

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF SAN JUAN COUNTY

STATE OF NEW MEXICO

EL PASO NATURAL GAS COMPANY,
a corporation, PAN AMERICAN
PETROLEUM CORPORATION, a
corporation, MARATHON OIL COMPANY,
a corporation, SOUTHWEST PRODUCTION
COMPANY, a partnership, and SUNSET
INTERNATIONAL PETROLEUM CORPORA-
TION, a corporation,

Petitioners,

vs.

OIL CONSERVATION COMMISSION OF
NEW MEXICO, JACK M. CAMPBELL,
Chairman, E. S. WALKER, Member,
A. L. PORTER, JR., Member and
Secretary, CONSOLIDATED OIL & GAS,
INC., a corporation,

Respondents.

No. 11,685

TRIAL BRIEF OF PETITIONERS

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INDEX TO BRIEF

	<u>Page</u>
INDEX TO BRIEF	i
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES	ii
STATEMENT OF THE CASE	1
POINTS RELIED ON BY PETITIONERS ON PETITION FOR REVIEW	15
ARGUMENT AND AUTHORITIES	16
CONCLUSION.	49

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

<u>Cases Cited:</u>	<u>Page</u>
American Jurisprudence 2d, Administrative Law, §691.	36, 37
Chiordi v. Jernigan, 46 N.M. 396, 129 P. 2d 640 (1942).	36, 37
Continental Oil Company, et al. v. Oil Conservation Commission, et al., 70 N.M. 310, 373 P. 2d 809 (1962).	17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 25, 26, 27, 29, 36, 49
Ferguson-Steere Motor Co. v. State Corporation Commission, 63 N.M. 137, 314 P. 2d 894 (1957).	36, 48
New Mexico Statutes Annotated, 1953 Compilation:	
Sec. 65-3-10	33
Sec. 65-3-14(a).	26, 33
Sec. 65-3-29(h)	24, 33
Opp Cotton Mills v. Administrator, 312 U.S. 126, 61 S. Ct. 524, 185 L. Ed. 624 (1941). . . .	27
Sims v. Mechem, 72 N.M. 186, 382 P. 2d 183 (1963).	21, 22, 25, 49

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

This is an appeal from Order No. R-2259-B entered by the New Mexico Oil Conservation Commission in Case No. 2504 which radically changed the original gas proration formula for the Basin Dakota Gas Pool. That formula had been promulgated when prorating of production from the pool was begun and had been in effect for approximately thirty-two months. During that period some 640* producing Basin Dakota wells had been drilled and completed in reliance upon the formula and the order which promulgated it.

The Basin Dakota Pool includes all of the known productive areas of the Dakota Formation lying in San Juan, Rio Arriba and Sandoval Counties, New Mexico. Petitioners are the operators of some 283 producing gas wells in the Basin-Dakota Gas Pool. Respondent Consolidated Oil and Gas, Inc. (Consolidated), Intervenors Texaco, Inc., and Sunray D-X Oil Company, who have intervened herein on the side of Consolidated, and Tidewater Oil Company which has attempted to intervene, operate a total of approximately 50 wells in this pool. During the course of the hearings and rehearings on the change of formula, thirteen (13) individuals or companies operating in the aggregate approximately one hundred eleven (111) of the wells in the Basin Dakota Pool supported a change in the proration formula, while fourteen (14) individuals or companies operating in the aggregate approximately four hundred forty-two (442) wells in the Basin Dakota Pool opposed the change and supported the existing formula.

* On January 1, 1961, there were 301 wells in the Basin Dakota (Tr. 499). On February 14, 1963, (the date of the Rehearing) there were 941. Thus, (Rehearing Tr. 144) between November 4, 1960, and July 9, 1963, at least 640 new wells were drilled and completed.

In order to prevent production from the Basin Dakota Gas Pool in excess of market demand, the Commission by its Order R-1670-C, entered Nov. 4, 1960, restricted the production from the pool, and prorated the allowable production among the various wells in the pool using for this purpose a proration formula set out in the Order. The pool has been developed on 320-acre spacing; that is to say, that the Rules and Regulations of the Commission authorize, with some degree of acreage tolerance, one gas well for each 320 surface acres, the acreage attributable to each well being sometimes referred to as a "spacing unit" or "proration unit". Those wells incapable of delivering their allowable production are classified as marginal wells, and the spacing or proration units attributable to such wells are referred to as "marginal tracts". Wells capable of delivering their allowable are classified as non-marginal wells, and the spacing or proration units attributable thereto are referred to as "non-marginal tracts". Marginal wells are permitted to produce to the extent of their capacity, and such marginal allocation is deducted from the total pool demand before application of the proration formula to the non-marginal wells.

Upon notice and after hearing on October 13, 1960, the Commission promulgated its Order No. R-1670-C establishing what is known as the "25-75 formula" for the allocation of allowable production from the Basin Dakota Gas Pool. It did so by adopting Rule 9 (c) of

the General Rules applicable to the other prorated gas pools in Northwest New Mexico. The effect of this order was to allocate 25% of the allowable gas production among the non-marginal wells on the basis of the acreage factor of each well. This factor reflects the amount of acreage attributable to the well, as compared to the standard unit of 320 acres. The remaining 75% of the non-marginal well allowable of the pool was distributed on the basis of the acreage factor multiplied by the deliverability of the gas well.

Approximately 16 months and 372 development wells after publication of the Order establishing this 25-75 formula, (Tr. 500), Consolidated made application to change the formula and allocate 60% of the allowable to the non-marginal wells on the basis of the acreage factor and 40% on the basis of the acreage factor multiplied by the deliverability of the well (referred to as the "60-40 formula"). This application was denied by the Commission after a protracted hearing. Thereafter, on application by Consolidated, a rehearing was granted, a further hearing was held, and by Order No. R-2259-B the 25-75 formula was changed to the 60-40 formula, to be effective August 1, 1963. Petitioners, believing this order to be unlawful and invalid for the reasons herein stated, have asked this Court for review of the Commission's action.

A chronological table of the several applications, hearings, orders and petitions follows:

October 13, 1960

Original Hearing on Basin Dakota

November 4, 1960	Order No. R-1670-C (effective February 1, 1961) (establishing 25-75 formula)
February 23, 1962	Consolidated's Original Application (requesting 60-40 formula)
April 18-21, 1962	Hearing on Consolidated's Original Application
June 7, 1962	Order No. R-2259 (denying Consolidated's application)
June 27, 1962	Consolidated's Application for Rehearing
July 7, 1962	Order No. R-2259-A (granting rehearing)
February 4, 1963	Rehearing
July 9, 1963	Order No. R-2259-B (effective August 1, 1963)(changing formula from 25-75 to 60-40-entered July 9, although dated July 3)
July 26, 1963	Petitioners' Application for Rehearing
August 1, 1963	Order R-2259-C (denying Petitioners' application for rehearing)
August 20, 1963	Petition for Review filed in District Court
August 22, 1963	Notice of Appeal filed in District Court of San Juan County

The parties are in agreement that the Basin Dakota Pool should be prorated. It is conceded by all parties that allocations of allowable

production to the non-marginal wells in the pool must meet the requirements of Sec. 65-3-14(a), NMSA, 1953, and therefore, so far as it is practicable to do so, must afford to the owner of each non-marginal tract in the pool "the opportunity to produce his just and equitable share of the gas... in the pool, being an amount, so far as can be practically determined, and so far as such can be practicably obtained without waste, substantially in the proportion that the quantity of the recoverable... gas... under such property bears to the total recoverable... gas... in the pool....". (Tr. 99, 400, 410, 524; Rehearing Tr. 16-19, 21, 28, 39).

Attached to the Commission's Order No. R-2259-B changing the proration formula from 25-75 to 60-40 is Commission Exhibit "A". Since the Commission's Findings and Order are largely based on the statistical data for each of the 699 non-marginal wells contained in this Exhibit, and the validity and relevancy of this data is questioned by petitioners, an analysis of the content of this exhibit is essential to an understanding of the case.

Column A--AF.

The figures in this column represent the acreage factor (AF) for each of the 699 non-marginal wells. This is the ratio (expressed in terms of percent) of the surface acreage of the tract attributed to the well to 320 surface acres, which constitutes a standard spacing or proration unit for a well in the pool

as fixed by the Commission. Thus, a non-marginal tract with exactly 320 surface acres has an acreage factor of less than 100; and a non-marginal tract of more than 320 acres has an acreage factor of more than 100 .

Column B--Daily Deliverability.

This column shows the current ability of each well to deliver gas under stated conditions. It is expressed in units of 1,000 cubic feet (MCF) per day for each of the 699 non-marginal wells as of December, 1962.

Column C--Tract Reserves, MMCF.

In this column the Commission has set forth its findings as to the initial recoverable gas reserves expressed in units of one million cubic feet (MMCF) for each of the 699 non-marginal tracts. However, these figures do not represent the portion of these reserves which can be produced without waste. In its finding (7) the Commission found that it would be impractical to allocate reserves solely on the basis of these figures because of continuous fluctuation in them.

Column D--Percentage of Pool Reserves.

This column sets out the Commission's finding as to the percentage of the total reserves of all non-marginal tracts which underlies each of the 699 non-marginal tracts.

Column H--MCF Allowable.

This column sets forth, in terms of thousands of cubic feet, what the allowable would have been for each of the 699 non-marginal wells for the month of December,

1962, if the 60-40 formula had been used to prorate pool production for that month. The acreage factor for each non-marginal tract and the current deliverability of each non-marginal well, set forth in Columns A and B, respectively, were used in making this 60-40 formula calculation.

Column I--Percentage of Pool Allowable.

This column sets forth the percentage of total pool allowable which would have been allocated to each of the 699 non-marginal wells for the month of December, 1962, if the 60-40 formula had been used to prorate pool production for that month.

Column J--A/R Factor.

This column sets forth the ratio under the 60-40 formula between (1) the percentage of total pool allowable which would have been allocated to each of the 699 non-marginal tracts if the 60-40 formula had been used to prorate pool production for the month of December, 1962; and (2) the percentage of the total pool reserves of non-marginal tracts which the Commission found in Column D to be attributable to each non-marginal tract. In other words, this column sets forth the ratio between Column I and Column D, this ratio being the Allowable Reserve Factor (A/R Factor) for each non-marginal well for the month of December, 1962.

Columns E, F, and G--25-75 Formula.

In Columns E, F, and G data similar to that respectively

appearing in Columns H, I, and J is set forth, except that these columns pertain to the 25-75 formula rather than the 60-40 formula. This data has no particular significance in this appeal, insofar as the validity of the 60-40 formula, which is here in issue, is concerned. The validity of the 25-75 formula is not an issue in this case.

The figures in Exhibit "A" of the Commission's Order are identical with the figures set forth in Consolidated's Exhibit 4, except that Commission's Exhibit "A" omits reference to any formulas other than the 25-75 and 60-40 formulas. It was contended by Consolidated that if the percentage of pool allowable for a well was exactly equal to its percentage of pool reserves so that the A/R Factor for that well was equal to one, or 100%, then the particular formula used for the computation of such A/R Factor afforded that well its exact share of the pool reserves (Rehearing Tr. 22, 23, 25). It was conceded by Consolidated that its determination as to the reserves lying under each non-marginal tract, as tabulated in Exhibit 4, could be in error by as much as 30% due to reasonable differences in interpretation of the data on which the estimates of the reserves were based (Rehearing Tr. 26, 27). Consolidated thus concluded that if the A/R Factor for a well was between .7 or 70% and 1.3 or 130%, an abuse of correlative rights would not necessarily result, (Rehearing Tr. 26) but as to wells falling outside this range, abuses of correlative rights would tend to result (Rehearing Tr. 27).

The contentions of Consolidated apparently were accepted by the Commission, since in Paragraph 14 of its July 3, 1963 Order, the

Commission found as follows:

"(14) That, based upon the December 1962 pool allowable, a comparison of the number of non-marginal wells producing with a tract A/R Factor of from 0.7 to 1.3 under each formula as identified by an asterisk in Columns G and J of Exhibit A, and of the total volume of gas allocated to the wells in the 0.7 to 1.3 range under each formula, establishes that the proposed formula of 60 percent acreage plus 40 percent acreage times deliverability will more adequately protect correlative rights and prevent waste by permitting more wells to receive their just and equitable share of the gas in the pool, insofar as can be determined."

It is significant that the only references to the prevention of waste appear in this and the preceeding paragraphs of the Commission's findings. Only Finding No. 14 purports to relate the prevention of waste to the 60-40 formula and that solely on the basis that correlative rights will be protected, not that waste, as such, would be prevented. In fact, there was no evidence presented before the Commission by any of the parties that the 60-40 formula would prevent waste as defined by the New Mexico Statute.

A critical aspect of this case is the finding of the Commission as to the quantum of initial recoverable reserves underlying each non-marginal tract which appears in Column C of Exhibit A to the Order. If these reserve determinations are unreliable or are in error, then the data set forth in Commission's Exhibit "A" and all of the findings of the Commission which are predicated upon these reserve determinations are likewise in error.

There are two accepted methods used by petroleum engineers

in estimating recoverable gas reserves (Tr. 416). One is called the "volumetric method" in which the average net thickness of the producing sand under a property is multiplied by the acreage of the property to obtain the volume of producing sand (usually expressed in acre feet). Since only a portion of the gas can be recovered therefrom, the recovery per acre foot is then determined after considering pressure, temperature, the properties of the sand (such as porosity, permeability, interstitial water), and other appropriate factors (Tr. 366; Rehearing Tr. 53, 54). The production-pressure decline method is based on an historical comparison of the reservoir pressure with the cumulative production. Each well has a pressure decline as it produces and also has a quantitative production history (Tr. 191). Reservoir pressures of each well are plotted against the wells cumulative production, and the resulting decline curve is then projected down to the abandonment pressure at which further production will become uneconomical. (Tr. 406). The remaining cumulative production to the point of abandonment which is indicated by this projection constitutes the recoverable reserves for that well and the proration unit on which it is situate.

The Reservoir Department of petitioner, El Paso Natural Gas Company (El Paso), had made continuing calculations of the recoverable reserves in the Basin-Dakota Gas Pool. These calculations were not made to provide evidence suitable for submission to the Commission; they were not made for the purpose of determining the recoverable reserves of any well, proration unit or non-marginal tract involved in this appeal (Tr. 478; Rehearing Tr. 142, 143). El Paso's reserve calculations were

made for the purpose, and only for the purpose, of estimating the recoverable reserves in the pool as a whole (Rehearing Tr. 145).

At the first hearing on Consolidated's application in April, 1962, El Paso submitted its estimate of total pool reserves, calculated as of December 31, 1961 (Tr. 489, 493). El Paso's estimate was calculated on the basis of a study of 457 non-marginal wells, using the volumetric method (Tr. 479, 480; Rehearing Tr. 146). (By use of approximation, the testimony sometimes alludes to 460 such wells (Rehearing Tr. 14, 16). The data for making an accurate volumetric calculation was limited (Rehearing Tr. 143). El Paso had core analyses on only 65 to 68 of these wells (Tr. 479).

In order to determine the thickness of the net pay sand in the substantial portions of the reservoir for which no core analyses were available, El Paso compared the log of each well for which a core analysis was available to the core analysis of that well. This log was then compared to the logs of wells located throughout the pool in areas for which no core analyses were available. The net pay in these other areas of the pool was then estimated on the basis of this comparison (Tr. 479). Parameters of porosity, permeability, interstitial water, and other factors that go into making a volumetric calculation of reserves had to be obtained from these 65 to 68 cores. Averages for these parameters and for pressure and temperature were computed for each township rather than for individual wells (Tr. 480, 481; Rehearing Tr. 143). By applying these township averages to its estimates of net pay sand,

El Paso arrived at MCF per acre foot recoverable reserves for each township and on that basis calculated the total pool reserve (Rehearing Tr. 143).

It is significant that (1) El Paso stated that its reserve calculation methods did not accurately reflect the recoverable reserves under individual non-marginal tracts, but served only to provide a basis for estimating the recoverable reserves in the pool as a whole (Rehearing Tr. 145); and (2) El Paso's estimate of total pool recoverable reserves was, and is, subject to constant change, revision, correction, and refinement as new wells are drilled, new cores obtained, and as additional data becomes available (Tr. 480; Rehearing Tr. 136, 139, 140).

The initial recoverable reserves for each of the 699 non-marginal tracts on the Commission's December, 1962, proration schedule were determined by Consolidated almost entirely on the basis of El Paso's December 31, 1961 study of the 457 wells mentioned above (Rehearing Tr. 16-19, 35, 37). Consolidated submitted no independent calculations based on the volumetric method, the production-pressure decline method, or any other method to determine recoverable gas reserves under the individual non-marginal tracts. Instead it compared the El Paso total pool reserve estimates as of December 31, 1961, with certain reserve calculations which it testified it had made for 58 wells on which it had core and log data (Rehearing Tr. 35). According to Consolidated, a comparison of its reserve estimates for these 58 wells indicated that such estimates were in a range of 70% to 130% of El Paso's reserve

estimates (Rehearing Tr. 26, 35). On the basis of this 58-well comparison, Consolidated testified that it concluded, after allowing for reasonable differences in interpretation, that El Paso's December 31, 1961 calculations were substantially correct (Rehearing Tr. 35).

Using the El Paso reserve estimates as of December 31, 1961, Consolidated constructed a contour map (Consolidated's Exhibit 3) (Rehearing Tr. 17). This contour map was prepared by plotting the 457 wells mentioned above, using only these December 31, 1961 reserve figures (Rehearing Tr. 18).

Of the 699 non-marginal wells which appeared on the December, 1962 proration schedule, 239 wells had been completed subsequent to El Paso's December 31, 1961, reserve calculations. However, no attempt was made by Consolidated to use, or to reflect on its exhibit, the additional data which these 239 wells provided (Rehearing Tr. 34). Reserve estimates for these 239 wells were not calculated by Consolidated, and no effect of the drilling of these wells was reflected in Consolidated's reserve contour map (Consolidated's Exhibit 3), although all 699 non-marginal wells were plotted on the contour map and reserve figures were estimated for each of the 699 non-marginal tracts solely on the basis of the contour lines shown on this map (Rehearing Tr. 36).

Objections were made to admission in evidence of the recoverable reserves figures so obtained and presented by Consolidated (Rehearing Tr. 30, 44, 200). These objections were overruled and the Commission adopted Consolidated's contour map estimates as the recoverable reserves

under all of the 699 individual non-marginal tracts. As already stated, these reserve figures appear in Column C of Exhibit A of the Commission's Order.

Petitioners now seek review by this Court of Commission Order No. R-2259-B because it is petitioners' belief that the findings of the Commission and the evidence on which they are based do not meet the requirements of New Mexico law for a valid order changing an existing proration formula.

POINTS RELIED ON BY PETITIONERS
ON PETITION FOR REVIEW

- I. The Order of the Commission changing the original gas proration formula applicable to the Basin Dakota Gas Pool is unreasonable and unlawful because it is not based upon a finding that waste was occurring under the original formula or that a change of condition had occurred requiring a change in the formula.
- II. The Order is unreasonable and unlawful because the Commission failed to make the basic findings of jurisdictional facts required by statute.
- III. The Order is unreasonable and unlawful because it is based on affirmative findings which do not meet statutory requirements for a valid allocation of gas production.
- IV. The Order is unreasonable and unlawful because the Commission's findings and the Order are not based on or supported by substantial evidence:
 - A. The findings as to the initial recoverable reserves under each tract are based on out-of-date data which was designed to determine the recoverable reserves in the pool as a whole and not the recoverable gas in place under the individual tracts in the pool. Such data was erroneously received in evidence over the timely objection of the petitioner, El Paso.
 - B. The Commission's findings supporting the 60-40 formula are based upon a comparison of initial recoverable reserves for each tract in the pool with the current deliverabilities of the wells located upon said tracts. Such a comparison is not meaningful, is illusory and discriminatory and does not constitute substantial evidence to support the Commission's findings based upon it.
 - C. There is not substantial evidence in the record to support a finding by the Commission that waste will be prevented by the use of 60-40 formula.
 - D. There is not substantial evidence in the record that the 60-40 formula will, insofar as it is practicable

to do so, afford to the owner of each tract in the pool the opportunity to produce his just and equitable share of the gas in the pool.

- E. There is not substantial evidence to support the Commission's finding that the 60-40 formula will more adequately protect correlative rights and insofar as practicable prevent drainage between the producing tracts which is not equalized by counter-drainage.

ARGUMENT AND AUTHORITIES

- I. The Order of the Commission changing the original gas proration formula applicable to the Basin Dakota Gas Pool is unreasonable and unlawful because it is not based upon a finding that waste was occurring under the original formula or that a change of condition had occurred requiring a change in the formula.
- II. The Order is unreasonable and unlawful because the Commission failed to make the basic findings of jurisdictional facts required by statute.

Petitioners' Points I and II quoted above are so related that argument of the two points is being consolidated. It will be divided into subheads A and B.

- A. The effect of the failure to find what portion of the recoverable reserves under each tract could be produced without waste.

Two decisions of the New Mexico Supreme Court have reviewed orders of the Oil Conservation Commission. In each case the order was declared invalid and void because the Commission failed to make basic findings of jurisdictional fact which were essential to the validity of the order.

Continental Oil Company v. Oil Conservation Commission, 70 N.M. 310, 373 P.2d 809 (1962), involved an order of the Commission changing the gas proration formula in the Jalmat Gas Pool of Lea County, and is commonly referred to as the "Jalmat" case. The situation was comparable to that in the case at bar in that the Commission had undertaken to change a gas proration formula in reliance on which a large number of wells had been drilled. The Supreme Court carefully reviewed the statutes governing Commission action, and particularly those governing the allocation of production in prorated gas pools. It held that the Commission not only must meet the statutory requirements in order to effect a valid change in all allocation formula, but that it also must show affirmatively in its order that it has done so. The Court then examined the Commission order, found that the required basic findings had not been made, and held the order invalid and void.

In the Jalmat opinion, the Court did not deal in generalities as to the findings required by the statute. On the contrary, the provisions of each applicable statute were analyzed, and the findings required were specified. In such an analysis the Court at 70 N.M. 310, 319, 373 P.2d

809, 814, said:

"Therefore, the commission, by 'basic conclusions of fact' (or what might be termed 'findings'), must determine, insofar as practicable, (1) the amount of recoverable gas under each producer's tract; (2) the total amount of recoverable gas in the pool; (3) the proportion that (1) bears to (2); and (4) what portion of the arrived at proportion can be recovered without waste." (Emphasis by the Court)

Again, the Court reiterates at 70 N.M. 324, 373 P.2d 818):

"To state the problem in a different way, if the commission had determined, from a practical standpoint, that each owner had a certain amount of gas underlying his acreage; that the pool contained a certain amount of gas; and that a determined amount of gas could be produced and obtained without waste; then the commission would have complied with the mandate of the statute...."

In the face of this clear and unequivocal statement of the requirements which must be met by an order of the Commission changing an existing gas proration formula it is difficult to understand the failure of the Commission in the case at the bar to meet all of these requirements. Yet, fail it did.

In its Order No. R-2259-B, the Commission included findings as to (1) the amount of recoverable gas under each producer's tract, (2) the total amount of recoverable gas in the pool, and (3) the proportion that (1) bears to (2). But where is basic finding of fact (4) required by the Jalmat case? Where is the finding as to the "portion of the arrived at proportion" which "can be recovered without waste"? There is no such finding, nor is there any indication that the Commission attempted to make such a finding, even "insofar as is practicable" (70 N.M. at

319, 373 P.2d at 815).

The Court in the Jalmat case left no room for doubt as to the effect of failure to make one or more of the "basic findings of jurisdictional fact" which it found to be essential to the validity of a commission order changing a gas proration formula. It said at page 321 of the New Mexico Report (373 P.2d at 816):

"**basic jurisdictional findings, supported by evidence, are required to show that the Commission has heeded the mandate and the standards set out by statute"

and it there concluded:

"We therefore find that the order of the commission lacked the basic findings necessary to and upon which jurisdiction depended, and that therefore Order No. R-1092-C and Order No. R-1092-A are invalid and void."

The Court having determined that a finding as to the portion of the recoverable gas in place which can be recovered without waste is a basic jurisdictional finding, and that lacking such a finding, an order is invalid, Order No. R-2259-B is clearly unlawful and void.

The fatal character of the deficiency in the Order which results from failure of the Commission to make the required finding as to "what portion of the arrived at proportion can be recovered without waste" can be demonstrated readily. As an unavoidable result of this failure the Commission used a standard for the measurement of each individual owner's correlative rights which is not authorized by the statute and which

is contrary to the decision of the Supreme Court in the Jalmat case.

In its finding (7) the Commission finds that Column D of Exhibit A states the percent of the total pool reserves which are attributable to each non-marginal tract in the pool. As enumerated in the Jalmat case (70 NM 310, 319, 373 P.2d 809, 815), this is required basic finding (3) as to the proportion that the recoverable gas under each producer's tract bears to the total recoverable gas in the pool. It is not required basic finding (4) as to "what portion of the arrived at proportion can be produced without waste". There is no such finding. Nonetheless, the Commission has used the figures in Column D as the R (reserves) portion of the A/R (Allowable /Reserves) Factor of the wells as described in Finding (11). The effect of so doing is to use the total recoverable gas in place under each tract as the basis for testing the effect of the 60-40 and 25-75 proration formulas in the Order, rather than the recoverable gas in place which can be produced without waste, which the statute makes the measure of each owners right to the gas in the reservoir. In so doing the Commission has fallen into fatal error.

As pointed out above, the Jalmat decision requires that the Commission make separate specific findings as to the recoverable gas in place under each producers tract and as to the portion thereof which can be produced without waste. One is not the equivalent of the other. The owner of a tract in a pool is entitled to produce only the portion of the recoverable gas reserves which can be produced without waste. Continental Oil Company v. Oil Conservation Commission, 70 NM 310, 323, 373 P.2d 809, 818. Determination of that portion as to all tracts is mandatory upon the Commission.

Yet the Commission not having determined what those portions were, for the individual tracts in the pool, it could not test the proposed 60-40 formula or the existing 25-75 formula against them. What it did do, as stated in findings (11), (13) and (14), was to test the formulas against the reserves shown in Column D, which included that portion of the gas in place which it would be illegal to produce because to do so would result in waste.

The result is that the formulas were not tested for their effect on the correlative rights of the owners at all. The conclusion reached by the Commission on the basis of this test, that the 60-40 formula would protect correlative rights to a greater degree than the existing formula, was therefore wholly fallacious, and is unsupported by substantial evidence. Since this A/R Factor test is the entire basis for the findings of the Commission and for the change of formula made by the order, and since the test used a standard prohibited by the statute, the order is unreasonable, unlawful and invalid.

B. The failure of the Commission to find that waste was occurring under the original formula or would be prevented by the proposed formula.

The case of Sims v. Mechem 72 N.M. 186, 382 P.2d 183 (1963), was the second appeal from a decision of the Oil Conservation Commission considered by the Supreme Court of New Mexico. It involved exercise by the Commission of its power to effect compulsory pooling of adjacent tracts and did not relate to the change of a proration formula. The result reached was identical with that reached in the Jalmat case. The Order was declared

invalid and void because it did not contain basic findings required under the New Mexico statute.

In the Sims opinion, the Jalmat case was relied upon very heavily. As in Jalmat, the Court in Sims looked to the basis of the Commission's authority, which it found expressed in Section 65-3-10, as the power and duty to prevent waste and protect correlative rights. Looking next to Section 65-3-29(h), the Court concluded that the prevention of waste must be the foundation for any Commission action. The Court then examined the order under attack for a proper finding concerning waste, and finding none, held the order void, saying (72 N.M. 186, _____, 382 P.2d 183, 185):

"We conclude, therefore, that since commission Order R-1310 contains no findings as to the existence of waste, or that pooling would prevent waste, based upon evidence to support such a finding, the commission was without jurisdiction to enter Order R-1310, and that it is void. Continental Oil Company v. Oil Conservation Commission, supra."

In the case at bar there is no finding that waste was occurring under the old formula or that adoption of the new formula will prevent waste.

The only use of the word "waste" occurs in Findings (13) and (14) of the order, which findings fall far short of meeting this requirement. Findings (13) and (14) are as follows (Order No. R-2259-B):

"(13) That under the present 25-75 formula, correlative rights are not being adequately protected; that the protection of correlative rights is a necessary adjunct to the prevention of waste, and that waste will result unless the Commission acts to protect correlative rights.

"(14) That, based upon the December, 1962 pool allowable, a comparison of the number of non-marginal wells producing with a tract A/R Factor of from 0.7 to 1.3 under each formula as identified by an asterisk in Columns G and J of Exhibit A, and of the total volume of gas allocated to the wells in the 0.7 to 1.3 range under each formula, establishes that the proposed formula of 60 percent acreage plus 40 percent acreage times deliverability will more adequately protect correlative rights and prevent waste by permitting more wells to receive their just and equitable share of the gas in the pool, insofar as can be determined."

In Finding (13), the Commission, after finding that correlative rights were not being adequately protected under the old formula, concludes that waste will result unless action is taken to protect correlative rights. That waste inevitably occurs unless correlative rights are protected, is untenable as a legal conclusion. Such a conclusion is obviously erroneous in view of the statutory definition of correlative rights (Section 65-3-29-(h) which recognizes that the right to one's just and equitable share of gas in the reservoir is limited to that portion which may be recovered without waste. In other words, the Commission's statutory duty to prevent waste is unconditioned, but the action which may be taken to protect correlative rights is limited by the paramount duty to prevent waste. Correlative rights are entitled to protection only to the extent that waste will not be caused thereby. Accordingly, the conclusion of Finding (13) is erroneous, for waste does not necessarily occur as the result of all infringements of correlative rights, and there is no evidence in the record as to waste which would occur if no change in the 25-75 formula were made.

Having reached an erroneous conclusion that waste necessarily

will result from violation of correlative rights, Finding (13) insofar as it relates to waste, cannot be considered as supporting the Order. The erroneous conclusion in Finding (13) that waste will result unless the Commission acts to protect correlative rights is not the equivalent of a finding as to the existence of waste under the existing formula or that the new formula will prevent waste. Without a proper finding of the existence of waste under the old formula or that the new formula will prevent waste, Order R-2259-B lacks an essential basic finding of jurisdictional fact and is void.

It is obvious that in making Findings (13) and (14) the Commission was seeking desperately a means whereby its Order might be predicated upon the prevention of waste. It was faced at the outset, however, with a total absence of evidence in the record* that waste was occurring under the 25-75 formula. In Finding (14), it found that the proposed 60-40 formula "will more adequately protect correlative rights and prevent waste by permitting more wells to receive their just and equitable share of the gas in the pool." (Emphasis supplied). But "permitting more wells to receive their just and equitable share of the gas in the pool" constitutes the protection of correlative rights only to the extent that the share can be produced without waste Sec. 65-3-29(h) NMSA, 1953. With the statutory language "without waste" omitted, as it was omitted in Finding (14), the effect not only is not to prevent waste, but if literally applied could result in waste.

Consequently, even though Findings (13) and (14) mention waste,

* The record on this subject will be analyzed in detail under Point IV in this brief.

neither affirmatively finds that waste was occurring under the old formula or that waste will be prevented under the new formula. Nowhere else in the order does the word "waste" even appear. Under the doctrine of the Sims case an affirmative finding of waste, supported by substantial evidence, is indispensable to the validity of the order; the lack of such a finding renders the order invalid and void.

In summary of this point, we submit that Commission Order No. R-2259-B is invalid and void in that it fails to contain basic findings of jurisdictional fact required by the Jalmat and Sims cases, to-wit: (1) there is no finding of the portion of each tract's recoverable reserves which can be recovered without waste, and (2) there is no finding that waste is occurring under the 25-75 formula or that waste will be prevented by adoption of the 60-40 formula.

III. THE ORDER IS UNREASONABLE AND UNLAWFUL
BECAUSE IT IS BASED ON AFFIRMATIVE FINDINGS
WHICH DO NOT MEET STATUTORY REQUIREMENTS
FOR A VALID ALLOCATION OF GAS PRODUCTION.

A. Allocation of Production Contrary to Statute

Petitioners have pointed out under Proposition II the failure of the Commission to make the necessary basic findings of jurisdictional fact required by statute. Under this Point, it will be demonstrated that the Commission made findings that are improper in themselves and which render the order invalid. We refer particularly to Findings (7), (10), (11) and (14) of the Commission's order.

Section 65-3-14(a), N. M. S. A. , 1953 establishes standards to guide the Oil Conservation Commission in allocating production:

"65-3-14. Equitable allocation of allowable production--Pooling--Spacing. --(a) The rules, regulations or orders of the commission shall, so far as it is practicable to do so, afford to the owner of each property in a pool the opportunity to produce his just and equitable share of the oil or gas, or both, in the pool, being an amount, so far as can be practically determined, and so far as such can be practicably obtained without waste, substantially in the proportion that the quantity of the recoverable oil or gas, or both, under such property bears to the total recoverable oil or gas, or both, in the pool, and for this purpose to use his just and equitable share of the reservoir energy. "

The legislature has provided that the owner of each property is entitled to an allocation of his proportionate share of the pool allowable. The Supreme Court, in Continental Oil Company vs. Oil Conservation Commission, supra, as above pointed out, has applied this statute strictly and for failure of the Commission to comply with it

struck down an order of the New Mexico Oil Conservation Commission similar to the one here under consideration. In that case, the Supreme Court of New Mexico quoted from the case of Opp Cotton Mills vs. Administrator, 312 U.S. 126, 61 S.Ct. 524, 85 L. Ed. 624 (1941) as follows:

"The essentials of the legislative function are the determination of the legislative policy and its formulation as a rule of conduct. These essentials are preserved when Congress specifies the basic conclusions of fact upon ascertainment of which, from relevant data by a designated administrative agency, it ordains that its statutory demand is to be effective. "

Then, continuing in its own words, the New Mexico Court said to the New Mexico Oil Conservation Commission:

"The Oil Conservation Commission is a creature of statute, expressly defined, limited and empowered by the laws creating it. "

On that premise, it required that the Commission conform to the statute and that it make specific findings establishing that it had done so.

