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Analytical Report

2/10/2023

Customer:	Occidental Permian Ltd.	Order:	503-4218
Location:	North Hobbs Unit	Received:	2/9/2023
Description:	Samples from Central Tank, North, and West Batteries for Hydrocarbon Analyses	Primary Contact:	Chris Poe

REPORT DISTRIBUTION:

Chris Poe, Richard Sanders

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Pantechs Laboratories, Inc. Order: 503-4218 Order Date: 2/9/2023 Order Description: North Hobbs Unit, Samples from Central Tank, North, and West Batteries for Hydrocarbon Analyses

Sample List						
Fluid	Operator	Location	Site	Sample Point	Date	Time
Gas	Occidental Permian Ltd.	North Hobbs Unit	Central Tank Battery	Gas Leg of Production Separator	2/9/2023	3:41 PM
Gas	Occidental Permian Ltd.	North Hobbs Unit	North Injection Battery	Gas Leg of Production Separator	2/9/2023	3:31 PM
Gas	Occidental Permian Ltd.	North Hobbs Unit	West Injection Battery	Gas Leg of Production Separator	2/9/2023	4:04 PM
Gas	Occidental Permian Ltd.	South Hobbs Unit	Central Tank Battery	Gas Leg of Production Separator	2/9/2023	3:11 PM

No Sample List				
Operator	Location	Site	Sample Point	Comment

Pantechs Laboratories, Inc. - Order: 503-4218 - Order Date: 2/9/2023 Order Description: North Hobbs Unit, Samples from Central Tank, North, and West Batteries for Hydrocarbon Analyses

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SAMPLE ID		COLLECTION DATA	COLLECTION DATA		
Operator	Occidental Permian Ltd.	Pressure	26 psig		
Location	North Hobbs Unit	Sample Temp	N/A		
Site	Central Tank Battery	Atm Temp	45 F		
Site Type	Battery	Collection Date	02/09/2023		
Sample Point	Gas Leg of Production Separator	Collection Time	3:41 PM		
Spot/Comp	Spot	Collection By	Cody Carson		
Meter ID		Pressure Base	14.650 psi		
Purchaser		Temperature Base	60 F		
Fluid	Gas	Container(s)	PL2344		

GPA 2261 Gas Fractional Analysis with Water Vapor

COMPOUND	FORMULA	MOL%	WT%	GPM
NITROGEN	N2	0.056	0.033	0.006
CARBON DIOXIDE	C02	80.489	74.605	13.780
HYDROGEN SULFIDE	H2S	1.281	0.919	0.173
WATER VAPOR	H2O	0.555	0.211	0.032
METHANE	C1	0.484	0.164	0.082
ETHANE	C2	0.391	0.248	0.105
PROPANE	C3	2.653	2.464	0.734
I-BUTANE	iC4	1.657	2.028	0.545
N-BUTANE	nC4	4.715	5.772	1.493
I-PENTANE	iC5	2.289	3.478	0.842
N-PENTANE	nC5	1.769	2.688	0.644
HEXANES PLUS	C6+	3.661	7.390	1.579
TOTALS:		100.000	100.000	20.015

Value of "0.000" in fractional interpreted as below detectable limit. If Onsite H2S testing is performed, its resulting value is used in fractional table

GPA 2172/ASTM D3588 CALCULATED PROPERTIES

WATER CONTENT	BTU/CF	Specific Gr.	Z Factor	Mol Weight	Wobbe IDX
DRY	652.96	1.652	0.990	47.381	508.07
MEASURED WATER	653.42	1.656	0.990	47.481	

Water Vapor

GPM	PPMM	LBS/MMSCF	SAMPLE SATURATED
0.032	5,550.000	264.286	No

Onsite Testing by Stain Tube

METHOD	ТҮРЕ	MEAS VALUE	MOL%	GRAINS/100	PPMV
GPA2377	H2S	1.20 vol%	1.2810	813.46	12,934.0

Mol%, Grains/100, PPMV are pressure and temperature corrected to base conditions. Released to Imaging: 1/28/2025 11:38:17 AM

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SAMPLE ID	SAMPLE ID		l de la constante de
Operator	Occidental Permian Ltd.	Pressure	34 psig
Location	North Hobbs Unit	Sample Temp	N/A
Site	North Injection Battery	Atm Temp	45 F
Site Type	Battery	Collection Date	02/09/2023
Sample Point	Gas Leg of Production Separator	Collection Time	3:31 PM
Spot/Comp	Spot	Collection By	Cody Carson
Meter ID		Pressure Base	14.650 psi
Purchaser		Temperature Base	60 F
Fluid	Gas	Container(s)	PL1003

GPA 2261 Gas Fractional Analysis with Water Vapor

COMPOUND	FORMULA	MOL%	WT%	GPM
NITROGEN	N2	0.065	0.041	0.007
CARBON DIOXIDE	CO2	94.461	92.516	16.121
HYDROGEN SULFIDE	H2S	0.214	0.162	0.029
WATER VAPOR	H20	0.540	0.216	0.031
METHANE	C1	0.083	0.030	0.014
ETHANE	C2	0.132	0.088	0.035
PROPANE	C3	0.839	0.823	0.231
I-BUTANE	iC4	0.397	0.514	0.130
N-BUTANE	nC4	1.096	1.418	0.346
I-PENTANE	iC5	0.452	0.726	0.166
N-PENTANE	nC5	0.388	0.623	0.141
HEXANES PLUS	C6+	1.333	2.843	0.573
TOTALS:		100.000	100.000	17.824

Value of "0.000" in fractional interpreted as below detectable limit. If Onsite H2S testing is performed, its resulting value is used in fractional table

GPA 2172/ASTM D3588 CALCULATED PROPERTIES

WATER CONTENT	BTU/CF	Specific Gr.	Z Factor	Mol Weight	Wobbe IDX
DRY	178.36	1.558	0.993	44.838	142.89
MEASURED WATER	178.67	1.562	0.993	44.935	

<u>Water Vapo</u>r

GPM		PPMM	LBS/MMSCF	SAMPLE SATURATED
	0.031	5,400.000	257.143	No

Onsite Testing by Stain Tube

METHOD	ТҮРЕ	MEAS VALUE	MOL%	GRAINS/100	PPMV
GPA2377	H2S	0.20 vol%	0.2135	135.58	2,155.7

Mol%, Grains/100, PPMV are pressure and temperature corrected to base conditions.

