean
24	the OCD. I don't mean you personally.
25	Q. No, certainly.

1	A. The Oil Conservation Division.
2	Q. Sir, I've been in-house, so to speak, for so
3	long that I dip into the weeds too much.
4	So, Representative Murphy, in your
5	direct testimony, you had talked about a couple
6	different numbers, the 56 million, the 66.7 million,
7	and you just referred to a more recent number of 70, I
8	believe it was 76, but that same material. So,
9	there's a lot of money in the quote, unquote,
10	reclamation fund, you would agree?
11	A. Yes.
12	Q. Okay. But we ran through an analysis here
13	on cross that, you know, the status quo of plugging
14	might be 3,150 wells plugged under an orphaned
15	program. And, you know, using your analysis of 66.7
16	million could plug either 800 to 1,000 wells. That
17	looks like if you're plugging 1,000 wells, you
18	think that there should be a per-well plugging cost
19	averaging \$66,700, that would mean that there would
20	have to be \$210 million over to plug those 3,150
21	wells. And if we're using those OCD's average cost
22	from FY24 of \$163,000 for the well-bore plugging, that
23	would be \$513 million, in excess of \$513 million.
24	Would you agree with that?
25	A. Yes, I would agree with it. But I think
	Page 187

1	here's the point, and I think it's easy to get people
2	confused about these numbers, and sometimes I even get
3	a little bit confused.
4	So let's just agree, for sake of
5	agreement, that we have 3,000 wells that the OCD is
6	worried about, and \$150,000 seems to be the number,
7	that's \$450 million. You went back just now between
8	210 on the low estimate and 00 on a high estimate. So
9	let's just take your number. Let's take 500 million.
- 0	All right. That's what's been swept out of that fund
.1	in the last four years. That's what that fund will
_2	generate over the next four or five years.
_3	So I keep coming back to the point,
4	Mr. Tremaine, that this is not a funding problem, and
-5	I don't know why it's being described that way. Even
-6	at 3,000 wells, which I don't begin to accept for a
.7	moment, but let's just do that, \$500 million, 137-,
-8	\$125 million a year coming into the reclamation fund,
_9	how long does it take to pay that \$500 million?
20	Q. That's fine. Well, I understand the point
21	you're trying to make, Representative. I have kind of
22	a different a little different analysis I want to
23	examine with you.
24	So even if the reclamation fund were
25	dramatically increased, as I think you're

1	suggesting
2	A. Actually, I'm not suggesting that. I'm
3	suggesting that the balance be moved into a protected
4	fund, that you all be given whatever you can spend.
5	So no, I mean let's be clear about what I'm
6	suggesting.
7	I'm suggesting that the OCD be given the
8	resources that it needs and the funding that it needs
9	to plug these wells. And I don't care if there's 350
LO	of them, I don't care if there's 3,000 of them.
L1	You've got the money to do it. You spend 20 you've
L2	got a balance of \$75 million, you spend about 25 a
L3	year. You've got three years of plugging fund in your
L4	balance right now.
L 5	This year, industry will generate
L6	another 100 and to 125 million, none of which you'll
L7	need to plug wells. And next year.
L8	Q. So I think what you're saying,
L9	Representative Murphy, is that there are funds being
20	utilized or appropriated by the legislature to other
21	purposes, which would need to be placed into the
22	reclamation fund. That would be step one, right? And
23	then step two, would require
24	A. Well, it's a little different than that.
25	Q an approval or appropriation by the
	Page 189

1	legislature for OCD to actually spend the funds. Is
2	that accurate?
3	A. I'm sorry I interrupted you. But let me see
4	if I can answer it. Is that the legislature, by
5	nature, is not going to give any agency more money
6	than they can spend, because there are so many
7	perceived needs for that money. So when you submit a
8	budget for roughly \$21 million a year and say, "This
9	is what we need to plug wells," that's what they're
10	going to give you and that's what you've gotten.
11	Now, you say over a period of some
12	years, you're going to need roughly another \$425
13	million. And that will be there in that fund because
14	historically it's been generating that, and there's no
15	reason to believe that it won't continue to generate
16	that.
17	And so I'm not sure I'm not sure
18	where we're miscommunicating here, but maybe
19	Q. No, sir, we're not. I don't believe we're
20	miscommunicating. I think it's different perspectives
21	and I'm trying to get at something else.
22	So let's talk about let's say that
23	hypothetically there are no procurement problems,
24	there are no recruitment problems, we can get every
25	staff that is necessary to administer the increased

1 fund. 2 And let's say that tomorrow, the Division went from -- I believe your number was 3 plugging an average of 50 wells per year. 4 5 tomorrow, the Division went to plugging 200 wells per year like that. All right? There's no other 6 problems. 8 If we're talking about 3,150 wells, 9 that's going to take us what, 12 to 15 years to plug 10 all of those wells, assuming that OCD was able to 11 instantaneously ramp up everything to the point of 12 where everything that you're asking us to do was 13 entirely possible with no restrictions. 14 A. Mr. Truman, I think he can plug 500 wells a 15 year with a robust plugging industry. And that's what 16 I was trying to get to before. We were hoping to be 17 part of that industry. But that opportunity doesn't exist because of these procurement issues. 18 19 So, I mean, we designed our rigs -- what 20 I recall is, we figured one would plug 50 wells a year. About one -- a little less than one per week, 2.1 or a little more than one per week, given holidays and 22 so forth. And we planned for a minimum of two and up 23 24 to four rigs. So we'd be able to, just my company,

Page 191

we'd be able to plug 200 wells a year.

25

1	Assuming that there are other companies
2	out there that would do the same thing we were doing,
3	which there would be, then you would be up to probably
4	400 or 500 wells a year, and you'd have your problems
5	solved very rapidly.
6	Q. Representative, I greatly appreciate the
7	vote of confidence and being able to plug 500 wells a
8	year.
9	A. Well, that's what happens when you engage
10	industry. And when you ignore it, we end up in a room
11	like this.
12	Q. Well, Representative, how is that going to
13	work? I mean, where are those OCD staff coming from?
14	A. Well, you know, we talked about this in
15	committee, and I was assured that you all could get it
16	because of all the federal employees that are going to
17	be laid off. As a matter of fact, that was a direct
18	quote from I don't know if it was Ben Shelton or
19	one of the representatives at OCD. I'm not going to
20	mischaracterize it. But I asked that question, "Can
21	you ramp up?" "Oh, yeah, we can ramp up." So there's
22	your answer.
23	Q. Well, Representative, I would submit that
24	there's a distinction between ramping up, even
25	aggressively ramping up, and multiplying the current

1	capacity as you stated it by 10 times over a short
2	period of time.
3	A. Well, I can only speak to what we plan,
4	right? And so from our company business plan, we
5	would have ramped you up four times. And I have a
6	hard time believing that once somebody sees that
7	opportunity, we wouldn't have a lot of competition.
8	And so it goes back to process. And
9	that's we've talked about procurement, but we
10	haven't talked about process. And I don't once
11	again, I'm not a lawyer, I don't know what your
12	constraints are within the legal framework, but I know
13	this. You've sued companies before, you've won a
14	district court. You've taken over their wells, I
15	believe you've plugged them.
16	And my question is, why hasn't the OCD
17	done that more aggressively? Why haven't they done it
18	sooner? And why aren't they doing it more?
19	And if that's not adequate, if you need
20	more authority from the legislature, then please come
21	to us and tell us what you need. I don't know if you
22	need some sort of emergency power once again, I'm
23	not a lawyer you need some sort of emergency powers
24	to expedite things. But that's the process problem.
25	You don't have a pool of wells big
	Page 193

1	enough to really be very concerned about. And that's
2	why I say you don't have an orphaned well problem.
3	What you've got is speculation that you might have an
4	orphaned well problem, which runs into a hundred years
5	of industry history, which says that you won't have an
6	orphaned well problem. But if you do have an orphaned
7	well problem, you're going to have \$125 million a year
8	to solve it.
9	Q. Do you agree that we have an inactive law
10	enforcement problem?
11	A. I can't speak to that really. I mean, I
12	look at your list, it appears that you did. You know,
13	I can't we don't have any inactive wells well,
14	we may have one that we're waiting to be plugged.
15	NM3, I believe, may be inactive. But it'll be plugged
16	soon. So we don't I don't have a lot of direct
17	experience with that. But according to your numbers,
18	it does appear you did.
19	Q. Representative Murphy, I greatly appreciate
20	the vote of confidence and the blessing to more
21	aggressively pursue an active well-enforcement. I
22	guess I am struggling with apparent presumption that
23	if we more aggressively pursue an active well
24	enforcement, that we won't simply be adding wells, a
25	substantial number of wells to the orphaned well list.

	A. Well, you will
2	Q. Because that's been the history.
3	A. You will be, but you'll have the funds to do
4	it, Mr. Tremaine. But here's the other thing, and
5	this is something that I'd hoped to talk to the LFC
6	about.
7	They talked a lot about the Colorado
8	experience, and this goes directly to what you just
9	asked me. In Colorado and this is one thing I want
10	to talk to them about. It's interesting they
11	mentioned the Colorado experience, but they failed to
12	include the impact of that experience. Right? They
13	failed to include the fact that 2,000 wells were added
14	to the inactive well list immediately or the orphan
15	list or whatever it was.
16	And so under your numbers, the state
17	immediately, immediately picked up \$300 million of
18	liability at \$150,000 per well. So if you pursue the
19	\$150,000 per well, you're absolutely and maybe
20	that's your point, is that that is your process, is
21	that you want to force these people out of compliance
22	so you can expedite the process to get it.
23	All I would say to that, if that's where
24	you're headed, there's a lot easier ways to do it, and
25	the legislature can probably help you with that.

1	Because we want this process solved as well, and the
2	industry wants this process solved as well. Because
3	quite frankly, as an oil and gas operator, I'm sick
4	and tired of hearing about how we're not cleaning up
5	our own messes when we pay to clean up our own messes.
6	That's insulting to me, and it's not true.
7	Q. So, Representative Murphy, the reason you
8	say that is because of the existence of the
9	reclamation fund?
LO	A. Correct.
L1	Q. Okay. And so, again, last question here.
L2	Representative Murphy, I think the sum total of our
L3	discussion today and my understanding of your
L4	recommendations, is that you think that the OCD or
L5	Commission should wait for the legislature to take
L6	action in one of the future sessions; is that fair?
L7	A. I would welcome as a legislator, I would
L8	welcome a dialogue. OCD's never come to me and said,
L9	"Will you help us fix this problem?" And I know the
20	legislature feels very strongly, both sides of the
21	aisle, that this issue needs to be addressed.
22	There will be a bill. I don't know if
23	it'll make it up on the call or not, but it will be
24	bipartisan, as the past bills have been. I can't
25	predict what that will do, but I will say this. We

1	should have some optimism. Because when Meredith
2	Dixon and myself and Rob Montoya and a few others,
3	proposed 403 in committee, it came out unanimous.
4	Matthew McQueen, the chairman, worked closely with me
5	in making that bill a good bill. Vice Chairman
6	Sarinana did the same thing. And for those of us that
7	are familiar with the energy and natural resource
8	committee, that's a pretty rare feat, to have a bill
9	come out unanimously.
10	Unfortunately, it came out late and we
11	couldn't get it in front of the finance,
12	Representative Lente's committee in time. But there
13	seems to be a lot of bipartisan support for this
14	approach.
15	And I also feel like it's the proper
16	venue. And I'm, once again, not a lawyer and don't
17	mean to get into whether you have the jurisdiction or
18	you don't. I personally believe you don't, I'm not a
19	lawyer.
20	But I will say this, is that I think the
21	people, the early leadership of New Mexico, recognized
22	how important oil and gas is to our economy and put
23	some real constraints on what can be done to this
24	industry, and largely retained a lot of that power
25	within the legislature. And I believe that this is

1	such an important issue and it could have such a huge
2	impact on this day, that that's the body that should
3	be debating this.
4	And it bothers me that an applicant who
5	has a mission statement of working to end oil and gas
6	leasing and drilling on our public lands, that is on
7	the website, and the environmental defense fund, had
8	so much influence in the report that's driving this
9	hearing and driving this action. And I think that
10	from a policy standpoint, that's a very dangerous
11	thing.
12	Q. Representative Murphy, the legislature has,
13	despite bipartisan support, not taken any action to
14	address this issue or finalize any action to address
15	this issue in the last several years. Would you
16	agree?
17	A. I disagree. We've been legislative
18	process moves at the pace of legislative process.
19	There was a lot of there was a lot of discussions
20	and everything under 403, and there were there was a
21	lot of movement.
22	If you take that what happened at 403 to
23	my bill, our bill, in this year, I mean, it made it
24	through a hearing. We had a similar bill that
25	advanced on the Senate side. I think there's a lot of

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1	legislative process that's being done and there's a
2	lot of debate. And quite frankly, there's a lot of
3	thought going in to how to solve this problem without
4	jeopardizing a very, very important industry.
5	MR. TREMAINE: Thank you, Representative
6	Murphy. No further questions.
7	HEARING OFFICER ORTH: Thank you,
8	Mr. Tremaine. Mr. Biernoff, do you have questions?
9	MR. MOORE: Good afternoon, Madam Hearing
10	Officer. I'll be representing the commissioner this
11	afternoon, at least for a little while longer. Chris
12	Grazer should be joining later. Our schedules are in
13	flux. I just have a couple of questions for
14	Representative Murphy.
15	CROSS-EXAMINATION
16	BY MR. MOORE:
17	Q. Good afternoon, Representative Murphy. My
18	name is Richard Moore. I represent the commissioner
19	of public lands and the State Land Office.
20	A. Nice to meet.
21	Q. Nice to meet you as well, and thank you for
22	your testimony this afternoon.
23	In testifying about the number of
24	orphaned or inactive wells on federal versus state or
25	private land, you used Cano Petro as an example; is

1	that correct?
2	A. Actually, I was referring to previous
3	testimony by the commissioner, I believe, because Cano
4	came up. And so yes, I was referencing that.
5	Q. But I believe that you testified that Cano
6	Petro only has a handful of wells that are not on
7	federal land; is that correct?
8	A. My understanding is there were roughly 299
9	wells, somewhere around 300 wells of Cano, and the
10	vast majority of those were federal. That's been what
11	I've been told.
12	Q. I'm just going to share my screen here
13	quickly. Are you familiar with the inactive well
14	list? I know that's come up.
15	A. I am.
16	Q. So having then searched for inactive wells
17	on Cano Petro, this is the results. Would you
18	characterize so you mentioned that you're familiar
19	with the list. You're familiar with what the F and
20	the P stand for under lease-type and surface owner,
21	correct?
22	A. Yes.
23	Q. Looking at this inactive list for Cano
24	Petro, would you characterize the number of wells that
25	are indicated as private lease or surface owner as

1	merely a handful?
2	A. No, I wouldn't. I would say that there's
3	just glancing at it, I haven't counted it, but to be
4	fair, it would probably be a mix of mostly federal and
5	private. I see very little state on there.
6	However, I would also note there
7	well, we're getting down to quite a few of the
8	federal. But regardless of whether they're federal
9	and they're paid for federal, even if they're private,
10	federal or state, as was established earlier, the
11	recommendation fund is available to plug them. So
12	whatever number of wells there were or are, there's
13	ample funding.
14	MR. MOORE: Well, thank you for your answers
15	and your testimony today.
16	That is all the questions that I have
17	and I'll pass the witness.
18	THE WITNESS: Thank you, Mr. Moore.
19	HEARING OFFICER ORTH: Thank you, Mr. Moore.
20	Let's see. I don't believe we have
21	Mr. Nanasi. Mr. Maxwell
22	CHAIR CHANG: May I recommend a
23	mid-afternoon break at this point, before we move on?
24	THE COURT: Oh, yes. Absolutely. Thank you
25	so much for the reminder, Mr. Chair. Let's come back
	Page 201

1	at 3:00.
2	(Recess held from 2:48 to 3:00 p.m.)
3	HEARING OFFICER ORTH: Again, I think we do
4	not have Ms. Nanasi. I believe Mr. Maxwell is at the
5	polls.
6	Mr. Rankin, do you have questions?
7	Mr. RANKIN: I have no questions for
8	Representative Murphy. Thank you very much.
9	All right. EOG is monitoring.
10	Mr. Suazo, do you have questions of
11	Representative Murphy?
12	Mr. SUAZO: No questions.
13	HEARING OFFICER ORTH: All right.
14	Ms. Tripp, do you have redirect?
15	MS. TRIPP: Yes, Madam Hearing Officer, just
16	very briefly.
17	REDIRECT EXAMINATION
18	BY MS. TRIPP:
19	Q. So, Representative Murphy, you went through
20	some math with Mr. Tremaine, and the figures that were
21	used were 63,000 wells at 5 percent, being 3,150 wells
22	potentially that would be orphaned; is that right?
23	A. That's my recollection, yes.
24	Q. Okay. About how long would you estimate a
25	well's lifespan?

1	A. 30 to 50 years.
2	Q. In the 63,000, that 63,000 is composed of
3	all active wells. Was that your understanding?
4	A. That's correct.
5	Q. So do you have any expectation that there
6	will be 3,000 or 3,150 wells orphaned next year?
7	A. No.
8	MS. TRIPP: No further questions.
9	HEARING OFFICER ORTH: All right. Thank you
10	very much, Ms. Tripp.
11	HEARING OFFICER ORTH: Commissioner Ampomah,
12	do you have questions?
13	COMMISSIONER AMPOMAH: Yes, I do.
14	EXAMINATION
15	BY COMMISSIONER AMPOMAH:
16	Q. Representative Murphy, thanks so much for
17	
Ι/	your testimony today. I'm Dr. Ampomah from New Mexico
18	your testimony today. I'm Dr. Ampomah from New Mexico Tech, so nice for meeting you.
18	Tech, so nice for meeting you.
18 19	Tech, so nice for meeting you. A. Nice meeting you.
18 19 20	Tech, so nice for meeting you. A. Nice meeting you. Q. I do have a couple of questions if we can
18 19 20 21	Tech, so nice for meeting you. A. Nice meeting you. Q. I do have a couple of questions if we can bring up the slides and walk through that the direct.
18 19 20 21 22	Tech, so nice for meeting you. A. Nice meeting you. Q. I do have a couple of questions if we can bring up the slides and walk through that the direct. Let's start from slide number 3. I
18 19 20 21 22	Tech, so nice for meeting you. A. Nice meeting you. Q. I do have a couple of questions if we can bring up the slides and walk through that the direct. Let's start from slide number 3. I thank you once again for the testimony. Here, item

1	Can you share with the Commission the
2	average cost of the plugging?
3	A. The average cost, typically these wells vary
4	between 5,000 and 8,500 feet. Principally, Delaware
5	wells, but there are probably some exceptions.
6	Our actual plugging and reclamation
7	costs would be somewhere around 100,000 to 120,000, on
8	average. We've had some higher and some lower. And
9	it might be a little bit more if you include
10	reclamation on some sites. But it'd be somewhere in
11	that range, 100,000, either way.
12	Q. So we heard the same from Armstrong, as
13	well, averaging 120, but his wells were much deeper.
14	But it sounds like you are combining a little bit of
15	the reclamation to it.
16	A. Yes.
17	Q. So it's a little bit difficult to
18	distinguish between how much is actually for the well
19	plugging?
20	A. That's right, Commissioner. And the other
21	thing I would say is that many of his wells, they're
22	deeper, but they're single horizon or single zone.
23	In the Delaware Formation, where we
24	operate, there's many times 15 to 17 individual sands,
25	not necessarily all present at the same time. But we
	Page 204

1	might have multiple sets of perforations, so there's
2	differences.
3	Q. Thank you. Let's go to slide Number 4. So
4	slide Number 4, based on your discussion, you said
5	that it will not solve let's say you're talking
6	about a single well bonding of 150,000 per well limit.
7	You're saying that it will not solve this problem.
8	But I'm asking you, will it not make
9	sure that OCD has enough bonding to support the
10	plugging for companies that are bonding their wells?
11	A. Respectfully, Mr. Commissioner, not in my
12	opinion. And I tell you why, is that the problem,
13	people are not going to be able to come up with
14	150,000, and so they're going to simply and this is
15	the Colorado experience they're going to simply
16	walk away. And when many of those wells might have
17	been plugged by them over a course of time.
18	They just can't think they can deal
19	with the plugging of wells periodically, two or three
20	wells a year, or whatever their plans are for over a
21	period of years. But to be hit with \$150,000 bond
22	that they have to meet immediately is not going to
23	make economic sense to them. So the ones that can pay
24	it, are the ones that you don't need it from; and the
25	ones that can't pay it, that you need it from, can't
	Page 205

1 pay it. 2 And so I don't think -- I think you'll 3 collect very little of that, especially amongst the, quote, unquote, problem operators. Even if you go to 4 a good operator, if you came to me and you said, "All right. Your well is" -- you know, "You either have to 6 put this \$150,000 bond up, or plug it, " I think I'd be 8 inclined to plug it, because I eliminate all 9 regulatory, you know, dangers. At a low-volume well 10 like that I'd have to see the payout. You know, I'm 11 going to put up \$150,000 bond and then I'm going to 12 have to plug it, too. 13 I mean, it doesn't make economic sense 14 to me. Because when you think about the categories of 15 operators, the real problem ones are not going to be 16 able to come up with the money. Especially when the 17 money is already there through the reclamation fund. So that's the basis of that comment. 18 19 Q. But if you're looking at your average well 20 plugging cost, and in the same as what Armstrong 21 Energy, more or less presented to the Commission, it 22 sounds like the actual plugging cost can probably not be less than 120,000? 23 2.4 A. Excuse me, Mr. Commissioner. You asked me

Page 206

what the average was. So we have many, many wells

25

1	that are less than 125. So if I have a well if I
2	look at a well, and it's going to cost me \$50,000 to
3	plug it, and I have to put up 150, I think the
4	decision is pretty clear.
5	Q. So then on that one, do you know if IPANM or
6	NMOGA has presented to the Commission a quantified
7	risk-based way of assigning the bonds for the
8	Commission's consideration? Do you know?
9	A. I do not know. But I approach it a little
10	bit differently. And the reason I have is that I've
11	looked at it mainly, how does New Mexico compare to
12	adjoining states? For example, we are competing
13	primarily with Texas and Oklahoma, less so with
14	Colorado. So I look at it from an economic
15	competitive standpoint, is that it's going to impact
16	that. And I hope that answers your question.
17	Q. Okay. Yeah. So I'm sure you understand the
18	situation the three of us, you know, Commissioner
19	Bloom on the platform, that we are in. Because we
20	need to make all these difficult decisions. And the
21	industry, I mean, you guys have plugged over
22	95 percent, yeah. And we've heard about risk based,
23	risk based, risk based. You know, the applicant is
24	putting their case direct, direct.
25	So are IPANM and NMOGA going to go back
	Page 207

1	and try to help us quantify the risk base, you know,
2	as it is stated in the application for our
3	consideration?
4	A. You know, I can't speak for them,
5	Commissioner. I would say that history is the best,
6	you know, past is prologue, right? We've got a
7	hundred years of history in this state, 1926 to 2000
8	almost 26 of producing oil and gas wells. And
9	historically, we've seen somewhere between 2 and 5
LO	percent of those wells being orphaned, over a
L1	hundred-year period. And there's no reason, in my
L2	mind, for there to be a lot of speculation about what
L3	the future may hold.
L4	As you know, in the oil and gas
L5	industry, we have what's called a decline curve. And
L6	that curve, that forward-looking curve, is based upon
L7	past performance. And it's a pretty solid scientific
L8	method of judging future performance as well. So
L9	that's how I'd answer that question.
20	Q. And I appreciate that. Let's go to slide
21	Number 5. So when we started the hearing, you know,
22	the TA issues were something that I also was concern
23	with because of the production cycles, primary,
24	secondary and tertiary. And I did not based on the
25	experience, I don't feel like put in the eighth year,

1	you know, where I mean, we're probably not going to
2	be able to go through secondary, not even to tertiary
3	without really having premature plugging.
4	You know, so there have been a lot of
5	discussions here where there is a potential where the
6	applicant, even that was Mr. Alexander who provided
7	some exceptions, you know, for the beneficial use.
8	And that is definitely going to handle if the
9	applicant brings that back, that is definitely going
10	to help on the premature plugging in terms of the
11	beneficial use.
12	But I want to talk to you about the TA
13	status. So the TA status, too, I do like what the
14	applicant put forward, because they do have the
15	approved and then the expired TA status.
16	So let's focus on the approved TA
17	status, for instance. Based on the current rule, if
18	enacted, it sounds like approved TA will still need it
19	to be borne at 150,000. Is that your understanding?
20	A. That's my understanding.
21	Q. Now, on that one, don't you believe that,
22	let's say, an approved TA status means that OCD has
23	inspected this well to know that the mechanical
24	integrity of this well is so good? Is there any
25	you know, should that approve TA also, more or less,

1	be in the same category as expired TA in terms of the
2	bonding?
3	A. No, I don't believe so. I mean, the
4	industry practice with respect to temporary abandon is
5	to set a cast iron bridge plug and usually some volume
6	of cement above it to circulate the well with inert
7	fluids and to pressure test. And if I recall the
8	rule, it's required, I think, every five years unless
9	otherwise notified by the Commission. But it's at
10	least a five-year test. That pretty well ensures the
11	mechanical integrity of that well.
12	And we've got to remember what we're
13	looking at in terms of wells. These are wells whose
14	bottom hole pressure is essentially zero. I mean,
15	right, you've got a fluid that can only if you've
16	got a 3,000-foot well, your bottom hole pressure might
17	be 200 or 300 pounds. So what does that mean? The
18	fluid can only migrate up 300 or 400 feet. It can
19	never get to the surface because there's not enough
20	bottom hole pressure at the bottom to push it all the
21	way up.
22	Now, some gas can migrate, you know, if
23	not TA'd. But if it's TA'd, everything is sealed down
24	there. And so to me, it's really in many ways,
25	when you think about the future potential of that

well, it's much better to leave a well in that sort of status if it has future potential than to plug it.

2.4

Now, many of the studies that we did back when I was working primarily on secondary and tertiary recovery projects, and this is also -- I'm going to complicates your policy plate here a little bit -- is that one of the things that we found was that when you take any given reservoir, when you plug out some percentage of those wells, the economic viability of that secondary or tertiary recovery project is no longer there because you have to re-drill those wells.

And the reason you have to re-drill those wells is you have to be able to establish the patterns to get the efficiencies to get the recoveries to get the revenues. And so from a policy standpoint, I am very reluctant to plug wells.

And the reason is, is that I think many policymakers look at them and say, "Well, these things are long-term liabilities." Well, not if they're handled correctly, right? And the way I look at it is they are long-term assets. They are the key strategic petroleum reserve because they allow us access back into the reservoir in order to apply some sort of technology.

1	And so that's I probably took a long
2	way around the barn. And I apologize.
3	Q. But you believe that the expired TA wells,
4	they have to be bonded because those are wells that
5	probably OCD might be responsible for?
6	A. I would say that a properly TA'd well and
7	maintained should not be bonded. And in terms of
8	whether there's some detail I would say, look, an
9	unapproved or a TA'd well that's out of compliance,
LO	then I could see where that might require bonding.
L1	But I think there's statutory limits as to what that
L2	can be.
L3	Q. Well, the applicant, you know, they do have,
L4	you know, in the proposed rule and you did not go
L 5	through this rule exactly, so I don't want to really
L6	push on that line. But in that they do have the
L7	bonding for inactive wells; you know, it includes
L8	approved and even expired. But what I'm suggesting is
L9	that the approved needs to be dealt with separately.
20	A. I would agree with that.
21	Q. Yeah, from the expired. And they are
22	putting 150 bonding on expired because they are
23	non-compliance. And I don't think you disagree with
24	that.
25	A. I believe well, I'm not sure I
	Page 212

1	understand. Putting a hundred and well, putting a
2	single-well bond on, in my opinion, that ought to be
3	something that's looked at very, very carefully.
4	Because once again, if you've got a well
5	that is out of compliance in whatever way it's out of
6	compliance, then there ought to be a process that that
7	well is put back into compliance. And if the OCD
8	doesn't have the tools to do that, they should have
9	the tools to do that.
10	But I don't believe bonding is that
11	solution, especially when there's so much money
12	available from other sources and reclamation fund.
13	Now, when you take and the reason being it's
14	largely about capital. And capital is pretty precious
15	not only in the oil and gas industry, but in business
16	in general, for investment purposes.
17	Q. Okay. Let's go to slide Number 6. So slide
18	Number 6, bullet point two, you said propose rules
19	would have chilling effect. Is that based on the
20	details you've provided to us or specifically how
21	is the marginal rule? So let's take the marginal
22	definition for instance and then the beneficial use
23	and combine them.
24	A. Okay.
25	Q. So how is that going to provide a chilling

1 effect, you know, to the industry? 2 A. Okay. So with respect to margin -- well, there's a number of areas. With respect to marginal 3 wells, it'll be clear that they either need to be 4 5 plugged or a substantial amount of money needs to be 6 put up very quickly. 7 And that goes back to my point of --8 well, and this is going to answer your question, 9 because it really is about what the impact of that would be. 10 11 I believe the chilling effect is going 12 to be that we have another example of regulatory 13 uncertainty going to an extreme. And that you also 14 have an expansion of regulatory authority into areas 15 that the industry typically has not seen before, 16 calling for financial records of private companies, 17 for example. That's chilling. Private companies are private for a 18 19 And there are metrics on their ability to reason. 20 perform. But in this case, I'd have to agree that as 2.1 long as they meet the statutory requirements, that 22 diving in and having an agency that is charged with protecting correlative rights, preventing waste, 23 24 protecting health and the environment, to some degree, that's not exactly a mission that falls very well in 25

1 that agency. 2 O. So let's talk about -- let's still talk about marginal wells. There has been a lot of 3 discussions about changing the 1,000 to about 750 BOE. 4 5 Is that something that you will support? 6 A. It's not. And it's because I reject the 7 premise. I do. And with all due respect, 8 Commissioner, the thing is, is that we now have 9 agencies that are getting into economics. And they don't know my wells' economics. 10 11 And unless you allow the owner to 12 continue to produce that asset, as long, as it's 13 economic to do so, if you disrupt that system, then 14 you're going to lose waste. 15 And in my opinion, I think -- and once 16 again, I'm not a lawyer, but in thinking about it, if 17 I have to prematurely plug a well because of the arbitrary either production number or other number, 18 19 and I lose access to my profits and reserves, that's a 20 taking, in my opinion. 2.1 And that's not something that the OCC, 22 with all due respect, should be in the middle of. I 23 think, you know, you set reasonable bonding limits, and we can debate about what those are in terms of 2.4 blanket bonds, that are consistent with other area 25

1	states, so that we stay competitive. And then you
2	ensure, through the procurement, through the process
3	of populating, as I think it was described, access to
4	these wells, and then you make sure that there's
5	funding. And we know that there's funding. And so
6	the whole approach to me is, from a public policy
7	standpoint, really poorly thought out.
8	Q. So, you are not so you've described, from
9	an operator standpoint, these marginal worlds, some of
L O	them are economic, you know, based on, let's say, from
L1	an operator's point of view.
L2	You know, Commissioner Bloom has
L3	proposed, or based on the discussion, we've discussed
L4	about putting some exceptions with regards to the
L5	definition, you know, to make sure that we are really
L6	targeting the bad operators that are not really in
L7	compliance. So it sounds like you are not in a
L8	position to even help us with some of these
L9	exceptions.
20	A. Well, I could be. But under the current
21	framework, I mean, I think I would have to really be
22	convinced that this is the right policy approach, and
23	I just don't see it right now.
24	I mean, it's and when you start
25	thinking about those exceptions, you're not going to

1	be able to catch them all, right? Maybe we'll catch
2	some of them.
3	But, you know, when I looked at it
4	I'll just explain my situation. When I looked at it,
5	I said, Okay, I described the four wells, two federal,
6	two state, both of which are around 700 BOE, all of
7	which produce over 180 days. Okay?
8	But if you eliminated let's say they
9	produced 100 days. They produced 100 days, but they
10	made 1,000 BOE or 750 or whatever that threshold is.
11	Then I wouldn't make that, right? Because it would
12	have to be no, I would make that because I hadn't
13	produced the 180 days. But it's economic, right? So
14	I've got an economic well that doesn't produce the 180
15	days. That's marginal.
16	Q. No, it's not.
17	A. Or maybe I had that backwards.
18	Q. Yeah.
19	A. Excuse me. Yeah, it at least has to produce
20	180 days, right?
21	Q. And less than 1,000.
22	A. Yeah, less than 1,000. Okay. Well, I was
23	just using numbers. But let's say that let's say I
24	have a well, which I do, I have four wells that
25	produce 700 BOE, they produce over 180 days. All

1	right? So they're okay. But what if they produced
2	100 days? They wouldn't be okay because it's "and."
3	Here, it hurts. Right? Because I can show that well
4	being economic, but it didn't make the 100 days or
5	180 days of production. So it's got to be 750 and
6	180. I'm 750 and 100. I'm not exempt.
7	Q. So let's attach on that one. And that is
8	where the Commission is also considering that let's
9	say in this instance there could be an issue why the
10	well was not able to produce after the, let's say, 750
11	or, let's say, 1,000.
12	So there are some of these issues that
13	could happen that the Commission is looking into to
14	put it as an exception so that you do not really go
15	after a well that because of, let's say, a mechanical
16	issue or some kind of issue, pipeline, whatever, they
17	were not able to meet that criteria.
18	So we're trying to see if we can come up
19	with some exceptions to make sure that we do not
20	necessarily go after wells that are economical.
21	A. I'd be interested to hear, you know, how
22	that would go. I think the approach is when I
23	began sort of that thought process of what you're
24	talking about, I considered sort of the factors that I
25	could think of that might go into sort of that

1	economic analysis, and they would probably be better
2	than this, but not much better.
3	And the reason here are the facts.
4	We talked about age. I think everybody sort of agreed
5	with that. We talked about depth. I think but we
6	also have to talk about location, northwest or
7	southeast. We have to talk about is it primary oil or
8	gas. I mean, is there hydrogen sulfide available?
9	What is the gathering situation? What is the what
10	are the natural processes that are going on with the
11	well that might make a 200 BOE well profitable that
12	produces 30 days. It wouldn't meet that either.
13	And so what I'm saying is, is that when
14	you approach it in that way, you're never going to get
15	it really right.
16	The way to do it I think historically
17	has been correct, and that is, you leave the owner and
18	the operator in charge of determining the economic
19	benefit, and then you protect yourself and you protect
20	the state through reasonable bonding and through the
21	use of the funds the industry has dedicated to
22	plugging that. And that is the ultimate protection.
23	Once again, I probably took the long way
24	around the barn. I apologize, Commissioner.
25	Q. So you talked about funds holdup. You know,
	Page 219

1 you talked, still on this slide, you talked about 2 funds hold up that could have been utilized instead of 3 using to pay high premiums on financial assurance surety bonds. 4 5 And Mr. Gilstrap yesterday testified to 6 the Commission presenting two scenarios. And one of the one of the scenarios that he presented here was a 8 situation where an operator has to put up 3.75 million 9 to 5.25 million yearly payments on the surety bond. mean, there's a lot of numbers. 10 11 A. That's a lot of money. 12 Q. Now, you know, you talked about funds is not 13 the problem, right for the orphan, or let's say for the plugging. Now, with this huge amount of money 14 15 that is going to be held up to just paying premiums, 16 just paying premiums to the surety companies, I'm not 17 sure how that solve the plugging problem. I don't 18 know.

A. I don't know either, and I'm not familiar with those particular circumstances. I guess this has been -- this is my experience, and that is, even if you had -- let's say that you created a brand-new company and you funded it with a whole lot of money,

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20

2.1

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it's going to come into New Mexico and it wants to

you just put \$100 million into a brand-new company and

1	explore and buy wells and do all the things, and it
2	needs bonding. Right? It would probably, even with a
3	lot of money in the bank, would have to put that
4	bonding up in cash.
5	And the reason is, is that, this would
6	have been my experience, the surety companies are not
7	going to write a bond just based upon your assets.
8	They're going to write a bond based upon how long
9	you've been in business, what your track record is and
10	so forth.
11	So when I say it has a chilling effect
12	or there's all these input all these impacts, it's
13	primarily to those people that are entering the
14	business, right? Those of us that are well
15	established in the business are probably paying some
16	of the premiums you heard, 1, 2, 3, 5 percent maybe.
17	But the entrants, many of the companies coming into
18	this, are either going to have to put up a cash bond
19	or they're going to pay a very, very high percentage.
20	And my point is only this, is that
21	capital is very, very precious. And given that, in my
22	opinion, the orphan-well situation, the reclamation,
23	the plugging is largely addressed through the
24	reclamation fund, is it good policy to take millions
25	or tens or hundreds of millions of dollars and put it

1	into a fund that may be released later, may not, but
2	probably will, when that money could be invested in
3	this state, actually finding and producing oil and
4	gas?
5	And if you think about that, when a
6	company comes into the state, they're not looking just
7	to get their money back, right? So let's say they
8	have to pay the \$5 million in premiums. Well, if they
9	invested that \$5 million, they would expect probably
10	\$15 million back, two or three to one return, or
11	otherwise they won't stay in business.
12	That money, a good portion of it, comes
13	right to the beneficiaries, comes right to the state.
14	So where do you want the money? Do you want it
15	sitting in a can under grandma's bed? Or do you want
16	it out drilling wells, producing, paying salaries? I
17	mean, that's the policy argument, I believe.
18	Q. Yeah. But we all agree that the orphan well
19	could be a problem for our state, right? So based on
20	the discussion that we're having, my question to you
21	is what is the alternative situation?
22	A. Well, I had this conversation with
23	Mr. Tremaine, and he said there's roughly I
24	disagree there's that many wells, but let's take his
25	number. And we'll take a compromise number. He said

1	3,100. I'll use 3,000 because I'm sitting here.
2	3,000 times \$150, 450 million would be generated in
3	three years from the reclamation fund, if they could
4	spend it.
5	Now, remember, not all those wells are
6	ready to be plugged. They're worried about them.
7	Some they're somewhat worried about, some they're
8	really worried about. But once again, it's
9	speculation.
10	We've got, I think, 700 wells, I think
11	was the number that was discussed here. That's, I
12	don't know, what, \$15 million, 12 and a half million
13	dollars, something like that. So that's why I say
14	that the money is not a problem, because the money is
15	coming in faster than the activity is happening.
16	Q. So you don't believe that operators should
17	more or less be asked to put a bond that could be
18	utilized or let's say a bond that is almost close
19	to how much it costs to plug the well?
20	A. I don't believe and let me speak to I
21	think what we've all been trying to address, either
22	the bad actors or the unfortunate situations where the
23	state is left with a lot of wells, right? I don't
24	think that's and historically we haven't seen that
25	that just drops in our lap; it happens over time and
	Page 223

1 we can deal with it, as we have for 100 years. 2 And I'll just go back, I think the ones that you want to collect it from, you'll never collect 3 In other words, if you go to the 10 4 it from. operators that they have talked about being 89 percent of the problem, you're probably not going to collect 6 from them. If you go to the list that was even more 8 expensive than I thought, however many hundreds there 9 are that haven't put up the 150, most of them probably won't either. 10 11 So what's going to happen? What's the 12 impact of that? No money collected, huge transfer of wells over to be the plugging fund. When many of 13 14 those wells might very well have been plugged over 15 time. So I just don't see the policy or economic win, 16 Commissioner. 17 Q. Yeah, but so assuming those ten companies -or let's say the companies that are going to earn the 18 19 most, assuming OCD was able to bond each of these 20 wells, 150, 150, and then they've neglected their 2.1 responsibility, don't you believe that OCD can go to 22 the surety companies and get the same amount instead 23 of using the state funds to plug these wells? 2.4 A. I don't believe so. I don't believe, from my knowledge of the sureties and bonding and the state 25

1	of the industry, that the operators that you target
2	are going to are going to do that.
3	Look, how realistic is it to think of an
4	operator having, let's just say, 50 wells and he
5	doesn't report production on them for 12 months.
6	Right? But he's going to come up with seven and a
7	half million dollars in bonds? That's just not
8	realistic to me, Commissioner.
9	COMMISSIONER AMPOMAH: Yeah. Thank you for
10	your time, sir.
11	THE WITNESS: Thank you, sir. I really
12	enjoyed the discussion. I think we're fleshing it
13	out a little bit.
14	UNIDENTIFIED FEMALE: Thank you.
15	Commissioner Bloom, do you have
16	questions.
17	COMMISSIONER BLOOM: Yeah, thank you Madam
18	Hearing Officer.
19	EXAMINATION
20	BY COMMISSIONER BLOOM:
21	Q. Good afternoon, Representative Murphy.
22	A. Hi, Commissioner. How are you?
23	Q. Fine. Thanks. Yourself?
24	A. I'm good.
25	Q. All right. Again, thank you for your
	Page 225

1	testimony. Thank you for your service as a state
2	legislator. I hear the pay is not great.
3	A. I've heard that too?
4	Q. Hey, I appreciate you having mentioned
5	Daniel Yergin' work, "The Prize." It's a fantastic
6	history of oil and gas. And you mentioned Oil Creek.
7	I was born in Oil City and grew up with Oil Creek in
8	the backyard. And my family's worked my dad's an
9	attorney, started off doing oil and gas law, finished
10	in oil and gas real estate.
11	My stepfather worked for Gulf, Mobile,
12	Halliburton over the years. When you talked about
13	downturns, I remember the '80s, I remember the l'90s
14	when he was out of a job for, you know, a year or two
15	at a time, and it was tough times.
16	Representative Murphy, I'd like to get
17	into some of the issues around OCC's authority and
18	jurisdiction, as you said, and some of the issues that
19	you raised around that.
20	You stated in your written testimony,
21	Page 7, I quote: From my perspective, WELC is asking
22	the Commission to take steps that far exceed its
23	authority under the Oil and Gas Act. I'm no attorney,
24	but I have lived and worked with the Oil and Gas Act
25	and its regulations for the past 40 years. The
	Page 226

1	Commission's primary purpose has always been to
2	prevent waste and protect correlative rights. End
3	quote. Did I get that right?
4	A. Yes. I read along the same, yeah.
5	Q. So, Representative Murphy, you mentioned
6	engaging with the LFC staff on the well report and
7	being dissatisfied with it. I take it you've read the
8	report in its entirety?
9	A. I have.
10	Q. Yeah. Okay. I quoted a section to
11	Mr. Ezzell, and I'll read that again. It says, quote,
12	the federal Environmental Protection Agency estimates
13	annual methane emissions from the nation's inactive
14	and unplugged oil and gas wells are comparable to
15	adding an additional 2 million gas-powered cars to the
16	road. End quote.
17	Is that methane a wasted resource?
18	A. If that report is accurate, I would I
19	would say yes. And I'm sorry, Commissioner Bloom, I'm
20	not familiar with it, but you said that's a national
21	report, not a New Mexico-focused report; is that
22	correct?
23	Q. Yeah. That's a federal EPA estimate of
24	annual methane emissions from inactive and unplugged
25	oil and gas wells.

1	A. I'm sorry. Yes, I accept that.
2	Q. We heard from the OCD that 60 percent of
3	inactive wells in New Mexico leak methane. If that's
4	true, is this also fugitive methane waste, and then
5	does the OCC regulate waste?
6	A. Yes. Along with others.
7	Q. Yeah. Does proper plugging stop methane
8	leakage and waste?
9	A. It does, but it's not the only method.
10	Q. You're a long-time
11	A. But I think it's important
12	Q. Yeah, go ahead. Finish.
13	A. Yeah, Commissioner Bloom, I also think
14	it's to put this in perspective and I see where
15	you're headed and I share the concern about methane
16	being vented from unplugged wells.
17	But I would also note this, is I think
18	we always sort of have to quantify what we're talking
19	about. And plugging the well is one option. We can
20	talk about the pros and cons of that. But the easy
21	option would be to TA the well, or the even easier
22	option is to basically just fix the minor leaks, which
23	should be done.
24	But in order to quantify this because
25	I've really had a question about it. And during last
	Page 228

1	week's water and natural resources, we were presented
2	with a presentation from the New Mexico Environment
3	Department, and it talked about this very subject. It
4	talks about the New Mexico oil and gas greenhouse
5	emissions inventory for year 2023 for methane and
6	carbon dioxide. And this is a report director Miano,
7	of EPA Division, New Mexico Environment Department,
8	presented in Artesia.
9	And I find it interesting that we have a
10	number of categories. We have production, gathering
11	and boosting, processing, transportation and storage,
12	and inactive oil and gas wells. Now, all of these
13	colors represent these first four. This red color,
14	inactive oil and gas wells, does not appear on this
15	chart. So I think when we talk about this, we need to
16	quantify the numbers, right? They're so low that the
17	New Mexico Energy Department isn't even graphing them.
18	So I hope that answered your question.
19	Q. Yeah, it did. Thank you, Representative
20	Murphy.
21	So I know you're a long time oil and gas
22	man, and so in terms of those emissions, we'd also be
23	getting some of the volatile organic compounds, the
24	BTEXs, benzene, toluene, ethylbenzene and xylene,
25	correct?

1	A. Correct.
2	Q. You know, it's certainly my understanding.
3	I believe it's the Commission's understanding that the
4	Commission is also charged with protecting the
5	environment, water and public health. Do you agree
6	with that?
7	A. I do agree with that.
8	Q. I'm not sure where we're going to end up in
9	this rulemaking, but, you know, I am interested in
10	exploring where we have authority, and we wouldn't
11	want to exceed that. And, you know, perhaps from what
12	I'm seeing, this probably ends up in the courts or
13	something, and they can decide.
14	We've been over some of this. I feel
15	like I'm repeating, you know, questions with the same
16	answers I got from Mr. Ezzell and other, you know,
17	NMOGA witness also. But I guess we're seeing some
18	commonalities in the testimony as well.
19	A. Representative, if you also talked to us
20	about your legislative work in the last session and
21	for the upcoming session; is that correct?
22	Q. I mean, at the end of the day, can anyone
23	guarantee what the legislature will do?
24	A. No. Just like we can't guarantee what the
25	courts would do.

land, to plug 750 wells.

25

1	A. Yeah I've heard that testimony, Commissioner
2	Bloom. I'd also I've encouraged both the Bureau of
3	Land Management and I would encourage your office to
4	look at issuing leases with unplugged wells as long as
5	the purchaser is willing to take on that
6	responsibility and bond them.
7	And that would actually eliminate a lot
8	of problems, both on at any rate, that's a policy
9	discussion we can have later.
10	Q. And that's interesting because that might
11	require legislation as our oil and gas lease is set
12	statutorily when we re-lease land to the next lessee,
13	gets that free and clear.
14	COMMISSIONER BLOOM: All right, I think,
15	Representative Murphy, I'm starting to fade at the
16	end of the day. I'm going to leave it there. Thank
17	you so much for your time and testimony today?
18	THE WITNESS: I very much appreciate your
19	background there. I hope you're putting on some skis
20	and hitting the Matterhorn or something. It looks
21	good.
22	COMMISSIONER BLOOM: I'd love to?
23	HEARING OFFICER ORTH: Thank you,
24	Commissioner.
25	THE WITNESS: Thank you, Commissioner Bloom.

1	HEARING OFFICER ORTH: Chair Chang, do you
2	have questions?
3	CHAIR CHANG: Representative Murphy, thank
4	you very much for joining us here and providing us
5	with your testimony.
6	I'll just make a brief comment that
7	whatever comes of this current bonding petition, I
8	certainly agree with you that OCD needs to make the
9	best possible use of every dollar in the reclamation
10	fund, and I certainly hope we can work with all the
11	various stakeholders to make that happen in terms of
12	the specifics. I think we've covered it in fairly
13	exhaustive detail, so I think I'll let you go for the
14	afternoon.
15	THE WITNESS: Thank you very much. I
16	appreciate you.
17	CHAIR CHANG: Thank you.
18	THE WITNESS: Thank you, Commission.
19	HEARING OFFICER ORTH: Thank you,
20	Representative Murphy.
21	THE WITNESS: I guess that you didn't
22	actually release me, so I spoke a little bit.
23	HEARING OFFICER ORTH: Is there any reason
24	not to excuse Representative Murphy?
25	MS. TRIPP: Thank you so much. No.

1	HEARING OFFICER ORTH: Thank you very much.
2	Well, it is 3:47. Sheila, do we have
3	it looks as though there are a number of names for
4	the 4 o'clock. Do we have some of those folks on the
5	platform already?
6	MS. APODACA: I haven't seen any, and we had
7	forewarned some of them that we may not be in session
8	this afternoon, so they may not all be in attendance.
9	HEARING OFFICER ORTH: All right. Thank
10	you. Do you want to take the first 15 minutes?
11	MR. CLOUTIER: We can introduce Dr. Arscott,
12	and he can start it up. We've discuss that we may
13	need to chop him up a little bit.
14	MS. APODACA: We do have one in-person
15	commenter, if you'd like to take him down.
16	HEARING OFFICER ORTH: No. We're going to
17	do 15 minutes of Dr. Arscott, and then we'll go to
18	the public.
19	MS. APODACA: Very good.
20	MR. CLOUTIER: IPANM calls Dr. Rob Arscott.
21	And, Ms. Apodaca, if you could give
22	Mr. Arscott would you e-mail him the hearing
23	notice so he can log in to the Teams meeting.
24	Ms. Tripp and I forgot to do that.
25	Ms. APODACA: He's logged on and he has the
	Page 234

1	permission.
2	MR. CLOUTIER: Thank you. All right.
3	Appreciate it, Ms. Apodaca.
4	So we're going to do our best to speed
5	Dr. Arscott up by having me ask a few questions and
6	then get out of the way and let him run through his
7	presentation with fewer questions from me.
8	HEARING OFFICER ORTH: Dr. Arscott, would
9	you please spell your first and last name.
10	THE WITNESS: Robert Arscott, R-O-B-E-R-T,
11	A-R-S-C-O-T-T.
12	HEARING OFFICER ORTH: Do you swear or
13	affirm to tell the truth?
14	THE WITNESS: I do.
15	HEARING OFFICER ORTH: Thank you very much.
16	Go ahead, Mr. Cloutier.
17	ROBERT ARSCOTT,
18	having first been duly sworn, testified as follows:
19	DIRECT EXAMINATION
20	BY MR. CLOUTIER:
21	Q. Would you please introduce yourself to the
22	three members of the Commission.
23	A. May I share my screen? There you go.
24	Yeah, my name is Rob Arscott. I'm here
25	to offer testimony on behalf of the Independent

1 Petroleum Association of New Mexico. 2 Currently, my role is as an economist. 3 I do consulting work at a company called Applied Economics in Austin, Texas. Prior to this role, which 4 I've been in for about two years now, I was an assistant professor of finance at Syracuse University, 6 where I taught courses on corporate finance topics and 8 real estate. 9 And in a previous life, a long time ago, 10 I worked in syndicated lending at an investment bank, 11 and in private equity as an acquisitions associate at 12 a real estate fund in London, England. 13 My education, I have a bachelor of business administration from Concordia University in 14 15 I have an MBA from Oxford University in the Austin. 16 UK. And I have an MSBA in applied economics, and a 17 PhD in finance from the University of Rochester. Q. And very briefly, what do you do at Applied 18 Economics, Dr. Arscott? 19 20 A. Yeah, so Applied Economics and I regularly consult on matters related to oil and gas. I would 2.1 22 say the majority of my work over the past little over two years now has been with various oil and gas 23 2.4 clients, both upstream operations as well as in 25 midstream.