In findings (10) and (11) of the order the Commission gave the appearance of intending to following the statute, but actually did something else entirely. In finding (10), the Commission found that there was no direct correlation between deliverability and reserves or between acreage and reserves. Alone, this finding is not improper, for if the Commission had been justifying resort to another criterion that had a direct correlation to reserves, it would have been proper to find that deliverability and acreage had no such relationship. But

the exact contrary is the case. In finding (10) the Commission determined that deliverability and acreage were not proper criteria, yet in the following findings the Commission adopted a combination of these allegedly useless criteria as the entire basis for the allocation of allowable in the Basin-Dakota Pool for an indefinite period of time.

The Commission began its deviation from statutory requirements at the outset of finding (11) when it stated what it considered to be "the most reasonable basis for allocating production". Then it arrived at its allocation formula, not by promulgating the formula which would permit the owner of each property to produce his proportionate share of the pool reserves as nearly as can practicably be determined and produced without waste, but rather by selecting a formula that "will allow the maximum number of wells in the pool to produce" between 70% and 130% of its total reserves as computed in Column C, without reference to waste. Thus it is apparent that instead of meeting the statutory requirements and making findings to demonstrate that it had done so, the Commission substituted its judgment for the statutory standards and requirements and promulgated the order which in its opinion provided the "most reasonable basis for allocating production. "

The Commission attempted to justify its action on the basis that the formula would give a "maximum number of wells" between 70% and 130% of what they were entitled to receive, when applied to the

pool allowable for the month of December 1962. It made no attempt to explore the effect of its application to the pool allowable for any other month even though the formula would be in effect indefinitely. Even if it were conceded, which it is not, that a formula which gave every operator between 70% and 130% of what he was entitled to receive under the statute was proper, this order still would be invalid. By its own provisions it demonstrates that even though it considers the bracket from 70% to 130% to be within acceptable tolerance, Exhibit A attached to the order shows that a vast number of the tracts in the pool fall outside of the 70% to 130% norm under this formula. No one would contend that the tracts that fall outside of the arbitrary 70% to 130% norm are being allocated their prorata share of the pool allowable. Even the Commission does not so represent; rather, it seems to concede that the order does not follow the statute in this respect but adopts it as the "most reasonable basis for allocation of production" available.

This case is not the first time that the Commission, because of a difficult situation, has endeavored to substitute its own standard for that of the statute in promulgating a proration order. In the so-called "Jalmat" case, the Commission based its formula on findings that it would provide "a more equitable allocation" just as here it finds the formula to provide the "most reasonable basis" for allocating production. The Supreme Court struck down the Jalmat order saying:

"Referring to the Commission's Finding No. 5, which is to the effect that the new formula will result in a 'more equitable allocation' of the gas production in

said pool than under the present gas proration formula, we do not believe it is a substitute for, or the equivalent of, a finding that the present gas proration formula does not protect correlative rights."

It is recognized that the problem of the Commission in arriving at a proration formula is not a simple one. It also is recognized that the statute provided for this situation in 65-3-14(a) by the provision that the Commission should allocate the proportionate share of the pool reserves to each tract owner "so far as it is practicable to do so" and "substantially in the proportion," etc. But this is not accomplished by the arbitrary use of factors which the Commission has determined to have no direct correlation with correlative rights. Neither is it accomplished by promulgating an order that serves to allocate between 70% and 130% of the proper allowable to approximately one-half of the pool tract owners, leaving almost the same number with drastically more, or less, allowable than they are entitled to receive.

B. The Commission Cannot Have It Both Ways.

There is an additional and very fundamental respect in which the affirmative findings of the Commission result in invalidity of the Order. In finding (8) the Commission has found that production cannot be allocated solely on the basis of the percentage of the total pool reserve attributable to each non-marginal tract, because of "the continuous fluctuation in reserve computations resulting from new completions in the pool and re-evaluation of reserves of existing wells." In other words, the Commission found that there is such constant fluctuation in the figures in Column D of Exhibit A that they are not a suitable or reliable measure

of the statutory right of the individual owners to participate in the allocation of pool allowable over the extended period that a proration formula would be in effect. The Commission so concluded in the face of the fact that the statute makes the percentage of pool reserves the principal measure of the rights of individual owners to participate in allowable production, and hence of their correlative rights.

Having so concluded, however, the Commission nevertheless proceeded to compare the results of the 60-40 formula and the 25-75 formula to the figures in Column D of Exhibit A and to make correlation with those figures the basis, and the sole basis, for changing the existing formula and promulgating the 60-40 formula. The vice inherent in so doing is obvious. Thereby the Commission accepted and gave effect to the figures in Column D as the correct measure of the rights of each owner for the period that the 60-40 formula shall remain in effect, when it had already concluded that they were unreliable and impracticable of use for that purpose.

Either the percentages in Column D were suitable measures of the correlative rights of the owners in a proration formula (the "without waste" aspect is disregarded for purposes of this discussion) or else their continuous fluctuation, as found by the Commission, made them unsuitable for that purpose and their use "impracticable."

The Commission cannot have it both ways, but that is exactly what it has tried to do. It attempted to say that the use of these percentages was impracticable as a basis for allocating allowable because of the continuous

fluctuation which would occur; yet it substituted the 60-40 formula for the 25-75 formula because its use more closely approached the exact result which would have been obtained if the percentages in Column D had been used.

If the Commission was correct in finding that it was impracticable to prorate on those percentages, it was equally impracticable to prorate on a formula (60-40) which was selected solely on the basis that it got the same result in a different way, or at least close to the same result.

The use of a formula so selected had all of the vice and none of the virtue of using the Column D percentages themselves. The Commission found that the vice which prevented use of Column D was the continuous fluctuation in these calculations which would result from additional development in the pool. But since the 60-40 formula was adopted only because its results more closely conformed to the use of Column D, the same information from additional development would require equal, and equally frequent, changes in the 60-40 formula, if the A/R factor of a majority of the wells was to be maintained in the 70% - 130% (or .7-1.3) range of tolerance.

Obviously the virtue of the use of the Column D percentages themselves would have been that at least as of December 1, 1962, all wells would have produced with what the Commission in its finding (11) called "the ideal A/R Factor of 1.0). No such virtue could be claimed for the 60-40 formula, however, as under it almost half of the wells in the pool not only do not produce at the ideal factor of 1.0 but are outside the

Commission's 0.7 to 1.3 limits of reasonable tolerance.

Use of the percentages in Column D as a basis for determining the allowable of individual wells either was practicable or it was impracticable. If it was practicable, the statute required the Commission to use them as the best measure of the correlative rights of the owners and the order is erroneous in holding to the contrary. If it was impracticable, as the Commission found, the use of the 60-40 formula was equally impracticable, in that as a result the correlative rights of the owners of the individual tracts in the pool would be measured by the percentages in Column D, for the duration of the 60-40 formula, with no provision for giving effect to changes and fluctuation which the Commission found would occur. In either event, the order is patently erroneous, arbitrary and invalid.

C. The Affirmative Findings of the Order Disclose
that Correlative Rights Are Not Protected by it.

Section 65-3-10, NMSA, 1953 provides:

"The Commission is hereby empowered, and it is its duty, to prevent the waste prohibited by this Act and to protect correlative rights, as in this Act provided....."

(emphasis ours)

At Section 65-3-29(h) the legislature defined "correlative rights" in the following language:

"(h) 'Correlative rights' means the opportunity afforded, so far as it is practicable to do so, to the owner of each property in a pool to produce without waste his just and equitable share of the oil or gas, or both, in the pool, being an amount, so far as can be practically determined, and so far as can be practicably obtained without waste, substantially in the proportion that the quantity of recoverable oil or gas, or both, under such property bears to the total recoverable oil or gas, or both, in the pool, and for such purpose to use his just and equitable share of the reservoir energy."

Section 65-3-14(a) of the statute, which was enacted long prior to the statutory definition of correlative rights quoted above, contains this requirement:

"The rules, regulations or orders of the Commission shall, so far as it is practicable to do so, afford to the owner of each property in the pool the opportunity to produce his just and equitable share of the oil or gas, or both, in the pool....."

The quotation then defines an owner's "just and equitable share" in the same words that are used in the definition of correlative rights in Sec. 65-3-29(h), *supra*.

It is apparent that the foregoing sections of the New Mexico statute

make it mandatory that the Commission permit each owner to produce the percentage of the pool allowable which corresponds to the portion of the recoverable gas in the pool which lies under his tract and can be produced without waste. Unless this opportunity is afforded to the owner of a tract in the pool, his correlative rights are not protected. Any order of the Commission which fails to protect correlative rights is invalid under the last quoted section of the statute. In this situation it is apparent that no order of the Commission is valid which fails "so far as it is practicable to do so" to afford every owner the opportunity to produce the portion of the pool allowable which corresponds to his portion of the pool's recoverable reserves and can be produced without waste. Only if it is impracticable to do otherwise is the Commission authorized to allocate allowable on a basis which denies this fundamental right of a tract owner. Only in case of such impracticability will an order which has this effect be valid.

The affirmative findings of the Commission in Order R-2259-B, and Exhibit A which is a part thereof, show that under the 60-40 formula a large proportion, but less than half, of the wells in the pool will receive an allocation of allowable greater or less than the "acceptable tolerance" which the Commission fixes as extending from 70% to 130% of the allowable which Column D of Exhibit A shows the well owner to be entitled to receive. A formula which otherwise violates the mandate of the statute and denies to so many owners the opportunity which the statute guarantees to them, is valid only if it is "impracticable" to afford this opportunity to them.

It has been pointed out heretofore that it is petitioners' position that the figures in Column D and Column J do not meet the requirements of the statute because effect has not been given in them to only that portion of the tract reserves which can be produced without waste. For purposes of the analysis here being made, however, we are accepting the Commission's conclusion that the figures in Column C and D constitute a correct measure of the correlative rights of each well owner, as well as other conclusions in the order.

The Commission asserts that by Order R-2259-B it has afforded the opportunity guaranteed by the statute to all of the operators in the pool "so far as it is practicable to do so." Yet, Exhibit A itself demonstrates that upwards of one-half of the wells in the pool are denied their statutory opportunity. Column J of Exhibit A contains example after example of wells which, under the 60-40 formula, will receive less than half of the allowable to which they are entitled under the statutory definition of correlative rights, and other wells which will receive up to six (6), seven (7), and even eight (8) times the amount of allowable which they would be entitled to receive if the statutory mandate had been carried out as to them.

It is respectfully submitted that when an order itself affirmatively discloses that the owners of nearly one-half of the wells affected by it will be denied the rights given them by mandate of the statute, a very serious question arises as to the validity of the order, in spite of the usual presumptions which support it. When such a situation is considered in the

light of the other infirmities of the order discussed in this brief, the unreasonableness and unlawfulness of the order become apparent.

IV. THE ORDER IS UNREASONABLE AND UNLAWFUL
BECAUSE THE COMMISSION'S FINDINGS AND
ORDER ARE NOT BASED ON OR SUPPORTED BY
SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE.

Respondents in this review proceeding contend for the validity of Order R-2259-B. That order changed the 25-75 formula which had been the basis for allocation of allowable for 32 months to a 60-40 formula. In order to accomplish a valid change in the existing formula the Commission was required to make findings as to the individual tract reserves throughout the Basin Dakota Gas Pool. Continental Oil Company v. Oil Conservation Commission, supra, (sometimes hereinafter referred to as the Jalmat Case). The findings so made must be supported by substantial evidence or the order is invalid. Jalmat Case, supra, Ferguson-Steere Motor Co., v. State Corp. Commission, 63 N.M. 137, 314 P.2d 894 (1957); Chiordi v. Jernigan, 46 N.M. 396, 129 P.2d 640 (1942); 2 Am Jur 2d, Administrative Law, Sec. 691.

None of the petitioners nor any other opponent of the proposed 60-40 formula offered any evidence as to the individual tract reserves in the Basin Dakota Gas Pool. The Commission offered no reserve testimony. Of all the parties, only Consolidated offered evidence as to such reserves. Does the evidence introduced by Consolidated meet the requirements for substantial evidence and so furnish support for the Commission's findings? When a finding of support by "substantial evidence", is required such support

must be found in evidence which is competent and admissible as tested by the usual rules for producing evidence in a legal proceeding. 2 Am. Jur. 2d, Administrative Law, Sec. 691, pg. 577; Chiordi v. Jernigan, supra. The evidence offered by Consolidated cannot meet these requirements for the reasons hereinafter discussed.

A. The Findings as to the initial recoverable reserves under each tract are based on out-of-date data which was designed to determine the recoverable reserves in the pool as a whole and not the recoverable gas in place under the individual tracts in the pool, Such data was erroneously received in evidence over the timely objection of the petitioner, El Paso.

The Commission recognized the necessity, as stated in the Jalmat Case, of determining initial recoverable gas reserves underlying each non-marginal tract before changing the existing proration order. Finding No. 6 is its sole attempt to meet that requirement. It found that such reserves for each non-marginal tract were those "as shown in Column C, Tract Reserves, of Exhibit A attached hereto and made a part hereof." What was the source of these figures? What was the substantial evidence on which the finding was based? The figures contained in Column C were derived entirely from Consolidated's Exhibits 2 and 4 presented at the Rehearing. No other party nor the Commission offered evidence as to individual tract reserves. A comparison of the figures in Column C with those of Consolidated's Exhibits 2 and 4 will show them to be identical as to those tracts appearing in Column C and Consolidated's exhibits.

What was the basis of the initial tract reserves so submitted by Consolidated? How were they determined? Were they based upon reserve studies made by Consolidated? They were not. Or based upon reserve

studies made by the Commission? No. The tract reserves for 460 wells offered by Consolidated were taken from a study made by El Paso Natural Gas Company as to these 460 wells in which initial recoverable reserves were estimated by using average factors for each township. (Rehearing Tr. 15, Tr. 479, 480) All of Consolidated's nine exhibits were based on this data obtained from El Paso's studies. El Paso made timely objections to the admission of Consolidated's Exhibits 3 through 7 (Rehearing Tr. 30), Exhibit 8 (Rehearing Tr. 44) and Exhibit 9 (Rehearing Tr. 200), on the grounds that they were hearsay, inaccurate, that no proper foundation was laid, and that the data on which they were based was out of date and had been revised. These objections were overruled by the Commission. (Rehearing Tr. 33, 44, 201)

El Paso preserved its objection, will renew it before the Court, and here maintains that these Exhibits are not properly a part of the record. However, for the purpose of this argument, even if the Exhibits were properly admitted in evidence, they do not constitute legal, competent and substantial evidence of individual tract reserves. The estimates made by El Paso in its study covering the 460 wells had been superseded and replaced before the estimate was offered in evidence by Consolidated. This occurred as new information in conflict with former assumptions became available (Rehearing Tr. 136). These studies were designed for and were useable only for determination of over-all pool reserves, not for reserves underlying individual tracts (Rehearing Tr. 145).

As to the 239 recently completed wells, Consolidated did not have El Paso's studies, and offered no evidence reflecting the information provided by their completion. It merely guessed as to the net pay as well as the reservoir factors. This guess was made by extending contour lines on a map and assuming that reserves followed the contours as drawn. This is known as "extrapolation."

Perhaps a brief summary of the testimony concerning El Paso's studies will be helpful to the court. The Dakota Formation in the Basin Dakota Gas Pool is a sand of a variable nature with both vertical and lateral changes throughout (Tr. 309, 620). The variations in rock characteristics across the field show that all tracts, although having about the same surface acreage, do not necessarily have the same quality of rock below or the same amount of recoverable gas in place (Tr. 404). Under these circumstances, the determination of individual tract recoverable reserves by averaging recoverable reserve data on a township basis, will not accurately reflect the actual recoverable reserves as to specific tracts. (Rehearing Tr. 143).

Using the information currently available, El Paso, as a part of a continuing study of Dakota reserves, averages the factors for calculating reserves for each township in the Basin Dakota Pool. Individual tract reserves are then calculated using these averages (Tr. 480). This is done only for the purpose of estimating the over-all dedicated reserves of the pool and it is adequate for that purpose (Rehearing Tr. 145).

Such an estimation as to the total reserves of the pool may vary

between 1.9 and 2.25 trillion cubic feet and still be considered reasonable (Tr. 497, Rehearing Tr. 20). The wider the area the greater the margin allowed for error. To estimate total pool reserves, information from every well in the pool is not required. For example, 68 core analyses from various Dakota wells scattered over the San Juan Basin Area, with log and deliverability information are considered sufficient to determine the net effective pay sand on each of 457 wells when calculating the total pool reserves (Tr. 479).

We wish to point out to the Court that in determining the reserves underlying the entire pool, it is immaterial if the actual recoverable reserves underlying a particular tract in the township are above the average established for that township because this discrepancy will probably be offset by a tract in the same township having recoverable reserves below the average. One tract offsets the other and this method gives a reasonably accurate estimate for the entire pool.

However, in computing individual tract reserves upon which allowables will be based, the statement applicable to computing total pool reserves no longer hold true. It is not sufficient to average recoverable reserve factors by township and apply this average to an individual tract because individual tracts vary greatly. Nor is it competent to extrapolate and arbitrarily assign recoverable reserve figures for tracts on which no computations of average factors or determinations of net pay from examinations of well logs have been made. The distinction lies in the difference of purpose. When the purpose is to compute individual well allowables,

the variation from tract to tract becomes highly significant. Factors above and below the average cannot be offset on a township basis without doing violence to property rights of individual tract owners. It thus becomes apparent that when individual tract allowables are determined on the basis of individual tract reserves calculated by utilizing average recoverable reserve factors by township, or by the method of extrapolating from supposedly known to unknown quantities, correlative rights are violated. This applies especially in the Basin Dakota Gas Pool where there is so much variance in the reservoir characteristics and individual well recoverable reserves, even on adjacent tracts, fluctuate to a great degree.

At no time did El Paso even suggest that its studies on 460 tracts were adequate for the purpose of determining individual tract reserves. Consolidated used these studies in spite of their admitted inadequacy for the purpose for which offered. It introduced them in evidence and they are the only evidence upon which the Commission's finding No. 6 is based. It is crystal clear that such evidence is not competent evidence as to the reserves underlying the 460 tracts and even less competent for the 239 extrapolated tracts. Yet it is the evidence on which the Commission's findings are based and on which the entire order was predicated. If it did not constitute competent or admissible evidence for the purpose for which it was offered and used, it is not substantial evidence supporting the order. Clearly it was not such evidence. It provides no support for the findings of tract reserves made by the Commission. The order therefore is

invalid and void.

- B. The Commission's findings supporting the 60-40 formula are based upon a comparison of initial recoverable reserves for each tract in the pool with the current deliverabilities of the wells located upon said tracts. Such a comparison is not meaningful, is illusory and discriminatory and does not constitute substantial evidence to support the Commission's findings based upon it.

The only testimony offered as to individual tract reserves, the acreage factor, and deliverability was that offered by Consolidated. Columns "A", "B" and "C" (acreage factor, deliverability, and tract reserves, respectively) of the Commission's Exhibit A of Order No. R-2259-B were taken intact from Consolidated's Exhibit 4. The figures for the reserve factors were either taken from estimates made by El Paso or were extrapolated from those estimates (Rehearing Tr. 21). These estimates were estimates of initial recoverable reserves prior to any production from the tracts (Rehearing Tr. 134). The deliverabilities under Column B of said Exhibit A are identical with the second figure for each well under the "A-D-R" Column of Consolidated's Exhibit 4 and are deliverabilities that were current as of 1962. Consolidated and the Commission then compared these initial recoverable reserves with current deliverabilities to arrive at an A/R Factor, and ultimately, the amount of allowables for individual tracts (Rehearing Tr. 134).

The Commission's Findings Nos. (10), (12) and (13), are based entirely upon this comparison. The vice in the comparison was the comparison of initial recoverable reserves to current deliverabilities.

Invidious discrimination was the inevitable result.

Treating initial recoverable reserves as if they were current recoverable reserves, as Consolidated and the Commission did in their exhibits, is comparable to placing the same value on an automobile that is eight years old and has been driven 70,000 miles as on one of the same make and model that is brand new and hasn't been driven off the dealer's floor. No one in the automobile business would do that, just as no actuary, in preparing an annuity table, would give the same life expectancy for a twenty-year old as for a new born baby. The erroneous comparison by Consolidated and the Commission resulted in findings and allowable allocations which were clearly discriminatory. Such a comparison does not constitute substantial evidence to support the findings which the Commission attempted to base upon it.

The record shows that old wells have less deliverability than new wells. Old wells also have less reserves because they have produced a portion of their initial recoverable reserves. To base an order affecting correlative rights on a ratio established upon the comparison of current deliverabilities with initial recoverable reserves is arbitrary, unreasonable and unlawful. The discrimination which results from such a comparison was called to the attention of the Commission (Tr. 135, 205, 206). Its inevitable result is abuse of correlative rights and invalidity of the order based upon it.

- C. There is not substantial evidence in the record to support a finding by the Commission that waste will be prevented by the use of the 60-40 formula.

Finding No. (14) of the order is as follows:

"That, based upon the December 1962 pool allowable, a comparison of the number of nonmarginal wells producing with a tract A/R Factor of from 0.7 to 1.3 under each formula, as identified by an asterisk in Columns G and J of Exhibit A, and of the total volume of gas allocated to the wells in the 0.7 to 1.3 range under each formula, establishes that the proposed formula of 60 per cent acreage plus 40 per cent acreage times deliverability will more adequately protect correlative rights and prevent waste by permitting more wells to receive their just and equitable share of the gas in the pool, insofar as can be determined."

In the testimony before the Commission at the Hearing and Rehearing there was only one reference to waste. It occurred when the witness, Mr. Trueblood, was asked whether or not the nondevelopment of the Basin Dakota Pool would result in waste. This question was objected to because nondevelopment had not been shown and the counsel for Consolidated stated he would come back to the point later (Tr. 21, 22). He never did. No witness offered any proof or even stated an opinion that waste would be prevented under the 60-40 formula.

Both Petitioners and Respondents agreed that the 60-40 formula would not protect correlative rights (Tr. 27, 177, 211, 284, 412, 525, 557, 623, Rehearing Tr. 64, 171), but the record is completely devoid of any evidence of any kind that the 60-40 formula would prevent waste in any manner.

The finding that waste will be prevented by the promulgation of a 60-40 formula is a finding of fact and must be based upon substantial evidence supporting it. Without such evidence the order is void and the

Commission has no power to act. Yet there is no evidence as to waste or its prevention in the record. Evidence as to protection of correlative rights is not the equivalent of evidence as to prevention of waste, and will not supply the substantial evidence which is missing as to the prevention of waste by the 60-40 formula. The relationship between the Commission's paramount duty to prevent waste and its subordinate duty to protect correlative rights has been discussed under Points I & II and will not be repeated here. For the reasons there pointed out the two duties cannot be equated and neither can evidence as to protection of correlative rights be considered as ipso facto supporting findings as to waste prevention.

Findings that waste was occurring under the 25-75 formula and that it would be prevented under the 60-40 formula were indispensable to the validity of the order. Substantial evidence to support such findings also was indispensable to the validity of the order. Whether or not the Court agrees with the position of Petitioners that no such findings were made, in the complete absence of any evidence in the record as to waste or its prevention, the question of findings becomes moot and the order must fall for lack of substantial evidence to support findings on the subject.

- D. There is not substantial evidence in the record that the 60-40 formula will, insofar as it is practicable to do so, afford to the owners of each tract in the pool the opportunity to produce his just and equitable share of the gas in the pool.
- E. There is not substantial evidence in the record to support the Commission's finding that the 60-40

formula will more adequately protect cor-
relative rights, and insofar as practicable
prevent drainage between the producing
tracts, which is not equalized by counter-
drainage.

Finding No. (15) and (16) of the Commission are as follows:

(15) "That numerous wells in the Basin Dakota Gas Pool are capable of draining more than their just and equitable share of the gas in the pool, and that an allocation formula of 60 per cent acreage plus 40 per cent acreage times deliverability will, insofar as is practicable prevent drainage between producing tracts which is not equalized by counterdrainage."

(16) "That an allocation formula of 60 per cent acreage plus 40 per cent acreage times deliverability will, insofar as it is practicable to do so, afford to the owner of each property in the pool the opportunity to use his just and equitable share of the reservoir energy."

None of the witnesses, whether for Respondents or Petitioners, testified that the 60-40 formula would protect correlative rights, even insofar as it is practicable to do so.

Mr. Trueblood stated: "With this in mind, what we're asking for, mind you, is a 60-40; a 60-40 would leave something like this and still create drainage (Tr. 27). (Emphasis supplied)

Mr. Haseltine, another witness for Respondents had this to say:

"I'm certain in my own mind that to go to the 60-40 formula that's before the Commission now is just a step in the right direction. It's not far enough to be equitable, based on what I've seen in the Dakota Pool. But, how far we should go in that direction I just wouldn't try to say. Certainly farther than the 60-40" (Tr. 176-177).

Mr. Wiedekehr, the remaining witness for Respondents, was of the opinion the deliverability portion of the formula, to be fair, should be in the range of one-third, making the formula in the range of 66-34 (Tr. 211).

Later, Mr. Trueblood testified that the percentage of deliverability in the formula should be 25 per cent (Rehearing Tr. 23).

All of the witnesses for Petitioners agreed that the 60-40 formula would violate correlative rights (Tr. 284, 412, 525, 527, 623, Rehearing Tr. 64, 171).

The Commission did not find that the 60-40 formula is a "step in the right direction." It found that the 60-40 formula "will, insofar as it is practicable to do so, afford to the owner of each property in the pool the opportunity to use his just and equitable share of the reservoir energy" and that insofar as practicable that it would prevent drainage which is not equalized by counterdrainage.

No search of the record, however diligent, can uncover any evidence substantial or otherwise, to substantiate these findings. On the contrary, all of the evidence contradicts them. Respondent's witnesses Trueblood, Haseltine and Wiedekehr did not testify that the 60-40 formula would protect correlative rights "insofar as practicable." They said it would not do so because such a formula did not go far enough; that it would have to go much farther to be fair. They didn't testify the 60-40 formula would prevent drainage between producing tracts that is not equalized by counterdrainage. They testified that drainage would continue, but to a lesser degree and this

was all of the evidence on the subject before the Commission.

Petitioners witnesses maintained that the 60-40 formula was inequitable and would not protect correlative rights (Tr. 525, 527, 623, Rehearing Tr. 64, 171). One witness stated, "Under this formula, the low reserve wells would deplete their reserves in about 7 years, after which time they would recover in excess of the reserves properly attributable to the tracts where they produce. In doing this correlative rights would be violated" (Rehearing Tr. 171, 178). The same witness gave the opinion that, if the 60-40 formula were adopted, there would be about 350 abuses of correlative rights out of the 699 wells presented.

It is recognized that mere difference of opinion as to the relative weight of the evidence, where in conflict, is not a sufficient basis to overturn an administrative decision, even though the court might have reached a different result. But when, as in this case, there is no evidence in the record to support the basic findings necessary to protect correlative rights as required by the statute, a question of law is presented and the reviewing court should set aside the Order. Ferguson-Steere Motor Co. v. State Corp. Commission, 63 N.M. 137, 314 P.2d 895 (1957).

CONCLUSION

In conclusion, and by way of summary, Petitioners submit that Order R-2259-B is unlawful and invalid. In it the Commission wholly failed to meet the requirements laid down by the Supreme Court in the Jalmat and Sims decisions. It made no finding as to the portion of the recoverable gas in place under the individual tracts in the pool which could be produced without waste; it made no finding that waste was occurring under the 25-75 formula or that it would be prevented by the 60-40 formula.

As a result of not having found the portion of the reserves under the individual tracts which could be produced without waste, it was impossible for the Commission to make a valid finding that correlative rights would be protected under the 60-40 formula. It had not yet determined the extent of the rights of the individual owners to be protected. The standard by which they were to be measured was provided by the statute and the Supreme Court had held that this determination was mandatory. Yet the Commission failed to make it.

The invalidity of the order is further demonstrated by the Commission's findings contained in the order. Accepting the order at face value, only slightly more than half of the wells in the pool would receive an allowable falling within what the Commission considered to be acceptable tolerance (.7 to 1.3).

The Commission found that because of constant fluctuation,

it could not allocate allowable on the percentages of Column D; yet it turned right around and selected the 60-40 formula on the basis that its use more closely approximated the results of using those percentages . It thereby cemented into the proration order all of the vices on the basis of which it had eliminated Column D from consideration. If fluctuations in percentages would result in abuse of correlative rights in one case, it did so equally in the other. The Commission cannot have it both ways.

The use of acreage and deliverability in the formula in the face of finding (10), holding that there is no direct correlation of either with the statutory measure of correlative rights, is inconsistent. When the use made of these factors in the formula results in recognition, in the order itself, that almost half of the wells will not receive the allocation to which the statute entitles them, or a reasonable approximation thereof, it is apparent that the Commission has not arrived at an acceptable, or a valid, formula.

Finally, the record discloses that the Commission relied upon evidence not competent for the purpose for which offered and used. It, therefore, was erroneously admitted. On the vital issue of waste, the transcript is completely silent. The critical findings of the Commission, on which the order depends for its validity, are not supported by substantial evidence.

For each, and all, of the foregoing reasons Order R-2259-B is unreasonable and unlawful and the court should so declare.

Respectfully submitted,

ATWOOD & MALONE

By

Ross R. Malone
Post Office Drawer 700
Roswell, New Mexico

Ben R. Howell

Garrett C. Whitworth
EL PASO NATURAL GAS COMPANY
El Paso, Texas

Robert B. Hampton
MARATHON OIL COMPANY
Post Office Box 120
Casper, Wyoming

J. K. Smith
PAN AMERICAN PETROLEUM
CORPORATION
Post Office Box 1410
Fort Worth, Texas

SETH, MONTGOMERY, FEDERICI
& ANDREWS

By *Sam. Federici + R. E. Morris*
Post Office Box 2307
Santa Fe, New Mexico

VERITY, BURR, COOLEY & JONES

By *George H. Verity*
Petroleum Center Building
Farmington, New Mexico

Attorneys for Petitioners

CHIEF JUSTICE
DAVID W. CARMODY
JUSTICES
DAVID CHAVEZ, JR.
M. E. NOBLE
IRWIN S. MOISE
J. C. COMPTON

Supreme Court of New Mexico
Santa Fe, New Mexico
March 26, 1965

LOWELL C. GREEN
CLERK
COURT ADMINISTRATOR


Keleher & McLeod
Attorneys at Law
First National Bank Building WEST
Albuquerque, New Mexico

Re: Pubco Petroleum Corporation v. Oil Conservation
Commission of New Mexico - No. 7590

Gentlemen:

The Court today has denied, without written comment,
Appellant's motion for rehearing in the above cause.
Accordingly, the Mandate has issued, a copy of which is
enclosed.

Very truly yours,



L
enclosure

cc: Mr. J. M. Durrett ✓
Special Assistant Attorney General
New Mexico Oil Conservation Commission
State Land Office Building
Santa Fe, New Mexico

Kellahin & Fox
Attorneys at Law
Box 1769
Santa Fe, New Mexico

LAW OFFICES
OF
W. A. KELEHER
A. H. McLEOD

ATTORNEYS AND COUNSELORS AT LAW
FIRST NATIONAL BANK BUILDING WEST
ALBUQUERQUE, NEW MEXICO
87101

W. A. KELEHER
A. H. McLEOD
T. B. KELEHER
JOHN B. TITTMANN
RUSSELL MOORE
WILLIAM B. KELEHER
MICHAEL L. KELEHER

March 17, 1965

Mr. Lowell Green
Clerk, Supreme Court
Supreme Court Building
Santa Fe, New Mexico

Re: Pubco Petroleum Corporation
vs. Oil Conservation Commission
of New Mexico and Consolidated
Oil and Gas, Inc., a corporation

Dear Mr. Green:

Enclosed herewith is original and two
copies of Petition for Rehearing in the above case
together with Certificate of Service.

Very truly yours,

/s/ John B. Tittmann

JBT/vr

Enclosures

cc: Mr. J. M. Durrett, Jr.
Kellahin & Fox

LAW OFFICES
OF
W. A. KELEHER
A. H. MCLEOD

ATTORNEYS AND COUNSELLORS AT LAW
FIRST NATIONAL BANK BUILDING
ALBUQUERQUE, NEW MEXICO

MAIN OFFICE OCC

1964 MAR 24 AM 8:18

W. A. KELEHER
A. H. MCLEOD
T. B. KELEHER
JOHN B. TITTMANN
RUSSELL MOORE
WILLIAM B. KELEHER
MICHAEL L. KELEHER

87101

March 23, 1964

Mr. J. M. Durrett, Jr.
Attorney at Law
Oil Conservation Commission
State Capitol Building
Santa Fe, N.M.


Kellahin and Fox
Attorneys at Law
P. O. Box 1713
Santa Fe, N.M.

Re: Pubco Petroleum Corporation vs.
Oil Conservation Commission of
New Mexico et al - No. 7590

Gentlemen:

Enclosed please find copy of Appellant's
Brief in Chief in the above matter, the original of
which has been filed with the Clerk of the Court.

Very truly yours,



JBT:jm

Enc.