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SAMPLE ID		COLLECTION DATA	
Operator	Occidental Permian Ltd.	Pressure	28 psig
Location	North Hobbs Unit	Sample Temp	N/A
Site	West Injection Battery	Atm Temp	40 F
Site Type	Battery	Collection Date	02/09/2023
Sample Point	Gas Leg of Production Separator	Collection Time	4:04 PM
Spot/Comp	Spot	Collection By	Cody Carson
Meter ID		Pressure Base	14.650 psi
Purchaser		Temperature Base	60 F
Fluid	Gas	Container(s)	PL0245

GPA 2261 Gas Fractional Analysis with Water Vapor

COMPOUND	FORMULA	MOL%	WT%	GPM
NITROGEN	N2	0.048	0.030	0.005
CARBON DIOXIDE	CO2	93.595	92.306	15.972
HYDROGEN SULFIDE	H2S	1.480	1.130	0.200
WATER VAPOR	H20	0.511	0.206	0.029
METHANE	C1	0.487	0.175	0.083
ETHANE	C2	0.185	0.125	0.050
PROPANE	C3	0.623	0.616	0.172
I-BUTANE	iC4	0.219	0.285	0.072
N-BUTANE	nC4	0.645	0.840	0.204
I-PENTANE	iC5	0.435	0.703	0.159
N-PENTANE	nC5	0.417	0.674	0.151
HEXANES PLUS	C6+	1.355	2.910	0.582
TOTALS:		100.000	100.000	17.679

Value of "0.000" in fractional interpreted as below detectable limit. If Onsite H2S testing is performed, its resulting value is used in fractional table

GPA 2172/ASTM D3588 CALCULATED PROPERTIES

WATER CONTENT	BTU/CF	Specific Gr.	Z Factor	Mol Weight	Wobbe IDX
DRY	167.09	1.547	0.993	44.533	134.32
MEASURED WATER	167.38	1.551	0.993	44.625	

<u>Water Vapor</u>

GPM		PPMM	LBS/MMSCF	SAMPLE SATURATED
	0.029	5,110.000	243.333	No

Onsite Testing by Stain Tube

METHOD	ТҮРЕ	MEAS VALUE	MOL%	GRAINS/100	PPMV
GPA2377	H2S	1.40 vol%	1.4797	939.64	14,940.3

Mol%, Grains/100, PPMV are pressure and temperature corrected to base conditions.

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SAMPLE ID		COLLECTION DATA			
Operator	Occidental Permian Ltd.	Pressure	27 psig		
Location	South Hobbs Unit	Sample Temp	N/A		
Site	Central Tank Battery	Atm Temp	50 F		
Site Type	Battery	Collection Date	02/09/2023		
Sample Point	Gas Leg of Production Separator	Collection Time	3:11 PM		
Spot/Comp	Spot	Collection By	Cody Carson		
Meter ID		Pressure Base	14.650 psi		
Purchaser		Temperature Base	60 F		
Fluid	Gas	Container(s)	PL2332		

GPA 2261 Gas Fractional Analysis with Water Vapor

COMPOUND	FORMULA	MOL%	WT%	GPM
NITROGEN	N2	0.056	0.033	0.006
CARBON DIOXIDE	CO2	80.302	74.480	13.748
HYDROGEN SULFIDE	H2S	1.509	1.084	0.204
WATER VAPOR	H20	0.553	0.210	0.032
METHANE	C1	0.483	0.163	0.082
ETHANE	C2	0.390	0.247	0.105
PROPANE	C3	2.647	2.460	0.733
I-BUTANE	iC4	1.653	2.025	0.543
N-BUTANE	nC4	4.705	5.763	1.490
I-PENTANE	iC5	2.284	3.473	0.840
N-PENTANE	nC5	1.765	2.684	0.642
HEXANES PLUS	C6+	3.653	7.378	1.575
TOTALS:		100.000	100.000	20.000

Value of "0.000" in fractional interpreted as below detectable limit. If Onsite H2S testing is performed, its resulting value is used in fractional table

GPA 2172/ASTM D3588 CALCULATED PROPERTIES

WATER CONTENT	BTU/CF	Specific Gr.	Z Factor	Mol Weight	Wobbe IDX
DRY	653.00	1.651	0.990	47.351	508.26
MEASURED WATER	653.46	1.655	0.990	47.450	

<u>Water Vapo</u>r

GPM		PPMM	LBS/MMSCF	SAMPLE SATURATED
	0.032	5,530.000	263.333	No


Onsite Testing by Stain Tube

METHOD	ТҮРЕ	MEAS VALUE	MOL%	GRAINS/100	PPMV
GPA2377	H2S	1.40 vol%	1.5093	958.43	15,239.0

Mol%, Grains/100, PPMV are pressure and temperature corrected to base conditions.

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CO2%	80.94%
HC%	19.06%
Flare Volur	306 mscfd
HC Volume	58.3236 mscfd
CO2 Volum	247.6764 mscfd



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Reason why this event was beyond Operator's control:

The emissions event was caused by the unforeseen, unexpected, sudden, and unavoidable breakdown of equipment or process that was beyond the owner/operator's control, and did not stem from activity that could have been foreseen and avoided, and could not have been avoided by good design, operation, and preventative maintenance practices. It is OXY's policy to route all stranded gas to a flare during an unforeseen and unavoidable emergency or malfunction, in order to minimize emissions as much as possible. Internal OXY compression equipment failure procedures ensure that upon a compressor unit shutdown, a production tech is promptly notified and is instructed to assess the issue as soon as possible in order to take prompt corrective action and minimize emissions. Upon arrival, the Oxy production tech must assess whether compressor shutdown is due to damage and repair is needed, or whether there are other reasons.

In this case, this emissions event was caused by compressor unit LP 4500 malfunctioning due to the compressor unit having a faulty air regulator on the blowdown valve, which caused, the unit to lose air, therefore, triggering a malfunction alarm, and automatically shutting the unit down. Oxy production tech immediately arrived at location and began assessing the situation. Oxy production tech began inspecting the unit for additional issues, and finding none, began to troubleshoot the unit's alarm. Oxy production tech upon determining that the air regulator was faulty, called out for a compressor mechanic to the facility and have it replaced immediately. Compressor mechanic arrived on-site and began troubleshooting the unit. Once the Oxy production tech and compressor mechanic made the necessary adjustments and the air regulator was repaired, the unit's control panel was reset, and the unit was returned to normal working service. The compressor unit was working properly prior to the malfunction occurring. This event was completely out of OXY's control to prevent from occurring but OXY made every effort to control and minimize excess emissions while OXY production techs resolved the issues. Notwithstanding compressor design and operation, compressors are inherently dynamic and alarm triggers, whether true or false, can cause compressors to malfunction and automatically shutdown with warning or advance notice.

2 Steps Taken to limit duration and magnitude of venting or flaring:

It is OXY's policy to route all stranded gas to a flare during an unforeseen and unavoidable emergency or malfunction, in order to minimize emissions as much as possible. In this case, the steps taken to limit duration and magnitude of flaring was for an Oxy production techs to quickly respond to the compressor malfunction alarm, diagnose the issue, and make the necessary call to have a compressor mechanic to come out to the facility. By working together, the compressor mechanic and the Oxy production tech were able to troubleshoot the unit, so that the unit was restarted and returned to normal working service in a safe and diligent manner.