1	Here's a brief little sample of some
2	clients that I've worked with over the past year.
3	Some of them are fairly large producers. Some of them
4	are not so large. Kraken Resources, for example,
5	would be an example, a private equity backed operator
6	that primarily operates out of the Bakken in North
7	Dakota.
8	Q. Thank you. And you submitted direct and
9	rebuttal testimony in this matter?
10	A. I did.
11	Q. Do you have any corrections to that
12	testimony?
13	A. I do not.
14	MR. CLOUTIER: All right. We offer
15	Dr. Arscott's direct and rebuttal testimony into
16	evidence. And then Dr. Arscott is the sponsor of IPA
17	and Exhibits 1 through 9 and 29 through 36, which we
18	also tend to read I'm hearing officer.
19	HEARING OFFICER ORTH: Thank you. I'll
20	pause for a moment in the event there are objections.
21	BY MR. CLOUTIER:
22	Q. And from now on, Dr. Ascott, I'm going to
23	let you take it away. And I may interrupt if I think
24	something needs clarification, but why don't you go
25	ahead and talk to the Commission, at least about the

1	first point you'd like to make.
2	HEARING OFFICER ORTH: The exhibits are
3	admitted.
4	MR. CLOUTIER: Thank you. I apologize,
5	Madam Hearing Officer.
6	(Admitted: Arscott Direct and
7	Rebuttal Testimony, IPANM Exhibits
8	1 through 9 and 29 through 36.)
9	A. All right. Well, thank you very much.
LO	So I guess I'll start with this question
L1	as to what is the right amount of financial assurance.
L2	And so I've been asked to work on this financial
L3	assurance aspect of the proposed rule.
L4	And in part of my work in this, I've
L5	been doing a lot of research on I've been doing
L6	research into some of the theoretical, at least in a
L7	perfect rule, theoretical amount of financial
L8	assurance, how would you determine that.
L9	But it's really based on something known
20	as the judgment-proof problem, which is related to
21	this concept of limited liability, which is very
22	important to our capitalist economy. If it weren't
23	for limited liability, we would likely not have the
24	level of innovation and investment and entrepreneurial
25	activity that we enjoy in this country. It encourages

1 people to take risks. And the dark side of this is sometimes 2 3 we run into moral hazard issues, such as this concept known as the judgment-proof problem. 4 5 judgment-proof problem arises when you have, in this case, an operator that becomes insolvent. 6 declare bankruptcy, and through bankruptcy protection, 8 an operator can shirk its responsibility potentially 9 to properly plug and abandon its wells. And so the duty to plug and abandon the 10 11 wells then falls to the state, at the state's expense. 12 And this is obviously not an ideal outcome, especially 13 from a social standpoint. And so we have to come up with ways in which we can encourage bad actors, for 14 15 example, to behave like good actors. 16 One of the ways that we do this is with 17 So what the bond does is the bond requires a bond. 18 the operator to put up some monetary incentive to 19 provide for the incentive to plug and complete the 20 well according to his obligation. 2.1 If the operator fails to plug the well, 22 he'll forfeit the bond. That money will then go to the state to aid in plugging the wells. And in 23 2.4 addition to providing an incentive to plug the wells, this actually delivers money to the state to help with 25

1	the plugging effort. So in that sense, it's an
2	efficient way to deal with this judgment-proof
3	problem.
4	Now, there is this tension between
5	economic growth and public protection. Obviously, the
6	bond can protect the public from the costs of plugging
7	and abandoning wells that are abandoned by private
8	industry. But if we set the bond amount too high, it
9	will stifle economic growth.
10	Now, there is a theoretically ideal
11	amount of bond protection. And the economic
12	literature is actually clear on this. It's related to
13	the expected P&A cost of a well. But actually, the
14	P&A cost and expectation for a well is actually the
15	maximum bond amount that, in theory, you should
16	require.
17	The reason why the ideal bond amount may
18	actually not be equal to expected P&A costs is because
19	operators face a lot of other potential deterrence to
20	defaulting on their obligations to plug their wells.
21	Some of those deterrence are non-monetary. For
22	example, the operator faces a reputational risk if
23	they fail to honor their obligation to plug wells.
24	Aside from non-monetary considerations, operators also
25	have monetary considerations related to lost profit,

potentially from continued operations.

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You can imagine an operator that, in expectation, might think that they might be able to reap substantial profits from continued operations in the state. But if they fail to plug their wells, they may find that they face permit denials from the regulatory authority, in addition to possibly revocations of their authority to transport oil and gas in the state. That would effectively end that operator's ability to do business in the oil and gas industry in the state and represent a significant monetary cost if he fails to plug his well.

So, in the portfolio of incentives that the operator faces that would lead him to honor his obligation, in some cases, the bond, even a bond in the full amount of the expected plugging and abandonment expense, may not really move the needle much in terms of affecting the operator's decision to honor his obligation.

So, in that case, the bond amount, whatever the cost of that bond is, would be a pure cost and not necessarily have any associated benefit. In that respect, the ideal bond amount might actually be considerably lower than the expected cost of plugging and abandonment.

1	Because the ideal bond amount is in some
2	ways connected to expected P&A costs, it's important
3	to recognize that there's considerable variation in
4	plugging and abandonment costs in the data. For
5	example, the OCD's plugging costs may not reflect
6	typical costs of plugging wells throughout the state.
7	According to Ben Shelton, the OCD's cost may be
8	anywhere between 10 to 15 percent higher than what
9	private industry's costs are.
10	Regardless, if we were to set a bond
11	amount at, say, 150,000 per well, if this is somewhere
12	near the average cost for wells in the state, by
13	definition, the median or the average is going to be
14	set higher than about half of the wells in the state.
15	Now, to the extent that we're talking
16	about wells that, in expectation, have plugging costs
17	that are less than 150,000, for example, a well that

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talking ging costs well that maybe costs 50,000 or even, let's say, 100,000, a well that, in expectation, will cost 100,000, we know that, theoretically, the optimal bonding amount should be no more than the expected costs of P&A'ing in the well. So if a well is an expected cost of P&A equal to 100,000, imposing a financial assurance burden in the amount of 150,000 on that well presents an economically unjustified cost.

Page 242

1	We're not necessarily talking about
2	forcing operators to fully internalize the costs of
3	their activity at that point. We're now imposing a
4	cost in excess of what is economically justified.
5	Now, this can lead to the premature plugging of wells,
6	which ultimately would lead to waste, reserves that
7	are lost beneath the ground because we plugged the
8	well prematurely.
9	There are other sources available to
10	address the orphan well problem. We've heard from
11	several people during this hearing. The OCD
12	reclamation fund is one such source. There is a
13	conservation tax of anywhere between .19 percent and
14	.24 percent that is charged on all hydrocarbons
15	severed and sold in the state. Depending on oil
16	prices, either 10 to 20 percent of that revenue is
17	diverted to the reclamation fund.
18	According to the LFC report that was
19	published earlier this year, the fund had a balance of
20	60 million as at the end of fiscal year 2024.
21	Although, as we've heard from Representative Murphy,
22	that may be significantly higher. I think he said 76
23	million.
24	There are also federal grants that can
25	be used to address the orphan well problem. According

1	to the LFC report, a little over \$55 million of such
2	grants have already been used in New Mexico. And
3	New Mexico remains eligible for a further 111.8
4	million.
5	So, the proposed rules will lower the
6	incentives to produce oil and gas in New Mexico. And
7	I say that because there is an increase to the cost of
8	production related to the amount of financial
9	assurance that's levied on the operator. To the
10	extent that that financial assurance is economically
11	unjustified, it's too high. And if it's too high,
12	then it increases fixed costs above what's
13	economically justifiable and, therefore, reduces the
14	incentives for operators to continue to produce oil
15	and gas.
16	-1 66
10	The effects will vary by operator
	depending on the types of wells that they operate in
17	
17 18	depending on the types of wells that they operate in
17 18 19	depending on the types of wells that they operate in their own financial condition. This one-size-fits-all
17 18 19 20	depending on the types of wells that they operate in their own financial condition. This one-size-fits-all \$150,000 per single well is, I would argue, overly
17 18 19 20	depending on the types of wells that they operate in their own financial condition. This one-size-fits-all \$150,000 per single well is, I would argue, overly broad because it ignores the default likelihood and
17 18 19 20 21	depending on the types of wells that they operate in their own financial condition. This one-size-fits-all \$150,000 per single well is, I would argue, overly broad because it ignores the default likelihood and cost of default that is unique to each individual
17 18 19 20 21	depending on the types of wells that they operate in their own financial condition. This one-size-fits-all \$150,000 per single well is, I would argue, overly broad because it ignores the default likelihood and cost of default that is unique to each individual well. In some cases, FA costs will be extreme.
17 18 19 20 21 22	depending on the types of wells that they operate in their own financial condition. This one-size-fits-all \$150,000 per single well is, I would argue, overly broad because it ignores the default likelihood and cost of default that is unique to each individual well. In some cases, FA costs will be extreme. And in these cases, I'm going to mention

1	heard about many, many times. So the cash bond is, as
2	opposed to a surety bond, this is a bond that requires
3	100 percent collateralization. The operator that is
4	taking out a cash bond has to put up full \$150,000
5	today. They may not plug the well for years to come,
6	after which they can get the money from their bond
7	back only after the well has been verified as plugged
8	correctly. All the while, the operator is out that
9	capital. If I have to deposit \$150,000 today, that's
10	\$150,000 that I don't get to deploy for other
11	purposes.
12	To the extent that we're talking about
13	operators of PDP reserves, or proven develop producing

operators of PDP reserves, or proven develop producing reserves, those typically have a discount rate of about 10 percent per year. So an operator that's setting aside \$150,000 on a cash bond actually faces a bonding cost on an annual basis equal to 10 percent of that amount. So these cash bonds are actually quite expensive relative to surety bonds that may have fees ranging between 2 percent and 3 percent.

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The other case in which FA costs will be extreme, in my estimation, will be in cases where the portfolio of the operator contains more than 15 percent either marginal or inactive wells as the proposed rules define them. I'll give you two

1	examples after comment.
2	HEARING OFFICER ORTH: Thank you very much.
3	I thought perhaps before you started your next slide
4	we could do public comment.
5	So we have reached another public
6	comment session. Is there anyone in the room who
7	would like to so, Dr. Arscott, if you would vacate
8	the witness stand.
9	And, sir, if you would come up. If you
10	would say and spell your first and last name please.
11	MR. MCQUEEN: My name is Matthew McQueen,
12	M-A-T-T-H-E-W, $M-C-Q-U-E-E-N$.
13	HEARING OFFICER ORTH: Do you swear or
14	affirm to tell the truth?
15	MR. MCQUEEN: I do.
16	HEARING OFFICER ORTH: Thank you. Go ahead.
17	MR. MCQUEEN: Thank you, Chair, Members of
18	the Commission. My name is Matthew McQueen. I'm a
19	member of the New Mexico Legislature. And I've been
20	in the legislature for 11 years, and for the past
21	nine years, I've chaired the House energy,
22	environment and natural resources committee.
23	I'm here today as an individual, as a
24	legislator, to encourage you to adopt a strong and
25	effective bonding rule. I caught a little bit of the

1	testimony and my colleague, Representative Murphy,
2	and he's on the committee that I chair.
3	I will tell you, I was also at the water
4	and natural resources committee meeting in Artesia
5	last week. And it was interesting to me the
6	recommendation fund was discussed at some length.
7	And it was discussed shortly after we discussed the
8	liability in un-remediated uranium mines that exist
9	in New Mexico.
10	To me, the bonding is I describe it
11	as an insurance policy. I think it is a form of
12	insurance. This is what we will draw on if we ever
13	need to. Hopefully, we don't need to. But the State
14	of New Mexico can't continue to leave itself in the
15	position where it has to clean up after industry when
16	industry goes south.
17	The reclamation fund is being used. I
18	support Representative Murphy's legislation to stop
19	diverting a portion of that fund so we have more of
20	that fund available and that we can ramp up the
21	expenditures of that fund. But the reclamation fund
22	serves a different purpose. It's different than
23	bonding.
24	The reclamation fund, in my mind, is
25	what we use to plug and abandon wells that have

1	already been abandoned or already been orphaned. And
2	the bonding is what we will use in the future,
3	especially if there is a downturn and a lot of these
4	are orphaned at the same time, whether it's a single
5	company or industry-wide.
6	And I will say, I hear occasionally that
7	the smaller operators can't afford the bonds. And it
8	sends a shiver down my spine because if they can't
9	afford the bonds, how are they going to plug and
10	abandon their wells?
11	And those my comments. Thank you very
12	much.
13	HEARING OFFICER ORTH: Sheila, who do we
14	have on the platform?
15	Ms. APODACA: I don't see anybody on the
16	platform.
17	HEARING OFFICER ORTH: If you're on the
18	platform and would like to offer public comment at
19	this time, please raise your virtual hand. If you
20	have dialed in, you would raise your hand by pressing
21	star 5. No one?
22	All right. Our next public comment
23	session will be at 9 o'clock tomorrow morning. We
24	will also have a public comment session Thursday at
25	9 o'clock in the morning.

Let's go back to the technical case,
Dr. Arscott. Sorry for the interruption. Please go
ahead.
A. No. Thank you. Okay. So I'm going to move
back one slide. The issue I was discussing is what I
think the proposed rules, what effect they'll have on
the incentives to produce oil and gas in New Mexico.
And I think in particular this
15 percent threshold may have a barely significant
distorted effect on the incentives to produce oil and
gas. To illustrate, I'll give you two examples. Both
examples will be operators with only ten wells.
This first example we'll call Operator
A. Operator A has ten wells, eight of which are
highly productive; one with low production, but not
marginal, as defined in the proposed rule, and one
inactive. Now the 15 percent threshold is, again, if
there's 15 percent either marginal or inactive wells
in the operator's portfolio. And as it stands, with
only one inactive well, this operator is currently at
10 percent.
Under the proposed financial assurance
rules, the inactive well will require a single bond in
the amount of \$150,000. But the other nine would
qualify for a blanket bond in the amount of \$250,000.

1 All in, this is a \$400,000 financial assurance amount. 2 Now, the issue is if the low-producing 3 well declines into marginal status, if that happens, the operator will have 20 percent of his wells in 4 either inactive or marginal status. That will trigger 6 the 15 percent threshold rule, which will increase the required bonding amount to \$150,000 on all ten of this 8 operator's wells. As a result, the financial 9 assurance amount will increase from \$400,000 to over -- well, to \$1.5 million. 10 11 And I almost said over, because the 12 actual increase in the cost might be more than, say, 13 three times as much. We've almost tripled the amount of bond required. But there is also a secondary 14 15 effect in terms of the premiums that this operator may 16 have to pay on those bonds, because all else equal, if 17 we increase the amount of debt or the amount of 18 bonding required that's extended from, say, a surety 19 provider, that increases the risk to that provider. 20 And as you increase the risk, a rational provider of 2.1 that security will charge a higher premium. 22 And so what you may have is not only an increase in the bond amounts, but you may also have a 23 2.4 concomitant increase in the premiums charged on those 25 bonds.

1	I'll give you a second example. We'll
2	call this Operator B. Operator B also has ten wells,
3	five of which are highly productive, and five are
4	marginal. Five of these ten wells would be classified
5	as either marginal or inactive, therefore triggering
6	the 15 percent threshold rule.
7	Under existing financial assurance
8	regulations, this operator could have covered its
9	financial assurance obligation with a \$50,000 blanket
LO	bond. However, under the proposed rules, all ten of
L1	this operator's wells would require \$150,000 each.
L2	Again, resulting in a financial assurance amount of
L3	1.5 million.
L4	There are two aspects of this that I
L5	would like to point out. In reference to Operator A,
L6	who had nine or rather eight highly productive
L7	wells, in comparison to Operator B, which has only
L8	five highly productive wells, both of these operators
L9	are charged the same amount of financial assurance.
20	To the extent that marginal wells are
21	argued to be more risky from an orphaned-well
22	perspective, which to be clear, I'm not saying one way
23	or the other, although that is the implication, I
24	believe, we have two portfolios that vary in their
25	risk in terms of producing orphaned wells and vet they

have the identical amount of bonding assurance.

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I think it's worth asking how we think operators will respond to this 15 percent threshold. As the previous two examples have shown, there is a significant incentive to immediately plug or sell these marginal wells.

In the case of Operator A, who had a low-producing well that was declining into marginal status, incentive to plug that well that is not yet marginal before it gets to marginal status. The increase in financial assurance as a result of the 15 percent threshold presents a very large increase to the fixed cost of operating wells. Therefore, I would expect operators to expend considerable effort in order to plug these wells before they can cause the cost to the operator to skyrocket because of the \$150,000 bonding requirement on every single one of the operator's wells.

Ultimately, I think this will lead to premature plugging. Because we have to ask ourselves, how will this operator get rid of these marginal wells? Maybe you could try to sell them. I don't think there would be a market for these wells, because any likely buyer would face the same concerns about the 15 percent threshold. Therefore, it is highly

1 likely that these marginal wells would all be 2 prematurely plugged. 3 In of why increasing financial assurance would affect the economic life of a well, I'm going to 4 5 give you guys a picture. This is IPANM Exhibit 2. 6 And what I'm showing here is money on the vertical axis, and time on the horizontal axis. 8 The declining curve that starts out very 9 high and declines over time becomes very low and the slope becomes shallower, is my sort of rough 10 11 approximation of the net inflow produced from a well 12 over time. So as the volume of production declined 13 over time at a constant assumed price, we get this curve that captures our net inflow, meaning the amount 14 15 of hydrocarbons produced multiplied by price minus any 16 variable costs associated with that production. 17 In addition to this curve that represents the net inflow from the well, I'm also 18 showing a horizontal line that I'm calling fixed 19 20 outflow. These represent the fixed costs associated 2.1 with the well. These are the costs that you have to 22 pay every month regardless of how many barrels you 23 produce. So things like labor and electricity and also financial assurance. 2.4

To the extent that the financial

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assurance that's proposed in this proposed rulemaking
would lead the financial assurance costs in this well,
in this example, to exceed the economically justified
amount of financial assurance, those costs would
increase the fixed outflow line up, holding everything
else constant. It must be the case at the point at
which the net inflow curve crosses below this fixed
outflow line would move to the left.

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This is an important point, because when this curve, this net inflow curve, falls below the fixed outflow line, the well starts producing at a loss. So it's about that point that the operator would find an economic incentive to plug the well, not necessarily exactly that point because there's some auction value in the well. Who knows? Maybe commodity prices will increase tomorrow. But generally, this is about the time that an operator would find it from a purely economic perspective advantageous to plug the well.

So having established that the economic life of oil and gas wells will be shortened by the proposed rule, I've asked myself this question: What would have happened had we applied this rule several years ago? Because I think, based on what I believe the incentives are for operators in terms of avoiding

1	the 15 percent threshold, I think that it would be
2	highly likely that a lot of marginal wells would be
3	plugged prematurely.
4	And so I looked at June of 2017 in the
5	data supplied by Enverus. I'm looking at vertical
6	wells only. And in this month, June 2017, I applied
7	the definition for marginal well status to every
8	single one of these vertical wells in New Mexico. And
9	I collected all of the wells that would have been
LO	categorized as marginal under the proposed rule, and
L1	there is about 7,800 of these, exactly 7,844 of these
L2	wells.
L3	A great majority of them are listed in
L4	row 1. Row 1 through 6, as you decline down the
L5	table, increase in terms of the amount of barrels of
L6	oil equivalent produced on a per well basis.
L7	So the top row consists of all marginal
L8	classified wells in June 2017 that ultimately went on
L9	to produce next to nothing. And there are quite a few
20	of these wells. In fact, there's 6,260 of them.
21	Collectively, these 6,260 wells produced only 418,000
22	barrels of oil equivalent in the seven years after
23	June 2017. So pretty much none of these return to any
24	sort of meaningful production. Now, a number of these
25	have actually been plugged in the years since. In

1 fact, of those 6,260, 2,561 have already been plugged. 2 As we move down the table, I'm 3 categorizing wells into buckets according to how productive those wells are. In the second row, this 4 5 consists of wells that went on to produce between 1,000 and 5,000 barrels of oil equivalent. In total, 6 when you think about aggregating these 892 wells on row 2, they cumulatively, over those seven years, 8 9 produce almost 2.3 million barrels of oil equivalent. 10 This gets larger and larger as you move 11 down the table. If we look at the last row, these 12 would be the most prolific of these wells. There's 13 only six of these wells, but these six wells went on to produce over a million barrels of oil equivalent. 14 15 Again, this all would have transpired after the point 16 at which these wells would have been characterized as 17 marginal. Given the incentives that I think 18 19

Given the incentives that I think operators would have with regard to should I plug this well I think that's entering into marginal status, because it has the threat of dramatically increasing the financial assurance burden on the entire portfolio, given the 15 percent threshold, I think there's a strong incentive to plug marginal wells. Had these wells been plugged prematurely, we never

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would have realized this production.

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Some specific examples of the wells in this data set. Here is one, the San Juan 36 Unit 407. You can see here, it's got a fairly -- it almost looks like the classic arc/decline curve. For decades, this well was very, very consistent. You can see there was a brief cessation of production, though, right at the point where -- I think this was about June 2017, in which it was characterized as marginal because there's about a year where it didn't produce anything.

Now, that obviously was a brief cessation in this overall consistent period of production. And it may be that this well would have returned to production and would not have been prematurely plugged. Although you have to consider the fact that the likelihood that it would have been plugged is much higher than it would be absent the 15 percent threshold.

other examples include the federal G 1 well. This almost looks like a poster child of a well that should be plugged. If you were to look at this in June of 2017, you can see that the production had been declining for a long period of time. In the few years preceding June 2017, not only was the production extremely low, but it was erratic. It may have been

1	determined that this is a well that should have been
2	plugged. And yet, with some stimulation, this well
3	has gone on to become a prolific producer.
4	Another example, this one is almost
5	certainly involved in a CO2 flood, but has undergone a
6	couple different rounds of stimulation. You can see
7	at multiple points in its history it would have been
8	classified as marginal and, again, the likelihood of
9	it being prematurely plugged cannot be ignored.
LO	It's something that I think is visually,
L1	at least for me, convincing that there are a lot of
L2	different stories here behind where a well a well's
L3	individual story in terms of what brought it to
L4	marginal status. I don't think it's a uniform
L 5	categorization. I think there's a lot of variety in
L6	the types of wells that you find categorized as
L7	marginal.
L8	And certainly in these cases that I'm
L9	showing you, these are wells that should not have been
20	plugged at those times. I'll give you one last
21	example. This is the Scott 2A well. This is operated
22	by San Juan Resources, a small independent operator.
23	San Juan Resources purchased this well
24	right at the bottom of that first hill. Right at the
25	point where it would have been classified as marginal,

1	it had effectively ceased producing entirely, San Juan
2	Resources purchased the well, brought it back onto
3	production, and it's been producing at a stable rate
4	ever since.
5	So again, examples of marginal wells
6	that have plenty of productive potential in the months
7	and even years after which it would have been
8	classified as marginal. The effects of these proposed
9	rules, I think, will disproportionately affect small
10	operators.
11	Now, in order to make this a little bit
12	more clear, I'm going to give you guys this table
13	here, which is IPANM Exhibit 8.
14	In this table, I've taken my Enverus
15	data, which, again, is a subset of vertical wells
16	only. But here, I'm looking only at the vertical
17	wells in my sample that are either on state or private
18	fee lands as of November 2024, which is where my data
19	ends.
20	Now of these 376 operators identified in
21	the data, I've ranked them according to how many wells
22	each operator operates. So the first row is the very
23	smallest of these operators. There are 61 of these
24	operators, each operating a single well. So in
25	comparison to the total number of wells that we've

1	been talking about here, I know Mr. Purvis has
2	mentioned 63,000 wells, we're talking about a very,
3	very small amount of wells in terms of the grand
4	scheme.
5	I'm offering this table as a way to
6	illustrate how the proposed rule can be somewhat
7	regressive in terms of actually producing financial
8	assurance burdens that are particularly high on the
9	smallest operators and low for the largest operators.
10	For these 61 operators that operate a
11	single well, the average bond per well under the
12	existing rules was about \$39,000. Under the proposed
13	rules, the average would be \$150,000; again, because
14	the rules require a uniform single-well bonding
15	requirement of \$150,000 per well. It represents a
16	very significant increase in the actual bonding
17	amount, but again, the costs associated with the
18	bonding proposal here may actually be more than just
19	the multiple increase in the amount of the bond
20	because this may coincide with an increase in the
21	bonding premium charged on those bonds.
22	As we move down the table, we get to row
23	2, it's operators that operate between two and ten
24	wells. There are 130 of those operators. You can see
25	their average bond per well increases from almost

1 28,000 to a little over 100,000. 2 As you move down the list, you get 3 larger and larger operators in terms of the size of 4 their portfolio. However, I want to remind you that 5 this is only for vertical wells. And the largest operators, take the last row, for example, operators 6 with more than 500 wells, these are some of the 8 largest operators in the state, they almost certainly 9 have large numbers of horizontal wells, for example, that would not be included in this data. 10 11 Nevertheless, the table hopefully makes 12 clear that the proposed rules disproportionately 13 affect the smallest of the operators out there. Continuing on this theme, I'd like to 14 15 maybe do a little bit of an example, sort of a toy 16 example, thinking about what would be the percentage 17 increase to the fixed operating costs for wells, given various levels of these operating expenses. 18 19 Going back to my earlier picture of that 20 straight, flat, fixed outflow line and the declining 2.1 curve representing net inflows, we know that the 22 decision to plug the well occurs about where the net 23 inflow meets the net outflow. 2.4 And so the wells that we should expect to be the most sensitive to increases in the financial 25

assurance costs should be wells that have fixed costs extremely close to their net inflows. So this table provides a sort of toy example for various bond premia and various lease operating costs to show you what the percentage increase would be over the base case lease operating expense that operators would face for these wells.

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I'm going to assume an increase in average bond amount per well of 110,000. I'm choosing that because that is the increase associated with the most sensitive of the operators in my previous table. That is the 61 operators, each operating a single well. I'm really asking what would happen to their lease operating expenses if they were to pay the proposed financial assurance burden at various rates of return.

So starting in row 1, I'm going to assume that the bond required rate of return is 10 percent, which, again, would probably be consistent with a cash bond. Again, if we're thinking about an operator that has a 10 percent cost of capital, which is fairly typical, there are studies done by -- sorry, not studies, but surveys done by the Society of Petroleum Evaluation Engineers, annual surveys that ask, amongst other things, what types of discount

1	rates do people assign in valuing various categories
2	of reserves. For proven developed and producing
3	reserves, PDPs, the most common discount rate is
4	10 percent. And so this is very typical, I think, of
5	what most operators would actually face in terms of
6	the cost of capital.
7	As you move down the table, the bond
8	premium declines until eventually you get to
9	1 percent. Now, for most operators that satisfy the
10	financial assurance obligation through a surety bond,
11	they're paying premiums on the order of 2 percent to
12	3 percent. But again, I want to caution that if we're
13	going to increase the amount of financial assurance,
14	it could be that the bond premium is going to increase
15	along with the amount of bond face value that's
16	required of these operators.
17	Nevertheless, I want to calculate the
18	percentage increase above the base lease operating
19	expense, assuming three different scenarios. In one

Nevertheless, I want to calculate the percentage increase above the base lease operating expense, assuming three different scenarios. In one scenario, which is column 4, I'm going to assume a lease operating expense of only 1,500 per month. This is extremely low. This is an amount that was quoted to me from one of six operators I interviewed. I also was quoted amounts of 2,500 a month and 5,000 a month.

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Page 263

The lease operating expenses typically

1	for oil wells will be much higher than this. In fact,
2	there may be gas wells that have higher lease
3	operating expenses as well. But these three give us
4	at least a rough approximation of what the effect
5	would be on the percentage increase above fixed costs
6	for the smallest, most sensitive operators.
7	At a rate of return of 10 percent in
8	column 1, this amount of bonding increase, given a
9	lease operating expense of \$5,000 per month, would
10	represent an 18 percent increase above base case fixed
11	operating costs. If we're talking about an operator
12	that has a margin of 15 to 20 percent, this represents
13	almost all of the profit margin on the well.
14	Now, as we move down the table, we might
15	think about if this operator is paying a premium
16	between 2 and 3 percent, let's say 2 percent, that
17	same \$5,000 a month LOE, the increase in financial
18	assurance, would represent only a 4 percent increase.
19	And so the point of this table is really
20	to illustrate that the sensitivity in terms of how we
21	think that the or how I think the proposed
22	financial assurance will affect operators, it's going
23	to be operators that face very high bond premium,
24	perhaps operators that are only posting cash bonds
25	because their cost of capital then becomes their cost

of bonding.	Not only is it about the rate of return
on the bond,	but it's also a function of the well in
terms of how	costly it is to continue operating that
well.	

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So, the conclusion from all this is that the operators that are going to be the most affected are likely going to be small and potentially financially constrained. Financially constrained operators are highly likely to have no recourse other than a cash bond. They likely do not have the resources required to access the surety bond market. These would be operators that have very little working capital, have very limited access to debt markets, very little collateral with which they can post secure loans and bonds. These are the types of operators that will be facing the highest increase in the financial assurance cost.

And to the extent that these are the most financially sensitive operators in the sample, my concern would be that the proposed rules may push some of these operators into financial distress and possibly bankruptcy. If there is no accommodation for financially constrained operators in the short run, my concern is that responsible operators may be rendered insolvent because of the increased financial assurance

1 This may ultimately, potentially, reduce the 2 amount of private funds available for plugging. I'm going to pivot here. Number one, 3 I'm amazed that I -- I think I speed ran through that. 4 5 I was a little thrown. But I would like to get into my rebuttal points at this point. 6 To begin with, I would like to address this notion of holdback that has been sponsored by 8 9 Mr. Purvis. Mr. Purvis has talked about this concept of holdback, which he characterizes as when a well 10 11 reaches a point in its life cycle where the amount of 12 expected cash flow in the future equals the amount of 13 plugging liability that will eventually have to be 14 paid in connection with that well. 15 And so there are a couple problems with 16 They're all rooted in this concept called the 17 "time value of money," which is central in finance. 18 This time value of money concept could be summed up in one sentence, and that's that: A dollar tomorrow is 19 20 worth less than a dollar today. And when you think about it, this has to 2.1 22 be true. If, for example, you could deposit a dollar into a savings account with no risk, let's say that 23 24 the savings account pays you 5 percent in a year. one year's time, your dollar would grow to become a 25

1 dollar and five cents. Therefore, a dollar today cannot be 2 worth a dollar tomorrow. It's worth a dollar and five 3 And this idea that money has a time value is 4 cents. 5 critical in how we value assets of all types. Now, holdback ignores the time value of 6 7 money because it adds cash flows from various periods 8 in time together without making the proper adjustment 9 to account for the time value of money. 10 In some sense, it's worthwhile to think 11 about why you can't do this. I've already sort of 12 described intuitively from a mathematical standpoint that a dollar today would be worth a dollar and five 13 cents a year from now. But I would really suggest 14 15 that you think about it in terms of money having time 16 units. A dollar a year from now is denominated 17 in time units a year from now. And just like it 18 doesn't make sense to add a U.S. dollar to a Canadian 19 20 dollar, it doesn't make any sense to add a dollar 2.1 today to a dollar tomorrow. They simply cannot be added together with any economic sense. 22 23 The way to think about plugging 2.4 decisions in terms of the expected value or the 25 expected future cash flows on a well is actually the

1 net present value, or NPV. I'm going to argue that 2 this is the right way to think about when to time the 3 plugging and abandonment of a well. And so what I'm showing you here is a 4 5 plot of the NPV as a function of the time until a well 6 is plugged and abandoned. In this simple example, we're going to assume the plugging cost is normalized 8 at negative 100. And so if you decide to plug the 9 well immediately at time zero, all the way over at the left side of the chart, the NPV is worth negative 100 10 11 because you have no cash flows from operating the 12 Instead, all you have is the negative 100 in 13 plugging cost. 14 As you wait to plug and abandon the 15 well, you will operate the well, presumably collecting 16 some positive net inflows from the sale of 17 hydrocarbons, less your fixed cost. And if you do this long enough, the NPV grows and grows and grows 18 19 until eventually you get to the top of the hill. 20 If you plug the well before you get to the top of the hill, you're leaving profitable 21 22 resources out in front of you. You're plugging too early, premature plugging. If you wait too long, you 23 24 will have entered a state where you start to operate the well at a loss, and this starts to chip away at 25

1 the net present value of the well. 2 And so when you're thinking about a valuation exercise to determine mathematically when is 3 the right time to plug and abandon the well, it's not 4 by adding cash flows together inter-temporally without any regard for the time value of money, it's by using 6 the proper time value of money technique to calculate 8 the NPV and find the top of the hill. In this case, 9 the optimal time to plug and abandon the well is about 12 years. 10 11 I'm going to work through a few 12 We'll start with the simplest one. examples. this is actually fairly similar to Mr. Purvis' example 13 in his direct testimony in which we have an asset that 14 15 produces a positive 25 million and ultimately has a 16 plugging expense of negative 25 million. I'm going to 17 simplify this as much as possible. 18 So I'm going to say you're going to get 19 positive 25 million today and you're going to plug the 20 well in exactly a year for negative 25 million. 2.1 this well would be in holdback because negative 25 22 million plus 25 million is zero. 23 I'm also going to assume a return on 2.4 savings equal to 10 percent, which, when we're thinking about PDPs, operators with PDPs, a 10 percent 25

1 discount rate again is pretty typical. This well is 2 in holdback, but it doesn't have no value. Mr. Purvis has said that a well in holdback is a liability. I'm 3 going to show you that it's anything but. 4 5 Not only is this not a liability, it has 6 considerable value. And it has to be the case because if you take that positive 25 million and you deposit 8 it at your rate of return of 10 percent, in exactly 9 one year, it will grow by 10 percent of 25 million or 2 and a half million dollars. 10 11 So at the end of one year, you're going 12 to end up with positive 27.5 million, at which point 13 you pay the 25 million in plugging expense and you're

left with a surplus of 2 and a half million dollars. It cannot be the case that this is a liability. is a valuable asset.

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Let's look at a slightly more complicated example, but the same rules apply, the same concepts apply. This, again, is going to add \$25 million in positive cash flows, but this time instead of coming at one lump sum at time zero, I'm going to spread this out over time, similar to an oil well where it's declining over time until eventually, in year five, you have to pay the negative \$25 million in plugging expense.

This well, again, is in holdback because
if you add up the positive 25 million in green cash
flows, they equal exactly the negative 25 million in
plugging expense. While this well is in holdback, I'm
going to show you again that this well actually does
have considerable value. And I'm going to show you a
couple of these tables, and so I'm going to invest a
little bit of time to walk through this table.
This is IPANM supplemental Exhibit 30,
and what I'm showing you here is a table that tracks
the balance of an investment over time. As you walk
down the table on column 1, you're keeping track of
which year it is, starting in year one and then
eventually ending up in year five at the bottom of the
table, our beginning balance, we start at zero
dollars. Our growth in savings, because we started
with zero dollars, is zero dollars.
But in year one, we get to the third
column, or rather the fourth column, where we invest,
or withdraw in this case we invest the \$10 million
positive cash flow we received from operating the
well.
I'm going to walk back to that picture
one more time to show you that 10 million. That's
that first green bar over on the left. It's a

Τ	positive 10 million in year one, then it declines to
2	7 million in year two, and 5 million in year three,
3	3 million in year four.
4	When we go back to this table, you can
5	see in that column where, in row one, we have positive
6	10 million. If we walk down that column, we see those
7	positive cash flows, 10 million in year one, 7 million
8	in year two, 5 million in year three, 3 million in
9	year four. Then ultimately, at the end of year five,
10	we pay our negative 25 million dollar plugging
11	expense.
12	The trick here is to notice what happens
13	along the way, because before we have to pay that
14	negative 25 million, we have a series of positive cash
15	flows that we've been able to invest at some positive
16	rate of return; in this case, 10 percent.
17	So in the first row, we start with a
18	zero balance, we make our first deposit of 10 million,
19	our ending balance is 10 million. At the beginning of
20	year two, we start with the previous year's ending
21	balance, \$10 million, and now we have our first
22	instance of a growth in savings. Because we earned
23	10 percent on our money, we're going to earn
24	\$1 million over that year two.
25	To this \$11 million, we're going to add
	Dago 272
	Page 272

1	the \$7 million from operating the well, to ultimately
2	end up at \$18 million as our ending balance at the end
3	of year two.
4	That balance carries forward to the next
5	row down, where the beginning balance starts at 18
6	million. This time our growth in savings is
7	10 percent times 18 million, or \$1.8 million. To
8	that, we add the \$5 million from operating the well in
9	that year. Now we get an ending balance of
10	\$24.8 million.
11	And we keep doing this until eventually
12	we get to year five, and in year five, we have a
13	beginning balance of a little over \$30 million. We
14	accrue interest or growth in savings of a little over
15	\$3 million on that balance. And then we pay the
16	plugging liability of 25 million. But at the end of
17	the day, after we've paid the plugging liability, we
18	end up with a surplus of a little over \$83 million.
19	So again, we have a case in which we
20	have a well in holdback, which Mr. Purvis, again,
21	defines as a liability; by definition, something that
22	has no value. And yet, it has considerable value, in
23	this case over \$8.3 million, five years from now. Now
24	that surplus of \$8.3 million, that only arrives in
25	exactly five years, right, because we have to get to a

1	point where we actually pay all the cash flows, right,
2	we pay the plugging expense, we've collected the cash
3	flows from operating the well for these five years.
4	How does this surplus in five years time
5	relate to the net present value that I was trying to
6	convince you is the way to think about valuing the
7	well? Well, it turns out that the net present value
8	is the amount of money that we would have to deposit
9	today in order to end up with exactly \$8.3 million
LO	five years from now.
L1	I can show you that with another table.
L2	So if we start in year one and we deposit the net
L3	present value of 5.1 million, and then we make no
L4	investments at all so we're not thinking about the
L5	same example where we have positive cash flows, we
L6	deposit into the account over time. This example,
L7	we're not making any other investments other than the
L8	initial investment of the NPV 5.1 million. If we do
L9	that at our 10 percent rate of return, we will end up
20	with \$8.3 million in surplus, the exact same surplus
21	from the project we just looked at.
22	And so that's really what the NPV is.
23	It tells us in today's dollars what the expected
24	surplus is associated with the project.
25	So again, we've got a project that is

1 not a liability. In fact, it's an asset that any 2 rational buyer in the market would be willing to pay \$5.15 million for. 3 Staying on this topic, again, sort of 4 5 using these tables that we sort of invested a little 6 bit of time in figuring out how they work, let's ask some other questions that have to do with the time 8 value of money and the expected plugging expense. 9 One question might be, how much money do we have to set aside today in order to make sure that 10 11 we cover that \$25 million five years from now? 12 Because if we go back to my original picture with the 13 NPV in terms of what is the optimal time to plug the well, if we have an estimate of when we think that is, 14 15 we could plan for it. We could set aside money for 16 it. 17 Question is, how much would we have to set aside today? You have the savings rate of 18 19 10 percent. Turns out we would only have to set aside 20 \$15.5 million. That's the beginning balance investment in year one in this table, which is IPANM 2.1 supplemental Exhibit 32. If we deposit that amount, 22 23 and it grows at a 10 percent rate of return, we will end up with exactly 25 million, the exact amount we 2.4

will need to make sure we can plug that well.

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1	And as this relates to the optimal or
2	ideal, theoretical ideal, financial assurance bonding
3	amount, again, we see that there is another reason why
4	we would expect that the ideal bonding amount should
5	fall short of the expected cost of plugging and
6	abandoning the well. In this case, our expected P&A
7	cost is 25 million, and yet, because we have a
8	positive rate of return on our savings, we only have
9	to set aside \$15.5 million today in order to satisfy
10	that obligation.
11	Now, I have played a little bit of a
12	trick on you, because 10 percent rate of return is an
13	appropriate cost of capital for a risky business.
14	This assumes that the operator can take that money and
15	redeposit it into his own operations, but those
16	operations are risky. So to the extent that I may be
17	exaggerating somewhat the amount of money you have to
18	deposit today in order to satisfy that future
19	obligation, it could be that I'm ignoring some of the
20	risk inherent in this 10 percent rate of return, and
21	that may be true.
22	So let's do the same exercise, except
23	this time let's completely remove risk from the
24	equation. What if we, instead of deploying that 15

million into our own operations at a rate of return of

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10 percent, let's think about what if we deposit it in				
treasury bills or a risk-free rate of return. This				
way our money is going to grow at 4 percent, and I				
looked this up a couple months ago when I wrote my				
testimony, and it turns out not much has changed in				
treasury yield since. The ten-year treasury yield is				
still about 4 percent. So this is actually a				
realistic, risk-free rate of return.				

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If we deposit \$20.5 million today risk-free in treasury bills, we will end up with the \$25 million we need to plug the well in five years? So again, even absent risk, it is still the case that the optimal amount we need to set aside today to cover future plugging expenses is strictly lower than the expected value of P&A costs. And that's just because of the time value of money.

There is one last example I want to provide because the last example I gave you assumed that we have an operator that actually has \$20 million to set aside today to cover that future cost, which as we've heard from numerous people, and as I've tried to suggest as well, that we have a number of operators that are financially constrained. And this means that their financial resources are limited, and we shouldn't expect that they have that type of liquidity

1	that they can pump that amount of money down right
2	now.
3	So let's relax this even further, again,
4	keeping the risk-free rate of return, so we've got no
5	risk here whatsoever. Instead of having to deposit
6	anything right now, let's just use the cash flow from
7	operating the well to self-finance the plugging
8	liability at the end of five years. We invest the \$10
9	million from operating the well in year one, that then
LO	grows. We invest the \$7 million that we get from
L1	operating the well in year two, that then grows and we
L2	keep doing this.
L3	We could self-fund the liability at a
L4	risk-free rate of return and still end up with a
L5	surplus of \$3.1 million at the end of five years.
L6	Again, this is a well that would be characterized as a
L7	liability, it is in holdback.
L8	And this is emblematic of why this
L9	notion of holdback should not be relied on in any
20	matters concerning the value of oil and gas wells. It
21	shouldn't be used as a measure of determining the
22	optimal time to plugging and abandoned well, because
23	it's divorced from fundamental economic principles
24	regarding the time value of money.
25	I'd like to say a little bit about what
	Page 278

1	I think would be practical limitations to avoiding the
2	proposed 15 percent threshold. Mr. Purvis has
3	testified that over 52 percent of operators in
4	New Mexico are already in breach of the 15 percent
5	threshold. This strikes me as a lot of operators, and
6	so to the extent that we think that operators would
7	have no trouble in adapting to this policy, half of
8	operators in the state is a large number. I'm not
9	necessarily confident that all of them would be able
LO	to adapt in time.
L1	This is to say nothing of the permitting
L2	processes that are involved, the availability of
L3	plugging services. All of this likely limits the
L4	number of wells that could be plugged in short order.
L5	And, of course, if we're going to credit operators
L6	with an ability to adapt to the proposed rules, I
L7	believe they'll do so by prematurely plugging their
L8	marginal wells in order to avoid the steep FA cost
L9	increase associated with the 15 percent threshold.
20	All of this should be administratively
21	burdensome, because, of course, plugging wells
22	necessarily means they have to be inspected, and all
23	of this takes time and resources.
24	Another aspect of the proposed rule that
25	I think might be difficult to implement in terms of

1	feasibility, the definition of marginal well, as
2	you've heard, is a two-pronged inquiry.
3	It's the number of production days, does
4	it produce less than 180 days a year, and does it
5	produce fewer than 1,000 barrels of oil equivalent in
6	a year. This is a graph showing these two dimensions
7	in Mr. Purvis' testimony. And he's got some
8	color-coding here to identify marginal wells in blue,
9	and in purple we have some no-beneficial-use wells,
10	and so on and so forth. Although the wells in black,
11	presumably, are wells that would not be classified as
12	marginal.
13	Now, I looked at this picture, and one
14	thing jumped out at me, looked a little bit strange,
15	and I highlighted these, what appear to be vertical
16	lines with some red arrows just to draw your eye.
17	This type of bunching, where we see almost really
18	vertical lines throughout the data, as you move from
19	right to left or left to right, these bunching occur
20	almost exactly at intervals of 30 or 31 days, right?
21	So 30, 31, 60, 61, 62, they are almost
22	certainly the number of calendar days in a month,
23	which this tells me that there's already considerable
24	leeway in how operators are able to report this data.
25	Now, if you are going to adopt a rule that requires
	Page 280

1	that you need to depend on an accurate measure of the
2	number of production days, this may be quite difficult
3	to monitor.
4	And this type of bunching tells me that
5	this rule may actually serve to help to weed out
6	honest reporters who will not fudge what they tell the
7	department, the Division, as opposed to bad actors
8	who, by definition, would have less misgivings from
9	misleading the department Division, excuse me,
10	along the dimension of the number of production days.
11	And so my concern is that this may not
12	catch the bad actors we're concerned about, and may
13	actually weed out honest, responsible operators at the
14	same time.
15	Lastly, this is a chart from I know
16	this is credited to the Interstate Oil and Gas Compact
17	Commission, but I believe I pulled this from one of
18	the Department of Interior's annual reports,
19	regardless. The source of the picture is the IOGCC.
20	And what this shows us here is the recent trend in
21	documented orphaned wells.
22	And I'm going to argue that the recent
23	trend is almost certainly policy-induced as opposed to
24	any real indication of the physical number of orphaned
25	wells in the United States.