LAW OFFICES
OF
W. A. KELEHER

A. H. MCLEOD

ATTORNEYS AND COUNSELORS AT LAW
FIRST NATIONAL BANK BUILDING WEST
ALBUQUERQUE, NEW MEXICO
87101

February 20, 1964

W. A. KELEHER
A. H. MCLEOD
T. B. KELEHER
JOHN B. TITTMANN
RUSSELL MOORE
WILLIAM B. KELEHER
MICHAEL L. KELEHER

Mrs. Virginia A. Kittell
District Court Clerk
San Juan County Courthouse
Aztec, New Mexico

Re: Pubco Petroleum Corporation
v. Oil Conservation Commission,
et al., No. 11637

Dear Mrs. Kittell:

Enclosed please find copy of transcript in the above case which has been checked and approved subject to the making of the corrections noted in the letters of Messrs. Kellahin and Durrett.

There is no need to prepare a Stipulation and Order settling the Bill of Exceptions since there was no testimony in this case.

If it is your practice to docket the transcript directly, I would appreciate your doing so. If that is your practice, I enclose at this time check of W. A. Keleher in the amount of \$20 payable to the order of the Clerk of the Supreme Court. If it is not your practice to docket, kindly return the three copies of the transcript direct to me with my check and I will see that filing is made by February 28.

We, of course, have guaranteed your costs and I would appreciate your inserting in the final transcript the necessary amount of the costs.

There is no need to prepare an additional copy as I will borrow one from the Supreme Court Clerk.

Thanking you for your cooperation in this matter, I am

Yours very truly,

/s/ WILLIAM B. KELEHER

WBK:cjw
Enclosures
cc: Kellahin and Fox
J. M. Durrett, Jr.
Certified - RRR

KELLAHIN AND FOX

ATTORNEYS AT LAW

54½ EAST SAN FRANCISCO STREET

POST OFFICE BOX 1769 1769

SANTA FE, NEW MEXICO 87501

TELEPHONES

983-9396

982-2991

JASON W. KELLAHIN
ROBERT E. FOX

February 18, 1964

Mrs. Virginia A. Kittell
Clerk of the District Court
San Juan County Courthouse
Aztec, New Mexico

Re: Pubco Petroleum vs. Oil
Conservation Commission,
et al., No. 11637.

Dear Mrs. Kittell:

C
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I am returning herewith copy of the transcript in the above case which you forwarded to me for checking. I note only the following minor errors:

Page 5 - In the caption, the order should be R-2259-B

In paragraph (2), in each instance the order numbers should be preceded by R- rather than a \$ sign.

Page 7 - Middle of page, adjunct spelled adjunce.

Page 33 - At the end of paragraph 10, the order number should be R-1670-C

In paragraph 11, cubic is spelled cubit.

Page 40 - Second line, styled misspelled.

Thank you for the opportunity of looking over the transcript.

Very truly yours,

JASON W. KELLAHIN

jwk:mas

cc: J. M. Durrett, Jr. ✓
T. P. Stockmar
William B. Keleher

OIL CONSERVATION COMMISSION

P. O. BOX 871

SANTA FE, NEW MEXICO

February 18, 1964

Mrs. Virginia A. Kittell
District Court Clerk
San Juan County Courthouse
Aztec, New Mexico

Re: Pubco Petroleum Corporation vs.
Oil Conservation Commission, et
al., No. 11637

Dear Mrs. Kittell:

Thank you for your letter of February 14, 1964, enclosing a copy of the transcript in the above case. I am returning the transcript herewith. I have marked the following corrections in pencil and indicated the same by a check mark in the left-hand margin:

On Pages 2, 5, and 33, the letter prefix of a Commission Order should read R instead of \$.

On Page 5 in Commission Finding No. (1), ov should read of.

On Page 6 in Commission Finding No. (4), seekd should read seeks. Also on Page 6, Commission Finding No. (5) has been omitted and Commission Finding No. (6) is erroneously designated No. (5), and in Commission Finding No. (8) fluctation should read fluctuation.

On Page 7 in Commission Finding No. (13), adjunce should read adjunct.

OIL CONSERVATION COMMISSION

P. O. BOX 871

SANTA FE, NEW MEXICO

-2-

February 18, 1964

Mrs. Virginia A. Kittell
District Court Clerk

At the top of Page 31 the designation 19__ JUN _ PM 4 5;
should read 1962 JUN 27 PM 4:54.

The transcript otherwise appears satisfactory.

Very truly yours,

J. M. DURRETT, Jr.
Attorney

JMD/esr
Enclosure

cc: Mr. William B. Keleher
Attorney
First National Bank Building
Albuquerque, New Mexico

Mr. Jason W. Kellahin
Kellahin & Fox
Attorneys at Law
P. O. Box 1769
Santa Fe, New Mexico

OFFICE OF DISTRICT COURT CLERK
SAN JUAN COUNTY



AZTEC, NEW MEXICO

February 14, 1964

William B. Keleher, Attorney
First National Bank Building
Albuquerque, New Mexico

Re: Pubco Petroleum
vs. Oil Conservation
Commission, et al
Cause 11637

Dear Mr. Keleher:

Please find enclosed copy of the transcript
in the above entitled appeal to the Supreme Court.

I am also sending copies to Kellahan & Fox,
and J. M. Durrett, Jr., I will appreciate if the
copies may be checked as soon as possible and returned
to this office for binding as the due date for filing
is February 28th.

Thanking you kindly, I remain,

Very truly yours,

Mrs. Virginia A. Kittell
District Court Clerk

cc:Kellahan & Fox
J. M. Durrett, Jr.

MAIN OFFICE OCC

1963 OCT 31 AM 8:37

87101

October 29, 1963

Mrs. Virginia A. Kittell
Clerk of the District Court
San Juan County Courthouse
Aztec, N.M.

Re: Pubco Petroleum Corporation vs.
Oil Conservation Commission of New Mexico et al
No. 11637

Dear Mrs. Kittell:

Enclosed please find notice of appeal, which
please file in the above cause.

Yours very truly,

(SIGNED) WILLIAM B. KELLEHER

WBK:jm

Enc.

cc: Mr. J. M. Durrett, Jr.
Attorney
Oil Conservation Commission
P. O. Box 871
Santa Fe, N.M.

Mr. Jason Kellahin
Attorney at Law
54½ East San Francisco St.
Santa Fe, N.M.

LAW OFFICES
OF
W. A. KELEHER

A. H. McLEOD

ATTORNEYS AND COUNSELLORS AT LAW
FIRST NATIONAL BANK BUILDING
ALBUQUERQUE, NEW MEXICO

87101

W. A. KELEHER
A. H. McLEOD
T. B. KELEHER
JOHN B. TITTMANN
RUSSELL MOORE
WILLIAM B. KELEHER
MICHAEL L. KELEHER

FILED OCT 31 1963

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October 29, 1963

Mr. J. M. Durrett, Jr.
Attorney
Oil Conservation Commission
P. O. Box 871
Santa Fe, N.M.

Re: Pubco Petroleum Corporation vs.
Oil Conservation Commission of New Mexico et al
No. 11637

Dear Mr. Durrett:

Enclosed please find copy of the praecipe
in the above entitled matter, the original of which
was filed with the Clerk of the Court.

Yours very truly,

William B. Keleher

WBK:jm

Enc.

cc: Mr. Jason Kellahin
Attorney at Law
54½ East San Francisco St.
Santa Fe, N.M.

JASON W. KELLAHIN
ROBERT E. FOX

KELLAHIN AND FOX
ATTORNEYS AT LAW
54½ EAST SAN FRANCISCO STREET
POST OFFICE BOX 171
SANTA FE, NEW MEXICO

TELEPHONES
983-9396
982-2991

October 14, 1963

Mr. James M. Durrett, Jr.
Oil Conservation Commission of
New Mexico
P. O. Box 871
Santa Fe, New Mexico

Re: Pubco Petroleum Company
vs. Oil Conservation
Commission, et al.,
No. 11637, San Juan
County.

Dear Mr. Durrett:

Enclosed you will find the original and two copies of order
pertaining to the dismissal of Pubco's Petition for Review.
If this order meets with your approval, I would appreciate
it if you would forward it to Mr. Keleher.

Very truly yours,

Jason W. Kellahin
JASON W. KELLAHIN

jwk:mas
enclosures

OIL CONSERVATION COMMISSION
P. O. BOX 871
SANTA FE, NEW MEXICO

October 15, 1963

Mr. William B. Keleher
Attorney at Law
First National Bank Building (West)
Albuquerque, New Mexico

Re: Pubco Petroleum Company v.
Oil Conservation Commission
et al., San Juan County,
No. 11637

Dear Bill:

Jason Kellahin has now prepared and approved an order dismissing the above case and forwarded the same to me for approval. I have approved the order and am enclosing the original and one copy herewith.

Will you please approve the order as to form and forward the original to the Court for filing, keeping the extra copy for your files.

Very truly yours,

J. M. DURRETT, Jr.
Attorney

JMD/esr
Enclosures

KELLAHIN AND FOX
ATTORNEYS AT LAW
54½ EAST SAN FRANCISCO STREET
POST OFFICE BOX 1713
SANTA FE, NEW MEXICO

JASON W. KELLAHIN
ROBERT E. FOX

TELEPHONES
983-9396
982-2991

August 30, 1953

Honorable J. C. McColligh
District Judge
County Courthouse
Aztec, New Mexico

Re: Pubco Petroleum Corporation vs. Oil
Conservation Commission, et al., No.
11637, San Juan County.

Dear Judge McColligh:

We have received a copy of a motion filed by petitioner in the above case requesting consolidation of that case with case No. 11685, El Paso Natural Gas Company, et al., vs. Oil Conservation Commission, et al.

On August 27, we forwarded for filing a motion to dismiss and for other relief in connection with cause No. 11637; and pending a hearing on that motion, we would respectfully request that there be no consolidation of the two causes until the motion has been disposed of.

Your consideration in this regard will be appreciated.

Very truly yours,

JASON W. KELLAHIN

jwk:mas

cc: Mr. W. A. Kelerher & Mr. John B. Pittman
Seth, Montgomery, Federici & Andrews
Atwood & Malone
Verity, Burr, Cooley & Jones
Mr. J. M. Durrett, Jr., attorney for
Oil Conservation Commission
Mr. T. P. Stockmar

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LAW OFFICES
OF
W. A. KELEHER

A. H. MCLEOD

ATTORNEYS AND COUNSELLORS AT LAW
FIRST NATIONAL BANK BUILDING
ALBUQUERQUE, NEW MEXICO

W. A. KELEHER
A. H. MCLEOD
T. B. KELEHER
JOHN B. TITTMANN
RUSSELL MOORE
WILLIAM B. KELEHER
MICHAEL L. KELEHER

87101

August 29, 1963

Oil Conservation Commission
Post Office Box 871
Santa Fe, New Mexico

Attention: J. M. DURRETT, Jr.
Special Assistant
Attorney General

Re: Pubco Petroleum Corp. v.
O.C.C., et al, No. 11637
a n d
El Paso Natural Gas Co.,
et al v. O.C.C., et al
San Juan County No. 11685

Gentlemen:

Enclosed please find a copy of Motion
to consolidate, an original which has been
filed in each case.

Yours very truly,

William B. Keleher

WBK:cjw

Enclosure

KELLAHIN AND FOX

ATTORNEYS AT LAW

JASON W. KELLAHIN
ROBERT E. FOX

54½ EAST SAN FRANCISCO STREET
POST OFFICE BOX 1713

SANTA FE, NEW MEXICO

TELEPHONES
983-9396
982-2991

August 27, 1963


Oil Conservation Commission of
New Mexico
J. M. Durrett, Jr., Attorney
P. O. Box 871
Santa Fe, New Mexico

Re: Pubco Petroleum Corp. vs. Oil Conservation
Commission, et al., No. 11637, San Juan
County, New Mexico.

Gentlemen:

I am enclosing herewith a motion filed on behalf of
the respondent Consolidated Oil & Gas, Inc., in the
above-captioned case.

Yours very truly,



JASON W. KELLAHIN

jwk:mas
enclosure

OIL CONSERVATION COMMISSION

P. O. BOX 871

SANTA FE, NEW MEXICO

August 26, 1963

C
O
P
Y

Mrs. Virginia A. Kittel
Clerk of the District Court
County Court House
Aztec, New Mexico

Re: Pubco Petroleum Corporation v.
Oil Conservation Commission of
New Mexico, et al., San Juan
County, No. 11637

Dear Mrs. Kittel:

Will you please file the enclosed Reply to Petition
for Review in the above case.

Very truly yours,

J. M. DURRETT, Jr.
Special Assistant
Attorney General

JMD/esr
Enclosure

OIL CONSERVATION COMMISSION

P. O. BOX 871

SANTA FE, NEW MEXICO

August 26, 1963

C
O
P
Y

Mr. Jason W. Kellahin
Kellahin & Fox
Attorneys at Law
P. O. Box 1713
Santa Fe, New Mexico

Re: Pubco Petroleum Corporation v.
Oil Conservation Commission of
New Mexico, et al., San Juan
County, No. 11637

Dear Mr. Kellahin:

I am enclosing herewith a Reply to Petition for
Review on behalf of Respondent, Oil Conservation Com-
mission of New Mexico.

Very truly yours,

J. M. DURRETT, Jr.
Special Assistant
Attorney General

JMD/esr
Enclosure

OIL CONSERVATION COMMISSION

P. O. BOX 871

SANTA FE, NEW MEXICO

August 26, 1963

**Mr. W. A. Keleher and
Mr. John B. Tittman
Attorneys at Law
First National Bank Bldg. (West)
Albuquerque, New Mexico**

**Re: Pubco Petroleum Corporation v.
Oil Conservation Commission of
New Mexico, et al., San Juan
County, No. 11637**

Gentlemen:

**I am enclosing herewith a Reply to Petition for
Review on behalf of Respondent, Oil Conservation Com-
mission of New Mexico.**

Very truly yours,

**J. M. DURRETT, Jr.
Special Assistant
Attorney General**

**JMD/esr
Enclosure**

OIL CONSERVATION COMMISSION
P. O. BOX 871
SANTA FE, NEW MEXICO

August 26, 1963

Mr. Ted P. Stockmar
Holz, Roberts, Moore & Owen
Attorneys at Law
1700 Broadway
Denver 2, Colorado

Re: Pubco Petroleum Corporation v.
Oil Conservation Commission of
New Mexico, et al., San Juan
County, No. 11637

Dear Mr. Stockmar:

I am enclosing herewith a Reply to Petition for
Review on behalf of Respondent, Oil Conservation Com-
mission of New Mexico.

Very truly yours,

J. M. DURRETT, Jr.
Special Assistant
Attorney General

JMD/esr
Enclosure

OIL CONSERVATION COMMISSION

P. O. BOX 871

SANTA FE, NEW MEXICO

August 16, 1963

C
O
P
Y

Mrs. Virginia A. Kittel
Clerk of the District Court
County Court House
Aztec, New Mexico

Re: Pubco Petroleum Corporation v.
Oil Conservation Commission of
New Mexico, et al., San Juan
County, No. 11637

Dear Mrs. Kittel:

Will you please file the enclosed Entry of
Appearance in the above case.

Very truly yours,

J. M. DURRETT, Jr.
Special Assistant
Attorney General

JMD/esr
Enclosure

KELLAHIN AND FOX

ATTORNEYS AT LAW

54½ EAST SAN FRANCISCO STREET

POST OFFICE BOX 1713

SANTA FE, NEW MEXICO

JASON W. KELLAHIN
ROBERT E. FOX

TELEPHONES
983-9396
982-2991

August 19, 1963

Mrs. Virginia A. Kittell
Clerk of the District Court
San Juan County
County Courthouse
Aztec, New Mexico

Re: Pubco Petroleum Corporation vs. Oil Conservation
Commission, et al., No. 11637, San Juan County.

Dear Mrs. Kittell:

Enclosed you will find entry of appearance of Kellahin
& Fox in association with T. P. Stockmar of Denver,
Colorado in behalf of respondent Consolidated Oil &
Gas, Inc., in the above cause, for filing.

Very truly yours,

JASON W. KELLAHIN

jwk:mas
enclosure

cc with enclosure: Mr. T. P. Stockmar
Mr. W. A. Keleher &
Mr. John B. Wittmann

C
O
P
Y

P. O. BOX 871
SANTA FE, NEW MEXICO

August 5, 1963

Mr. W. A. Keleher
Attorney at Law
First National Bank Building (West)
Albuquerque, New Mexico

Re: Pubco Petroleum Corporation
v. Oil Conservation Commission,
et al., San Juan County, No. 11637

Dear Mr. Keleher:

As it will be necessary for me to be out of the State during the last two weeks in August in order to attend USAR active duty training at Ft. Polk, Louisiana, I will appreciate the above case being set for hearing sometime subsequent to September 1, 1963.

Very truly yours,

J. M. DURRETT, Jr.
Attorney

JMD/esr

C
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Y

1 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW MEXICO

2 MANDATE

NO. 7590

3 THE STATE OF NEW MEXICO TO THE DISTRICT COURT sitting
4 within and for the County of San Juan, GREETING:

5 WHEREAS, in a certain cause lately pending before you,
6 numbered 11637 on your Civil Docket, wherein Pubco Petroleum
7 Corporation was Petitioner, and Oil Conservation Commission
8 of New Mexico, et al were Respondents, by your consideration
9 in that behalf judgment was entered against said Petitioner;
10 and
11

12 WHEREAS, said cause and judgment were afterwards brought
13 into our Supreme Court for review by Petitioner by appeal,
14 whereupon such proceedings were had that on March 1, 1965 an
15 opinion was handed down and the judgment of said Supreme Court
16 was entered affirming your judgment aforesaid, and remanding
17 said cause to you;

18 NOW, THEREFORE, this cause is hereby remanded to you for
19 such further proceedings therein as may be proper, if any, con-
20 sistent and in conformity with said opinion and said judgment.

21 WITNESS, The Honorable David W. Carmody,
22 Chief Justice of the Supreme Court
23 of the State of New Mexico, and
24 the seal of said Court this 26th
25 day of March, 1965.

26 James E. Green
27 Clerk of the Supreme Court
28 of the State of New Mexico
29
30
31
32

1 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW MEXICO

2 Friday, March 26, 1965

3
4 NO. 7590

5 PUBCO PETROLEUM CORPORATION,

6 Petitioner - Appellant,

7 vs.

San Juan County

8 OIL CONSERVATION COMMISSION OF
9 NEW MEXICO and CONSOLIDATED OIL
AND GAS, INC., a corporation,

10 Respondents - Appellees.

11
12 This matter coming on before the Court for consideration
13 on motion of Appellant for rehearing, and the Court having
14 considered said motion and being sufficiently advised in the
15 premises,

16 IT IS ORDERED that the motion for rehearing be and the
17 same is hereby denied, and the Clerk is directed to issue
18 Mandate forthwith.

19
20
21 ATTEST: A True Copy

22 *James E. Guen*
23 _____
Clerk of the Supreme Court
of the State of New Mexico

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW MEXICO

PUBCO PETROLEUM CORPORATION,

Appellant,

vs.

No. 7590

OIL CONSERVATION COMMISSION OF
NEW MEXICO and CONSOLIDATED OIL
AND GAS, INC., a corporation,

Appellees.

PETITION FOR REHEARING

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Albuquerque, New Mexico

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Special Assistant Attorney General

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Oil Conservation Commission
of New Mexico

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Denver, Colorado

Attorneys for Appellee
Consolidated Oil & Gas, Inc.

PETITION FOR REHEARING

Comes now appellant, Pubco, Petroleum Corporation by its attorneys and respectfully petitions the Court for rehearing in the above entitled and numbered cause, and as grounds therefore shows to the Court:

I

In the seventh paragraph of the Court's opinion the Court defines the term, "Party to such rehearing proceeding" as meaning only the party who has applied for rehearing and is dissatisfied with the results.

II

The Court's opinion quotes the applicable statute, being Sec. 65-3-22, 1953 Comp. Paragraph (b) of said Section reads, "Any party to such rehearing proceeding". Apparently this is the term the Court is construing. The effect of the Court's construction apparently is to change the meaning of the word "any" to "only".

III

In the interest of clarifying the use of the English language both for the benefit of the bar, future legislators and the public in general, it is respectfully submitted that in all good grace the Court should elaborate its opinion to indicate not only that the word "any" does not mean any one of numerous or several parties, but means "only" one. In view of the wording of the Court's opinion, it is respectfully submitted that members of the legislature should be advised by this Court what language is necessary to make the word "any" have its normal, accepted meaning in the English language as defined in Webster's New Collegiate Dictionary, 1960, which reads:

"an'y (en'i), adj. (AS. anig, fr. an one.)
1. Being one (or, pl., some) indiscrimin-
ately of whatever kind; no matter what one;
as, ask any uniformed man; lest any marks
show. . . ."

WHEREFORE, petitioner prays that in the interest of
clarity the Court's opinion be modified to set forth the actual
term or phrase that it is construing, namely, "Any party to such
rehearing proceeding" instead of, "Party to such rehearing pro-
ceeding".

Respectfully submitted,

W. A. KELEHER and JOHN B. TITTMANN

By /s/ John B. Tittmann
Attorneys for Appellant
First National Bank Building, West
Albuquerque, New Mexico

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW MEXICO

PUBCO PETROLEUM CORPORATION,

Appellant,

vs.

No. 7590

OIL CONSERVATION COMMISSION OF
NEW MEXICO and CONSOLIDATED OIL
AND GAS, INC., a corporation,

Appellees.

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

The undersigned attorney for appellant hereby certifies that he served a copy of appellant's petition for rehearing upon each of opposing counsel by mailing the same to them on March 17, 1965.

KELEHER & McLEOD and
JOHN B. TITTMANN

By /s/ John B. Tittmann
Attorneys for Appellant
First National Bank Bldg. West
Albuquerque, New Mexico

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW MEXICO

PUBCO PETROLEUM CORPORATION,

Petitioner-Appellant,

vs.

NO. 7 5 9 0

OIL CONSERVATION COMMISSION OF
NEW MEXICO and CONSOLIDATED OIL
AND GAS, INC., a corporation,

Respondents-Appellees.

APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF SAN JUAN COUNTY

McCULLOH, JUDGE

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Consolidated Oil & Gas, Inc.

O P I N I O N

COMPTON, Justice.

Pubco Petroleum Corporation appeals from an order dismissing its petition for review of an order of the Oil Conservation Commission of New Mexico.

On November 4, 1960, the Oil Conservation Commission entered an order prorating the Basin-Sakota Gas Pool in San Juan, Rio Arriba and Sandoval Counties. Production was allocated thereby on a "basis of 25 per cent acreage plus 75 per cent acreage times deliverability, * * * referred to as the 25-75 formula."

In February, 1962, Consolidated Oil and Gas, Inc., filed an application with the Commission to change the then existing formula which application was denied June 7, 1962. By timely action Consolidated applied for and was granted a rehearing at which additional testimony was taken and a new order was entered establishing the formula on a 40-60 per cent basis.

Pubco filed its petition in the district court for review of the Commission's order entered on rehearing, asserting its invalidity for various and sundry reasons. Motions to dismiss the petition were filed by both the Commission and Consolidated on the ground, among others, that Pubco had failed to exhaust its administrative remedies. The motions were sustained and Pubco has appealed.

Appellant contends that all required administrative remedies were exhausted when Consolidated was granted a rehearing. Appellees take an opposite view. They make the contention that appellant failed to exhaust its administrative remedies in not applying for a rehearing of the new Commission order.

These contentions require a construction of § 65-3-22, 1953 Comp., the pertinent part of which reads:

"(a) Within twenty [20] days after entry of any order or decision of the commission, any person affected thereby may file with the commission an

1 application for rehearing in respect of any matter
2 determined by such order or decision, setting forth
3 the respect in which such order or decision is
4 believed to be erroneous. The commission shall
5 grant or refuse any such application in whole or
6 in part within ten [10] days after the same is
7 filed and failure to act thereon within such
8 period shall be deemed a refusal thereof and a
9 final disposition of such application. In the
10 event the rehearing is granted, the commission may
11 enter such new order or decision after rehearing
12 as may be required under the circumstances.
13 (Emphasis ours.)

14 " (b) Any party to such rehearing proceeding,
15 dissatisfied with the disposition of the application
16 for rehearing, may appeal therefrom to the district
17 court of the county wherein is located any property
18 of such party affected by the decision, by filing
19 a petition for the review of the action of the
20 commission within twenty [20] days after the entry
21 of the order following rehearing or after the
22 refusal or rehearing as the case may be. Such
23 petition shall state briefly the nature of the
24 proceedings before the commission and shall set
25 forth the order or decision of the commission
26 complained of and the grounds of invalidity thereof
27 upon which the applicant will rely; Provided,
28 however, that the questions reviewed on appeal shall
29 be only questions presented to the commission by the
30 application for rehearing. * * * (Emphasis ours.)

31 We think appellees' position is sound. Admittedly,
32 appellant did not apply for a rehearing after entry of the new
33 order. Subsection (a) specifically required the filing of an
34 application for rehearing setting forth the claimed invalidity of
35 the order entered by the Commission. Its purpose is to afford the
36 Commission an opportunity to reconsider and correct an erroneous
37 decision. Nevertheless, Pubco relies strongly on subsection (b)
38 as affording a right of review of the order by the district court.
39 We fail to see where the subsection supports its claim. The sub-
40 section relates solely to a dissatisfied applicant and what he may
41 do following entry of an order on rehearing or the refusal of a
42 rehearing. The term "party to such rehearing proceeding" as used
43 in the subsection simply means a party who has applied for a re-
44 hearing and is dissatisfied with the disposition of his application.
45 The subsection is rather explicit; nowhere therein do we find the
46 right of review by the court, except by a dissatisfied applicant.

Thus, we reach the conclusion that appellant has failed to exhaust its statutory administrative remedies. It follows that the trial court was without jurisdiction to entertain a review of the order. Compare *Smith v. Southern Union Gas Co.*, 58 N.M. 197, 269 P.2d 745; *Jones v. Board of School Directors of Independent School Dist. No. 22*, 55 N.M. 195, 230 P.2d 321; *American Refrigerator Transit Co. v. Shepard*, 33 N.M. 271, 206 P.2d 551; *Samuel B. Franklin & Company v. Securities and Exchange Commission*, 290 F.2d 719, 368 U.S. 899, 82 S.Ct. 142, 7 L.Ed 2d 88.

Other questions are posed on appeal but the conclusion reached obviates our discussion and disposition of them.

The order should be affirmed, and IT IS SO ORDERED.

s/ L. C. Compton
Justice

WE COLOUR:

s/ David W. Carmody C. J.

s/ M. E. Noble J.

PUBCO V. OCC - SUPREME COURT, NO. 7590
ORAL ARGUMENT BY J. M. DURRETT

As Mr. Kellahin has pointed out, it is our position that the appellant's right to judicial review was limited by the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies and that the District Court correctly applied the doctrine in dismissing the appellant's petition for review.

It is also our position that the District Court did not commit error in dismissing the petition for review in view of the doctrine of separation of powers expressed in Art. III, Section 1 of the Constitution of New Mexico.

Appellees respectfully submit that the jurisdiction of the District Court was limited due to ^{the} ~~the~~ constitutional ^{provision} ~~division of~~ powers expressed in Art. III, Section 1 of the Constitution of New Mexico and the legislative nature and function of the Oil Conservation Commission.

In Continental Oil Company v. Oil Conservation Commission, 70 N.M. 310, this Court held that the function of the Commission is administrative and not quasi-judicial. As an administrative agency, the Commission acts as a branch of the legislature. Its only power is that power delegated to it by the legislature. ~~Its functions are, of necessity, legislative functions,~~ and the right to judicial review of a Commission order is a limited right granted by the legislature. In the absence of an express statutory provision granting the right to judicial review, the only jurisdiction the Court would have to review an order issued by the Oil Conservation Commission would be that jurisdiction that the Court has to review an act of the legislature. In connection with this point, I would like to call the

Court's attention to an article prepared by Mr. R. M. Williams, Assistant General Attorney for Phillips Petroleum Co., concerning the Nature and Effect of Conservation Orders, published in the Eighth Annual Rocky Mountain Mineral Law Institute publication on Oil & Gas. At page 437, Mr. Williams makes this comment:

"As in the case of all administrative law and regardless of what may appear to be characteristics similar to judicial orders, conservation orders, are, of necessity, legislative and must be so treated. Such orders are authorized by the legislature to carry out and give effect to a legislative function under standards prescribed by the legislature; they constitute a delegation of legislative authority. If other than legislative, the orders would violate the state constitutional provisions requiring a separation of powers as between the legislative, judicial and executive branches of government."

We submit that in considering an appeal from an order issued by the Oil Conservation Commission the Court is not a Court of general jurisdiction but is a Court of limited jurisdiction, and can exercise only the jurisdiction granted to it by the legislature. This Court has previously recognized this limitation in cases concerning appeals from actions by administrative agencies.

In Transcontinental Bus System v. State Corporation Commission,

56 N.M. 158, at page 167, this Court stated:

"The State Corporation Commission in these matters is an administrative board exercising a legislative function which courts are without power to control and review except by express constitutional or statutory authority. There are a few states having statutes that grant general appellate jurisdiction to the courts concerning orders of administrative boards such as the State Corporation Commission and in such states, construing such statutes giving general appellate jurisdiction, the courts have held that they have the same jurisdiction to hear and determine the appeals as in other civil cases. However, we find that in those states having statutes similar to ours where a court

is allowed to review the action of the Commission, the court is limited in the exercise of its powers to those expressly delegated by the statute."

The Court's limited jurisdiction was also recognized in the Continental case where this Court held that portions of Section 65-3-22(b) were unconstitutional contravening Art. III, Section 1 of the Constitution.

It is our contention that jurisdiction is not conferred upon the Court to review an order of the Oil Conservation Commission until the parties seeking review of the order have complied with the procedural requirements of the statute authorizing judicial review. The Court's jurisdiction to review a Commission order has been limited by the legislature in establishing a specific procedure to obtain judicial review of a Commission order. Section 65-3-22(a) provides that "within 20 days after entry of any order or decision of the Commission, any person affected thereby may file with the Commission an application for rehearing." This section also requires the Commission to grant or refuse the application within 10 days and provides that failure to act within 10 days shall be deemed a refusal and final disposition of the application. Section 65-3-22(b) provides that any party to such rehearing proceeding may appeal. We submit that in view of this language no jurisdiction has been conferred upon the Court by the legislature until the party seeking judicial review has filed an application for rehearing with the Commission and there has been final disposition of the application. This conclusion is also supported by the restrictive provision in Section 65-3-22(b) that the questions reviewed on appeal shall be only questions presented to the Commission by the application for rehearing. It is our contention that this restrictive provision limits the jurisdiction

of the Court and that no jurisdiction is conferred upon the Court until the party seeking judicial review has filed an application for rehearing with the Commission setting forth the respect in which such order or decision is believed to be erroneous. We submit that the statute clearly expresses a legislative intent that the Court will not have jurisdiction until the questions to be presented to the Court have first been presented to the Commission by the party seeking judicial review and the Commission has been given an opportunity to correct the alleged error.

To support this theory we would like to call the Court's attention to two cases that our research has disclosed since submission of our brief. Each of these cases involve an appeal from an order issued by an administrative agency under a statute substantially similar to the New Mexico statute and in each of these cases the appellant had requested a rehearing before the regulatory agency, a rehearing had been granted and the administrative agency had issued an order following rehearing from which an appeal was taken without filing an additional request for rehearing. In State ex rel Southwest Water Co. v. Public Service Commission, 173 S.W.2d 113 (1943), the Kansas City Court of Appeals, Missouri, stated:

"The last order, in fact, differed from the first in that the cause was dismissed and no reference was made thereon to 'without prejudice,' as was done in the first order; but if the language of the last order had been identical with that of the first, yet it was a new order and the circuit court was without jurisdiction to review it because no motion for rehearing had been filed before the Commission."

In Alton Railroad Company v. Illinois Commerce Commission, 407 Ill. 220, 95 N.E.2d 76 (1950), the Supreme Court of Illinois made this statement:

"The necessity of a new petition to place before the courts the issues raised by the 1947 order is further shown by the portion of Section 67 which specifically

provides that no one can urge or rely in any appeal upon grounds not set forth in an application for rehearing. It should be noted that this sentence was inserted in the statute by the 1935 legislature, showing an express intent that matters cannot be raised on appeal which the Commission has not had an opportunity to reconsider and correct if necessary on a petition for rehearing. By the same token, the statute prevents the raising of issues on appeal to the courts which were not previously presented to the Commission."

In connection with this case it should be noted that the Illinois statute contained the following provision:

"Only one rehearing shall be granted by the Commission; but this shall not be construed to prevent any party from filing a petition setting up a new and different state of facts after two years, and invoking the action of the Commission thereon."

The Court considered this phrase and determined that it did not refer to a rehearing prior to appeal but created a limitation upon a party from twice, or more, attempting to get an alteration of a Commission order within two years after its entry, and thereafter only on new and different facts.

As the appellant in this case did not file an application for rehearing with the Commission, the questions presented to the Court by the petition for review were not first presented to the Commission. As no jurisdiction is conferred upon the Court by the statute until these questions have first been presented to the Commission, the appeal was premature and subject to dismissal by the District Court for lack of jurisdiction.

We also submit that even if the Court should determine that the appellant is correct in the contention that the statute contemplates the filing of only one application for rehearing in a proceeding before the Commission and that this requirement was met when the application for rehearing was filed by Consolidated Oil & Gas, the District Court did not commit error in dismissing the petition for review. Since the questions raised in the appellant's petition for review

were not raised in the application for rehearing filed by Consolidated, the District Court did not have jurisdiction to consider these questions and could only dismiss the petition for review.