Corrective Actions taken to eliminate the cause and reoccurrence of venting or flaring:

The emissions event was caused by the unforeseen, unexpected, sudden, and unavoidable breakdown of equipment or process that was beyond the owner/operator's control, and did not stem from activity that could have been foreseen and avoided, and could not have been avoided by good design, operation, and preventative maintenance practices. It is OXY's policy to route all stranded gas to a flare during an unforeseen and unavoidable emergency or malfunction, in order to minimize emissions as much as possible. Oxy cannot take any corrective actions to eliminate the cause and potential reoccurrence of compressor malfunctions as notwithstanding proper gas compressor design and operation, various forms of mechanical or technical issues can be sudden, reasonably unforeseeable and unexpected which can cause compressor unit malfunctions to occur without warning or advance notice. Oxy continually strives to maintain and operate its facility equipment in a manner consistent with good practices for minimizing emissions and reducing the number of emission events. The only actions that Oxy can take and handle that is within its control, is to continue with its compression equipment preventative maintenance program for this facility's compression equipment.

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Reason why this event was beyond Operator's control:

The emissions event was caused by the unforeseen, unexpected, sudden, and unavoidable breakdown of equipment or process that was beyond the owner/operator's control, and did not stem from activity that could have been foreseen and avoided, and could not have been avoided by good design, operation, and preventative maintenance practices. It is OXY's policy to route all stranded sales gas to a flare during an unforeseen and unavoidable emergency or malfunction, in order to minimize emissions as much as possible. The flare is regularly monitored to the ensure flame is lit and meeting opacity requirements. Internal OXY compression equipment failure procedures ensure that upon a compressor unit shutdown, a production tech is promptly notified and is instructed to assess the issue as soon as possible in order to take prompt corrective action and minimize emissions. Upon arrival, production tech must assess whether compressor shutdown is due to damage and repair is needed, or whether there are other reasons.


In this case, we lost all 4 compressors due to rate of gas coming into the plant, Pressure building up caused other trains to go down. . We never know when a transmitter will go into default. We called the field to back out gas got the compressors back online as soon as we could.

Steps Taken to limit duration and magnitude of venting or flaring:

It is OXY's policy to route all stranded sales gas to a flare during an unforeseen and unavoidable emergency or malfunction, in order to minimize emissions as much as possible. In this case, the steps taken to limit duration and magnitude of flaring was for Oxy production techs to quickly respond to the compressor alarm, diagnose the issue, and make the necessary calls to seek additional assistance. By working together, Oxy technicians were able to troubleshoot the issue and restart the unit back to normal working service. We called the field to block out gas coming into the plant untill we were able to restart rall 4 compressors

Corrective Actions taken to eliminate the cause and reoccurrence of venting or flaring:

The emissions event was caused by the unforeseen, unexpected, sudden, and unavoidable breakdown of equipment or process that was beyond the owner/operator's control, and did not stem from activity that could have been foreseen and avoided, and could not have been avoided by good design, operation, and preventative maintenance practices. It is OXY's policy to route all stranded sales gas to a flare during an unforeseen and unavoidable emergency or malfunction, in order to minimize emissions as much as possible. Oxy cannot take any corrective actions to eliminate the cause and potential reoccurrence of compressor malfunctions as notwithstanding proper gas compressor design and operation, various forms of mechanical or technical issues can be sudden, reasonably unforeseeable and unexpected which can cause compressor unit malfunctions to occur without warning or advance notice. Oxy continually strives to maintain and operate its facility equipment in a manner consistent with good practices for minimizing emissions and reducing the number of emission events. The only actions that Oxy can take and handle that is within its control, is to continue with its compression equipment preventative maintenance program for this facility's compression equipment.



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The emissions event was caused by the unforeseen, unexpected, sudden, and unavoidable breakdown of equipment or process that was beyond the owner/operator's control, and did not stem from activity that could have been foreseen and avoided, and could not have been avoided by good design, operation, and preventative maintenance practices.

In this case, compressor LP 4500 unit's malfunction occurred due to a suction control valve issue. This sudden and unexpected malfunction occurred as a result of the suction control valve losing communication with the compressor control panel, forcing the suction control valve to stay in an open position, which in turn, pulled the suction psi to a low level, causing the unit's low suction PSI malfunction alarm to occur and automatically shutting the unit down. This event was completely out of OXY's control to prevent from occurring but OXY made every effort to control and minimize excess emissions while an OXY production tech resolved the issue. Notwithstanding compressor station design and operation, compressors are inherently dynamic and even the smallest mechanical issue, whether true or false, can be sudden, reasonably unforeseeable and unexpected which can cause compression malfunctions to occur without warning. The compressor unit was working as designed and operated normally prior to the sudden and without warning malfunction.

Steps Taken to limit duration and magnitude of venting or flaring:

The steps taken to limit duration and magnitude of flaring was for an Oxy production tech to quickly respond to the compressor malfunction alarm and begin inspecting the unit, diagnose the issue, and make the necessary adjustments to restart the unit back to normal working service. It is OXY's policy to route all stranded gas to a flare during an unforeseen and unavoidable emergency or malfunction, in order to minimize emissions as much as possible. Internal procedures ensure that upon compressor unit shutdown, OXY production techs are promptly notified, and are instructed to assess the issue as soon as possible in order to take prompt corrective action and minimize emissions. Upon arrival, an Oxy production tech must assess whether compressor shutdown is due to damage and repair is needed, or whether there are other reasons. In this case, upon immediate arrival to the facility, an Oxy production tech performed a visual inspection of the malfunctioned compressor unit and finding no other cause for issues, simply reset the alarm control panels and restarted the unit to normal working service. As stated before, the compressor unit was working as designed and operated normally prior to the sudden and without warning malfunction.

Corrective Actions taken to eliminate the cause and reoccurrence of venting or flaring:

The emissions event was caused by the unforeseen, unexpected, sudden, and unavoidable breakdown of equipment or process that was beyond the owner/operator's control, and did not stem from activity that could have been foreseen and avoided, and could not have been avoided by good design, operation, and preventative maintenance practices. It is OXY's policy to route all stranded gas to a flare during an unforeseen and unavoidable emergency or malfunction, in order to minimize emissions as much as possible. Oxy cannot take any corrective actions to eliminate the cause and potential reoccurrence of compressor malfunctions due to as notwithstanding proper gas compressor design and operation, various forms of mechanical or technical issues, whether true or false, can be sudden, reasonably unforeseeable and unexpected which can cause compressor unit malfunctions to occur without warning or advance notice. Oxy continually strives to maintain and operate its facility equipment in a manner consistent with good practices for minimizing emissions and reducing the number of emission events. The only actions that Oxy can take and handle that is within its control, is to continue with its compression equipment preventative maintenance program for this facility's compression equipment.

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The emissions event was caused by the unforeseen, unexpected, sudden, and unavoidable breakdown of equipment or process that was beyond the owner/operator's control, and did not stem from activity that could have been foreseen and avoided, and could not have been avoided by good design, operation, and preventative maintenance practices. It is OXY's policy to route all stranded gas to a flare during an unforeseen and unavoidable emergency or malfunction, in order to minimize emissions as much as possible.