1	So if I can draw your attention all the			
2	way to the right side of the plot, in 2024 we have			
3	141,000 and almost 142,000 orphaned wells. If you			
4	walk back to the left, the next data point is 131,000			
5	orphan wells, and that's in 2021. So pretty			
6	significant increase, right? We're increasing by			
7	about 10,000 over a three-year period.			
8	But the real increase occurs between			
9	2019 and 2021. 2019, we have a count of 61,246			
10	orphaned wells, and by the time you get to 2021, only			
11	two years later, you're all the way up at 131,000			
12	plus.			
13	Question is, why do we see this steep			
14	increase? Again, this is the amount of documented			
15	orphaned wells. There is a pretty unfortunate data			
16	visualization cardinal sin here which is not making			
17	the units of one of your axes consistent.			
18	I want you to look at the leftmost data			
19	point, the 49,743. Based on the number of years that			
20	elapsed between the 2019 number and the 2024 number,			
21	you might expect this leftmost value would be			
22	somewhere around 2010, and yet it's 1992. So the			
23	x-axis here is not uniform in terms of spacing.			
24	What this graph actually tells us, as			
25	opposed to a recent trend, and this is between 1992			

Τ	and 2019, so almost a 30-year period, the number of
2	documented orphaned wells is relatively flat,
3	fluctuating between 49,000 and 62,000. It's only in
4	the last couple of years, especially between 2019 and
5	2021, that we've had this large increase in the number
6	of documented wells.
7	And I'm going to argue the most likely
8	reason for this is it's policy-induced. There are
9	federal grants earmarked toward addressing orphaned
LO	wells at this time. If we go back to the passage of
11	the BIL, the Department of the Interior has grants
12	that they're going to award states based on need. And
13	so there is an incentive at the state level to
14	document as many orphaned wells as possible at this
15	time, and that could go a long way toward explaining
16	why we see the recent trend.
17	And to the extent that people have been
18	citing this trend as an indication of some future
L9	continuation of this trend, I would hesitate somewhat.
20	I would argue that, because this is likely
21	policy-induced, there isn't as much reason to expect
22	that this trend is going to continue.
23	MR. CLOUTIER: Madam Hearing Officer, that
24	concludes Dr. Arscott's direct and rebuttal
25	testimony. We're right at 5 o'clock. I would

1	anticipate he's got about 15 minutes of surrebuttal.
2	So I don't know what we want to do with our time.
3	HEARING OFFICER ORTH: I think we want a
4	break now.
5	MR. CLOUTIER: That's what I thought.
6	HEARING OFFICER ORTH: Well, we've actually
7	been going two hours.
8	MR. CLOUTIER: Yes. That's fine. I'm just
9	not in charge, so I don't want to presume that I am.
10	HEARING OFFICER ORTH: Thank you so much.
11	All right, we'll resume at 9:00 in the
12	morning and we'll start with public comment and then
13	we'll do your surrebuttal.
14	THE WITNESS: Okay. Thank you very much.
15	HEARING OFFICER ORTH: Thank you so much.
16	(Proceedings adjourned at 5:00 p.m.)
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	Page 284

1	AFFIRMATION OF COMPLETION OF TRANSCRIPT
2	
3	I, Kelli Gallegos, DO HEREBY AFFIRM on
4	November 4, 2025, a hearing of the New Mexico Oil
5	Conservation Commission was taken before me via video
6	conference.
7	I FURTHER AFFIRM that I did report in
8	stenographic shorthand the proceedings as set forth
9	herein, and the foregoing is a true and correct
10	transcript of the proceedings to the best of my
11	ability.
12	I FURTHER AFFIRM that I am neither employed
13	by nor related to any of the parties in this matter
14	and that I have no interest in the final disposition
15	of this matter.
16	Hell Gallon.
17	Kelli Gallegos
	VERITEXT LEGAL SOLUTIONS
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	Albuquerque, New Mexico 87102
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	Page 285

[& - 150]

&	224:4 242:8	107 4:7	133 10:11,12
& 2:21 3:3,4	243:16 245:15	109 4:7	75:16 158:20
	245:17 249:21	10:50 78:19	1350 165:16
0	262:19,21	11 129:3	137 153:1
0.6 24:21	263:4 264:7	246:20 272:25	186:15 188:17
00 188:8	269:24,25	110 4:8	14 117:10
1	270:8,9 271:20	110,000 262:9	1400 165:24
1 47:7 173:3	271:24 272:1,6	111.8 244:3	141,000 282:3
221:16 237:17	272:7,16,18,19	113 180:1	142,000 282:3
238:8 255:14	272:21,23	1148 3:18	15 8:7 63:20
255:14 257:19	273:7 274:19	115 4:8	78:12,17,21
262:17 263:9	275:19,23	11:00 78:17,19	87:7 99:8
264:8 271:12	276:12,20	12 109:21	103:22 129:9
272:24	277:1 278:8	137:24 139:21	137:24 139:22
1,000 3:4	10,000 155:25	174:22 175:1,2	147:15 155:15
187:16,17	282:7	175:12 191:9	156:19 157:25
215:4 217:10	100 11:4 21:1	223:12 225:5	158:6,19 191:9
217:21,22	28:8 46:9	269:10	204:24 222:10
218:11 256:6	87:24 88:11	120 204:13	223:12 234:10
280:5	102:1 120:11	120,000 204:7	234:17 242:8
1,250 12:4	131:18,19	206:23	244:25 245:24
1,350 154:6	132:3,21 147:7	1220 1:6 2:10	249:9,17,18
1,450 154:6	153:1 167:2	125 3:14	250:6 251:6
1,500 263:21	180:6,16,17	188:18 189:16	252:3,11,25
1,700 154:7	186:22 189:16	194:7 207:1	255:1 256:23
1.5 250:10	217:9,9 218:2	127 5:6	257:18 264:12
251:13	218:4,6 220:24	128 4:10	276:24 279:2,4
1.6 29:20 30:13	224:1 245:3	12th 6:4	279:19 284:1
36:3	268:8,10,12	13 52:19 53:10	15,000 129:10
1.8 17:14 273:7	100,000 204:7	109:9	15.5 72:17
10 2:16 77:2	204:11 242:18	130 132:4	275:20 276:9
88:19 139:21	242:19,23	260:24	150 22:12
141:6 151:24	261:1	131,000 282:4	74:11 207:3
161:21 174:22	105 285:18	282:11	212:22 223:2
175:2 193:1			224:9,20,20

[150,000 - 225]

150,000 13:15	1850 s 163:2	1991 129:1	2015 139:11
18:6 70:8	1859 163:6	1991 129.1 1992 282:22,25	162:9
133:10 154:23	19 87:7 243:13	1:15 125:13,15	2017 22:2
183:11 188:6	19 87.7 243.13 19.15.2 1:10	1:15 125.13,13 1st 1:5 58:23	255:4,6,18,23
195:18,19	19.15.25 1:10		257:8,22,24
205:6,14,21	176:23	2	2019 72:16
206:7,11	176.23 19.15.25.8b	2 2:4 155:10	152:22 282:9,9
209:19 242:11	176:20	173:4 176:24	282:20 283:1,4
242:17,24	1 76:20 19.15.5 1:10	208:9 221:16	202 4:12
1		227:15 245:20	
244:19 245:4,9	19.15.8 1:10	253:5 256:8	2020 231:16
245:10,16 249:24 250:7	19.15.8.12	260:23 263:11	2021 122:4,11
251:11 252:17	57:19 19.15.8.9a 49:4	264:16,16	144:17 282:5,9 282:10 283:5
	53:20,24 55:6	270:10,14	2022 144:16
260:13,15 16 117:10	19.15.9 1:10	2,000 133:22	2022 144:16 2023 16:19
118:14 158:19	19.15.9 1:10 19.15.9.8 47:2	195:13	158:21 229:5
163,000 71:16	19.15.9.9 47.2	2,318 180:1	2024 10:10
72:10,12 73:9	19.15.9.9 47:2 1920s 130:1	2,500 263:24	16:19 72:16
73:13 187:22	1920s 130.1 1926 208:7	2,561 256:1	118:10 147:13
164 4:10	1920 208:7 1955 7:24	2.3 256:9	158:21 179:23
169 4:11	1955 7.24 1959 10:22	20 15:10	243:20 259:18
17 204:24	138:11	122:19 132:7	282:2,20
17 204.24 1700 165:15	1960s 138:12	151:23 153:2	2025 1:14
18 75:9 173:24	1965 139:20	173:24 189:11	118:16 119:4
264:10 273:2,5	1903 139.20 1970 112:10,19	243:16 250:4	285:4
273:7	1970 112.10,19 1977 10:25	264:12 277:19	203 4:12
180 77:3,7,25	1977 10.23 1980s 147:19	20,000 129:10	203 4.12 21 152:9
77:25 133:19	1986 33:15	20.5 277:9	155:10 190:8
155:14 156:20	162:10	200 157:20	210 187:20
171:16 217:7	1988 128:19	191:5,25	188:8
217:13,14,20	199 4:11	210:17 219:11	213 3:14
217:25 218:5,6	1990 129:12	2000 208:7	22 117:8
280:4	1990s 147:20	2001 129:14	2208 2:21
1800s 7:12,18	163:3	2010 282:22	225 4:13
13005 7.12,10	103.3	2011 117:5	1.15

	1	1	
23 129:1	2:48 202:2	34 5:6 44:3	40 7:22 49:8
235 4:14	2a 258:21	121:25 125:23	112:23 130:5
238 5:8	2l 173:3	127:13,18	150:16 180:19
24 243:14	3	130:25	226:25
24.8 273:10	3 61:1,1 132:1	349 154:24	400 152:22
24683 6:5	177:1 203:22	35 122:18	192:4 210:18
25 132:7	221:16 245:20	350 154:4,24	400,000 250:1,9
145:24 173:24	263:12 264:16	165:5,15	403 197:3
189:12 269:15		166:15 189:9	198:20,22
269:16,19,20	272:3,8 273:15	36 5:8 122:1	407 257:3
269:21,22	3,000 141:13	237:17 238:8	409 2:4
270:7,9,13,20	166:1 188:5,16	257:3	418,000 255:21
270:24 271:2,3	189:10 203:6	37 5:4 42:25	425 190:12
272:10,14	210:16 223:1,2	43:13,16	43 5:4,5
273:16 275:11	3,100 178:19	376 259:20	45 4:5 5:5 43:4
275:24 276:7	223:1	38 5:4 42:25	43:8,10,18,21
277:11	3,150 170:18	43:13,17 47:14	43:22 44:21
250 33:8	187:14,20	131:8 203:24	71:9 78:21
250,000 96:23	191:8 202:21	39 5:4 42:25	450 178:20
96:25 97:6	203:6	43:13,17	188:7 223:2
98:13 100:10	3.1 278:15	39,000 260:12	46 86:3
100:16 108:2	3.5 173:23	3:00 202:1,2	49,000 283:3
108:13 249:25	3.75 220:8	3:47 234:2	49,743 282:19
26 208:8	30 35:16 41:12	3rd 142:13	4th 3:4
27,000 141:2	203:1 219:12	4	5
27.5 270:12	271:9 273:13	-	_
28 113:3,4	280:20,21	4 1:14 61:4	5 31:15 53:13
28,000 261:1	283:1	165:9,21	53:15 111:2
285 5:9	300 74:1,4,7	203:24 205:3,4	122:12 131:16
28943 285:16	195:17 200:9	234:4 263:20	131:20 155:10
29 5:8 237:17	210:17,18	264:18 277:3,7	161:15 170:6
238:8	30s 130:2	285:4	170:15 202:21
	31 280:20,21	4,000 17:6	208:9,21
299 154:19	32 10:7 275:22	29:19	221:16 222:8,9
200:8	33 179:15	4,400 28:3	248:21 266:24
			272:2,8 273:8
	L		

283:25	6	7,000 133:23	8
5,000 166:17		7,800 255:11	_
204:4 256:6	6 4:3 121:4	7,844 255:11	8 88:19 141:6
263:24 264:9	161:16 213:17	7-29b 173:3	174:22 175:2
264:17	213:18 255:14	70 187:7	259:13 8.500 204:4
5.1 274:13,18	6,000 124:4	70-2-14 79:8	8,500 204:4
5.15 275:3	6,260 255:20,21	110:10	8.3 273:23,24
5.25 220:9	256:1	70-2-14a 56:12	274:9,20
50 74:11 87:12	60 4:6 83:8,17	70-2-3 87:1	80 135:9 137:7
87:24 88:12	116:18 118:16	70-2-38b 182:4	152:19
90:1 140:4	137:6 147:12 147:23 151:19	183:25	800 124:6
144:24 191:4	228:2 243:20	70-2-3a 45:12	187:16 80s 226:13
191:20 203:1	280:21	70-2.3 82:13	82 155:8
225:4		700 17:5,14	83 273:18
50,000 61:13,16	60,000 13:9 600 88:15	28:1 29:20	84 4:6
69:8 74:13,13	61 259:23	30:13 38:10	85 139:20
207:2 242:18	260:10 262:12	165:22 166:22	87 162:10
251:9	280:21	171:15 217:6	87102 3:5
500 3:4 188:9	61,246 282:9	217:25 223:10	285:18
188:17,19	62 280:21	702 29:18	87199 3:10
191:14 192:4,7	62,000 283:3	72 129:15	87501 2:4 3:14
261:7 285:18	63,000 170:12	74 161:15	87504 2:22
51 161:15	202:21 203:2,2	75 129:16	3:19
513 187:23,23	260:2	139:20 154:25	87505 2:11
52 154:23	630 132:13	186:21 189:12	88 52:1
279:3	66 17:12 30:12	750 124:16	88202 2:16
53 161:16	151:20	133:18,22	89 224:5
55 112:20	66,700 187:19	215:4 217:10	892 256:7
244:1	66.7 187:6,15	218:5,6,10	
56 93:10 187:6		231:25	9
575-993 31:24	7	76 151:22	9 5:8 75:9
58 99:3 103:21	7 111:24	187:8 243:22	237:17 238:8
59 142:1	122:17,18	79 161:20	248:23,25
5:00 284:16	226:21 272:2,7		90 135:9
	273:1 278:10		142:24 152:19
			161:20 175:13

39:24 110:8	218:10,17	account 141:13
154:1 175:20	224:19 241:3	266:23,24
181:14,16	272:15 279:9	267:9 274:16
240:7 248:1	280:24	accountability
268:6 278:22	above 77:25	25:17 123:4
abandoning	210:6 244:12	231:17
110:12 240:7	263:18 264:5	accountable
276:6	264:10	26:18,23 36:14
abandonment	absent 257:17	accountants
142:18,19	277:12	115:19
176:7,22	absolutely	accrue 273:14
241:17,25	54:23 84:1	accurate 68:5
242:4 268:3	85:25 94:17	171:3 185:19
abiernoff 3:21	195:19 201:24	190:2 227:18
ability 50:20	abuse 14:4	281:1
68:2 71:7	abuses 87:16	achieve 10:20
89:23 93:11	89:3,25 90:24	44:15
96:10 105:21	91:3	acloutier 2:17
118:1 134:18	abusive 91:19	acquire 50:13
214:19 241:10	accept 66:21	acquired 130:7
279:16 285:11	180:3,7 183:6	163:11
able 7:13,16	183:7 188:16	acquisition
11:9 34:15,22	228:1	49:7,12 50:1
59:6 67:6	acceptable	50:14,25 51:6
94:19 96:1	171:7 172:11	67:13 68:13
97:10 100:7	accepted	147:20
106:11 126:3	160:12	acquisitions
127:2 143:11	access 211:23	236:11
160:10 163:15	215:19 216:3	acres 129:10
169:25 178:3	265:11,13	act 12:18 25:23
178:11 191:10	accommodati	30:16 40:3,3
191:24,25	265:22	45:13 56:11
192:7 205:13	accordance	72:4 73:3 76:1
206:16 209:2	176:23 182:9	76:4 78:5 79:6
211:14 217:1		87:1 108:24,25
	154:1 175:20 181:14,16 240:7 248:1 268:6 278:22 abandoning 110:12 240:7 276:6 abandonment 142:18,19 176:7,22 241:17,25 242:4 268:3 abiernoff 3:21 ability 50:20 68:2 71:7 89:23 93:11 96:10 105:21 118:1 134:18 214:19 241:10 279:16 285:11 able 7:13,16 11:9 34:15,22 59:6 67:6 94:19 96:1 97:10 100:7 106:11 126:3 127:2 143:11 160:10 163:15 169:25 178:3 178:11 191:10 191:24,25 192:7 205:13 206:16 209:2	154:1 175:20 224:19 241:3 181:14,16 272:15 279:9 240:7 248:1 280:24 268:6 278:22 above 77:25 abandoning 210:6 244:12 110:12 240:7 263:18 264:5 276:6 264:10 abandonment absent 257:17 142:18,19 277:12 176:7,22 absolutely 241:17,25 54:23 84:1 242:4 268:3 85:25 94:17 ability 50:20 abuse 14:4 68:2 71:7 abuse 87:16 89:23 93:11 89:3,25 90:24 96:10 105:21 91:3 118:1 134:18 abusive 91:19 24:19 241:10 accept 66:21 279:16 285:11 180:3,7 183:6 183:7 188:16 183:7 188:16 11:9 34:15,22 228:1 59:6 67:6 acceptable 171:7 172:11 access 211:23 160:12 12 access 211:23 25:19 216:3 265:11,13 169:25 178:3 265:11,13 178:11 191:10 accommodati 265:22 accordance <

[act - admitted]

110 15 140 01	4 11 7 10	111 0 0 1 1	060
119:15 142:21	actually 7:12	adding 9:8,11	96:9
142:22 173:10	7:17,23 62:5	116:12 194:24	adjoining
226:23,24	98:25 101:15	227:15 269:5	207:12
action 18:11	124:10 129:16	addition 20:1	adjourned
77:21,22 95:7	130:2 151:19	239:24 241:7	284:16
177:11 178:4	169:13 183:2	253:17	adjudicated
178:13 196:16	184:5 189:2	additional 9:5	48:4
198:9,13,14	190:1 200:2	9:11 63:21	adjudications
actions 75:13	204:18 222:3	89:22,24 90:25	47:20 94:16
77:6 107:1	231:11 232:7	91:16,16 92:21	adjustment
180:16	233:22 239:25	100:21,23	267:8
active 69:9	240:12,13,14	101:1,17	administer
98:11 129:17	240:18 241:23	116:12 135:12	190:25
129:24 170:19	245:16,18	165:24 227:15	administering
177:2 194:21	255:25 260:7	address 30:18	181:13
194:23 203:3	260:18 263:5	51:11,17,24	administration
actively 130:6	267:25 269:13	94:13 125:19	119:7 130:17
activities 34:6	271:5 274:1	139:12 198:14	130:19,21,24
101:11 103:16	277:7,19 281:5	198:14 223:21	236:14
181:25	281:13 282:24	243:10,25	administrations
activity 52:22	284:6	266:7	119:11
105:9 109:15	adam 2:22	addressed	administrative
109:20 114:16	155:9	196:21 221:23	64:20 86:17
223:15 238:25	adapt 279:10	addressing	administrativ
243:3	279:16	102:20 126:8	279:20
actors 18:8	adapting 279:7	283:9	administrator
133:1 135:2,8	add 59:2	adds 267:7	6:17
223:22 239:14	143:23 164:12	adequate 30:11	admiral 130:20
239:15 281:7	183:18 267:19	30:25 35:21	admission
281:12	267:20 270:19	96:16,21,22	43:10 44:11,15
acts 144:17	271:2 272:25	97:25 98:24	126:13 163:21
actual 102:13	273:8	100:15,16,16	admit 62:20
204:6 206:22	added 17:3	193:19	127:6,14
250:12 260:16	138:17 195:13	adequately	admitted 5:3
	267:22	71:6 95:22	43:15,16,21,22

[admitted - air]

127:18 164:4	35:5,8,11	ago 16:19	185:6,11
164:15,17	37:21 38:25	91:11 96:18	187:10,24,25
179:14 238:3,6	41:2 128:6	118:14 123:4	188:4 194:9
admitting	235:13 246:14	147:16 170:22	198:16 212:20
31:11	285:3,7,12	236:9 254:24	214:20 222:18
adopt 18:16	affirmation	277:4	230:5,7 233:8
21:5 25:24	285:1	agrankin 2:23	agreed 19:18
38:15 40:5	afford 18:9	agree 50:17	73:18 219:4
99:5 246:24	20:15 28:13,14	54:17,24 56:5	agreement 63:5
280:25	30:9 42:3	58:13 61:3,7	66:3 85:14
adoption 10:17	248:7,9	61:19,25 66:1	97:5 184:4,25
advanced	afternoon	67:22 68:20	185:17,18
198:25	44:13 169:3	69:15 70:4,10	188:5
advancements	199:9,11,17,22	70:12,13,15,22	agreements
33:9	201:23 225:21	71:8,20 73:13	48:5 64:22
advantageous	233:14 234:8	74:12,17 75:11	85:9,17,20,23
254:19	age 69:22 73:11	75:14,15,16,25	agrees 99:7
advisor 130:11	111:12,13	76:5,7,22 77:3	agricultural
130:15,22	112:1,1,3,4	77:9 78:4	42:13
advocate 23:18	219:4	81:14,16,17,23	ahead 10:4
afe 146:15	agencies 215:9	82:1,10,24	11:20 15:6
affairs 11:23	agency 7:21	83:2,15,23	26:11 27:16
affect 111:13	93:20 116:10	91:5 102:16	29:5 35:13
111:14 253:4	152:16 153:8	106:1 117:22	60:20,24 78:22
259:9 261:13	169:19 178:15	119:8,16,17,21	91:22 92:5
264:22	190:5 214:22	119:24 120:6	99:24 101:25
affected 265:6	215:1 227:12	120:18 121:24	123:25 128:9
affecting	agent 7:24	170:11,20,21	228:12 235:16
241:18	aggregating	172:9 173:20	237:25 246:16
affirm 6:13 7:3	256:7	174:3,7,16,18	249:3
10:1 11:17	aggressively	174:25 175:3,4	aid 239:23
15:3 19:1	192:25 193:17	175:11 176:13	air 23:23 25:12
21:17 23:6,13	194:21,23	176:18 177:7	25:21 36:15
26:8 27:14	aging 16:6,17	177:15 181:20	38:16 41:14
29:3 32:14	24:3	183:13 184:7,8	

[aisle - apartments]

aisle 196:21	amazed 266:4	282:14	annually 12:3
albert 1:21	amend 10:14	amounts 61:11	58:20
albuquerque	amended 50:19	250:23 263:24	answer 71:8
3:5,10 285:18	61:23	ample 166:12	76:9 83:10
alexander	amendment	201:13	90:15 99:24
109:8,23,25	55:17	amplifies 20:14	101:20 102:14
209:6	amendments	ampomah 1:22	103:1,14
alexander's	1:10 10:18	4:8,12 110:18	106:14 157:17
52:10	62:4 63:21	110:20,22,24	175:15 190:4
alicia 37:15,25	american 85:10	115:4 126:22	192:22 208:19
alive 37:2	amount 69:5,5	203:11,13,15	214:8
allocated	69:9 74:1,2,8	203:17 225:9	answered 81:4
142:20 143:1	95:9 133:7,14	analysis 99:13	92:24,24 93:7
allow 66:20	137:17 156:3	99:17,20	99:1 102:24
78:5 156:9	179:5,6 214:5	113:10,13	229:18
211:23 215:11	220:14 224:22	133:12,13,16	answering
allowed 37:4	238:11,17	133:17,25	75:24 96:15
45:23 76:18	240:8,11,15,17	141:7 162:9	102:8
95:20 96:20	241:16,20,23	168:15 186:9	answers 201:14
101:20 129:4	242:1,11,20,24	187:12,15	207:16 230:16
139:1 161:7	244:8 245:18	188:22 219:1	anthony 7:14
allowing 14:16	249:24,25	analyst 139:24	anticipate
allows 58:12	250:1,7,9,13,17	andres 70:8	148:12 284:1
63:20	250:17 251:12	andrew 2:17	antonio 38:22
allstate 7:23	251:19 252:1	anecdotal 53:5	38:22,23 39:1
alteration	253:14 254:4	ann 2:18	39:3,4 40:10
63:19	255:15 260:3	annotated	anybody
alternative	260:17,19	173:3	248:15
44:14 89:24	262:9 263:13	annual 59:11	anymore 42:4
91:2 97:17	263:15,22	72:14 106:9	144:11
222:21	264:8 266:2,11	115:18 116:10	anytime 75:16
alternatives	266:12 274:8	227:13,24	anyway 47:9
92:1,16,20,22	275:22,24	245:17 262:24	125:6
140:18	276:3,4,17	281:18	apartments
	277:13 278:1		30:2

[apodaca - armstrong]

apodaca 6:17	application	appropriated	arbiter 76:2
31:11,25 234:6	118:11 208:2	189:20	arbitrary 99:8
234:14,19,21	applied 14:10	appropriating	133:17 134:2,2
234:25 235:3	86:7 122:3,10	91:6	134:12 158:7
248:15	236:3,16,18,20	appropriation	158:12 171:2,9
apologize 33:3	254:23 255:6	179:1 189:25	172:7,8,11
164:1 186:23	applies 59:8	appropriations	183:11 215:18
212:2 219:24	apply 67:3 87:8	89:23 91:5	arc 257:5
238:4	114:16 211:24	approval	arcane 120:25
apparent	270:18,19	189:25	ardent 35:17
194:22	appointed 6:6	approvals	area 30:1 39:14
apparently	appreciate	174:5,9	40:6 119:4
184:16	49:14 107:4	approve 85:19	122:1 215:25
appear 194:18	126:17 192:6	209:25	areas 42:12
229:14 280:15	194:19 208:20	approved	157:14 214:3
appears 86:19	226:4 232:18	57:22 173:21	214:14
182:20 194:12	233:16 235:3	176:6,22	argue 11:5
applicant 13:25	appreciated	209:15,16,18	244:19 268:1
93:16,21 198:4	115:16,21	209:22 212:18	281:22 283:7
207:23 209:6,9	approach 99:7	212:19	283:20
209:14 212:13	99:22 197:14	approves	argued 251:21
applicant's	207:9 216:6,22	144:12	argument
47:1 52:18	218:22 219:14	approving	19:15,19 39:8
53:10 116:5	approached	58:11	49:21 104:6
155:8	141:23	approximate	113:21 222:17
applicants 2:2	approaches	104:4	ari 3:20 84:7
10:18 11:5	155:18	approximately	arises 239:5
45:9 47:21	approaching	12:4 87:18	arkansas
49:3 51:11,17	114:18 135:18	166:17 170:12	129:25
53:19 55:14	appropriate	173:23 180:19	arm's 63:24
58:15,16,23	44:11 77:6	approximation	64:6
73:9 118:11	78:6 91:25	253:11 264:4	armstrong 44:6
119:23 122:7	103:3 171:8	april 161:2,9	44:12 125:23
165:2 168:3	276:13	167:12 168:1	126:3 204:12
		168:11	206:20

[armstrong's - attach]

armstrong's	92:23 93:6	assign 263:1	53:18 54:1
126:1	107:24 124:4	assigning 207:7	55:9,16,24
arose 44:5	142:11 160:23	assistant 236:6	56:16 57:20,21
arrange 142:11	168:14 172:21	assoc 2:14	57:23,25 58:2
arranged 142:4	183:24 192:20	associate	58:6,7,9,11,22
arrangement	195:9 206:24	236:11	59:10 64:14
185:4	223:17 231:14	associated	69:14 73:5
arrives 273:24	238:12 254:22	111:12 117:2	78:4 79:1,9,14
arrows 280:16	asking 22:18	181:12,17,22	79:15,22 89:11
arscott 4:14 5:7	80:7 90:6,25	182:5 183:14	96:21 110:6,12
234:11,17,20	92:12,14,20	241:22 253:16	111:11 150:6
234:22 235:5,8	100:14 102:16	253:20 260:17	182:25,25
234.22 233.3,8	110:4 112:3	262:10 274:24	220:3 238:11
236:19 237:16	132:20 164:8	279:19	238:13,18
238:6 246:7	191:12 205:8	association 3:3	242:23 244:9
249:2	226:21 252:2	85:10 115:19	244:10 249:22
arscott's	262:13	130:11 141:24	250:1,9 251:7
237:15 283:24	asleep 39:13	236:1	251:9,12,19
artesia 138:12	aspect 238:13	assume 83:12	251.9,12,19 252:1,11 253:3
138:22 229:8	279:24	92:7 101:16	253:24 254:1,2
247:4	aspects 52:4	102:15,17	253:24 254:1,2
artfully 56:4	251:14	180:22 262:8	260:8 262:1,15
article 63:20	assess 99:9	262:18 263:20	263:10,13
artist 35:16	assessed 8:15	268:7 269:23	264:18,22
ascott 237:22	assessment	assumed	265:17,25
aside 111:4	100:2,22 134:1	253:13 277:18	276:2
162:14 240:24	assessments	assumes 276:14	assurances
245:16 275:10	9:8	assuming 16:8	36:9 122:4
275:15,18,19	asset 215:12	90:9 153:15	151:1
276:9 277:13	269:14 270:16	191:10 192:1	assured 192:15
277:20	275:1	224:17,19	atmosphere
asked 45:22	assets 50:21	263:19	33:17
51:11,17,20,24	105:15 211:22	assurance 6:5	atripp 2:18
73:18 76:13	221:7 267:5	9:5 49:5,25	attach 218:7
81:24 90:8	221.1 201.3	50:24 51:4	210.7
01.21 70.0		30.2131.7	

[attached - bad]

44 1 1 20 14	104 10 102 20	.1 1 25 22	140 21 21
attached 69:14	184:10 193:20	avoided 35:23	149:21,21
attempt 10:9	214:14 226:17	avoiding	158:5 163:5
12:24 51:21	226:23 230:10	254:25 279:1	176:12 183:24
179:19	241:7,8	award 283:12	186:17 188:7
attempted	authorized	awarded	188:13 193:8
64:25	48:2,15,17,21	185:16	201:25 207:25
attempts 49:6	48:25 74:1	aware 49:20	209:9 211:4,23
231:4	availability	50:1,8 51:10	213:7 214:7
attendance	279:12	51:18 52:2	222:7,10 224:2
234:8	available	59:16 83:5,8	231:13,15
attention 80:11	102:19 144:15	97:2 120:21	245:7 249:1,5
112:8 152:14	174:14 201:11	122:3 123:3,6	259:2 261:19
282:1	213:12 219:8	124:17,19	271:23 272:4
attorney 62:11	243:9 247:20	184:23	275:12 282:4
62:24 89:8	266:2	axes 282:17	283:10
173:8 226:9,23	ave 2:4 3:14	axis 253:7,7	backed 237:5
atucker 2:24	avenue 12:15	282:23	background
1. 50.00	105 11		020.10
auction 50:23	avenues 135:11	\mathbf{b}	232:19
50:24 254:15	avenues 135:11 average 71:16		backtrack
		b 6:25 26:6	
50:24 254:15	average 71:16	b 6:25 26:6 29:1 35:3	backtrack
50:24 254:15 august 179:23	average 71:16 72:3,19,22	b 6:25 26:6 29:1 35:3 40:25,25	backtrack 183:23
50:24 254:15 august 179:23 austin 236:4,15	average 71:16 72:3,19,22 97:3,6 121:5	b 6:25 26:6 29:1 35:3 40:25,25 235:10 251:2,2	backtrack 183:23 backup 20:9
50:24 254:15 august 179:23 austin 236:4,15 authenticates	average 71:16 72:3,19,22 97:3,6 121:5 152:25 171:13	b 6:25 26:6 29:1 35:3 40:25,25 235:10 251:2,2 251:17	backtrack 183:23 backup 20:9 39:18
50:24 254:15 august 179:23 austin 236:4,15 authenticates 43:8	average 71:16 72:3,19,22 97:3,6 121:5 152:25 171:13 183:4,15	b 6:25 26:6 29:1 35:3 40:25,25 235:10 251:2,2 251:17 baby 135:23	backtrack 183:23 backup 20:9 39:18 backwards
50:24 254:15 august 179:23 austin 236:4,15 authenticates 43:8 author 160:21	average 71:16 72:3,19,22 97:3,6 121:5 152:25 171:13 183:4,15 187:21 191:4	b 6:25 26:6 29:1 35:3 40:25,25 235:10 251:2,2 251:17 baby 135:23 bachelor	backtrack 183:23 backup 20:9 39:18 backwards 39:11 169:25
50:24 254:15 august 179:23 austin 236:4,15 authenticates 43:8 author 160:21 162:25	average 71:16 72:3,19,22 97:3,6 121:5 152:25 171:13 183:4,15 187:21 191:4 204:2,3,8	b 6:25 26:6 29:1 35:3 40:25,25 235:10 251:2,2 251:17 baby 135:23 bachelor 236:13	backtrack 183:23 backup 20:9 39:18 backwards 39:11 169:25 217:17
50:24 254:15 august 179:23 austin 236:4,15 authenticates 43:8 author 160:21 162:25 authority 13:24	average 71:16 72:3,19,22 97:3,6 121:5 152:25 171:13 183:4,15 187:21 191:4 204:2,3,8 206:19,25	b 6:25 26:6 29:1 35:3 40:25,25 235:10 251:2,2 251:17 baby 135:23 bachelor 236:13 back 7:11	backtrack 183:23 backup 20:9 39:18 backwards 39:11 169:25 217:17 backyard
50:24 254:15 august 179:23 austin 236:4,15 authenticates 43:8 author 160:21 162:25 authority 13:24 14:4 48:10,11	average 71:16 72:3,19,22 97:3,6 121:5 152:25 171:13 183:4,15 187:21 191:4 204:2,3,8 206:19,25 242:12,13	b 6:25 26:6 29:1 35:3 40:25,25 235:10 251:2,2 251:17 baby 135:23 bachelor 236:13 back 7:11 14:17 22:2	backtrack 183:23 backup 20:9 39:18 backwards 39:11 169:25 217:17 backyard 226:8
50:24 254:15 august 179:23 austin 236:4,15 authenticates 43:8 author 160:21 162:25 authority 13:24 14:4 48:10,11 50:1,15 80:24	average 71:16 72:3,19,22 97:3,6 121:5 152:25 171:13 183:4,15 187:21 191:4 204:2,3,8 206:19,25 242:12,13 260:11,13,25	b 6:25 26:6 29:1 35:3 40:25,25 235:10 251:2,2 251:17 baby 135:23 bachelor 236:13 back 7:11 14:17 22:2 42:6,21 55:2	backtrack 183:23 backup 20:9 39:18 backwards 39:11 169:25 217:17 backyard 226:8 backyards
50:24 254:15 august 179:23 austin 236:4,15 authenticates 43:8 author 160:21 162:25 authority 13:24 14:4 48:10,11 50:1,15 80:24 81:7,21 99:5	average 71:16 72:3,19,22 97:3,6 121:5 152:25 171:13 183:4,15 187:21 191:4 204:2,3,8 206:19,25 242:12,13 260:11,13,25 262:9	b 6:25 26:6 29:1 35:3 40:25,25 235:10 251:2,2 251:17 baby 135:23 bachelor 236:13 back 7:11 14:17 22:2 42:6,21 55:2 69:2 74:3	backtrack 183:23 backup 20:9 39:18 backwards 39:11 169:25 217:17 backyard 226:8 backyards 17:25
50:24 254:15 august 179:23 austin 236:4,15 authenticates 43:8 author 160:21 162:25 authority 13:24 14:4 48:10,11 50:1,15 80:24 81:7,21 99:5 108:13,23	average 71:16 72:3,19,22 97:3,6 121:5 152:25 171:13 183:4,15 187:21 191:4 204:2,3,8 206:19,25 242:12,13 260:11,13,25 262:9 averaging	b 6:25 26:6 29:1 35:3 40:25,25 235:10 251:2,2 251:17 baby 135:23 bachelor 236:13 back 7:11 14:17 22:2 42:6,21 55:2 69:2 74:3 78:17 96:5	backtrack 183:23 backup 20:9 39:18 backwards 39:11 169:25 217:17 backyard 226:8 backyards 17:25 bad 18:8 76:6
50:24 254:15 august 179:23 austin 236:4,15 authenticates 43:8 author 160:21 162:25 authority 13:24 14:4 48:10,11 50:1,15 80:24 81:7,21 99:5 108:13,23 109:9 111:5	average 71:16 72:3,19,22 97:3,6 121:5 152:25 171:13 183:4,15 187:21 191:4 204:2,3,8 206:19,25 242:12,13 260:11,13,25 262:9 averaging 187:19 204:13	b 6:25 26:6 29:1 35:3 40:25,25 235:10 251:2,2 251:17 baby 135:23 bachelor 236:13 back 7:11 14:17 22:2 42:6,21 55:2 69:2 74:3 78:17 96:5 97:8,9 105:6	backtrack 183:23 backup 20:9 39:18 backwards 39:11 169:25 217:17 backyard 226:8 backyards 17:25 bad 18:8 76:6 87:14,18,24
50:24 254:15 august 179:23 austin 236:4,15 authenticates 43:8 author 160:21 162:25 authority 13:24 14:4 48:10,11 50:1,15 80:24 81:7,21 99:5 108:13,23 109:9 111:5 118:2 119:16	average 71:16 72:3,19,22 97:3,6 121:5 152:25 171:13 183:4,15 187:21 191:4 204:2,3,8 206:19,25 242:12,13 260:11,13,25 262:9 averaging 187:19 204:13 avoid 51:21	b 6:25 26:6 29:1 35:3 40:25,25 235:10 251:2,2 251:17 baby 135:23 bachelor 236:13 back 7:11 14:17 22:2 42:6,21 55:2 69:2 74:3 78:17 96:5 97:8,9 105:6 114:6 121:10	backtrack 183:23 backup 20:9 39:18 backwards 39:11 169:25 217:17 backyard 226:8 backyards 17:25 bad 18:8 76:6 87:14,18,24 88:9 90:24
50:24 254:15 august 179:23 austin 236:4,15 authenticates 43:8 author 160:21 162:25 authority 13:24 14:4 48:10,11 50:1,15 80:24 81:7,21 99:5 108:13,23 109:9 111:5 118:2 119:16 119:20 146:15	average 71:16 72:3,19,22 97:3,6 121:5 152:25 171:13 183:4,15 187:21 191:4 204:2,3,8 206:19,25 242:12,13 260:11,13,25 262:9 averaging 187:19 204:13 avoid 51:21 105:17 108:7	b 6:25 26:6 29:1 35:3 40:25,25 235:10 251:2,2 251:17 baby 135:23 bachelor 236:13 back 7:11 14:17 22:2 42:6,21 55:2 69:2 74:3 78:17 96:5 97:8,9 105:6	backtrack 183:23 backup 20:9 39:18 backwards 39:11 169:25 217:17 backyard 226:8 backyards 17:25 bad 18:8 76:6 87:14,18,24 88:9 90:24 92:1,19 95:24

[bad - believe]

	T	I	
133:1,2 134:25	base 41:14	86:5 119:22	beliefs 66:19
135:2,8 138:9	182:24 208:1	160:9,9 169:15	believe 17:10
216:16 223:22	262:5 263:18	206:18 245:17	19:10 27:22
239:14 281:7	264:10	255:16	34:19 36:24
281:12	based 12:1	bath 135:24	37:1 38:5
baker 149:15	52:15 72:2,22	batteries 16:21	44:15 47:11
bakken 237:6	73:7 75:1,5	beatty 3:4	52:8 77:13
balance 91:11	77:3 99:7,22	beautiful 22:4	79:4 87:5
104:15 105:15	112:17 113:11	35:17	103:18 107:9
105:25 106:3	113:14,15	becoming	112:23 114:24
106:11,15,20	160:9,9 170:18	43:14 136:19	118:3,5 122:7
186:21 189:3	180:5 183:5	bed 222:15	122:16 123:2
189:12,14	205:4 207:7,22	began 128:22	125:18,23
243:19 271:11	207:23,23	161:9 218:23	133:18 135:16
271:15 272:18	208:16,24	beginning 47:4	135:17 139:25
272:19,21	209:17 213:19	70:25 109:17	143:1 144:15
273:2,4,5,9,13	216:10,13	143:19 271:15	165:14 167:22
273:15 275:20	221:7,8 222:19	272:19 273:5	169:15,16
bank 221:3	238:19 254:24	273:13 275:20	171:9 172:7
236:10	282:19 283:12	beginnings	179:12,16
bankruptcy	bases 44:14	140:11	185:13 187:8
29:13 96:5	basic 40:1	begins 51:5	190:15,19
98:10 239:7,7	basically 50:23	behalf 15:17	191:3 193:15
265:22	75:17 97:23	38:1 39:5	194:15 197:18
bar 271:25	129:4 133:18	84:18,19,24	197:25 200:3,5
bare 27:1	139:1 140:17	85:1 128:4	201:20 202:4
barely 249:9	140:21 145:18	138:23 235:25	209:21 210:3
barn 212:2	146:15,16	behave 239:15	212:3,25
219:24	147:2 161:6	behavior	213:10 214:11
barrel 144:2,4	228:22	100:11	222:17 223:16
144:6 158:7	basin 15:9	belabor 127:6	223:20 224:21
barrels 12:1	23:25 24:11	173:14 178:10	224:24,24
253:22 255:15	147:17	belief 36:24	230:3 251:24
255:22 256:6,9	basis 53:9	37:5	254:24 279:17
256:14 280:5	72:21 73:1,3		281:17

[believed - bond]

believed 36:25	bias 62:23	billions 15:25	blessing 36:25
believing 193:6	bible 64:19	138:18	194:20
ben 192:18	bid 146:13	bills 12:20	blm 178:15
242:7	biernoff 3:20	196:24 231:1	185:4,15
beneath 243:7	4:6 84:5,6,7,10	277:2,10	blocked 203:24
benefactors	90:12,22 91:21	billy 7:17	bloom 1:21 4:8
12:9	91:23,24	binding 124:10	4:13 115:7,9
beneficial 9:9	101:21 107:3,8	bipartisan	115:12 124:23
86:6,8,16,19,19	107:24 199:8	153:13,14	125:2 207:19
86:21,25 127:5	big 8:20 29:8	185:9 196:24	216:12 225:15
171:2 176:25	144:21 146:11	197:13 198:13	225:17,20
209:7,11	157:11 160:5	bit 60:20 79:1	227:19 228:13
213:22 280:9	162:13 163:6	81:24 94:22	231:7 232:2,14
beneficiaries	163:10 193:25	105:21 115:14	232:22,25
120:12,13	bigger 39:19	124:10 144:14	blowing 105:16
121:12 134:11	140:25	183:24 188:3	blue 280:8
222:13	biggest 70:25	204:9,14,17	blythe 26:2,12
beneficiary	158:13 160:4	207:10 211:7	board 6:16
121:21	bil 186:1,3,10	225:13 233:22	39:5,15 130:8
benefit 114:5	283:11	234:13 246:25	130:8,10
135:4 182:8	bill 10:10,12	259:11 261:15	136:20
219:19 241:22	25:22 75:15	271:8 275:6	bob 6:18 7:9
benzene 25:12	76:6 118:20	276:11 278:25	bodily 8:23
229:24	158:20 196:22	280:14	body 145:5
best 98:17	197:5,5,8	black 280:10	198:2
137:11 208:5	198:23,23,24	blah 48:22,22	boe 133:18
233:9 235:4	231:5,8	48:23 56:17,17	171:15 173:7
285:10	billion 12:3	56:17	215:4 217:6,10
better 36:25	17:14,16 29:20	blame 71:12,14	217:25 219:11
88:7,8 111:19	30:13 36:3	blank 63:20	bonafide
150:22 153:11	102:4 121:15	blanket 61:15	105:15
211:1 219:1,2	122:1,1,12,17	69:5,7 80:25	bond 49:6,11
beyond 83:2	122:18,18	95:9 108:3	56:8,19,21
108:13 156:11	153:23,23	215:25 249:25	57:12 61:15
		251:9	68:14 69:8

[bond - bring]

	I	I	
70:8 78:9 79:2	212:7	78:6 79:25	210:14,16,20
79:21 80:5,8	bonding 12:22	80:1,18 81:5	210:20 258:24
80:12,15,17,20	13:13 15:16	89:11,18 96:23	271:14
80:22,24,25	18:6,17 19:13	108:2,13,23	bought 19:18
81:1,2,8,9,19	19:21 20:5,6	110:13 123:12	bound 85:23
81:22 95:9,10	20:13 25:9	132:24 134:22	boundaries
96:23,25 97:7	26:21 27:21	135:21 150:14	182:17
98:13 100:12	29:8 30:25	151:3 182:7	box 2:16,21
108:3 111:10	38:4,15 39:7,9	185:16 207:7	3:10,18
123:16,18	39:19,25 59:3	215:25 220:4	bradfute 3:9,11
151:8 158:10	64:19 65:1,3	225:7 245:18	bradfutelaw.c
183:11 205:21	70:22 96:16	245:19 248:7,9	3:11,12
206:7,11 213:2	110:11 113:6	250:16,25	brand 86:7
220:9 221:7,8	119:1 122:4,11	260:21 264:24	220:22,24
221:18 223:17	122:16 133:10	265:15	brandon 179:9
223:18 224:19	133:14 142:4,8	bone 129:7	breach 279:4
232:6 239:17	143:24 155:12	book 36:20	break 78:13
239:17,17,22	205:6,9,10	75:8	132:10 201:23
240:6,8,11,15	210:2 212:10	books 163:1	284:4
240:17 241:15	212:17,22	boom 129:24	breathe 25:21
241:15,20,21	213:10 215:23	140:6 147:21	brian 28:22
241:23 242:1	219:20 221:2,4	149:10	briani 31:9,16
242:10 244:24	224:25 233:7	booms 162:7	31:17,17 34:14
245:1,2,2,4,6	242:20 245:17	boosting	34:17,21 40:17
245:16 249:23	246:25 247:10	229:11	40:18
249:25 250:14	247:23 248:2	border 117:14	bridge 175:21
250:23 251:10	250:7,18 252:1	bore 187:22	210:5
260:11,19,25	252:17 260:14	bores 140:23	brief 233:6
262:3,9,18,20	260:16,18,21	born 7:13	237:1 257:7,11
263:7,10,14,15	264:8 265:1	138:11 226:7	briefly 202:16
264:23 265:2	276:2,4	borne 36:5 65:4	236:18
265:10,11	bonds 13:16	209:19	bring 53:13
bonded 73:25	20:14 30:5	bothers 198:4	76:12 111:1
95:22 96:9	56:22 57:8	bottom 20:25	203:21
124:6,7 212:4	66:21 69:7	61:1 139:14	

[brings - capitalist]

h 22.0	hd 242-22	h	22722124 124.0
brings 22:9	burden 242:23	bwenergylaw	canceled 124:8
177:10 209:9	256:22 262:15	3:6,7	cancellable
broad 244:20	burdens 150:6	c	57:9
broadly 14:6	260:8	c 2:1 3:1 6:25	candidates
broke 44:19	burdensome	9:23 18:25	139:7,7
78:21	279:21	27:12,12 37:18	candy 9:20,23
broken 20:12	bureau 185:1	38:23 235:11	10:5
20:13 39:10	185:11 232:2	246:12	cano 66:17,18
40:2	burn 33:17	calculate	66:24 96:4,17
broker 50:22	bush 130:18,24	153:22 263:17	96:25 97:7
brookins 35:2,2	business 7:20	269:7	98:5,7,18
35:6,9,12,15	7:22 8:11,13	calder 4:5 45:2	100:8 154:16
37:9	8:13,18,22	calendar	154:19 199:25
brother 148:15	13:17 29:14	280:22	200:3,5,9,17,23
brought 33:8	31:4 41:16	call 18:10	cantrell 5:4
114:6 258:13	66:15 67:8	22:20 90:17	42:25 43:13,16
259:2	70:9 92:7	100:6 127:20	cap 34:25
bryant 40:20	94:21 96:2,2	134:18 149:18	capabilities
40:24,25 41:3	128:20 145:3	153:15 156:16	92:8
41:6,6 42:18	146:14 150:8,9	196:23 249:13	capability
btexs 229:24	150:10 159:8	251:2	106:25
buckets 256:3	193:4 213:15	called 7:15,21	capable 46:22
budget 91:11	221:9,14,15	31:13 142:12	capacities
92:13 132:6	222:11 236:14	146:14 157:13	128:17
146:16 179:5,6	241:10 276:13	163:1 176:14	capacity 62:8
190:8	businesses 14:8	185:15 208:15	193:1
build 146:1	42:2	236:3 266:16	capital 6:25
153:19	businessman	calling 125:17	105:3 139:10
building 1:5	77:22	214:16 253:19	150:21 213:14
bullet 153:20	buy 67:7 68:3	calls 127:22	213:14 221:21
213:18	221:1	142:3 234:20	245:9 262:21
bunching	buyer 252:24	canadian	263:6 264:25
280:17,19	275:2	267:19	265:13 276:13
281:4	buying 41:20	cancelable	capitalist
	80:25		238:22
		56:19,23 57:1	

[capped - changes]

capped 174:17	244:22,23	caught 246:25	certified 23:18
capture 36:7	245:22 258:18	cause 9:2,12	cessation 257:7
captures	cash 151:9	10:18 64:11	257:12
253:14	221:4,18	103:12 114:13	cetera 65:20
carbon 229:6	244:24 245:1,4	252:15	102:21
cardinal	245:16,18	caused 8:24	chair 1:21 15:7
282:16	262:20 264:24	82:7	27:17 29:6
care 38:3 39:6	265:10 266:12	causing 30:6	37:24 39:3
61:23 111:7	267:7,25	135:9	125:3,5,9
142:22 160:5,6	268:11 269:5	caution 263:12	201:22,25
189:9,10	270:20 271:2	caveat 180:10	233:1,3,17
career 136:1	271:21 272:7	ceased 259:1	246:17 247:2
156:21	272:14 274:1,2	cement 146:23	chaired 246:21
carefully 213:3	274:15 278:6	210:6	chairman
carries 273:4	casing 111:21	center 2:3 45:8	197:4,5
carrying 30:15	cast 210:5	122:3,10	challenge
cars 116:13	castillo 18:19	130:12 165:2	140:13 141:1
227:15	18:20,24,25	central 266:17	chance 11:9
case 29:18	19:3,6 21:9	cents 267:1,4	34:11 44:4
42:21 43:6	catastrophic	267:14	60:19 91:7
118:10 119:7	14:19	certain 31:21	112:11 131:9
123:13,20	catch 217:1,1	37:12 43:8	146:11,12
178:21 207:24	281:12	47:23 76:1	153:25
214:20 239:6	categories	108:2 173:5	chang 1:21
241:20 245:21	146:24 171:7	certainly 94:11	125:3,5,9
249:1 252:7	173:18 206:14	95:11 122:15	201:22 233:1,3
254:6 262:5	229:10 263:1	186:25 230:2	233:17
264:10 269:8	categorization	233:8,10 258:5	change 47:3
270:6,15	258:15	258:18 261:8	63:11 72:8
271:20 272:16	categorized	280:22 281:23	74:19 146:8
273:19,23	255:10 258:16	certainty 14:8	186:12
276:6 277:12	categorizing	158:15	changed 63:7
cases 134:17,18	256:3	certificate 5:9	277:5
134:20 149:19	category	certification	changes 10:12
151:7 241:15	172:23 210:1	48:2,21	12:12,17 13:23

[changes - clear]

14:17 15:16	chemicals	citizen 26:13	clean 11:6 18:9
27:21 29:8	25:11	27:20	18:15 19:16
38:4 39:7	chevron 147:18	citizens 35:18	20:23 21:1
74:14 138:6	149:15	38:1	25:21 27:3,23
changing 39:9	cheyenne 38:22	city 226:7	28:5,9,11,15
215:4	39:4	civilization	29:15,23 30:1
chapter 87:7	child 257:20	33:9	33:3,5,14,20,25
characterize	children 41:9	claim 10:20	34:10,11 35:24
159:6 200:18	chilled 68:2	19:12 62:4	38:6,14 101:4
200:24	chilling 50:19	65:8 66:7	101:6 121:17
characterized	51:1 67:20	70:19 113:11	121:21 137:11
256:16 257:9	68:17 213:19	claiming 89:11	196:5 247:15
278:16	213:25 214:11	claims 9:4	cleaned 16:15
characterizes	214:17 221:11	70:15	124:20
266:10	chino 1:5	clarification	cleaning 11:8
charge 9:5 22:9	chip 268:25	237:24	19:11 26:18,23
219:18 250:21	choose 66:11	clarifications	27:1 31:3
284:9	147:3	177:6	120:15 131:23
charged 10:16	choosing 262:9	clarified	196:4
93:20 117:21	chop 234:13	170:22	cleanup 15:16
214:22 230:4	chosen 118:20	clarify 49:24	17:6,13,16
243:14 250:24	chris 199:11	51:3 55:21	18:7,11 19:23
251:19 260:21	circulate 44:2	126:4 169:11	20:11 21:7
chart 229:15	210:6	170:1 177:3	26:22 30:6
268:10 281:15	circumstances	181:6 183:3	31:2 36:7,12
chase 21:3	220:20	clarity 126:22	102:21 105:18
chaves 10:8	circumvent	classic 257:5	166:3
142:2	12:24	classified 251:4	clear 25:4
cheaper 8:25	citation 47:4	255:18 258:8	62:25 70:11
71:2	173:9	258:25 259:8	74:25 85:6
cheaply 146:6	cite 106:23	280:11	90:21 92:18
check 39:5	cited 56:11	classifies	96:3 100:9
checker 39:15	60:16,21 75:6	180:20	144:18 146:7
checkerboard	citing 82:15	classify 112:2	180:11 182:21
40:6	283:18		183:2 189:5

[clear - commented]

			1
207:4 214:4	126:10,19	collecting	176:12 193:20
232:13 240:12	127:19 164:9	268:15	196:18 197:9
251:22 259:12	234:11,20	collection	200:14 201:25
261:12	235:2,16,20	103:2	205:13 206:16
clearly 16:24	237:14,21	collectively	218:18 220:25
25:4 57:19	238:4 283:23	33:13 152:17	225:6 239:13
clerk 64:6	284:5,8	255:21	245:5 246:9
client 84:25	cloutier's	collects 121:1	comes 77:7
clients 53:4	164:13	color 229:13	96:5 119:20
89:17 236:24	co2 136:4 137:3	280:8	121:7 126:25
237:2	139:7,7 149:1	colorado 21:25	137:14 150:5
climate 25:25	258:5	195:7,9,11	154:12 222:6
clinton 130:17	coalition 15:9	205:15 207:14	222:12,13
130:20	15:17 16:9	colors 229:13	233:7
close 18:9	code 86:17	column 263:20	coming 119:23
25:13,15 30:1	173:11	264:8 271:12	132:13 133:6
30:5,12 36:17	coding 280:8	271:19,19	136:16 145:20
113:2 121:14	coincide 260:20	272:5,6	150:12 155:1
157:10 180:16	cold 118:24	combine	186:17 188:13
223:18 262:2	collapsed 16:14	213:23	188:18 192:13
closed 231:18	collateral	combined	221:17 223:15
closely 197:4	265:14	146:12	270:21
closer 15:22,22	collateralizati	combining	comment 6:8
122:17	245:3	204:14	6:11 19:8
clothing 41:24	colleague 23:24	come 6:8 30:5	31:22 37:11
cloud 18:1	24:13 247:1	30:12 35:18	40:11 43:3,14
cloutier 2:17	collect 134:21	38:20 59:2	75:17 101:12
4:7,14 42:23	206:3 224:3,3	78:17 95:17	155:20 206:18
43:24 45:11,22	224:6	97:9 101:18	233:6 246:1,4
54:2,7,11,13	collected 89:15	102:23 103:2	246:6 248:18
62:12,15,15,16	97:21 98:14	105:6 106:22	248:22,24
76:8 90:3,6	103:8,17	112:16 116:1	284:12
91:20 101:19	151:17 152:23	121:10 122:23	commented
109:6,7,13	152:24 224:12	125:13 159:11	134:3
110:14,17	255:9 274:2	162:19 167:4	