We therefore respectfully submit that the District Court's Order of Dismissal should be affirmed.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW MEXICO

PUBCO PETROLEUM CORPORATION,

Petitioner-Appellant,

-vs-

No. 7590

OIL CONSERVATION COMMISSION
OF NEW MEXICO and CONSOLIDATED
OIL & GAS, INC., a corporation,

Respondents-Appellees.

ANSWER BRIEF OF APPELLEES

OIL CONSERVATION COMMISSION OF NEW MEXICO

and

CONSOLIDATED OIL & GAS, INC.

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General

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INDEX

	Page
OBJECTION TO APPELLANT'S STATEMENT OF THE CASE	1
OBJECTION TO APPELLANT'S STATEMENT OF THE FACTS	2
ANSWER TO APPELLANT'S POINT I:	3
THE DISTRICT COURT LACKED JURISDICTION OVER THE SUBJECT MATTER OF APPELLANT'S PETITION FOR REVIEW AND DID NOT ERR IN DISMISSING THE SAME.	
A. The District Court lacked juris- diction over the subject matter of Appellant's petition for review for the reason that Appellant had not exhausted its adminis- trative remedies before the Com- mission.	
B. The Appellant's petition for review was subject to dismissal by the District Court as Appellant had failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted.	4
C. The District Court lacked juris- diction over the subject matter of appellant's petition for review as appellant had failed to join indispensable parties.	12
D. The District Court was without jurisdiction of the parties to and the subject matter of appel- lant's Petition for Reivew for the reason that the action was not timely filed, as provided by law.	14
CONCLUSION	15

CASES CITED

	Page
Aircraft and Diesel Equipment Corporation v. Hirsch 331 U.S. 752 67 S. Ct. 1493 91 L.Ed 1796 (1947)	9
American Refrigerator Transit Co. v. Shepard 54 N.M. 271 206 P2d 551 (1949)	8
American Trust & Savings Bank of Albuquerque v. Scobee 29 N.M. 463 224 P. 788 (1924)	12
Associated Petroleum Transport v. Shepard 54 N.M. 52 201 P.2d 772 (1949)	8
Continental Oil Company vs. Oil Conservation Commission 70 N.M. 310, 373 P.2d 809	10
Burguete v. Del Curto 49 N.M. 292 163 P.2d 257 (1945)	12, 13
In re Blatt 41 N.M. 269 67 P.2d 293	15
Jones v. Board of School Directors of Independent School Dist. No. 22 55 N.M. 195, 198 230 P.2d 321 (1951)	7, 8
Miller v. Doe 70 N.M. 432 374 P.2d 305	15
Samuel B. Franklin & Company v. Securities Exchange Commission 290 F2d 719 368 U.S. 889 82 S. Ct. 142 7 L.Ed 2d 88	11
Smith v. Southern Union Gas Company 58 N.M. 197, 200 269 P.2d 745 (1954)	7
State Game Commission v. Tackett 71 N.M. 400 379 P2d 54 (1952)	12

State v. W. S. Ranch Company	
69 N.M. 169	
364 P.2d 1036 (1961)	13
Taggader v. Montoya	
54 N.M. 18	
212 P.2d 1049	15
Transcontinental Bus System v. State Corporation	
Commission	
56 N.M. 158	
241 P.3d 829	10

OTHER AUTHORITIES

2 Am. Jur. Administrative Law Section 608	9
2 Am. Jur. Administrative Law Section 609	6
2 Am. Jur. Administrative Law Section 719	11
2 Am. Jur. Administrative Law Section 729	6

NEW MEXICO STATUTES

65-3-22, NMSA, 1953 Compilation	2, 4, 5, 6, 14, 16
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NEW MEXICO SESSION LAWS

L. 1941 C. 202, as amended	8
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW MEXICO

PUBCO PETROLEUM CORPORATION,

Petitioner-Appellant,

-vs-

No. 7590

OIL CONSERVATION COMMISSION OF
NEW MEXICO, et al.,

Respondents-Appellees.

OBJECTION TO APPELLANT'S STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Appellees accept appellant's Statement of the Case except that appellee Consolidated Oil & Gas, Inc., objects to appellant's statement that Oil Conservation Commission Order No. R-2259-B was dated July 3, 1963, but entered on July 9, 1963. It is the position of appellee Consolidated that the only information contained in the record in this case is that the order was dated, and presumably entered July 3, 1963 (Tr.5). Only in pleadings filed by appellant does the assertion that the order was entered on July 9, 1963 appear (Tr. 2, 25). This was denied by appellee Consolidated Oil & Gas, Inc. (Tr. 38).

OBJECTION TO APPELLANT'S STATEMENT OF THE FACTS

Appellee Consolidated Oil & Gas, Inc., accepts appellant's Statement of the Facts except that it is stated that "Within 20 days of the entry of that order, appellant filed in the District Court of San Juan County its Petition for Review, pursuant to Section 65-3-22, N.M.S.A. 1953 Comp." Order No. R-2259-B is dated July 3, 1953 (Tr.3). Appellant's Petition for Review was filed in the District Court of San Juan County on July 29, 1963 (Tr.1). The issue that the action was not timely filed as provided by law was raised by appellee Consolidated Oil & Gas, Inc., in the District Court in its motion to dismiss (Tr. 38). Appellee, Oil Conservation Commission, accepts appellant's statement of the facts.

ANSWER TO APPELLANT'S POINT I

THE DISTRICT COURT LACKED JURISDICTION OVER THE SUBJECT MATTER OF APPELLANT'S PETITION FOR REVIEW AND DID NOT ERR IN DISMISSING THE SAME.

- A. The District Court lacked jurisdiction over the subject matter of appellant's petition for review for the reason that appellant had not exhausted its administrative remedies before the Commission.
- B. The appellant's petition for review was subject to dismissal by the District Court as appellant had failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted.
- C. The District Court lacked jurisdiction over the subject matter of appellant's petition for review as appellant had failed to join indispensable parties.
- C. The District Court lacked jurisdiction over the subject matter of appellant's petition for review for the reason that the action was not timely filed as provided by law.

ARGUMENT AND AUTHORITIES

POINT I (PART A AND B)

THE DISTRICT COURT LACKED JURISDICTION OVER THE SUBJECT MATTER OF APPELLANT'S PETITION FOR REVIEW AND DID NOT ERR IN DISMISSING THE SAME.

- A. The District Court lacked jurisdiction over the subject matter of appellant's petition for review for the reason that appellant had not exhausted its administrative remedies before the Commission.
- B. The appellant's petition for review was subject to dismissal by the District Court as appellant had failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted.

Appellees submit that the District Court did not commit error in dismissing the Petition for review as the appellant failed to exhaust the administrative remedies provided by Section 65-3-22, NMSA, 1953 Comp., and the Court did not have jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action.

Appellees agree with appellant's statement that the right to obtain judicial review of an Oil Conservation Commission order is created by Section 65-3-22, NMSA, 1953 Comp., the pertinent part of which reads as follows:

"65-3-22. Rehearings--Appeals.--(a) Within twenty /20/ days after entry of any order or decision of the commission, any person affected thereby may file with the commission an application for rehearing in respect of any matter determined by such order or decision, setting forth the respect in which such order or decision is believed to be erroneous. The commission shall grant or refuse any such application in whole or in part within ten /10/ days after the same is filed and failure to act thereon within such period shall be deemed a refusal thereof and a final disposition of such application. In the event the rehearing is granted, the commission may enter such new order or decision after rehearing as may be required under the circumstances.

"(b) Any party to such rehearing proceeding, dissatisfied with the disposition of the application for rehearing, may appeal therefrom to the district court of the county wherein is located any property of such party affected by the decision, by filing a petition for the review of the action of the commission within twenty /20/ days after the entry of the order following rehearing or after the

refusal or /of?/ rehearing as the case may be. Such petition shall state briefly the nature of the proceedings before the commission and shall set forth the order or decision of the commission complained of and the grounds of invalidity thereof upon which the applicant will rely; Provided, however, that the questions reviewed on appeal shall be only questions presented to the commission by the application for rehearing. Notice of such appeal shall be served upon the adverse party or parties and the commission in the manner provided for the service of summons in civil proceedings. * * * ."

This statute specifically describes the procedure that must be followed to obtain judicial review of an order of the Oil Conservation Commission.

Appellees submit that the statute under consideration clearly expresses a legislative intent that the Commission be afforded an opportunity to reconsider its action before a right to judicial review exists. Section 65-3-22 (a), NMSA, 1953 Comp., requires that an application for rehearing set forth the respect in which the order is believed to be erroneous. It also requires the Commission to grant or refuse any such application in whole or in part within ten days after the same is filed and authorizes the Commission to enter such new order or decision after rehearing as may be required under the circumstances. This clearly expresses the legislative intent that the Commission must have an opportunity to reconsider its order before the right to judicial review exists even if the Commission only desires to reconsider the order in part.

Appellant has contended that the statute does not permit an application for rehearing of an order issued as a result of a rehearing. Appellees point out that Section 65-3-22(a), NMSA, 1953 Comp., permits the filing of an application for rehearing within twenty days after entry of any order. It also should be noted that the Commission must grant or refuse any such application in whole or in part within ten days after the same is filed and failure to act thereon within such

period shall be deemed a refusal thereof and a final disposition of the application. This also indicates the legislative intent that the Commission be given the opportunity to review any order before a right to judicial review exists. The legislative intent is clearly expressed in Section 65-3-22(b), NMSA, 1953 Comp., wherein the Legislature specifically provided that the questions reviewed on appeal shall be only questions presented to the Commission by the application for rehearing.

A discussion of the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is found in 2 Am. Jur. 2d, Administrative Law, Section 609, wherein the writer states as follows:

"Whether a party, in order to exhaust his administrative remedies after the administrative agency has reached its decision, must seek a rehearing, reconsideration, or modification of the decision is affected by statutes or regulations which require such action to be taken, by statutes or judicial doctrine which preclude urging on review matters which have not been presented to the administrative agency, by statutes which dispense with the requirement and, of course, by the existence of power to reconsider or modify."

Appellees submit that Section 65-3-22, NMSA, 1953 Comp., not only requires that action be taken to exhaust the administrative remedy by filing an application for rehearing, but also precludes urging on review matters which have not been presented to the administrative agency as the statute provides that the questions reviewed on appeal shall be only questions presented to the Commission by the application for rehearing. It also should be noted that there is no statute which dispenses with the requirement of filing an application for rehearing and that Section 65-3-22(a), NMSA, 1953 Comp. specifically provides that the Commission may enter such new order or decision after rehearing as may be required under the circumstances.

The Court's attention is called to 2 Am. Jr. 2d, Administrative Law, Section 729, containing a discussion of the interpretation placed

upon various types of statutes which reads, in part, as follows:

"Some statutes relating to particular agencies provide that no cause of action shall accrue in any court * * * unless such person shall have made application to the agency for a rehearing on the order or decision involved. Other statutes provide that a petition for statutory review must be filed within a specified time after an application for rehearing is denied or after rendition of decision on a rehearing, and they also are deemed to make it necessary to file a petition for rehearing and procure a ruling thereon before the matter can be reviewed in court."

Although our statutes do not specifically provide that no cause of action shall accrue in any court, appellee submit that the statute under consideration certainly provides that a petition for statutory review must be filed within a specified time (twenty days) after an application for rehearing is denied or after rendition of decision on a rehearing.

Several New Mexico decisions have applied the doctrine of administrative exhaustion of administrative remedies. In Smith v. Southern Union Gas Company, 58 N.M. 197, 200, 269 P.2d 745 (1954), a proceeding to enjoin the gas company from turning off the plaintiff's gas and to recover damages for discrimination, the trial court found that it did not have jurisdiction as the plaintiff had not exhausted his administrative remedies provided by the Public Utility Act and entered a judgment of dismissal. The Supreme Court, affirmed, stating:

"it has been the policy of this Court since the decision in First National Bank of Raton v. McBride, 1915, 20 N.M. 381, 149 P. 353, that where a remedy has been provided before an administrative commission for one claiming discrimination in the matter of taxes, he must exhaust his administrative remedies before resorting to the courts."

In Jones v. Board of School Directors of Independent School Dist. No. 22, 55 N.M. 195, 198, 230 P.2d 321 (1951), an action for a declaration of plaintiff's rights under the Teachers Tenure Law

and for damages for breach of contract, the Supreme Court affirmed the District Court order dismissing the complaint and stated:

"It is to be observed that the order of dismissal does not state the ground upon which the court rests the order. Nevertheless, it appearing from the stipulation that the plaintiff had failed to pursue and exhaust his statutory remedies, this omission supports the order of dismissal, even if the order had been expressly placed upon another ground."

It was stipulated in the above case that the plaintiff took none of the statutory steps for the hearing provided by the Teachers Tenure Law, L. 1941, c. 202, as amended. The Tenure law provides:

"Notice to discontinue the service of such classroom teacher * * * shall specify a place and date * * * at which time said teacher may at his or her discretion appear before the board for hearing. If the decision * * * is not satisfactory * * * he or she may appeal to the State Board of Education."

The Court made the following statement at page 198 concerning the teachers duty to exhaust the remedies provided by statute:

"The statute imposes on the teacher, who so desires an obligation to call for a hearing before the local board, to be followed by an appeal to State Board of Education in the event decision of the local board is unsatisfactory, before resorting to the courts for relief."

Appellees submit the statute in this case is substantially similar to the statute in the Jones case, and the only reasonable interpretation that can be placed upon such a statute is that the administrative agency must be given an opportunity to consider the complaining party's allegations before a right to judicial review exists. In the case before the Court, the Commission was not given such an opportunity. Appellant did not file an application for rehearing.

It also has been held in cases involving the State Tax Commission that all administrative remedies must be exhausted before resorting to the courts. See Associated Petroleum Transport v. Shepard, 54 N.M. 52, 201 P.2d 772 (1949) and American Refrigerator Transit Co. v. Shepard 54 N.M. 271, 206 P.2d 551 (1949).

The appellant contends in its Brief-in Chief that the statute does not permit the filing of application for a rehearing once an order has issued as the result of a rehearing. Appellees submit that the statute not only permits the filing of such an application, but

that the same is required under the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies. The doctrine does not require merely the initiation of prescribed administrative procedures, it requires the exhausting of administrative remedies by pursuing them to their appropriate conclusion and awaiting their final outcome before seeking judicial intervention. Aircraft and Diesel Equipment Corporation v. Hirsch, 331 U.S. 752, 67 S. Ct. 1493, 91 L.Ed. 1796 (1947); 2 Am. Jur. 2d, Administrative Law, Section 608. Appellees submit that the appellant not only failed to pursue its administrative remedies and wait their final outcome, but did not initiate the prescribed administrative procedures in the case before the Court as appellant failed to file an application for rehearing with the Commission setting forth the respect in which it believed the order to be erroneous.

The appellant states in its Brief-in-Chief that it would have lost its right to judicial review had it not filed its Petition for Review within twenty days following entry of the Commission's Order. Appellees submit that this contention is without merit. The statute specifically provides that any party to such rehearing proceeding may appeal to the District Court by filing a petition for the review of the action of the Commission within twenty days after the entry of the order following rehearing or after the refusal of rehearing as the case may be.

Appellant cannot escape the plain, clear, concise provision of the statute that "the questions reviewed on appeal shall be only questions presented to the Commission by the application for rehearing"

This provision of the statute is something more than a direction to the parties that they must seek rehearing before the Commission before resorting to the court. It is a limitation on the jurisdiction of the court to review the action of the Commission.

In Transcontinental Bus System vs. State Corporation Commission,
56 N.M. 158, 241 P.2d 829, this court pointed out:

"The State Corporation Commission in these matters is an administrative board exercising a legislative function which courts are without power to control and review except by express constitutional or statutory authority. * * * However, we find that in those states having statutes similar to ours where a court is allowed to review the action of the Commission, the court is limited in the exercise of its powers to those expressly delegated in the statute."

The Oil Conservation Commission, like the State Corporation Commission in its exercise of power under the motor carrier act, is a creature of the legislature, exercising legislative functions. 70 N.M. 310, 373 P.2d 809.
Continental Oil Co., vs. Oil Conservation Commission/ It is submitted that district courts, under the Oil Conservation Commission act, are limited in their review to the review expressly authorized in the statute, which can only mean the court can review only matters presented in a petition for rehearing before the Commission.

Assuming that appellant in this case could have appealed for a review of matters raised in the petition for rehearing before the commission by the appellee Consolidated Oil & Gas, Inc., it did not do so. It appealed, instead, from the order entered by the commission pursuant to that rehearing, making a direct attack on the later order (Tr. 1).

The only orders that could be reviewed under the provisions of the statute are orders that have been subject of a petition for rehearing filed with the Commission. If not, the requirements of the statute that "the questions reviewed on appeal shall be only questions presented to the Commission by the application for rehearing," would be absolutely meaningless. To frame his pleadings before the district court the statute requires a petition for rehearing by the dissatisfied party. Otherwise an appellant would be limited to questions raised by another party under the circumstances

that exist in this case.

Appellant has argued that had it filed a petition for rehearing before the Commission its appeal to the court would be barred as not timely filed. It has been held that the timely filing of a petition for agency reconsideration tolls the time for appeal, and that an appeal taken within the designated time for appeal after termination of the petition for reconsideration is timely. Samuel B. Franklin & Company vs. Securities Exchange Commission 290 F2d 719, Cert. denied, 368 U. S. 889, 82 S. Ct. 142, 7 L.Ed2d 88; 2 Am. Jur.2d, Administrative Law, Sec. 719.

As the appellant did not file an application for rehearing, the District Court could not consider the questions raised in its petition for review. The petition for review (Tr. 1) therefore necessarily failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. The same conclusion is inevitable if it is considered the appeal is on the basis of the application for rehearing filed by Consolidated Oil & Gas, Inc. None of the allegations contained in the Consolidated application for rehearing are contained in appellant's petition for review (Tr. 31-37).

The scope of the court's review being limited by statute, and none of the matters covered by the statute having been presented by appellant, the court could only conclude that appellant had failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted.

POINT I (PART C)

THE DISTRICT COURT LACKED JURISDICTION OVER THE SUBJECT MATTER OF APPELLANT'S PETITION FOR REVIEW AND DID NOT ERR IN DISMISSING THE SAME.

- C. The District Court lacked jurisdiction over the subject matter of appellant's petition for review as appellant had failed to join indispensable parties.

Appellees submit that the District Court did not commit error in dismissing the Petition for Review as the appellant had failed to join indispensable parties and the Court did not have jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action. Only the Commission and Consolidated Oil & Gas, Inc., were joined as defendants (Tr. 1, 25, 26). In American Trust & Savings Bank of Albuquerque v. Scobee 29 N.M. 436, 224 P. 788 (1924), the Court adopted the following test for indispensable party:

"There is a general rule that all persons whose interests will necessarily be affected by any decree in a given case, are necessary and indispensable parties, and the Court will not proceed to a decree without them."

This rule has been specifically affirmed in more recent cases. See Burquete v. Del Curto, 49 N.M. 292, 163 P.2d 257 (1945) and State Game Commission v. Tackett, 71 N.M. 400, 379 P.2d 54 (1962). In both of these recent cases, the above-quoted language of the Scobee case has been specifically adopted.

As the Commission order complained of by appellant concerns a formula that allocates allowable gas production among all the operators in the Basin-Dakota Gas Pool, it is obvious that a change in the formula will necessarily directly affect the amount of gas every operator in the pool is permitted to produce. An examination of Exhibit A of Order No. R-2259-B attached to the Petition for Review established that there were numerous parties whose interests would necessarily be affected by a decree in the case (Tr. 10-24). Exhibit A of Order No. R-2259-B also indicates the extent that the

formula affects these parties. Although the appellant may argue the hardship of joining all of the operators in the Basin-Dakota Gas Pool, it has been held that all indispensable parties must be joined even if such parties cannot for any reason be brought before the Court. Burquete v. Del Curto, supra; State v. W. S. Ranch Company, 69 N.M. 169, 364 P.2d 1036 (1961).

POINT I (PART D)

THE DISTRICT COURT LACKED JURISDICTION OVER THE
SUBJECT MATTER OF APPELLANT'S PETITION FOR RE-
VIEW AND DID NOT ERR IN DISMISSING THE SAME.

- D. The District Court was without jurisdiction of the parties to and the subject matter of appellant's Petition for Review for the reason that the action was not timely filed, as provided by law.

Appellant's right to review of the Commission's orders is derived from the provisions of Section 65-3-22(b), where it is provided:

"(b) Any party to such rehearing proceeding, dissatisfied with the disposition of the application for rehearing, may appeal therefrom to the district court of the county wherein is located any property of such party affected by the decision, by filing a petition for the review of the action of the Commission within twenty /20/ days after the entry of the order following rehearing or after the refusal or /of?/ rehearing as the case may be. * * * ."

The appellee Consolidated Oil and Gas, Inc., takes the position that there was no compliance with this section of the statute, but is not joined by the appellee Oil Conservation Commission of New Mexico in this position.

Appellant makes the assertion that the order appealed from, Order No. R-2259-B, though dated July 3, 1963, was entered on July 9, 1963. In doing so, appellant is making a legal conclusion based upon facts not before the court.

Insofar as the record in this proceeding is concerned, the order appealed from is dated July 3, 1963, (Tr. 5). Appellant's Petition for Review was filed in the District Court of San Juan County on July 29, 1963 (Tr. 1). The issue that the action was not timely filed in the District Court was raised by the appellee Consolidated Oil & Gas, Inc., in its motion to dismiss (Tr. 38). This defense was at no time

waived by the appellee Consolidated Oil & Gas, Inc., although it was not argued by the appellee Oil Conservation Commission. The appellee Oil Conservation Commission in fact appears to have admitted that the cause was timely filed in the District Court (Tr.29). Such an admission cannot, however, serve as a waiver of the defense by Consolidated in this proceeding.

The record in this proceeding, other than the bare assertions made in appellant's pleadings (Tr. 2, 25,), is devoid of anything to support the contention that the order of the Commission, dated on its face as July 3, 1963, was entered on July 9, 1963.

Under these circumstances it can only be concluded that the date of the order governs, and that the petition for review by appellants was not filed in the District Court within twenty days after entry of the order.

In the absence of a statute authorizing it, there can be no appeal from the decision of a special tribunal. Taggader v. Montoya, 54 N.M. 18, 212 P.2d 1049. As appellant has stated in its brief, it hardly requires citation of authority for the proposition that filing within the time specified in the statute is jurisdictional. Miller vs. Doe, 70 N.M. 432, 374 P.2d 305. The timely filing of the appeal is essential to the court's jurisdiction. In re Blatt, 41 N.M. 269; 67P.2d 293.

C O N C L U S I O N

It is respectfully submitted that the appellant did not comply with the provisions of Sec. 65-3-22, NMSA, 1953 Compilation, in that it did not apply to the Oil Conservation Commission of New Mexico for rehearing, and that the District Court was without jurisdiction of the case; that the appellant's petition for review did not state a claim upon which relief could be granted; that appellant failed to name indispensable parties to the action before the District Court; and that the proceeding was not timely filed, as provided by Sec. 65-3-22, NMSA, 1953 Compilation. The District Court therefore did not err in dismissing appellant's petition for review.

Respectfully submitted,

EARL E. HARTLEY
Attorney General

By _____
J. M. Durrett
Special Assistant Attorney General

ATTORNEYS FOR OIL CONSERVATION
COMMISSION

KELLAHIN & FOX
Santa Fe, New Mexico

By _____
Jason W. Kellahin

T. P. STOCKMAR
Denver, Colorado

ATTORNEYS FOR CONSOLIDATED OIL & GAS,
INC.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW MEXICO

Cases to be Submitted

Monday
February 1, 1965
9:00 A. M.

No. 7552

Quirina DesGeorges, et al,
Appellants

vs.

Richard Grainger, et al,
Appellees

Stephen A. Mitchell
Thomas J. Russell
of the Illinois Bar

Matias A. Zamora
Ernest E. Valdez
John E. Conway
for Appellees Graingers
R. Howard Brandenburg
for Appellee Frances Martin

No. 7576

Kenneth A. Heron, Appellant

vs.

Truman Smith, Appellee

Kenneth Heron, pro se

Standley, Kegel, Campos & Cook

No. 7573

J. H. Thompson, Appellant
and Cross-Appellee

vs.

H. B. Zachry Co., a corporation,
Appellee & Cross-Appellant

Shipley, Seller & Whorton
W. C. Whatley
R. E. Riordan

Keleher & McLeod
T. B. Keleher
Russell Moore

No. 7590

Pubco Petroleum Corporation,
Appellant

vs.

Oil Conservation Commission of
New Mexico, et al, Appellees

Keleher & McLeod
John B. Tittman

Earl E. Hartley, Attorney General
J. M. Durrett, Jr., Special Asst.
Atty. Gen. for Oil Conservation
Commission of New Mexico
Kellahin & Fox
T. P. Stockmar, Denver, Colorado,
for Consolidated Oil & Gas, Inc.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW MEXICO

Cases to be Submitted

Tuesday
February 2, 1965
9:00 A. M.

(No. 7584 CONSOLIDATED

(Martha V. Hambaugh, Appellant

(vs.

(James M. Peoples, et al, Appellees

(No. 7585

(Mildred Lillybell Peoples, Appellant

(vs.

(James M. Peoples, et al, Appellees

Dale B. Dilts
Glenn O. Young
Sapulpa, Oklahoma

Rodey, Dickason, Sloan, Akin & Robb
for Appellees Stephen D. Hambaugh,
John W. Myers, Alan Jacobson,
Ruth Lewis, Sandia Ranch Sanitor-
ium, Inc.

Alexander F. Sceresse
William J. Bingham
for Appellee Margeurite K. Armijo
Stanley P. Zuris
for Appellee Edward G. Parham
Irving E. Moore
for Appellee David F. Cargo
Edward J. Apcdaca
for Appellees H. Richard Black-
hurst, Mary Ware, Windrey Ware
Smith, Kiker and Ransom
for Appellee Eva C. Thomas
Sutin and Jones
for Appellee Richard C. Civerolo

No. 7583

Major Oil Development Co., Appellant

vs.

First National Bank of Albuquerque,
Appellee

Dale B. Dilts

Rodey, Dickason, Sloan, Akin & Robb
John P. Eastham
Duane C. Gilkey

No. 7589 - BRIEFS

Daniel John Mayer, et al, Appellees

vs.

Dept. of Public Welfare of the State
of New Mexico, Appellant

Dale B. Dilts

Earl E. Hartley, Attorney General
Mrs. Julia C. Southerland,
Special Asst. Atty. Gen.

No. 7592 - BRIEFS

Charles Ray McAfoos, Appellant

vs.

Borden Implement Co., Employer, and
The Travelers Insurance Companies,
Insurer - Appellees

Dan B. Buzzard

Smith, Smith and Tharp

Supreme Court of the State of New Mexico
Santa Fe, New Mexico Jan. 5, 1965

Dear Sir:

Cause No. 7590
Pubco Petroleum Corp v. O.C.C. of N. M.
has been placed on the calendar for submission to the Court upon
oral argument { on February 1, 1965, 1965, at
~~xxxxxx~~
9 o'clock a.m.

Please return to me promptly copy of transcript of the record in this case, if
you have one.

Laurel Green
Clerk of Supreme Court

MAIN OFFICE OCC

1964 MAR 24 AM 8:18

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW MEXICO

PUBCO PETROLEUM CORPORATION,

Petitioner and Appellant,

vs.


No. 7590

OIL CONSERVATION COMMISSION OF
NEW MEXICO and CONSOLIDATED OIL
AND GAS, INC., a corporation,

Respondents and Appellees.

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

JOHN B. TITTMANN, one of the attorneys for
Petitioner and Appellant, does hereby certify that he
caused copies of Appellant's Brief in Chief to be mailed
to J. M. Durrett, Jr., Attorney at Law, Oil Conservation
Commission, State Capitol Building, Santa Fe, New Mexico,
and to Kellahin and Fox, Attorneys at Law, P. O. Box 1713,
Santa Fe, New Mexico, with sufficient postage attached, on
the 23 day of March, 1964.


JOHN B. TITTMANN
One of the Attorneys for Petitioner
and Appellant
First National Bank Bldg.-West
Albuquerque, New Mexico

MAIN OFFICE OCC

1964 MAR 24 AM 8:18

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW MEXICO

PUBCO PETROLEUM CORPORATION,

Petitioner and Appellant,

vs.

No. 7590

OIL CONSERVATION COMMISSION OF
NEW MEXICO and CONSOLIDATED OIL
AND GAS, INC., a corporation,

Respondents and Appellees.

APPELLANT'S BRIEF IN CHIEF

W. A. KELEHER and
JOHN B. TITTMANN

Attorneys for Petitioner
and Appellant
First National Bank Bldg.-West
Albuquerque, New Mexico

I N D E X

	<u>Page</u>
STATEMENT OF THE CASE	1
STATEMENT OF FACTS	2
POINT RELIED UPON FOR REVERSAL	3
ARGUMENT AND AUTHORITIES	3
POINT I	3
THE DISTRICT COURT HAD JURISDICTION OF THE PARTIES TO AND THE SUBJECT MATTER OF APPELLANT'S PETITION FOR REVIEW AND ERRED IN DISMISSING THE SAME.	
CONCLUSION	6

PRIMARY AUTHORITIES

CASES:

Continental Oil Co. vs. Oil Conservation Commission, 70 N.M. 310, 373; P.2d 809 (1962)	5
Miller vs. Doe, 70 N.M. 432, 374; P.2d 305 (1962). . .	5
Ross vs. Industrial Commission, 82 Ariz. 9, 307 P.2d 612 (1957)	5

STATUTES:

New Mexico Statutes Annotated, 1953 Comp. Section 65-3-22	2, 3, 4, 5, 6
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SECONDARY AUTHORITY

2 Am. Jur. 2d, Administrative Law, Section 718 . . .	5
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Appellee, CONSOLIDATED OIL & GAS, INC., applied to the OIL CONSERVATION COMMISSION OF NEW MEXICO for a change in the proration formula of gas in the Basin Dakota Gas Pool in San Juan and Rio Arriba Counties. The case was docketed by the Commission as No. 2504 (TR-1).

The case was heard by the Commission on April 18 through 21, 1962. On June 7, 1962 the Commission entered its order No. R-2259 denying Consolidated's application for modification of the proration formula (TR-1).

Thereafter Consolidated filed an application for rehearing, which was heard by the Commission on February 14, 1963. After the rehearing, the Commission issued its order No. R-2259-A, dated July 3, 1963 but entered on July 9, 1963, which order granted Consolidated's application and changed the proration formula for the Basin Dakota Gas Pool (TR-2).

On July 29, 1963 Appellant, PUBCO PETROLEUM CORPORATION, filed in the District Court of San Juan County its Petition For Review of Commission order No. R-2259-B, which was docketed in said court as No. 11637 (TR-1). Notice of Appeal was duly given (TR-25,26) and Appellees, OIL CONSERVATION COMMISSION OF NEW MEXICO and CONSOLIDATED OIL & GAS, INC., both filed entries of appearance (TR-27,28).

Appellee Commission filed a reply to the Petition For Review raising affirmative defenses (TR-29), and Appellee Consolidated filed a Motion to Dismiss said Petition For Review (TR-38).

The District Court, after argument on the Commission's affirmative defenses and Consolidated's Motion to Dismiss, entered its order on October 28, 1963 dismissing Appellant's Petition For Review (TR-42).

Notice of Appeal was filed October 31, 1963, together with Praecipe for the entire record (TR-43, 45). The time within which to file the transcript was extended to February 28, 1964, and the transcript was duly filed on said date (TR-46).

STATEMENT OF FACTS

All of the facts necessary for the determination of this appeal are contained in the foregoing Statement of the Case. In brief summary, they are that Consolidated filed an application with the Commission for modification of proration formula for the Basin Dakota Gas Pool in San Juan and Rio Arriba Counties, to which case Appellant was a party. The case was heard by the Commission, and it entered its order denying Consolidated's application. Consolidated filed with the Commission an application for rehearing, which was granted. Upon rehearing the Commission entered its order granting Consolidated's application for a change in proration formula and changing said formula. Within 20 days of the entry of that order, Appellant filed in the District Court of San Juan County its Petition for Review, pursuant to Section 65-3-22 N.M.S.A. 1953 Comp. The Petition

For Review was dismissed by the District Court of San Juan County without indicating in the court's order any reason for the dismissal.

POINT RELIED UPON FOR REVERSAL

POINT I

THE DISTRICT COURT HAD JURISDICTION OF THE PARTIES TO AND THE SUBJECT MATTER OF APPELLANT'S PETITION FOR REVIEW AND ERRED IN DISMISSING THE SAME.

ARGUMENT AND AUTHORITIES

POINT I

THE DISTRICT COURT HAD JURISDICTION OF THE PARTIES TO AND THE SUBJECT MATTER OF APPELLANT'S PETITION FOR REVIEW AND ERRED IN DISMISSING THE SAME.

Appellant's right to obtain a judicial review of an order of the OIL CONSERVATION COMMISSION OF NEW MEXICO is created by statute, namely Section 65-3-22 N.M.S.A. 1953 Comp., which, in pertinent part, reads as follows:

"65-3-22. Rehearings-Appeals.--(a) Within twenty (20) days after entry of any order or decision of the commission, any person affected thereby may file with the commission an application for rehearing in respect of any matter determined by such order or decision, setting forth the respect in which such order or decision is believed to be erroneous. The commission shall grant or refuse any such application in whole or in part within ten (10) days after the same is filed and failure to act thereon within such period shall be deemed a refusal thereof and a final disposition of such application. In the event the rehearing is granted, the commission may enter such new order or decision after rehearing as may be required under the circumstances.