In this case, gas compressor LP 4500 unit's malfunction occurred due to a high discharge temperature alarm, which was triggered by the combination of extremely high ambient temperatures and certain engine operating conditions, (despite proper design and operation) causing the compressors to overheat, which in turn prompted the engine's alarm sensor to abruptly shut down the unit to avoid catastrophic damage to the internal engine components. The heat of the day was exceeding 104 degrees at the time the compressor was operating and subsequent malfunction alarm occurred. The compressor unit was working and operating normally prior to the malfunction occurring. This event was completely out of OXY's control to prevent from occurring but OXY made every effort to control and minimize excess emissions while OXY productions resolved the issues. Notwithstanding compressor design and operation, compressors are inherently dynamic and high external ambient temperatures can cause compressors to malfunction and shutdown with warning or advance notice. High external ambient temperatures can decrease the efficiency of the compressor unit coolers to maintain operability temperatures as well as increase the temperatures of the equipment itself from radiant heat. In addition, external high ambient temperatures can also raise the temperature of the incoming gas to the compressors as the radiant heat hits the flowlines the gas is flowing through; which in turn, this metal flowline shall increase the gas temperature, which causes the internal compressor temperature to rise as well. These gas compressors are engineered to shutdown at certain maximum external/internal temperatures in order to avoid catastrophic damage to the compressors.

Steps Taken to limit duration and magnitude of venting or flaring:

It is OXY's policy to route all stranded gas to a flare during an unforeseen and unavoidable emergency or malfunction, in order to minimize emissions as much as possible. Internal procedures ensure that upon compressor unit shutdown, OXY production techs are promptly notified, and are instructed to assess the issue as soon as possible in order to take prompt corrective action and minimize emissions. Upon arrival, an Oxy production tech must assess whether compressor shutdown is due to damage and repair is needed, or whether there are other reasons. In this case, gas compressor LP 4500 unit's malfunction occurred due to a high discharge temperature alarm, which was triggered by the combination of extremely high ambient temperatures and certain engine operating conditions (despite proper design and operation) causing the compressors to overheat, which in turn prompted the engine's alarm sensor to abruptly shut down the unit to avoid catastrophic damage to the internal engine components. The heat of the day was exceeding 104 degrees at the time the compressor malfunction alarm occurred. The steps taken to limit duration and magnitude of flaring was for an Oxy production tech to quickly respond to the compressor malfunction alarm, inspect the unit, diagnose the issue, and make the necessary adjustments to restart the unit back to normal working service.

Corrective Actions taken to eliminate the cause and reoccurrence of venting or flaring:

The emissions event was caused by the unforeseen, unexpected, sudden, and unavoidable breakdown of equipment or process that was beyond the owner/operator's control, and did not stem from activity that could have been foreseen and avoided, and could not have been avoided by good design, operation, and preventative maintenance practices. It is OXY's policy to route all stranded gas to a flare during an unforeseen and unavoidable emergency or malfunction, in order to minimize emissions as much as possible. Oxy cannot take any corrective actions to eliminate the cause and potential reoccurrence of compressor malfunctions due to as notwithstanding proper gas compressor design and operation, various forms of mechanical or technical issues can be sudden, reasonably unforeseeable and unexpected which can cause compressor unit malfunctions to occur without warning or advance notice. Oxy continually strives to maintain and operate its facility equipment in a manner consistent with good practices for minimizing emissions and reducing the number of emission events. The only actions that Oxy can take and handle that is within its control, is to continue with its compression equipment preventative maintenance program for this facility's compression equipment.

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Oxy engages in respectable and good facility operation practices while also maintaining its continuous equipment preventative maintenance program. Internal OXY procedures ensure that upon a gas compressor unit shutdown, production techs are promptly notified via an equipment alarm notification app and are trained to respond immediately in order to assess the issue as soon as possible, so that prompt corrective actions are taken to minimize emissions. Oxy production techs must assess whether a gas compressor unit shutdown is due to damage and repair is needed, or whether there are other reasons for its cause.

In this case, the Oxy production tech determined that the cause of the Toromont compressor was due to a high discharge pressure. Immediate action was taken to reset the control panel and restart the unit. Unfortunately, the compressor unit failed to restart after several attempts, so the Oxy production tech went ahead and started a spare compression unit, to minimize emissions and cease flaring. In addition, Oxy production tech submitted notice to Oxy's internal automation team to troubleshoot the unit as soon as possible.


Steps Taken to limit duration and magnitude of venting or flaring:

It is OXY's policy to route all stranded sales gas to a flare during a sudden, unforeseen and unavoidable emergency or malfunction, in order to minimize emissions as much as possible. The flare at this facility has a 98% combustion efficiency in order to lessen emissions as much as possible. The flare is regularly monitored to the ensure flame is lit and meeting opacity requirements. Notwithstanding compressor engine design and operation, compressors are inherently dynamic and even the smallest alarms, false or true, can be sudden, reasonably unforeseeable and unexpected which can cause compression malfunctions to occur, thereby, triggering the unit's sensors to automatically shut down the unit to avoid catastrophic damage to the internal engine components.

In this case, the steps taken to limit duration and magnitude of flaring was for the Oxy production tech to reset the control panel and restart the unit. Unfortunately, the compressor unit failed to restart after several attempts, so the Oxy production tech went ahead and started a spare compression unit, located on-site, to minimize emissions and cease flaring. In addition, the Oxy production tech submitted notice to Oxy's internal automation team to troubleshoot the unit as soon as possible. Once the spare compression unit was started and working properly, flaring ceased.

Corrective Actions taken to eliminate the cause and reoccurrence of venting or flaring:

This emissions event was caused by the unforeseen, unexpected, sudden, and unavoidable breakdown of equipment or process that was beyond the owner/operator's control, and did not stem from activity that could have been foreseen and avoided, and could not have been avoided or prevented by good design, operation, and preventative maintenance practices. It is OXY's policy to route all stranded sales gas to a flare during a sudden, unforeseen and unavoidable emergency or malfunction, in order to minimize emissions as much as possible. The flare at this facility has a 98% combustion efficiency in order to lessen emissions as much as possible. The flare at this facility has a 98% combustion efficiency in order to lessen emissions as much as possible. The flare is regularly monitored to the ensure flame is lit and meeting opacity requirements. Oxy is limited in the corrective actions available to them to eliminate the cause and potential reoccurrence of compressor malfunctions as notwithstanding proper gas compressor design and operation, various forms of mechanical or technical issues can be sudden, reasonably unforeseeable and unexpected, which can cause compressor unit malfunctions to occur without warning or advance notice. Oxy continually strives to maintain and operate its facility equipment in a manner consistent with good practices for minimizing emissions and reducing the number of emission events. The Toromont compressor unit was working as designed and operated normally prior to the sudden and without warning automatic shutdown of the compressor unit. Oxy has a strong and positive compression equipment preventative maintenance program in place.