[commenter - company]

commenter	commission's	committee	18:10 21:3
101:13,16	26:21 55:9	10:13 75:21	24:10 29:10,12
102:17 234:15	57:18 112:14	135:6 138:2	29:25 30:5
comments 6:14	179:1 207:8	152:2 192:15	31:3 33:15,20
6:16 11:22	227:1 230:3	197:3,8,12	36:10,14 94:25
17:2 26:25	commissioner	246:22 247:2,4	104:5,8,23
31:19 32:20	3:17 4:8,8,12	committees	106:8 123:9
76:24 120:9	4:13 84:7	131:2	124:9 135:9
128:4 248:11	110:18,20,22	committing	141:15 147:13
commercial	114:17 115:4,7	83:18	147:15,19,23
8:20 138:13	115:9,12 119:8	commodity	148:18 163:9
commission 1:3	119:10 124:4	113:20,25	163:10,12
1:20,23 2:9 6:7	124:23 125:2	254:16	192:1 193:13
6:12,17 7:8	126:22 128:1	common 8:17	205:10 214:16
9:14 10:16	199:10,18	27:25 50:22	214:18 220:16
27:18 32:19	200:3 203:11	86:12 161:19	221:6,17
33:7,12,19	203:13,15	173:18 263:3	224:17,18,22
44:8 53:17	204:20 205:11	commonalities	231:19
58:4 67:15	206:24 207:18	230:18	company 12:5
78:14 99:5	208:5 215:8	commonsense	13:23 16:16
108:12,23	216:12 219:24	18:4	22:8,11 25:19
111:4,9,11,25	224:16 225:8,9	communities	58:9 96:17,18
113:17 114:24	225:15,17,20	15:19 20:17	98:8 104:13
126:25 127:5,9	225:22 227:19	22:12 24:9	106:5 128:3,19
127:15 128:15	228:13 231:7	25:18,21 27:7	129:1 130:14
132:22 163:17	232:1,14,22,24	39:21 42:11	138:24 145:15
179:4 183:5	232:25	community	146:1,4 148:1
196:15 204:1	commissioners	22:7 23:17	148:4 149:13
206:21 207:6	11:21 15:8	24:15,22 25:9	150:12,15,17
210:9 218:8,13	19:7 21:21	39:6,11 160:14	158:8 191:24
220:6 226:22	29:7 37:25	161:5	193:4 203:24
230:4 233:18	39:4 40:20	compact	220:23,24
235:22 237:25	42:15 119:6	281:16	222:6 236:3
246:18 281:17	committed	companies	248:5
285:5	89:25	15:20,24 17:17	

[company's - conservation]

company's	87:25 88:20	concepts	conduct 91:19
106:3,6	89:19 92:9,25	270:19	conduits
comparable	93:17,22,22	concern 186:12	117:14
116:12 227:14	94:7,24,25	208:22 228:15	conference
compare	95:5,21 96:10	265:20,24	115:18 285:6
122:17 207:11	98:9,20 99:21	281:11	confidence
comparison	100:11 104:6,9	concerned	192:7 194:20
251:17 259:25	174:20 180:7	12:11 17:8	confident 14:3
compensation	195:21 212:9	26:13 27:19	279:9
62:21	212:23 213:5,6	38:1 47:19	confirm 83:12
competing	213:7 216:17	142:17 143:3	confirming
207:12	compliant	144:2,3,6	108:19
competition	66:17 81:21	194:1 281:12	confronted
193:7	89:12 180:17	concerning	167:23
competitive	complicated	19:15 278:20	confused 188:2
207:15 216:1	83:24 136:6	concerns 47:1	188:3
complained	270:18	122:23 131:3	connected
30:10	complicates	131:12,14	242:2
complaint	211:6	252:24	connection
24:23	comply 46:1	concludes	266:14
complaints	106:25 160:11	155:2 283:24	cons 228:20
24:17	comport 67:14	conclusion	consequence
complete	composed	265:5	13:14
101:20 136:18	203:2	concomitant	conservation
239:19	compounds	250:24	1:3 2:9 10:23
completed 34:7	229:23	concordia	11:2,3,5,7
44:20	comprehensi	236:14	26:21 30:15
completely	168:3	condition 58:1	34:3 56:17
20:19 276:23	compromise	79:22 80:8	60:11 79:13
completes	222:25	244:18	91:8,12,17
163:19	concept 86:7,8	conditioned	94:7 97:20
completion	86:11 238:21	110:7	98:15 101:2,5
285:1	239:3 266:9,16	conditions	102:2 103:3,4
compliance	266:18	79:15 81:18	103:8,17
14:1 36:3			105:11,14

[conservation - corporations]

106:17 120:19	215:25 257:6	contemplated	contrary 53:1
132:3 151:14	257:12 262:19	64:17	contribute
151:17 169:7	282:17	contention 79:2	132:2 141:4,5
178:5 187:1	consistently	context 103:23	141:9
243:13 285:5	159:9	continuation	control 34:18
consider 22:19	consists 255:17	283:19	40:16
37:3 69:3,11	256:5	continue 18:3	convenience
88:1,4,13	constant 22:9	22:13 57:3	127:12
93:11 94:12	253:13 254:6	62:3 65:16	convenient
113:17 159:15	constrained	114:15 121:9	127:15
257:15	135:14 265:8,8	121:20 131:25	conversation
considerable	265:23 277:23	166:14 190:15	222:22
13:12 242:3	constraints	215:12 244:14	conversations
252:14 270:6	193:12 197:23	247:14 265:3	143:18 186:5
271:6 273:22	consult 236:21	283:22	convince 274:6
280:23	consultation	continued	convinced
considerably	184:25	241:1,4	160:14 216:22
241:24	consulted	continues	convincing
consideration	159:1	24:11 61:3	258:11
22:22 100:20	consulting	103:7	coordinates
207:8 208:3	160:22 236:3	continuing	17:1
considerations	cont'd 3:1 5:1	33:16 261:14	copas 63:4
240:24,25	contacted	continuous	64:10
considered	145:16 167:12	24:18,22	corners 23:17
68:24 69:15,20	168:1,10	continuously	corollary 66:6
69:25 70:5,6	contained	177:2	corporate
70:11,12,12,13	146:5	contract 65:4	11:23 17:11
70:16 72:5	containment	65:14 146:9,11	35:19 236:7
94:24 111:9	16:21	185:3,17	corporation
218:24	contains	contractors	28:14 138:24
considering	245:23	131:19,21	corporations
218:8	contamination	145:11 185:15	18:2 20:7,8,24
considers 141:7	117:9,12	contracts 63:5	27:6 28:2,7,13
consistent	contemplate	64:16 86:12	38:9,11 39:17
142:25 182:23	65:3	154:13	

[corrales - court]

	I	I	I
corrales 41:7	170:10 177:21	182:11 183:4	253:16,20,21
41:16	181:25 196:10	183:16,18	254:2,4 260:17
correct 45:20	200:1,7,21	187:18,21	261:17 262:1,1
45:24 47:3,10	203:4 219:17	204:2,3 206:20	262:4 264:5,11
47:24 48:6,11	227:22 229:25	206:22 207:2	277:15
48:20 49:1,2,7	230:1,21 285:9	240:13,14	council 117:6
49:12 51:5	corrected 61:14	241:12,21,22	121:3
52:12,16,17	62:7 74:3	241:24 242:7	counsel 1:23
53:2,9,11,20	94:14	242:12,19,22	51:9 54:24
54:25 55:6,10	correction	242:25 243:4	counsel's 54:17
55:14,17 56:9	74:23	244:7,21	count 282:9
56:12,25 57:14	corrections	245:17 250:12	counted 201:3
58:11 59:13,18	237:11	252:13,16	counties 10:8
61:20,24 62:2	correctly 47:19	262:21 263:6	12:6
62:16 63:5,11	211:21 245:8	264:25,25	countries 41:21
63:25 64:9,11	correlate 69:25	265:17 268:7	country 15:19
64:17 65:20	correlated	268:13,17	33:24 95:15
66:4 67:25	69:21,21	276:5,7,13	238:25
68:6,15 69:11	correlative	277:20 279:18	county 129:11
70:23 71:4	214:23 227:2	costly 265:3	142:2
74:22 75:2,7	corroded 16:13	costs 8:19 16:5	couple 76:23
76:19 78:1,2	corrosion	17:16 19:23	107:18 109:7
80:1,13 81:11	111:16	30:4,6 36:5,13	123:14 124:8
82:11,14 83:19	corrosive	36:14 64:19	135:25 187:5
83:20,21 85:25	117:18	65:4 69:22	199:13 203:20
108:4,14 109:1	cost 8:18 9:1	70:22 71:16	258:6 266:15
110:9 118:7,17	18:7 20:16	72:5 73:4 97:3	271:7 277:4
118:21 119:2	29:20 31:4	97:6 134:22	283:4
121:22 122:22	36:4 41:23	166:3 183:1	course 46:23
123:10 131:24	42:2,14 64:14	204:7 223:19	118:2 119:22
165:6,13 166:6	64:25 69:10	240:6,18 242:2	154:8 205:17
166:18 167:7	70:1 72:3,19	242:4,5,6,9,16	279:15,21
167:13,14,16	72:22 73:14,15	242:18,21	courses 236:7
167:18,20,21	101:10 102:20	243:2 244:12	court 54:21,22
168:11,12	111:12,14	244:22 245:21	134:24 193:14

[court - deadline]

			T
201:24	critical 14:8,11	curtailing 42:6	dark 239:2
courts 230:12	135:24 149:7	curve 208:15	dash 37:19
230:25	267:5	208:16,16	data 17:13
cover 70:23	critically	253:8,14,17	50:22 53:1,6
97:7,25 101:10	149:22	254:7,10,10	53:10 162:19
275:11 277:13	cross 4:5,6,6,7	257:5 261:21	179:25 242:4
277:20	4:10,11,11	cut 37:4 124:1	255:5 257:3
covered 55:12	43:5 44:6,21	143:5	259:15,18,21
57:21 64:20	45:5 60:7 84:9	cuts 42:7	261:10 280:18
233:12 251:8	107:20 126:2,7	cutting 42:6	280:24 282:4
covering 30:6	164:23 169:1	cycle 266:11	282:15,18
30:13	187:13 199:15	cycles 208:23	david 32:11
covers 59:14	crosses 254:7	cynical 35:22	day 6:4 12:2
cracking 87:15	cruces 7:10,22	d	118:16 134:3
89:3,24 90:24	crude 45:18	d 4:1 5:1 9:23	135:21 144:2,4
91:2,18	140:8 149:11	21:15 23:4	144:6 157:3,22
crazy 39:13	crux 64:10	26:7 32:12,12	158:7 173:7
create 10:23	74:14	163:10	198:2 230:22
11:1 12:13	culpa 61:14	d.c. 143:18	232:16 273:17
50:22 150:8	cumulatively	dad 148:8	days 77:3,7,11
161:12	256:8	dad 148:8 dad's 226:8	77:25 133:19
created 30:14	cure 183:11	dad \$ 226:8 dakota 237:7	150:19 155:14
33:4 95:13	current 14:3	dakota 237:7 dallas 115:20	156:20 157:5,6
220:22	49:24 51:3		157:20 171:16
creating 13:15	130:8 175:13	damage 8:24	175:13 176:23
14:9 172:15,17	180:6 192:25	30:4 111:17	217:7,9,9,13,15
credit 151:10	209:17 216:20	123:16,18	217:20,25
279:15	233:7	damages 35:24	218:2,4,5
credited 281:16	currently 13:9	36:14	219:12 280:3,4
creek 163:5	14:5 128:18	dan 162:25	280:20,22
226:6,7	129:9,15	danger 104:19	281:2,10
creeping 15:22	153:10 154:25	dangerous	dead 37:2
criteria 171:6	165:10,21	14:18 198:10	deadline 138:7
172:12,22	236:2 249:20	dangers 206:9	157:18
218:17		daniel 226:5	
		-	

[deal - deposit]

deal 64:7	declined 139:6	defines 82:24	demonstrated
145:21 205:18	253:12	173:4 273:21	134:15
224:1 240:2	declines 250:3	definitely 9:12	demonstrative
dealing 92:1	253:9 263:8	209:8,9	164:2,18
145:17	272:1	definition	demonstratives
deals 144:1	declining 24:3	45:11 77:9,10	164:6,7
dealt 212:19	252:8 253:8	82:9,16 86:17	denials 241:6
death 8:24	257:23 261:20	114:2 171:6,18	denied 37:5
debate 199:2	270:23	175:6 213:22	denominated
215:24	decreased	216:15 242:13	267:17
debating 198:3	114:5	255:7 273:21	denver 130:3
debt 106:17	decreases	280:1 281:8	deny 13:24
250:17 265:13	59:13	definitions	14:7,13 167:24
decades 30:4	dedicated	73:25	denying 14:9
115:17 139:3,3	15:10 219:21	deflections	department
154:12 257:5	deemed 56:8	30:23	25:3 43:9
deceived 37:2	deep 129:7	defy 35:19	72:14 130:16
decide 93:16	172:5	degree 21:24	130:22 229:3,7
230:13 268:8	deeper 204:13	134:25 214:24	229:17 281:7,9
decided 114:10	204:22	delaware 129:6	281:18 283:11
146:12	deeply 24:4,6	129:6 204:4,23	depend 281:1
deciders 140:1	default 104:20	delay 103:12	depending
decision 77:22	244:20,21	delete 53:19	105:22 137:5
134:6 207:4	defaulting	deleted 53:25	171:13 243:15
241:18 261:22	240:20	55:14,20,25	244:17
decisions	defending	160:15	depends 9:10
207:20 267:24	172:23	deletes 55:18	deploy 13:10
declaration	defense 52:20	deletion 53:24	245:10
43:7	168:7 198:7	delivers 239:25	deploying
declare 239:7	define 171:6	demand 83:3	276:24
decline 9:12	172:12 173:18	104:9 178:14	deposit 30:3
24:12 25:8	245:25	demands 266:1	245:9 266:22
140:7 208:15	defined 173:6	demonstrate	270:7 272:18
255:14 257:5	249:16	179:5	274:8,12,16
			275:22 276:18

[deposit - disagree]

277:1,9 278:5	details 185:20	dialing 31:15	dimensions
depression	213:20	dialogue	280:6
32:24	deteriorate	196:18	dine 38:3 39:6
dept 2:10	16:1	difference	dioxide 229:6
depth 68:24,25	determination	77:19 98:16	dip 187:3
69:11,14,21,25	105:12 115:1	184:12	direct 4:10,14
73:11 219:5	176:24	differences	5:7 8:3 47:12
deputy 179:9	determine	205:2	49:22 51:14
describe 89:25	106:18 238:18	different 22:6	72:7 86:2,4
111:8 113:19	269:3	22:16 24:18	87:11 89:1
176:3 247:10	determined	58:9 72:20	90:2 93:9 99:3
described	258:1	157:14 170:14	103:21 111:1
90:13 98:14	determines	171:7 172:14	128:12 155:3
103:24 148:22	99:5	185:6 187:6	163:19,20
151:16 188:15	determining	188:22,22	164:17 174:23
216:3,8 217:5	95:9 219:18	189:24 190:20	179:4 183:25
267:12	278:21	247:22,22	187:5 192:17
describing	deterrence	258:6,12	194:16 203:21
105:2	240:19,21	263:19	207:24,24
description	detrimental	differently	235:19 237:8
34:2 113:25	22:17	157:15,16	237:15 238:6
desert 39:14	develop 89:24	207:10	269:14 283:24
deserve 25:21	91:17 245:13	difficult 112:13	directly 44:5
designated	developed	112:18 137:25	79:18 111:13
119:6	32:25 52:20	150:1,9,13	111:14 120:7
designed 160:4	85:11 86:9	153:18 162:18	158:25 195:8
191:19	136:13 142:3	163:13 204:17	director 34:2
designer 35:16	156:15 263:2	207:20 279:25	92:7 142:5,6
designing	development	281:2	143:9 167:23
146:5	23:20 104:2,10	dilapidated	169:6 179:9
despite 19:17	115:17 160:18	16:17	229:6
198:13	162:4	dime 91:9	directors
detail 85:10	devoted 94:2	103:4	130:10
141:19 212:8	dialed 248:20	dimension	disagree 56:5
233:13		281:10	56:20 63:15

[disagree - dollar]

	I	I	I
70:2 115:3	discussed 97:20	175:16 176:2	57:22 60:12
198:17 212:23	116:4,17	180:18,22	79:13 91:17
222:24	154:17 159:5	183:10	93:15,24 94:7
disagreed	216:13 223:11	disregard	105:11,14
52:10	247:6,7,7	35:22	106:17 108:12
disagreement	discussing	disrupt 215:13	108:22 169:7
64:21,23	47:14 93:11	dissatisfied	177:10,20
disappears	103:22 249:5	227:7	178:6 179:2
98:2	discussion 78:3	distinction	181:9 182:4
disapprove	97:15 102:17	173:17 178:24	186:10 187:1
85:19	140:12 166:13	184:9,13	191:3,5 229:7
discern 105:14	180:6 181:5	185:24 192:24	281:7,9
disclaimers	196:13 205:4	distinguish	divorced
139:14	216:13 222:20	175:9 184:1	278:23
discount	225:12 232:9	185:5 204:18	dixon 197:2
139:14 245:14	discussions	distorted	dli 24:21
262:25 263:3	113:16 138:2	249:10	doctor 7:16
270:1	162:5 198:19	distracted	document 24:1
discourage	209:5 215:4	30:22	118:9 283:14
150:10	disinformation	distress 265:21	documented
discoveries	33:18	distributed	43:19 281:21
129:3,7,25	dismantled	121:11	282:14 283:2,6
148:9 163:8	16:23	district 10:7	documents
discovers 136:9	dismiss 12:15	142:1 193:14	43:8,19
discovery	49:15,16,21	diverted 91:10	dodge 97:22
163:7	50:4,5,7,8,10	243:17	doing 31:4 92:3
discrete 185:10	50:12 52:6	diverting	99:25 119:23
185:19	disposition	247:19	120:1 123:19
discretion 69:6	285:14	divest 158:2	175:23,24
105:21 106:21	disproportion	163:12	192:2 193:18
156:11 176:6	150:4 259:9	divested 130:7	226:9 231:19
discuss 44:10	261:12	divesting 158:3	238:15,15
86:3 97:18	dispute 53:10	diving 214:22	273:11 278:12
234:12	73:17 83:11,14	division 30:15	dollar 98:9
	83:15 124:21	34:3 56:17	233:9 266:19

[dollar - economic]

266:20,22,25	dr 1:22 110:24	drive 1:6 2:10	144:17 147:20
267:1,2,3,3,13	203:17 234:11	13:16 137:2	150:19 162:10
267:13,17,19	234:17,20	140:17	163:3 197:21
267:20,20,21	235:5,8 236:19	driven 136:25	268:23
272:10	237:15,16,22	drivers 22:8	earmarked
dollars 12:3	246:7 249:2	driving 198:8,9	283:9
17:16 20:22	283:24	drops 223:25	earn 224:18
26:15,17 31:1	draft 160:13,13	due 42:2,13	272:23
102:4 121:15	drafts 172:25	215:7,22	earned 121:14
132:12 138:18	drain 39:25	duly 45:4 119:9	272:22
138:19 139:4	dramatically	128:11 235:18	earth 36:21,22
142:18,19,20	188:25 256:21	duties 119:13	36:23,24 37:1
145:7 153:4,23	drastic 14:17	duty 239:10	37:2 161:6
154:9,10	draw 247:12	dzilthnaodithle	earthkeeper
174:13 185:21	280:16 282:1	24:15	36:20
221:25 223:13	drawing	e	earthworks
225:7 270:10	148:24	e 2:1,1 3:1,1 4:1	23:19
270:14 271:16	dried 25:2	5:1 6:25 7:1	ease 111:15
271:17,17	drill 18:14	9:24,24 11:15	easier 195:24
274:23	20:25 42:11	15:1 21:15	228:21
domestic 8:8	211:12,13	23:4 26:6,7	easily 63:7
48:6	drilled 19:19	27:11 29:1,1,1	east 2:4 129:24
dominance	24:7 112:10	27.11 27.1,1,1	70.10.10
	24.7 112.10	32.12 37.18 19	easy 50:10,18
139:10	123:21 129:11	32:12 37:18,19 38:23 23 23	easy 50:10,18 52:7 162:11
139:10 door 14:18		38:23,23,23	,
	123:21 129:11	38:23,23,23 40:25 54:5,8	52:7 162:11
door 14:18	123:21 129:11 129:12 182:10	38:23,23,23 40:25 54:5,8 55:24 127:4	52:7 162:11 188:1 228:20
door 14:18 downtime	123:21 129:11 129:12 182:10 drilling 21:6	38:23,23,23 40:25 54:5,8 55:24 127:4 234:22 235:10	52:7 162:11 188:1 228:20 economic 46:19
door 14:18 downtime 162:6,11	123:21 129:11 129:12 182:10 drilling 21:6 28:15 42:7,12	38:23,23,23 40:25 54:5,8 55:24 127:4 234:22 235:10 246:12,12,12	52:7 162:11 188:1 228:20 economic 46:19 46:21 82:6,12
door 14:18 downtime 162:6,11 downturn	123:21 129:11 129:12 182:10 drilling 21:6 28:15 42:7,12 64:7 82:6,22	38:23,23,23 40:25 54:5,8 55:24 127:4 234:22 235:10 246:12,12,12 earlier 21:23	52:7 162:11 188:1 228:20 economic 46:19 46:21 82:6,12 82:21 133:16
door 14:18 downtime 162:6,11 downturn 248:3	123:21 129:11 129:12 182:10 drilling 21:6 28:15 42:7,12 64:7 82:6,22 129:17 138:15	38:23,23,23 40:25 54:5,8 55:24 127:4 234:22 235:10 246:12,12,12 earlier 21:23 151:13 178:20	52:7 162:11 188:1 228:20 economic 46:19 46:21 82:6,12 82:21 133:16 133:17 136:19
door 14:18 downtime 162:6,11 downturn 248:3 downturns	123:21 129:11 129:12 182:10 drilling 21:6 28:15 42:7,12 64:7 82:6,22 129:17 138:15 146:18 198:6	38:23,23,23 40:25 54:5,8 55:24 127:4 234:22 235:10 246:12,12,12 earlier 21:23 151:13 178:20 180:5 201:10	52:7 162:11 188:1 228:20 economic 46:19 46:21 82:6,12 82:21 133:16 133:17 136:19 141:8,14 172:6
door 14:18 downtime 162:6,11 downturn 248:3 downturns 226:13	123:21 129:11 129:12 182:10 drilling 21:6 28:15 42:7,12 64:7 82:6,22 129:17 138:15 146:18 198:6 222:16	38:23,23,23 40:25 54:5,8 55:24 127:4 234:22 235:10 246:12,12,12 earlier 21:23 151:13 178:20 180:5 201:10 243:19 261:19	52:7 162:11 188:1 228:20 economic 46:19 46:21 82:6,12 82:21 133:16 133:17 136:19 141:8,14 172:6 205:23 206:13
door 14:18 downtime 162:6,11 downturn 248:3 downturns 226:13 dozen 97:16	123:21 129:11 129:12 182:10 drilling 21:6 28:15 42:7,12 64:7 82:6,22 129:17 138:15 146:18 198:6 222:16 drills 25:19	38:23,23,23 40:25 54:5,8 55:24 127:4 234:22 235:10 246:12,12,12 earlier 21:23 151:13 178:20 180:5 201:10 243:19 261:19 early 24:8	52:7 162:11 188:1 228:20 economic 46:19 46:21 82:6,12 82:21 133:16 133:17 136:19 141:8,14 172:6 205:23 206:13 207:14 211:9
door 14:18 downtime 162:6,11 downturn 248:3 downturns 226:13 dozen 97:16 124:8	123:21 129:11 129:12 182:10 drilling 21:6 28:15 42:7,12 64:7 82:6,22 129:17 138:15 146:18 198:6 222:16 drills 25:19 drinking 28:4	38:23,23,23 40:25 54:5,8 55:24 127:4 234:22 235:10 246:12,12,12 earlier 21:23 151:13 178:20 180:5 201:10 243:19 261:19	52:7 162:11 188:1 228:20 economic 46:19 46:21 82:6,12 82:21 133:16 133:17 136:19 141:8,14 172:6 205:23 206:13 207:14 211:9 215:13 216:10

[economic - ends]

224:15 240:5,9	221:11 249:6	175:19 176:5	emissions
240:11 253:4	249:10 250:15	176:21 183:1	24:18,23 25:2
254:13,18,20	264:4	184:25 187:16	116:10 117:2
267:22 278:23	effective	204:11 206:6	227:13,24
economical	246:25	214:4 215:18	229:5,22
218:20	effectively	219:12 220:19	emitters 160:4
economically	146:6 152:21	221:18 223:21	emnrd.nm.gov
42:12 172:3	241:9 259:1	224:10 243:16	2:12,13
242:25 243:4	effects 161:18	245:24 249:18	empirical
244:10,13	244:16 259:8	250:5 251:5	162:19
254:3	efficiencies	259:17	employed 8:12
economics 46:4	211:15	elapsed 282:20	285:12
46:17 113:24	efficient 240:2	elected 119:9	employees 8:9
114:25 134:5	effort 92:15	electrical 22:10	128:25,25
215:9,10 236:4	93:3 114:15	149:12	129:2 192:16
236:16,19,20	118:24 129:5	electricity	employing
economist	158:23,24	253:23	181:11
236:2	240:1 252:14	eligible 244:3	employs 8:6
economy 12:10	efforts 174:19	eliminate 206:8	empowered
14:12,20	eight 18:11	232:7	93:16
197:22 238:22	52:12,22	eliminated 54:4	enacted 209:18
eddy 10:8 12:6	128:24,25	217:8	encountered
129:11	137:20 139:13	eliminating	94:9
education 8:17	147:13,14,22	13:19	encourage
32:23 34:9	147:24 156:12	em 88:24	18:16 232:3
42:9 128:16	249:14 251:16	embarrassed	239:14 246:24
236:13	eighth 124:6	50:3	encouraged
effect 22:19	208:25	emblematic	232:2
45:23 50:20	either 42:4 50:4	278:18	encourages
52:15 64:22	104:3 127:11	emerge 98:10	238:25
68:17 77:15	133:1 139:20	emergencies	encouraging
78:10 155:18	142:20 144:16	39:17	172:15,17
156:16 165:11	148:11 150:22	emergency	ends 89:1
183:17 213:19	151:7 158:1	193:22,23	230:12 259:19
214:1,11	159:8 171:1		

[energy - et]

	I	I	I
energy 2:10	ensure 27:6	89:19 116:9	erratic 257:25
28:11 75:22	216:2	160:13 161:5	errors 74:24
121:8 130:16	ensures 20:6	165:1 168:7	especially 8:20
130:17 131:2	34:4 210:10	198:7 227:12	14:10 20:16
197:7 206:21	enter 66:15	environment	22:6 52:4 81:7
229:17 246:21	67:7 68:2	95:14	114:21 206:3
enforce 18:16	80:24	environments	206:16 213:11
67:2 96:10	entered 58:2	114:11	239:12 248:3
enforcement	147:17 268:24	eog 3:8,13	283:4
88:9,23 97:10	entering	107:15 202:9	esq 1:24
105:22 106:22	221:13 256:20	eogresources	essence 133:7
107:1 123:4	entire 74:13,14	3:15	essentially 55:8
174:19 176:5	136:11 256:22	eor 136:4	131:17 210:14
177:11 178:4	entirely 191:13	epa 227:23	essentials 8:1
178:13 180:15	259:1	229:7	establish
194:10,21,24	entirety 227:8	equal 69:9	211:14
231:17	entitled 76:9	240:18 242:22	established
enforces 34:4	90:10	245:17 250:16	13:6 150:16
enforcing 92:9	entity 48:18	269:24 271:3	201:10 221:15
93:20 98:22	entrants	equals 266:12	254:20
231:23	221:17	equation	estate 226:10
engage 192:9	entrepreneurial	276:24	236:8,12
engaged 184:24	238:24	equipment	estimate 188:8
engaging 227:6	entry 150:7,8	15:21 16:13	188:8 202:24
engineer 21:25	enverus 255:5	146:24	227:23 275:14
111:18	259:14	equipped	estimated
engineers	environment	134:14	166:15
262:24	29:23 117:22	equity 236:11	estimates
england 236:12	118:4 214:24	237:5	116:10 227:12
enhanced	229:2,7 230:5	equivalent 12:2	estimating
140:22	246:22	255:16,22	166:17,19
enjoy 22:3	environmental	256:6,9,14	estimation
238:25	2:3 13:1 14:14	280:5	245:22
enjoyed 225:12	25:3 36:11	errata 61:14	et 65:19 102:21
	45:8 52:20		

[etched - exist]

etched 73:10	275:24 280:20	274:16 277:17	exempted
ethylbenzene	exaggerating	277:18	54:10,11,12
229:24	276:17	examples	exempting 56:1
evaluating	examination	155:12 172:2,3	exempting 50.1
145:23	4:5,6,6,7,7,8,8	246:1 249:11	53:25 55:5
evaluation	4:10,10,11,11	249:12 252:4	exemptions
262:24	4:12,12,13,14	257:2,19 259:5	160:2
event 13:25	44:6,21 45:5	269:12	exempts 55:7,8
43:12 78:7	60:7 84:9	exceed 61:11	55:15
80:5,16 81:17	107:20 109:12	166:3 172:4	exercise 269:3
163:24 237:20	110:21 115:11	226:22 230:11	276:22
eventually	126:2,7 128:12	254:3	exhaustive
263:8 266:13	164:23 169:1	except 276:22	233:13
268:19 270:23	199:15 202:17	exception	exhibit 5:5,6
271:14 273:11	203:14 225:19	114:1 218:14	43:4,10,18,21
everhart 3:6	235:19	exceptions	43:22 44:3
everybody	examine	113:18 137:1	51:20 52:1,18
17:19 101:2	188:23	160:10,15	52:19,24 53:10
105:17 135:16	examining 43:5	175:25 177:6	109:8 125:19
157:11 162:14	example 16:16	204:5 209:7	125:22 126:13
219:4	65:15 81:9	216:14,19,25	126:25 127:11
everybody's	97:11,13,18	218:19	127:18 155:8
114:19	98:6 118:23	excess 83:2	161:15,20
everyday 41:24	138:21 146:19	108:2 137:22	179:15 253:5
evidence 16:25	156:7 199:25	187:23 243:4	259:13 271:9
73:6 237:16	207:12 214:12	exchange 51:1	275:22
exact 274:20	214:17 237:4,5	67:20 68:18	exhibits 5:3,4,8
275:24	239:15 240:22	excuse 76:25	42:24 43:2,13
exactly 19:20	242:5,17	125:10 152:24	43:16 164:7
39:11 51:19	249:13 251:1	154:24 171:14	237:17 238:2,7
63:12 212:15	254:3 258:4,21	206:24 217:19	exist 60:17
214:25 254:14	261:6,9,15,16	233:24 281:9	73:21 74:20,21
255:11 269:20	262:3 266:22	executed 63:18	182:16 191:18
270:8 271:3	268:6 269:13	exempt 53:17	247:8
273:25 274:9	270:18 274:15	218:6	

[existed - ezzell]

		1-1101-	- 4
existed 93:24	expedite	176:1 181:7	explosive
existence 196:8	193:24 195:22	194:17 195:8	117:19
existing 99:18	expeditiously	195:11,12	express 59:14
99:19 156:8	134:19	205:15 208:25	extended 72:17
170:19 176:10	expend 252:14	220:21 221:6	250:18
176:15 177:4	expenditure	experienced	extent 95:8
251:7 260:12	146:15	22:14	167:15 242:15
exists 33:20	expenditures	experiences	244:10 245:12
60:18 74:23	173:22 174:4,7	33:1	251:20 253:25
177:5	247:21	expert 49:22	265:18 276:16
exiting 151:1	expense 8:20	173:15 231:9	279:6 283:17
exits 149:8	21:1 239:11	expertise 93:23	extra 124:10
exodus 148:17	241:17 262:6	experts 71:1	extraordinary
expand 151:13	263:19,21	expired 36:1	13:24
expanded	264:9 269:16	209:15 210:1	extreme 214:13
143:21	270:13,25	212:3,18,21,22	244:22 245:22
expansion	271:4 272:11	explain 159:11	extremely
214:14	274:2 275:8	159:24 217:4	12:10 66:16
expect 21:2	expenses 8:17	explained	166:2 257:25
222:9 252:14	261:18 262:14	49:22 145:18	262:2 263:22
261:24 276:4	263:25 264:3	147:2 155:9	exxon 147:18
277:25 282:21	277:14	explaining	149:17
283:21	expensive 30:7	283:15	eye 280:16
expectation	39:20 146:20	explanation	ezzell 4:5 9:20
203:5 240:14	151:4 224:8	136:9	9:21,22,23
241:3 242:16	245:19	explicit 13:7	10:2,5,6 11:12
242:19	experience 53:3	exploration	14:21 42:22,24
expected 166:3	53:5 63:23	129:5 148:5,8	44:18,20,24
240:13,18	113:14,15	150:23 162:1	45:2,7 53:16
241:16,24	128:16 129:19	explore 60:19	59:22 60:9
242:2,21,22	130:5 133:21	92:2 94:22	76:12 77:1
266:12 267:24	134:23 141:22	221:1	78:25 84:3,11
267:25 274:23	145:8 150:25	exploring	84:18 86:15
275:8 276:5,6	151:9 152:4	62:22 230:10	87:10,17,24
277:15	160:19 163:14		89:22 90:8,15

[ezzell - federal]

	T	I	
90:19,23 91:15	146:13 153:3	fairness 25:17	father 7:23
91:25 92:14	161:8 184:24	29:9	128:20 130:1
93:8 95:18	192:17 195:13	faith 37:5	137:22 138:11
96:16 98:4	255:20 256:1	160:1,16	148:14
99:12 100:19	257:16 264:1	fall 154:22	fault 134:16
101:9,25 102:6	275:1	158:21 171:12	faulty 75:1
102:10 103:1	factor 69:15	276:5	favor 29:7
103:14,21	94:11,23 95:5	falls 20:16	91:15
105:25 107:3,6	95:6	214:25 239:11	fe 1:7 2:4,11,22
107:22 110:19	factored	254:10	3:14,19 35:15
110:23 115:14	183:15	familiar 52:18	36:19
116:4 117:4,20	factors 111:8	52:24 67:12	feasibility
118:5 120:21	112:15 159:4	148:25 158:22	280:1
124:23 125:11	218:24	158:24 165:8	feat 197:8
125:12 134:3	facts 219:3	186:4 197:7	federal 14:1
227:11 230:16	factually	200:13,18,19	30:19 48:5
231:14	131:24	220:19 227:20	53:16 54:1,6,7
f	fade 232:15	familiarity	54:10 55:5,8
f 27:12 200:19	fail 66:15 95:25	63:10	55:15 56:1
fa 55:12 244:22	240:23 241:5	families 17:23	93:18,19 94:1
245:21 279:18	failed 12:23	family 7:11	95:1 114:4,15
face 240:19	13:1 176:16	25:10 115:23	116:9 136:12
241:6 252:24	195:11,13	115:24 138:12	142:18,19
262:6 263:5,15	fails 25:23	family's 226:8	143:7 145:5,7
264:23	239:21 241:12	fan 29:8	154:7,8,9,13,14
faces 240:22	fair 28:16,16	fantastic 226:5	154:21 165:12
241:14 245:16	30:24 39:24	far 106:9 166:3	165:16,18
facilities	54:15 65:18	226:22 231:22	166:9,18 170:3
181:13,17,22	70:17 71:8	farmer 10:6	171:19 180:12
182:6 183:15	76:21 160:17	fascinating	182:7 183:18
facing 265:16	196:16 201:4	32:20	184:2,4,16,17
fact 74:18	fairly 233:12	fast 103:11	184:21,25
75:17,21 78:5	237:3 257:4	143:12,17	185:3,16,21
86:21 88:16	262:22 269:13	faster 223:15	186:2,11
97:20 141:13			192:16 199:24
71.20 141.13			

[federal - first]

	1	1	
200:7,10 201:4	fields 139:2,5	106:7,12,25	225:23 284:8
201:8,8,9,10	fifth 32:23 34:8	110:6,11	fines 16:4
217:5 227:12	122:19	111:10 122:4	107:1
227:23 243:24	fighting 126:23	150:6 151:1	finish 54:19
257:19 283:9	figure 73:8	182:24,25	228:12
federally 55:8	152:17	214:16 220:3	finished 44:18
55:12	figured 191:20	238:11,12,17	161:1 226:9
fee 9:5 20:20	figures 202:20	242:23 244:8	firm 84:18,25
114:4 136:12	figuring 275:6	244:10,18	89:17,17
154:20 165:16	filed 24:16,23	249:22 250:1,8	firm's 62:21
165:22 182:10	49:15 85:8	251:7,9,12,19	first 6:11,22
184:14,14	118:9 125:25	252:11 253:3	8:4 12:14
259:18	filled 102:22	253:24,25	14:25 18:22
feel 197:15	115:20	254:2,4 256:22	19:22 21:13,14
208:25 230:14	final 160:13	260:7 261:25	23:3 26:5 27:5
feeling 231:15	285:14	262:15 263:10	27:9 28:16,25
feels 196:20	finalize 198:14	263:13 264:17	35:1 37:14
fees 9:7 245:19	finally 162:16	264:22 265:17	38:21 40:22
feet 24:15	231:13	265:21,25	45:3 60:14
204:4 210:18	finance 152:1,5	276:2 277:24	71:21 93:15
felicia 1:18 6:6	197:11 236:6,7	financially	94:5 98:19
female 225:14	236:17 266:17	265:8,8,19,23	109:11 113:7
fewer 235:7	278:7	277:23	118:9 126:6
280:5	financial 6:5	find 13:2 24:4	127:24 128:11
field 22:3,5	49:5,25 50:24	76:24 95:15	129:11,13
23:18,25 25:4	51:4 53:18	98:10 229:9	138:13,14
28:17 100:3	54:1 55:9,16	241:6 254:13	139:23,24
129:3 136:10	55:23 56:15	254:18 258:16	156:4 160:5
136:11,13,19	57:20,21,23,25	269:8	163:1 229:13
136:21 137:11	58:2,5,7,9,11	finding 222:3	234:10 235:9
137:12 138:21	58:22 59:10	findings 144:12	235:18 238:1
139:2 149:19	64:14 69:14	160:25	246:10 249:13
150:23 157:10	73:4 78:4 79:1	finds 96:6	258:24 259:22
171:21	79:9,14,15,22	fine 78:15 80:2	271:25 272:17
	89:11 96:21	146:10 188:20	272:18,21

[firsthand - four]

firsthand 24:2	flagrantly	folks 34:19,23	formed 128:19
38:8	87:25	234:4	138:17
fiscal 121:14	flaring 83:6	follow 30:9	former 43:3
173:24,24	flat 261:20	84:15	128:20
174:10 243:20	283:2	following 12:10	forming 104:18
fit 66:4	flatly 75:17	29:12 87:11	forms 63:18
fits 244:18	flawed 141:21	89:2 99:4	64:13 85:10
five 28:9 121:4	fleshing 225:12	109:21 117:5	formula 138:3
132:14 140:17	flexibility	follows 45:4	formulation
145:24 148:21	115:1	128:11 235:18	46:13
155:22 156:9	flood 138:13	food 8:2,4 42:4	forth 130:1
157:5 188:12	258:5	foot 70:8	132:22 162:18
210:8,10 251:3	flooding 137:3	123:21 133:22	163:11 191:23
251:3,4,18	138:23	133:23 210:16	221:10 280:10
267:1,3,13	floor 1:5	force 41:14	285:8
270:24 271:14	flow 16:22	56:16 77:17	forward 159:14
272:9 273:12	139:10 266:12	134:10 195:21	208:16 209:14
273:12,23,25	271:21 278:6	forced 65:16	273:4
274:3,4,10	flows 267:7,25	forcing 77:19	fossil 33:8,10
275:11 277:11	268:11 269:5	77:22 151:18	33:15
278:8,15	270:20 271:3	243:2	found 24:4
fix 39:18 50:10	272:7,15 274:1	foregoing	69:20 93:21
50:18 52:7	274:3,15	285:9	117:7 124:6
152:17 196:19	fluctuating	forewarned	211:7
228:22	283:3	234:7	foundation
fixed 100:6	fluid 210:15,18	forfeit 239:22	126:21 177:4
244:12 252:13	fluids 16:20	forgetting 57:4	181:19
253:19,20	157:15 210:7	forgive 156:1	foundational
254:5,7,11	flux 199:13	forgot 234:24	174:25
261:17,20	focus 76:12	form 56:21	four 23:17 24:5
262:1 264:5,10	174:19 209:16	63:13,20 138:1	41:9 121:13
268:17	focused 81:25	247:11	123:4 155:22
fixes 18:4	82:5,11 155:22	formation	156:3 171:12
flagged 17:5	227:21	129:6 137:21	171:14,21
		204:23	178:23 188:11

[four - further]

188:12 191:24	277:10 278:4	fund 8:3 10:24	224:13 233:10
193:5 217:5,24	278:14	11:1 13:6,10	236:12 243:12
229:13 272:3,9	freedom 51:1	17:11,12 20:2	243:17,19
fourth 71:25	friend 148:7	20:4,5,9,19	247:6,17,19,20
72:2 129:20,21	162:24	30:11,14,17,18	247:21,21,24
271:19 285:18	friendly 41:21	39:16 52:20	278:13
fox 2:5,5 4:5,10	friends 95:14	71:6,11 91:9,9	fundamental
44:22,23 45:1	front 16:7	91:10,12,14	278:23
45:6,7 54:2,6,9	42:22 50:12	101:6,10,14	funded 11:2
54:12,15,16	87:4 114:13	102:3,4,19	20:7 71:6
59:21,25 60:1	116:1 131:1	103:5,18 120:5	105:3 120:24
67:12 81:24	148:6 197:11	120:7,19,22	220:23
164:5,10,12,19	268:22	121:1,6,11,15	funding 20:10
164:21,24	frustrated	121:16,17,25	91:13,14 96:6
165:1 167:2	159:21	122:20,24	97:25 133:11
168:20	frustrating	132:3,3,14	166:12 185:7
frac 17:25	159:7	151:14,18,19	188:14 189:8
fraction 141:8	fte 91:16	152:13,20,20	201:13 216:5,5
154:20	fudge 281:6	153:18 154:25	funds 13:10
fractured	fuel 33:15	168:7 170:8	20:7 28:8
157:16	41:23 42:3,3	173:21 174:8	36:12 39:25
framework	42:14	178:18,21	91:9 101:1
14:9 193:12	fuels 33:8,11,17	179:2 181:6,8	120:11 173:21
216:21	fugitive 116:19	181:10,20	178:18 182:10
francis 1:6 2:10	117:2 228:4	182:11 184:6	186:11,18
francisco 27:9	fulfill 21:3	184:15,18	189:19 190:1
27:11,12,15,17	full 25:20	185:9 187:10	195:3 219:21
27:18 28:21	149:10 241:16	188:10,11,18	219:25 220:2
frank 128:20	245:4	188:24 189:4	220:12 224:23
frankly 196:3	fully 79:15	189:13,22	266:2
199:2	243:2	190:13 191:1	fungible 186:14
free 14:15	fun 70:18	196:9 198:7	funneled 102:2
66:14,19 67:20	function 265:2	201:11 206:17	further 94:23
68:2,18 95:23	268:5	213:12 221:24	109:3 124:24
232:13 277:2,8		222:1 223:3	159:18 175:8

[further - given]