"(b) Any party to such rehearing proceeding, dissatisfied with the disposition of the application

for rehearing, may appeal therefrom to the district court of the county wherein is located any property of such party affected by the decision, by filing a petition for the review of the action of the commission within twenty (20) days after the entry of the order following rehearing or after the refusal (of?) or rehearing as the case may be. Such petition shall state briefly the nature of the proceedings before the commission and shall set forth the order or decision of the commission complained of and the grounds of invalidity thereof upon which the applicant will rely; Provided, however, that the questions reviewed on appeal shall be only questions presented to the commission by the application for rehearing. Notice of such appeal shall be served upon the adverse party or parties and the commission in the manner provided for the service of summons in civil proceedings...."

The trial court did not indicate the basis or reason for its decision dismissing Appellant's Petition For Review. Appellees, by motion and response, based their request for dismissal on a number of grounds, which may be summarized as follows: Failure of Appellant to exhaust its administrative remedies; Appellant's Petition was not timely filed; failure to join indispensable parties and the Court's lack of jurisdiction of the subject matter.

In argument to the trial court, Appellees' main reliance was upon the contention that Appellant had failed to exhaust its administrative remedies in that it had not applied for a rehearing on the order of the Commission issued after the rehearing applied for by Consolidated. That the Appellant's Petition For Review was not timely filed, was not seriously urged and could not be for the reason that it is alleged in paragraph two of the Petition For Review that Commission order No. R-2259-B, although dated July 3, was

entered July 9, 1963, which allegation was admitted by the Commission in its reply to the Petition and the Petition For Review was filed within 20 days of such entry as provided by statute.

It is respectfully submitted that Appellant did exhaust its administrative remedies. Section 65-3-22 does not require or even permit an application for rehearing of an order issued on rehearing. The statute contemplates only one rehearing, which was held by the Commission on the application of Consolidated.

If Appellant had not filed its Petition For Review within 20 days after the entry of the order following rehearing, it would lose its right to judicial review, and the Court would be without jurisdiction. It hardly requires citation of authority for the proposition that filing within the time specified in the statute is jurisdictional. Miller vs. Doe, 70 N.M. 432, 374 P.2d 305 (1962); Ross vs. Industrial Commission, 82 Ariz. 9, 307 P.2d 612 (1957); 2 Am. Jur. 2d, Administrative Law, Sec. 718; Continental Oil Co. vs. Oil Conservation Commission, 70 N.M. 310, 373 P.2d 809 (1962).

The statute does not require Appellant to file a second application for rehearing after the Commission has already granted and held one rehearing. In fact, the statute does not permit or provide for a second application for rehearing. The statute is plain and specific. It grants the right of appeal to any party to a Commission rehearing preceeding from the Commission order on rehearing by filing a petition for review within 20 days after the

entry of "...the order following rehearing...". Had Appellant filed a second application for rehearing before the Commission and not filed its Petition For Review of order No. R-2259-B within 20 days from July 9, 1963 or after July 29, 1963, the District Court would be without jurisdiction of the appeal.


CONCLUSION

It is respectfully submitted that Appellant followed and complied with Section 65-3-22 N.M.S.A. 1953 Comp.; that the District Court erred in dismissing the appeal and should have heard and decided the same on its merits.

Respectfully submitted,

W. A. KELEHER and
JOHN B. TITTMANN

By (SIGNED) JOHN B. TITTMANN
Attorneys for Petitioner and
Appellant
First National Bank Bldg.-West
Albuquerque, New Mexico



Virginia A. Kittell
CLERK

STATE OF ANEW MEXICO

COUNTY OF SAN JUAN

IN THE DISTRICT COURT

PUBCO PETROLEUM,

Petitioner,

vs.

No. 11637

OIL CONSERVATION COMMISSION OF
NEW MEXICO and CONSOLIDATED
OIL AND GAS, INC., a corporation,

Respondents.

O R D E R

This matter having come on to be heard before the Court upon Motion of Appellants, for an Order extending the time within which to file the transcript upon appeal, and the Court being otherwise fully advised in the premises,

IT, THEREFORE, ORDERED, that the time within which to file the transcript upon appeal be and the same hereby is extended until the 28th day of February, 1964.

C. C. McCULLOH
DISTRICT JUDGE

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF SAN JUAN COUNTY
STATE OF NEW MEXICO

PUBCO PETROLEUM CORPORATION,

Petitioner,

vs.

No. 11637

OIL CONSERVATION COMMISSION OF
NEW MEXICO, and CONSOLIDATED
OIL AND GAS, INC., a corporation,

Respondents.

PUBCO - PRAECIPE
(No. 11,637)

P R A E C I P E

TO: VIRGINIA A. KITTELL
Clerk of the District Court
Eleventh Judicial District
San Juan County, New Mexico

Please prepare the transcript of the record in
the above entitled cause, including therein each and every
document and exhibit attached to such document, if any,
including but not limited to the following:

1. Petition For Review filed by PUBCO PETROLEUM
CORPORATION with Exhibit 1 to such Petition, said Exhibit 1
being a true and correct copy of Order No. R-2259-B of the
Oil Conservation Commission.
2. Notice of Appeal to Oil Conservation Commission
of New Mexico, Consolidated Oil and Gas, Inc., and all of the
adverse parties.
3. Certificate of Service.

4. Entry of Appearance of James M. Durrett, Jr.
for Oil and Gas Conservation Commission.
5. Entry of Appearance of Kellahin & Fox and
T. P. Stockmar for Consolidated Oil and Gas, Inc.
6. Reply to Petition For Review of Respondent,
Oil Conservation Commission of New Mexico, with Exhibit A.
7. Motion of Respondent, Consolidated Oil and
Gas, Inc.
8. Motion For Consolidation of Causes 11637 and
11685.
9. Order of dismissal entered October 28, 1963.
10. Notice of Appeal to Supreme Court of the State
of New Mexico.
11. This Praecipe.

Respectfully submitted,

W. A. KELEHER,
JOHN B. TITTMANN and
WILLIAM B. KELEHER

By (SIGNED) WILLIAM B. KELEHER
Attorneys for Petitioner
First National Bank Bldg. West
Albuquerque, New Mexico

I hereby certify that I caused
a copy of the foregoing Praecipe
to be mailed to opposing counsel
of record this 30 day of October
1963.

(SIGNED) WILLIAM B. KELEHER
WILLIAM B. KELEHER

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF SAN JUAN COUNTY
STATE OF NEW MEXICO

PUBCO PETROLEUM CORPORATION,
Petitioner,

vs.

No. 11637

OIL CONSERVATION COMMISSION OF
NEW MEXICO, and CONSOLIDATED
OIL AND GAS, INC., a corporation,
Respondents.

PUBCO
NOTICE OF APPEAL

NOTICE OF APPEAL

Please take notice that the petitioner, PUBCO
PETROLEUM CORPORATION, hereby appeals to the Supreme Court
of the State of New Mexico from the order of the District
Court for the District of San Juan County entered in the office
of the Clerk of said Court on October 28, 1963, dismissing the
Petition For Review.

Respectfully submitted,

W. A. KELEHER,
JOHN B. TITTMANN and
WILLIAM B. KELEHER

By (SIGNED) WILLIAM B. KELEHER
Attorneys for Petitioner
First National Bank Building West
Albuquerque, New Mexico

I hereby certify that I caused
a copy of the foregoing notice
to be mailed to opposing counsel
of record this 29 day of October
1963.

(SIGNED) WILLIAM B. KELEHER
WILLIAM B. KELEHER

State of New Mexico
Eleventh Judicial District Court

CHAMBERS OF
C. C. McCULLOH
JUDGE, DIV. 1

Aster

MAIN OFFICE OCC

TELEPHONE FE 4-6151

October 30, 1963
1963 OCT 31 AM 8:36

Mr. William B. Keleher
Attorney at Law
First National Bank Building
Albuquerque, New Mexico


Re: Pubco Petroleum Corporation, vs. Oil Conservation
Commission, et al, No. 11637, San Juan County.

Dear Mr. Keleher:

Replying to your letter dated October 28, 1963, I
had already received the proposed orders from Mr. Durrett
and had signed and filed the order initialed by Durrett
and Kellahin, before receiving your letter.

Best personal regards.

Very truly yours,


C. C. McCULLOH
District Judge

CCM:vf

cc: Mr. J. M. Durrett, Jr.

Mr. Jason W. Kellahin

State of New Mexico
Eleventh Judicial District Court
Aztec

MAIN OFFICE OCC

CHAMBERS OF
C. C. McCULLOH
JUDGE, DIV. 1

October 28, 1963

1963 OCT 29 AM 8:30 TELEPHONE FE 4-6151

Mr. J. M. Durrett, Jr.
Attorney
Oil Conservation Commission
P.O. Box 871
Santa Fe, New Mexico


Re: Pubco Petroleum Corporation vs. Oil Conservation
Commission, et al, No. 11637, San Juan County.

Dear Jimmie:

I have signed the order in the above-entitled cause
which was submitted by Jason Kellahin, and it is being
filed as of the above date.

Best personal regards,

Very truly yours,



C. C. McCULLOH
District Judge

CCM:vf

cc: Mr. Jason Kellahin
Mr. William B. Kelleher

MAIN OFFICE OCC

1963 OCT 29 AM 9:31

ZIP - 87101

October 28, 1963

Honorable C. C. McCulloh
District Judge
County Courthouse
Aztec, New Mexico

Re: Pubco Petroleum Corporation v. Oil Conservation
Commission, et al, San Juan County No. 11637

Dear Judge McCulloh:

I am in receipt of copy of a letter dated October 25, 1963, addressed to you, in which Mr. J. M. Durrett states he has not been able to agree on the form of order to be signed in the above entitled case.

The order that I submitted is a two-page order. In the third paragraph of my proposed order I set forth certain findings. The findings are taken from the allegations of the second paragraph of the Pubco Petition for Review, which paragraph was admitted as true by the Oil Conservation Commission in its reply. I want to point up exactly what the decision of the court was so that on appeal there can be no question as to the grounds for the dismissal. I do not think Mr. Kellahin's order is adequate.

In the event that the court declines to sign the order prepared by me, I would appreciate a hearing, and if possible, would like to have heard at the same time the Pubco Petroleum Corporation's Petition to Intervene in the El Paso Natural Gas Company, et al, v. O.C.C., et al case, which is No. 11685.

Yours very truly,

s/ William B. Kelleher

WBK/msd

cc: Mr. J. M. Durrett, Jr., Attorney
Oil Conservation Commission
P.O. Box 871, Santa Fe, N.M.

Mr. Jason W. Kellahin
Attorney at Law
P.O. Box 1713, Santa Fe, N.M.

OIL CONSERVATION COMMISSION
P. O. BOX 871
SANTA FE, NEW MEXICO

October 25, 1963

C
O
P
Y

Honorable C. C. McCulloh
District Judge
County Courthouse
Aztec, New Mexico

Re: Pubco Petroleum Corporation v.
Oil Conservation Commission et al.,
San Juan County, No. 11637

Dear Judge McCulloh:

As opposing counsel have not been able to agree upon the form of the order to be entered in the above case, I am enclosing herewith an Order submitted by William B. Keleher, Attorney for Pubco Petroleum Corporation, along with an Order submitted by Jason W. Kellahin, Attorney for Consolidated Oil & Gas, Inc., and approved by me for the Oil Conservation Commission.

Very truly yours,

J. M. DURRETT, Jr.
Attorney

JMD/esr
Enclosures

cc: Mr. William B. Keleher
Attorney at Law
First National Bank Building (West)
Albuquerque, New Mexico

Mr. Jason W. Kellahin
Attorney at Law
P. O. Box 1713
Santa Fe, New Mexico

LAW OFFICES
OF
W. A. KELEHER

A. H. McLEOD

ATTORNEYS AND COUNSELLORS AT LAW
FIRST NATIONAL BANK BUILDING
ALBUQUERQUE, NEW MEXICO 87101

W. A. KELEHER
A. H. McLEOD
T. B. KELEHER
JOHN B. TITTMANN
RUSSELL MOORE
WILLIAM B. KELEHER
MICHAEL L. KELEHER

October 23, 1963

Oil Conservation Commission
Post Office Box 871
Santa Fe, New Mexico

Attention: J. M. Durrett, Jr.
Attorney

Re: Pubco Petroleum Company v.
Oil Conservation Commission,
et al, San Juan County-11637

Gentlemen:

Reference is made to the letter of October 15, signed by Mr. Durrett, in which you enclose a proposed Order in the above entitled case. After review of same, we feel that the Order should be expanded somewhat, and I therefore enclose at this time original and two copies of a revised Order. If you will kindly review, and if same meets with your approval, initial original and forward same, together with a copy to Mr. Kellahin, it will be appreciated. You will note that the Order recites the basis of the decision. The findings are taken from the Petition for Review filed by Pubco, as admitted by the Oil Conservation Commission Reply.

We request that we be notified when the Order is forwarded to Judge McCulloh for signature. If you would prefer, return the Order to me and I will see that Judge McCulloh signs the Order after your approval and that of Mr. Kellahin.

Yours very truly,

William B. Keleher

WBK:cjw

Enclosures

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF SAN JUAN COUNTY
STATE OF NEW MEXICO

PUBCO PETROLEUM CORPORATION,

Petitioner,

vs.

No. 11637

OIL CONSERVATION COMMISSION OF
NEW MEXICO, and CONSOLIDATED
OIL AND GAS, INC., a corporation,

Respondants.

O R D E R

This matter coming on to be heard on affirmative defenses raised in the Reply to the Petition for Review filed by Respondent, OIL CONSERVATION COMMISSION OF NEW MEXICO, and on the Motion to Dismiss filed by the Respondent, CONSOLIDATED OIL AND GAS, INC., a corporation, and the Petitioner appearing by its attorney, William B. Keleher, and the Respondent, OIL CONSERVATION COMMISSION OF NEW MEXICO, appearing by its attorney, James M. Durrett, Jr., and the Respondent, CONSOLIDATED OIL AND GAS, INC., a corporation, appearing by its attorney, Jason W. Kellahin.

And the Court having examined the file, heard the arguments of counsel and being fully advised, FINDS:

That Consolidated Oil and Gas, Inc., a Colorado corporation, with permit to do business in New Mexico, in February of 1962, filed its application with the Oil Conservation Commission to modify the Commission's Order R-1670-C, which application was docketed by the Commission as its Case No. 2504. Hearing was held on this case before the Commission on April 18 through April 21, 1962. By Order No. R-2259, dated June 7, 1962, the

Commission denied the application. Consolidated Oil and Gas, Inc., filed an application for rehearing which was heard by the Commission on February 14, 1963, and by Order No. R-2259-B dated July 3, 1963, and entered on July 9, 1963, the Commission granted the application changing the proration formula for the Basin-Dakota Gas Pool from 25 percent acreage plus 75 percent acreage times deliverability to 60 percent acreage plus 40 percent acreage times deliverability by amending the Special Rules and Regulations for the Basin-Dakota Gas Pool, as promulgated by Order No. R-1670-C.

That thereafter Petitioner, PUBCO PETROLEUM CORPORATION, appealed from Order No. R-2259-B of the Oil Conservation Commission to the District Court of San Juan County, which appeal was docketed July 29, 1963 in the District Court, San Juan County. That the Petitioner, Pubco Petroleum Corporation, failed to ask that the Oil Conservation Commission hold a second rehearing and, therefore, failed to exhaust its administrative remedy.

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Petitioner's Petition for Review be, and the same is hereby dismissed on the grounds that Petitioner has failed to exhaust its administrative remedy, to all of which Petitioner excepts and objects.

DISTRICT JUDGE

STATE OF NEW MEXICO
COUNTY OF SAN JUAN

)
)
)

IN THE DISTRICT COURT

PUBCO PETROLEUM CORPORATION,

Petitioner,

-vs-

No. 11637

OIL CONSERVATION COMMISSION OF
NEW MEXICO, and CONSOLIDATED
OIL AND GAS, INC., a Corporation,

O R D E R

This matter coming on to be heard on affirmative defenses raised in the Reply to the Petition for Review filed by Respondent Oil Conservation Commission of New Mexico, and on the motion to dismiss filed by the Respondent Consolidated Oil and Gas, Inc., and the Petitioner appearing by its attorney, William B. Keleher, and James M. Durrett, Jr., appearing for Respondent Oil Conservation Commission, and Jason W. Kellahin appearing for Respondent Consolidated Oil and Gas, Inc.,

And the Court having considered the allegations of the Petitioner's Petition for Review, and heard argument of counsel, and being fully advised, and good cause therefor appearing,

It is ORDERED that Petitioner's Petition for Review be, and the same hereby is, dismissed, to all of which Petitioner excepts and objects.

DISTRICT JUDGE

STATE OF NEW MEXICO
COUNTY OF SAN JUAN

)
)
)

IN THE DISTRICT COURT

PUBCO PETROLEUM CORPORATION,

Petitioner,

-vs-

No. 11637

OIL CONSERVATION COMMISSION OF
NEW MEXICO, and CONSOLIDATED
OIL AND GAS, INC., A Corporation,

Respondents.

O R D E R

This matter coming on to be heard on affirmative defenses raised in the Reply to the Petition for Review filed by Respondent Oil Conservation Commission of New Mexico, and on the motion to dismiss filed by the Respondent Consolidated Oil and Gas, Inc., and the Petitioner appearing by its attorney, William B. Keleher, and James M. Durrett, Jr., appearing for Respondent Oil Conservation Commission, and Jason W. Kellahin appearing for Respondent Consolidated Oil and Gas, Inc.,

And the Court having considered the allegations of the Petitioner's Petition for Review, and heard argument of counsel, and being fully advised, and good cause therefor appearing,

It is ORDERED that Petitioner's Petition for Review be, and the same hereby is, dismissed.

DISTRICT JUDGE

STATE OF NEW MEXICO

COUNTY OF SAN JUAN

IN THE DISTRICT COURT

PUBCO PETROLEUM CORPORATION,

Petitioner,

-vs-

No. 11,637

OIL CONSERVATION COMMISSION
of NEW MEXICO and CONSOLIDATED
OIL & GAS, INC., a corporation,

Respondents.

EL PASO NATURAL GAS COMPANY,
a corporation; PAN AMERICAN
PETROLEUM CORPORATION, a
corporation; MARATHON OIL
COMPANY, a corporation;
SOUTHWEST PRODUCTION COMPANY,
a partnership; and SUNSET
INTERNATIONAL PETROLEUM
CORPORATION, a corporation,

Petitioners,

-vs-

No. 11,685

OIL CONSERVATION COMMISSION of
NEW MEXICO, JACK M. CAMPBELL,
Chairman; E. S. WALKER, Member;
A. L. PORTER, JR., Member and
Secretary; CONSOLIDATED OIL &
GAS, INC., a corporation,

Respondents.

PUBCO AND SOUTHWEST
MOTION TO CONSOLIDATE

MOTION

Come now Pubco Petroleum Corporation, Petitioner in the
above styled cause No. 11,637; and Southwest Production Company,
one of the Petitioners in above styled cause No. 11,685, and
move the Court that said two causes be consolidated, and in sup-
port thereof would show to the Court that each of said causes
is an appeal from Order No. 2259-B of the Oil Conservation Com-
mission of New Mexico and that each of said causes should there-
fore be consolidated and heard together.

KLENER & McLEOD

VERITY, BURR, COOLEY & JONES

By John E. Tittman

By Geo. L. Verity

Attorneys for Petitioner,
Pubco Petroleum Corporation

Attorneys for Petitioner,
Southwest Production Company

ILLEGIBLE

VERITY, BURR, COOLEY & JONES
ATTORNEYS AND COUNSELORS AT LAW
SUITE 152 PETROLEUM CENTER BUILDING
FARMINGTON, NEW MEXICO

CERTIFICATE

I hereby certify that I caused a copy of this motion to be mailed to opposing counsel on the 24 day of May, 1963.

STATE OF NEW MEXICO
COUNTY OF SAN JUAN

)
)
)

IN THE DISTRICT COURT

PUBCO PETROLEUM CORPORATION,

Petitioner,

-vs-

No. 11637

OIL CONSERVATION COMMISSION
OF NEW MEXICO, and CONSOLIDATED
OIL AND GAS, INC., a corporation,

Respondents.

CONSOLIDATED
MOTION TO DISMISS
(No. 11,637)

M O T I O N

Comes now Consolidated Oil & Gas, Inc., named a respondent herein, and moves the Court as follows:

1. To dismiss the petition for review on the ground that the Court is without jurisdiction of the subject matter of the action.
2. To dismiss the petition for review on the ground that the action was not timely filed as provided by law.
3. To dismiss the petition for review because the petition fails to state a claim against respondents upon which relief can be granted, under the applicable appeal statute.
4. To dismiss the petition for review for the reason that a full and adequate administrative remedy is available to petitioner and petitioner has failed to exhaust its administrative remedy.
5. To dismiss the petition for review for failure of petitioner to join indispensable parties.

Without waiving any of the above and foregoing motions, respondent, Consolidated Oil & Gas, Inc., moves the Court to quash the return of service of summons on the ground that the

respondent has not been properly served with process in this action, as required by law, all of which more clearly appears on the face of the record in this cause.

Without waiving any of the above and foregoing motions, respondent, Consolidated Oil & Gas, Inc., moves the Court to strike paragraphs III, IV, V, VI, VII, VIII, IX and X of the petition herein, and as grounds therefor would show that the contents of said paragraphs and each of them are impertinent and immaterial.

Respectfully submitted,

CONSOLIDATED OIL & GAS, INC.

By Jason W. Kellahin
KELLAHIN & FOX
P. O. Box 1713
Santa Fe, New Mexico

One of the Attorneys for Respondent

I hereby certify that a true copy of
the foregoing instrument was mailed to
opposing counsel of record this 27th
day of August, 1963
Jason W. Kellahin

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF SAN JUAN COUNTY
STATE OF NEW MEXICO

OCC
ANSWER (No. 11,637)

PUBCO PETROLEUM CORPORATION,)
)
 Petitioner,)
)
 vs.)
)
 OIL CONSERVATION COMMISSION OF)
 NEW MEXICO and CONSOLIDATED)
 OIL AND GAS, INC., a corporation,)
)
 Respondents.)

No. 11637

REPLY TO PETITION FOR REVIEW

Respondent, Oil Conservation Commission of New Mexico,
in reply to the Petition for Review, states:

1. Respondent admits the allegations of paragraphs I and II of the Petition for Review.
2. Respondent denies each and every allegation of paragraphs III through X of the Petition, including all legal conclusions stated therein.

WHEREFORE, Respondent prays:

1. That the Petition for Review be dismissed.
2. That Commission Order No. R-2259-B be affirmed.
3. That the Court grant respondent such other and further relief as the Court deems just.

AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES

1. As its first affirmative defense, respondent states that petitioner has failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.
2. As its second affirmative defense, respondent states that the Court lacks jurisdiction over the subject matter and the

parties to this action as the petitioner has failed to exhaust the administrative remedies provided by Section 65-3-22, New Mexico Statutes Annotated, 1953 Compilation.

3. As its third affirmative defense, respondent states that if the Court has jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties to this action, which is specifically denied by respondent, under the provisions of Section 65-3-22(b), New Mexico Statutes Annotated, 1953 Compilation, the Court cannot consider the allegations contained in the Petition for Review as the questions raised by such allegations were not presented to the Commission by the application for rehearing as is more fully shown by a copy of the Petition for Rehearing marked Respondent's Exhibit A, attached hereto, and incorporated herein by reference.


WHEREFORE, Respondent prays:

1. That the Petition for Review be dismissed.
2. That Commission Order No. R-2259-B be affirmed.
3. That the Court grant respondent such other and further relief as the Court deems just.



J. M. DURRETT, Jr.
Special Assistant Attorney General
representing the Oil Conservation
Commission of New Mexico, P.O. Box
871, Santa Fe, New Mexico

I hereby certify that on the
26th . . day of . . August . . ,
1963 , a copy of the fore
going pleading was mailed to
opposing counsel of record.

..  ..

RESPONDENT'S EXHIBIT A

BEFORE THE OIL CONSERVATION COMMISSION OF

THE STATE OF NEW MEXICO

MAIN OFFICE OGC

1962 JUN 27 PM 4 54

IN THE MATTER OF THE HEARING
CALLED BY THE OIL CONSERVATION
COMMISSION OF NEW MEXICO FOR
THE PURPOSE OF CONSIDERING:

CASE NO. 2504

ORDER NO. R-2259

APPLICATION OF CONSOLIDATED
OIL & GAS, INC. FOR AN AMEND-
MENT OF ORDER NO. R-1670-C,
CHANGING THE ALLOCATION FORMULA
FOR THE BASIN-DAKOTA GAS POOL,
SAN JUAN, RIO ARRIBA AND SANDOVAL
COUNTIES, NEW MEXICO.

PETITION FOR REHEARING

Comes now Consolidated Oil & Gas, Inc., applicant in the
above styled hearing, through its attorneys of record therein,
and hereby respectfully petitions the Oil Conservation Commission,
hereinafter referred to as the Commission, for review of the
action of the Commission in the above styled matter and in
connection therewith shows the following:

1. This cause came on for hearing before the Commission
at 9:00 A. M. on April 18, 1962, at Santa Fe, New Mexico.

2. That by Order No. R-1670-C, entered in Case No. 2095
effective February 1, 1961, the Basin-Dakota Gas Pool was
created and prorated under an allocation formula based on
seventy-five (75) percent acreage times deliverability plus
twenty-five (25) percent acreage.

3. That the applicant, Consolidated Oil & Gas, Inc.
seeks the rescission of said Order No. R-1670-C and, as stated
in its prior application seeks a new and establishing an allocation
formula for the Basin-Dakota Gas Pool based on forty (40) percent
acreage times deliverability plus sixty (60) percent acreage.

4. Finding No. 4 of Order No. E-2259 states:

"(4) That the evidence presented at the hearing of this case concerning recoverable gas reserves in the subject pool is insufficient to justify any change in the present allocation formula."

5. Sufficient evidence was presented at the April 18, 1962 hearing of this matter to justify a change in the present allocation formula. In addition the Commission has in its files and may take notice of evidence relating to the Basin-Dakota Pool, the wells completed therein and the proration tracts specified. Such evidence includes data relating to acreage, pressure, open flow, Porosity, permeability, deliverability, quality of gas, and other pertinent data.

6. From available data it is practicable for the Commission to determine (a) the amount of recoverable gas under each producer's tract, (b) the total amount of recoverable gas in the pool, (c) the proportion that (a) bears to (b); and (d) what portion of the arrived at proportion can be recovered without waste, and from such determinations the correlative rights of interested parties can be determined.

7. Evidence presented and other data available to the Commission amply shows that Order No. E-1670-C, which permits and will increasingly permit non-ratable taking of gas, does not protect correlative rights and permits drainage between producing tracts in the Basin-Dakota Pool which is not equalized by counter drainage. Waste results when correlative rights are not protected.

8. On June 7, 1962, the Commission entered its Order No. E-2259 in the above styled matter, thus perpetuating Order No. E-1670-C, which is the action of the Commission hereby sought to be reviewed.

9. Order No. E-1670-C is based upon a finding that "there is a general correlation between the deliverabilities of the gas wells in the Dakota Producing Interval and the recoverable gas in place under the tracts dedicated to the wells." Evidence presented at the April 18, 1962 hearing of this matter conclusively shows

that no such correlation exists, and that the Commission's Order No. R-1670-G is void insofar as it establishes an allowable allocation formula for the Basin-Dakota pool and should be rescinded by the Commission.

10. Evidence presented and data available to the Commission amply supports applicant's contention that the appropriate allocation formula for the Basin-Dakota Pool should be based on no more than 40% acreage times deliverability plus no less than 60% acreage. Such an order will prevent waste, will distribute the allowable production among the producers in the pool on a reasonable basis, will not violate correlative rights, and will prevent premature abandonment of wells, which are or will become uneconomic under the formula set forth in Order No. R-1670-G.

11. Independently of other showings herein made, the evidence available to the Commission would fully support an order that wells having a deliverability of less than 300,000 cubic feet per day should not be prorated and that no well can have an effective deliverability in excess of 2,000,000 cubic feet per day for the purposes of any allocation formula without causing waste and abusing correlative rights.

Based upon the showings hereinabove made, the Applicant respectfully requests the Commission to set the above styled matter down for rehearing as provided by law. In connection therewith the applicant requests that the rehearing, if granted, be had on the following basis:

(a) That in its notice of the rehearing the Commission advise all interested parties that the hearing will consist of two parts: (i) a preliminary hearing before an examiner to take evidence concerning basic factual data relating to each well completed or drilling in the Basin-Dakota Pool. Attached hereto as Exhibit "A" is a proposed data sheet which sets forth the data to be gathered by the examiner as to each well and tract; and (ii) a subsequent hearing thirty or so days later before the Commission itself at which

additional testimony, evidence and expert opinions will be received;

(b) That in conjunction with both phases of the hearing the Commission exercise to the fullest its power of subpoena pursuant to Section 65-3-7 of the Oil and Gas Conservation Act to compel the production by all producers, owners and operators of all books, records and papers pertinent to the questions before the Commission at the rehearing and to compel the appearance of expert witnesses who can testify with respect thereto. That the announced purpose and scope of the investigation be to obtain, insofar as practicable, evidence relating to the correlative rights of all interested parties in and to the Basin-Dakota Pool.

(c) Attached hereto as Exhibit "B" is a list of the names and addresses of interested parties, insofar as known to applicant. If the requested method of handling the hearing is acceptable to the Commission the applicant will timely furnish to the Commission more detailed written requests relating to witnesses, books, records and papers to be subpoenaed.

Although applicant seeks a rehearing on any basis agreeable to the Commission, it is believed that handling the matter as requested will place the least burden on the Commission, provide the greatest opportunity for interested parties voluntarily to cooperate in gathering and presenting additional data, and provide for the Commission the maximum available amount of data practically available upon which to base a valid and appropriate order relating to gas production from the Basin-Dakota Pool.

Respectfully submitted this
27th day of June, 1962

Consolidated Oil & Gas, Inc.

Helm, Roberts, Moore & Owen,
Ted P. Stockmar
1700 Broadway
Denver 2, Colorado

Kellahin & Fox
P. O. Box 17E
Santa Fe, New Mexico

W. John W. Kellahin

ATTORNEYS FOR APPLICANT

Exhibit 7

SAN JUAN BASIN
DAKOTA GAS RESERVOIR
PRODUCING WELLS

Tract De- scription & Designation	Average (Feet)	*Initial Reservoir Pressure (PSIG)	* Average Porosity		* Average Perme- ability (Md.)	** Initial		** Deliverability		Gross		Net		*** Gas Reserves	
			Total	Net Gas Sat.		Absolute Open Flow Potential (MCFD)	Initial Recent (MCFD) (MCFD)			Pay Gas (Ft.)	Pay Gas (Ft.)			Ultimate (MCF)	At 6/1/62 (MCF)

* State source of data, measured or estimated.
** Standard No. 100 one-point method
*** Utilized following assumptions:
 B use pressure = 11.4 PSIA
 Abundance per acre = 270 PSIA
 Reserve = 1000 volume = 1300 W.

Public Petroleum Corporation
P. O. Box 1419
Albuquerque, New Mexico

Western Natural Gas Co.
1006 Main Street
Houston, Texas

R & G Drilling Co.
P. O. Box 327
Farmington, New Mexico

Wilshire Oil Company of Texas

Redfern & Herd
P. O. Box 1747
Midland, Texas

Val E. Reese & Associates, Inc.
Sims Building
Albuquerque, New Mexico

Paul F. Rutledge
Petroleum Building
Santa Fe, New Mexico

Skelly Oil Co.
P. O. Box 1850
Tulsa, Oklahoma

Southern Union Gas Company
Fidelity Union Tower
Dallas, Texas

Southwestern Production, Inc.
P. O. Box 765
Hobbs, New Mexico

Sunray-Midcontinent Oil Co.
101 University Blvd.
Denver, Colorado

Sunset International Petroleum Corp.
Midland Savings Building
Denver, Colorado

Tenneco, Inc.
P. O. Box 1714
Durango, Colorado

Tidewater Oil Company
P. O. Box 1960
Durango, Colorado

Texaco, Inc.
P. O. Box 3102
Midland, Texas

Texas-Eastern Transmission Co.
P. O. Box 1159
Houston, Texas

J. Glenn Turner
Mercantile Bank Building
Dallas, Texas

W. H. Weaver

STATE OF NEW MEXICO)
COUNTY OF SAN JUAN)

IN THE DISTRICT COURT

PUBCO PETROLEUM CORPORATION,

Petitioner,

-VS-

No. 11637

OIL CONSERVATION COMMISSION OF
NEW MEXICO and CONSOLIDATED OIL
AND GAS, INC., a corporation,

Respondents.

CONSOLIDATED
ENTRY OF APPEARANCE

ENTRY OF APPEARANCE

Come now KELLAHIN & FOX, P. O. Box 1713, Santa Fe, New Mexico, and hereby enter their appearance in the above-captioned cause, for and on behalf of the Respondent CONSOLIDATED OIL AND GAS, INC., in association with T. P. STOCKMAR, 1700 Broadway, Denver 2, Colorado, a member of the bar of the State of Colorado.

KELLAHIN & FOX
and
T. P. STOCKMAR

By Jason W. Kellahin
P. O. Box 1713
Santa Fe, New Mexico

I hereby certify that a true copy of
the foregoing instrument was mailed to
opposing counsel of record this 19th
day of Aug, 1963

Jason W. Kellahin

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF SAN JUAN COUNTY
STATE OF NEW MEXICO

OCC
ENTRY OF APPEARANCE

PUBCO PETROLEUM CORPORATION,

Petitioner,

vs.