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Oxy engages in respectable and good facility operation practices while also maintaining its continuous equipment preventative maintenance program. Internal OXY procedures ensure that upon a gas spike from the field. Production techs are promptly notified via an equipment/flare alarm notification app and are trained to respond immediately in order to assess the issue as soon as possible, so that prompt corrective actions are taken to minimize emissions. Oxy production techs must assess whether a Gas spike causing to flare is due to damage and repair is needed, or whether there are other reasons for its cause.

In this case, the Oxy production tech determined that the cause of the compressor shutting down on a highliquid levelwas due to a inlet rate caused by the Field shutting in wells to do a tie in at VRU. When they were done with the tie-in , they brought back gas to South Hobbs RCF, This caused our compressor to have liquid in the 2nd stage scrubber . We were able to get 1 compressor up and running while B train Compressor was being drain from the 2nd stage scrubber , we also had trouble with 2nd stage had liquids. So it took several tries to get it up

Steps Taken to limit duration and magnitude of venting or flaring:

It is OXY's policy to route all stranded sales gas to a flare during a sudden, unforeseen and unavoidable emergency or malfunction, in order to minimize emissions as much as possible. The flare at this facility has a 98% combustion efficiency in order to lessen emissions as much as possible. The flare is regularly monitored to the ensure flame is lit and meeting opacity requirements. Notwithstanding compressor engine design and operation, compressors are inherently dynamic and even the smallest alarms, false or true, can be sudden, reasonably unforeseeable and unexpected which can cause compression malfunctions to occur, thereby, triggering the unit's sensors to automatically shut down the unit to avoid catastrophic damage to the internal engine components.

In this case, the steps taken to limit duration and magnitude of flaring was for the Oxy production tech to reset the control panel and restart the unit. Unfortunately, the compressor unit failed to restart after several attempts, so the Oxy production tech went ahead and started a spare compression unit, located on-site, to minimize emissions and cease flaring.

Corrective Actions taken to eliminate the cause and reoccurrence of venting or flaring:

This emissions event was caused by the unforeseen, unexpected, sudden, and unavoidable breakdown of equipment or process that was beyond the owner/operator's control, and did not stem from activity that could have been foreseen and avoided, and could not have been avoided or prevented by good design, operation, and preventative maintenance practices. It is OXY's policy to route all stranded sales gas to a flare during a sudden, unforeseen and unavoidable emergency or malfunction, in order to minimize emissions as much as possible. The flare at this facility has a 98% combustion efficiency in order to lessen emissions as much as possible. The flare is regularly monitored to the ensure flame is lit and meeting opacity requirements. Oxy is limited in the corrective

actions available to them to eliminate the cause and potential reoccurrence of compressor malfunctions as notwithstanding proper gas compressor design and operation, various forms of mechanical or technical issues can be sudden, reasonably unforeseeable and unexpected, which can cause compressor unit malfunctions to occur without warning or advance notice. Oxy continually strives to maintain and operate its facility equipment in a manner consistent with good practices for minimizing emissions and reducing the number of emission events. The Toromont compressor unit was working as designed and operated normally prior to the sudden and without warning automatic shutdown of the compressor unit. Oxy has a strong and positive compression equipment preventative maintenance program in place.

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Oxy engages in respectable and good facility operation practices while also maintaining its continuous equipment preventative maintenance program. Internal OXY procedures ensure that upon a gas compressor unit shutdown, production techs are promptly notified via an equipment alarm notification app and are trained to respond immediately in order to assess the issue as soon as possible, so that prompt corrective actions are taken to minimize emissions. Oxy production techs must assess whether a gas compressor unit shutdown is due to damage and repair is needed, or whether there are other reasons for its cause.

In this case, this facility is an unmanned location and therefore, the Oxy production tech, upon receiving the malfunction alarm for the North Hobbs Unit CTB, quickly drove to the facility from another distant facility location. Upon the production tech's arrival, the immediate steps taken was to check the lube oil level and inspect the unit for additional potential issues. The Oxy production tech determined that the cause of the Toromont compressor was due to a low lube oil differrential pressure. The Oxy production tech continued to troubleshoot the compressor and found that the coupler to the lube pump needed to be addressed. After all repiars were made the Toromont compressor unit was working as designed and operated normally prior to the sudden and without warning automatic shutdown of the compressor unit.

Steps Taken to limit duration and magnitude of venting or flaring:

It is OXY's policy to route all stranded sales gas to a flare during a sudden, unforeseen and unavoidable emergency or malfunction, in order to minimize emissions as much as possible. The flare at this facility has a 98% combustion efficiency in order to lessen emissions as much as possible. The flare is regularly monitored to the ensure flame is lit and meeting opacity requirements. In this case, the immediate steps taken to limit duration and magnitude of flaring was for the Oxy production tech, upon his arrival to the facility from another distant facility, was to check the lube oil level and inspect the compressor unit for additional potential issues. The Oxy production tech determined that the cause of the Toromont compressor was due to a low lube oil level sensor. The Oxy production tech reset the control panel and restarted the unit. The Toromont compressor unit was working as designed and operated normally prior to the sudden and without warning automatic shutdown of the compressor unit. Flaring ceased as soon as the compressor unit was up to normal working condition and speed.

Corrective Actions taken to eliminate the cause and reoccurrence of venting or flaring:

This emissions event was caused by the unforeseen, unexpected, sudden, and unavoidable breakdown of equipment or process that was beyond the owner/operator's control, and did not stem from activity that could have been foreseen and avoided, and could not have been avoided or prevented by good design, operation, and preventative maintenance practices. It is OXY's policy to route all stranded sales gas to a flare during a sudden, unforeseen and unavoidable emergency or malfunction, in order to minimize emissions as much as possible. The flare at this facility has a 98% combustion efficiency in order to lessen emissions as much as possible. The flare is regularly monitored to the ensure flame is lit and meeting opacity requirements. Oxy is limited in the corrective actions available to them to eliminate the cause and potential reoccurrence of compressor malfunctions as notwithstanding compressor engine design and operation, compressors are inherently dynamic and even the smallest alarms, false or true, can be sudden, reasonably unforeseeable and unexpected which can cause compression malfunctions to occur, thereby, triggering the unit's sensors to automatically shut down the unit to avoid catastrophic damage to the internal engine components. Oxy continually strives to maintain and operate its facility equipment in a manner consistent with good practices for minimizing emissions and reducing the number of emission events. The Toromont compressor unit was working as designed and operated normally prior to the sudden and without warning automatic shutdown of the compressor unit. Oxy has a strong and positive compression equipment preventative maintenance program in place.

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The emissions event was caused by the unforeseen, unexpected, sudden, and unavoidable breakdown of equipment or process that was beyond the owner/operator's control, and did not stem from activity that could have been foreseen and avoided, and could not have been avoided by good design, operation, and preventative maintenance practices. In this case, compressor LP 4500 unit's malfunction occurred due to a false discharge temperature reading, which caused the unit to automatically shut down. All OXY operations and facility equipment were running at maximized optimization prior to the malfunction which prompted the compressor unit to shut down. The facility and all its equipment were working as designed and operated normally prior to the sudden and without warning malfunction.