40:6,7 104:2,9 79:6 83:6,9 gdp 9:13 geometry 149 166:4 196:16 85:3 86:7,11 geez 162:12 george 130:18 208:13,18 95:19 101:3,4 gene 40:14 geoscience 210:25 211:2 95:19 101:3,4 general 8:20 getting 8:25 248:2 266:12 102:1 104:5,8 89:8 91:10 40:4 79:20 135:15 143:3 267:25 276:18 108:24 116:11 103:5,18 114:3 40:4 79:20 135:15 143:3 283:18 117:19 119:15 132:14 152:20 135:15 143:3 144:23 147:5 g 129:21 130:11 137:1 140:5 100:6 108:1,1 179:24 201:7 170:16 178:5 179:24 201:7 215:9 229:23 215:9 229:23 215:9 229:23 215:9 229:23 215:9 229:23 215:9 229:23 215:9 229:23 215:9 229:23 216:22 217:12,14 254:17 218:11 254:17 218:11 254:17 218:11 218:12 218:11 219:11 27:15:9 223:2 218:9:15 223:2 23:23:2 223:2 23				
285:7,12 42:5,8 45:13 gases 33:23 182:17 future 14:6 45:18 46:9 117:17 geological 28:3,11 36:5 56:11 67:9 gathering 21:24 38:12 39:23 72:4 73:3 78:4 219:9 229:10 geological 40:6,7 104:2,9 79:6 83:6,9 gdp 9:13 geometry 149 208:13,18 87:1 90:1 94:1 gene 40:14 geoscience 210:25 211:2 95:19 101:3,4 general 8:20 geoscience 248:2 266:12 102:1 104:5,8 89:8 91:10 getting 8:25 267:25 276:18 108:24 116:11 103:5,18 114:3 40:4 79:20 283:18 117:19 119:15 132:14 152:20 135:15 143:3 277:14,20 116:13 117:9 213:16 generally 80:22 151:3,4,4 121:2,8 129:8 29:21 130:11 100:6 108:1,1 179:24 201:7 121:15 257:19 141:24 149:11 120:23 136:25 215:9 229:23 151:3,4,4 122:11,17 254:17 254:17 254:17 259:29:23 285:17 196:3 197:22 188:12 189:	199:6 203:8	36:10 38:6,9	264:2 278:20	145:18
future 14:6 45:18 46:9 117:17 geological 28:3,11 36:5 56:11 67:9 gathering 21:24 38:12 39:23 72:4 73:3 78:4 219:9 229:10 geologist 148 40:6,7 104:2,9 79:6 83:6,9 gdp 9:13 geometry 149 208:13,18 87:1 90:1 94:1 gene 40:14 geoscience 210:25 211:2 95:19 101:3,4 general 8:20 geoscience 248:2 266:12 102:1 104:5,8 89:8 91:10 getting 82:5 267:25 276:18 108:24 116:11 103:5,18 114:3 40:4 79:20 283:18 117:19 119:15 132:14 152:20 135:15 143:3 283:18 117:19 119:15 generally 80:22 151:3,4,4 g 129:21 130:11 100:6 108:1,1 179:24 201:7 gap 95:4 122:4 151:3,153:5 144:25 151:10 177:12,14 gllstrap 220:2 gardner 130:3 198:5 208:8,14 120:11 178:22 188:12 189:15 95:2 113:24 generate <td>244:3 278:3</td> <td>38:11 41:19</td> <td>281:16</td> <td>geographical</td>	244:3 278:3	38:11 41:19	281:16	geographical
28:3,11 36:5 56:11 67:9 gathering 21:24 38:12 39:23 72:4 73:3 78:4 219:9 229:10 geologist 148 40:6,7 104:2,9 79:6 83:6,9 gdp 9:13 geometry 149 166:4 196:16 85:3 86:7,11 geez 162:12 george 130:18 208:13,18 87:1 90:1 94:1 gene 40:14 geoscience 248:2 266:12 102:1 104:5,8 89:8 91:10 gestting 8:25 267:25 276:18 108:24 116:11 103:5,18 114:3 40:4 79:20 283:18 117:19 119:15 132:14 152:20 135:15 143:3 15ty24 187:22 121:2,8 129:8 generally 80:22 151:3,4,4 121:15 257:19 137:1 140:5 100:6 108:1,1 179:24 201:7 121:15 257:19 151:3 153:5 144:25 151:10 177:12,14 glh 40:14 122:11,17 163:2 166:2 254:17 generate 120:11 178:22 18:23 89:23 11:4 12:1,9,18 13:5 14:1 210:22 213:15 190:15 114:25 136:8 13:5 14:1 226:24 227:14 226:24 227:14 190:14 190:14 </td <td>285:7,12</td> <td>42:5,8 45:13</td> <td>gases 33:23</td> <td>182:17</td>	285:7,12	42:5,8 45:13	gases 33:23	182:17
38:12 39:23 72:4 73:3 78:4 219:9 229:10 geologist 148 40:6,7 104:2,9 79:6 83:6,9 gdp 9:13 geometry 149 166:4 196:16 85:3 86:7,11 geez 162:12 george 130:18 208:13,18 87:1 90:1 94:1 gene 40:14 geoscience 248:2 266:12 102:1 104:5,8 89:8 91:10 getting 8:25 267:25 276:18 108:24 116:11 103:5,18 114:3 40:4 79:20 283:18 117:19 119:15 132:14 152:20 135:15 143:3 283:18 117:19 119:15 generally 80:22 151:3,4,4 29:21 130:11 137:1 140:5 100:6 108:1,1 179:24 201:7 21:15 257:19 151:3 153:5 144:25 151:10 179:24 201:7 285:17 157:20,21 177:12,14 give 19:8 36:2 285:17 163:2 166:2 254:17 generate 120:11 178:22 188:12 189:15 9:0:15 130:8 29 ardner 130:3 198:5 208:8,14 210:22 213:15 190:15 114:25 136:8 11:4 12:1,9,18 219:8 222:4 188:12 189:15 138:9 139:15 13:5 14:1 226:24 227:14 226:24 227:14 190:14 2	future 14:6	45:18 46:9	117:17	geological
40:6,7 104:2,9 79:6 83:6,9 gdp 9:13 geometry 149 166:4 196:16 85:3 86:7,11 geez 162:12 george 130:18 208:13,18 87:1 90:1 94:1 gene 40:14 george 130:18 210:25 211:2 95:19 101:3,4 general 8:20 130:6 getting 8:25 248:2 266:12 102:1 104:5,8 89:8 91:10 103:5,18 114:3 40:4 79:20 135:15 143:3 277:14,20 116:13 117:9 132:14 152:20 135:15 143:3 144:23 147:5 283:18 117:19 119:15 213:16 generally 80:22 151:3,4,4 129:21 130:11 137:1 140:5 100:6 108:1,1 179:24 201:7 179:24 201:7 120:11,17 141:24 149:11 120:23 136:25 215:9 229:23 144:25 151:10 179:24 201:7 120:11,17 163:2 166:2 173:9 182:11 254:17 120:11 178:22 188:12 189:15 47:11,18 69:3 130:24 114:21,9,18 13:5 14:1 226:24 227:14 223:2 145:23 190:5 145:23 190:5	28:3,11 36:5	56:11 67:9	gathering	21:24
166:4 196:16 85:3 86:7,11 geez 162:12 george 130:18 208:13,18 95:19 101:3,4 general 8:20 130:6 geoscience 248:2 266:12 102:1 104:5,8 89:8 91:10 getting 8:25 267:25 276:18 108:24 116:11 103:5,18 114:3 40:4 79:20 283:18 117:19 119:15 132:14 152:20 135:15 143:3 283:18 117:19 119:15 213:16 144:23 147:5 g 129:21 130:11 85:13 90:7 170:16 178:5 g2 2:22 7:1,1 137:1 140:5 100:6 108:1,1 179:24 201:7 gallegos 285:3 157:20,21 177:12,14 gilstrap 225:23 gap 95:4 122:4 163:2 166:2 254:17 generate 47:11,18 69:3 gas 3:3 8:6,19 196:3 197:22 188:12 189:15 95:2 113:24 11:4 12:1,9,18 219:8 222:4 120:21 178:22 87:23 89:23 11:4 12:1,9,18 226:6,9,10,23 226:24 227:14 223:2 145:23 190:5 15:12,24 17:10 226:24 227:14 226:24 227:14 226:27 25:24:91 190:14 <	38:12 39:23	72:4 73:3 78:4	219:9 229:10	geologist 148:9
208:13,18 210:25 211:2 248:2 266:12 248:2 266:12 267:25 276:18 277:14,20 283:18 37:1 90:1 94:1 32:14 152:20 283:18 38:18 39:19:15 39:19:15 39:19:15 39:19:15 39:19:15 39:19:15 39:19:15 39:19:15 39:19:15 39:19:15 39:19:15 39:19:15 39:19:15 39:19:15 39:19:15 39:19:15 39:19:15 39:19:15 39:19:15 39:19:15 39:19:15 39:19:15 39:19:15 39:19:15 39:19:15 39:19:14 39:19:14 39:19:14 39:19:14 39:19:14 39:19:14 39:19:14 39:19:14 39:19:14 39:19:14 39:19:14 39:19:14 39:19:19:14 39:19:19:14 39:19:19:14 39:19:19:14 30:6 39:20:20:11 30:6 39:20:20:11 30:6 39:20:20:11 30:6 39:20:20:11 30:6 39:20:20:11 30:6 39:20:20:11 30:6 39:20:20:11 30:6 39:20:10:20:11 30:6 39:20:10:20:11 30:6 39:20:10:20:11 30:6 39:20:10:20:11 30:6 39:20:10:20:11 30:6 39:20:10:20:11 30:6 39:20:10:20:11 30:6 39:20:10:20:11 30:6 39:20:10:20:11 30:6 39:20:10:20:11 30:6 39:20:10:20:11 30:6 30:40:47:20 30:40:47:20 30:10:40:47:20 30:10:10:13:14 30:10:10:14 30:10:10:14 30:10:10:14 30:10:	40:6,7 104:2,9	79:6 83:6,9	gdp 9:13	geometry 149:4
210:25 211:2 248:2 266:12 102:1 104:5,8 267:25 276:18 116:13 117:9 116:13 117:9 283:18 117:19 119:15 129:21 130:11 29:21 130:11 29:21 130:11 29:21 130:11 29:21 130:11 29:21 130:11 29:21 130:11 29:21 130:11 29:21 130:11 20:23 136:25 285:17 29 position of the position of	166:4 196:16	85:3 86:7,11	geez 162:12	george 130:18
248:2 266:12 102:1 104:5,8 89:8 91:10 getting 8:25 267:25 276:18 108:24 116:11 103:5,18 114:3 40:4 79:20 135:15 143:3 277:14,20 116:13 117:9 132:14 152:20 135:15 143:3 144:23 147:5 283:18 117:19 119:15 213:16 144:23 147:5 144:23 147:5 g 129:21 130:11 85:13 90:7 170:16 178:5 179:24 201:7 170:16 178:5 179:24 201:7 215:9 229:23 <td>208:13,18</td> <td>87:1 90:1 94:1</td> <td>gene 40:14</td> <td>geoscience</td>	208:13,18	87:1 90:1 94:1	gene 40:14	geoscience
267:25 276:18 108:24 116:11 103:5,18 114:3 40:4 79:20 277:14,20 116:13 117:9 132:14 152:20 135:15 143:3 283:18 117:19 119:15 213:16 144:23 147:5 fy24 187:22 121:2,8 129:8 generally 80:22 151:3,4,4 g 129:21 130:11 85:13 90:7 170:16 178:5 137:1 140:5 141:24 149:11 120:23 136:25 215:9 229:23 gallegos 285:3 151:3 153:5 144:25 151:10 gh 40:14 gardner 130:3 166:2 177:12,14 gistrap 220:5 gardner 130:3 196:3 197:22 198:5 208:8,14 120:11 178:22 87:23 89:23 11:4 12:1,9,18 210:22 213:15 190:15 144:25 136:8 13:5 14:1 226:6,9,10,23 223:2 145:23 190:5 15:12,24 17:10 226:24 227:14 226:24 227:14 190:14 245:25 249:1	210:25 211:2	95:19 101:3,4	general 8:20	130:6
277:14,20 283:18 117:19 119:15 121:2,8 129:8 129:21 130:11 21:15 257:19 285:17 28p 95:4 122:4 122:11,17 28p 95:4 122:4 122:11,17 28p 95:0,15 10:23 28s 3:3 8:6,19 9:10,15 10:23 11:4 12:1,9,18 13:5 14:1 15:12,24 17:10 116:13 117:9 119:15 213:16 213:16 213:16 213:16 213:16 213:16 213:16 213:16 213:16 213:16 213:16 213:17:9 213:16 213:16 213:16 213:16 213:16 213:16 213:16 213:16 213:16 213:16 213:16 213:16 213:16 213:16 213:16 213:16 213:16 213:17:9 213:16	248:2 266:12	102:1 104:5,8	89:8 91:10	getting 8:25
283:18 117:19 119:15 213:16 144:23 147:5 g 129:21 130:11 85:13 90:7 170:16 178:5 g 137:1 140:5 140:6 108:1,1 179:24 201:7 gallegos 285:3 151:3 153:5 144:25 151:10 179:24 201:7 gap 95:4 122:4 157:20,21 177:12,14 gilstrap 220:5 gardner 130:3 196:3 197:22 198:5 208:8,14 120:21 178:22 87:23 89:23 9:10,15 10:23 11:4 12:1,9,18 210:22 213:15 190:15 144:25 136:8 13:5 14:1 226:24 227:14 226:24 227:14 223:2 145:23 190:5 13:5 24:1 15:12,24 17:10 15:12,24 17:10 160:14 170:16 178:5 170:16 178:5 170:16 178:5 170:16 178:5 170:24 201:7 215:9 229:23 gh 40:14 gilstrap 220:5 give 19:8 36:2 19:8 36:2 19:10:11 178:22 173:11 18 69:3 173:12,14 173:13:24 173:13:24 173:13:24 173:13:24 173:13:24 173:13:24 173:13:24 173:13:24 173:13:24 173:13:24 <td>267:25 276:18</td> <td>108:24 116:11</td> <td>103:5,18 114:3</td> <td>40:4 79:20</td>	267:25 276:18	108:24 116:11	103:5,18 114:3	40:4 79:20
fy24 187:22 121:2,8 129:8 generally 80:22 151:3,4,4 g 129:21 130:11 137:1 140:5 100:6 108:1,1 179:24 201:7 gallegos 285:17 141:24 149:11 120:23 136:25 215:9 229:23 gap 95:4 122:4 157:20,21 177:12,14 gilstrap 220:5 gardner 130:3 196:3 197:22 173:9 182:11 196:3 197:22 188:12 189:15 47:11,18 69:2 gas 3:3 8:6,19 9:10,15 10:23 11:4 12:1,9,18 210:22 213:15 190:15 114:25 136:8 13:5 14:1 226:24 227:14 226:24 227:14 223:2 145:23 190:5 15:12,24 17:10 226:24 227:14 227:15 25 190:14 245:25 249:1	277:14,20	116:13 117:9	132:14 152:20	135:15 143:3
g 2:22 7:1,1	283:18	117:19 119:15	213:16	144:23 147:5
g 2:22 7:1,1 21:15 257:19 gallegos 285:3 285:17 gap 95:4 122:4 122:11,17 gardner 130:3 gas 3:3 8:6,19 9:10,15 10:23 11:4 12:1,9,18 13:5 14:1 15:12,24 17:10 137:1 140:5 141:24 149:11 151:3 153:5 157:20,21 163:2 166:2 173:9 182:11 196:3 197:22 198:5 208:8,14 210:22 213:15 210:22 213:15 226:6,9,10,23 226:24 227:14 237:15 25 100:6 108:1,1 120:23 136:25 144:25 151:10 gh 40:14 gilstrap 220:5 give 19:8 36:2 47:11,18 69:7 47:11,18 69:7 120:11 178:22 188:12 189:15 190:15 generated 138:9 139:15 190:10 234:2 245:25 249:1	fy24 187:22	121:2,8 129:8	generally 80:22	151:3,4,4
g 2:22 7:1,1 137:1 140:5 100:6 108:1,1 179:24 201:7 gallegos 285:3 285:17 151:3 153:5 144:25 151:10 gh 40:14 gap 95:4 122:4 163:2 166:2 254:17 gistrap 220:5 gardner 130:3 196:3 197:22 198:5 208:8,14 120:11 178:22 87:23 89:23 9:10,15 10:23 11:4 12:1,9,18 219:8 222:4 190:15 13:9 13:15 13:5 14:1 226:6,9,10,23 223:2 145:23 190:5 15:12,24 17:10 226:24 227:14 227:15 25 190:14 245:25 249:1	g	129:21 130:11	85:13 90:7	170:16 178:5
21:15 257:19 gallegos 285:3 285:17 gap 95:4 122:4 122:11,17 gardner 130:3 gas 3:3 8:6,19 9:10,15 10:23 11:4 12:1,9,18 13:5 14:1 15:12,24 17:10 141:24 149:11 151:3 153:5 157:20,21 163:2 166:2 173:9 182:11 196:3 197:22 198:5 208:8,14 210:22 213:15 219:8 222:4 226:6,9,10,23 226:24 227:14 227:15 25 120:23 136:25 144:25 151:10 177:12,14 gilstrap 220:5 give 19:8 36:2 47:11,18 69:7 47:11,18 69:7 190:15 190:15 190:15 190:10 234:2 245:25 249:1		137:1 140:5	100:6 108:1,1	179:24 201:7
gallegos 285:17 gap 95:4 122:4 163:2 166:2 254:17 generate 47:11,18 69:2 gardner 130:3 gas 3:3 8:6,19 9:10,15 10:23 198:5 208:8,14 190:15 188:12 189:15 95:2 113:24 13:5 14:1 226:6,9,10,23 226:24 227:14 generating 190:10 234:2 15:12,24 17:10 226:24 227:15 25 generating 190:10 234:2	1	141:24 149:11	120:23 136:25	215:9 229:23
285:17 gap 95:4 122:4 122:11,17 gardner 130:3 gas 3:3 8:6,19 9:10,15 10:23 11:4 12:1,9,18 13:5 14:1 15:12,24 17:10 157:20,21 163:2 166:2 177:12,14 254:17 26nerate 120:11 178:22 198:5 208:8,14 210:22 213:15 219:8 222:4 226:6,9,10,23 226:24 227:14 254:17 generate 120:11 178:22 190:15 114:25 136:8 138:9 139:15 145:23 190:5 190:14 226:24 227:14 226:24 227:14 226:24 227:14 226:24 227:14 254:17 259illetrap 220:3 247:11,18 69:7 257:15 25 254:17 259illetrap 220:3 259ille		151:3 153:5	144:25 151:10	gh 40:14
gap 95:4 122:4 163:2 166:2 254:17 give 19:8 36:2 122:11,17 196:3 197:22 120:11 178:22 87:23 89:23 198:5 208:8,14 188:12 189:15 95:2 113:24 199:10,15 10:23 11:4 12:1,9,18 120:22 213:15 190:15 13:5 14:1 226:6,9,10,23 223:2 145:23 190:5 15:12,24 17:10 226:24 227:14 226:24 227:14 190:14 190:10 234:2		157:20,21	177:12,14	gilstrap 220:5
122:11,17 gardner 130:3 gas 3:3 8:6,19 9:10,15 10:23 11:4 12:1,9,18 13:5 14:1 15:12,24 17:10 173:9 182:11 196:3 197:22 198:5 208:8,14 210:22 213:15 219:8 222:4 226:6,9,10,23 226:24 227:14 226:24 227:14 226:24 227:15 25 173:9 182:11 196:3 197:22 120:11 178:22 188:12 189:15 190:15 114:25 136:8 138:9 139:15 190:10 234:2 245:25 249:1		163:2 166:2	254:17	give 19:8 36:24
gardner 130:3 gas 3:3 8:6,19 9:10,15 10:23 210:22 213:15 11:4 12:1,9,18 219:8 222:4 13:5 14:1 226:6,9,10,23 15:12,24 17:10 226:24 227:14 190:14 227:15 25 120:11 178:22 87:23 89:23 188:12 189:15 95:2 113:24 114:25 136:8 138:9 139:15 120:11 178:22 120:11 178:22 120:12 189:15 120:12 189:15 120:12 189:15 120:12 189:15 120:12 189:15 120:13 190:15 120:13 178:22 138:9 139:15 120:14 120:14 120:14 120:11 178:22 120:12 189:15 120:13 190:15 120:13 190:15 120:14 120:14 120:14 120:13 190:15 120:14 120:13 190:15 120:14 120:13 190:15 120:14 120:13 190:15 120:14 120:14 120:14 120:15 120:15 120:15 120:15 120:15 120:15 120:15 120:15	• •	173:9 182:11	generate	47:11,18 69:7
gas 3:3 8:6,19 9:10,15 10:23 210:22 213:15 11:4 12:1,9,18 219:8 222:4 13:5 14:1 226:6,9,10,23 15:12,24 17:10 226:24 227:14 198:5 208:8,14 188:12 189:15 190:15 114:25 136:8 138:9 139:15 190:10 234:2 226:24 227:14 226:24 227:14 227:15 25 190:14	· /	196:3 197:22	120:11 178:22	87:23 89:23
9:10,15 10:23 11:4 12:1,9,18 13:5 14:1 15:12,24 17:10 210:22 213:15 219:8 222:4 226:6,9,10,23 226:24 227:14 226:24 227:14 226:24 227:15 25 190:15 114:25 136:8 138:9 139:15 145:23 190:5 190:10 234:2		198:5 208:8,14	188:12 189:15	95:2 113:24
11:4 12:1,9,18 13:5 14:1 15:12,24 17:10 219:8 222:4 226:6,9,10,23 226:24 227:14 226:24 227:14 226:24 227:14 227:15 25 228:24 229:24 229:25 229:26 229:26 229:27 27 27 27 27 27 27 27 27 27 27 27 27 2	, ,	210:22 213:15	190:15	114:25 136:8
13:5 14:1 15:12,24 17:10 226:6,9,10,23 226:24 227:14 226:24 227:14 227:15 25 227:15 25 190:14 190:14 245:25 249:1	·	219:8 222:4	generated	138:9 139:15
15:12,24 17:10 226:24 227:14 generating 190:10 234:2	· · ·	226:6,9,10,23	223:2	145:23 190:5
1 277.15 25 1 100.17 1 2715.25 2710.1		226:24 227:14	generating	190:10 234:21
	17:17,21 19:10	227:15,25	190:14	245:25 249:11
20:7,23 23:18 229:4,12,14,21 generation 251:1 253:5	1	229:4,12,14,21	generation	251:1 253:5
23:20 24:1 236:21 41:8 129:20,21 258:20 259:1	· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·	232:11 236:21	41:8 129:20,21	258:20 259:12
23.20 24.1 27:23 28:2 236:23 241:9 129:22 148:10 264:3		236:23 241:9	129:22 148:10	264:3
27.23 28.2 29:10 30:4,16 241:10 244:6 148:14 given 31:25		241:10 244:6	148:14	given 31:25
30:22 33:23 244:15 249:7 gentleman 89:5 112:9		244:15 249:7	gentleman	89:5 112:9
30.22 33.23 34:4 35:23 249:11 254:21 62:23,23 113:1 118:3		249:11 254:21	62:23,23	113:1 118:3

[given - good]

152:15,25	156:24 175:22	126:10 127:20	230:8 232:16
154:10 189:4,7	184:11 205:3	129:17 136:10	234:16 235:4
191:22 211:8	206:4 207:25	136:11,12	237:22 242:13
221:21 256:18	208:20 209:2	138:3,4,8	244:23 248:9
256:23 261:17	212:14 213:17	140:3,6,7,7,12	249:4 253:4
264:8	218:14,20,22	140:20,24,25	259:12 261:19
gives 119:15	218:25 224:2,4	145:6,20,21	262:8,17
giving 84:21	224:7,21	146:8,9,16,17	263:13,14,20
87:13,18	228:12 231:13	150:10,13,17	264:22 265:6,7
glad 231:6	233:13 234:17	150:18,25	266:3 268:1,7
glance 139:23	235:16,23	151:7,8 152:9	269:11,16,18
139:25	237:24 239:22	152:12 153:14	269:18,19,23
glancing 201:3	246:16 249:1,2	153:16 154:22	270:4,11,19,22
glenn 21:10,11	272:4 275:12	156:1,10,13	271:5,6,7,23
21:14,15,18,21	283:10,15	163:5 170:4	272:23,25
21:24 22:23	goal 159:10	173:13 176:7	277:3 279:15
go 10:3 11:20	god 7:4	182:3 183:23	280:25 281:22
13:5 15:6	goes 7:11 11:3	185:22 190:5	283:7,12,22
22:13 23:10	56:18 117:4	190:10,12	284:7
26:11 27:16	121:10 136:9	191:9 192:12	good 6:3 7:7
29:5 35:13	136:14 143:14	192:16,19	9:22 14:23
42:4,21 55:2	144:5 193:8	194:7 199:3	15:7 19:6
58:7,8 60:20	195:8 214:7	200:12 205:13	21:11,12,21
60:24 76:23	247:16	205:14,15,22	27:17 28:24
77:25 78:22	going 34:24	206:11,11,15	29:6 37:24
89:8 91:22	51:22 53:13	207:2,15,25	39:3 40:20,21
92:5 99:24	60:3 61:6 64:6	209:1,8,9	44:25 45:1
100:4 101:25	64:11 65:7	211:6 213:25	56:23 60:9,9
104:14 109:10	70:8 73:20	214:8,11,13	60:14 78:13
109:11 110:3	74:3 76:23	215:14 216:25	84:6,11,14
111:24 113:3	77:14 79:10	219:10,14	88:7,25,25,25
123:25 125:9	81:1 93:9 97:9	220:15,25	93:6 97:11
128:9 135:11	102:12,12	221:7,8,18,19	105:3,23
137:9,12	103:4,15,17	224:6,11,18	107:22,23
140:10 141:14	112:11 113:22	225:2,2,6	114:23 115:13

[good - hall's]

		I	I
133:4 139:6	186:1,10	gross 8:8	179:24 194:22
160:1,16,18	grants 36:22	ground 10:21	220:20 230:17
161:12 162:23	143:7 185:10	49:17 243:7	233:21 238:10
162:24 169:3,4	185:10 186:3	groundwater	gulf 226:11
181:3 197:5	243:24 244:2	117:5,7,9	guy 66:14
199:9,17 206:5	283:9,11	group 15:10	95:23 163:6,7
209:24 221:24	granular	142:16,17	guys 97:9
222:12 225:21	100:22	groups 145:24	105:24,24
225:24 232:21	graph 280:6	grow 266:25	160:6 207:21
234:19 239:15	282:24	270:9 277:3	253:5 259:12
gotten 190:10	graphing	growing 29:12	h
government	229:17	30:7,19 41:19	h 3:19 11:15
40:1 94:10	gratitude 60:15	grown 151:24	26:6 37:19
95:1 96:1	gray 159:1	152:13 174:14	38:23 128:2
154:13 184:17	grayburg	grows 19:25	246:12
governor 72:15	138:21	268:18,18,18	h.w. 130:18
119:7,9	grazer 199:12	275:23 278:10	hairs 159:1
governor's	great 7:13	278:11	halbouty
153:15	32:24 41:10	growth 8:8	130:19
gps 17:1	63:17 105:15	240:5,9 271:16	half 12:3
grade 29:17	129:23 226:2	272:22 273:6	121:14 156:2
32:23 34:9	255:13	273:14	223:12 225:7
132:19,19	greater 112:11	guarantee	242:14 270:10
graduate 7:19	greatest 33:9	36:11 134:8,9	270:14 279:7
grand 260:3	greatly 145:10	230:23,24	hall 1:5 2:12
grandchildren	192:6 194:19	guaranteed	
41:10,10	green 271:2,25	36:9	4:6 60:3,3,6,8 60:10 76:8,10
grandfather	greenhouse	guardians	'
7:13 32:22	117:19 229:4	161:6	76:13,15 78:11
34:8 129:23,23	gregory 1:21	guardrails	78:14,21,22,23
grandma's	grew 23:19	36:13	78:24 84:2,4
222:15	226:7	guess 52:7	95:23 108:6,15
grant 13:24	grid 22:10	60:19 72:16	110:4 116:16
120:6 121:1,25	groceries 41:24	80:23 147:24	168:23
154:11 185:19		161:23 178:17	hall's 84:16

[halliburton - hearing]

halliburton	happens 90:18	healthcare	21:8,12,16,19
149:17 226:12	115:2 136:15	20:23	22:23 23:2,5
hanaa 24:21	162:14 176:3	hear 6:20 9:21	23:12,15 26:1
hand 31:14	177:12 192:9	18:20 31:18	26:4,8,11 27:8
34:14 40:18	223:25 250:3	32:5,6,7 65:8	27:13,16 28:20
172:15,17	272:12	69:24 89:1	28:24 29:2,5
248:19,20	happy 44:8	109:25 110:2	30:10 31:6,13
handful 87:13	82:19 113:1	138:25 167:8	32:2,8,13,16
87:21 88:2,4	126:15	168:13,16,18	34:12 35:4,7
88:12,12,13	harbaugh	179:8 218:21	35:10,13 37:8
200:6 201:1	40:14,15	226:2 248:6	37:16,20,23
handle 209:8	hard 54:21	heard 1:17 25:6	38:19,24 39:2
handled 211:21	137:20 138:7	39:8 65:11	40:9,21 41:1,4
handling 20:2	156:12 157:18	69:19 70:2,2	42:17,23 43:11
hands 42:20	193:6	92:17 101:12	43:18,23,25
hang 105:4	hardship	102:25 115:18	44:17,23 51:7
hannigan	114:13	116:16 135:10	51:9,10,15
148:14	harm 9:3	136:24 141:3	60:1,4,5 76:11
hannigans	harms 15:11	142:2 143:23	78:11,16,20,23
148:13	hart 2:21	143:24 144:20	84:4,6 90:4,12
happen 71:10	harvard 148:7	148:7,13	90:18 91:21,22
89:16 140:3	148:8	167:10,11	92:4 101:19,23
150:25 151:10	harvey 37:15	183:17 204:12	102:25 107:5,7
153:18 167:1	37:15,18,22,24	207:22 221:16	107:14,15,19
218:13 224:11	37:25	226:3 228:2	108:7,16,21
231:2 233:11	hazard 239:3	232:1 243:10	109:4,7 110:15
262:13	hazel 130:18,21	243:21 245:1	110:16 115:6,9
happened	he'll 239:22	277:21 280:2	115:16 116:6
159:24 198:22	headed 195:24	hearing 1:1,18	125:1,7,10,16
254:23	228:15	6:3,4,6,21 7:2,5	125:18,22,24
happening 24:2	health 19:24	9:18,25 10:3	126:12 127:8
76:19 103:5	24:10 28:4	11:11,16,19	127:19,21,23
105:8 129:18	29:23 38:13	14:24 15:3,6	128:5,8 135:4
223:15	117:22 118:4	18:12,18,21	155:6 163:22
	214:24 230:5	19:1,4 20:1	164:1,3,5,11,13

[hearing - hook]

164:19,21	209:10 216:18	highly 104:16	hit 151:12
168:22,25	239:25 281:5	117:18 249:15	158:10 205:21
196:4 198:9,24	helpful 163:16	251:3,16,18	hitting 232:20
199:7,9 201:19	169:23	252:25 255:2	hoeing 156:22
202:3,13,15	helping 53:3	265:9	hold 21:24
203:9,11	helps 8:3,7	hilcorp 24:14	26:22 36:13
208:21 225:18	22:10	24:20	50:23 75:23
232:23 233:1	herfano 24:21	hill 258:24	208:13 220:2
233:19,23	hesitate 283:19	268:19,21	holdback 266:8
234:1,9,16,22	heterogeneity	269:8	266:10 267:6
235:8,12,15	157:13	hills 16:10,18	269:21 270:2,3
237:18,19	hey 226:4	138:22	271:1,4 273:20
238:2,5 243:11	hi 225:22	hindsight 66:20	278:17,19
246:2,13,16	high 9:16 18:6	hinkle 2:15	holding 25:22
248:13,17	42:2 112:2,7	84:18,21 89:17	254:5
283:23 284:3,6	112:12 146:5	hinklelawfir	holds 17:12
284:10,15	158:9 188:8	2:17,18	holdup 219:25
285:4	220:3 221:19	hire 50:22	hole 210:14,16
heat 33:17	240:8 244:11	92:10	210:20
heating 8:5	244:11 253:9	histogram	holes 111:21
heins 11:13,13	260:8 264:23	109:17,19	holidays
11:14,14,18,21	higher 122:13	historical	191:22
14:21	122:14,14,15	162:23	holland 2:21
heinz 11:23	151:7 179:4	historically	hollandhart.c
held 19:11	204:8 242:8,14	163:4 166:24	2:23,24
26:17 78:19	243:22 250:21	183:19,19	holy 37:3
89:11 125:14	257:17 264:1,2	184:19 190:14	home 8:5 22:20
202:2 220:15	highest 265:16	208:9 219:16	homes 15:23
hello 14:24	highlight 61:6	223:24	honest 33:19
23:2,6 26:3,4	79:10 176:20	history 30:8	281:6,13
26:12 164:25	182:3	95:12 99:21	honor 36:10
help 7:4 34:17	highlighted	115:16 150:12	240:23 241:14
46:12 95:4	59:17 81:14	167:2,5 194:5	241:19
167:17 195:25	110:5 177:6	195:2 208:5,7	hook 17:16
196:19 208:1	280:15	226:6 258:7	

[hope - inactive]

hope 91:7	139:3,3 221:25	idle 39:12,13	implement
207:16 229:18	224:8	155:13,15	14:17 91:2,18
231:8 232:19	hurt 134:11,11	156:6,18	92:22 279:25
233:10	hurts 218:3	ignore 94:7	implemented
hoped 195:5	hydrocarbon	192:10	138:13,14
hopefully 46:11	46:3,8,15	ignored 75:17	148:24
100:7 163:16	hydrocarbons	258:9	implicated
247:13 261:11	117:15 243:14	ignores 131:15	117:12
hoping 191:16	253:15 268:17	244:20 267:6	implication
horizon 204:22	hydrogen	ignoring	251:23
horizontal	25:12 117:17	276:19	implies 59:1
129:13 138:14	219:8	illustrate	imply 68:11
140:21 148:24	hypothetical	249:11 260:6	important
253:7,19 261:9	113:11	264:20	20:13 149:23
hours 155:25	hypothetically	imagine 112:18	197:22 198:1
157:3 284:7	190:23	241:2	199:4 228:11
house 10:10,12	i	imaging 23:18	238:22 242:2
75:15 131:2	idea 57:8 59:19	immediately	254:9
132:5 158:20	65:22 89:21	106:24 121:11	importantly
187:2 246:21	104:3,7,11	195:14,17,17	13:22
housekeeping	109:24 120:24	205:22 252:5	imposing
44:1	138:7 150:23	268:9	242:23 243:3
huge 139:21	267:4	impact 113:23	improperly
140:10 141:16	ideal 239:12	141:15 148:20	117:11,16
198:1 220:14	240:10,17	148:20 150:5	181:15
224:12	241:23 242:1	154:10 195:12	inaction 20:16
hughes 149:16	276:2,2,4	198:2 207:15	inactive 18:6
human 25:18	identical 252:1	214:9 224:12	52:11,21 53:7
humans 36:20	identified	impacted 39:20	54:10 55:21
hundred 29:16	92:15 259:20	150:18	86:18 96:5,19
88:3 122:20	identify 91:1	impacts 12:11	97:16 102:20
155:1 194:4	280:8	23:22 25:7	103:25 104:23
208:7,11 213:1	identifying	38:9 221:12	105:13 106:19
hundreds 31:1	166:7	imperative	106:23 109:19
132:12 138:18	100.7	44:7	116:11,18

[inactive - industry]

117:7 120:16	includes 45:13	142:4 143:24	indigenous
123:5 165:24	77:10 121:7	155:11 173:22	23:17
175:9,12	180:12,13	188:25 190:25	individual
177:11,22	212:17	265:25	13:16 72:4,23
180:20 184:2	including 113:8	increases 13:13	99:10,14,15,20
194:9,13,15	117:13,17	59:13 244:12	132:24 133:14
195:14 199:24	182:10 185:8	250:19 260:25	148:4 204:24
200:13,16,23	185:21	261:25	244:21 246:23
212:17 227:13	income 22:16	increasing	258:13
227:24 228:3	inconsistent	13:18 36:1	individualized
229:12,14	186:9	166:4 253:3	99:17
231:18 245:24	incorporated	256:21 282:6	induced 281:23
249:17,18,20	114:1	incredible	283:8,21
249:23 250:5	incorrect 47:7	145:2	industries
251:5	56:7 65:24	independence	35:23
incentive	74:4 131:24	163:5	industry 8:1,2
239:18,19,24	increase 12:22	independent	8:6,15 9:2,12
252:5,9 254:13	17:21 108:13	2:14 7:20	10:24 11:4,6,8
256:24 283:13	108:23 179:1	13:17 83:12	14:11 15:19
incentives	244:7 250:6,9	106:10 113:10	20:20 22:8
172:13 173:5	250:12,17,20	113:13 147:11	25:23 26:16,22
241:13 244:6	250:23,24	147:25 150:3	27:1,4 30:8
244:14 249:7	252:11,12	158:14 163:8	41:19 42:13
249:10 254:25	254:5,16	235:25 258:22	64:22 71:1,4
256:18	255:15 260:16	independently	75:16 87:14,18
incidents 24:24	260:19,20	53:12	88:6 89:10
117:9,13	261:17 262:5,8	independents	101:3,5 102:1
inclined 206:8	262:10 263:13	147:22 149:20	129:21 130:11
include 15:13	263:14,18	150:5	131:16,17
114:25 119:13	264:5,8,10,17	indicated	132:23 133:1,8
195:12,13	264:18 265:16	200:25	134:4 135:13
204:9 257:19	279:19 282:6,8	indicates 181:9	140:5,14
included 16:25	282:14 283:5	indication	147:10 153:1,5
261:10	increased	281:24 283:18	159:25 160:21
	19:13 59:9		161:4,10

[industry - internalize]

1 < 2 1 7 2 2	4.0	1 1 200 5	
162:15,22	informally	insolvent 239:6	intended 11:3,7
163:2,4,14	130:18	265:25	13:11 19:16
166:24 168:14	information	inspect 100:4	48:17 56:3
168:16 169:10	47:23 48:1,16	inspected	91:13 97:25
169:21 189:15	106:2,12 135:4	209:23 279:22	120:20 153:19
191:15,17	142:6 144:13	inspector	intensified
192:10 194:5	154:2 231:21	175:23	15:11
196:2 197:24	infrastructure	inspectors	intent 49:23
199:4 207:21	8:4 16:6 24:3	100:4	51:2 54:14
208:15 210:4	137:14 149:9	instance 66:24	182:14
213:15 214:1	149:14 185:9	69:22 76:19	intentions
214:15 219:21	inherent	93:15,19	133:2
225:1 240:8	276:20	104:18 115:2	inter 269:5
241:11 247:15	inherently	209:17 213:22	interest 65:9,12
247:16 248:5	30:24 141:20	218:9 244:24	65:19,19,23,25
industry's	inheriting 18:8	272:22	66:2 67:21
30:23 31:2	inhibit 67:23	instances 173:5	68:18 94:18
70:23 242:9	initial 120:9	instantaneous	106:5 114:19
inert 210:6	274:18	191:11	273:14 285:14
inevitability	initiated	institute 231:16	interested
17:22	140:16	instituted	106:18 148:23
inflation	initiatives 13:2	123:3	218:21 230:9
122:13,13,15	injection 22:7	instructions	interesting
142:21	22:11	127:1,3	51:7 152:1
inflicted 35:24	injury 8:24	instruments	195:10 229:9
inflow 142:17	innovation	110:6	232:10 247:5
253:11,14,18	238:24	insufficient	interior 130:23
254:7,10	input 12:19	20:15	130:23 283:11
261:23	160:24 161:4	insulting 196:6	interior's
inflows 261:21	161:10 221:12	insurance 7:21	281:18
262:2 268:16	inquiry 280:2	7:21 8:18,21	internal 142:15
influence 198:8	insertions	8:21 9:1,6,7,8	142:17
influential	51:18	247:11,12	internalize
32:22	inside 16:20	integrity	243:2
		209:24 210:11	

[interpret - jobs]

•		207 27 224 20	107.14
interpret 54:18	invested 121:3	207:25 234:20	it'll 127:14
93:25	222:2,9 275:5	238:7 253:5	153:22,23
interpreted	investigate	259:13 271:9	154:16 157:3
14:6	94:18 95:11	275:21	194:15 196:23
interrupt	investment	ipanm's 12:14	214:4
101:21 102:12	98:10 121:3	ipra 43:19	item 146:18,19
237:23	142:21 213:16	iron 210:5	203:23
interrupted	236:10 238:24	irresponsible	items 41:25
190:3	271:11 274:18	29:13	j
interrupting	275:21	irritants 41:17	j 2:17 11:14
76:8 96:14	investments	irs 172:24	jack 16:23
interruption	274:14,17	isolated 24:24	jackson 138:21
249:2	investors	issue 20:3	jacob 3:6
interstate	106:16	56:18 94:3,16	january 91:7
281:16	involved 51:13	132:18 143:10	118:15
intervals	52:3 123:9,13	145:17 147:9	jeff 148:7,9
280:20	136:2 137:21	153:14,16	jennifer 3:11
interviewed	148:2,5,15	155:23 166:19	3:11
263:23	158:25 162:3,8	167:24 176:14	jeopardizing
intimated	258:5 279:12	185:22 196:21	199:4
168:5	involvement	198:1,14,15	jesse 2:11 169:4
introduce	167:15,19	218:9,16,16	jessek.tremaine
90:20 118:20	iogcc 281:19	249:5 250:2	2:12
128:15 234:11	ipa 237:16	issued 16:4	jeverhart 3:7
235:21	ipanm 5:4,5,7	58:3	
introduced	42:24 43:4,16	issues 118:3	joa 63:4 joas 63:4 64:10
153:13	43:22 49:15,20	123:10 132:9,9	65:15
intuitively	50:9 52:1	143:15 146:8	job 34:2 66:10
267:12	62:19 84:19	177:10 191:18	•
inventory	85:1 97:4	208:22 218:12	66:11 92:6 99:25 100:1
229:5	112:23 113:2	226:17,18	
invest 271:7,19	127:21 128:4	239:3	112:14 226:14
271:20 272:15	130:9,9 141:24	issuing 232:4	jobs 13:19 22:6
278:8,10	159:2 164:17	it'd 204:10	22:12,17 42:1
	169:17 207:5		42:7 141:13

[john - know]

john 163:10	justifiable	218:16 231:23	136:23 138:4
johnson 43:7	244:13	kindly 36:23	139:20 145:8
join 31:20	justified 243:4	kindness 36:23	145:10 146:17
42:22	254:3	kinds 22:6	150:17 151:16
joined 23:24	k	82:20	152:3 154:16
joining 199:12	k 2:11 23:4	kiowa 36:18	159:4 161:1,7
233:4	27:11 35:3	kirtland 41:14	161:25 162:12
joint 85:8,14,16	128:2	knew 110:1	162:18 165:8
85:19,23	karen 41:7	know 15:19	166:20,21
130:13	keep 6:14 8:12	18:2 20:2	170:15 172:5
joints 16:14	20:1 25:1 40:3	22:24 31:24	172:24,25
jonny 11:13,14	57:4 93:8	33:13,14,22	173:1 175:15
11:22	136:23,24	46:20 47:8,15	177:11 178:7
jordan 3:15,15	156:8 188:13	50:17 52:15	178:16 179:16
jpas 115:17	273:11 278:12	64:23,24 70:6	184:19 185:20
juan 23:25	keeping 41:18	71:9,18 72:12	187:13,15
24:11 257:3	271:12 278:4	72:13 75:12,25	188:15 192:14
258:22,23	keeps 76:8	76:20 87:12	192:18 193:11
259:1	kelli 285:3,17	88:11,16,16	193:12,21
judging 208:18	kelly 27:8,11	89:7,13,16,20	194:12 196:19
judgment	27:18	90:10,16 93:23	196:22 200:14
238:20 239:4,5	kendra 22:24	95:24 97:6	206:6,9,10
240:2	23:1,16	98:6 100:3	207:5,8,9,18,23
jump 65:7	kept 174:4,9	104:13 106:17	208:1,4,6,14,21
jumped 280:14	kessler 3:15,15	106:25 107:2	209:1,4,7,23,25
june 118:10	key 211:22	109:22 111:18	210:22 212:13
142:13 255:4,6	kicks 132:3	111:19,20,21	212:14,17
255:18,23	kid 7:18	112:1 113:5	214:1 215:10
257:8,22,24	kilgore 130:3	114:8 115:23	215:23 216:5
jurisdiction	kill 71:12	116:2 119:20	216:10,12,15
48:6 197:17	killing 73:19	120:23 121:1	217:3 218:21
226:18	kind 71:14	121:15 124:3,7	219:25 220:12
jurisdictions	80:15 99:16	124:12,14,18	220:18,19
93:13 95:5	114:21 120:25	124:21 125:25	223:12 226:14
	127:9 188:21	132:2 135:7	229:21 230:2,9

[know - leaks]

230:11,15,16	26:19 34:6	55:11,13,15,25	86:9,11,12,24
231:1,3,15,21	35:19,20,22,25	55:25 56:1	89:17,17 93:18
231:23 242:19	36:12,15 38:16	58:17,25 59:4	128:20 165:2
260:1 261:21	84:8 89:18	59:7,14,17,17	185:9 194:9
281:15 284:2	107:24 114:17	61:7 64:4	226:9
knowledge	120:4,6,10,21	67:12,18 68:4	laws 14:1 16:3
119:17 134:24	120:22 121:1,6	68:8,12 110:5	93:20,25 94:1
224:25	121:9,16,18,20	182:14	lawyer 45:8
known 7:15	121:25 123:3,6	lap 223:25	52:5 60:11
33:10,15	123:9,17 124:5	large 96:19	63:11 165:1
128:23 144:14	124:15,20	97:14 117:15	182:19 193:11
148:8 162:7,10	166:1,18	120:14 144:21	193:23 197:16
238:19 239:4	178:15 182:10	237:3,4 252:12	197:19 215:16
knows 33:7,12	185:1,11	261:9 279:8	lawyers 111:7
92:8 105:23	199:19,25	283:5	lay 64:3
135:7 254:15	200:7 231:3,9	largely 197:24	lea 12:6
kraken 237:4	231:15,25	213:14 221:23	lead 241:14
kyle 2:6	232:3,12	larger 256:10	243:5,6 252:19
l	landmen 85:11	256:10 261:3,3	254:2
1 3:11 7:1 9:24	lands 3:17	largest 11:25	leadership
9:24 15:1	25:14 26:14	260:9 261:5,8	197:21
18:24,24,25,25	84:8 114:10	las 7:10,22	leading 108:6
21:15,15 26:6	119:8,10	lasting 38:8	108:15
27:11,11 35:2	122:12 165:23	lastly 123:2	leak 16:22
37:18	166:9,10	130:20 281:15	25:11 116:18
l'90s 226:13	180:23,24	late 7:18	117:16 228:3
labor 253:23	181:1 182:7	141:23 147:19	leakage 116:23
laboratory	198:6 199:19	197:10	228:8
130:13	231:18 259:18	lateral 129:12	leaking 15:21
laborious	landscape	129:12	16:6,12,18
137:25	35:16,18	law 2:3 27:24	33:23
lack 93:1	language 14:5	29:10,13,24	leaks 39:14
laid 192:17	45:13,20 49:24	30:9 38:7 45:8	116:25 117:15
land 3:18 15:25	50:11,19 51:9	60:22 61:8	228:22
23:23 25:25	51:12,16,25,25	62:5 84:18	

[learned - life]

learned 97:5	124:20 147:19	legislators	283:13
157:1	162:15 223:23	118:19	levels 119:1
lease 121:9	254:8 268:10	legislature	261:18
123:19,20	270:14 271:25	10:14,22,25	levied 244:9
200:20,25	280:19,19	12:21 13:6	lfc 76:17 116:5
232:11,12	282:4	72:15 75:12	117:4 141:17
262:4,5,14	leftmost 282:18	76:1,17 91:1	141:18,18,22
263:18,21,25	282:21	91:11 100:24	142:2,5,15,17
264:2,9	legal 77:21	109:1 118:7,23	144:11 161:2
leasehold 65:21	86:7 135:11	119:3,25 120:3	165:8,9,19,21
leases 121:9	169:6 186:9	121:4 135:12	166:6,17,25
123:14 124:4	193:12 285:17	141:25 152:21	167:12,13,16
136:12,12,13	legged 132:10	189:20 190:1,4	167:20 168:14
136:13 232:4	legislate 119:3	193:20 195:25	168:15 195:5
leasing 121:9	legislation	196:15,20	227:6 243:18
129:5 198:6	10:14 12:16	197:25 198:12	244:1
leave 10:21	90:6,7,20 91:7	230:23 246:19	liabilities
16:6 26:18	91:8 118:25	246:20	122:25 211:20
64:8 98:8	153:13,15	legislature's	liability 8:20
133:2 140:24	232:11 247:18	182:14	8:21 17:14
162:14 211:1	legislative	lend 137:2	31:5 195:18
		1 1 226 10	238:21,23
219:17 232:16	10:10 12:19,25	lending 236:10	236.21,23
219:17 232:16 247:14	10:10 12:19,25 14:16 89:23	length 63:24	247:8 266:13
	,		·
247:14	14:16 89:23	length 63:24	247:8 266:13
247:14 leaves 96:4	14:16 89:23 118:16 132:5	length 63:24 64:6 109:19	247:8 266:13 270:3,5,15
247:14 leaves 96:4 140:10	14:16 89:23 118:16 132:5 158:22 198:17	length 63:24 64:6 109:19 247:6	247:8 266:13 270:3,5,15 273:16,17,21
247:14 leaves 96:4 140:10 leaving 15:21	14:16 89:23 118:16 132:5 158:22 198:17 198:18 199:1	length 63:24 64:6 109:19 247:6 lente's 197:12	247:8 266:13 270:3,5,15 273:16,17,21 275:1 278:8,13
247:14 leaves 96:4 140:10 leaving 15:21 38:17 268:21	14:16 89:23 118:16 132:5 158:22 198:17 198:18 199:1 230:20	length 63:24 64:6 109:19 247:6 lente's 197:12 lessee 123:15	247:8 266:13 270:3,5,15 273:16,17,21 275:1 278:8,13 278:17
247:14 leaves 96:4 140:10 leaving 15:21 38:17 268:21 led 52:8 129:5	14:16 89:23 118:16 132:5 158:22 198:17 198:18 199:1 230:20 legislatively	length 63:24 64:6 109:19 247:6 lente's 197:12 lessee 123:15 123:19,21	247:8 266:13 270:3,5,15 273:16,17,21 275:1 278:8,13 278:17 license 7:14,17
247:14 leaves 96:4 140:10 leaving 15:21 38:17 268:21 led 52:8 129:5 130:25	14:16 89:23 118:16 132:5 158:22 198:17 198:18 199:1 230:20 legislatively 173:21	length 63:24 64:6 109:19 247:6 lente's 197:12 lessee 123:15 123:19,21 232:12	247:8 266:13 270:3,5,15 273:16,17,21 275:1 278:8,13 278:17 license 7:14,17 licensed 62:11
247:14 leaves 96:4 140:10 leaving 15:21 38:17 268:21 led 52:8 129:5 130:25 lee 148:8	14:16 89:23 118:16 132:5 158:22 198:17 198:18 199:1 230:20 legislatively 173:21 legislator 90:16	length 63:24 64:6 109:19 247:6 lente's 197:12 lessee 123:15 123:19,21 232:12 lessees 121:22	247:8 266:13 270:3,5,15 273:16,17,21 275:1 278:8,13 278:17 license 7:14,17 licensed 62:11 67:16
247:14 leaves 96:4 140:10 leaving 15:21 38:17 268:21 led 52:8 129:5 130:25 lee 148:8 leeway 280:24 left 16:8 18:1 25:8,22 56:1	14:16 89:23 118:16 132:5 158:22 198:17 198:18 199:1 230:20 legislatively 173:21 legislator 90:16 90:17 115:24	length 63:24 64:6 109:19 247:6 lente's 197:12 lessee 123:15 123:19,21 232:12 lessees 121:22 124:15 231:24	247:8 266:13 270:3,5,15 273:16,17,21 275:1 278:8,13 278:17 license 7:14,17 licensed 62:11 67:16 life 8:2 23:22
247:14 leaves 96:4 140:10 leaving 15:21 38:17 268:21 led 52:8 129:5 130:25 lee 148:8 leeway 280:24 left 16:8 18:1	14:16 89:23 118:16 132:5 158:22 198:17 198:18 199:1 230:20 legislatively 173:21 legislator 90:16 90:17 115:24 135:3 152:6	length 63:24 64:6 109:19 247:6 lente's 197:12 lessee 123:15 123:19,21 232:12 lessees 121:22 124:15 231:24 letter 151:10 letting 7:8 level 160:20,20	247:8 266:13 270:3,5,15 273:16,17,21 275:1 278:8,13 278:17 license 7:14,17 licensed 62:11 67:16 life 8:2 23:22 32:23 33:1,10
247:14 leaves 96:4 140:10 leaving 15:21 38:17 268:21 led 52:8 129:5 130:25 lee 148:8 leeway 280:24 left 16:8 18:1 25:8,22 56:1	14:16 89:23 118:16 132:5 158:22 198:17 198:18 199:1 230:20 legislatively 173:21 legislator 90:16 90:17 115:24 135:3 152:6 196:17 226:2	length 63:24 64:6 109:19 247:6 lente's 197:12 lessee 123:15 123:19,21 232:12 lessees 121:22 124:15 231:24 letter 151:10 letting 7:8	247:8 266:13 270:3,5,15 273:16,17,21 275:1 278:8,13 278:17 license 7:14,17 licensed 62:11 67:16 life 8:2 23:22 32:23 33:1,10 101:5 113:8

[life - look]

			I
253:4 254:21	212:16 253:19	201:5 204:9,14	logged 234:25
266:11	254:5,8,11	204:17 206:3	london 236:12
lifespan 202:25	261:20	207:9 211:6	long 12:11
lights 147:4	lines 16:7	225:13 233:22	18:17 25:1
likelihood	120:10 149:13	234:13 236:22	96:20 98:12
244:20 257:16	155:10 161:15	237:1 244:1	129:12 135:13
258:8	174:22 175:2	246:25 259:11	136:7 156:13
likely 111:16	280:16,18	261:1,15	158:16,16
111:22 136:10	liquidity	265:12,14	187:3 188:19
165:23 238:23	277:25	266:5 271:8	202:24 211:20
252:24 253:1	list 6:9 59:2,6	273:13,14,18	211:22 212:1
255:2 265:7,9	179:18,21	275:5 276:11	214:21 215:12
265:10 279:13	194:12,25	278:25 280:14	219:23 221:8
283:7,20	195:14,15	live 15:14 18:1	228:10 229:21
likes 64:4	200:14,19,23	23:23 24:9	232:4 236:9
likewise 178:11	224:7 261:2	25:14,15 33:6	257:23 268:18
liliana 18:19,24	listed 179:14	39:14 82:22	268:23 283:15
limit 46:19,21	255:13	157:23	longer 46:22
79:25 205:6	listen 126:16	lived 15:18	53:17 56:8
limitations	listening 32:20	32:23 226:24	57:13 114:8
108:24 279:1	42:15	lives 25:18 55:5	115:14 175:19
limited 44:21	literature	living 16:7	176:25 199:11
119:16 142:6	240:12	25:13	211:11
145:10 163:14	litigator 92:23	llc 11:24	look 17:4 56:21
238:21,23	little 22:1 60:20	llp 2:15,21	61:23 63:11
265:13 277:24	79:1 81:24	loans 265:15	72:14 87:3
limits 134:12	83:24 90:14	lobbyists 17:10	96:17 99:3
136:1 212:11	94:22 105:21	local 141:14	100:3 136:25
215:23 279:13	115:14 123:1	location 219:6	153:25 162:21
lincoln 3:14	124:10 144:14	loco 16:10,18	169:18 181:8
line 16:22	150:1 160:6,11	138:22	194:12 207:2
20:25 75:9	163:13 183:24	loe 264:17	207:14 211:19
81:20 140:17	188:3,22	log 149:16	211:21 212:8
146:18,19	189:24 191:21	234:23	225:3 232:4
161:16 165:13	191:22 199:11		256:11 257:21

[look - majors]

	1	т.	
270:17 282:18	89:9 93:10	149:16 158:4	202:15 225:17
looked 118:9	104:23 106:19	188:8 206:9	238:5 283:23
131:8 136:4	113:16 135:4	229:16 249:15	made 12:18
139:17 146:3	138:1 140:20	250:2 252:8	33:13 44:12
162:10 207:11	144:5 146:1	253:9 257:25	49:20 63:3
213:3 217:3,4	150:12,21	260:9 263:22	102:10 104:6
255:4 274:21	156:14 159:1	lower 204:8	106:3 113:21
277:4 280:13	159:25 175:25	241:24 244:5	114:24 118:11
280:14	181:5 187:9	277:14	121:21 126:7
looking 53:6	193:7 194:16	lujan 130:23	129:3 148:9
57:18 60:25	195:7,24	lump 270:21	151:25 161:9
99:10,15	197:13,24	lunch 125:4,13	163:6 178:14
104:15 118:6	198:19,19,21	125:14,21	198:23 217:10
122:16 142:7	198:25 199:2,2	lura 35:2	mail 127:4
142:16,16	208:12 209:4	m	234:22
155:23 170:17	215:3 220:10	m 6:25 15:1,2	main 129:10
200:23 206:19	220:11,23	26:7 34:18	150:20
208:16 210:13	221:3 223:23	40:16 128:2,2	maintain 71:17
218:13 222:6	232:7 238:15	246:12,12	72:6 73:24
255:5 259:16	240:19 248:3	ma'am 34:24	80:14,20 149:9
looks 176:11	255:2 258:11	48:7 52:25	maintained
187:17 232:20	258:15 279:5	53:8 59:23	24:8 149:12
234:3 257:4,20	lots 89:9 105:3	madam 42:23	212:7
loop 183:24	loud 92:18	43:25 44:23	maintenance
loophole 18:9	louisiana	45:21,25 46:5	120:22 121:6
lose 30:20	129:25	60:3 78:23	121:11,17
215:14,19	lousy 66:22	84:6 91:21	major 140:6
losing 42:1	love 33:10 71:5	101:19 107:5	147:19
loss 22:14,16	115:16 147:10	107:14,19	majority 129:1
254:12 268:25	232:22	107.14,19	154:20 160:12
lost 114:22	loving 17:23	115:9 125:18	165:17 185:2
176:11 240:25	low 16:12	125:24 126:12	200:10 236:22
243:7	24:14,25 77:4	127:21 128:1	255:13
lot 25:6 64:2,5	77:5 113:21	164:1,5,21	majors 149:8
64:11 85:9	114:11 128:23	168:25 199:9	
		100.43 177.7	