OIL CONSERVATION COMMISSION OF
NEW MEXICO and CONSOLIDATED
OIL AND GAS, INC., a corporation,

Respondents.

No. 11637

ENTRY OF APPEARANCE

J. M. Durrett, Jr., Special Assistant Attorney General,
heraby enters his appearance on behalf of the respondent, Oil Con-
servation Commission of New Mexico, in the above entitled and
numbered cause.

J M Durrett Jr

J. M. DURRETT, Jr.
Special Assistant Attorney General
representing the Oil Conservation
Commission of New Mexico, P.O. Box
871, Santa Fe, New Mexico

I hereby certify that on the
16th ... day of ... August ... ,
1963 ... , a copy of the fore-
going pleading was mailed to
opposing counsel of record.

J M Durrett Jr

Sec of oil
conservation comm

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF SAN JUAN COUNTY N. M. 3 34
STATE OF NEW MEXICO

PUBCC PETROLEUM CORPORATION,

Petitioner,

vs.

No. 11637

OIL CONSERVATION COMMISSION OF
NEW MEXICO and CONSOLIDATED
OIL AND GAS, INC., a corporation,

Respondents.

NOTICE OF APPEAL

TO: OIL CONSERVATION COMMISSION OF
NEW MEXICO, CONSOLIDATED OIL AND
GAS, INC., AND ALL OF THE ADVERSE
PARTIES:

YOU ARE HEREBY NOTIFIED that PUBCO PETROLEUM CORPORATION
has appealed from Order No. R-2259-B of the Commission entered
July 9, 1963 after rehearing by filing in the District Court
of San Juan County, New Mexico its Petition for Review, a true
copy of which is hereto attached.

W. A. KELEHER and
JOHN B. TITTMANN

By s/ John B. Tittmann
Attorneys for Petitioner
First National Bank Bldg. (West)
Albuquerque, New Mexico

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF SAN JUAN COUNTY

STATE OF NEW MEXICO

FILE NO. 11637

RECEIVED JUL 11 3 44

PUBCO PETROLEUM CORPORATION, INC.,

Petitioner,

vs.

No. 11637

OIL CONSERVATION COMMISSION OF
NEW MEXICO and CONSOLIDATED
OIL AND GAS, INC., a corporation,

Respondents.

PETITION FOR REVIEW

Comes now PUBCO PETROLEUM CORPORATION by its attorneys,
W. A. Keleher and John B. Tittmann, and appeals from the
order of the Oil Conservation Commission of New Mexico
entered July 9, 1963 in Case No. 2504 on the docket of said
Commission, being Order No. R-2259-B, and respectfully shows
to the court:

I.

That PUBCO PETROLEUM CORPORATION is a corporation duly
organized and existing under and by virtue of the laws of the
State of New Mexico, with its principal office in Albuquerque,
New Mexico, and owns gas-producing property in San Juan County
affected by the decision of the Oil Conservation Commission
herein appealed from.

II.

Consolidated Oil and Gas, Inc., a Colorado corporation,
with permit to do business in New Mexico, in February of 1962,
filed its application with the Oil Conservation Commission to
modify the Commission's Order R-1670-C, which application was

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PUBCO
PETITION FOR REVIEW

docketed by the Commission as its Case No. 2504. Hearing was held on this case before the Commission on April 18 through April 21, 1962. By Order No. R-2259, dated June 7, 1962, the Commission denied the application. Consolidated Oil and Gas, Inc., filed an application for rehearing which was heard by the Commission on February 14, 1963, and by Order No. R-2259-B dated July 3, 1963, and entered on July 9, 1963, the Commission granted the application changing the proration formula for the Basin-Dakota Gas Pool from 25 percent acreage plus 75 percent acreage times deliverability to 60 percent acreage plus 40 percent acreage times deliverability by amending the Special Rules and Regulations for the Basin-Dakota Gas Pool, as promulgated by Order No. R-1670-C. A true and correct copy of said Order No. R-2259-B is attached hereto as Exhibit 1, and by reference incorporated herein.

III.

Said order appealed from is invalid in that findings 6, 7, 9, and Exhibit "A" attached to said order are not based upon competent, substantial and sufficient evidence. Said findings and exhibit are based upon incompetent hearsay evidence and upon data admittedly erroneous, out-dated and for which no proper foundation or authentication was made.

IV.

Since the initial recoverable gas reserves for each individual tract are in error, the percentage of pool reserves attributable to each non-marginal tract and the tract acreage factors listed in said Exhibit A are also in error; accordingly, said Order No. R-2259-B fails to afford to the owner of each

property in the pool the opportunity to produce his just and equitable share of the gas in the pool, insofar as this can be done without waste, and for such purpose to use his just and equitable share of the reservoir energy, and is therefore violative of correlative rights.

V.

The order appealed from is invalid to the extent that it is predicated on finding No. 10, for the reason that there is no evidence, substantial or otherwise, which supports said finding and on the contrary the evidence definitely establishes a direct correlation between deliverability and reserve.

VI.

The order appealed from is invalid because it must be based upon the prevention of waste, and there is no evidence in the record to support any finding that waste is or has occurred under the present 25-75 formula or that waste will be prevented by the 60-40 formula adopted in said order.

VII.

Findings 13 and 14, insofar as they relate to waste, are not supported by any evidence in the record and are based upon erroneous theory and assumption that waste and violation of correlative rights are synonymous and identical.

VIII.

The order appealed from is invalid insofar as it is dependent upon Findings 15 and 16, for the reason that there is no substantial evidence in the record to support said findings.

The order appealed from is invalid for the reason that the Commission has failed to make the basic findings necessary to the validity of the order concerning the portion of each tract's proportion of the total pool reserves which can be recovered without waste, and the record contains no evidence upon which such finding can be based.

X.

The order appealed from is invalid for the reason that no evidence was introduced of any change in circumstances of the operation of the Basin-Dakota Gas Pool which as a matter of fact could legally justify changing the 25-75% formula previously in effect.

WHEREFORE, petitioner prays that Commission Order No. R-2259-B be vacated and set aside.

W. A. KELLNER and
JOHN B. TITTMANN

By s/ John B. Tittmann
Attorneys for Petitioner
First National Bank Bldg. (West)
Albuquerque, New Mexico

7-25-63

BEFORE THE OIL CONSERVATION COMMISSION
OF THE STATE OF NEW MEXICO

IN THE MATTER OF THE HEARING
CALLED BY THE OIL CONSERVATION
COMMISSION OF NEW MEXICO FOR
THE PURPOSE OF CONSIDERING:

CASE No. 2504
Order No. R-2259-B

APPLICATION OF CONSOLIDATED OIL & GAS, INC.,
FOR AN AMENDMENT OF ORDER NO. R-1670-C,
CHANGING THE ALLOCATION FORMULA FOR THE
BASIN-DAKOTA GAS POOL, SAN JUAN, RIO ARriba
AND SANDOVAL COUNTIES, NEW MEXICO.

ORDER OF THE COMMISSION

BY THE COMMISSION:

This cause came on for rehearing at 9 o'clock a.m. on February 14, 1963, at Santa Fe, New Mexico, before the Oil Conservation Commission of New Mexico, hereinafter referred to as the "Commission."

NOW, on this 3rd day of July, 1963, the Commission, a quorum being present, having considered the testimony presented and the exhibits received at said hearing, and being fully advised in the premises,

FINDS:

(1) That due public notice having been given as required by law, the Commission has jurisdiction of this cause and the subject matter thereof.

(2) That Order No. R-1670-C, entered by the Commission on November 4, 1960, established Special Rules and Regulations for the Basin-Dakota Gas Pool and adopted, by reference, Rule 9(C) of the General Rules applicable to prorated gas pools in Northwest New Mexico, as set forth in Order No. R-1670.

(3) That Rule 9(C) of the General Rules applicable to prorated gas pools in Northwest New Mexico, as set forth in Order No. R-1670, allocates production on the basis of 25 percent acreage plus 75 percent acreage times deliverability, hereinafter referred to as the 25-75 formula.

(4) That the applicant, Consolidated Oil & Gas, Inc., seeks amendment of the Special Rules and Regulations for the Basin-Dakota Gas Pool to allocate production on the basis of 60 percent acreage plus 40 percent acreage times deliverability.

(5) That the initial recoverable gas reserves in the Basin-Dakota Gas Pool, insofar as can be determined, total approximately 2.255 trillion cubic feet, of which approximately 96 billion cubic feet is attributed to marginal wells, which are permitted to produce at capacity.

(6) That the initial recoverable gas reserves underlying each non-marginal tract in the Basin-Dakota Gas Pool are as shown in Column C, Tract Reserves, of Exhibit A attached hereto and made a part hereof.

(7) That the percent of the total pool reserves attributable to each non-marginal tract in the Basin-Dakota Gas Pool is as shown in Column D, Percent of Pool Reserves, of Exhibit A.

(8) That it is impracticable to allocate production solely on the basis of the percentage of pool reserves due to the continuous fluctuation in reserve computations resulting from new completions in the pool and re-evaluation of reserves of existing wells.

(9) That the tract acreage factor for each non-marginal well in the Basin-Dakota Gas Pool is as shown in Column A of Exhibit A; that the deliverability for each non-marginal well, insofar as can be determined, is as shown in Column B of Exhibit A.

(10) That in the Basin-Dakota Gas Pool there is no direct correlation between deliverability and reserves, or acreage and reserves, and that, therefore, neither should be used as the sole criterion for distributing the total pool allowable among the tracts.

(11) That the most reasonable basis for allocating production in the Basin-Dakota Gas Pool is to determine, for each proposed formula, the percentage of total pool allowable apportioned to each non-marginal tract as compared to its percentage of total pool reserves, said relationship hereinafter referred to as the tract's A/R Factor, and to select the allocation formula that will allow the maximum number of wells in the pool to produce with an ideal tract A/R Factor of 1.0, or with a tract A/R Factor of from 0.7 to 1.3, which, due to inherent variance in interpreting and computing reserves, is within a reasonable tolerance.

(12) That the percentage of deliverability and the percentage of acreage included in the allocation formula affect the percentage of the total pool allowable assigned to each non-marginal well in the pool, thereby affecting the number of wells in the pool producing with a tract A/R Factor of from 0.7 to 1.3.

(13) That under the present 25-75 formula, correlative rights are not being adequately protected; that the protection of correlative rights is a necessary adjunct to the prevention of waste, and that waste will result unless the Commission acts to protect correlative rights.

(14) That, based upon the December 1962 pool allowable, a comparison of the number of non-marginal wells producing with a tract A/R Factor of from 0.7 to 1.3 under each formula as identified by an asterisk in Columns G and J of Exhibit A, and of the total volume of gas allocated to the wells in the 0.7 to 1.3 range under each formula, establishes that the proposed formula of 60 percent acreage plus 40 percent acreage times deliverability will more adequately protect correlative rights and prevent waste by permitting more wells to receive their just and equitable share of the gas in the pool, insofar as can be determined.

(15) That numerous wells in the Basin-Dakota Gas Pool are capable of draining more than their just and equitable share of the gas in the pool, and that an allocation formula of 60 percent acreage plus 40 percent acreage times deliverability will, insofar as is practicable, prevent drainage between producing tracts which is not equalized by counter drainage.

(16) That an allocation formula of 60 percent acreage plus 40 percent acreage times deliverability will, insofar as it is practicable to do so, afford to the owner of each property in the pool the opportunity to use his just and equitable share of the reservoir energy.

(17) That Order No. R-1670-C should be amended to provide an allocation formula for the Basin-Dakota Gas Pool in San Juan, Rio Arriba, and Sandoval Counties, New Mexico, based 60 percent on acreage and 40 percent on acreage times deliverability.

(18) That, due to the time required to administer a new allocation formula for a prorated gas pool, this order should not be effective until August 1, 1963, the beginning of the next six-month proration period for the Basin-Dakota Gas Pool.

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED:

(1) That the Special Rules and Regulations for the Basin-Dakota Gas Pool, as promulgated by Order No. R-1670-C, are hereby amended by adoption of the following:

RULE 9(C): The pool allowable remaining each month after deducting the total allowable assigned to marginal wells shall be allocated among the non-marginal wells entitled to an allowable in the following manner:

1. Forty percent (40%) of the pool allowable remaining to be allocated to non-marginal wells shall be allocated among such wells in the proportion that each well's "AD Factor" bears to the total "AD Factor" for all non-marginal wells in the pool.

-4-

CASE No. 2504

Order No. R-2259-B

2. Sixty percent (60%) of the pool allowable remaining to be allocated to non-marginal wells shall be allocated among such wells in the proportion that each well's acreage factor bears to the total acreage factor for all non-marginal wells in the pool.

(2) That Order No. R-2259 is hereby superseded.

(3) That jurisdiction of this cause is retained for the entry of such further orders as the Commission may deem necessary.

(4) That this order shall be effective August 1, 1963, the beginning of the next six-month proration period for the Basin-Dakota Gas Pool.

DONE at Santa Fe, New Mexico, on the day and year herein-above designated.

STATE OF NEW MEXICO
OIL CONSERVATION COMMISSION

JACK M. CAMPBELL, Chairman

E. S. WALKER, Member

A. L. PORTER, Jr., Member & Secretary

S E A L

esr/

ORDER NO. R-2259-B

ALLOCATION FORMULAE 25 PERCENT ACREAGE 75 PERCENT
ACREAGE TIMES DELIVERABILITY

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60 PERCENT ACREAGE 40 PERCENT ACREAGE TIMES DELIVERABILITY

EASIN DAKOTA TRACT/POOL RESERVES AND ALLOCATION
ARRANGED IN THE ORDER OF PIPELINE AND OPERATOR

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See Pan American Petroleum Corp. v. Orr, 18 O&GR 1061 (USCA, 5th Cir., Tex. 1963), a case where the two year limitation period was the issue. Here plaintiff in effect conceded the point by pleading only two year recovery.

W. J. F.

♦ ♦ ♦ ♦ ♦

PICKENS et al. v. RAILROAD COMMISSION et al.

Texas Supreme Court

February 10, 1965—No. A-10116

387 S.W. 2d 35

(Rehearing denied March 10, 1965)

Allowables: Oil Allocation Formula Based 50% on Surface Acreage-50% on Acre Feet Supported by Substantial Evidence.

Appellants from the trial court's affirmation of Railroad Commission order prorating production on the basis of 50% surface acreage-50% acre feet had properties located in the thicker interior portions of the reservoir. They contended it was illegal discrimination not to give each owner a full opportunity to capture the oil in place beneath his acreage through adoption of a 100% acre foot formula. Expert witnesses testified the pool was subject to a water drive which, under a 100% acre foot formula, would result in thinner edge acreage being watered out before it had an opportunity to produce its fair share, with consequent unfair advantage to the thicker interior acreage, and that the formula adopted gave an opportunity to produce a fair share to all owners in the pool. Held: Affirmed. The testimony constitutes substantial evidence in support of the Commission's order which is all that is required to sustain it.

For appellants: Prentice Wilson, Dallas; Roach & Robertson, Dallas; Fred Erisman, Longview; J. W. Hassell, Jr., Dallas.

For appellees: Waggoner Carr, Atty. Gen., Linward Shivers, Joseph Trimble, Asst. Attys. Gen., Austin; Powell, Ranbut, McGinnis, Reavely & Lochridge, Robert C. McGinnis, B. D. St. Clair, Austin; Robert B. Payne, Dallas; R. J. Stanton and H. D. Bushnell, Tulsa, Oklahoma; Robert F. LeBlanc, C. C. Cammack, Gentry Lee, Alfred O. Hull, Bartesville, Oklahoma; William P. Gibson and Wallace G. Malone, Dallas.

Direct Appeal from Travis County 98th District Court.

GREENHILL, Justice.

The main question here is the validity of the order of the Texas Railroad Commission prorating the production allowable

of oil from the Fairway (James Lime) field in Anderson and Henderson Counties, Texas. The order fixed the rate at which the various owners of the oil could produce. The district court found the order to be reasonably supported by substantial evidence and upheld it. W. L. Pickens and others have brought the case to us by direct appeal. The main law question before us is the same as that before the district court: Is the Commission's proration order reasonably supported by substantial evidence?

The formula under attack has two basic elements: (1) the number of surface acres in the production unit on which there is a well, usually 160 acres; and (2) the number of acre-feet of productive sand or rock which are within, or below, the 160 surface acres. The acre-foot is a measure of volume. Some surface acres of the field have, vertically, a thicker section of productive sand below them. An acre-foot, as used here, refers to a horizontal square acre with a thickness of one foot of productive sand. An acre-foot contains 43,560 cubic feet of oil or gas-bearing formation.

In addition to pleading that the order was unreasonable because it did not protect their correlative rights and would permit uncompensated drainage, Pickens et al. pleaded that any formula which was not "based solely on net acre-feet of pay underlying each unit tract" would be unreasonable, would fail to protect their correlative rights, and would deprive them of their property without due process of law. Their witness's testimony was that the formula should have been based 100 per cent on acre-feet of productive sand.

The proration order was arrived at in the following manner: the Commission each month determines the amount of oil to be produced from all fields in Texas. It divides this amount among the various fields. The total amount this particular field may produce is determined from time to time and is not fixed in the proration allowable formula here attacked. What the proration order does is to allocate to the wells in the field the part of the total field allowable which each well may produce. There are some exceptions because some wells have but limited capacity, others have a high gas-oil ratio, and so forth. Those wells are given particular allowables and are not here involved. The remaining volume of oil, whatever it is, is divided in half: one-half of the oil is allocated to the wells in that proportion which their assigned surface acreage in the oil field (usually 160 acres) bears to the total acreage in the field (about 21,000 acres); and the other half is distributed among the same wells in that proportion which their assigned acre-feet, their net acre-feet, bears to the total acre-feet in the field. Thus it is said that the formula allows 50 per cent for acreage (up to 160 surface acres), and 50 per cent for acre-feet.

The Fairway (James Lime) Field was discovered in 1960.

It is located in a single structure, a common reservoir, some 9,500 feet below the surface. Early in 1961, the Commission issued an order prorating the field's production on the basis of a formula which was weighted to allow 50 per cent for the producing well itself. This is called a "per well" factor. The other 50 per cent was credited to surface acreage in the producing unit up to 160 acres. So the first formula was 50 per cent per well and 50 per cent for surface acreage.

On March 8, 1961, and February 14, 1962, this Court handed down its opinions in the *Normanna*¹ and *Port Acres*² cases. Those opinions invalidated particular gas proration orders in those fields which contained a substantial [one-third] "per well" factor. Thereafter on May 23, 1962, the Commission withdrew its Fairway Field proration formula which contained the 50 per cent "per well" factor and promulgated a proration schedule based 100 per cent on surface acreage in each producing unit.

The spacing pattern was, and is, basically 160 acres to the well. No small tracts are here involved. Under that formula, the allowable oil production for each well was determined entirely by the number of surface acres, up to 160, which were situated over productive sand or rock. Pickens protested this formula but did not appeal.

In November and December of 1962, the Commission held a new hearing. On March 6, 1963, it promulgated the order here in question. The Commission retained 160 acres as the spacing unit for wells (about which there is no controversy); and, as stated, it announced that the proration of the allowable production of oil among the wells would be based on a fraction made up of two factors: (1) 50 per cent for the number of surface acres over the productive strata, and (2) 50 per cent for the number of acre-feet in the production unit. This "50 per cent acreage, 50 per cent acre-feet" formula will be hereafter referred to as the "50-50 formula." It must be borne in mind that it differs very substantially from another 50-50 formula previously used which allocated 50 per cent to the well alone and 50 per cent to surface acres.

The total allowable for the field is approximately 40,000 barrels per day. At the time of issuance of the order, there were 135 wells in the field, three of which were operated by Appellant Pickens. On the basis of surface acres in the field, each well on a 160-acre tract would be allowed to produce approximately 302 barrels per day. The witness Latimer testi-

¹ *Atlantic Refining Co. v. Railroad Commission*, 162 Tex. 274, 346 S.W. 2d 801, [14 O&GR 362] (1961) (*Normanna Field*).

² *Halbouty v. Railroad Commission*, 357 S.W. 2d 364, [16 O&GR 788] (Tex. 1962) (*Port Acres Field*).

fied that when the field was prorated on a 100 per cent acreage basis, Appellant Pickens' three wells on 480 of the field's 21,000 acres had an allowable of 333 barrels per day each. The effect of the 50-50 formula was to raise his allowable to between 362 and 378 barrels per well per day. The allowables on other wells having fewer acre-feet were lowered. For example, the Sun Oil Company's Lloyd #1 Well had an allowable of 233 barrels per day under the 50-50 formula.

Pickens and others filed suit in Travis County on April 8, 1963, to attack this order of March 6, 1963. They contend, among other things, that it was unreasonable and was not supported by substantial evidence, mainly, in that it discriminates against people who have the most oil in place under their surface acres, i.e., the most acre-feet; and it allows, they say, an undue advantage to those having the same surface acreage over the oil but fewer acre feet of oil in place. They also contend that it will bring about undue uncompensated draining which will ultimately result in their great financial loss. Pickens et al. seek to bring this case within the decisions of the Normanna and Port Acres cases, *supra*, as well as the decision in Railroad Commission v. Shell Oil Co., 380 S.W. 2d 556 [20 O&GR 888] Tex. 1964), which passed upon the proration order in the Quitman Field.

The Commission's order is presumed to be valid. The question is not whether the Commission came to a proper factual conclusion on the basis of conflicting evidence, but whether it acted arbitrarily and without regard to the facts. Railroad Commission v. Manziel, 361 S.W. 2d 560, [17 O&GR 444] (Tex. 1962). Our duty is to look to the record as a whole to see whether the order of the Commission is reasonably supported by substantial evidence. While we look to the record as a whole, our duty is to determine whether there is in the record competent evidence which reasonably supports the order. The evidence is voluminous; of necessity it must be greatly condensed.

The oil-bearing strata in question is several miles across, and is elevated about 130 feet toward its center. The thickest of the oil-saturated sand or rock (some 115 feet vertically) is in the central part of the strata or field. It is not located over subsurface water. If the field could be sliced and looked at vertically, the oil-bearing portion or strata could roughly be compared to an elongated, very gradually sloping crescent, the entire center of which is elevated toward the surface. It may be described as a symmetric recumbent antiform. The "thick" area of the field, which has the most acre-feet of oil-bearing rock, is updip (at a higher elevation in the structure) from the thinner sections which are toward the ends of the crescent. The thinnest producing rock or sand is some 15 feet thick. The average thickness is about 77 feet. The argument of Pickens is that since

there is an average of 77 acre-feet of producing sand below each average surface acre, the 50-50 formula is weighted overwhelmingly in favor of surface acres as contrasted to acre-feet of producing sand. There is not, they say, one acre-foot for each surface acre (which they say would make a 50-50 allocation more equitable), but an average of 77 acre-feet for each surface acre. Hence the areas of thickest sands are not being allowed to produce in proportion to the reserves in place.

Pickens and others relied upon the testimony of H. J. Gryu, a consulting petroleum engineer and geologist. He projected the 77-to-1 figures mentioned above to show that Pickens et al. will ultimately recover amounts substantially less under the 50-50 formula than they would if the formula used were based 100 per cent on the number of acre-feet under each tract. His testimony was that oil wells would drain in excess of 160 surface acres, and that Pickens et al. would be the victims of net uncompensated drainage.

Gryu disputed the assertion that there was any water drive or water encroachment in the field. He testified that any water in the wells toward the edge of the field was due to poor cementing of the wells. He conceded that there was water in some of the wells, and that there was water in contact with the oil on the edge of the field. He had not studied the aquifer (water-bearing sand) surrounding the field and underlying a large part of it, but he stood on the proposition of no water encroachment. He concluded that the oil reservoir was not made up of homogeneous rock or sand. He advocated a 100 per cent acre-foot formula, "although we don't know enough about these acre feet to differentiate and say, 'Mr. X has got twice as good acre feet as Mr. Y.' " Gryu was the only witness for Appellants Pickens et al.

The Appellees called five expert witnesses, who were petroleum reserve engineer, and a petroleum consultant. These experts agreed that the field was virtually surrounded by water which was in contact with the oil in the field, and that a substantial portion of the field was located over water which was also in contact with the oil. Their testimony was that there was a marked difference in the bottom-hole pressures in the various wells in the field. The wells toward the center of the field and the thick section of the oil-bearing strata had a lower pressure than the wells toward the edge of the field, particularly to the southeast.

The discovery wells were in the southeast part of the field, and that portion of the field had produced almost a year longer than the center section. Yet the pressure in that southeast area has not declined as much, proportionately, as the pressure in the center or thicker section of the field where Appellants Pickens et al. (as well as many of the Appellees, including the Appellee

Hunt Oil Company) had their wells. The explanation was that as the oil was withdrawn from the field, water moved into the field around its edges to replace the oil, thus keeping up the pressure. There was evidence that edge wells were making water and that the amount of water in the wells was increasing.

The witness Thomas W. Clay testified that the aquifer which was under portions of the field and adjacent to the field, was very sizable; large enough for a water drive. He concluded that there was not a complete water drive but there would be a limited water drive; that the water would expand. In his opinion, the 50-50 formula gave each operator or owner a reasonable opportunity to recover the oil in place under his tract.

The witness J. R. Latimer, Jr., testified that the aquifer was about three times the size of the field, and its encroachment explained the maintenance of bottom-hole pressure in the wells located over the water. He said that 52 per cent of the field was underlain by water. He pointed out one well which had been abandoned as a non-producer because of water. Another had increased in water production from 40 to 54 per cent; another from zero to 54 per cent water.

It was Latimer's testimony that substantial quantities of water are in fact moving into the field, and its movement will continue. At first he did not believe that there was enough evidence to support the conclusion that there was a water drive. This belief continued into 1962. But he thereafter changed his mind. While the amount of water now being produced from oil wells is insignificant compared to the total volume of oil which has been produced, water is moving into the field and will continue to do so.

The water, he said, encroaching from the edges of the field, would push the oil updip toward the thicker sections of the strata where Appellant Pickens' wells are located. The thinner sections would be watered out first. In his opinion, a 100 per cent acre-foot proration formula would cause an acceleration of the influx of water, and the allowables from the watered-out wells on the thinner tracts would then be transferred to the wells on the thick tracts toward the center of the field.

The witness Latimer further testified to pressure differentials in the field. Oil, he said, will drain toward low pressure. It cannot drain against pressure. The area in the center of the field, around the wells of Pickens et al., has lower pressure than the pressure around the thin or edge tracts.

So his testimony was that net drainage was not away from the wells of Appellants Pickens et al. but toward them because of (1) the difference in pressure and (2) the force of the water pushing the oil updip. He concluded that the 50-50 formula more nearly gave all the owners an equal opportunity to produce their in-place reserves. He doubted that even under that

formula the edge wells would come even close to producing what was considered to be originally in place because the oil is being pushed past them, updip.

The witness Harold Dixon agreed that the water is increasing in sufficient quantities to move the oil updip to the thicker tracts. He testified that water is presently moving into the field. In his opinion, for the wells on the thin sections to be able to produce the recoverable oil under them, they should have an opportunity to produce their oil before the water pushes the oil updip. The 50-50 formula, he said, affords that opportunity, and would result in allowing the thicker tracts (of Appellants Pickens et al.) to recover more, even far more, than their original in-place reserves.

The witness Fred Oliver agreed that because of the pressure differential, there would be drainage toward the wells of Pickens et al. He disputed the testimony of Pickens' witness Gruy as to the disproportionate amount of ultimate recovery of oil in various portions of the field under the 50-50 formula. He testified that the thin tracts would not have opportunity to produce their in-place oil under a 100 per cent acre-foot formula and that the 50-50 formula gave each owner a reasonable opportunity to recover his in-place oil. He was unable to say that there was a water drive. On the other hand, he could not say that there was no water influx. The area of the aquifer was of sufficient size to affect the reservoir drive or mechanism. The indications are, he said, that there will be a partial water drive in the field, and the water drive will be definitely significant to the edge tracts. Some areas will lose in-place oil by reason of water influx. He would expect that a water drive would be readily apparent within four years. By that time, however, under a 100 per cent acre-foot formula, the wells on the thin tracts would be abandoned or their capacity reduced.

Appellees' most positive expert witness was Pat Kelly, a petroleum engineer. Because he was an employee of the Commission and had heard the evidence in this case as a Commission examiner, his testimony was objected to. The admissibility of his testimony is the subject of discussion later herein. He was permitted to testify as to what he knew as an expert and not as to what he had heard as an examiner.

Kelly testified that water was unquestionably moving into the field at this time. He did not know the extent (degree or speed) of the encroachment but "We . . . know that it is encroaching. . . . It is known right now that there is water encroachment in the field." The eminence of the water encroachment, he said, put the wells on the thinner tracts in jeopardy of abandonment before the recovery of the in-place oil beneath those tracts. "The watering out of wells that are in close proximity to water is further conclusive proof of a water drive." A 100 per cent

acre-foot formula would, he said, aggravate the water encroachment. Under it, the thinner tracts would be severely drained. He further objected to the 100 per cent acre-foot formula because the reservoir was not homogeneous. There are many variables and unknowns within it, such as structure, pressure, permeability and porosity; and the 50 per cent acreage factor in the formula, "balanced against the unknowns." It was his opinion that the thinner tracts underlain by water should be permitted to produce at a higher relative rate because this would give them a greater chance to produce their in-place reserves.

While as stated there is a mass of evidence in this case, some of which is conflicting, and much of which would have supported the Commission if it had entered a different order, the foregoing constitutes substantial competent evidence to support this proration order of the Commission. There was an abundance of testimony that under the Commission's formula, each operator would have the opportunity to recover his in-place oil reserves. This Court held in the *Quinman Field* case³ that in a Rule 37 case (involving a permit to drill a well on a small tract), the landowner is entitled to a fair chance to recover the oil and gas in and under his land or its equivalent in kind to prevent confiscation of his property. But in determining the validity of a field-wide proration order, the landowner is not wholly restricted to a recovery of reserves underlying his land. The test in that case (which is this case) is whether he has an opportunity to produce his fair share of the minerals in the reservoir. *Railroad Commission v. Shell Oil Co.*, 380 S.W. 2d 556 at 560, [20 O&GR 888] (Tex. 1964).

While the Appellants' witness Gruy testified that Appellants would suffer uncompensated drainage under the Commission's formula, there was an abundance of competent testimony that the net drainage was *toward* the Appellants' portion of the field, not only because of water encroachment but because of the difference in pressure. Hence the facts of this case are distinguishable from the *Normanna* and *Port Acres* cases (supra, footnotes 1 and 2) where the evidence was undisputed that there would be enormous amounts of uncompensated drainage from the large tracts in question to the small town-lot wells. The evidence in those cases as well as in *Railroad Commission v. Shell Oil Co.*, supra, footnote 3, was that the wells on the small tracts would depend for their production as much as 85 per cent on oil or gas drained from under other tracts. There is competent testimony here that there would be little if any drainage toward the edge wells which did not have a thick sec-

³ *Railroad Commission v. Shell Oil Co.*, 380 S.W. 2d 556, [20 O&GR 888] (Tex. 1964). See also *Railroad Commission v. Williams*, 356 S.W. 2d 13 at 136, [16 O&GR 177] (Tex. 1962) as to Rule 37 cases.

tion of oil-bearing sand or rock; i.e., those wells which did not have as many acre-feet as those wells in the center.

This Court has taken note before that oil moves to areas of low pressure and that drainage is from areas of high pressure to areas of low pressure. *Railroad Commission v. Manziel*, 361 S.W. 2d 560, [17 O&GR 444] (Tex. 1962). In that case as oil was produced, the bottom-hole pressure dropped from 2,650 pounds per square inch to an average of 371 pounds p.s.i. Water was forced into the strata from the surface in order to produce the oil that would otherwise be lost. Here in the edge portions of the field, as oil was produced, the pressure did not substantially decline as it did in Manziel. This, and other things, led the petroleum engineers to conclude that the pressure in the wells was being sustained by the intrusion of water from the aquifer which was next to and below much of the field. This Court, in Manziel, noted that pressure was greatest in the Whelan Brothers-Vickie Lynn Unit, and hence, "It stands to reason that under these conditions, the drainage from the Whelan Brothers-Vickie Lynn Unit will continue." 361 S.W. 2d at 573. Similarly, we said in the Port Acres case, "That is to say that since the gas in a continuous reservoir will flow to a point of low pressure the landowner is not restricted to the particular gas that may underlie his property . . ." 357 S.W. 2d at 375, [16 O&GR 788].

Moreover, there is an acceptable reason for allowing the thinner tracts with fewer acre-feet to produce at a higher rate. As set out above, there is evidence that as the oil is withdrawn from the entire field (not just the edge tracts), water rises or comes into the thin or outside areas. This does two things: it cuts down on the recoverable oil in those tracts, and it pushes oil up dip toward the thick tracts. If this oil is not recovered before that happens, it is lost to the owners of that tract. Their correlative rights are not protected.

In the *Normanna*, *Port Acres*, and *Quitman Field* cases,⁴ this Court struck down proration formulas having a substantial "per well" factor. Here there is none. Moreover, even in those cases, this Court did not hold that a per well factor made the proration formula invalid per se. In the *Quitman Field* case, we said, "The Commission is not enjoined from adopting any formula which provides less than a 50% well factor . . ." 380 S.W. 2d at 561. The Court did not tie the hands of the Commission, and we do not tie them here.

⁴ *Atlantic Ref. Co. v. Railroad Commission*, 346 S.W. 2d 801, [14 O&GR 362] (Tex. 1961) (*Normanna Field*); *Halbouty v. Railroad Commission*, 357 S.W. 2d 364, [16 O&GR 788] (Tex. 1962) (*Port Acres Field*); and *Railroad Commission v. Shell Oil Co.*, 380 S.W. 2d 556, [20 O&GR 888] (Tex. 1964) (*Quitman Field*).