Steps Taken to limit duration and magnitude of venting or flaring:

The steps taken to limit duration and magnitude of flaring was for an Oxy production tech to quickly respond to the compressor malfunction alarm and begin inspecting the unit, diagnose the issue, and make the necessary adjustments to restart the unit back to normal working service. It is OXY's policy to route all stranded gas to a flare during an unforeseen and unavoidable emergency or malfunction, in order to minimize emissions as much as possible. Internal procedures ensure that upon compressor unit shutdown, OXY production techs are promptly notified, and are instructed to assess the issue as soon as possible in order to take prompt corrective action and minimize emissions. Upon arrival, an Oxy production tech must assess whether compressor shutdown is due to damage and repair is needed, or whether there are other reasons. In this case, the Oxy production tech was on-site when the malfunction occurred, as this is normally an unmanned facility. The Oxy production tech performed a visual inspection of the malfunctioned compressor unit and finding no other cause for issues, simply restarted the unit to normal working service. The facility and all its equipment were working as designed and operated normally prior to the sudden and without warning malfunction. Flaring ceased within minutes of the facility and its compression equipment working as designed and operating normally.

Corrective Actions taken to eliminate the cause and reoccurrence of venting or flaring:

Oxy is limited in the corrective actions available to them to eliminate the cause and potential reoccurrence of compressor malfunctions as notwithstanding compressor engine design and operation, compressors are inherently dynamic and even the smallest alarms, false or true, can be sudden, reasonably unforeseeable and unexpected which can cause compression malfunctions to occur, thereby, triggering the unit's sensors to automatically shut down the unit to avoid catastrophic damage to the internal engine components. Oxy continually strives to maintain and operate its facility and its equipment in a manner consistent with good practices for minimizing emissions and reducing the number of emission events. The only actions that Oxy can take and handle that is within its control, is to continue with its preventative maintenance program for this facility and its compression equipment.

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Reason why this event was beyond Operator's control:

The emissions event was caused by the unforeseen, unexpected, sudden, and unavoidable breakdown of equipment or process that was beyond the owner/operator's control, and did not stem from activity that could have been foreseen and avoided, and could not have been avoided by good design, operation, and preventative maintenance practices. This gas compressor is engineered to shutdown at a certain maximum speeds, temperature and pressure capacity in order to avoid both catastrophic damage to the compressor. In this case, compressor LP 4500 unit's malfunction occurred due to extreme freezing weather conditions, at or below zero degrees, which caused the unit to automatically shut down. The facility equipment and the unit itself, was insulated and heat traced in advance, as part of Oxy's winter weather preparations. All OXY operations and facility equipment were running at maximized optimization prior to the malfunction which prompted the compressor unit to shut down. The facility and all its equipment were working as designed and operated normally prior to the sudden and without warning malfunction.

Steps Taken to limit duration and magnitude of venting or flaring:

The steps taken to limit duration and magnitude of flaring was for an Oxy production tech to quickly respond to the compressor malfunction alarm and begin inspecting the unit, diagnose the issue, and make the necessary adjustments to restart the unit back to normal working service. It is OXY's policy to route all stranded gas to a flare during an unforeseen and unavoidable emergency or malfunction, in order to minimize emissions as much as possible. Internal procedures ensure that upon compressor unit shutdown, OXY production techs are promptly notified, and are instructed to assess the issue as soon as possible in order to take prompt corrective action and minimize emissions. Upon arrival, an Oxy production tech must assess whether compressor shutdown is due to damage and repair is needed, or whether there are other reasons. In this case, due the extreme weather conditions, it did take some time for field personnel to arrive at this facility, as this is an unmanned facility. Upon arrival, the Oxy production techs performed a visual inspection of the malfunctioned compressor unit and finding no other cause for issues, simply attempted to restart the compression unit, but the unit would not restart. After multiple attempts, the Oxy production techs shut it the wells to the facility and shut the facility down until weather conditions improved.

Corrective Actions taken to eliminate the cause and reoccurrence of venting or flaring:

Oxy is limited in the corrective actions available to them to eliminate the cause and potential reoccurrence of compressor malfunctions as notwithstanding compressor engine design and operation, compressors are inherently dynamic and even the smallest alarms, false or true, can be sudden, reasonably unforeseeable and unexpected which can cause compression malfunctions to occur, thereby, triggering the unit's sensors to automatically shut down the unit to avoid catastrophic damage to the internal engine components. Oxy continually strives to maintain and operate its facility and its equipment in a manner consistent with good practices for minimizing emissions and reducing the number of emission events. The only actions that Oxy can take and handle that is within its control, is to continue with its preventative maintenance program for this facility and its compression equipment.

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Reason why this event was beyond Operator's control:

The emissions event was caused by the unforeseen, unexpected, sudden, and unavoidable breakdown of equipment or process that was beyond the owner/operator's control, and did not stem from activity that could have been foreseen and avoided, and could not have been avoided by good design, operation, and preventative maintenance practices. In this case, compressor LP 4500 unit's malfunction occurred due to the lube oil pump failing, which caused the unit to automatically shut down. All OXY operations and facility equipment were running at maximized optimization prior to the malfunction which prompted the compressor unit to shut down. The facility and all its equipment were working as designed and operated normally prior to the sudden and without warning malfunction.

Steps Taken to limit duration and magnitude of venting or flaring:

The steps taken to limit duration and magnitude of flaring was for an Oxy production tech to quickly respond to the compressor malfunction alarm and begin inspecting the unit, diagnose the issue, and make the necessary adjustments to restart the unit back to normal working service. It is OXY's policy to route all stranded gas to a flare during an unforeseen and unavoidable emergency or malfunction, in order to minimize emissions as much as possible. Internal procedures ensure that upon compressor unit shutdown, OXY production techs are promptly notified, and are instructed to assess the issue as soon as possible in order to take prompt corrective action and minimize emissions. Upon arrival, an Oxy production tech must assess whether compressor shutdown is due to damage and repair is needed, or whether there are other reasons. In this case, the Oxy production tech arrived from another facility rather quickly, as this an unmanned facility and performed a visual inspection of the malfunctioned compressor unit and finding that the lube oil pump failed, quickly replaced the part, and called for a maintenance tech to come out and check the unit out. The unit was restarted and returned to normal working operations. The facility and all its equipment were working as designed and operated normally prior to the sudden and without warning malfunction.

Corrective Actions taken to eliminate the cause and reoccurrence of venting or flaring:

Oxy is limited in the corrective actions available to them to eliminate the cause and potential reoccurrence of compressor malfunctions as notwithstanding compressor engine design and operation, compressors are inherently dynamic and even the smallest alarms, false or true, can be sudden, reasonably unforeseeable and unexpected which can cause compression malfunctions to occur, thereby, triggering the unit's sensors to automatically shut down the unit to avoid catastrophic damage to the internal engine components. Oxy continually strives to maintain and operate its facility and its equipment in a manner consistent with good practices for minimizing emissions and reducing the number of emission events. The only actions that Oxy can take and handle that is within its control, is to continue with its preventative maintenance program for this facility and its compression equipment.