[make - maximize]

	I	I	I
make 19:22	153:15 157:6	99:8 104:1,17	master 155:25
21:5 26:25	157:19 158:11	104:23 105:13	180:14
28:5,16,18	261:11	106:19 113:17	master's 21:24
29:15 33:2,20	making 15:25	113:18 114:2	mateo 7:15
33:25 34:10	77:22 111:10	133:20 155:15	material 187:8
38:14,17 61:24	153:10 173:9	156:18 171:1	materials
63:21 69:14	197:5 267:8	171:22,23	146:24
74:12,19 86:2	274:17 282:16	213:21,21	math 169:22
98:3 103:13,24	maljamar	214:3 215:3	202:20
105:11 115:1	138:22	216:9 217:15	mathematical
120:17 127:14	man 229:22	245:24 249:16	267:12
133:9,22 134:1	management	249:18 250:3,5	mathematically
134:6,12	40:2 130:6	251:4,5,20	269:3
137:12 153:17	138:6 185:1,11	252:6,8,10,10	matt 2:7
157:4,8,21	232:3	252:21 253:1	matter 1:9
159:3 171:23	manager	255:2,7,10,17	27:22 38:5
171:23 174:25	130:13	256:17,20,24	44:1 62:19,25
184:9,12	mandy 23:24	257:9 258:8,14	73:10 74:15
185:23,25	24:13	258:17,25	151:24 152:8
188:21 196:23	manifested	259:5,8 279:18	166:11 172:14
205:8,23	114:7	280:1,8,12	192:17 237:9
206:13 207:20	manner 45:15	marginally	285:13,15
216:4,15	45:17 69:22	136:19	matterhorn
217:11,12	70:7 182:8	mark 4:9	232:20
218:4,19	manpower	127:22 128:2	matters 126:24
219:11 233:6,8	100:1,20	128:10	236:21 278:20
233:11 238:1	manuel 130:23	market 66:14	matthew 197:4
259:11 267:19	march 118:15	66:19 68:2	246:11,18
267:20 272:18	margin 214:2	83:3 95:23	matthias 3:12
274:13 275:10	264:12,13	151:1 252:23	3:12
275:25	marginal 56:8	265:11 275:2	maunders 26:2
makes 20:12	57:13 58:15,20	markets 265:13	26:3,6,10,12,13
25:4 26:16	58:21 59:2,5	married 90:18	maximize
56:23 70:11	73:25 77:10	massively	149:3
73:6 132:6	78:1 81:18	142:4	

[maximum - mexico]

maximum 74:1	meaningful	meetings 138:5	38:18 101:4,7
74:12 240:15	255:24	167:23 168:6	messes 31:2
maxwell	means 15:19	meets 261:23	33:4 121:17,21
107:11 201:21	17:15 40:3	melissa 14:22	131:23 196:5,5
202:4	46:14 87:15	15:8	met 140:14
mba 236:15	89:3,4,24	member 1:21	methane 33:22
mcgonigle 6:18	90:24 91:2,18	1:22 36:18	116:10,14,19
6:19,20,24,24	157:14 180:23	85:2 130:8,9	116:19,23
7:4,7,9,21 9:19	209:22 277:23	141:25 142:15	117:2,18 118:3
mcqueen 197:4	279:22	246:19	159:25 160:1,3
246:11,11,15	meant 120:9	members 1:20	227:13,17,24
246:17,18	181:2	15:14 16:9	228:3,4,7,15
mea 61:14	measure	117:6 141:23	229:5
mean 19:16	278:21 281:1	235:22 246:17	method 208:18
36:3 40:2 46:2	mechanical	mention 8:18	228:9
46:14 63:17	209:23 210:11	79:17 244:23	metrics 214:19
74:15 103:11			
	218:15	mentioned	mexican 41:9
111:7 114:7	mechanisms	24:13 91:25	mexicans 16:7
127:8 141:3	153:17	100:20 120:4	19:9 21:2
143:10,16	media 177:25	122:7 131:4	26:15,24 27:3
157:9 169:12	186:7	142:1,22	mexico 1:2,7
175:18 186:14	median 242:13	147:12 154:16	2:4,9,11,16,22
186:17,23,24	meet 59:24	162:5 178:19	3:5,10,14,18,19
187:19 189:5	60:11 143:4,4	195:11 200:18	7:10 8:10,13
191:19 192:13	143:11 169:4,5	226:4,6 227:5	9:10,10,16
194:11 197:17	171:16 199:20	260:2	10:7,19,22,25
198:23 206:13	199:21 205:22	meredith 197:1	12:1,5 13:4
207:21 209:1	214:21 218:17	merely 201:1	14:11 17:6,24
210:3,14,17	219:12	mesilla 7:12,13	22:1,3,9,15,18
216:21,24	meeting 142:5	7:18	22:19 25:3,19
219:8 220:10	142:11,14	mess 11:6,8	26:21 27:19
222:17 230:22	152:2 159:17	15:20 26:23	28:12 29:19
231:2,20	203:18,19	27:4 29:15	30:19 33:24
meaning	234:23 247:4	33:3,13,14,21	34:1 38:2 40:7
126:18 253:14		33:25 34:10	41:7,13 42:7,8

[mexico - mishap]

42.0.46.12	140.12	222.12.12	247.24
42:9 46:12	148:13	223:12,12	247:24
60:22 61:8	michael.hall	225:7 227:15	minds 126:18
62:11 66:7	2:13	243:20,23	mine 32:21
86:10,11 87:19	mid 7:12	244:1,4 250:10	148:18 162:24
88:20 94:8,21	118:15,15	251:13 256:9	mineral 65:19
95:20 96:7	201:23	256:14 269:15	182:16
98:11 104:20	middle 215:22	269:16,19,20	minerals 2:10
106:6 110:24	midstream	269:22,22	180:24
114:9,16	236:25	270:7,9,10,12	mines 247:8
116:18 117:14	migrate 210:18	270:13,14,20	minimum 27:1
129:19,22	210:22	270:24 271:2,3	74:2,7,13
130:10,11	miguel 3:5	271:20,24	191:23
136:24 138:12	miles 24:21	272:1,2,2,3,6,7	mining 138:24
138:14,15	million 11:5	272:7,8,8,10,14	minor 100:5
140:19 141:24	17:12,14 28:8	272:18,19,21	228:22
147:15,19	29:20 30:12,13	272:24,25	minority 90:1
148:11 149:1	72:17 98:9	273:1,2,6,7,7,8	minus 253:15
170:12 173:2,3	102:1 116:12	273:10,13,15	minute 96:18
173:18 174:23	132:4,7,13	273:16,18,23	minutes 6:15
175:5 182:18	141:6,6 142:24	273:24 274:9	44:22 71:9
197:21 203:17	151:20,22,24	274:13,18,20	78:12,17,21
203:25 207:11	152:9,22 153:1	275:3,11,20,24	170:22 234:10
220:25 227:21	154:23 173:23	276:7,9,25	234:17 284:1
228:3 229:2,4	173:24 178:20	277:9,11,19	mischaracteri
229:7,17 236:1	184:20 185:21	278:9,10,15	192:20
244:2,3,6	186:14,21,22	millions 26:16	miscommuni
246:19 247:9	187:6,6,16,20	31:1 132:12	190:18,20
247:14 249:7	187:23,23	138:18 139:4	miscommuni
255:8 279:4	188:7,9,17,18	221:24,25	126:5
285:4,18	188:19 189:12	mind 20:19	misfortune
mexico's 8:7	189:16 190:8	22:1 54:22	133:1
17:13 28:6	190:13 194:7	79:7 97:13	misgivings
miano 229:6	195:17 220:8,9	99:2,21 104:13	281:8
michael 2:12	220:24 222:8,9	104:22 136:23	mishap 8:23
60:10 130:19	222:10 223:2	136:24 208:12	_

[misleading - moving]

misleading	money 28:10	moneys 120:7	27:17 28:23,24
281:9	29:21 30:19	monitor 281:3	29:6 31:21
misled 141:16	31:2 42:11	monitoring	37:13,24 39:3
168:19	91:6 97:24	16:10 107:16	40:20,21 42:16
mispronounc	98:13 101:9	202:9	44:2,25 45:1
40:18	102:9,23	montero 7:15	60:9,9,12 84:6
misquoted	103:14 115:25	month 23:24	84:11 90:18
60:18	120:12 121:6	24:23 103:8	101:12 102:18
mission 198:5	121:10,17,21	157:21 171:24	107:6,22,23
214:25	133:22 143:5	253:22 255:6	115:13,13
misstate 107:25	144:15,18	263:21,24,24	132:18 135:1
170:23	145:20 152:16	264:9,17	159:5 248:23
mistaken 48:8	153:7 154:11	280:22	248:25 284:12
misunderstan	154:11 171:23	months 109:21	mother's 7:11
126:5	171:23 178:22	118:14,19	motion 12:15
misuse 35:19	186:1,13 187:9	121:13 151:23	49:15,21 50:4
mix 201:4	189:11 190:5,7	151:24 175:12	50:5,7,8,9,12
mobile 226:11	206:16,17	225:5 259:6	52:6
modified 63:7	213:11 214:5	277:4	move 43:10
modify 50:13	220:11,14,23	montoya 197:2	44:20 88:10
50:14	221:3 222:2,7	moor 4:11	108:9 159:9
molding 22:7	222:12,14	moore 3:19	201:23 241:17
22:11	223:14,14	84:5 199:9,16	249:4 254:8
molecule 46:8	224:12 239:22	199:18 201:14	256:2,10
momaday	239:25 245:6	201:18,19	260:22 261:2
36:18	253:6 266:17	moral 239:3	263:7 264:14
moment 43:12	266:18 267:4,7	morgan 49:22	280:18
102:16 163:24	267:9,15 269:6	50:2 56:7,19	moved 21:25
164:4 188:17	269:7 272:23	56:22 128:21	159:18 189:3
237:20	274:8 275:8,9	morgan's 51:19	movement
monetary	275:15 276:14	52:1 72:16	198:21
239:18 240:21	276:17 277:3	morning 6:4,10	moves 198:18
240:24,25	277:16 278:1	7:7 9:22 14:23	moving 44:10
241:12	278:24	15:7 19:6	51:18 93:8
		21:11,12,21,22	

[msba - need]

I 026.16	4-1 22.7		
msba 236:16	muted 23:7	name's 60:10	nearly 12:2
msuazo 3:6	n	named 16:16	28:1,8 38:10
multi 98:9	n 2:1 3:1 4:1	names 6:9	necessarily
158:20	5:1 7:1 9:23	234:3	65:23 91:5
multiple 25:2	11:14,14,15	nanasi 107:10	134:16 150:17
136:11 138:6	15:2 18:24	201:21 202:4	204:25 218:20
167:23 168:6	21:15,15,15	nas 147:18	241:22 243:1
205:1 258:7	23:4,4 26:7	nation 23:20	254:14 279:9
260:19	27:12 29:1,1	27:20 38:2,10	279:22
multiplied	32:12 35:3	39:6 40:7	necessary
253:15	36:18 38:23,23	nation's 116:11	44:16 76:18
multiplying	38:23,23 40:25	227:13	178:4,13
192:25	246:12	national 41:20	181:11 190:25
murphy 4:9	naive 33:7	115:19 130:13	need 17:22
127:22 128:2	name 6:6,12,22	160:19 227:20	18:15 20:4,11
128:10,14	6:24,25 7:9,14	native 7:9	21:3 36:9,22
150:2 155:4,5	9:22,23 10:5	natural 2:10	39:25 44:10
161:13 163:18	11:22 14:25	17:18 45:18	63:10 70:8
163:23 164:17	15:8 18:23	83:6,9 135:6	92:10 93:1
164:20,25	21:13,14,15,23	149:11 151:2	102:12 111:8
169:3 176:19	22:25 23:3,16	151:21 197:7	125:19,20
178:25 184:23	26:5,12 27:9	219:10 229:1	127:6 135:12
185:25 187:4	27:18 28:25	246:22 247:4	139:14 144:22
189:19 194:19	32:9 35:1	naturally 140:9	145:4 146:25
196:7,12	37:14,25 38:21	157:17	147:22 148:19
198:12 199:6	38:22 39:4	nature 137:6	154:5,23
199:14,17	40:18,22,24	190:5	156:11 162:21
202:8,11,19	41:6 45:7	navajo 23:20	165:12,23
203:16 225:21	87:14,18	27:20 38:2,10	166:8,25
226:16 227:5	127:25 128:2	39:5 40:7	189:17,21
229:20 232:15	164:25 169:4	navy 41:12,15	190:9,12
233:3,20,24	199:18 235:9	near 12:11	193:19,21,22
243:21 247:1	235:24 246:10	23:23 24:20	193:23 205:24
murphy's	246:11,18	38:9 117:13	205:25 207:20
155:3 247:18	240.11,10	242:12	209:18 214:4

[need - nmoga's]

	,		
229:15 231:15	negotiations	17:6,13,24	173:18 174:23
234:13 247:13	68:3 136:20	19:9,19 20:19	175:5 182:18
247:13 275:25	158:25 159:6	21:2 22:1,3,9	197:21 203:17
277:11,13	neighborhood	22:15,18,19	203:25 207:11
281:1 283:12	88:19	25:3,19 26:15	220:22,24,25
needed 19:20	neighbors 25:9	26:21,21 27:3	227:21 228:3
42:7 57:23	neither 182:23	27:6,19 28:6	229:2,4,7,17
99:8 100:21	285:12	28:12 29:19	236:1 244:2,3
101:14	net 253:11,14	30:19 33:24	244:6 246:19
needle 241:17	253:18 254:7	34:1 38:2 40:7	247:9,14 249:7
needs 9:15	254:10 261:21	41:9,13 42:7,8	255:8 279:4
20:22 36:13	261:22,23	42:9 46:12	285:4,18
58:6 70:22	262:2 268:1,16	48:22 60:22	newer 111:23
91:12 101:4	269:1 274:5,7	61:8 62:11	112:4,5
102:21 149:2	274:12	66:7 80:24	newmont
166:16 189:8,8	neutral 59:12	81:2 86:7,10	138:24
190:7 196:21	never 16:15	86:11 87:19	news 124:13
212:19 214:5	19:16 63:13	88:20 93:17,21	nice 59:23
221:2 233:8	67:16 86:10	94:8,21 95:20	169:5 199:20
237:24	123:21,21	96:6,7 98:10	199:21 203:18
negative 268:8	162:6,9 167:18	98:11 101:21	203:19
268:10,12	196:18 210:19	104:20 106:6	night 44:19
269:16,20,21	219:14 224:3	110:24 114:9	nine 246:21
270:24 271:3	256:25	114:16 116:18	249:24 251:16
272:10,14	nevertheless	117:13 119:1	nm 2:10,14 3:3
neglected 24:25	180:16 261:11	129:19,22	3:17
224:20	263:17	130:10 136:24	nm3 194:15
negotiate 49:7	new 1:2,7 2:4,9	137:12 138:12	nmac 1:10 49:4
49:12 68:13	2:11,16,22 3:5	138:14,15	87:7
negotiated	3:10,14,18,19	140:19 141:24	nmoga 12:14
59:18,19 160:1	7:10 8:7,10,13	147:15,19	49:16,20 207:6
160:1	9:10,10,16	148:5,11,23	207:25 230:17
negotiation	10:7,19,22,25	149:1,4 150:11	nmoga's 50:9
64:3,6 67:7	12:1,5 13:4	150:23 162:1	159:2
160:16	14:4,9,11 16:7	170:12 173:2,3	

[nmsa - obligations]

nmsa 176:23	notion 131:22	194:25 199:23	0
nmslo.gov 3:20	132:17 266:8	200:24 201:12	
3:21	278:19	203:22,24	o 6:25 7:1
nmsu 7:19	notwithstandi	205:3,4 208:21	11:14 15:2
noise 24:10	177:5	213:17,18	18:25 21:15
non 16:12	novelist 36:19	214:3 215:18	23:4 27:12
29:22 57:9	november 1:14	215:18 222:25	32:12 35:3,3
64:18 66:17	259:18 285:4	222:25 223:11	37:18 38:23,23
85:15,22 89:12	novs 177:23	229:10 234:3	40:25 235:10
89:19 94:25	npv 268:1,5,10	255:24 259:25	235:11
95:5 98:5	268:18 269:8	266:3 277:22	o'clock 234:4
180:17 186:11	274:18,22	279:8,14 280:3	248:23,25
212:23 240:21	275:13	280:22 281:2	283:25
240:24	number 13:18	281:10,24	o'leary 130:18
normalized	17:20 31:24	282:19,20,20	130:21
268:7	36:1 41:19	283:1,5	oath 61:25
normally 64:1	58:20 59:8,11	numbers 99:8	object 126:21
north 237:6	59:12 71:21	131:7 145:24	objection 90:3
northern	87:20,23 89:20	152:23,24	91:20 108:6
129:25	96:19 97:14	165:14 170:15	126:6,6
northwest	104:4,4,7	172:25 173:25	objectionable 127:11
145:13 219:6	105:12 111:2	174:1 187:6	
note 201:6	111:24 112:17	188:2 194:17	objections 43:12,20
228:17	113:3,4 124:18	195:16 217:23	108:15 127:13
noted 12:14	128:17,23	220:10 229:16	163:25 237:20
48:3 87:6	139:21 143:14	261:9	obligation
155:21	145:1 154:15	numerous	35:24 62:3
notes 142:13	155:11 156:12	130:13 131:1	239:20 240:23
notice 89:7	158:9 160:2	136:2 148:9	241:15,19
127:3,10	165:7 169:7,12	277:21	251:9 263:10
176:14 177:10	169:12,15,17	nw 3:4 285:18	276:10,19
177:13 234:23	170:6 171:11	nykiel 2:7,7	obligations
272:12	171:12 174:12		88:1 105:18
notified 210:9	178:3,12 187:7		240:20
	188:6,9 191:3		270.20

[observation - officer]

observation	58:10,16,24	174:11,18	office 3:18 84:8
86:2	66:8,18,23	175:23 176:13	89:18 107:24
observed 16:18	68:24 69:3,7	177:25 179:4	120:5,10
83:9	71:1,2,7 72:17	179:14 180:15	120.5,10
obstacles 150:8	78:5,9 79:2	180:20 182:14	123:3,9,17
obtain 7:14,16	80:15,20,23	182:24 184:10	142:12 178:15
obviously	81:5 83:9	184:24 185:3,7	199:19 231:3,9
239:12 240:5	85:16,19,22	185:15,16,18	231:15 232:3
257:11	87:8,25 88:20	186:24 188:5	office's 120:22
oc 152:8	88:23 89:6,9	189:7 190:1	officer 1:18 6:3
occ 6:4 116:21	89:23 90:13	191:10 192:13	6:6,21 7:2,5
117:21 118:1,7	91:1,14 92:6	191.10 192.13	9:18,25 10:3
118:25 119:14	92:22,25 93:11	196:14 205:9	11:11,16,19
119:16,18	94:12,24 95:2	209:22 212:5	14:24 15:3,6
133:25 215:21	95:6,8,11,16,16	213:7 224:19	18:12,18,21
228:5	96:9 98:22	224:21 228:2	19:1,4 21:8,12
occ's 226:17	99:13,25 100:7	231:12 233:8	21:16,19 22:23
occasion 60:10	100:12,21,23	243:11	23:2,5,12,15
occasionally	100.12,21,23	ocd's 49:4	26:1,4,8,11
248:6	102.3 104.0	66:10 67:8	27:8,13,16
occur 52:22	105.20,25	70:22 71:17	28:20,24 29:2
111:15 138:5	100.4,13,23	72:3,22 94:18	29:5 31:6,13
280:19	114:25 116:16	94:19 127:1,3	32:2,8,13,16
occurred 98:18	116:17 119:15	174:3,7 175:13	34:12 35:4,7
occurring	125:20,22	177:22 180:13	35:10,13 37:8
100:2 152:15	126:13 127:13	187:21 196:18	37:16,20,23
occurs 261:22	127:18 132:5	242:5,7	38:19,24 39:2
282:8	133:25 134:14	october 16:20	40:9,21 41:1,4
ocd 5:6 13:9,24	135:4,7 144:23	offer 31:9	42:17,23 43:11
14:4,6 44:3	145:3,17 152:3	37:11 40:11	43:18,23,25
47:21,23 48:9	153:2 156:8	231:6 235:25	44:17,23 51:7
48:11,16 49:24	159:9 160:14	237:14 248:18	51:10,10 60:1
51:11,17 53:19	165:5,10,21,24	offered 51:9	60:4,5 76:11
54:1 55:14	166:7,16	offering 164:6	78:11,16,20,23
56:7,21 57:12	169:19 170:1	260:5	84:4,7 90:4,12
25.7,2107.12			

[officer - okay]

91:21,22 92:4	official 48:2,15	79:13 85:3	255:16,22
101:19,23	48:17,22,25	86:7,11,25	256:6,9,14
102:25 107:5,7	officials 119:9	90:1 91:17	264:1 270:22
107:14,15,19	oh 32:4 35:12	94:1,6 95:19	278:20 280:5
108:7,16,21	40:21 47:18	101:3,4 104:5	281:16 285:4
109:4,8 110:15	74:6 75:10	104:8 105:11	oils 72:4
110:16 115:6	83:1 84:1	105:13 106:17	ok 109:11
115:10 125:1,7	124:2 165:10	108:24 116:11	okay 23:12
125:10,16,18	167:5 192:21	117:8 119:15	32:2 40:24
125:22,24	201:24	121:2,8 122:14	51:15 53:13
126:12 127:8	ohio 117:10	129:8,21	54:24 55:2,4
127:19,21,23	oil 1:3 2:9 3:3	130:11 133:6	57:7,11,16
128:5,8 130:8	8:1,6,15,19,22	136:24 137:7,9	58:18 60:24
130:9 147:1	9:2,10,15	137:11,12,17	61:6,25 62:8
155:6 163:22	10:23 11:4	140:4 141:24	63:3,16 65:13
164:2,3,5,11,13	12:1,2,8,18	149:11,19	71:19,22 73:20
164:19,22	13:5 14:1	151:3 153:4	74:7 75:6,9,10
168:22,25	15:11,18,24	157:12 163:2,5	76:23 77:13
199:7,10	16:20 17:10,17	163:11 166:2	79:5,19 80:10
201:19 202:3	17:21 19:10	169:6 173:9	80:12 81:17,23
202:13,15	20:7,23 22:3,5	178:5 182:11	84:15,20,24
203:9,11	23:20 24:1,3	187:1 196:3	85:3,6,22 86:1
225:18 232:23	25:11 26:16,21	197:22 198:5	86:21 87:6,10
233:1,19,23	26:22,25 27:4	208:8,14	87:21 88:10,18
234:1,9,16	27:23 28:2	213:15 219:7	88:25 89:16,22
235:8,12,15	29:10 30:4,15	222:3 226:6,6	93:6 94:4 96:3
237:18,19	30:16,22 33:23	226:7,7,9,10,23	96:14,25 98:3
238:2,5 246:2	34:3,4 35:23	226:24 227:14	98:12,25
246:13,16	36:7,10 38:6,9	227:25 229:4	100:19 101:8
248:13,17	38:11 41:18,20	229:12,14,21	102:6 103:21
283:23 284:3,6	41:25 42:8	232:11 236:21	104:12 107:3
284:10,15	45:12,18 46:9	236:23 241:8	113:15 116:8
officer's 51:16	56:11,17 60:11	241:10 243:15	123:23,23
offices 149:18	67:9,17 72:4	244:6,14 249:7	131:12 133:13
	73:3 78:4 79:6	249:10 254:21	144:21 147:13

[okay - operators]

159:12,15	219:23 223:8	274:3 278:7,9	105:2,12,14,16
165:19 170:11	ones 111:23	278:11	106:16,19
170:22 171:5	140:19 145:12	operation 8:23	134:6 147:12
171:19 172:8	177:24 185:13	51:4 112:20	151:6 155:12
173:12,15	205:23,24,25	147:6	160:9 161:25
174:16,22	206:15 224:2	operations 8:25	169:20,20
175:8,16 176:4	online 50:23	15:12 23:22	176:16,21
176:10 177:9	136:16 165:6	86:8 98:11	177:16 196:3
178:2 179:13	operate 65:16	102:3 130:6	206:5 216:9
179:18 180:5,8	95:19 96:20	145:9 148:10	219:18 220:8
180:14,25	98:11 129:15	236:24 241:1,4	225:4 237:5
182:2 183:3,13	138:3 141:15	276:15,16,25	239:6,8,18,21
183:21 184:22	204:24 244:17	operative 61:8	240:22 241:2
186:6,8 187:12	260:10,23	operator 12:1	241:14 244:9
196:11 202:24	268:15,24	27:23 38:6	244:16 245:3,8
207:17 213:17	operated 12:5	46:2,14,16,24	245:15,23
213:24 214:2	16:24 97:1	46:24 47:2,3,4	249:13,14,20
217:5,7,22	154:19 258:21	47:22 48:3,3	250:4,15 251:2
218:1,2 227:10	operates 106:5	48:15,19,20,22	251:2,8,15,17
249:4 284:14	148:4 237:6	49:1 50:20	252:7,16,21
oklahoma	259:22	57:22 58:8,17	254:12,17
207:13	operating	58:19,21 59:4	258:22 259:22
old 24:7 137:11	11:24 45:14,16	59:9 64:3,4,13	262:21 264:11
older 16:11	50:1,15 85:9	64:15,18 65:8	264:15 276:14
111:15,22	85:14,16,20,23	65:12,15,18,25	277:19
112:5,5,6	96:6 129:9	66:2,9,18,21,25	operator's
once 19:23	131:5 138:2	67:3,4,25	95:11 99:20
26:18 34:6	150:12 252:13	77:24 85:4	106:3 155:14
66:3 139:13	259:24 261:17	92:2,19 93:17	216:11 241:10
154:21 158:2,5	261:18 262:4,6	93:21 94:8,9	241:18 249:19
175:11 182:19	262:12,14	96:3 97:14	250:8 251:11
186:17 193:6	263:18,21,25	98:2,5 99:16	252:18
193:10,22	264:3,9,11	99:16 100:8,10	operators 12:9
197:16 203:23	265:3 268:11	100:17 103:25	13:4,17 19:10
213:4 215:15	271:21 273:1,8	104:15,19,21	19:12 25:7,17

[operators - orth]

	I	ı	I
28:17 36:6	260:24 261:3,6	opposite 62:5	243:10,25
49:6,11,18	261:6,8,13	optical 23:18	282:5
64:24,25 65:14	262:6,11,12	optimal 242:20	orphaned 13:8
65:22 66:8,11	263:5,9,16,23	269:9 275:13	13:18 17:7
80:21 85:15,15	264:6,22,23,24	276:1 277:13	36:4 71:3 83:8
87:13,17,25	265:6,9,12,15	278:22	83:17 120:15
88:7,9,15,19	265:19,21,23	optimism 197:1	154:1,5 166:5
89:12 90:1,24	265:24 269:25	option 228:19	174:24 175:6,9
91:19 93:12	277:22 279:3,5	228:21,22	184:5 185:8
95:24,24 97:21	279:6,8,15	oral 85:7	187:14 194:2,4
99:10,14,15,18	280:24 281:13	order 10:24	194:6,6,25
99:19 104:22	operatorship	46:1 55:21	199:24 202:22
108:3 124:15	67:13 68:15	182:5,15	203:6 208:10
133:4 134:25	81:5	211:24 228:24	248:1,4 251:21
135:22 136:21	opinion 84:22	252:15 259:11	251:25 281:21
150:3,5 155:19	113:14 134:19	263:11 274:9	281:24 282:3
158:14,14	140:4 153:24	275:10 276:9	282:10,15
159:13 161:19	156:13 158:6	276:18 279:14	283:2,9,14
161:22 162:13	161:12 205:12	279:18	orth 1:18 6:3,6
167:3 169:14	213:2 215:15	orders 48:4	6:21 7:2,5 9:18
174:19 179:18	215:20 221:22	organic 229:23	9:25 10:3
179:22 180:1	opinions 154:3	organization	11:11,16,19
180:13,17	opportunities	117:6	14:24 15:3,6
206:4,15	71:10	organizations	18:12,18,21
216:16 223:16	opportunity	13:1 14:15	19:1,4 21:8,12
224:5 225:1	6:9 11:22 19:8	15:10,13	21:16,19 22:23
231:24 240:19	32:19 141:1	original 91:4	23:2,5,12,15
240:24 243:2	145:3 179:13	137:7 275:12	26:1,4,8,11
244:14 245:13	191:17 193:7	originally	27:8,13,16
248:7 249:12	opposed 73:22	41:11 140:15	28:20,24 29:2
251:18 252:3	108:2 126:8	orphan 13:15	29:5 31:6,13
252:14 254:25	245:2 281:7,23	123:5 170:8	32:2,8,13,16
256:19 259:10	282:25	184:1 195:14	34:12 35:4,7
259:20,23,24	opposes 12:7	220:13 221:22	35:10,13 37:8
260:9,9,10,23		222:18 231:17	37:16,20,23

[orth - particular]

	I	I	I
38:19,24 39:2	261:20,23	136:21	pages 158:19
40:9,21 41:1,4	outside 108:23	owning 68:5	paid 13:20
42:17 43:11,18	133:19 134:7	oxford 236:15	131:17 133:5
43:23 44:17	outstanding	oxy 2:20 59:18	153:5 184:15
60:1,5 76:11	101:10	59:20 64:5	201:9 266:14
78:11,16,20	overall 86:5	147:18	273:17
84:4 90:4,12	257:12	p	palace 2:4
91:22 92:4	overdue 18:17	p 2:1,1 3:1,1	paragraph
101:23 102:25	overhead 9:11	23:4 32:12	71:23 74:14
107:7,15 108:7	64:20	128:2 200:20	paraphrase
108:16,21	overly 244:19	p&a 145:9	170:24 174:15
109:4 110:16	overnight	240:13,14,18	parentheses
115:6 125:1,7	98:20	242:2,22 276:6	99:6
125:10,16,22	overregulated	277:15	part 19:18 20:4
127:8,19,23	8:14	p&a'd 123:5	24:25 29:14
128:5,8 155:6	oversight 25:9	124:16	34:3 43:2
163:22 164:3	overstating	p&a'ing 242:21	45:11 48:1
164:11,13,19	54:3	p.m. 125:15	61:7 69:19
168:22 199:7	own 11:6,8	202:2 284:16	71:16 72:10
201:19 202:3	21:1 33:16	p.o. 2:16,21	73:20 116:5
202:13 203:9	65:19 84:21	3:10,18	141:10 154:11
203:11 232:23	97:3 101:4	pace 174:4,9	162:2 171:20
233:1,19,23	133:7 134:16	198:18	175:4 181:9
234:1,9,16	136:10 157:2	package 171:20	191:17 238:14
235:8,12,15	161:8 196:5,5	page 4:2 5:2	parted 111:20
237:19 238:2	244:18 276:15	61:1,1,3 71:23	partially 16:23
246:2,13,16	276:25	74:19 75:9	participants
248:13,17	owned 17:18	86:3 87:12	168:8
284:3,6,10,15	28:13 65:25		participate
ought 152:14	66:2	90:1 93:10	168:15
213:2,6	owner 7:20	99:3 103:21	participated
outcome	8:11 200:20,25	155:10 161:15	64:2 67:17
239:12	215:11 219:17	161:16 165:9	particular
outflow 253:20	owners 8:19,22	165:20 174:22	49:16 55:23
254:5,8,11	114:4 134:12	175:1,2 226:21	84:25 85:3
. ,			

[particular - percent]

94:8 105:1	153:11 196:24	paychecks 8:9	people 8:12
220:20 249:8	208:6,17	paying 9:6 12:2	15:23 21:6
particularly	226:25 236:22	16:8 27:3 28:6	23:23 25:25
151:2 181:6	237:2 246:20	46:23 101:5	30:2,10 42:1,3
260:8	pat 151:25	133:7 134:5	44:3 63:10,21
parties 44:2	patch 122:14	149:15,17	77:14 92:10
51:18 63:25	pattern 24:25	220:15,16	124:9 132:22
65:4 66:4	patterns	221:15 222:16	138:1 143:19
75:14 85:13	140:17 211:15	263:11 264:15	145:16 147:21
106:4 159:9	patterson 32:6	payment	149:7,24 157:8
285:13	32:11,11,15,18	132:11,14	162:19 188:1
partner 62:12	34:13	135:19 186:18	195:21 197:21
62:16 128:20	pause 43:12	payments	205:13 221:13
partnerships	163:24 237:20	141:14 220:9	239:1 243:11
130:14	pay 8:16,22,23	payout 206:10	263:1 277:21
parts 16:10	9:1 13:4 21:6	pays 11:4 102:1	283:17
61:19,19 73:21	25:10 27:7	153:1 184:13	perceived
party 64:16	30:1 31:2 36:6	266:24	190:7
80:25,25 85:16	80:11 102:3	pc 3:4,9	percent 8:7
85:22 106:18	107:1 112:7	pdp 245:13	21:1 29:16,17
134:8 177:18	131:18,19,20	pdps 263:3	29:17 46:9
178:14	132:23 133:5,8	269:25,25	52:21 65:9
pass 64:13,25	151:7 182:11	peace 22:1	74:1,4,7 83:8
84:2 119:10	184:17,18	peaking 162:18	83:17 88:19
201:17	188:19 196:5	pecos 1:5	99:8 103:22
passage 89:1	205:23,25	peltz 155:9	116:18 117:8
99:11 283:10	206:1 220:3	158:19 161:8	117:10 121:4
passed 36:19	221:19 222:8	167:8	122:19 131:15
81:18 128:21	226:2 250:16	peltz's 155:21	131:16,18,19
144:18	253:22 262:14	161:1 162:20	131:19,20
passing 58:5	270:13,24	167:8 168:10	132:19,21,21
118:24 132:19	272:10,13	168:13	137:7 147:12
past 12:21 33:8	273:15 274:1,2	penalties 16:4	147:23 151:23
122:20 125:3	275:2	pennsylvania	152:19 155:15
130:8,9,10,25		163:6	156:19 157:25

[percent - picture]

	I	I	I
158:6 161:20	221:19 261:16	13:3 15:9,12	peter 49:22
161:21,24	262:5 263:18	15:15 16:11	petition 12:8
166:24 167:4	264:5	permission	14:5,14 119:18
169:11,21	percentages	31:18 176:11	233:7
170:6,16 180:6	178:16	235:1	petitioner
180:17,19	perfect 238:17	permissions	182:24
202:21 207:22	perforations	32:1	petro 96:4,17
208:10 221:16	205:1	permit 67:3	97:1 98:5
224:5 228:2	perform 137:16	241:6	199:25 200:6
242:8 243:13	214:20	permitted	200:17,24
243:14,16	performance	129:13	petroleum 2:14
244:25 245:3	208:17,18	permitting	45:18 115:19
245:15,17,20	performed	279:11	130:12 211:23
245:20,24	78:10 79:16	persists 170:17	236:1 262:24
249:9,17,18,21	performing	person 32:22	phase 136:14
250:4,6 251:6	181:14	40:13 234:14	phd 236:17
252:3,12,25	period 117:11	personal 23:21	phone 31:14
255:1 256:23	139:19,22	53:3 84:22	32:3 100:6
257:18 262:19	143:2 171:13	153:24	photo 16:25
262:21 263:4,9	175:22 177:1	personality	photos 16:25
263:11,12	190:11 193:2	157:2	phrase 87:21
264:7,10,12,16	205:21 208:11	personally	109:14
264:16,18	257:12,23	186:24 197:18	physical 281:24
266:24 269:24	282:7 283:1	personnel	physically
269:25 270:8,9	periodically	181:11	46:17
272:16,23	205:19	perspective	physician's
273:7 274:19	periods 267:7	138:10 162:23	7:14,17
275:19,23	permanent	163:15 166:25	pick 67:2 98:15
276:12,20	120:5,7 121:1	226:21 228:14	101:10 147:2
277:1,3,7	121:25 122:20	231:4 251:22	picked 137:23
279:2,3,4,19	122:24	254:18	195:17
percentage	permeable	perspectives	picture 253:5
83:21 104:8,11	157:17	190:20	261:19 271:23
120:15 178:3,7	permian 11:24	pervasive	275:12 280:13
178:12 211:9	11:25 12:7	89:19	281:19

[piece - plugged]

piece 106:2	248:16,18	131:18 132:11	275:13,25
pieces 115:21	play 161:25	132:21,25	277:11
pin 162:13	played 276:11	134:15 135:22	plugged 29:22
pinto 23:1,1,4,7	playing 28:16	144:19,24	29:24 34:5
23:10,14,16,17	plays 148:6	145:20 152:13	58:1 71:3 78:7
26:1	pleadings 50:8	154:14,24	79:3,23 80:6
pipeline 218:16	please 6:16,23	158:2,2 165:6	80:16,18 81:10
pipelines 17:24	10:3 14:25	165:23 166:12	103:10 110:7
pipes 149:9	15:6 18:12,22	166:16,21	117:11,16
pivot 266:3	21:5,13 23:3	167:4 175:21	131:8,16,17
place 16:3	25:24 26:5	176:17,21	134:10 144:22
19:23 27:5	27:10 28:25	178:19 181:21	144:23 145:4
28:16 51:4	32:10 37:14	182:15 184:11	147:6,8 154:5
63:8 71:21	38:15,21 40:5	184:20 185:7	154:9 165:12
92:6 98:13,19	40:23 49:9	186:15,16	165:15 166:8
98:23 105:10	68:7 71:24	187:16,20	166:24 169:13
124:11 137:7	76:12,14 79:11	189:9,17 190:9	169:18,19,20
140:8 162:22	80:11 92:5	191:9,14,20,25	169:20,21
176:22	108:7 127:24	192:7 201:11	170:1,7,16,18
placed 176:6	166:14 193:20	206:7,8,12	175:13 176:16
189:21	235:9,21	207:3 210:5	177:16,18,20
plan 29:14	246:10 248:19	211:2,8,17	178:5,13,21
39:18 62:21	249:2	215:17 223:19	181:15,15
145:23 193:3,4	pleased 129:18	224:23 231:25	182:5,15 183:8
275:15	pleases 78:14	239:9,10,19,21	185:3,14,18
planned 125:20	plenty 102:7,9	239:24 240:20	187:14 193:15
191:23	259:6	240:23 241:5	194:14,15
plans 104:2,10	plot 268:5	241:12 245:5	205:17 207:21
181:13 205:20	282:2	247:25 248:9	214:5 223:6
plastic 22:7,11	plug 27:7 28:17	252:5,9,15	224:14 243:7
plate 211:6	29:11 36:4	254:13,19	245:7 253:2
platform 6:19	71:2 72:3,17	256:19,24	255:3,25 256:1
31:8,14 40:13	72:22 77:5,14	261:22 268:8	256:25 257:15
42:19 207:19	77:23 111:14	268:14,20	257:17,21
234:5 248:14	124:16 131:6,7	269:4,9,19	258:2,9,20

[plugged - portfolio]

268:6 279:14	191:4,5,15	113:7 114:23	162:6 172:15
plugging 6:5	204:2,6,19	127:6 133:9	172:17,21
13:7 20:8,10	205:10,19	136:18 139:15	198:10 211:6
20:12 30:6,14	206:20,22	139:16,19	211:16 216:6
30:17,20 39:10	209:3,10	153:20 159:21	216:22 221:24
58:22 59:10	219:22 220:14	159:22 162:17	222:17 224:15
69:10,21 70:1	220:17 221:23	163:12 164:14	232:8 247:11
71:17 72:5	224:13 228:7	166:11,16	279:7 281:23
73:14 78:9	228:19 231:22	172:1,21	283:8,21
79:17,21,25	239:23 240:1,6	178:11 182:2	policymakers
80:9,12,17	241:16,25	185:22 188:1	140:1 211:19
81:15,19,22	242:4,5,6,16	188:13,20	polls 107:11
82:8 95:10	243:5 252:20	191:11 195:20	202:5
97:3,6 101:11	266:2,13	201:23 213:18	pollute 16:5
103:15 105:17	267:23 268:3,7	214:7 216:11	polluting 25:1
110:12,13	268:13,22,23	221:20 238:1	pollution 15:11
111:15 116:23	269:16 270:13	243:3 251:15	15:22 24:2
116:25 120:8	270:25 271:4	254:6,9,12,14	pool 45:19
123:11 131:22	272:10 273:16	256:15 257:8	157:12 193:25
133:8 142:18	273:17 274:2	258:25 264:19	pooled 16:20
142:19 143:12	275:8 276:5	266:6,11	poor 114:6
143:13,17	277:14 278:7	270:12 274:1	poorly 24:8
145:17 146:1,4	278:22 279:13	282:4,19	216:7
146:21 155:13	279:17,21	pointing 60:16	popped 47:8
156:6 165:21	plugs 59:5	175:5 184:1	populating
165:25 167:3	plus 8:25	points 24:22	216:3
169:10 170:8	109:21 155:1	135:25 155:4	population 8:7
170:17 173:22	269:22 282:12	258:7 266:6	populations
174:4,8,12,13	poco 16:16	policy 9:8	155:14 156:18
178:14 181:14	17:8	14:17 56:23	157:25
182:12 183:5	poet 36:18	99:6 114:9	porta 147:4
183:16,18	point 41:20	137:10 138:8	portfolio 104:1
184:24 185:17	44:12 82:18	139:8 148:18	104:17 133:24
187:13,17,18	86:23 88:11	159:8 160:18	170:19 241:13
187:22 189:13	96:7 102:10	160:19 161:12	245:23 249:19

[portfolio - presumably]

256:23 261:4	posting 264:24	preceding	prepared 17:22
portfolios	potent 117:18	257:24	25:19
251:24	potential 25:6	precious 35:20	preparing
portion 104:16	209:5 210:25	213:14 221:21	181:13
123:20 133:2	211:2 240:19	precise 104:4	present 29:22
137:20 143:25	259:6	preclude 58:4	204:25 231:7
222:12 247:19	potentially	58:10	268:1 269:1
pose 25:13	68:3 178:20	predict 196:25	274:5,7,13
101:21 104:19	184:5 202:22	predicted	presentation
104:24	239:8 241:1	166:4	167:13,20
position 68:24	265:7 266:1	prefer 44:15	168:2,11 229:2
90:19 94:6	potty 147:5	prehearing	235:7
126:6 159:2	pounds 210:17	122:9	presentations
216:18 247:15	powell 43:5	premature 82:8	51:12 161:9
positive 268:16	69:24 179:9,20	209:3,10 243:5	presented
269:15,19	powell's 69:18	252:20 268:23	154:2 206:21
270:7,12,20	70:11 179:25	prematurely	207:6 220:7
271:2,21 272:1	180:19	134:10 158:3	229:1,8
272:5,7,14,15	power 22:8	215:17 243:8	presenting
274:15 276:8	179:1,3 193:22	253:2 255:3	220:6
possessed 37:3	197:24	256:25 257:15	presents
possible 36:3	powered	258:9 279:17	242:24 252:12
46:17,18 62:23	116:13 227:15	premia 262:3	preserve
65:5 99:22	powers 88:23	premise 180:3	140:23 149:22
177:15 191:13	135:12 193:23	183:10 215:7	president 11:23
233:9 269:17	practical	premium 9:8	128:3,18 130:9
283:14	157:19 158:4	250:21 260:21	press 34:17
possibly 147:14	176:1 279:1	263:8,14	124:13
241:7 265:22	practice 49:24	264:15,23	pressing
post 132:24	51:3 210:4	premiums 9:7	248:20
159:10 265:14	pray 37:6	220:3,15,16	pressure 137:2
posted 68:14	pre 85:8 116:6	221:16 222:8	210:7,14,16,20
123:16,18	precautions 9:3	250:15,24	presumably
poster 257:20	precedent	263:11	268:15 280:11
	14:19		

[presume - process]

	I	I	
presume 284:9	136:3,4 162:8	122:17 137:6	223:14 224:6
presumption	207:13 211:4	139:6 146:20	238:20 239:4,5
171:1 194:22	221:13 237:6	147:24 153:24	240:3 243:10
pretty 64:7	primary	154:17 156:11	243:25
140:16 144:1	136:14 137:4	158:4 159:7,24	problematic
197:8 207:4	137:13,16,18	174:2 192:3	55:19 67:18
208:17 210:10	208:23 219:7	195:25 201:4	89:15 108:3
213:14 255:23	227:1	204:5 206:22	156:13
270:1 282:5,15	principally	209:1 212:1,5	problems 64:11
prevent 149:4	145:13 204:4	219:1,23 221:2	155:17 160:5
227:2	principles	221:15 222:2,9	190:23,24
preventing	278:23	224:6,9 230:12	191:7 192:4
10:17 39:23	printed 61:21	231:20 262:19	232:8 266:15
172:16,18	61:22	problem 18:5	procedural
214:23	prior 47:23	29:12 30:7,18	52:4
prevention	49:25 50:24	39:19 50:11	procedure
19:21	109:19 123:19	70:25 92:2,19	182:9
previous 140:8	236:4	94:15 96:8	procedures
200:2 236:9	private 130:14	98:9 103:19	134:17
252:4 262:11	131:18 135:15	132:12,15,15	proceed 183:12
272:20	165:22 166:1,9	132:16 133:11	proceeding
previously 13:1	180:20,23,24	133:12 135:10	12:17 14:18
45:3	180:24 181:1,3	135:17,18	45:9 50:25
price 25:10	199:25 200:25	137:10,19	84:17 94:6
28:6 30:13	201:5,9 214:16	141:6 145:25	108:11 131:10
113:21 114:6	214:18,18	158:12,13	165:3
114:11 146:22	236:11 237:5	162:2 174:24	proceedings
253:13,15	240:7 242:9	183:12 184:1,6	1:13 4:3 6:2
prices 41:23	259:17 266:2	186:19 188:14	131:25 284:16
42:1 114:1	prize 162:25	193:24 194:2,4	285:8,10
149:16 243:16	163:1 226:5	194:6,7,10	process 10:10
254:16	probably 56:13	196:19 199:3	12:25 132:5,9
pride 63:17	56:14 80:23	205:7,12 206:4	132:16 134:18
primarily	87:2 88:3,14	206:15 220:13	135:19 136:8
129:6 131:2	112:11,20	220:17 222:19	137:25 158:21
	1		

[process - promise]

	I	I	I
168:4 193:8,10	161:21 171:16	137:16 140:24	profitable
193:24 195:20	217:9,9,13	141:8 147:13	219:11 268:21
195:22 196:1,2	218:1 253:11	147:23 149:3	profited 29:25
198:18,18	253:15 255:16	157:4,7 160:9	31:3
199:1 213:6	255:21	161:21 162:17	profiting 26:19
216:2 218:23	producer 85:4	170:25 171:5	27:5 62:18,24
processes 14:16	129:22 258:3	171:11,21	profits 17:18
142:9 219:10	producers 77:4	172:2,10,16,22	18:3 25:1
279:12	77:5 147:15	179:22 180:2	172:18 215:19
processing	237:3	181:12,17,22	241:4
229:11	produces 46:7	182:6 183:14	program 123:5
procurement	219:12 269:15	208:23 215:18	124:17 129:17
132:9 134:17	producing 12:4	218:5 225:5	143:20 170:8
135:20 142:8	16:1,12 24:14	229:10 244:8	170:17,18
143:10 146:8	24:25 45:14,16	249:15 253:12	174:13 187:15
147:1,9 190:23	46:23 77:24	253:16 255:24	231:17,22
191:18 193:9	113:20 128:23	257:1,7,13,14	prohibited 83:6
216:2	136:17 147:23	257:22,24	118:25
procurement's	155:13 166:2	259:3 280:3	project 129:11
132:15	168:2 170:19	281:2,10	130:13 138:13
produce 46:2	173:7 208:8	productive	138:15 147:18
46:15,16,18	222:3,16	101:6 104:17	211:11 274:21
77:5 83:24	245:13 250:2	249:15 251:3	274:24,25
113:5,22	251:25 252:8	251:16,18	projects 136:3
114:15 156:19	254:11 259:1,3	256:4 259:6	136:4,5,7
157:3,6 215:12	260:7 263:2	professional	137:3,15
217:7,14,19,25	product 8:8	85:11	138:17 139:19
217:25 218:10	production	professor 236:6	156:5,14,17
244:6,14 249:7	9:15 17:21	proffer 163:20	211:5
249:10 253:23	24:11 34:6	profile 99:14	prolific 256:12
255:19 256:5,9	77:3,11 83:2	profit 21:6	258:3
256:14 257:10	109:21 114:5	26:17 36:7	prologue 208:6
280:4,5	114:20 127:2	38:17 240:25	promise 18:15
produced 12:2	128:3,19 129:4	264:13	68:13
117:15 157:22	136:14 137:14		

[promises - public]

promises 231:2	260:18	proposition	239:19 277:18
promotion	proposals 49:4	56:12	provided 33:11
156:23	propose 47:21	pros 228:20	85:9 112:15
prompt 23:8	58:16,24	prospective	155:12 178:18
pronged 280:2	213:18	140:4	209:6 213:20
proof 186:20	proposed 1:10	prospectives	provider
238:20 239:4,5	10:11 12:20	99:18	250:19,19,20
240:2	13:13,23 14:5	protect 10:19	provides 8:1,3
proper 12:15	14:7 15:16	25:24 36:11	48:16 56:15
25:8 116:23,25	27:21 29:8	38:16 40:6	262:3
133:14 197:15	38:4 39:7 40:5	219:19,19	providing
228:7 267:8	44:3 47:1	227:2 240:6	128:4 233:4
269:7	50:25 51:25,25	protected	239:24
properly 34:5,6	53:19 55:14,17	36:16 153:11	provision 48:14
176:21 181:18	67:22 68:25	189:3	48:21 49:10,14
212:6 239:9	69:2,4 73:24	protecting	49:16 55:4,7
properties 51:1	77:4,10 92:16	25:18 117:21	56:15 58:10,12
68:3 130:7	92:22 93:16	214:23,24	62:6 65:3
property 8:24	94:12 131:10	230:4	provisions
65:9,19,23	131:15 150:4	protection	30:16 47:1,10
66:1 67:7,20	155:18 161:18	116:9 117:6	47:22 87:7,8
67:24 68:5,10	183:4 197:3	153:17 219:22	93:14,18
68:14,15,16,18	212:14 216:13	227:12 239:7	proximity
68:20,22	238:13 244:5	240:5,11	25:14,15
135:15	245:25 249:6	protections	public 1:1 3:17
proponents	249:16,22	231:8	6:8,10 17:6,15
75:15	251:10 254:1,1	protective 16:3	19:8 20:22
proportional	254:22 255:10	protector 35:17	26:14 28:8
30:3	259:8 260:6,12	protects 8:21	29:20,23 31:1
proportionately	261:12 262:15	proven 245:13	31:4,22 37:11
174:12	264:21 265:20	263:2	39:25 40:11
proposal 72:2	279:2,16,24	provide 11:22	43:3,14 84:8
72:21 73:7	proposing	47:22 48:11,14	101:12 106:4,8
90:10 158:18	133:18 182:24	111:25 160:10	106:10 117:22
159:18,18		160:10 213:25	118:4 119:8,10