Even if it be conceded that Pickens et al. will suffer some injury, that alone is not enough to invalidate the order. "When the orders are supported by evidence . . . the fact that the application of the order has resulted in economic loss to some does not warrant a finding that there has been a deprivation of property without due process of law." Railroad Commission v. Manziel, 361 S.W. 2d 560 at 565, [17 O&GR 444] (Tex. 1962).

On the problems of due process and confiscation, the question of whether a proration schedule based on factors other than acre-feet of recoverable oil would wrongfully deprive a person of his property was before the United States Supreme Court in Railroad Commission of Texas v. Rowan & Nichols Co., 310 U.S. 573 (1940). The Commission's East Texas proration formula then provided that a [good] well could daily produce 3.2 per cent of its hourly potential. This resulted in an allowable of about 22 barrels per day per well for the good wells with the best reserves in place. But of the total number of barrels allowed to be produced from the field, about 73 per cent of the total oil produced came from wells which were exempt from the proration formula because they were "marginal wells." Each of these marginal wells was permitted to produce up to 20 barrels per day. It was contended that the proration formula failed to give sufficient weight to the reserves in place, particularly the wells in the deep and rich portions of the field. The contention before the United States Supreme Court is set out in the opinion:

"Only an allocation based upon acre-feet of sand or its equivalent would be a reasonable means of measuring the oil in place beneath respondent's leases; and any formula failing to do this takes respondent's property without due process of law." 310 U.S. at 578.

The lower federal courts struck down the order, but the Supreme Court reversed. It held that the proration of oil upon a fair basis was a matter for the administrative bodies and not for the judiciary. "A controversy like this always calls for fresh reminder that courts must not substitute their notions of expediency and fairness for those which have guided the agencies to whom the formulation and execution of policy have been entrusted." 310 U.S. at 580-81. The force of the opinion by Justice Frankfurter is magnified by the dissent which says that an order not based on in-place reserves amounts to a confiscation of property.

The above case was followed in Railroad Commission of Texas v. Rowan & Nichols Oil Co., 311 U.S. 570 (1941). The Court there said, "Thus it is that a production formula dependent on current reserves of oil in place—a consideration which

greatly influenced the court below [in striking down the order] and was urged before us--contains elements of unfairness to wells on the edge of the field by disregarding the migration of oil from west to east." 311 U.S. at 574.

In *Railroad Commission v. Humble Oil & Ref. Co.*, 193 S.W. 2d 824 (Tex.Civ.App. 1946, n.r.e.), the Commission's proration order for the Hawkins Field was based on a formula of 50 per cent for the well and 50 per cent for surface acreage. It was upheld as against many of the contentions advanced by Appellants here. Judge McClendon stated that "It has never been held that recoverable reserves constitutes the only factor to be considered in determining the validity of a proration order." 193 S.W. 2d at 833. The evidence there was that a formula based only on reserves (acre-feet) would be impractical. That opinion was affirmed by the United States Supreme Court. *Humble Oil & Ref. Co. v. Railroad Commission of Texas*, 331 U.S. 791 (1947).

In the *Port Acres* case, it was proposed that the proration formula be based exclusively on net acre-feet. Part of the Commission's order appealed from stated: "'The Commission further denied your [Halbouty's] application for an allocation formula based on net acre feet . . .'" 357 S.W. 2d at 367. While the Court struck down the particular formula with the large "per well" factor in it, the Court did not direct or even hint that a 100 per cent acre-foot formula would be the only acceptable one. Instead, the Court held:

"We fully appreciate the thorny problem that the Commission has in this matter of proration among the hundreds of fields under their supervision with different characteristics and the diverse conflicting interests, views and opinions, but we are confident that with the trained personnel at their disposal a much nearer approximation can be made, giving to all parties an opportunity to produce a fair share of the minerals underlying the field with ratable allowables that will be more nearly equitable than appeals in the case before us." 357 S.W. 2d at 375-76.

The *Quinnan Field* opinion pointed out (380 S.W. 2d at 560) that the Commission has been directed by the Legislature to consider many factors (not just reserves). A proration statute specifically lists surface acres as a consideration. Article 6008, § 13 V.A.C.S.

This Court has taken the position that it is not the function of the Court to substitute itself for the Commission in determining the wisdom or advisability of a particular order. The power to regulate the production of oil and gas has been delegated by the Legislature to the Commission. The Court will not usurp that authority. It will not invalidate an order of the Com-

mission because some other order might be thought by the Court to be better or more equitable. Railroad Commission v. Shell Oil Co., 139 Tex. 66, 161 S.W. 2d 1022 at 1029 (1942). The Commission's order will be sustained if it is reasonably supported by substantial evidence. Railroad Commission v. Mackhank Pet. Co., 144 Tex. 393, 190 S.W. 2d 802 (1945). Our holding is that this order of the Commission is reasonably supported by substantial evidence.

The Order Is Not Invalid as Compelling Unitization

Appellants Pickens et al. also here attack the order on the ground that it is an attempt on the part of the Commission to require forced pooling or unitization of the field. The argument is that the Commission is not authorized to force or require pooling; and it has sought to do so by indirection what it could not do directly. The assertion amounts to a charge that the Commission did not make a good faith independent effort to fairly prorate the oil but abdicated its governmental function to the field operators by blindly adopting their proposals. We are unable to agree with this assertion.

Appellants assert that there was not introduced before the Commission substantial evidence to support its order, particularly as to the water drive. The assertion is not a valid objection to the order. The record made before the Commission is not before us, and no attempt was made to introduce it into evidence. As this Court said in Railroad Commission v. Shell Oil Co., 139 Tex. 66, 161 S.W. 2d 1022 (1942), "Whether the agency heard sufficient evidence is not material. In fact, the evidence heard by the agency is not per se admissible upon the trial in the district court." 161 S.W. 2d at 1030.⁵

There was no evidence of any purpose or design on the part of the Commissioners to adopt any formula which would force Pickens or anyone else to pool his or their production. No small tracts are involved. The units of production are 160 acres, and each well is capable of producing the oil under its tract. It is not asserted that anyone must pool his land with that of others to recover the minerals thereunder because of the cost of drilling a well, or for any other reason, as was pointed out as one of the grounds for the dissents in the Normanna and Port Acres cases. The fact that persons or corporations owning 88 or 92 per cent of the production, after arguing among them-

⁵ Though both sides objected from time to time about what evidence the Commission heard, and the objections were sustained, there was in fact evidence from Appellants' witness Gryn that Phillips Petroleum Company had introduced evidence before the Commission as to the water drive.

selves, had been able to agree to the 50-50 formula which they recommended to the Commission, does not prove a relinquishment of authority by the Commission to any one.^{6a}

Appellants Pickens et al. say that this conclusion must be (conclusively) inferred as a fact from these circumstances.^{6b}

The evidence is that soon after the discovery of this field, various operators recognized that ultimately a secondary recovery program would be required to save great quantities of oil which would otherwise be left in the ground. Without such a program, they said, the field was expected to produce approximately 70 million barrels of oil. With a program of secondary recovery, an additional 130 million barrels could be recovered.

A secondary recovery program cannot be confined to particular tracts. It can be carried out with less complications and with greater ease if the entire field is unitized. But no one, under the present state of the Texas law, can be required to unitize his tract against his will, or to participate in a secondary recovery program.

Committees and subcommittees were formed among the operators to study the field and its problems. All the operators, including Appellant Pickens, were invited to attend the meetings. Mr. Gruy ultimately did attend meetings where he represented Pickens. The factual basis for a major exhibit prepared for this trial by Gruy was taken from the files of the committee which files were open to him.

The various producers had different selfish interests and different problems of production. Some were over thin tracts and others, including Appellee Hunt Oil Company (which had more acre-feet of production than anyone in the field) and Appellant Pickens, were over thick tracts. Hunt Oil Company was elected to head the main committee.

The majority of the committee decided that it would, in the future, recommend to the Commission that the field be unitized; and steps were taken in the hope of ultimately bringing about a voluntary unitization. At the time of the hearing before the Commission on this proration order, owners representing 88 per cent of the production, as a separate and independent matter, had agreed to a voluntary unitization of the field. Pickens et

^{6a} No question regarding the anti-trust laws is here raised or passed upon.

^{6b} Our disposition of this point makes it unnecessary to write upon the question of our jurisdiction to consider, on direct appeal, implied [or express] findings of fact made by the trial court. It has generally been regarded that this Court could consider only questions of law, and is without power to make or overturn findings of fact, except on the basis of "no evidence," "no substantial evidence," or the converse thereof.

al. had not. At the time of the hearing and at the time of trial, the proposal for voluntary unitization had not been presented to the Commission. The Commission's 50-50 formula makes no reference to unitization.

The same unofficial committee argued within itself over the most desirable proration formula. There were different opinions as to the best formula. As a result of what was regarded as an equitable compromise within the committee, the 50-50 proration formula was recommended. In making the recommendation it considered the structure of the field, permeability, porosity, pressure, where the water levels were, water drive, as well as acre-feet and surface acres. Evidence to support that formula was presented to the court. Some of the exhibits had been originally prepared by members of the committee for the consideration of the committee. The committee thought the 50-50 formula would be desirable for a period of 13 years. Thereafter a 100 per cent acre-foot formula would be desirable. At the time of the hearing before the Commission, the ownership of 88 per cent of the field's production approved of the formula; and by the time of trial, 92 per cent had approved.

Appellees assert that if this field is ultimately repressed by agreement of owners of 92 per cent of the production Pickens et al. will still be in an advantageous position on the structure and will be greatly benefited. They will be able to continue to produce on the basis of the Commission's proration order. Pickens will still recover, they say, more oil under the 50-50 formula, if the field is subject to secondary recovery, than is recoverable under his tracts by the ordinary or primary means.

The Commission did enter the 50-50 formula as the majority of the operators recommended. There is evidence that this formula will encourage unitization. From this, Appellants Pickens et al. say that as a matter of law the 50-50 order is invalid because it forces pooling. We cannot agree.

In promulgating a proration formula, the Commission is acting prospectively. Its actions are legislative in character. Since the earliest days of the oil industry, it has been customary for interested people to recommend orders to the Commission. The Yates Field was operated by an advisory committee before the Commission was given the power to prorate production. See *Standard Oil Co. v. Railroad Commission*, 215 S.W. 2d 633 at 634 (Tex.Civ.App. 1948, n.r.e.). There the operators employed an expert to prepare rules, and requested the Commission to adopt them. It did.

It is not improper for interested persons or groups to propose particular legislative orders. Similar action is common before the Legislature itself. It is unnecessary here for us to say that the courts are never interested in the motives of an administra-

tive body while it is acting in a legislative capacity under delegated powers. Here there is simply no evidence of any sort of abdication on the Commission's part or a delegation of its powers to anyone. There is no evidence that the Commission disregarded the engineering and geological data available to it and entered the order just because some operators recommended it. The question is not one of unitization or pooling. That question was not before the Commission and is not before us. The question here is whether the order which the Commission entered, when tested by the usual rules, is or is not reasonably supported by substantial evidence. We have held that it is. It is a valid exercise of the police power of the Commission to protect correlative rights under our statutes.

Evidence Adduced after Date of Commission's Order

Appellants Pickens et al. contend that the trial court erred in admitting evidence of tests made, or other evidence discovered, after the date of the Commission's proration order. They cite the familiar rule that the Commission's order is to be tested by the conditions as they existed at the time the Commission acted. *Magnolia Pet. Co. v. New Process Production Company*, 129 Tex. 617, 104 S.W. 2d 1106 (1937); *Railroad Commission v. Magnolia Pet. Co.*, 130 Tex. 484, 109 S.W. 2d 967 (1937); *Cook Drilling Co. v. Gulf Oil Corp.*, 139 Tex. 80, 161 S.W. 2d 1036 (1942).

The order in question was promulgated on March 6, 1963. Intervenor Hunt Oil Company, an appellee, tendered its Exhibit #1 which was based on reservoir conditions to August 28, 1963. It was a structural isopach map, "On Top of James [Lime] Porosity," and showed the portion of the field underlain by water. Exhibit #1 of Cities Service Oil Company was also an isopach map on top of the Fairway (James Lime) Field to show the area of the field underlain by water and the aquifer around the field. This exhibit was based on a map made in 1961 but which had been brought "up to date" down to August 1963. Hunt's Exhibits #2 and #3, objected to for the same reason, showed, down to August and November 1963, respectively, the cumulative oil production and the "water cut-percentage" (percentage of water produced per thousand barrels of oil) in particular wells. Part of the testimony of the witnesses Dixon, Latimer, and Kelly was based on these exhibits. There were other exhibits similarly objected to.

It was stipulated during the trial that "all geological or engineering data . . . offered by any expert witness shall not be objected to on the ground of hearsay evidence," or on the ground that it was not properly authenticated. Objection could be made on the grounds of materiality or relevance.

Appellants took the position that evidence of conditions, or evidence obtained, after March 3, 1963, was irrelevant and immaterial.

The trial court admitted the first of these exhibits with the following ruling:

"I will overrule the objection [of counsel for Pickens et al.] with the following qualification: That I will only consider it if it shows anything that was in existence, or tends to show anything that was in existence, at the time of the order of the Commission, whether it was discovered later, or platted later, studied later or the results showed later. . . ."

"Now that may be a little complicated, but I felt that I must qualify it to that extent. The limitation in so far as information obtained, experiments and results of experiments made since the Railroad Commission order, is admissible in so far as it might show, or tend to show, what was actually in existence, or conditions in existence at the time of the Railroad Commission order, whether they were then known or not."

There was substantially this same ruling on the admissibility of other evidence of the same nature.

The trial court's ruling was correct. *Lone Star Gas Co. v. State*, 137 Tex. 279, 153 S.W. 2d 681 at 700 (1941). Many of the basic "conditions" which were geologically in existence in the oil field at the time the Commission acted may have existed for a million years; and the fact that they were discovered, or evidence of the condition was adduced, after the Commission's order would not render the evidence inadmissible. It is, of course, possible for conditions to change within the field; and it would not be entirely fair to the Commission to judge its orders by conditions which have changed since its order. Here, however, the trial court admitted the geological evidence which showed, or which tended to show, what the conditions were as of the time of the order, and what the Commission might reasonably have anticipated to occur as a result of those conditions.

While no particular point has been made of it in our opinions, this Court has considered *geologic* evidence which was adduced or discovered after the entry of the Commission's order. In *Railroad Commission v. Manziel*, *supra*, for example, the order was dated August 15, 1960. This Court's opinion sets out the results of tests made thereafter on September 1, 1961. See 361 S.W. 2d at 573. Similarly in the *Port Acres* case, the order was dated August 18, 1958. The Commission refused to reconsider the order on July 6, 1959. This Court in its opinion refers to evidence as to uncompensated drainage as of April 1, 1960 (357 S.W. 2d at 371), and of tests made in October 1960 as to *com* native production among wells (See 357 S.W. 2d at

372, Footnote 1). As reflected by the majority and dissenting opinions in the Normanna case, the Bright & Schiff well which was under attack had not even been drilled, or the permit for its drilling issued, at the time the Commission issued its proration order for the field.⁷ Yet the validity of the Commission's field-wide proration order turned in part on what that particular well would produce in the future compared to the in-place reserves which its lease was supposed to have.

In all of these proration cases, the Court has considered this type of evidence for its value in showing, or tending to show, what the *conditions* were when the Commission acted, and how they might reasonably be expected to develop in the future, even though the tests to verify, *vel non*, the existence of those conditions may have been conducted at some later date. In passing, it is noted that the tests here were made within a relatively brief time after the Commission's order.

Admissibility of the Evidence of the Witness Pat Kelly

The defendant in the trial court, the Railroad Commission, tendered as its witness Mr. Pat Kelly to defend its position. Kelly qualified as an expert in the field of petroleum engineering. His testimony was objected to (1) because Kelly had been the trial examiner who took the testimony for the Commission when this matter was before the Commission; (2) because testimony received in the Commission's hearing is not *per se* admissible in the trial before the court, and (3) part of Kelly's testimony was based on tests made after the date of the Commission's order. This last objection, having been considered above, will not be again noticed.

As to the objection that Kelly had been an examiner and hence was not competent to testify, Appellants Pickens et al. had no authorities to present to the trial court, and they cite none here. In ruling upon the admissibility of Kelly's testimony, the trial court said that he would consider Kelly's testimony which was based upon what Kelly knew as an expert. With regard to the second objection, the court said, "I will not consider over objection matters which are based solely on the ground that is [the evidence] was before the Commission."

⁷ 346 S.W. 2d at 804. The proration orders were dated December 1957 and February 1958. 346 S.W. 2d at 802. Bright & Schiff's permit to drill was dated December 1958. 346 S.W. 2d at 816. There was considerable delay in the completion of the well because Atlantic Refining Company constructed a warehouse at the place where the driller needed to place his machinery. This resulted in injunction litigation ending in this Court. *Atlantic Ref. Co. v. Bright & Schiff*, 321 S.W. 2d 167, [10 O&GR 566] (Tex. Civ. App. 1959, n.r.e.). The estimates of future production appear in our Normanna opinion in 346 S.W. 2d at 803 and 804.

The fact that Kelly was an examiner for the Railroad Commission in this matter would not per se disqualify him as a witness for the Commission. The Commission, of course, is entitled to defend its order; and if Kelly otherwise qualified as an expert, he could testify to what he knew as an expert. There is precedent in this regard. In the "Flare Gas" case, *Railroad Commission v. Sterling Oil and Ref. Co.*, 147 Tex. 547, 218 S.W. 2d 415 (1949), this Court quoted the testimony of but two witnesses. They were Railroad Commissioners Murray and Thompson. Commissioner Murray testified as a petroleum engineer. Commissioner Thompson simply testified as a Commissioner in defense of the Commission's order. Based on the testimony of these two witnesses, this Court held the order to be reasonably supported by substantial evidence.

In other cases involving the Commission's orders, employees of the Commission have testified.⁶ Similar holdings have been made with regard to permitting a Commissioner in a condemnation case to testify as an expert upon the trial as to the value of the property taken. *City of Houston v. Schorr*, 231 S.W. 2d 740 (Tex.Civ.App. 1950, wr.dism'd); *Schwab v. County of Bexar*, 366 S.W. 2d 952 (Tex.Civ.App. 1963, n.r.e.). Without writing on the point, this Court considered such evidence in its opinion in *Texas Electric Service Co. v. Campbell*, 161 Tex. 77, 336 S.W. 2d 742 at 743 (1960).

Accordingly, we hold that the trial court did not err in admitting the evidence complained of. As above indicated, we also hold that the proration order in question for the Fairway (James Lime) Field is reasonably supported by substantial evidence and is valid. The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

DISCUSSION NOTES

Allowables: Oil Allocation Formula Based 50% on Surface Acreage-50% on Acre Feet Supported by Substantial Evidence.

This case demonstrates the continued vitality of the substantial evidence rule in sustaining the presumptive validity of the Railroad Commission's proration orders in situations

⁶ *Standard Oil Company of Texas v. Railroad Commission*, 215 S.W. 2d 633 (Tex. Civ. App. 1948, n.r.e.), involving the proration of oil in the Yates field, where the Court's opinion sets out and comments on the testimony of Mr. Jack Brunel, then the Director of the Commission's Oil and Gas Division; *Railroad Commission v. Humble Oil & Ref. Co.*, 193 S.W. 2d 824, 829, 831 (Tex.Civ.App. 1946, n.r.e.), where Mr. Brunel again testified; and *Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Railroad Commission*, 341 S.W. 2d 523, 14 O&GR 296 (Tex. Civ. App. 1960, n.r.e.).

where the order reasonably (though necessarily without perfect certainty) conforms with the Texas Supreme Court's command in that series of cases commencing with the *Noranna* decision in 1961 that owners of interests are to be accorded an opportunity to produce their fair shares. See discussion notes, 16 O&GR 813. Not answered is the point there discussed as to whether ownership in place or rule of capture now is basic property law in Texas. This decision can be interpreted as a proper police power conservation order modification imposed on either concept, though it is submitted that opportunity to produce, not relating to particular oil in place as this decision makes clear, more closely accords with a rule of capture basic law approach.

One wonders at what point, or if ever, discounted values might have to be taken into account in a situation like this. Obviously the edge owners of thinner sections gained some advantage here, for the total oil to which they are fairly entitled necessarily will be produced sooner than the total shares fairly attributable to the better interior acreage. This complication may have to be faced one day as a refinement of the *fair* opportunity concept.

Concerning discussion of ownership in place or rule of capture in Texas, see discussion notes at 20 O&GR 887. Also see the cases at 20 O&GR 880 and 888.

W. J. F.

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STREET et al. v. SINCLAIR PIPELINE COMPANY

Texas Court of Civil Appeals, Waco

January 14, 1965—No. 4299

386 S.W. 2d 350

Easement: Construction of Instrument Granting Pipeline Right of Way Construed To Deny Owner of Servient Estate the Right To Require Relocation of Line in Order That He May Recover Gravel Beneath the Easement.

Sinclair owned an easement across Street's fee simple estate under a grant providing that Sinclair would pay for all damages caused by its *operation* of the pipeline. Street mined all of the gravel from the tract except that underlying the pipeline. Street brought suit seeking a mandatory injunction requiring Sinclair to relocate the lines so that the underlying gravel could be mined or alternatively for damages. The lower court held for Sinclair, and Street appealed. **Held: Affirmed.** The owner's right to remove gravel is subservient to the estate of the easement holder. The damage clause in the grant

BEFORE THE OIL CONSERVATION COMMISSION
OF THE STATE OF NEW MEXICO

IN THE MATTER OF THE HEARING
CALLED BY THE OIL CONSERVATION
COMMISSION OF NEW MEXICO FOR
THE PURPOSE OF CONSIDERING:

CASE No. 1937
Order No. R-1670

APPLICATION OF THE OIL CONSERVATION
COMMISSION ON ITS OWN MOTION TO CON-
SIDER CONSOLIDATING THE SPECIAL RULES
GOVERNING THE SEVEN PRORATED GAS POOLS
IN NORTHWEST NEW MEXICO, AND TO CON-
SIDER CONSOLIDATING THE SPECIAL RULES
GOVERNING THE SIX PRORATED GAS POOLS
IN SOUTHEAST NEW MEXICO.

ORDER OF THE COMMISSION

BY THE COMMISSION:

This cause came on for hearing at 9 o'clock a.m., on April 13, 1960, at Hobbs, New Mexico, before the Oil Conservation Commission of New Mexico, hereinafter referred to as the "Commission."

NOW, on this 20th day of May, 1960, the Commission, a quorum being present, having considered the testimony presented and the exhibits received at said hearing, and being fully advised in the premises,

FINDS:

(1) That due public notice having been given as required by law, the Commission has jurisdiction of this cause and the subject matter thereof.

(2) That in the past the Commission has held numerous hearings and taken voluminous testimony from engineers, geologists, and other interested parties and entered many orders creating, delineating, spacing, prorating, and otherwise regulating the Pools now designated the Blinbry, Crosby-Devonian, Eumont, Jalmat, Justis, Tubb, Aztec-Pictured Cliffs, Ballard-Pictured Cliffs, Fulcher Kutz-Pictured Cliffs, South Blanco-Pictured Cliffs, Tapacito-Pictured Cliffs, West Kutz-Pictured Cliffs, and Blanco Mesaverde Gas Pools in the interests of conservation, prevention of waste, and protection of correlative rights.

(3) That it has been found by the Commission that one well will efficiently and economically drain the area of the proration units set out in the Special Pool Rules in each of the several gas pools listed above.

-2-

CASE No. 1937

Order No. R-1670

(4) That the total producing capacity of the wells in each of these pools has been found to be greater than the market demand for gas produced from each of these pools.

(5) That prorationing has been instituted in each of these pools.

(6) That it is both feasible and desirable that the Special Pool Rules for the seven prorated gas pools in Northwest New Mexico be consolidated and that the Special Pool Rules for the six prorated gas pools in Southeast New Mexico be consolidated.

(7) That the following orders should be superseded:

Aztec-Pictured
Cliffs Gas Pool

R-46
R-565
R-565-A
R-565-C
R-565-D
R-614
R-620
R-697

Ballard-Pictured
Cliffs Gas Pool

R-846
R-846-A
R-967

Fulcher Kutz-Pictured
Cliffs Gas Pool

748
R-59
R-565
R-565-A
R-565-C
R-565-D
R-614
R-620
R-697

South Blanco-
Pictured Cliffs
Gas Pool

R-565
R-565-A
R-565-B
R-565-C
R-565-D
R-614
R-620
R-967

Tapacito-Pictured
Cliffs Gas Pool

R-1193
R-1193-A

West Kutz-Pictured
Cliffs Gas Pool

R-46
R-566
R-566-A
R-566-B
R-566-C
R-566-D
R-566-E
R-967

Blanco Mesaverde
Gas Pool

R-799
R-110
R-128
R-128-A
R-128-B
R-128-C
R-128-D&E
R-967

Blinebry Gas Pool

R-264-A
R-356
R-372
R-372-A
R-464
R-610-C
R-610-D
R-967

Crosby Devonian Gas
Pool

R-639
R-639-A
R-639-B

-3-
CASE No. 1937
Order No. R-1670

Eumont Gas Pool

R-264-A
R-356
R-370
R-370-A
R-370-B
R-371
R-371-A
R-967

Jalmat Gas Pool

R-264-A
R-356
R-368
R-368-A
R-368-B
R-967

Justis Gas Pool

R-264-A
R-356
R-375
R-375-A
R-586-A
R-586-C
R-586-E
R-586-F
R-967

Tubb Gas Pool

R-356
R-373
R-373-A
R-464
R-967

(8) That all provisions in the following orders relative to the regulation of gas wells in prorated gas pools should be superseded:

Blinebry Gas Pool

R-264
R-610
R-610-A
R-610-B

Eumont Gas Pool

R-264
R-520
R-520-A
R-767
R-767-A

Jalmat Gas Pool

R-264
R-520
R-520-A
R-553
R-640
R-663
R-690

Justis Gas Pool

R-586

Tubb Gas Pool

R-264
R-586
R-586-B

-4-

CASE No. 1937
Order No. R-1670

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED:

(1) That the following orders be and the same are hereby superseded:

Aztec-Pictured
Cliffs Gas Pool

R-46
R-565
R-565-A
R-565-C
R-565-D
R-614
R-620
R-697

Ballard-Pictured
Cliffs Gas Pool

R-846
R-846-A
R-967

Fulcher Kutz-Pictured
Cliffs Gas Pool

748
R-59
R-565
R-565-A
R-565-C
R-565-D
R-614
R-620
R-697

South Blanco-
Pictured Cliffs
Gas Pool

R-565
R-565-A
R-565-B
R-565-C
R-565-D
R-614
R-620
R-967

Tapacito-Pictured
Cliffs Gas Pool

R-1193
R-1193-A

West Kutz-Pictured
Cliffs Gas Pool

R-46
R-566
R-566-A
R-566-B
R-566-C
R-566-D
R-566-E
R-967

Blanco Mesaverde
Gas Pool

R-799
R-110
R-128
R-128-A
R-128-B
R-128-C
R-128-D&E
R-967

Blinebry Gas Pool

R-264-A
R-356
R-372
R-372-A
R-464
R-610-C
R-610-D
R-967

Crosby Devonian Gas
Pool

R-639
R-639-A
R-639-B

-5-
CASE No. 1937
Order No. R-1670

Eumont Gas Pool

R-264-A
R-356
R-370
R-370-A
R-370-B
R-371
R-371-A
R-967

Jalmat Gas Pool

R-264-A
R-356
R-368
R-368-A
R-368-B
R-967

Justis Gas Pool

A-264-A
R-356
R-375
R-375-A
R-586-A
R-586-C
R-586-E
R-586-F
R-967

Tubb Gas Pool

R-356
R-373
R-373-A
R-464
R-967

-6-
CASE No. 1937
Order No. R-1670

(2) That all provisions in the following orders relative to the regulation of gas wells in prorated gas pools be and the same are hereby superseded:

Blinebry Gas Pool

R-264
R-610
R-610-A
R-610-B

Eumont Gas Pool

R-264
R-520
R-520-A
R-767
R-767-A

Jalmat Gas Pool

R-264
R-520
R-520-A
R-553
R-640
R-663
R-690

Justis Gas Pool

R-586

Tubb Gas Pool

R-264
R-586
R-586-B

(3) That the Special Pool Rules for the seven prorated gas pools in Northwest New Mexico, and the Special Pool Rules for the six prorated gas pools in Southeast New Mexico, be and the same are hereby consolidated as hereinafter set forth, in the following "Rules and Regulations Governing Prorated Gas Pools in New Mexico."

RULES AND REGULATIONS
GOVERNING
PRORATED GAS POOLS IN NEW MEXICO

* * *

Table of Contents

	<u>Page</u>
GENERAL RULES, NORTHWEST NEW MEXICO.....	1
Special Rules, Northwest New Mexico	
Aztec-Pictured Cliffs Gas Pool.....	11
Ballard-Pictured Cliffs Gas Pool.....	12
Fulcher Kutz-Pictured Cliffs Gas Pool.....	13
South Blanco-Pictured Cliffs Gas Pool.....	14
Tapacito-Pictured Cliffs Gas Pool.....	15
West Kutz-Pictured Cliffs Gas Pool.....	17
Blanco-Mesaverde Gas Pool.....	18
GENERAL RULES, SOUTHEAST NEW MEXICO.....	21
Special Rules, Southeast New Mexico	
Blinebry Gas Pool.....	30
Crosby-Devonian Gas Pool.....	36
Eumont Gas Pool.....	39
Jalmat Gas Pool.....	41
Justis Gas Pool.....	46
Tubb Gas Pool.....	47

CASE No. 1937
Order No. R-1670

I. GENERAL RULES AND REGULATIONS FOR THE PRORATED GAS POOLS OF
NORTHWESTERN NEW MEXICO

(See Special Pool Rules in each pool for orders applicable to those pools only. Special Pool Rules will be found in the same classification order as in the General section, and, unless the special rules conflict with the general rule, the general rule is also applicable.)

A. WELL LOCATION AND ACREAGE REQUIREMENTS

RULE 1: Any well drilled to the producing formation of a gas pool regulated by this order and within said pool or within one mile outside the boundary of that pool, and not nearer to nor within the boundaries of another designated pool producing from the same formation, shall be spaced, drilled, operated, and prorated in accordance with the regulations in effect in that pool.

RULE 2: Except as provided in the Special Pool Rules, after the effective date of this order each well drilled or recompleted on a standard gas proration unit within a gas pool regulated by this order shall be located at least 990 feet from the outer boundary line of the proration unit, provided however, that a tolerance of 200 feet is permissible.

RULE 3: The Secretary-Director of the Commission shall have authority to grant exception to the requirements of Rule 2 where application has been filed in due form and such exception is required because of conditions resulting from previously drilled wells in the area or the necessity for exception is based upon topographic conditions.

Applicants shall furnish all operators of leases offsetting the lease containing subject well, a copy of the application to the Commission, and applicant shall include with his application a list of names and addresses of all such operators, together with a written statement that all such operators have been properly notified by registered mail. The Secretary-Director of the Commission shall wait at least 20 days before approving any such exception, and shall approve such exception only in the absence of objection of any offset operators. In the event any operator objects to the exception, the Commission shall consider the matter only after proper notice and hearing.

NOTE: Rule 3 does not apply to Blanco Mesaverde or Tapacito-Pictured Cliffs Gas Pools - See Special Pool Rules, Rule 2.

CASE No. 1937
Order No. R-1670

RULE 4: The provisions of Statewide Rule 104, Paragraph (k), shall not apply to the gas pools regulated by this order.

RULE 5(A): The acreage allocated to a gas well for proration purposes shall be known as the gas proration unit for that well. For the purpose of gas allocation in the gas pools regulated by this order, a standard proration unit shall consist of contiguous surface acreage and shall be substantially in the form of a square in pools having 160-acre standard proration units, and substantially in the form of a rectangle in pools having 320-acre standard proration units, and shall be a legal subdivision of the U. S. Public Land Surveys (quarter-section or half-section, as applicable). A proration unit shall be considered to be a standard gas proration unit when it meets the above requirements and consists of acreage within the appropriate tolerance set out below:

<u>Standard Proration Unit</u>	<u>Acreage Tolerance for Standard Unit</u>
160 acres	158-162 acres
320 acres	316-324 acres

Any gas proration unit containing acreage within the appropriate tolerance limit above shall be considered to contain the number of acres in a standard unit for the purpose of computing allowables.

RULE 5(B): The Secretary-Director of the Commission shall have authority to grant an exception to Rule 5(A) without notice and hearing where application has been filed in due form and where the following facts exist and the following provisions are complied with:

1. The proposed non-standard proration unit consists of less acreage than a standard proration unit, or where the unorthodox size or shape of the tract is due to a variation in legal subdivision of the U. S. Public Land Surveys.
2. The non-standard gas proration unit consists of contiguous quarter-quarter sections and/or lots.
3. The non-standard gas proration unit lies wholly within a single governmental section.
4. The entire non-standard gas proration unit may reasonably be presumed to be productive of gas from the designated gas pool.
5. The applicant presents written consent in the form

CASE No. 1937
Order No. R-1670

of waivers from:

(a) All operators owning interests outside the non-standard gas proration unit but in the same section in which any part of the non-standard gas proration unit is situated, and

(b) All operators owning interests in acreage offsetting the non-standard gas proration unit.