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Reason why this event was beyond Operator's control:

The emissions event was caused by the unforeseen, unexpected, sudden, and unavoidable breakdown of equipment or process that was beyond the owner/operator's control, and did not stem from activity that could have been foreseen and avoided, and could not have been avoided by good design, operation, and preventative maintenance practices. In this case, compressor LP 4500 unit's malfunction occurred due to a facility power shutdown caused by an extreme weather-related storm. All OXY operations and facility equipment were running at maximized optimization prior to the shutdown occurring due to strong weather-related storms which triggered a facility power loss and prompting the compressor unit to shutdown. This event was completely out of OXY's control to prevent from occurring as Oxy cannot predict or anticipate how extraordinary, extreme, and/or overwhelmingly violent weather conditions can get but OXY made every effort to control and minimize flaring when those weather conditions are concluded and/or are no longer in effect. The facility and all its equipment were working as designed and operated normally prior to the sudden and without warning malfunction triggered by an extreme weather-related storm.

Steps Taken to limit duration and magnitude of venting or flaring:

The steps taken to limit duration and magnitude of flaring was for an Oxy production tech to quickly respond to the compressor malfunction alarm and begin inspecting the unit, diagnose the issue, and make the necessary adjustments to restart the unit back to normal working service. It is OXY's policy to route all stranded gas to a flare during an unforeseen and unavoidable emergency or malfunction, in order to minimize emissions as much as possible. Internal procedures ensure that upon compressor unit shutdown, OXY production techs are promptly notified, and are instructed to assess the issue as soon as possible in order to take prompt corrective action and minimize emissions. Upon arrival, an Oxy production tech must assess whether compressor shutdown is due to damage and repair is needed, or whether there are other reasons. In this case, upon the Oxy production tech's immediate arrival to the facility, he could see the entire facility was shutdown, and no power to the facility could be visually seen. The Oxy production tech, for his safety and per Oxy's work safe environment protocols, had to wait until the extreme violent nature of the weather storm had passed and/or stopped due to the intensity of the storm, at the time of his arrival to the facility. Once the storm had passed, and power was restored to the facility, the Oxy production tech performed a visual inspection of the

malfunctioned compressor unit and finding no other cause for issues, simply restarted the unit to normal working service. The facility and all its equipment were working as designed and operated normally prior to the sudden and without warning malfunction triggered by an extreme weather-related storm. Flaring ceased within minutes of the facility and its compression equipment working as designed and operating normally.

Corrective Actions taken to eliminate the cause and reoccurrence of venting or flaring:

The emissions event was caused by the unforeseen, unexpected, sudden, and unavoidable breakdown of equipment or process that was beyond the owner/operator's control, and did not stem from activity that could have been foreseen and avoided, and could not have been avoided by good design, operation, and preventative maintenance practices. It is OXY's policy to route all stranded gas to a flare during an unforeseen and unavoidable emergency or malfunction, in order to minimize emissions as much as possible. Oxy cannot take any corrective actions to eliminate the cause and potential reoccurrence of compressor malfunctions or facility shutdowns due to extreme weather-related conditions, affecting power usage, facility operations, etc. Oxy cannot predict or anticipate how extraordinary, extreme, and/or overwhelmingly violent weather conditions are concluded and/or are no longer in effect. Oxy continually strives to maintain and operate its facility and its equipment in a manner consistent with good practices for minimizing emissions and reducing the number of emission events. The only actions that Oxy can take and handle that is within its control, is to continue with its preventative maintenance program for this facility and its compression equipment.

General Information Phone: (505) 629-6116

Online Phone Directory https://www.emnrd.nm.gov/ocd/contact-us

State of New Mexico Energy, Minerals and Natural Resources Oil Conservation Division 1220 S. St Francis Dr. Santa Fe, NM 87505

DEFINITIONS

Operator:	OGRID:
OCCIDENTAL PERMIAN LTD	157984
P.O. Box 4294	Action Number:
Houston, TX 772104294	425743
	Action Type:
	[C-129] Venting and/or Flaring (C-129)

DEFINITIONS

For the sake of brevity and completeness, please allow for the following in all groups of questions and for the rest of this application:

- this application's operator, hereinafter "this operator";
- venting and/or flaring, hereinafter "vent or flare";
- any notification or report(s) of the C-129 form family, hereinafter "any C-129 forms";
- the statements in (and/or attached to) this, hereinafter "the statements in this";
- and the past tense will be used in lieu of mixed past/present tense questions and statements.

DEFINITIONS

Action 425743

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State of New Mexico Energy, Minerals and Natural Resources Oil Conservation Division 1220 S. St Francis Dr. Santa Fe, NM 87505

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QUESTIONS

Action 425743

QUESTIONS		
	OGRID:	
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OCCIDENTAL PERMIAN LTD	157984
P.O. Box 4294	Action Number:
Houston, TX 772104294	425743
	Action Type:
	[C-129] Venting and/or Flaring (C-129)

QUESTIONS

Operator:

Prerequisites	
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Incident Well	Unavailable.
Incident Facility	[fJXK1521644806] North Hobbs Unit CTB

Determination of Reporting Requirements

Answer all questions that apply. The Reason(s) statements are calculated based on your answers and may provide addional guidance.	
Was this vent or flare caused by an emergency or malfunction	Yes
Did this vent or flare last eight hours or more cumulatively within any 24-hour period from a single event	No
Is this considered a submission for a vent or flare event	Yes, minor venting and/or flaring of natural gas.
An operator shall file a form C-141 instead of a form C-129 for a release that, includes liquid during ve Was there at least 50 MCF of natural gas vented and/or flared during this event	enting and/or flaring that is or may be a major or minor release under 19.15.29.7 NMAC. Yes
Did this vent or flare result in the release of ANY liquids (not fully and/or completely flared) that reached (or has a chance of reaching) the ground, a surface, a watercourse, or otherwise, with reasonable probability, endanger public health, the environment or fresh water	Νο
Was the vent or flare within an incorporated municipal boundary or withing 300 feet from an occupied permanent residence, school, hospital, institution or church in existence	Νο

Equipment Involved	
Primary Equipment Involved	Producing Well
Additional details for Equipment Involved. Please specify	Suction scrubber froze

Representative Compositional Analysis of Vented or Flared Natural Gas		
Please provide the mole percent for the percentage questions in this group.		
Methane (CH4) percentage	0	
Nitrogen (N2) percentage, if greater than one percent	0	
Hydrogen Sulfide (H2S) PPM, rounded up	12,180	
Carbon Dioxide (C02) percentage, if greater than one percent	80	
Oxygen (02) percentage, if greater than one percent	0	
If you are venting and/or flaring because of Pipeline Specification, please provide the required specifications for each gas.		
Methane (CH4) percentage quality requirement	Not answered.	
Nitrogen (N2) percentage quality requirement	Not answered.	
Hydrogen Sufide (H2S) PPM quality requirement	Not answered.	
Carbon Dioxide (C02) percentage quality requirement	Not answered.	
Oxygen (02) percentage quality requirement	Not answered.	