[public - questions]

110 10 21 22	1.66.22	50.01.67.10	1 1 5 1 1 7
119:18,21,23	pure 166:23	53:21 67:13	quarter 165:17
198:6 199:19	167:6 241:21	72:7 87:20	quarters
216:6 230:5	purely 254:18	111:4 136:7	165:18
234:18 240:5,6	purple 280:9	139:12 151:9	question 49:9
246:4,5 248:18	purpose 11:8	158:10 159:14	54:19 65:2
248:22,24	13:7,11 30:12	197:22 206:7	70:10 75:24,24
284:12	86:19 91:13	206:11 207:3	76:13 77:8
published	120:20 126:11	208:25 209:14	79:24 80:6,10
106:9 243:19	143:6,7 153:6	213:7 214:6	80:11,14 81:3
pudding	153:7 227:1	218:14 220:8	81:4 82:10
186:20	247:22	220:24 221:3	90:20 91:4
pulitzer 162:24	purposes 97:15	221:18,25	94:2 99:1,12
pull 47:16	172:13 173:4	223:17 224:9	101:22 102:8
60:25 71:19	176:25 181:10	228:14 231:21	102:11,13,15
77:2 82:13	189:21 213:16	239:18 245:4	109:10 113:4
109:8	245:11	putting 207:24	132:21 140:20
pulled 89:18	pursuant 6:12	212:22 213:1,1	161:14 177:4
171:11 179:21	170:7,16	216:14 232:19	178:8 192:20
281:17	178:14	q	193:16 196:11
pulling 20:22	pursue 14:15	qualify 171:21	207:16 208:19
146:21	100:7 119:11	249:25	214:8 222:20
pump 16:23	134:25 194:21	quality 13:19	228:25 229:18
278:1	194:23 195:18	33:10	238:10 254:22
pumper 156:24	pursued 165:25	quantified	275:9,17
156:24,25	purview 94:19	207:6	282:13
punish 88:7	purvis 161:15	quantify	questions 44:24
punishing	260:1 266:9,9	111:12 112:16	57:6 59:21
25:16	269:13 270:2	113:23 208:1	71:9 84:16
punitive 159:19	273:20 279:2	228:18,24	94:4 107:6,12
purchased	280:7	229:16	107:17,18
128:25 258:23	push 139:8	quantities	108:17 109:3
259:2	210:20 212:16	46:23 134:5	110:15,19,25
purchaser	265:20	166:2	115:5,8 118:1
232:5	put 6:16 12:17	quantity 45:17	124:24 125:5
	30:3,5 42:3	quantity 15.17	127:1 160:24

[questions - reality]

164:20 169:8	263:24	ranked 259:21	react 157:15,16
180:5 199:6,8	r	rankin 2:22	reaction 158:18
199:13 201:16	r 2:1 3:1 6:25	107:12,13	reactivated
202:6,7,10,12	6:25 15:2	202:6,7	52:11 109:21
203:8,12,20	21:15 23:4	rapidly 151:1	reactivations
225:16 230:15	26:7 27:12	192:5	52:21 53:7
231:13 233:2	29:1 32:12	rare 197:8	read 50:4,7,16
235:5,7 275:7	35:2,3 37:19	rarely 16:4	56:14 68:4,8
quibble 126:20	40:25,25,25	rate 68:19 70:4	71:23 79:11
quibbling	128:2,2 235:10	76:16 77:24	89:1 93:9
61:18	235:10,11	114:14,17	109:15 116:4,8
quick 136:9	railroad 67:14	151:8 231:5	139:13 142:13
quickly 146:6	raise 31:14	232:8 245:14	155:20 165:19
200:13 214:6	153:7 155:4	259:3 262:18	167:9,10
quite 19:15	248:19,20	263:3 264:7	182:20 227:4,7
50:21 131:14	raised 34:14	265:1 270:1,8	227:11 237:18
161:1 172:7,8	41:23 46:25	272:16 274:19	reading 81:20
196:3 199:2	153:21 158:21	275:18,23	93:13 99:2
201:7 245:18	226:19	276:8,12,20,25	168:1
255:19 281:2	ramp 149:21	277:2,8 278:4	ready 223:6
quo 170:15	149:21 191:11	278:14	real 61:18,19
187:13	192:21,21	rates 262:15	65:25 67:20,24
quote 30:14	247:20	263:1	68:9,18 105:15
36:17 49:6,11	ramped 193:5	rather 20:20	132:18 139:8
50:10 86:13	ramping	59:3 114:11,12	145:25 152:14
87:16 104:14	192:24,25	251:16 271:19	172:1,3 197:23
104:20 116:9	ran 130:4	rational 250:20	206:15 226:10
116:13 117:5	187:12 266:4	275:2	236:8,12
117:19 167:16	rancher 10:6	rb 31:10	281:24 282:8
185:7 187:9	range 112:1,1,4	reach 129:12	realistic 225:3
192:18 206:4	112:6 132:7	152:25 184:4	225:8 277:8
226:21 227:3	171:15 204:11	reached 246:5	reality 70:9
227:11,16	ranges 17:14	reaches 137:4	134:14 157:22
quoted 99:11	ranging 245:20	266:11	171:10
227:10 263:22			

[realize - record]

	I	I	I
realize 96:15	103:9 123:15	receipt 43:19	188:18,24
149:24	132:8 138:15	101:1	189:22 196:9
realized 257:1	141:20 143:17	received 30:19	204:6,10,15
really 25:7 27:4	153:7 156:20	43:9 184:20	206:17 213:12
61:23 65:2	167:21,22	271:21	221:22,24
69:25 97:11	183:9 186:19	receiving	223:3 231:8
112:9 126:17	190:15 196:7	100:23	233:9 243:12
131:15 133:5,9	207:10 208:11	recent 187:7	243:17 247:17
134:1,3,24	211:13,18	281:20,22	247:21,24
135:24 138:8	213:13 214:19	282:25 283:16	recognize
141:3 143:22	219:3 221:5	recently 117:13	56:15 92:19
144:21 147:22	233:23 240:17	184:19	242:3
148:19,23	276:3 283:8,21	recess 78:19	recognized
151:25 155:21	reasonable	125:14 202:2	197:21
159:21 162:11	83:3 135:14	reclaim 72:3,11	recollection
162:21,23	215:23 219:20	72:23	154:17,18
163:15 169:23	reasonably	reclaiming 13:7	202:23
186:13 194:1	94:24	reclamation	recommend
194:11 209:3	reasons 12:10	11:1 13:5,10	201:22
210:24 212:15	14:13 22:16	17:11 20:2,3,5	recommendat
214:9 216:7,15	104:18 139:9	20:9,18 30:11	51:11 156:7
216:16,21	176:5	39:16 71:6,11	201:11 247:6
218:14 219:15	rebellious 33:4	71:16 73:4,15	recommendat
223:8 225:11	rebuts 44:5	91:9,14 101:11	196:14
228:25 231:23	rebuttal 5:7	102:4 120:8	recommended
238:19 241:17	44:3,11 49:23	121:16 151:13	155:18
262:13 264:19	61:1 74:22	151:18,19	reconstitute
267:14 274:22	75:6,11 118:6	173:21 174:8	98:9
280:17	237:9,15 238:7	178:18,21	record 6:1 17:3
realm 133:19	266:6 283:24	179:2 181:5,8	44:9 74:25
151:2	rec 170:8	181:10,20,24	95:21 126:9,23
reap 241:4	recall 57:7,9	182:11,22	163:21 164:9
reason 30:18	145:16 167:12	183:1,9,14	167:7 179:14
41:18 58:6	191:20 210:7	184:6,15,17	180:11 183:4
83:11,14,15		185:9 187:10	221:9

[records - related]

records 178:1	114:17 157:25	reform 19:20	regulated 68:1
179:19 214:16	266:1	reforms 12:15	regulates 49:17
recourse 265:9	reduced 156:17	14:16 18:17	65:23 67:24
recover 46:8	reduces 244:13	21:5	regulating
140:7	reducing 13:19	regard 46:3,16	65:22 68:9
recovered	15:10 155:14	87:14 256:19	regulation
45:19	reduction	269:6	10:15 150:9
recoveries	142:21	regarding 47:2	regulations 9:9
139:18 211:15	refer 104:22	49:5,10 153:14	14:2 22:13
recovery 53:4	127:15	161:18 162:5	86:12 93:25
105:5,5,7	reference 53:19	278:24	94:1 226:25
130:12 136:3	55:18,20 90:23	regardless	251:8
137:13,13,15	104:12 180:14	19:10 81:19	regulators 9:4
137:21 138:17	251:15	95:20 100:10	10:24 21:2
139:19 140:15	referenced 91:3	119:25 182:15	117:7 135:17
140:22 142:21	98:15 105:25	201:8 242:10	regulatory
156:5,17 211:5	127:4 158:20	253:22 281:19	12:16 14:7
211:10	177:13	regards 113:16	77:21 87:7,15
recreate 15:14	references 63:4	113:25 216:14	89:3,4 90:23
recruitment	referencing	region 39:15	91:2,18 93:12
190:24	200:4	registered	93:20 158:15
recurring	referred 45:11	169:13	159:8 206:9
16:15	55:5 161:17	registration	214:12,14
red 229:13	187:7	47:3,5,23	241:7
280:16	referring 79:20	48:20	reimbursed
redeposit	82:14 86:6	regressive	183:20
276:15	185:13 200:2	260:7	reject 183:10
redevelopment	refers 48:25	regs 123:17	215:6
150:22	69:2 169:12	regularly	rejected 10:13
redirect 4:7,12	refined 34:9	236:20	159:17
109:6,12	reflect 242:5	regulate 66:8	relate 274:5
202:14,17	reflected	66:10,24 67:1	related 103:16
redline 49:23	161:20 183:4	67:23 89:9	117:9 123:10
reduce 45:15	reflective	116:21 118:2	127:2 174:4
45:17,17	171:10	228:5	231:14 236:21

[related - representative]

238:20 240:12	relies 73:22	rendered	reported 25:2
240:25 244:8	reluctant	265:24	180:2
285:13	211:17	renewable	reporter 54:21
relates 137:19	rely 39:17	121:7,8	54:22
276:1	126:10	rent 30:2	reporters 281:6
relating 79:9	remain 9:16	rental 41:15	reporting
relationship	56:16	146:23	127:2
118:6 122:24	remaining 69:6	repair 30:4	reports 33:16
relationships	remains 244:3	repaying 101:6	72:14 106:9
150:16	remedial 36:14	repeat 49:9	179:22 186:7
relative 174:13	remediate 36:4	174:6	281:18
245:19	remediated	repeating	represent 15:9
relatively	103:10 181:18	230:15	45:9 142:1
150:11 154:15	182:6 247:8	replace 17:11	165:2 199:18
283:2	remediation	57:23	229:13 241:11
relax 278:3	35:21 101:11	replaced 58:6	253:20 264:10
releasable	102:21 103:16	81:13 137:14	264:18
56:24 57:1	181:16,25	replacement	representation
release 56:7	182:22 183:1	58:11	52:16 62:18
57:12 78:3,5,9	183:14,19	reply 50:9	representative
79:2,13 80:15	remember	report 116:5	38:3 48:18
80:17,20 81:5	47:19 86:18	129:18 141:17	84:21 127:22
233:22	135:23 210:12	141:18,19,22	127:24 128:14
released 56:16	223:5 226:13	142:3,3 144:1	150:2 155:5
57:25 80:5	226:13	160:21,24	161:13 163:18
81:10,12,20	remembers	161:3,5,10,11	163:23 164:20
222:1	130:1	162:4 165:9,9	164:25 169:3
releases 124:13	remind 102:13	165:20 166:7	170:24 172:9
relevance	261:4	167:16,17,17	172:20 173:20
91:20	reminder	167:19 198:8	174:18 175:8
relevant 90:9	201:25	225:5 227:6,8	176:13,19
relied 45:20	remotely 90:9	227:18,21,21	177:9 178:25
278:19	remove 276:23	229:6 243:18	179:8,20
relief 156:23,25	removed 57:21	244:1 280:24	180:15,18
		285:7	181:7,20

[representative - responsible]

182:13 183:22	require 18:5	research 83:13	258:22,23
184:22,23	20:19 30:24	122:11 130:12	259:2 265:11
185:25 187:4	39:24 48:10	238:15,16	268:22 277:24
188:21 189:19	49:6,25 51:3	research's	279:23
192:6,12,23	77:14,17 81:1	122:4	respect 95:1
194:19 196:7	93:19 110:10	reserve 211:23	128:18 149:5
196:12 197:12	189:23 212:10	reserves 215:19	210:4 214:2,3
198:12 199:5	232:11 240:16	243:6 245:13	215:7,22
199:14,17	249:23 251:11	245:14 263:2,3	241:23
202:8,11,19	260:14	reservoir 46:9	respectfully
203:16 225:21	required 8:15	137:6 211:8,24	205:11
226:16 227:5	47:22 55:12	reservoirs	respective
229:19 230:19	70:7 100:12	136:24 140:8,9	174:9
232:15 233:3	109:1 123:16	reset 101:1	respond 60:14
233:20,24	176:15 210:8	reside 41:7	252:3
243:21 247:1	250:7,14,18	resident 27:19	responders 8:4
247:18	262:18 263:16	35:15 36:19	response 33:18
representatives	265:11	resigning 65:16	104:9 126:1
192:19	requirement	resource	155:9 161:14
represented	55:24 177:5	116:14 140:10	161:22
123:8 170:14	252:17 260:15	197:7 227:17	responsibilities
representing	requirements	resources 2:10	20:9 28:7
10:7 199:10	12:22 13:13	3:8,13 11:24	responsibility
261:21	39:9 53:18	11:25 12:7	17:12 19:17
represents	55:16 58:7	13:3 16:17	21:4 25:20
179:21 253:18	214:21	17:9,18 35:20	27:24 38:7
260:15 264:12	requires 29:10	36:8 90:14	224:21 232:6
reputational	45:15 69:17	91:1 92:21	239:8
240:22	78:5 80:7	94:2 100:21,23	responsible
request 43:9	239:17 245:2	101:17 121:7	19:11 20:24
132:6 152:7,9	280:25	135:6 149:3	26:14 28:17
176:12 179:4	requiring	151:2,22	88:6 117:8
requested	49:11 50:24	174:14 189:8	138:23 145:7
142:15 152:8	77:4,5,20,21	229:1 237:4	212:5 265:24
168:15		246:22 247:4	281:13
	1		

[responsive - rights]

responsive	return 98:11	rid 252:21	150:10 157:2,4
102:11	109:15,20	rig 8:23 146:21	159:12,22
rest 28:18	222:10 255:23	147:3	164:3,4,11,15
38:18 186:16	262:16,18	right 8:9 15:24	170:9,12
restate 69:23	264:7 265:1	20:5,6,13 28:1	171:17 174:2
90:21	269:23 270:8	28:14 29:21	181:4 184:13
restoration	272:16 274:19	31:11 32:16	186:14 188:10
181:16	275:23 276:8	34:25 38:10	189:14,22
restored 34:6	276:12,20,25	40:12,16 43:11	191:6 193:4
181:18 182:6	277:2,8 278:4	43:15,21 44:17	195:12 202:9
restrict 12:22	278:14	44:19 48:24	202:13,22
restricted	returned	51:22 56:18	203:9 204:20
120:3	147:20 257:14	59:6 63:1,14	206:6 208:6
restrictions	revenue 8:3	66:7,8,15,24	210:15 211:21
191:13	9:11 113:8	67:1,10 68:20	216:22,23
restrictive	114:12 186:18	70:19 71:5,22	217:1,11,13,20
151:5	243:16	76:11 78:20	218:1,3 219:15
result 20:21	revenues 20:21	79:24 80:14	220:13 221:2
103:9 126:23	42:8 166:4	81:20 84:22	221:14 222:7
250:8 252:11	211:16	85:11,17,20,24	222:13,13,19
resulting	revere 36:21	87:8 93:4 97:4	223:23 225:6
251:12	review 44:4	98:16 100:12	225:25 227:3
results 29:18	58:20 59:11	101:16,23	229:16 232:14
200:17	86:3 124:4	107:15 109:4	234:9 235:2
resume 96:6	131:9 170:1,6	109:10 110:14	237:14 238:9
284:11	reviewed	110:16 111:2,6	238:11 248:22
retained	177:22 186:2	112:14 118:12	257:7 258:24
197:24	reviews 144:11	119:1,18,25	258:24 268:2
retired 7:20	revocations	120:2 122:21	269:4 273:25
8:11 21:25	241:8	123:3 125:1,8	274:1 278:1,6
22:2 41:8,13	revolution	127:14,23	280:19,19,20
41:15	139:11	132:1 133:23	282:2,6 283:25
retrievable	richard 3:19	140:2,10 141:4	284:11
175:21	199:18	141:7 143:7,13	rights 121:8
		146:2,21	135:15 214:23

[rights - rumor]

227:2	robert 4:14	rounds 258:6	251:6 254:22
righty 6:3	6:24 31:9	roustabout	254:23 255:10
78:16 127:8	40:24 41:6	156:22	260:6 279:24
rigs 146:5	148:15 235:10	routinely	280:25 281:5
191:19,24	235:17	154:11	rulemaking
rio 22:12	robust 20:5	row 255:14,14	12:8,16,23
risk 16:8 17:7	143:20 191:15	255:17 256:4,8	13:23 14:18
18:6 20:14,15	rochester	256:11 259:22	119:11,13,19
24:10 39:24	236:17	260:22 261:6	126:11 154:2
40:2 99:7,9,13	rock 157:14,15	262:17 272:5	160:17 230:9
99:20,22 100:3	rockefeller	272:17 273:5	254:1
100:22 104:24	163:10	royalties 12:4	rulemakings
112:2,7,12,17	rods 111:20	13:20 121:2	119:16
134:1 166:4	roland 21:10	141:11	rules 6:12
207:7,22,23,23	21:14,23	royalty 114:3	18:15 26:22
208:1 240:22	role 147:11	114:14 231:5	27:6 28:16
250:19,20	236:2,4	rule 10:11	38:16 40:5
251:25 266:23	rolling 121:5	15:16 16:3	54:1 55:9
276:20,23	room 34:20,23	18:4 25:16,24	57:18,20 58:5
277:2,8,10,12	37:10 38:20	27:21 28:18	68:25 69:2,4,7
278:4,5,14	40:10 50:22	29:8 38:4 39:7	76:18 77:14
risks 19:24	64:3 159:1	39:23 50:14	78:10 87:25
29:22 65:3	192:10 246:6	61:11 67:22	88:21 96:10
239:1	rooted 266:16	68:9,19 77:4	98:23,23 104:6
risky 251:21	roswell 2:16	81:18 88:8	131:10 150:4
276:13,16	142:1	92:16,17 94:12	155:19 161:18
rmoore 3:20	rough 253:10	111:10 131:15	213:18 244:5
rn 41:8	264:4	160:1,3 175:14	245:25 249:6
road 17:25	roughly 22:12	176:2,10,15,16	249:23 251:10
116:13 149:13	165:22 190:8	177:5 180:6	259:9 260:12
227:16	190:12 200:8	209:17 210:8	260:13,14
roads 28:11	222:23	212:14,15	261:12 265:20
rob 148:16	rounded	213:21 238:13	270:18 279:16
197:2 234:20	154:24	238:17 246:25	rumor 142:2
235:24		249:16 250:6	

[run - see]

run 10:9 235:6	san 23:25 24:11	116:9 129:20	screens 53:22
239:3 265:23	70:8 257:3	141:17 146:16	sealed 210:23
running 95:15	258:22,23	165:9,21 168:1	searched
149:11 156:15	259:1	176:2,24	200:16
182:7	sands 204:24	180:11 194:5	sec 77:2
runs 194:4	santa 1:7 2:4	227:11	second 13:3
S	2:11,22 3:14	scale 20:18	41:8 43:4
s 1:6 2:1 3:1	3:19 35:15	scarce 36:8	58:17 129:22
11:15 15:1,1	36:19	scenario	139:2 148:10
18:25 26:7	sarinana 197:6	263:20	148:14 251:1
27:12 29:1	satisfied 79:14	scenarios 220:6	256:4
32:12 35:3	81:19 142:10	220:7 263:19	secondary 53:4
37:18,18 48:25	satisfy 263:9	scenery 22:4	105:5,7 136:2
235:11	276:9,18	schedules	136:3 137:13
sackette 23:25	savings 266:23	199:12	137:15,21
sacred 36:15	266:24 269:24	scheduling	138:17 139:18
sacrifice	271:16 272:22	145:9	140:15 156:5
115:24	273:6,14	scheme 10:20	156:17 208:24
sadly 33:6,19	275:18 276:8	98:17 260:4	209:2 211:4,10
safeguards	saw 40:13	school 24:15,22	250:14
36:11	171:11	29:17 132:19	secret 106:15
saint 1:6	sayer 3:9,12	schools 20:23	secretary
sake 127:12	saying 59:3	22:17 28:10	130:16,23
188:4	60:21 92:16,18	scientific	section 45:12
salaries 222:16	92:20 112:6,19	208:17	53:20,25 87:1
sale 49:17	113:5,7 145:3	scientists 33:16	110:10 182:3
268:16	174:11 189:18	score 92:18	227:10
sales 121:9	205:7 219:13	scores 96:4	secure 265:14
sallee 142:5	251:22	97:1 98:12	security 30:3
143:9 160:23	says 29:24 34:3	scott 36:18	41:20 150:25
167:24 186:5	48:7,21 52:23	258:21	250:21
sample 109:20	58:5 59:7,9	screen 45:14	see 6:9 15:20
109:22 110:1	68:12,19 69:3	49:5 53:21	24:2 25:3 31:9
237:1 259:17	69:11,14 78:8	176:11 200:12	31:10 32:2
265:19	79:4 100:13	235:23	34:14,15 35:18

[see - shallower]

39:14,21 42:20	seems 143:10	206:13 240:1	sessions 196:16
44:8 47:17	188:6 197:13	267:10,19,20	set 36:12 61:10
50:17 55:13	seen 23:21	267:22	123:21 210:5
59:15 64:21	62:21 122:13	sensitive	215:23 232:11
66:4 71:5,22	124:12 139:10	261:25 262:11	240:8 242:10
95:13 98:8	152:5,23	264:6 265:19	242:14 257:3
106:11 107:9	158:16 159:8	sensitivity	275:10,15,18
110:5 112:13	162:6 173:25	264:20	275:19 276:9
118:10 120:19	179:15,16	sentence 34:9	277:13,20
124:5 136:22	208:9 214:15	74:10 79:11	285:8
139:18,21	223:24 231:20	81:14 109:14	sets 205:1
147:10 152:21	234:6	109:16 266:19	setting 119:1
152:25 153:7	sees 193:6	sentences 76:14	245:16
153:21 155:17	self 146:5 278:7	separately	settlement 48:5
156:21 157:24	278:13	212:19	settlements
164:19 179:13	sell 50:20 252:5	series 160:8	177:23
184:4 190:3	252:22	162:25 272:14	seven 8:12
201:5,20	selling 80:24	serious 100:7	147:14 153:23
206:10 212:10	semi 22:8	serve 281:5	225:6 231:4
216:23 218:18	semis 42:1	served 41:12	255:22 256:8
224:15 228:14	senate 131:2	117:14 128:17	seventh 11:25
248:15 257:4,6	132:4 152:1	130:7,12,15,21	several 12:21
257:22 258:6	198:25	serves 247:22	16:17 24:16
260:24 272:5,6	senator 9:22	service 19:7	63:3 102:10
276:3 280:17	10:2,5,7 11:11	115:23 226:1	145:15 198:15
282:13 283:16	14:21 151:25	services 279:13	243:11 254:23
seeing 148:17	send 6:16 23:8	session 10:10	severed 243:15
158:17,18	152:3,15	31:22 37:12,12	severity 94:13
230:12,17	sends 248:8	40:12 118:17	105:22
seeking 12:21	sense 27:25	132:5 153:13	shale 105:10
seem 93:14	56:23 120:17	153:16 158:22	139:10 140:6
104:19,24	134:13 157:9	230:20,21	147:21
127:9 144:23	157:19 158:11	234:7 246:6	shallow 172:4
174:17	159:3 175:17	248:23,24	shallower
	183:7 205:23		253:10

[shame - situations]

2624	1 (6.11	10.600	240.4.240.22
shame 26:24	shortfall	sides 196:20	248:4 249:23
shandler 1:24	101:14,15	signature	252:17 255:8
shanor 2:15	102:19,22	285:16	259:24 260:11
share 34:25	103:6,7,9	significant	260:14 262:12
109:10 176:11	shorthand	20:20 101:13	sir 61:5,22 72:1
200:12 204:1	285:8	104:16 106:1,2	73:1 83:14
228:15 235:23	shortly 247:7	241:11 249:9	109:18 120:6
shared 36:6	shovel 156:23	252:5 260:16	173:11 187:2
sharing 55:2	show 133:21,23	282:6	190:19 225:10
sheet 104:16	163:3 173:13	significantly	225:11 246:9
105:15 106:15	176:10 181:4	243:22	sister 137:23
106:20	218:3 231:12	similar 114:16	sit 66:23
sheets 105:25	262:4 270:4	115:18 173:25	147:21 152:4
106:3,11	271:5,6,24	198:24 269:13	162:12 178:2
sheila 6:17 23:8	274:11	270:22	site 24:14,16,19
31:10,23 40:14	showed 159:25	similarly	24:20
234:2 248:13	showing 45:13	178:10 183:13	sites 16:10,18
shelter 8:2	203:24 253:6	simple 33:6	17:8,25 24:1
shelton 192:18	253:19 258:19	65:2 268:6	24:24 97:17
242:7	268:4 271:10	simplest 269:12	103:10 181:12
shift 34:18	280:6	simplify 269:17	181:17 182:5
40:16 82:19	shown 252:4	simply 12:17	204:10
133:24	shows 17:13	43:8 49:24,25	sits 152:1
shifts 133:12	52:19,21	62:22 77:5	sitting 222:15
shipping 41:25	281:20	131:23 152:5	223:1 231:3
shirk 239:8	shuffling 20:21	155:13 194:24	situation 95:13
shiver 248:8	shut 41:22	205:14,15	97:19 105:2
shoe 64:6	42:10 157:5,20	267:21	113:12 207:18
shops 149:17	shutting 42:2	sin 282:16	217:4 219:9
short 193:1	shy 152:22	single 69:6,8	220:8 221:22
265:23 276:5	sic 13:9	73:23 112:17	222:21
279:14	sick 196:3	133:10 158:4	situations
shortened	side 198:25	182:25 204:22	98:18 103:25
254:21	239:2 268:10	204:22 205:6	223:22
	282:2	213:2 244:19	

[six - specific]

six 41:9,10	145:24 146:10	somebody	sorts 111:17
118:19 231:4	151:6 154:15	95:17 98:7	sought 12:12
256:13,13	154:19 161:18	132:17 136:9	sound 118:11
263:23	161:24 162:13	193:6	sounds 125:11
size 19:10 20:5	163:7,8 166:2	somewhat	184:11 204:14
20:6 27:22	258:22 259:9	161:23 223:7	206:22 209:18
38:5 244:18	260:3 265:7	260:6 276:17	216:17
261:3	smaller 13:16	283:19	source 243:12
skis 232:19	150:5 248:7	son 148:15	281:19
skyrocket	smallest 259:23	soon 17:7	sources 24:18
19:24 252:16	260:9 261:13	194:16	139:7 185:7
slated 165:15	264:6	sooner 193:18	213:12 243:9
sleeping 39:12	smart 40:1	sophisticated	south 2:10
slide 47:14 49:8	smells 24:9	63:24	247:16
53:13,15,23	smoke 105:16	sorry 34:21	southeast
55:7 58:19	social 239:13	35:6 40:17	145:13 219:7
77:2 111:2,24	society 141:9	54:20 82:3	southeastern
113:3,4 129:20	262:23	90:5 96:14	17:24
139:11,15,16	sold 41:16	99:23 123:25	spacing 282:23
203:22 205:3,4	147:17 243:15	144:10 155:5	speak 7:8 11:10
208:20 213:17	sole 172:12,22	164:5 173:8	29:7 32:19
213:17 220:1	solely 73:14	174:6 175:1	34:11 35:19
246:3 249:5	183:5	190:3 227:19	37:6 76:20
slides 55:3	solid 208:17	228:1 249:2	126:3 187:2
111:1,1 164:2	solution 20:4	262:22	193:3 194:11
164:18 203:21	137:1 213:11	sort 110:11	208:4 223:20
slightly 270:17	solutions 90:7	159:2 185:4	speaking 26:20
slope 253:10	285:17	193:22,23	27:19 38:1
slow 22:2	solve 133:11	211:1,24	39:5 70:21
slows 17:21	135:17,18	218:23,24,25	84:20 85:13
small 7:20 8:11	194:8 199:3	219:4 228:18	108:1 141:18
8:12,13,18,21	205:5,7 220:17	253:10 255:24	150:2
19:12 25:7,16	solved 147:10	261:15 262:3	specific 85:10
30:17 106:10	192:5 196:1,2	267:11 275:4,5	90:7,15 104:13
128:22,23			104:21 153:5

[specific - state]

170 00 107 10	1101		
173:22 185:10	spends 118:6	stakeholders	271:15 272:17
185:14 186:3	153:2	233:11	272:20 274:12
257:2	spent 7:22	stand 42:24	284:12
specifically	120:7,24	57:17 66:2	started 7:23
58:15,15 82:7	spill 16:3 17:1	80:4 86:14	136:20 137:23
168:14 213:20	17:8 103:15	115:15 127:22	146:4 156:21
244:24	spills 16:15	200:20 246:8	208:21 226:9
specifics	17:1	standard 46:1	246:3 271:16
233:12	spine 248:8	63:4 134:4	starting 71:25
speculation	spirit 37:3	163:11	78:25 161:25
166:23 167:6	spoke 233:22	standards	232:15 262:17
194:3 208:12	sponsor 237:16	143:4,5,6,12	271:13
223:9	sponsored	standing 146:4	starts 253:8
speed 235:4	42:25 266:8	standpoint	254:11 268:25
266:4	spot 140:18	135:19,20	273:5
spell 6:11,22	spread 33:18	148:19 157:19	state 1:2 3:18
14:25 18:22	270:22	171:22 176:1	8:3 10:7 12:3,5
21:13 23:3	spreadsheet	198:10 207:15	13:15,19,21
26:5 27:9	180:14	211:16 216:7,9	14:1,12 17:13
28:25 32:9	spring 129:7	239:13 267:12	20:6,10 22:15
37:16 40:22	spurting 16:22	stands 63:13	22:17,18,19
52:5 127:24	st 2:10	249:19	30:25 36:4
235:9 246:10	stable 259:3	star 31:15	40:22 41:13
spelled 40:25	staff 14:4,6	248:21	48:5,10,16
spence 9:23	15:13 91:16	start 7:6 19:5	57:20 84:8
10:6	92:8,10,21	21:19 23:15	86:5 87:11
spend 8:9	93:1,2 100:21	32:17 35:14	88:15 89:18
120:14 121:4	126:4 162:3	37:23 41:5	93:19 94:9
121:20 123:1	190:25 192:13	44:22 60:24	95:19 96:2
132:8 146:16	227:6	93:13 95:14	97:9 99:4
152:3,16 153:8	stagecoach	99:19 111:2	104:20,25
186:21,22	7:16	141:21 160:3	113:8 114:4,10
189:4,11,12	stakeholder	203:22 216:24	115:23,24
190:1,6 223:4	158:20	234:12 238:10	117:7 118:16
		268:24 269:12	120:13,14,16

[state - strata]

	T	I	
121:2,3,16,18	259:17 261:8	156:7,8,9	steep 279:18
122:12 123:6	268:24 279:8	170:15 175:20	282:13
123:14,17	283:13	187:13 209:13	stenographic
124:5,15,20	state's 12:8,9	209:13,15,17	285:8
129:13 131:20	14:19 34:4	209:22 211:2	step 76:14
134:11 135:3	55:16 93:18,25	250:3,5 252:9	189:22,23
136:13 137:15	170:7 239:11	252:10 255:7	stepfather
138:9,19 139:4	stated 53:24	256:20 258:14	226:11
141:16,25	67:19 71:15	statute 45:23	stepped 31:17
144:15,19	74:22,23	57:24 58:10	steps 155:11
145:6,6,12	100:25 108:1	60:16,21 61:10	226:22
154:10,12,13	131:25 143:8	61:18 69:2,17	stifle 240:9
154:20,22	151:19,20	70:7,21 73:21	stimulation
158:15,16	165:4 193:1	74:1,16,16,19	258:2,6
160:20 161:19	208:2 226:20	74:20,21 75:2	stipulate
165:16,17,22	statement	75:5,6,8 78:8	126:12
165:23 166:1,9	61:15 72:21	79:4,5,19 80:7	stipulation
166:18 167:3	73:1 80:4 89:2	82:14,24 83:19	127:7
170:16 171:20	103:23 116:6	86:22,23 96:24	stone 73:10
178:15 182:8	122:9 126:21	100:13 110:4	stool 132:10
182:10,17	152:1 174:25	114:8,9 123:17	stop 16:1 18:8
183:20 184:14	175:5 198:5	123:17 181:9	55:2 116:23,25
184:14,20	states 61:10	184:3	117:1 228:7
185:8 195:16	86:10 94:10,25	statutes 34:4	247:18
199:19,24	130:16,22	76:17 86:12	stopped 118:24
201:5,10 208:7	176:20 182:4	173:3	storage 229:11
217:6 219:20	207:12 216:1	statutorily	store 130:3,4
222:3,6,13,19	281:25 283:12	232:12	stories 124:13
223:23 224:23	statewide 13:13	statutory 81:21	258:12
224:25 226:1	96:23,25	108:13 212:11	story 258:13
231:9,18,24	stating 147:7	214:21	straight 261:20
239:11,23,25	stationed 41:14	stay 216:1	strange 280:14
241:5,9,11	statistics 154:1	222:11	strata 128:3,18
242:6,12,14	status 55:22,22	staying 130:3	129:11 130:25
243:15 247:13	57:13 114:18	275:4	131:5,5

[strategic - sureties]

stratogia	100.2 202.10	graggatad	00.12 16 20
strategic 211:22	109:3 202:10	suggested	99:13,16,20
	202:12	50:10 51:16,17	100:20,22,25
street 3:4	subject 49:15	93:18	113:11 135:13
143:23 285:18	50:6,6 54:4,8	suggesting	167:6 175:4
strength 106:7	55:23 229:3	189:1,2,3,6,7	197:13 198:13
stressing 42:13	subjective 14:9	212:18	205:9 215:5
strictly 277:14	submit 31:19	suggestion	247:18
strike 54:13	190:7 192:23	126:15	supporting
strikes 279:5	submitted	suggestions	231:10
stripper 114:14	51:25 179:22	113:24	supports 22:11
128:24 129:4	237:8	suing 231:24	90:8 141:13
141:2 172:12	submitting	suite 3:4,14	supposed 72:2
173:5,6	164:2	285:18	72:22,24 90:11
strong 8:13	subparagraph	sulfide 25:12	123:18 134:1
27:20 32:25	54:5,8	117:17 219:8	sure 15:1 18:14
38:3 104:15	subpart 55:24	sum 120:15	19:22 21:5
106:20 246:24	subset 259:15	196:12 270:21	26:6 28:18
256:24	substantial	summed	33:20 38:17
stronger 38:15	13:4 194:25	266:18	44:3 66:16
strongly 15:15	214:5 241:4	supervision	68:8 69:24
196:20	substantially	146:25	70:4 98:3
structure 108:4	173:23 174:20	supplemental	103:13 128:17
struggling	substantive	271:9 275:22	150:18 151:16
42:12 194:22	12:17	supplied 255:5	153:10 169:9
studied 141:19	substitutes	supplies 15:23	174:15 176:9
studies 211:3	10:13 75:22	supply 41:22	177:8 180:4,9
262:22,23	succeeded	support 15:16	185:17 190:17
study 117:4,5	231:22	22:5 26:14,20	190:17 205:9
117:10 122:5,8	sudden 158:9	27:20 38:3	207:17 212:25
122:10 143:8	sue 124:14	39:6 50:9 57:5	216:4,15
144:11 166:25	sued 193:13	57:8 89:22	218:19 220:17
studying 53:12	suffer 111:16	90:11,11,25	230:8 275:10
suazo 3:5 4:7	sufficient 20:6	91:6,8,16	275:25
107:17,18,21	suggest 93:15	92:15,17,21	sureties 224:25
108:8,9,10,18	267:14 277:22	93:3 98:22	

[surety - talk]

	gram a of 140.0	,	40lm 17:2 25:20
surety 57:8	suspect 148:2	t	take 17:3 25:20
150:13 220:4,9	158:14	t 6:25 15:2,2	44:8,18 51:6
220:16 221:6	swear 6:13 7:2	18:25 23:4	59:6 64:7
224:22 245:2	7:4 10:1 11:16	26:6 32:12,12	74:10 75:13
245:19 250:18	15:3 19:1	37:18 38:23	77:6 95:7
263:10 265:11	21:16 23:5,12	40:25,25	111:7 125:4
surface 117:12	26:8 27:13	130:19 235:10	127:3,10
123:16 181:24	29:3 32:14	235:11,11	132:18 141:12
182:16 200:20	35:5,7,10	246:12,12	156:10,13
200:25 210:19	37:21 38:24	ta 54:10 55:21	160:5,6,21
surfaced 82:25	39:1 41:2	55:22 74:13	161:11 166:19
surplus 270:14	64:19 128:6	95:10 136:1	169:17 179:11
273:18,24	161:8 174:1	137:20,20	180:15 188:9,9
274:4,20,20,24	235:12 246:13	138:7 156:7,8	188:19 191:9
278:15	sweeney 28:22	156:9 208:22	196:15 198:22
surprised	28:23 29:1,4,6	209:12,13,15	211:8 213:13
93:24	31:7	209:16,18,22	213:21 221:24
surrebuttal	sweeping 14:15	209:25 210:1	222:24,25
44:12 52:9	swept 132:13	212:3 228:21	226:22 227:7
53:14,15 56:6	152:20,24	ta'd 210:23,23	232:5 234:10
76:24 77:1	188:10	212:6,9	234:15 237:23
120:5 125:19	sworn 45:4	table 255:15	239:1 261:6
125:23,25	128:11 235:18	256:2,11	270:7 276:14
155:4 163:20	sync 136:18	259:12,14	taken 134:7
179:15 284:1	syndicated	260:5,22	139:16,20
284:13	236:10	261:11 262:2	155:11 193:14
surrebutted	syracuse 236:6	262:11 263:7	198:13 259:14
69:18	system 18:5	264:14,19	285:5
surrounded	20:12,14 25:4	271:8,10,12,15	takes 42:10
17:24 23:20	39:10,19 40:2	272:4 274:11	121:16 155:24
survey 181:11	215:13	275:21	279:23
surveys 262:23	systems 39:21	tables 271:7	takings 134:9
262:24	134:24 149:13	275:5	talk 7:25 30:23
survived 8:14			73:4 78:25
		tag 30:13	144:8,10 148:3

[talk - terms]

160:18,25 tannis 2:5 45:7 technological temporally 190:22 195:5 165:1 140:13 269:5 195:10 209:12 target 160:4 technologically 269:5 215:2,2 219:6 225:1 46:18 18:10 36:2 219:7 228:20 targeting technology temporary 229:15 237:25 216:16 46:11 139:1 175:20 176:7 talked 82:12,20 taught 236:7 148:23 162:1 176:22 210:4 82:21 85:7 tax 10:23 11:2 211:25 ten 8:12 102:4 94:16 139:24 11:3,5,7 20:21 teen 33:4 135:9,11 137:22 145:24 148:1 160:23 26:15 97:20,22 tell 6:13 7:3 137:22 145:24 162:16 182:22 98:14,15 101:2 10:1 11:17 148:21 153:22 187:5 192:14 101:5 102:2 15:4 19:2 156:1,10 193:9,10 195:7 103:3,48,17 21:17 23:6,13 171:20,20 219:4,5,25 15:14,17 26:9 27:14 249:12,14
195:10 209:12 target 160:4 technologically temporarily 215:2,2 219:6 225:1 46:18 18:10 36:2 219:7 228:20 targeting technology temporary 229:15 237:25 216:16 46:11 139:1 175:20 176:7 talked 82:12,20 taught 236:7 148:23 162:1 176:22 210:4 82:21 85:7 tax 10:23 11:2 211:25 ten 8:12 102:4 94:16 139:24 11:3,5,7 20:21 teen 33:4 135:9,11 148:1 160:23 26:15 97:20,22 tell 6:13 7:3 137:22 145:24 162:16 182:22 98:14,15 101:2 10:1 11:17 148:21 153:22 187:5 192:14 101:5 102:2 15:4 19:2 156:1,10 193:9,10 195:7 103:3,4,8,17 21:17 23:6,13 171:20,20 219:4,5,25 151:14,17 26:9 27:14 173:7 224:17 220:1,1,12 153:2 172:13 29:3 32:9,14 249:12,14 224:5 226:12 172:24 173:4 35:5,8,11 250:7 251:2,4 229:3 230:19 243:13 41:2 92:6 277:6
215:2,2 219:6 225:1 46:18 18:10 36:2 219:7 228:20 229:15 237:25 216:16 46:11 139:1 175:20 176:7 talked 82:12,20 taught 236:7 148:23 162:1 176:22 210:4 82:21 85:7 tax 10:23 11:2 211:25 ten 8:12 102:4 94:16 139:24 11:3,5,7 20:21 teen 33:4 135:9,11 148:1 160:23 26:15 97:20,22 tell 6:13 7:3 137:22 145:24 162:16 182:22 98:14,15 101:2 10:1 11:17 148:21 153:22 187:5 192:14 101:5 102:2 15:4 19:2 156:1,10 193:9,10 195:7 103:3,4,8,17 21:17 23:6,13 171:20,20 219:4,5,25 151:14,17 26:9 27:14 173:7 224:17 220:1,1,12 153:2 172:13 29:3 32:9,14 249:12,14 224:5 226:12 172:24 173:4 35:5,8,11 250:7 251:2,4 229:3 230:19 173:11,15 37:21 38:25 251:10 260:23 26:9 243:13 41:2 92:6 277:6
219:7 228:20 targeting technology temporary 229:15 237:25 216:16 46:11 139:1 175:20 176:7 talked 82:12,20 taught 236:7 148:23 162:1 176:22 210:4 82:21 85:7 tax 10:23 11:2 211:25 ten 8:12 102:4 94:16 139:24 11:3,5,7 20:21 teen 33:4 135:9,11 148:1 160:23 26:15 97:20,22 tell 6:13 7:3 137:22 145:24 162:16 182:22 98:14,15 101:2 10:1 11:17 148:21 153:22 187:5 192:14 101:5 102:2 15:4 19:2 156:1,10 193:9,10 195:7 103:3,4,8,17 21:17 23:6,13 171:20,20 219:4,5,25 151:14,17 26:9 27:14 173:7 224:17 220:1,1,12 153:2 172:13 29:3 32:9,14 249:12,14 224:5 226:12 172:24 173:4 35:5,8,11 250:7 251:2,4 229:3 230:19 173:11,15 37:21 38:25 251:10 260:23 26:9 243:13 41:2 92:6 277:6
229:15 237:25 216:16 46:11 139:1 175:20 176:7 talked 82:21 85:7 tax 10:23 11:2 211:25 ten 8:12 102:4 94:16 139:24 11:3,5,7 20:21 teen 33:4 135:9,11 148:1 160:23 26:15 97:20,22 tell 6:13 7:3 137:22 145:24 162:16 182:22 98:14,15 101:2 10:1 11:17 148:21 153:22 187:5 192:14 101:5 102:2 15:4 19:2 156:1,10 193:9,10 195:7 103:3,4,8,17 21:17 23:6,13 171:20,20 219:4,5,25 151:14,17 26:9 27:14 173:7 224:17 220:1,1,12 153:2 172:13 29:3 32:9,14 249:12,14 224:5 226:12 172:24 173:4 35:5,8,11 250:7 251:2,4 229:3 230:19 173:11,15 37:21 38:25 251:10 260:23 266:9 243:13 41:2 92:6 277:6
talked 82:12,20 taught 236:7 148:23 162:1 176:22 210:4 94:16 139:24 11:3,5,7 20:21 teen 33:4 135:9,11 148:1 160:23 26:15 97:20,22 tell 6:13 7:3 137:22 145:24 162:16 182:22 98:14,15 101:2 10:1 11:17 148:21 153:22 187:5 192:14 101:5 102:2 15:4 19:2 156:1,10 193:9,10 195:7 103:3,4,8,17 21:17 23:6,13 171:20,20 219:4,5,25 151:14,17 26:9 27:14 173:7 224:17 220:1,1,12 153:2 172:13 29:3 32:9,14 249:12,14 224:5 226:12 172:24 173:4 35:5,8,11 250:7 251:2,4 229:3 230:19 173:11,15 37:21 38:25 251:10 260:23 266:9 243:13 41:2 92:6 277:6
82:21 85:7 tax 10:23 11:2 211:25 ten 8:12 102:4 94:16 139:24 11:3,5,7 20:21 teen 33:4 135:9,11 148:1 160:23 26:15 97:20,22 tell 6:13 7:3 137:22 145:24 162:16 182:22 98:14,15 101:2 10:1 11:17 148:21 153:22 187:5 192:14 101:5 102:2 15:4 19:2 156:1,10 193:9,10 195:7 103:3,4,8,17 21:17 23:6,13 171:20,20 219:4,5,25 151:14,17 26:9 27:14 173:7 224:17 220:1,1,12 153:2 172:13 29:3 32:9,14 249:12,14 224:5 226:12 172:24 173:4 35:5,8,11 250:7 251:2,4 229:3 230:19 173:11,15 37:21 38:25 251:10 260:23 26:9 243:13 41:2 92:6 277:6
94:16 139:24 11:3,5,7 20:21 teen 33:4 135:9,11 148:1 160:23 26:15 97:20,22 tell 6:13 7:3 137:22 145:24 162:16 182:22 98:14,15 101:2 10:1 11:17 148:21 153:22 187:5 192:14 101:5 102:2 15:4 19:2 156:1,10 193:9,10 195:7 103:3,4,8,17 21:17 23:6,13 171:20,20 219:4,5,25 151:14,17 26:9 27:14 173:7 224:17 220:1,1,12 153:2 172:13 29:3 32:9,14 249:12,14 224:5 226:12 172:24 173:4 35:5,8,11 250:7 251:2,4 229:3 230:19 173:11,15 37:21 38:25 251:10 260:23 266:9 243:13 41:2 92:6 277:6
148:1 160:23 26:15 97:20,22 tell 6:13 7:3 137:22 145:24 162:16 182:22 98:14,15 101:2 10:1 11:17 148:21 153:22 187:5 192:14 101:5 102:2 15:4 19:2 156:1,10 193:9,10 195:7 103:3,4,8,17 21:17 23:6,13 171:20,20 219:4,5,25 151:14,17 26:9 27:14 173:7 224:17 220:1,1,12 153:2 172:13 29:3 32:9,14 249:12,14 224:5 226:12 172:24 173:4 35:5,8,11 250:7 251:2,4 229:3 230:19 173:11,15 37:21 38:25 251:10 260:23 26:9 243:13 41:2 92:6 277:6
162:16 182:22 98:14,15 101:2 10:1 11:17 148:21 153:22 187:5 192:14 101:5 102:2 15:4 19:2 156:1,10 193:9,10 195:7 103:3,4,8,17 21:17 23:6,13 171:20,20 219:4,5,25 151:14,17 26:9 27:14 173:7 224:17 220:1,1,12 153:2 172:13 29:3 32:9,14 249:12,14 224:5 226:12 172:24 173:4 35:5,8,11 250:7 251:2,4 229:3 230:19 173:11,15 37:21 38:25 251:10 260:23 266:9 243:13 41:2 92:6 277:6
187:5 192:14 101:5 102:2 15:4 19:2 156:1,10 193:9,10 195:7 103:3,4,8,17 21:17 23:6,13 171:20,20 219:4,5,25 151:14,17 26:9 27:14 173:7 224:17 220:1,1,12 153:2 172:13 29:3 32:9,14 249:12,14 224:5 226:12 172:24 173:4 35:5,8,11 250:7 251:2,4 229:3 230:19 173:11,15 37:21 38:25 251:10 260:23 266:9 243:13 41:2 92:6 277:6
193:9,10 195:7 103:3,4,8,17 21:17 23:6,13 171:20,20 219:4,5,25 151:14,17 26:9 27:14 173:7 224:17 220:1,1,12 153:2 172:13 29:3 32:9,14 249:12,14 224:5 226:12 172:24 173:4 35:5,8,11 250:7 251:2,4 229:3 230:19 173:11,15 37:21 38:25 251:10 260:23 266:9 243:13 41:2 92:6 277:6
219:4,5,25 151:14,17 26:9 27:14 173:7 224:17 220:1,1,12 153:2 172:13 29:3 32:9,14 249:12,14 224:5 226:12 172:24 173:4 35:5,8,11 250:7 251:2,4 229:3 230:19 173:11,15 37:21 38:25 251:10 260:23 266:9 243:13 41:2 92:6 277:6
220:1,1,12 153:2 172:13 29:3 32:9,14 249:12,14 224:5 226:12 172:24 173:4 35:5,8,11 250:7 251:2,4 229:3 230:19 173:11,15 37:21 38:25 251:10 260:23 266:9 243:13 41:2 92:6 277:6
224:5 226:12 172:24 173:4 35:5,8,11 250:7 251:2,4 229:3 230:19 173:11,15 37:21 38:25 251:10 260:23 266:9 243:13 41:2 92:6 277:6
229:3 230:19 173:11,15 37:21 38:25 251:10 260:23 266:9 243:13 41:2 92:6 277:6
266:9 243:13 41:2 92:6 277:6
talking 23:11 taxes 12:3 13:4 111:11 128:6 tenants 41:17
75:20,23 79:8 13:20 141:7,8 128:15 135:13 tend 45:17
80:19 97:15 taxpayer 153:4 139:13 152:12 237:18
98:1,4,7 154:22 156:4,10 tens 221:25
100:15 111:3 taxpayers 159:23 160:2 tension 240:4
141:5 143:11
162:17 175:23 teachers 8:4 183:8 193:21 86:16,19,21,25
184:13 191:8 teams 234:23 205:12 235:13 88:5 136:7
205:5 218:24 tech 46:12 246:14 247:3 211:20,22
228:18 242:15 110:25 130:12 281:6 terminated
243:1 245:12 146:5 149:1 telling 111:19 123:14
260:1,2 264:11 203:18 139:25 140:1,2 termination
talks 110:6 technical 42:21 141:21 123:15
163:2 229:4 249:1 tells 274:23 terms 50:15
tank 16:21 technique 280:23 281:4 54:25 85:23
tanks 16:13 269:7 282:24 114:25 149:2
167:21,25

[terms - thank]

186:3 209:10	testimonies	161:2,9,17	19:6,7 21:7,8
210:1,13 212:7	162:21	162:20 163:16	21:20,22 22:21
215:24 229:22	testimony 5:7	163:19,20	22:23 23:1,16
233:11 241:18	43:3 44:5,20	164:18 165:4	25:25 26:1,11
250:15 251:25	45:10 46:25	167:8,9,9,22,25	27:7,16 28:19
254:25 255:15	47:9,11,13,18	168:9,13,16,18	28:20 29:2,5
258:13 260:3,7	48:9,12 49:23	168:20 170:24	31:5,6 32:13
261:3 263:5	50:2,6 51:14	174:23 175:3	32:18 34:12
264:20 265:3	51:20 52:1,9	179:9,25	35:4,13 37:7,8
267:15,24	52:10 54:3,9	180:19 183:17	37:20 38:18,19
275:13 279:25	54:14,25 57:7	183:25 186:12	39:2 40:8,9
282:23	57:9,11,14	187:5 199:22	41:1,4 42:15
tertiary 105:5,7	59:22 64:9,10	200:3 201:15	42:17 43:23
136:2,4 139:6	64:12 68:23	203:17,23	44:23 59:22,23
139:18 156:17	69:19,19 70:11	226:1,20	60:1,5,6,16
208:24 209:2	71:15 72:7,8	230:18 231:10	68:23 78:23
211:5,10	72:16 73:2,14	232:1,17 233:5	84:3,4 87:10
test 210:7,10	73:22 74:22,25	235:25 237:9	98:25 99:2
testified 45:4	75:5,7,11	237:12,15	101:23 107:7
48:9 49:3,10	77:13 81:25	238:7 247:1	107:13 109:4
50:21 52:14	82:11,19,23	269:14 277:5	110:3,16 115:4
53:15,16,23	85:7,8 86:1,2,4	280:7 283:25	115:6,10,14,22
54:3 56:6,22	86:14 87:11,12	testing 9:9	120:4 124:23
98:21 128:11	88:14,17 89:14	texas 67:9,15	125:1,11
131:1 167:18	90:2 93:9 94:5	67:16 117:10	127:17,23
169:10 174:23	96:18 97:4,4	117:13 129:24	128:5,8 151:12
179:21 186:1	99:4 103:19,20	130:4 207:13	155:2,6 161:13
200:5 220:5	103:22,24	236:4	163:18,22
235:18 279:3	107:4,25	text 93:10	164:3,15,21
testify 109:25	108:11,19,25	thank 6:21 7:2	168:20,21,24
178:3,11	110:2,24	7:5,8 9:14,16	169:23 172:8
testifying 62:9	113:19 126:1	9:18,25 10:3	173:19 177:9
84:17,19	126:11 135:1,5	11:9,11,19,21	179:7,7 180:25
103:14 171:5	141:3 153:3	14:20,21 18:17	183:21 184:22
176:4 199:23	155:3,10,21	18:18,22 19:4	199:5,7,21

[thank - thinking]

			1
201:14,18,19	204:21 215:8	94:17,19 95:10	198:25 202:3
201:24 202:8	280:14	95:24,25 97:11	205:18 206:2,2
203:9,23 205:3	things 6:10	98:5,17,17,23	206:7,14 207:3
225:9,11,14,17	40:3 69:3	99:6 100:18	210:8,25
225:25 226:1	106:9 138:5	102:24 105:9	211:18 212:11
229:19 232:16	146:3,25	105:20 106:2	212:23 215:15
232:23,25	149:21,25	106:10 107:25	215:23 216:3
233:3,15,17,18	151:14 157:1	108:22 114:3	216:21 218:22
233:19,25	159:3 160:11	114:19,23,23	218:25 219:4,5
234:1,9 235:2	182:4 193:24	122:14 123:2,8	219:16 222:5
235:15 237:8	211:7,19 221:1	124:3,7 126:4	223:10,10,21
237:19 238:4,9	253:23 262:25	126:24 127:15	223:24 224:2
246:2,16,17	think 9:21 23:6	129:19 131:3	225:3,12
248:11 249:4	32:3,4 34:8	133:12 138:8	228:11,13,17
284:10,14,15	39:10 40:14	145:5 147:10	229:15 231:1
thanks 34:10	44:7,11 50:18	148:11,18	231:11,16
84:14 110:23	50:21,24 51:21	149:6,24 150:7	232:14 233:12
203:16 225:23	54:2,3,9,14	150:20,24,24	233:13 237:23
theme 261:14	55:18,20 56:4	151:12 152:14	241:3 243:22
theoretical	56:19 60:10	153:20,22,23	247:11 249:6,8
238:16,17	61:10 64:12	154:5,24 156:6	252:2,2,19,23
276:2	65:15 66:10,11	158:1,5,13	254:24 255:1
theoretically	66:14,16,17,18	162:2,17	256:7,18,20,23
240:10 242:20	66:23 67:1,19	164:14 165:20	257:8 258:10
theory 240:15	68:11,12 70:24	169:24 170:25	258:14,15
thermographer	71:10 72:10	171:9,14	259:9 263:4
23:19	73:6 74:6	172:14 173:25	264:15,21,21
thermography	77:15 78:25	175:17,18	266:4,21
24:5	79:8 80:23	177:24 184:9	267:10,15,23
thing 28:14	81:4,25 86:6	186:20 187:18	268:2 274:6
59:1 127:9	86:16,18 87:6	187:25 188:1	275:14 277:1
149:6 150:20	88:11,12,14	188:25 189:18	279:1,6,25
151:11 157:13	89:14 90:10,20	190:20 191:14	284:3
192:2 195:4,9	91:4,12,24	196:12,14	thinking
197:6 198:11	92:17,24 94:11	197:20 198:9	104:25 105:1

[thinking - today]

215:16 216:25	157:3 165:18	21:22 22:21	270:21,22,23
261:16 262:20	189:13 205:19	23:15 29:16	271:8,11,24
269:2,25	207:18 222:10	32:17 34:16	273:6 274:4,16
274:14	223:3 235:22	35:14 37:23	275:6,7,13
thinks 157:11	250:13 263:19	40:19 41:5,16	276:23 277:16
third 13:12	264:3 272:2,8	41:22 42:11	278:22,24
177:18 178:14	282:7	44:9 50:13	279:10,23
271:18	threshold 44:1	71:13 73:19	281:14 282:10
thirst 37:4	103:22 144:4	78:6,8,13	283:10,15
thorough 116:2	155:16 156:19	101:3,3,16	284:2
thought 76:17	157:25 158:6	107:1,4 109:19	times 24:16
88:16 89:5	158:10 172:22	115:5,15,25	74:11 102:11
90:13 92:5	217:10 244:25	118:6,15 123:1	114:5,21 131:1
99:23 112:9	249:9,17 250:6	124:5,10,24	132:23 135:7
113:1 114:22	251:6 252:3,12	125:3 128:24	137:15,17
145:2 164:7	252:25 255:1	129:16 135:10	138:5 141:11
165:5 199:3	256:23 257:18	135:10 136:15	144:25 149:8
216:7 218:23	279:2,5,19	139:17 145:25	149:10 156:3
224:8 246:3	thresholds	150:8 156:14	193:1,5 204:24
284:5	170:25 171:6	158:16 159:23	223:2 226:15
thoughts	172:2,10	160:11 173:16	245:1 250:13
105:18	thrive 37:6	193:2,6 197:12	258:20 273:7
thousands	throw 135:23	204:25 205:17	tired 196:4
147:8	thrown 266:5	223:25 224:15	tisdel 2:6,6
threat 25:13	thumbs 94:20	225:10 226:15	44:22
256:21	94:20 95:3,3	228:10 229:21	title 87:7
threatens 28:4	thursday 31:20	232:17 236:9	today 7:9,25
38:13	37:13 248:24	248:4,19 253:7	11:10 15:15
threats 118:3	tied 158:5	253:9,12,13	19:8 34:11
three 6:9,15 8:1	tiers 133:15	254:17 257:23	62:1,9 66:23
24:17,18,22	ties 150:21	266:17,18,25	76:19 84:13
43:2 74:11	tight 140:9	267:4,6,8,9,15	107:4,11
112:15 119:6	till 54:19	267:18 268:2,5	110:24 115:15
132:10 141:11	time 7:6 9:17	268:9 269:4,6	122:1,12
143:2 155:17	19:5 21:1,19	269:7,9 270:20	148:20 154:16

[today - tripp]

163:16 169:8	134:21 146:23	traction 13:2	treasurer
178:2 196:13	213:8,9	traditional	130:10
201:15 203:17	top 12:8 71:22	133:13	treasury 277:2
232:17 245:5,9	110:6 130:3	tragedy 22:15	277:6,6,10
246:23 266:20	146:19 161:22	trailer 147:4	treat 36:22,23
267:2,13,21	165:25 255:17	train 114:22	treated 43:2
269:19 274:9	268:19,21	transactional	tree 37:3
275:10,18	269:8	52:5	tremaine 2:11
276:9,18 277:9	topic 118:20	transactions	4:11 43:25
277:13,20	275:4	63:24	60:2,15 126:14
today's 274:23	topics 236:7	transcript 1:13	126:17 127:17
today's 274.23 together 87:3	topics 230.7	4:3 5:9 6:2,23	168:22,24,24
136:7 138:1	total 18:7 24:17	32:10 127:25	169:2,4 186:23
151:15 157:10	45:17 102:20	285:1,10	188:14 195:4
267:8,22 269:5	169:17 196:12	transfer 14:7	199:5,8 202:20
told 95:23	256:6 259:25	47:24 67:23	222:23
121:24 134:22	totally 154:18	224:12	trend 174:2
135:6,7 142:24	totaly 154.18	transferred	281:20,23
143:1 151:22	touch 65:7	80:21,22 81:6	282:25 283:16
155:24 160:3	tough 116:2	81:8	283:18,19,22
160:25 161:7	226:15	transfers 12:23	tribal 25:14
186:8 200:11	tougher 151:3	13:25 14:10	triba 25.14 tribe 36:18
toluene 229:24	toward 283:9	transparent	trick 272:12
tomorrow	283:15	12:24	276:12
191:2,5 248:23	towards 136:18	transpired	trickery 179:20
254:16 266:19	136:18	256:15	tried 10:11
267:3,21	toxic 18:1	transport	75:16 134:21
took 61:17	25:11 33:22	241:8	277:21
63:17 137:22	117:17	transportation	trigger 250:5
143:16,18	toy 261:15	229:11	triggering
212:1 219:23	262:3	travel 8:17	251:5
231:4	track 95:21	traveling	trip 23:25
toolbox 89:7	221:9 271:12	179:11	tripled 250:13
tools 89:6,9,12	tracks 271:10	trd 173:2	tripp 2:18 4:10
106:23 134:20	2 40220 271.10	1,0.2	4:12 109:9
100.20 101.20			2 107.7

[tripp - uncle]

125:16,18,24 15:4 19:2 20:3 21:17 23:6,13 75:20,21 128:9,13 155:2 26:9 27:14 116:12 119:9 137:17 140:17 163:22 164:1 32:14 35:5,8 141:11 145:13 202:14,15,18 35:11 37:21 151:14 157:6 203:8,10 233:25 234:24 128:6 235:13 171:19,19 189:23 191:23 145:8 279:7 167:1 208:1 222:10 226:14 252:22 1700bling 24:4 24:6 173:17 140:19 140:19 180:24 120:16,18 102:16,18 108:21 166:11 126:2 23 124:5,15 124:20 231:18 231:24 111:17 16:21 32:24 124:6 262:22 274:7 275:19 231:24 111:17 16:21 32:24 152:7,25 184:15 204:3 144:15 24:3 141:10 149:21 120:4 140:17 244:17 140				
128:9,13 155:2 26:9 27:14 16:12 119:9 137:17 140:17 140:17 140:17 140:17	125:16,18,24	15:4 19:2 20:3	53:22 55:23	184:15 204:3
155:7 163:18	126:18 127:21	21:17 23:6,13	75:20,21	214:15 245:14
163:22 164:1 32:14 35:5,8 141:11 145:13 74:24 202:14,15,18 35:11 37:21 151:14 157:6 123:25:24:24 128:6 235:13 171:19,19 189:23 191:23 246:12	128:9,13 155:2	26:9 27:14	116:12 119:9	263:25
202:14,15,18 35:11 37:21 151:14 157:6 u 203:8,10 38:25 41:2 158:7 159:16 u 15:2 26:7 233:25 234:24 128:6 235:13 171:19,19 35:2 128:2 246:12 trooper 41:13 try 40:19 95:16 189:23 191:23 246:12 us. 41:12,19 trouble 88:18 139:8 159:13 217:5,6 220:6 246:12 us. 41:12,19 145:8 279:7 167:1 208:1 222:10 226:14 236:5,23 244:24 245:25 24:6 252:22 236:5,23 244:24 245:25 249:11 251:14 uk 236:16 ultimate 219:22 24:6 26:25 71:12 249:11 251:14 251:24 252:4 249:11 251:14 251:24 252:4 246:12 us. 41:12,19 131:2 267:19 uk 236:16 ultimate 219:22 ultimate 219:22 ultimate 219:22 ultimate 219:22 ultimate 219:22 ultimate 219:22 ultimately 45:18 120:12 124:8 243:6 252:19 255:18 252:19 255:18 266:1 269:15 277:29 273:1 124:8 243:6 252:19 273:1 277:25 2	155:7 163:18	28:12 29:3	137:17 140:17	typographical
203:8,10 233:25 234:24 trooper 41:13 trope 161:19 trouble 88:18 145:8 279:7 troubles 88:22 24:6 troutman 14:22,23 15:1 15:5,7,8 18:12 18:14 100:21 191:16 100:21 191:16 100:21 191:16 100:21 166:11 108:21 160:18 108:21 166:11 108:21 160:18 108:21 160:18 108:21 160:11 108:21 160:18 108:21 160:18 108:21 160:18 108:21 160:18 108:21 160:18 108:21 160:18 108:21 160:18 108:21 160:18 108:21 160:18 108:21 160:18 108:21 160:18 108:21 160:18 108:21 160:18 108:21 160:18 108:21 160:18 108:21 160:18 108:21 149:49 109:21 108:21 108:21 149:49 109:21 108:21 149:49 109:21 108:22 10 118:22 26:7 124:20 23:18 109:22 10 118:22 26:14 128:6 220:6 128:2 22:10 226:14 128:6 220:6 128:2 22:10 226:14 128:6 220:6 128:2 22:10 226:14 128:6 220:6 128:2 128:2 124:12 124:2 246:12 128: 41:2,19 131:2 267:19 14k 236:16 141:10 149:22 14timate 114:20 121:8 22:22 124:8 243:6 128:2 22:10 226:14 124:2 245:25 124:24 245:25 124:8 24:6 128:4 128:16 200:20 121:48 24:6 128:8 129:22 129:22 111:17 124:8 24:6 128:4 128:4 128:16 200:20 127:25 280:17 128:4 129:22 129:28 11:17 128:26:12 124:8 24:6 128:8 128:12 128:4 128:16 200:20 129:22 129:22 129:22 121:29 124:8 24:6 128:9 124:8 24:6 128:9 124:12 124:8 24:6 128:9 124:12 124:8 24:6 128:9 124:12 124:8 24:6 128:9 124:12 124:8 24:6 128:9 124:12 12	163:22 164:1	32:14 35:5,8	141:11 145:13	74:24
203:8,10 233:25 234:24 trooper 41:13 trope 161:19 trouble 88:18 145:8 279:7 troubles 88:22 24:6 troutman 14:22,23 15:1 15:5,7,8 18:12 18:14 100:21 66:11 108:21 160:8 108:21 166:11 108:21 160:8 108:21 160:8 108:21 160:8 108:21 140:4 108:21 140:4 109:21 108:21 140:4 108:23 191:23 124:24 22:10 225:19 213:18 221:24 249:11 251:14 225:24 246:12 131:2 267:19 11 121:24 245:25 124:24 245:25 124:24 245:25 124:24 245:25 124:24 245:25 124:24 245:25 124:24 245:25 124:24 245:25 124:24 245:25 124:24 245:25 124:24 245:25 124:24 245:25 124:24 245:25 124:24 245:25 124:24 252:4 125:12* 124:8 243:6 121:24 124:8 243:6 128:22:10 126:14 121:18:12:12 124:8 243:6 127:20:26 124:12 124:8 243:6 121:12 124:8 243:6 127:20:26 124:12 124:8 24:6 128:21 128:22:10 126:14 121:18:12 129:22 11:14:10 121:18:12 121:18:12 128:26:19 131:2 267:19 14k: 236:16 11 11:12,19 131:2 267:19 14k: 236:16 11 121:18:12 122:22 122:9 124:8 24:6 124:12 124:8 24:6 124:12 124:24 245:25 124:24 25:24 124:12 124:8 24:6 128:14 128:14 129:22 128:4 128:14 128:16 200:20 197:26 141:10 121:18:19:19 131:2 26:14 121:18 121:19 131:2 26:14 121:18 121:19 131:2 26:14 121:18 121:19 131:2 26:14 121:18 121:19 131:2 26:14 121:18 121:19 131:2 26:14 121:18 121:19 131:2 26:14 121:18 121:19 131:2 26:14 121:19	202:14,15,18	35:11 37:21	151:14 157:6	u
128:6 235:13	203:8,10	38:25 41:2	158:7 159:16	
trooper 41:13 try 40:19 95:16 189:23 191:23 246:12 us. 41:12,19 trouble 88:18 145:8 279:7 troubles 167:1 208:1 2205:19 213:18 217:5,6 220:6 131:2 267:19 us. 41:12,19 131:2 267:19 uk 236:16 ultimate 236:16 ultimate 236:16 ultimate 219:22 ultimate 219:23 272:20,24 252:18 266:1 269:15 272:9 273:1 <th< td=""><td>233:25 234:24</td><td>128:6 235:13</td><td>171:19,19</td><td></td></th<>	233:25 234:24	128:6 235:13	171:19,19	
trope 161:19 try 40:19 95:16 205:19 213:18 u.s. 41:12,19 trouble 88:18 139:8 159:13 217:5,6 220:6 131:2 267:19 131:2 267:19 u.s. 41:12,19 troubles 88:22 troubling 24:4 252:22 236:5,23 ultimate 236:16 ultimate 24:6 26:25 71:12 249:11 251:14 251:24 252:4 24:252:4 24:22 24:22 24:22 ultimate 219:22 ultimate troutman 95:15 105:17 251:24 252:4 251:24 252:4 251:28 252:2 24:31 24:38 272:20,24 251:14 251:14 260:23 272:20,24 252:19 255:18 252:19 255:18 266:1 269:15 272:9 273:1	trooper 41:13	246:14	189:23 191:23	
trouble 88:18 139:8 159:13 217:5,6 220:6 131:2 267:19 troubles 88:22 troubling 24:4 252:22 236:5,23 ultimate troubling 24:4 24:6 26:25 71:12 249:11 251:14 ultimate troutman 95:15 105:17 251:24 252:4 251:24 252:4 ultimately 14:22,23 15:1 146:1 173:17 260:23 272:2,8 272:20,24 252:19 255:18 18:14 190:21 191:16 274:5 280:2,6 282:11 266:1 269:15 272:9 273:1 true 58:14 274:5 tsosie 37:15,15 type 98:1 149:4 266:1 269:15 272:9 273:1 un 247:8 unanimous 196:6 228:4 tucker 2:23 turn 34:24 281:4 197:9 unapproved 285:9 truly 22:21 108:16 147:6 140:17 244:17 258:16 262:25 265:15 267:5 typical 140:19 242:6 262:22 unauthorized 83:5 uncertainty 121:18 122:12 123:6 124:5,15 turns 66:22 274:7 275:19 242:6 262:22 263:4 270:1 <t< td=""><td>trope 161:19</td><td>try 40:19 95:16</td><td>205:19 213:18</td><td></td></t<>	trope 161:19	try 40:19 95:16	205:19 213:18	
145:8 279:7 167:1 208:1 222:10 226:14 uk 236:16 troubles 88:22 252:22 236:5,23 uktimate 219:22 24:6 26:25 71:12 249:11 251:14 219:22 ultimately troutman 95:15 105:17 260:23 272:2,8 219:22 ultimately 14:22,23 15:1 146:1 173:17 260:23 272:2,8 252:19 255:18 212:18 120:12 18:14 190:21 191:16 273:3 278:11 280:2,6 282:11 266:1 269:15 252:19 255:18 true 58:14 102:16,18 37:18,22,24,25 182:16 200:20 182:16 200:20 197:3 unanimous 196:6 228:4 266:22 276:21 281:4 197:9 unapproved 197:9 285:9 108:16 147:6 149:25 258:16 262:25 277:25 280:17 258:16 262:25 278:11:17 121:18 122:12 108:16 147:6 149:25 265:15 267:5 140:17 244:17 212:9 unauthorized 121:18 122:12 274:7 275:19 242:6 262:22 263:4 270:1 263:4 270:1 unchanged 56:2 124:10 6:13 7:3 277:5 141:10 149:21 141:10 149:21 141:10 149:21	trouble 88:18	139:8 159:13	217:5,6 220:6	'
troubles 88:22 252:22 236:5,23 ultimate 24:6 26:25 71:12 249:11 251:14 ultimate troutman 95:15 105:17 249:11 251:14 ultimate 14:22,23 15:1 146:1 173:17 260:23 272:2,8 ultimate 15:5,7,8 18:12 185:25 188:21 260:23 272:2,8 272:20,24 18:14 190:21 191:16 273:3 278:11 266:1 269:15 true 58:14 274:5 284:7 29:2 29:2 102:16,18 tsosie 37:15,15 37:18,22,24,25 182:16 200:20 277:25 280:17 196:6 228:4 tucker 2:23 277:25 280:17 unanimous 196:6 228:4 turn 34:24 95:16 100:8 types 111:17 140:17 244:17 197:9 unapproved 21:18 122:12 turnkey 147:5 turnkey 147:5 typical 140:19 33:5 uncertainty 121:18 122:12 274:7 275:19 242:6 262:22 263:4 270:1 unchanged 56:2 124:20 231:18 231:24 277:5 two 10:12 14:10 149:21	145:8 279:7	167:1 208:1	222:10 226:14	
troubling 24:4 trying 10:19 244:24 245:25 249:11 251:14 219:22 troutman 95:15 105:17 249:11 251:14 219:22 ultimately 14:22,23 15:1 146:1 173:17 260:23 272:2,8 251:24 252:4 45:18 120:12 15:5,7,8 18:12 185:25 188:21 272:20,24 272:20,24 252:19 255:18 18:14 190:21 191:16 273:3 278:11 280:2,6 282:11 266:1 269:15 272:9 273:1 272:9 273:1 272:9 273:1 272:9 273:1 102:16,18 tsosie 37:15,15 182:16 200:20 277:25 280:17 196:6 228:4 tucker 2:23 277:25 280:17 281:4 285:9 95:16 100:8 types 111:17 149:25 108:16 147:6 140:17 244:17 258:16 262:25 265:15 267:5 265:15 267:5 265:15 267:5 121:18 122:12 turnkey 147:5 typical 140:19 242:6 262:22 124:20 231:18 274:7 275:19 242:6 262:22 263:4 270:1 231:24 277:5 typically 132:6 56:2 141:1	troubles 88:22		236:5,23	
24:6 26:25 71:12 249:11 251:14 219:22 troutman 95:15 105:17 251:24 252:4 45:18 120:12 14:22,23 15:1 146:1 173:17 260:23 272:2,8 45:18 120:12 15:5,7,8 18:12 185:25 188:21 272:20,24 252:19 255:18 18:14 190:21 191:16 273:3 278:11 266:1 269:15 truck 22:8 218:18 223:21 280:2,6 282:11 266:1 269:15 102:16,18 274:5 284:7 182:16 200:20 277:25 280:17 196:6 228:4 266:22 276:21 281:4 182:16 200:20 277:25 280:17 281:4 285:9 95:16 100:8 197:3 197:3 197:9 truly 22:21 108:16 147:6 140:17 244:17 258:16 262:25 265:15 267:5 265:15 267:5 140:17 244:17 258:16 262:25 265:15 267:5 265:15 267:5 265:15 267:5 265:15 267:5 265:15 267:5 265:15 267:5 265:15 267:5 265:15 267:5 265:15 267:5 265:2 22 263:4 270:1 265:2 22 263:4 270:1 265:2 22 263:4 270:1 265:2 22 263:4 270:1	troubling 24:4	trying 10:19	,	
troutman 95:15 105:17 251:24 252:4 45:18 120:12 14:22,23 15:1 146:1 173:17 260:23 272:2,8 45:18 120:12 15:5,7,8 18:12 185:25 188:21 272:20,24 252:19 255:18 18:14 190:21 191:16 273:3 278:11 266:1 269:15 228:14 274:5 284:7 272:9 273:1 102:16,18 108:21 166:11 37:18,22,24,25 182:16 200:20 277:25 280:17 196:6 228:4 285:9 295:16 100:8 128:4 140:17 244:17 140:17 244:17 285:9 108:16 147:6 140:17 244:17 258:16 262:25 265:15 267:5 121:18 122:12 147:25 258:16 262:25 265:15 267:5 140:19 242:6 262:22 263:4 270:1 242:6 262:22 263:4 270:1 242:13 214:13 214:13 214:13 214:13 214:13 216:13 210:4 210:4 210:4 210:4 210:4 210:4 210:4 210:4 210:4 210:4 214:13 214:13 214:13 214:13 214:13 214:13 214:13 214:13 214:13 214:13 214:13 214:13 214:13 214:13 214:1		26:25 71:12	249:11 251:14	
14:22,23 15:1 146:1 173:17 260:23 272:2,8 124:8 243:6 15:5,7,8 18:12 185:25 188:21 272:20,24 252:19 255:18 18:14 190:21 191:16 273:3 278:11 266:1 269:15 22:8 274:5 280:2,6 282:11 266:1 269:15 102:16,18 274:5 284:7 108:21 149:4 182:16 200:20 197:3 196:6 228:4 277:25 280:17 197:3 197:3 197:3 197:3 197:9 197:	troutman	95:15 105:17	251:24 252:4	
15:5,7,8 18:12 185:25 188:21 272:20,24 252:19 255:18 18:14 190:21 191:16 273:3 278:11 266:1 269:15 truck 22:8 274:5 284:7 272:20,24 252:19 255:18 true 58:14 274:5 280:2,6 282:11 266:1 269:15 272:9 273:1	14:22,23 15:1	146:1 173:17	260:23 272:2,8	
18:14 190:21 191:16 273:3 278:11 266:1 269:15 218:18 223:21 280:2,6 282:11 266:1 269:15 272:9 273:1 272:9 273:1 102:16,18 tsosie 37:15,15 type 98:1 149:4 108:21 166:11 37:18,22,24,25 182:16 200:20 196:6 228:4 tucker 2:23 277:25 280:17 285:9 turn 34:24 95:16 100:8 types 111:17 140:17 244:17 140:17 244:17 258:16 262:25 121:18 122:12 turned 23:10 258:16 262:25 unauthorized 121:18 122:12 turnkey 147:5 typical 140:19 83:5 124:20 231:18 274:7 275:19 263:4 270:1 typically 132:6 231:24 277:5 two 10:12 141:10 149:21 unchanged 56:2 uncle 130:4	·	185:25 188:21	· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·	
truck 22:8 218:18 223:21 280:2,6 282:11 272:9 273:1 true 58:14 274:5 tsosie 37:15,15 type 98:1 149:4 un 247:8 unanimous 196:6 228:4 tucker 2:23 277:25 280:17 unanimous 197:3 285:9 turn 34:24 281:4 197:9 unapproved 212:9 truly 22:21 turned 23:10 turned 23:10 turnkey 147:5 typical 140:17 242:6 262:25 unauthorized 83:5 uncertainty 214:13 unchanged 56:2 214:13 unchanged 56:2 141:10 149:21 140:19 141:10 140:19 <td></td> <td>190:21 191:16</td> <td>· ·</td> <td></td>		190:21 191:16	· ·	
true 58:14 274:5 284:7 102:16,18 tsosie 37:15,15 type 98:1 149:4 108:21 166:11 37:18,22,24,25 182:16 200:20 197:3 196:6 228:4 tucker 2:23 turn 34:24 197:3 285:9 95:16 100:8 types 11:17 140:17 244:17 197:9 unapproved 121:18 122:12 turned 23:10 258:16 262:25 265:15 267:5 typical 140:19 123:6 124:5,15 turns 66:22 274:7 275:19 242:6 262:22 263:4 270:1 214:13 unchanged 231:24 truth 6:13 7:3 two 10:12 141:10 149:21 140:19 214:13	truck 22:8	218:18 223:21	280:2,6 282:11	
102:16,18 tsosie 37:15,15 type 98:1 149:4 108:21 166:11 37:18,22,24,25 182:16 200:20 196:6 228:4 266:22 276:21 277:25 280:17 285:9 281:4 281:4 108:16 100:8 108:16 147:6 140:17 244:17 108:16 147:6 149:25 258:16 262:25 121:18 122:12 121:18 122:12 123:6 124:5,15 124:20 231:18 231:24 274:7 275:19 242:6 262:22 121:18 122:12 277:5 263:4 270:1 124:10 149:21 132:6 124:20 231:18 274:7 275:19 263:4 270:1 231:24 277:5 141:10 149:21	true 58:14		· ·	
108:21 166:11 37:18,22,24,25 182:16 200:20 197:3 196:6 228:4 266:22 276:21 277:25 280:17 281:4 197:9 285:9 95:16 100:8 140:17 244:17 140:17 244:17 212:9 108:16 147:6 149:25 258:16 262:25 265:15 267:5 265:15 267:5 265:15 267:5 265:15 267:5 242:6 262:22 242:6 262:22 242:6 262:22 242:6 262:22 242:6 262:22 242:13 242:14:13 242:14:13 242:14:14 242:14 2	102:16,18	tsosie 37:15,15	tvpe 98:1 149:4	
196:6 228:4 tucker 2:23 277:25 280:17 266:22 276:21 turn 34:24 281:4 285:9 95:16 100:8 types 111:17 truly 22:21 108:16 147:6 140:17 244:17 truman 191:14 149:25 258:16 262:25 trust 114:10 turned 23:10 265:15 267:5 121:18 122:12 turnkey 147:5 typical 140:19 123:6 124:5,15 274:7 275:19 242:6 262:22 124:20 231:18 274:7 275:19 263:4 270:1 231:24 277:5 typically 132:6 truth 6:13 7:3 two 10:12 141:10 149:21	ĺ ,	· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·		
266:22 276:21 turn 34:24 281:4 197:9 285:9 95:16 100:8 types 111:17 140:17 244:17 212:9 truman 191:14 149:25 258:16 262:25 265:15 267:5 265:15 267:5 trust 114:10 turned 23:10 265:15 267:5 265:15 267:5 265:15 267:5 121:18 122:12 turnkey 147:5 turns 66:22 242:6 262:22 263:4 270:1 124:20 231:18 274:7 275:19 263:4 270:1 263:4 270:1 265:2 231:24 277:5 141:10 149:21 56:2 truth 6:13 7:3 two 10:12 141:10 149:21 130:4				
285:9 truly 22:21 truman 191:14 trust 114:10 123:6 124:5,15 124:20 231:18 231:24 truth 6:13 7:3 95:16 100:8 108:16 147:6 140:17 244:17 258:16 262:25 265:15 267:5 typical 140:19 242:6 262:22 242:6 262:22 263:4 270:1 typically 132:6 141:10 149:21 types 111:17 140:17 244:17 258:16 262:25 265:15 267:5 typical 140:19 242:6 262:22 263:4 270:1 typically 132:6 141:10 149:21 typically 132:6 141:10 149:21				
truly 22:21 108:16 147:6 140:17 244:17 212:9 trust 114:10 turned 23:10 258:16 262:25 unauthorized 121:18 122:12 turnkey 147:5 typical 140:19 watch 123:6 124:5,15 turns 66:22 66:22 242:6 262:22 uncertainty 124:20 231:18 274:7 275:19 263:4 270:1 typically 132:6 231:24 277:5 two 10:12 141:10 149:21 140:17 244:17 258:16 262:25 unauthorized 83:5 uncertainty 214:13 unchanged 56:2 uncle 130:4				
truman 191:14 149:25 258:16 262:25 unauthorized trust 114:10 turned 23:10 typical 140:19 83:5 123:6 124:5,15 turns 66:22 242:6 262:22 uncertainty 124:20 231:18 274:7 275:19 263:4 270:1 unchanged 231:24 277:5 two 10:12 141:10 149:21 56:2 unchanged 56:2 141:10 149:21			• •	
trust 114:10 turned 23:10 265:15 267:5 83:5 121:18 122:12 turnkey 147:5 typical 140:19 242:6 262:22 242:6 262:22 242:13 24:13 123:24 277:5 two 10:12 141:10 149:21 130:4	_		258:16 262:25	
121:18 122:12 turnkey 147:5 typical 140:19 123:6 124:5,15 turns 66:22 242:6 262:22 124:20 231:18 274:7 275:19 263:4 270:1 231:24 277:5 typically 132:6 truth 6:13 7:3 two 10:12 141:10 149:21				
123:6 124:5,15				
124:20 231:18			• •	
231:24	· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·			
truth 6:13 7:3 two 10:12 141:10 149:21 uncle 130:4				
uncie 130:4			" - "	
				uncle 130:4
			,	

[under - urgently]

under 45:23	163:15,17	unfortunately	unnecessary
46:10,13 55:22	165:7,14	11:2 197:10	13:12 82:6,22
61:25 62:3	169:16 171:25	unidentified	150:21
64:13 65:14	178:24 185:20	225:14	unplugged
72:4 73:24	188:20 207:17	uniform 258:14	96:20 97:16
80:25 83:18	213:1	260:14 282:23	116:11 117:8
108:3 124:16	understanding	unintended	117:11,16
130:17,18,20	9:15 67:14	13:14	120:16 227:14
171:18 173:3,9	75:1 80:2,3	unique 244:21	227:24 228:16
173:11 175:20	106:6 117:20	unit 104:18	232:4
176:14,24	121:19 142:25	146:21 257:3	unprecedented
177:4 184:6	164:8,10	united 94:10	12:12
185:3 187:14	170:13 182:13	130:16,22	unquote 167:17
195:16 198:20	182:23 185:2	281:25	185:8 187:9
200:20 216:20	186:10 196:13	unitizations	206:4
222:15 226:23	200:8 203:3	138:4	unrelated
249:22 251:7	209:19,20	unitized 156:15	123:12
251:10 255:10	230:2,3	units 53:4	unremediated
260:11,12	understands	137:22 267:16	97:17
underfund	145:5	267:18 282:17	unresolved
20:15	understood	university	47:20 48:4,4
undergone	140:16 183:21	130:14 236:6	94:15
258:5	undertake	236:14,15,17	untenable
underground	100:21	unjust 120:14	14:10
45:12 82:1,7	undertaking	unjustified	upcoming
82:11,16	99:13	242:25 244:11	230:21
understand 9:6	underutilized	unlined 16:21	update 58:22
35:9 51:2	148:25	unmute 6:19	59:10
61:17 77:7	uneconomic	9:21 23:9	updates 18:4
80:10 81:3	114:18 172:5	31:16,18,23	upstream
82:3 95:4 98:4	unfair 18:5	32:1,3 34:15	236:24
103:13 110:10	30:25 120:13	34:18,22 40:15	uranium 247:8
114:4 136:8	unfortunate	unmuted 31:19	urge 14:13
145:19 149:7	98:18 223:22	32:4	urgently 19:20
154:4 162:22	282:15		

[usa - volume]

usa 2:20	182:10 185:15	voluing 262:1	vested 106:4
		valuing 263:1 274:6	
usable 176:25	185:19 187:15		viability 211:10
use 11:3 26:15	187:21 217:23	variable 253:16	viable 172:3
30:14,20 31:1	220:3 224:23	variation 242:3	vice 11:23
58:8 86:6,8,16	269:6 275:5	varies 46:24	197:5
86:19,21,25	usually 125:4	variety 258:15	video 285:5
88:5 97:12	127:10 136:20	various 12:20	view 95:18 96:7
101:2 103:3	146:20 210:5	146:24 233:11	100:9,14
105:21 112:16	utilize 140:21	236:23 261:18	216:11
171:2 172:21	149:3	262:3,4,15	views 32:25
173:18 174:8	utilized 134:24	263:1 267:7	vigorously
179:2 181:10	140:19 150:22	vary 204:3	98:22
184:6 185:7	152:21 153:6	244:16 251:24	violation 94:14
209:7,11	179:6 189:20	vast 154:20	94:14 100:5
213:22 219:21	220:2 223:18	165:17 185:2	105:23 176:14
223:1 233:9	v	200:10	177:10,13
247:25 248:2	v 32:12 37:19	vehicles 42:4	violations 48:6
278:6 280:9	vacate 246:7	vendors 141:14	89:7 93:12
used 11:7 28:8	vacate 240.7 vague 90:3,4	vented 228:16	94:8 95:15
43:5 86:9	valley 7:12	venting 83:5,9	106:24
87:21 91:13	valuable	venture 96:6	virginia 41:11
97:24 109:23	270:16	147:14	virtual 1:21
120:19 134:19	valuation 269:3	venue 197:16	248:19
134:20 161:20		verified 245:7	virtually 52:11
172:11 181:8	value 141:8	veritext 285:17	visited 24:1,16
181:21,24	254:15 263:15	version 17:2	126:14
186:2,11	266:17,18	61:21,22	visualization
199:25 202:21	267:4,5,6,9,24	179:16	282:16
243:25 244:2	268:1 269:1,6	versus 105:16	visually 258:10
247:17 278:21	269:7 270:2,6	199:24	vividly 130:2
uses 91:8	271:6 273:22	vertex 122:8	vogue 105:6
using 31:14	273:22 274:5,7	vertical 253:6	voice 143:19
36:8 43:6	274:13 275:8	255:5,8 259:15	volatile 229:23
50:14 73:9	277:15,16	259:16 261:5	volume 128:22
149:20 172:10	278:20,24	280:15,18	128:23 144:21
117.20 172.10	282:21	200.12,10	120.25 111.21

[volume - we've]

158:4,9 206:9	105:4 123:25	45:12,23,24	way 31:15
210:5 253:12	126:25 135:17	46:2,13,14	54:18 67:23
volumes 77:11	144:16 160:6,7	81:25 82:1,6,7	70:24 72:20
136:17	169:11 170:23	82:9,11,12,14	76:1 88:7,8
volunteers	170:24 174:24	82:16,20,21,25	94:12 111:19
15:14	176:19 180:11	83:3,6,18,23	137:11 157:6
vote 18:16	181:4,6 182:2	116:19,21,24	158:1 163:5
38:15 192:7	182:21 183:23	117:1 118:3	169:16 170:3
194:20	184:3 185:5	134:8 140:25	176:2 182:20
W	188:22 195:9	149:4 172:16	183:11 188:15
w 29:1 246:12	195:21 196:1	172:18 173:16	204:11 207:7
wait 40:3 54:19	209:12 212:15	214:23 215:14	210:21 211:21
196:15 268:14	222:14,14,15	227:2 228:4,5	212:2 213:5
268:23	224:3 230:11	228:8 243:6	219:14,16,23
waiting 194:14	234:10 261:4	wasted 116:14	235:6 240:2
walk 16:5	263:12,17	137:10 227:17	251:22 260:5
17:17 18:2	277:17 282:18	wasteful 83:18	267:23 268:2,9
19:13 20:8	284:2,3,9	wasting 158:3	272:13 274:6
24:10 28:7	wanted 20:18	water 8:2,5	277:3 282:2,11
39:18 203:21	60:14 76:21	15:23 19:24	283:15
205:16 271:8	84:15 85:6	25:12 28:4	ways 121:8
271:11,23	115:22 117:25	29:23 35:20	195:24 210:24
271:11,23	122:25 131:4	36:8,15 38:13	239:14,16
walking 16:1	170:1 177:3	38:16 86:9,24	242:2
want 8:12 9:2,4	wants 17:3	117:15,22	we've 16:14
9:4,14,16	48:18 64:3	118:4 135:5,24	60:10 92:17
17:10 29:7	76:10 93:1	136:25 138:13	97:19 100:15
30:23 31:23	94:20 95:19	151:21 229:1	121:14 124:14
44:9 47:16	97:2 126:13	230:5 247:3	129:16 130:6
58:8 62:20,22	135:16 196:2	waterflooding	132:11 135:6
62:25 63:22	220:25	137:3	137:9 139:9
86:2 87:3	wars 32:24	waters 35:22	141:3 148:22
90:14 95:11,13	wash 186:19	36:12	158:15 175:18
98:3 103:2,4	waste 10:17,18	watkins 130:20	184:3 193:9
103:13,25	16:20 33:1		198:17 204:8

[we've - wells]

	1		
207:22 208:6,9	welcome 116:3	73:25 77:14	146:2,17 148:4
210:12 216:13	196:17,18	82:7,22 83:9	149:5,16
223:10,21	well's 202:25	83:18 86:8	152:13 154:1,1
230:14 231:21	258:12	95:10,19 96:5	154:5,7,8,14,19
233:12 234:12	wellbore	96:19 97:1,7	154:20,21
243:10,21	114:21 183:5	97:16 98:1,12	155:13,15
244:25 250:13	183:15	98:20 99:9	156:6,18,21
259:25 272:15	wellbores	102:20 103:10	157:9 158:9
273:17 274:2	169:13	104:1,1,10,17	165:5,11,12,12
274:25 277:21	wellhead 16:23	104:18,24	165:15,22,24
278:4 283:5	97:23	105:3,4,5,13,13	166:1,7,9,12,13
284:6	wells 12:4 13:8	106:19,23	166:16,20,25
wealthiest 30:8	13:15,16,18	109:20,22	167:3 169:11
wealthy 26:25	15:21,25 16:12	110:1 111:16	169:17 170:3,7
28:13	17:5,20 18:8	111:22 112:1,2	170:12,16,18
website 127:4	18:10 19:14,22	113:17,18	170:20 171:1,7
198:7	20:24 24:7	114:18 116:11	171:12,15,19
weed 281:5,13	25:1,7,11,20	116:18 117:8	171:20 172:12
weeds 156:22	26:18 27:2,7	117:11,14,16	172:23 173:5,6
187:3	28:1,9,12,18	120:16 123:5,5	173:6,19
week 24:13	29:11,18,22,25	124:7,16,20	174:12 175:9,9
151:21 152:8	30:17 33:23	128:23,24	175:18 176:6
159:16 191:21	34:5 36:1,5,6	129:15 131:5,6	176:15 177:11
191:22 247:5	38:10 39:12,12	131:7,8,16,18	177:12 178:4
week's 135:5	39:13,24 42:10	131:23 132:11	178:12,19
152:2 229:1	45:15,16 49:17	132:25 133:3,6	180:1,7,12,20
weeks 16:19	52:11,22 53:7	133:15,15,22	180:21 181:12
159:16	53:17 54:1,4,5	133:23 134:10	181:14,21
welc 12:12,24	54:6,7,10 55:8	134:12,15	182:5,9,15,15
13:14 14:14	55:15,21 56:1	135:22 136:16	183:8,18 184:2
132:22 168:7	58:16,20,21	140:6,22 141:2	184:5,11,21,25
226:21	59:2,5,8,9,11	141:9,15	185:3,8,14,18
welc's 12:7	59:13 61:16	143:12 144:2,4	186:2,11,15
14:5,14	64:2 68:25	144:6,19,22	187:14,16,17
	72:11,17,23	145:4,21,23	187:21 188:5

[wells - work]

188:16 189:9	243:5 244:17	western 2:3	225:11 230:17
189:17 190:9	245:24 247:25	45:8 86:10	231:10 232:18
191:4,5,8,10,14	248:10 249:12	165:1	232:25 233:15
191:20,25	249:14,18	westernlaw.org	233:18,21
192:4,7 193:14	250:4,8 251:2	2:5,6,7	235:10,14
193:25 194:13	251:4,11,17,18	whatsoever	246:8 284:14
194:24,25	251:20,25	278:5	witnessed
195:13 199:24	252:6,13,15,18	white 34:25	16:14 38:8
200:6,9,9,16,24	252:22,23	wholeheartedly	witnesses 4:4
201:12 202:21	253:1 254:21	120:18	97:4 148:6
202:21 203:3,6	255:2,6,8,9,12	wide 248:5	witnessing
203:25 204:3,5	255:18,20,21	wife 41:7 116:1	35:22 76:3
204:13,21	256:3,4,5,7,12	wild 161:6	wolfcamp
205:10,16,19	256:13,13,16	william 1:22	129:7
205:20 206:25	256:24,25	willing 232:5	won 193:13
208:8,10	257:2 258:16	275:2	wonderful 71:1
210:13,13	258:19 259:5	win 224:15	wondering
211:9,12,14,17	259:15,17,21	winning 162:24	78:12 79:7
212:3,4,17	259:25 260:2,3	wisdom 10:23	woods 151:25
214:4 215:3,10	260:24 261:5,7	11:1	word 51:6
216:4 217:5,24	261:9,17,24	wise 138:8	68:22 72:24
218:20 221:1	262:1,7 264:1	withdraw	74:18
222:16,24	264:2 278:20	271:20	words 50:13
223:5,10,23	279:14,18,21	withdrawing	73:23 80:12
224:13,14,20	280:8,9,10,11	126:8	136:16 224:4
224:23 225:4	281:21,25	withdrew 43:1	wordsmithing
227:14,25	282:3,5,10,15	withheld 97:22	51:8,21
228:3,16	283:2,6,10,14	witness 43:1	work 15:14
229:12,14	wendell 1:5	44:25 59:23	23:21 24:5
231:18,18,25	went 41:15	62:10,13,14,25	40:16 42:4
232:4 239:9,11	122:8 137:24	76:9 84:2	67:9 101:15
239:23,24	156:6 160:14	101:20 112:23	124:14 149:1,2
240:7,20,23	188:7 191:3,5	125:17 127:20	151:15 156:1,2
241:5 242:6,12	202:19 255:18	128:1,7 168:21	156:4 159:13
242:14,16	256:5,13	201:17,18	192:13 226:5

[work - yearly]

220 20 222 10	2.60.10	1 110 10	100 00 140 0
230:20 233:10	268:10	yards 149:18	139:22 143:2
236:3,22	worthwhile	149:21	144:24 150:16
238:12,14	267:10	yeah 54:21	152:10,10,25
269:11 275:6	worthy 67:2	64:5 69:17	155:1 156:12
worked 7:17	wozniak 3:4	70:20 83:1	169:18 173:24
120:10 124:9	wrap 18:13	88:14 91:24	173:24 177:1
162:9 168:3	write 167:17,17	94:17 108:7	180:2 186:15
197:4 226:8,11	221:7,8	111:2,8,24	186:22 188:18
226:24 236:10	writing 6:16	113:3 114:21	189:13,15,17
237:2	31:20 161:6	115:3 120:2,6	190:8 191:4,6
workers 22:14	167:19	120:23,25	191:15,21,25
working 25:5	written 17:2	123:24,25	192:4,8 194:7
153:10 156:22	43:2 47:12	124:3 126:10	198:23 203:6
161:2,10	70:24 82:23	164:10 169:24	205:20 208:11
169:24,25	85:8 86:1,4	171:24 173:25	208:25 210:10
198:5 211:4	87:11 93:14	179:12 181:1,3	226:14 229:5
231:23 265:12	94:13 162:25	183:7 185:24	237:2 243:19
works 39:21	167:22,25	192:21 207:17	243:20 245:15
63:13 162:22	226:20	207:22 212:21	257:10 266:24
163:4	wrong 57:12	217:18,19,22	267:14,17,18
world 30:9	64:9 74:18	222:18 224:17	269:20 270:9
32:24 33:7,24	wrote 65:10	225:9,17 227:4	270:11,24
64:18 113:9	277:4	227:10,23	271:13,13,14
116:3 157:23	X	228:7,12,13	271:18 272:1,2
172:1,3	x 4:1 5:1	229:19 231:12	272:2,3,7,8,8,9
worlds 216:9	146:16 282:23	232:1 235:24	272:9,20,24
worried 160:6	xto 64:5 147:17	236:20	273:3,9,12,12
188:6 223:6,7	xylene 229:24	year 11:5 13:5	274:12 275:21
223:8		26:17 36:20	277:6 278:9,11
worse 40:4	y	58:23 102:2	280:4,6 282:7
worst 37:4	y 9:23 11:14	115:20 117:10	283:1
178:20	26:6 27:11	118:14,16	year's 266:25
worth 134:22	29:1 37:19	121:4,13,14	272:20
252:2 266:20	38:23 40:25	132:4 133:19	yearly 220:9
267:3,3,13	128:2 146:16	137:20 139:13	-

[years - zone]

years 7:22 12:21 16:11,24 18:11 24:5 28:9 33:8 35:16 41:12 52:12,22 55:23 91:11 102:5 109:14 112:21 112:24 120:11 122:20 123:4 130:5,25 132:14 137:22 137:24 138:6 140:4 147:15 148:21,21 153:22 155:22 156:1,9,10 167:2 174:10 178:23 188:11 188:12 189:13 190:12 191:9 194:4 198:15 203:1 205:21 208:7 210:8 223:3 224:1	278:8,15 282:11,19 283:4 yergin 162:25 226:5 yesterday 44:6 44:13 45:10 46:25 47:10 48:8,9 49:3 52:14 53:14,16 53:23 56:6 57:11,14 61:15 63:3 65:10 82:22 94:16 126:2 220:5 yield 277:6,6 young 162:3 z z 9:24,24 146:17 zachary 1:24 zero 45:24 46:1 46:14 65:9 139:19 210:14
156:1,9,10 167:2 174:10 178:23 188:11 188:12 189:13 190:12 191:9 194:4 198:15 203:1 205:21	young 162:3 z z 9:24,24 146:17 zachary 1:24 zero 45:24 46:1 46:14 65:9