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State of New Mexico Energy, Minerals and Natural Resources Oil Conservation Division 1220 S. St Francis Dr. Santa Fe, NM 87505

QUESTIONS, Page 2

Action 425743

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QUESTIONS (continued)

Operator:	OGRID:	
OCCIDENTAL PERMIAN LTD	157984	
P.O. Box 4294	Action Number:	
Houston, TX 772104294	425743	
	Action Type:	
	[C-129] Venting and/or Flaring (C-129)	

QUESTIONS

Date(s) and Time(s)	
Date vent or flare was discovered or commenced	01/19/2025
Time vent or flare was discovered or commenced	03:20 AM
Time vent or flare was terminated	07:46 AM
Cumulative hours during this event	4

Measured or Estimated Volume of Vented or Flared Natural Gas	
Natural Gas Vented (Mcf) Details	Not answered.
Natural Gas Flared (Mcf) Details	Cause: Freeze Gas Compressor Station Natural Gas Flared Released: 58 Mcf Recovered: 0 Mcf Lost: 58 Mcf.
Other Released Details	Cause: Freeze Gas Compressor Station Carbon Dioxide Released: 248 Mcf Recovered: 0 Mcf Lost: 248 Mcf.
Additional details for Measured or Estimated Volume(s). Please specify	Not answered.
Is this a gas only submission (i.e. only significant Mcf values reported)	Yes, according to supplied volumes this appears to be a "gas only" report.

Venting or Flaring Resulting from Downstream Activity	
Was this vent or flare a result of downstream activity	No
Was notification of downstream activity received by this operator	Not answered.
Downstream OGRID that should have notified this operator	Not answered.
Date notified of downstream activity requiring this vent or flare	Not answered.
Time notified of downstream activity requiring this vent or flare	Not answered.

teps and Actions to Prevent Waste		
For this event, this operator could not have reasonably anticipated the current event and it was beyond this operator's control.	True	
Please explain reason for why this event was beyond this operator's control	The emissions event was caused by the unforeseen, unexpected, sudden, and unavoidable breakdown of equipment or process that was beyond the owner/operator's control, and did not stem from activity that could have been foreseen and avoided, and could not have been avoided by good design, operation, and preventative maintenance practices. This gas compressor is engineered to shutdown at a certain maximum speeds, temperature and pressure capacity in order to avoid both catastrophic damage to the compressor. In this case, compressor LP 4500 unit's malfunction occurred due to extreme freezing weather conditions, at or below zero degrees, which caused the unit to automatically shut down. The facility equipment and the unit itself were insulated and heat traced in advance, as part of Oxy's winter weather preparations. All OXY operations and facility equipment were running at maximized optimization prior to the malfunction which prompted the compressor unit to shut down. The facility and all its equipment were working as designed and operated normally prior to the sudden and without warning malfunction.	
	The steps taken to limit duration and magnitude of flaring was for an Oxy production tech to quickly respond to the compressor malfunction alarm and begin inspecting the unit, diagnose the issue, and make the necessary adjustments to restart the unit back to normal working service. It is OXY's policy to route all stranded gas to a flare during an unforeseen and unavoidable emergency or malfunction, in order to minimize emissions as much as possible. Internal procedures ensure that upon compressor unit shutdown, OXY production techs are promptly notified, and are instructed to assess the issue as soon as possible in	

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Steps taken to limit the duration and magnitude of vent or flare	order to take prompt corrective action and minimize emissions. Upon arrival, an Oxy production tech must assess whether compressor shutdown is due to damage and repair is needed, or whether there are other reasons. In this case, due the extreme weather conditions, it did take some time for field personnel to arrive at this facility, as this is an unmanned facility. Upon arrival, the Oxy production techs performed a visual inspection of the malfunctioned compressor unit and finding no other cause for issues, simply attempted to restart the compression unit, but the unit would not restart. After multiple attempts, the Oxy production techs shut it the wells to the facility and shut the facility down until weather conditions improved.
Corrective actions taken to eliminate the cause and reoccurrence of vent or flare	Oxy is limited in the corrective actions available to them to eliminate the cause and potential reoccurrence of compressor malfunctions as notwithstanding compressor engine design and operation, compressors are inherently dynamic and even the smallest alarms, false or true, can be sudden, reasonably unforeseeable and unexpected which can cause compression malfunctions to occur, thereby, triggering the unit's sensors to automatically shut down the unit to avoid catastrophic damage to the internal engine components. Oxy continually strives to maintain and operate its facility and its equipment in a manner consistent with good practices for minimizing emissions and reducing the number of emission events. The only actions that Oxy can take and handle that is within its control, is to continue with its preventative maintenance program for this facility and its compression equipment.

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ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

Action 425743

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ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

Operator:	OGRID:
OCCIDENTAL PERMIAN LTD	157984
P.O. Box 4294	Action Number:
Houston, TX 772104294	425743
	Action Type:
	[C-129] Venting and/or Flaring (C-129)

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

N	I acknowledge that I am authorized to submit a Venting and/or Flaring (C-129) report on behalf of this operator and understand that this report can be a complete C-129 submission per 19.15.27.8 and 19.15.28.8 NMAC.		
<	l acknowledge that upon submitting this application, I will be creating a new incident file (assigned to this operator) to track any C-129 forms, pursuant to 19.15.27.7 and 19.15.28.8 NMAC and understand that this submission meets the notification requirements of Paragraph (1) of Subsection G and F respectively.		
V	I hereby certify the statements in this report are true and correct to the best of my knowledge and acknowledge that any false statement may be subject to civil and criminal penalties under the Oil and Gas Act.		
V	I acknowledge that the acceptance of any C-129 forms by the OCD does not relieve this operator of liability should their operations have failed to adequately investigate, report, and remediate contamination that poses a threat to groundwater, surface water, human health, or the environment.		
V	I acknowledge that OCD acceptance of any C-129 forms does not relieve this operator of responsibility for compliance with any other applicable federal, state, or local laws and/or regulations.		

General Information Phone: (505) 629-6116

CONDITIONS

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State of New Mexico Energy, Minerals and Natural Resources Oil Conservation Division 1220 S. St Francis Dr. Santa Fe, NM 87505

CONDITIONS

Operator:	OGRID:
OCCIDENTAL PERMIAN LTD	157984
P.O. Box 4294	Action Number:
Houston, TX 772104294	425743
	Action Type:
	[C-129] Venting and/or Flaring (C-129)

Created By	Condition	Condition Date
srojas	If the information provided in this report requires an amendment, submit a [C-129] Amend Venting and/or Flaring Incident (C-129A), utilizing your incident number from this event.	1/28/2025

CONDITIONS

Action 425743