6. In lieu of subparagraph 5 of this rule, the applicant may furnish proof of the fact that said offset operators were notified by registered mail of his intent to form such non-standard gas proration unit. (This notification to offset operators should consist of the same information that is furnished to the Commission). The Secretary-Director of the Commission may approve the application if, after a period of 30 days following the mailing of said notice, no operator has made objection to formation of such non-standard gas proration unit. (See additional requirement for West Kutz-Pictured Cliffs Gas Pool)

B. NOMINATIONS AND PRORATION SCHEDULE

RULE 6(A): At least 30 days prior to the beginning of each gas proration period, the Commission shall hold a hearing after due notice has been given. The Commission shall cause to be submitted by each gas purchaser its "Preliminary Nominations" of the amount of gas which each in good faith actually desires to purchase within the ensuing proration period, by months, from each of the gas pools regulated by this order. The Commission shall consider the "Preliminary Nominations" of purchasers, actual production, and such other factors as may be deemed applicable in determining the amount of gas that may be produced without waste within the ensuing proration period. "Preliminary Nominations" shall be submitted on a form prescribed by the Commission.

RULE 6(B): The term "gas purchaser" as used in these rules shall mean any "taker" of gas either at the well-head or at any point on the lease where connection is made for gas transportation or utilization. It shall be the responsibility of said "taker" to submit a nomination in accordance with Rule 6(A) and Rule 7(A) of this order.

RULE 7(A): In the event a gas purchaser's market shall have increased or decreased, he may file with the Commission prior to the 10th day of the month a "Supplemental Nomination" showing the amount of gas he actually in good faith desires to purchase during the ensuing

CASE No. 1937
Order No. R-1670

proration month from the gas pools regulated by this order. The Commission shall hold a public hearing between the 13th and 20th days of each month to determine the reasonable market demand for gas for the ensuing proration month, and shall issue a proration schedule setting out the amount of gas which each well may produce during the ensuing proration month, along with such other information as is necessary to show the allowable-production status of each well on the schedule. "Supplemental Nominations" shall be submitted on a form prescribed by the Commission.

RULE 7(B): The Commission shall include in the proration schedule the gas wells in the gas pools regulated by this order delivering to a gas transportation facility, or lease gathering system, and shall include in the proration schedule any well which it finds is being unreasonably discriminated against through denial of access to a gas transportation facility, which is reasonably capable of handling the type of gas produced by such well.

C. ALLOCATION AND GRANTING OF ALLOWABLES

RULE 8(A): The total allowable to be allocated to each gas pool regulated by this order each month shall be equal to the sum of the "Preliminary" or "Supplemental Nominations" (whichever is applicable) for each pool, together with any adjustment which the Commission deems advisable. A monthly allowable shall be assigned to each well entitled to an allowable in each pool by allocating the pool allowable among all such wells in accordance with the procedure set out in Rule 9(C).

RULE 8(B)1: No gas well shall be given an allowable until Form C-104 and Form C-110 have been filed, together with a plat (C-128) showing acreage attributed to said well and the locations of all wells on the lease, and

2: Unless a deliverability test taken in conformance with the provisions of Order R-333-C and D as amended by R-333-E has been submitted, except as provided in Rule 10(C) below.

RULE 8(C): Allowables to newly completed gas wells shall commence:

1. On the date of connection to a gas transportation facility, such date to be determined from an affidavit furnished to the Commission (1000 Rio Brazos Road, Aztec, New Mexico) by the purchaser, or

CASE No. 1937
Order No. R-1670

2. The latest filing date of Form C-104, C-110, and C-128, or

3. A date 45 days prior to the date upon which the well's initial deliverability and shut-in pressure test is reported to the Commission on Form C-122-A in conformance with the provisions of Order R-333-C and D as amended by Order R-333-E,

whichever date is the later.

RULE 9(A): The product obtained by multiplying each well's acreage factor by the calculated deliverability (expressed as MCF per day) for that well shall be known as the AD factor for that well. The acreage factor shall be determined to the nearest hundredth of a unit by dividing the acreage within the proration unit by 160 in pools with 160 acre standard proration units and by 320 in pools with 320 acre standard gas proration units; however, the acreage tolerances provided in Rule 5(A) shall apply. The "AD Factor" shall be computed to the nearest whole unit.

RULE 9(B): The allowable to be assigned to each marginal well shall be equal to the maximum production of said well during any month of the preceding gas proration period except as provided in the Special Pool Rules.

RULE 9(C): The pool allowable remaining each month after deducting the total allowable assigned to marginal wells shall be allocated among the non-marginal wells entitled to an allowable in the following manner:

1. Seventy-five percent (75%) of the pool allowable remaining to be allocated to non-marginal wells shall be allocated among such wells in the proportion that each well's "AD Factor" bears to the total "AD Factor" for all non-marginal wells in the pool.

2. Twenty-five percent (25%) of the pool allowable remaining to be allocated to non-marginal wells shall be allocated among such wells in the proportion that each well's acreage factor bears to the total acreage factor for all non-marginal wells in the pool.

RULE 9(D): Annual deliverability tests taken each year shall be used in calculating allowables for wells in the gas pools regulated by this order for the twelve month period beginning February 1 of the following year.

RULE 10(A): If, during a proration month, the acreage

CASE No. 1937
Order No. R-1670

assigned to a well is increased, the operator shall notify the Commission in writing (1000 Rio Brazos Road, Aztec, New Mexico) of such increase by filing a revised plat (Form C-128). The increased allowable assigned the gas proration unit for the well shall be effective on the first day of the month following receipt of the notification by the Commission.

RULE 10(B): A change in a well's deliverability due to retest or test after recompletion or workover shall become effective:

1. On the date of reconnection after workover, such date to be determined from Form C-104 as filed by the operators, or
2. A date 45 days prior to the date upon which a well's initial deliverability and shut-in pressure test is reported to the Commission on Form C-122-A in conformance with the provisions of Order R-333-C and D as amended by Order R-333-E, or
3. A date 45 days prior to the receipt and approval of Form C-104 by the Commission's office (1000 Rio Brazos Road, Aztec, New Mexico); (Form C-104 shall specify the exact nature of the workover or remedial work. If the nature of the work cannot be explained on Form C-104, in that event, Form C-103 shall also be filed in accordance with Rule 1106 of the Commission's Statewide Rules and Regulations);

whichever is later.

RULE 10(C): The calculated deliverability at the "deliverability pressure" shall be determined in accordance with the provisions of Order R-333-C and D, as amended by Order R-333-E.

The Secretary-Director of the Commission shall have authority to allow exceptions to the annual deliverability test requirement for marginal wells where the deliverability of a well is of such volume as to have no significance in the determination of the well's allowable. Application for such exception may be submitted in writing by the operator of the well and, if granted, may be revoked by the Secretary-Director of the Commission at any time by requesting the well to be scheduled and tested in accordance with Order R-333-C and D as amended by Order R-333-E.

RULE 11: After notice and hearing, the Commission may assign minimum allowables in order to prevent the premature abandonment of wells.

RULE 12: Except as provided in the Special Pool Rules, the full production of gas from each well, including drilling gas, shall be charged against the well's allowable regardless of the disposition of the gas; provided, however, that gas used in maintaining the producing ability of the well shall not be charged against the allowable.

D. BALANCING OF PRODUCTION

RULE 13: The dates 7:00 a.m., February 1, and 7:00 a.m., August 1, shall be known as balancing dates, and the periods of time bounded by these dates shall be known as gas proration periods.

RULE 14(A): Underproduction: Any non-marginal well which has an underproduced status as of the end of a gas proration period shall be allowed to carry such underproduction forward into the next gas proration period and may produce such underproduction in addition to the allowable assigned during such succeeding period. Any allowable carried forward into a gas proration period and remaining unproduced at the end of such gas proration period shall be cancelled.

RULE 14(B): Production during any one month of a gas proration period in excess of the allowable assigned to a well for such month shall be applied against the underproduction carried into such period in determining the amount of allowable, if any, to be cancelled.

RULE 15(A): Overproduction: Any well which has an overproduced status as of the end of a gas proration period shall carry such overproduction forward into the next gas proration period, provided that such overproduction shall be made up during such succeeding period. Any well which has not made up the overproduction carried into a gas proration period by the end of such proration period shall be shut-in until such overproduction is made up.

RULE 15(B): Except as provided by the Special Pool Rules, if, at any time, a well is overproduced an amount equaling six times its current monthly allowable, it shall be shut-in during that month, and each succeeding month until the well is overproduced less than six times its current monthly allowable.

RULE 15(C): Allowable assigned to a well during any one

CASE No. 1937
Order No. R-1670

month of a gas proration period in excess of the production for the same month shall be applied against the overproduction carried into such period in determining the amount of overproduction, if any, which has not been made up.

RULE 15(D): The Commission may allow overproduction to be made up at a lesser rate than would be the case if the well were completely shut-in upon a showing at public hearing after due notice that complete shut-in of the well would result in material damage to the well.

RULE 15(E): Any allowable accrued to a well at the end of a proration period due to the cancellation of underage and the redistribution thereof shall be applied against the overproduction carried into said proration period.

E. CLASSIFICATION OF WELLS

RULE 16(A): After the production data is available for the last month of each gas proration period, any well which had an underproduced status at the beginning of the preceding gas proration period and which did not produce its allowable during at least one month of such preceding gas proration period may be classified as a marginal well, unless, prior to the end of said preceding gas proration period, the operator or other interested party presents satisfactory evidence to the Commission showing that the well should not be so classified. However, a well which in any month of said proration period has demonstrated its ability to produce its allowable for said proration period shall not be classified as a marginal well.

(Not applicable to Tapacito - See Special Pool Rules).

RULE 16(B): The Secretary-Director may reclassify a marginal or non-marginal well at any time the well's production data, deliverability data, or other evidence as to the well's producing ability justifies such reclassification.

RULE 17: A well which is classified as a marginal well shall not be permitted to accumulate underproduction, and any underproduction accrued to a well prior to its classification as a marginal well shall be cancelled.

RULE 18: If, at the end of a proration period, a marginal well has produced more than the total allowable for the period assigned a non-marginal unit of like deliverability and acreage, the marginal well shall be reclassified as a non-marginal well and its allowable and net status adjusted accordingly.

RULE 19: A well which has been reworked or recompleted shall be classified as a non-marginal well as of the date

CASE No. 1937
Order No. R-1670

of reconnection to a pipeline until such time as production data, deliverability data, or other evidence as to the well's producing ability indicates that the well should be classified as a marginal well.

RULE 20: All wells not classified as marginal wells shall be classified as non-marginal wells.

F. REPORTING OF PRODUCTION

RULE 21(A): The monthly gas production from each well shall be metered separately and the gas production therefrom shall be reported to the Commission on Form C-115 in accordance with Rule 1114 of the Commission's Rules and Regulations, so as to reach the Commission on or before the 24th day of the month next succeeding the month in which the gas reported was produced. The operator shall show on such report what disposition has been made of the gas produced.

RULE 21(B): Each purchaser or taker of gas in each of the designated gas pools regulated by this order shall submit a report to the Commission, so as to reach the Commission on or before the 15th day of the month next succeeding the month in which the gas was purchased or taken.

RULE 21(C): Such report shall be filed on either Form C-111 or Form C-114 (whichever is applicable) with the wells being listed in approximately the same order as they are listed on the proration schedule.

RULE 21(D): Forms C-111 and C-114 referred to herein shall be submitted in triplicate, the original being sent to the Commission at Box 871, Santa Fe, New Mexico, the remaining copies being sent to 1000 Rio Brazos Road, Aztec, New Mexico and Box 2045, Hobbs, New Mexico, respectively.

G. GENERAL

RULE 22: No gas, either dry gas or casinghead gas, produced from the gas pools regulated by this order shall be flared or vented except as provided in the Special Pool Rules.

RULE 23: Failure to comply with the provisions of this order or the rules contained herein shall result in the cancellation of allowable assigned to the affected well. No further allowable shall be assigned to the affected well until all rules and regulations are complied with. The Secretary-Director shall notify the operator of the well and the purchaser, in writing, of the date of allowable cancellation and the reason therefor.

CASE No. 1937
Order No. R-1670

RULE 24: All transporters or users of gas shall file gas well connection notices with the Commission as soon as possible after the date of connection or reconnection in accordance with the provisions of Rule 8(C) and 10(B), respectively.

(See Special Pool Rules for each pool for orders applicable to that pool only. Special Pool Rules will be found in the same classification order as in the General section, and, unless the special rules conflict with the general rule, the general rule is also applicable.)

CASE No. 1937
Order No. R-1670

II. SPECIAL RULES AND REGULATIONS FOR THE AZTEC-PICTURED CLIFFS
GAS POOL

(The Aztec-Pictured Cliffs Gas Pool was created March 15, 1950 and gas prorationing was instituted March 1, 1955)

A. WELL LOCATION AND ACREAGE REQUIREMENTS:

RULE 5(A): A standard gas proration unit in the Aztec-Pictured Cliffs Gas Pool shall be 160 acres.

G. GENERAL

RULE 22: No gas, either dry gas or casinghead gas, produced from the Aztec-Pictured Cliffs Gas Pool, except that gas used for "drilling-in" purposes, shall be flared or vented unless specifically authorized by order of the Commission after notice and hearing.

H. MISCELLANEOUS SPECIAL POOL RULES

RULE 25: The vertical limits of the Aztec-Pictured Cliffs Gas Pool shall be the Pictured Cliffs formation.

(General Pool Rules also apply unless in conflict with these Special Pool Rules)

III. SPECIAL RULES AND REGULATIONS FOR THE BALLARD-PICTURED CLIFFS GAS POOL

(The Ballard-Pictured Cliffs Gas Pool was created February 9, 1955 and gas prorationing was instituted October 1, 1956. The Otero-Pictured Cliffs and Canyon Largo-Pictured Cliffs Gas Pools were consolidated into the Ballard Pictured-Cliffs Gas Pool May 1, 1959. This pool also includes acreage that was formerly included in the Fulcher Kutz-Pictured Cliffs Gas Pool.)

A. WELL LOCATION AND ACREAGE REQUIREMENTS

RULE 5(A): A standard gas proration unit in the Ballard-Pictured Cliffs Gas Pool shall be 160 acres.

C. ALLOCATION AND GRANTING OF ALLOWABLES

RULE 12: Gas used on the lease shall not be charged against the allowable.

G. GENERAL

RULE 22: No gas, either dry gas or casinghead gas, produced from the Ballard-Pictured Cliffs Gas Pool, except that gas used for "drilling-in" purposes, shall be flared or vented unless specifically authorized by order of the Commission after notice and hearing.

H. MISCELLANEOUS SPECIAL POOL RULES

RULE 25: The vertical limits of the Ballard-Pictured Cliffs Gas Pool shall be the Pictured Cliffs formation.

(Rule 25 does not actually appear as such in any of the existing pool rules.)

(General Pool Rules also apply unless in conflict with these Special Pool Rules)

CASE No. 1937
Order No. R-1670

IV. SPECIAL RULES AND REGULATIONS FOR THE FULCHER KUTZ-PICTURED CLIFFS GAS POOL

(The Fulcher Kutz-Pictured Cliffs Gas Pool was created effective December 22, 1950 from a consolidation of the Fulcher Basin - Kutz Canyon Gas Pools. Gas prorationing was instituted March 1, 1955)

A. WELL LOCATION AND ACREAGE REQUIREMENTS

RULE 5(A): A standard gas proration unit in the Fulcher Kutz-Pictured Cliffs Gas Pool shall be 160 acres.

G. GENERAL

RULE 22: No gas, either dry gas or casinghead gas, produced from the Fulcher Kutz-Pictured Cliffs Gas Pool, except that gas used for "drilling-in" purposes, shall be flared or vented unless specifically authorized by order of the Commission after notice and hearing.

H. MISCELLANEOUS SPECIAL POOL RULES

RULE 25: The vertical limits of the Fulcher Kutz-Pictured Cliffs Gas Pool shall be the Pictured Cliffs formation.

(General Pool Rules also apply unless in conflict with these Special Pool Rules)

CASE No. 1937
Order No. R-1670

V. SPECIAL RULES AND REGULATIONS FOR THE SOUTH BLANCO-PICTURED CLIFFS GAS POOL

(The South Blanco-Pictured Cliffs Gas Pool was created May 20, 1952 and prorationing was instituted March 1, 1955.)

A. WELL LOCATION AND ACREAGE REQUIREMENTS

RULE 5(A): A standard gas proration unit in the South Blanco-Pictured Cliffs Gas Pool shall be 160 acres.

G. GENERAL

RULE 22: No gas, either dry gas or casinghead gas, produced from the South Blanco-Pictured Cliffs Gas Pool, except that gas used for "drilling-in" purposes, shall be flared or vented unless specifically authorized by order of the Commission after notice and hearing.

H. MISCELLANEOUS SPECIAL POOL RULES

RULE 25: The vertical limits of the South Blanco-Pictured Cliffs Gas Pool shall be the Pictured Cliffs formation.

(Rule 25 does not actually appear as such in any of the existing pool rules.)

(General Pool Rules also apply unless in conflict with these Special Pool Rules)

CASE No. 1937
Order No. R-1670

VI. SPECIAL RULES AND REGULATIONS FOR THE TAPACITO-PICTURED CLIFFS GAS POOL

(The Tapacito-Pictured Cliffs Gas Pool was created April 18, 1956 and prorationing was instituted August 1, 1958.)

A. WELL LOCATION AND ACREAGE REQUIREMENTS

RULE 2: Wells shall be located at least 790 feet from the outer boundaries of the drilling tract and no closer than 25 feet from any quarter-quarter section line or subdivision inner boundary. The Secretary-Director shall have authority to grant exception without notice and hearing where the application has been filed in due form and where the following facts exist and the following provisions are complied with:

- (A) The necessity for the unorthodox location is based on topographical conditions, and
- (B) 1. The ownership of all oil and gas leases within a radius of 790 feet of the proposed location is common with the ownership of the oil and gas leases under the proposed location, or
2. All owners of oil and gas leases within such radius consent in writing to the proposed location.
- (C) In lieu of Paragraph (B) 2 of this Rule the applicant may furnish proof of the fact that said offset operators were notified by registered mail of his intent to drill an unorthodox location. The Secretary-Director of the Commission may approve the application if, after a period of twenty days following the mailing of said notice, no operator has made objection to the drilling of the unorthodox location.

RULE 5(A): A standard gas proration unit in the Tapacito-Pictured Cliffs Gas Pool shall be 160 acres.

C. ALLOCATION AND GRANTING OF ALLOWABLES

RULE 9(B): The allowable to be assigned to each marginal well shall be equal to the maximum production of said well during any month of the preceding six months.

RULE 12: Gas used on the lease shall not be charged against the allowable

D. BALANCING OF PRODUCTION

RULE 15(B): If at any time a well is overproduced in an

CASE NO. 1937
Order No. R-1670

VI. SPECIAL RULES AND REGULATIONS FOR THE TAPACITO-PICTURED CLIFFS
GAS POOL (CONT'D)

amount equalling six times its average monthly allowable for the last six months, it shall be shut-in during that month and each succeeding month until it is overproduced less than 6 times its average monthly allowable.

E. CLASSIFICATION OF WELLS

RULE 16(A): A well shall be classified as marginal if it has failed for six consecutive months to produce its average monthly allowable for the six months immediately preceding such reclassification provided such failure was not occasioned by curtailment to compensate for over-production, unless prior to such reclassification the operator or other interested party presents satisfactory evidence showing that the well should not be classified as marginal. However, a well shall not be classified as marginal if, during any one month of the six-month period, said well has demonstrated its ability to produce its six months average allowable.

G. GENERAL

RULE 22: No gas, either dry gas or casinghead gas, produced from the Tapacito-Pictured Cliffs Pool, except that gas used for drilling purposes or for maintaining the productivity of a well, shall be flared or vented unless specifically authorized by order of the Commission after notice and hearing.

H. MISCELLANEOUS SPECIAL POOL RULES

RULE 25: The vertical limits of the Tapacito-Pictured Cliffs Gas Pool shall be the Pictured Cliffs formation.

(General Pool Rules also apply unless in conflict with these Special Pool Rules)

CASE No. 1937
Order No. R-1670

VII. SPECIAL RULES AND REGULATIONS FOR THE WEST KUTZ-PICTURED
CLIFFS GAS POOL

(The West Kutz-Pictured Cliffs Gas Pool was created September 29, 1950 and prorationing was instituted March 1, 1955.)

A. WELL LOCATION AND ACREAGE REQUIREMENTS

RULE 5(A): A standard gas proration unit in the West Kutz-Pictured Cliffs Gas Pool shall be 160 acres.

RULE 5(B): In order to qualify for exception to Rule 5(A) without notice and hearing a proposed non-standard gas proration unit in the West Kutz-Pictured Cliffs Gas Pool, in addition to the requirements of Rule 5(B) of the General Rules, may not exceed 2640 feet in length or width.

G. GENERAL

RULE 22: No gas, either dry gas or casinghead gas, produced from the West Kutz-Pictured Cliffs Gas Pool, except that gas used for "drilling-in" purposes, shall be flared or vented unless specifically authorized by order of the Commission after notice and hearing.

H. MISCELLANEOUS SPECIAL POOL RULES

RULE 25: The vertical limits of the West Kutz-Pictured Cliffs Gas Pool shall be the Pictured Cliffs formation.

(General Pool Rules also apply unless in conflict with these Special Pool Rules)

CASE No. 1937
Order No. R-1670

VIII. SPECIAL RULES AND REGULATIONS FOR THE BLANCO-MESAVERDE GAS POOL

(The Blanco Mesaverde Gas Pool was created February 25, 1949 and prorationing was instituted March 1, 1955. The Blanco-Mesaverde Gas Pool now includes acreage that was formerly included in the LaPlata Mesaverde, Northwest LaPlata Mesaverde, South LaPlata Mesaverde, and the Largo Mesaverde Gas Pools.)

A. WELL LOCATION AND ACREAGE REQUIREMENTS

RULE 2: Wells shall be located 990 feet from the outer boundary of either the Northeast or Southwest quarter of the section, subject to a variation of 200 feet for topographic conditions. Further tolerance shall be allowed by the Commission only in cases of extremely rough terrain where compliance would necessarily increase drilling costs.

RULE 5(A): A standard gas proration unit in the Blanco-Mesaverde Gas Pool shall be 320 acres.

G. GENERAL

RULE 22: No gas, either dry gas or casinghead gas, produced from the Blanco-Mesaverde Gas Pool, except that gas used for "drilling-in" purposes, shall be flared or vented unless specifically authorized by order of the Commission after notice and hearing.

H. MISCELLANEOUS SPECIAL POOL RULES

RULE 25: The general and special rules and regulations contained in this order pertaining to the Blanco-Mesaverde Gas Pool shall be limited in their application to the present 4200-5100 foot productive horizon where the productive sands are contained between the top of the Cliff House Sand and the base of the Point Lookout Sand of the Mesaverde.

RULE 26: Surface Pipe. The surface pipe shall be set to a minimum depth of 100 feet, and where shallow potable water-bearing beds are present, the surface pipe shall be set to such shallow potable water bearing beds and a sufficient amount of cement shall be used to circulate the cement behind the pipe to the bottom of the cellar. This surface casing shall stand cemented for at least 24 hours before drilling plug or initiating tests. The surface casing shall be tested after drilling plug by bailing the hole dry. The hole shall remain dry for one hour to constitute

CASE No. 1937
Order No. R-1670

VIII. SPECIAL RULES AND REGULATIONS FOR THE BLANCO-MESAVERDE
GAS POOL (CONT'D)

satisfactory proof of a water shut-off. In lieu of the foregoing test, the cement job shall be tested by building up a pressure of 1,000 psi, closing the valves, and allowing to stand thirty minutes. If the pressure does not drop more than 100 pounds during that period, the test shall be considered satisfactory. This test shall be made both before and after drilling the plug. The Commission shall be notified at least 24 hours prior to the conducting of any test.

RULE 27: Production String. The production string shall be set on top of the Cliff House Sand with a minimum of 100 sacks of cement and shall stand cemented not less than 36 hours before testing the casing. This test shall be made by building up a pressure of 1,000 psi, closing the valves, and allowing to stand thirty minutes. If the pressure does not drop more than 100 pounds during that period, the test shall be considered satisfactory.

RULE 28: All cementing shall be done by the pump-and-plug method. Bailing tests may be used on all casing and cement tests, and drill stem tests may be used on cement tests in lieu of pressure tests. In making bailing test, the well shall be bailed dry and remain approximately dry for thirty minutes. If any string of casing fails while being tested by pressure or by bailing tests herein required, it shall be recemented and retested or an additional string of casing should be run and cemented. If an additional string is used, the same test shall be made as outlined for the original string. In submitting Form C-101, "Notice of Intention to Drill," the number of sacks of cement to be used on each string of casing shall be stated.

RULE 29: Any completed well which produces any oil shall be tubed. This tubing shall be set as near the bottom of the hole as practicable, but in no case shall tubing perforations be more than 250 feet from the bottom. The bottom of the tubing shall be restricted to an opening of less than 1 inch or bullplugged in order to prevent the loss of pressure bombs or other measuring devices.

RULE 30: Any well which produces oil shall be equipped with a meter setting of adequate size to measure efficiently the gas, with this meter setting to be

CASE No. 1937
Order No. R-1670

VIII. SPECIAL RULES AND REGULATIONS FOR THE BLANCO-MESAVERDE
GAS POOL (CONT'D)

installed on the gas vent or discharge line. Wellhead equipment for all wells shall be installed and maintained in first-class condition, so that static bottom hole pressures and surface pressures may be obtained at any time by a duly authorized agent of the Commission. Valves shall be installed so that pressures may be readily obtained on the casing and also on the tubing, wherever tubing is installed. All connections subject to well pressure and all wellhead fittings shall be of first-class material, rated at 2,000 psi working pressure and maintained in gas-tight condition. There shall be at least one valve on each bradenhead. Operators shall be responsible for maintaining all equipment in first-class condition and shall repair or replace equipment where gas leakage occurs.

RULE 31: Drilling boilers shall not be set closer than 200 feet to any well or tank battery. All electrical equipment shall be in first-class condition and properly installed.

RULE 32: Wells shall not be shot or chemically treated until the permission of the Commission is obtained. Each well shall be shot or treated in such a manner as will not cause injury to the sand or result in water entering the oil or gas sand, and necessary precautions shall be taken to prevent injury to the casing. If shooting or chemical treatment results in irreparable injury to the well or to the oil or gas sand, the well shall be properly plugged and abandoned.

RULE 33: Bradenhead gas shall not be used either directly or expansively in engines, pumps or torches, or otherwise wasted. It may be used for lease and development purposes and for the development of nearby leases, except as prohibited above. Wells shall not be completed as Bradenhead gas wells unless special permission is obtained from the Commission.

(General Pool Rules also apply unless in conflict with these Special Pool Rules)

CASE No. 1937
Order No. R-1670

I. GENERAL RULES AND REGULATIONS FOR THE PRORATED GAS POOLS OF SOUTHEASTERN NEW MEXICO

(See Special Pool Rules in each pool for orders applicable to those pools only. Special Pool Rules will be found in the same classification order as in the General section, and, unless the special rules conflict with the general rule, the general rule is also applicable.)

A. WELL LOCATION AND ACREAGE REQUIREMENTS

RULE 1: Any well drilled to the producing formation of a gas pool regulated by this order and within said pool or within one mile outside the boundary of that pool, and not nearer to nor within the boundaries of another designated pool producing the same formation, shall be spaced, drilled, operated, and prorated in accordance with the regulations in effect in that pool.

RULE 2: After the effective date of this order each well drilled or recompleted on a standard gas proration unit within a gas pool regulated by this order shall be located not closer than 330 feet to a quarter-quarter section line or subdivision inner boundary line and not closer to the outer boundary line than the footages set out in the table immediately below:

<u>Standard Proration Unit</u>	<u>Footage From Unit Outer Boundary</u>
160 acres	660 feet
320 acres	660 feet
640 acres	1,980 feet

RULE 3: The Secretary-Director of the Commission shall have authority to grant exception to the requirements of Rule 2 without notice and hearing where the application has been filed in due form and where the following facts exist and the following provisions are complied with:

1. The necessity for the unorthodox location is based on topographical conditions, or is occasioned by the recompletion of a well previously drilled to another horizon.

2. (a) The ownership of all oil and gas leases within a radius of 1,980 feet of the proposed location is common with the ownership of the oil and gas leases under the proposed location, or

(b) All owners of oil and gas leases within

CASE No. 1937
Order No. R-1670

such radius consent in writing to the proposed location.

(c) In lieu of Paragraph 2(b) of this rule, the applicant may furnish proof of the fact that said offset operators were notified by registered mail of his Application for Approval of an Unorthodox Location. (This information to offset operators should consist of the same information that is furnished to the Commission.) The Secretary-Director of the Commission may approve the application, if, after a period of at least 20 days following the mailing of said notice, no operator has made objection to the drilling of the unorthodox location. In the event an operator objects to the unorthodox location, the Commission shall consider the matter only after proper notice and hearing.

RULE 4: The provisions of Statewide Rule 104, Paragraph (k), shall not apply to the gas pools regulated by this order.

RULE 5(A): The acreage allocated to a gas well for proration purposes shall be known as the gas proration unit for that well. For the purpose of gas allocation in the gas pools regulated by this order, a standard proration unit shall consist of contiguous surface acreage and shall be substantially in the form of a square in pools having 160-acre or 640-acre standard proration units, and substantially in the form of a rectangle in pools having 320-acre standard proration units, and shall be a legal subdivision of the U. S. Public Land Surveys (quarter-section, section, or half-section, as applicable). A proration unit shall be considered to be a standard gas proration unit when it meets the above requirements and consists of acreage within the appropriate tolerance set out below:

<u>Standard Proration Unit</u>	<u>Acreage Tolerance For Standard Unit</u>
160 acres	158-162 acres
320 acres	316-324 acres
640 acres	632-648 acres

Any gas proration unit containing acreage within the appropriate tolerance limit above shall be considered to contain the number of acres in a standard unit for the purpose of computing allowables.

RULE 5(B): In establishing a non-standard gas proration

CASE No. 1937
Order No. R-1670

unit for gas pools regulated by this order where the standard gas proration unit is 640 acres, the location of the well with respect to the two nearest boundary lines thereof shall govern the maximum amount of acreage that may be assigned to the well for the purposes of gas proration as follows:

<u>Location</u>	<u>Maximum Acreage</u>
660-660	160 acres
660-1980	320 acres

RULE 5(C): The Secretary-Director of the Commission shall have authority to grant an exception to Rule 5(A) without notice and hearing where application has been filed in due form and where the following facts exist and the following provisions are complied with:

1. The proposed non-standard proration unit consists of less acreage than a standard proration unit, or where the unorthodox size or shape of the tract is due to a variation in legal subdivision of the U. S. Public Land Surveys.
2. The non-standard gas proration unit consists of contiguous quarter-quarter sections and/or lots.
3. The non-standard gas proration unit lies wholly within a single governmental quarter section in pools with 160-acre standard proration units except the Tubb Gas Pool, and within a single governmental section in the Tubb Gas Pool and in all pools with 320-acre or 640-acre standard proration units.
4. The entire non-standard gas proration unit may reasonably be presumed to be productive of gas from the applicable gas pool.
5. The length or width of the non-standard gas proration unit does not exceed 2,640 feet in pools with 160-acre standard proration units, and does not exceed 5,280 feet in pools with 320-acre or 640-acre standard proration units.
6. The applicant presents written consent in the form of waivers from:
 - (a) All operators owning interests outside the non-standard gas proration unit but in the same quarter section in pools having 160-acre standard proration units or in the same section in pools having 320-acre or 640-acre standard proration units, in which any part of the non-standard gas proration unit is situated, and

(b) All operators owning interests within 1,500 feet of the well to which such non-standard gas proration unit is proposed to be dedicated.

7. In lieu of subparagraph 6 of this rule, the applicant may furnish proof of the fact that said offset operators were notified by registered mail of his intent to form such non-standard gas proration unit. (This notification to offset operators should consist of the same information that is furnished to the Commission.) The Secretary-Director of the Commission may approve the application if, after a period of 30 days following the mailing of said notice, no operator has made objection to formation of such non-standard gas proration unit.

B. NOMINATIONS AND PRORATION SCHEDULE

RULE 6(A): At least 30 days prior to the beginning of each gas proration period, the Commission shall hold a hearing after due notice has been given. The Commission shall cause to be submitted by each gas purchaser its "Preliminary Nominations" of the amount of gas which each in good faith actually desires to purchase within the ensuing proration period, by months, from each of the gas pools regulated by this order. The Commission shall consider the "Preliminary Nominations" of purchasers, actual production, and such other factors as may be deemed applicable in determining the amount of gas that may be produced without waste within the ensuing proration period. "Preliminary Nominations" shall be submitted on a form prescribed by the Commission.

RULE 6(B): The term "gas purchaser" as used in these rules shall mean any "taker" of gas either at the well-head or at any point on the lease where connection is made for gas transportation or utilization. It shall be the responsibility of said "taker" to submit a nomination in accordance with Rule 6(A) and Rule 7 (A) of this order.

RULE 7(A): In the event a gas purchaser's market shall have increased or decreased, he may file with the Commission prior to the 10th day of the month a "Supplemental Nomination" showing the amount of gas he actually in good faith desires to purchase during the ensuing proration month from any gas pool regulated by this order. The Commission shall hold a public hearing between the 13th and 20th days of each month to determine the reasonable market demand for gas for the ensuing proration month, and shall issue a proration schedule setting out the amount of gas which each well may produce during the ensuing proration month along with such other

CASE No. 1937
Order No. R-1670

information as is necessary to show the allowable-production status of each well on the schedule. "Supplemental Nominations" shall be submitted on a form prescribed by the Commission.

RULE 7(B): The Commission shall include in the proration schedule the gas wells in the gas pools regulated by this order delivering to a gas transportation facility, or lease gathering system, and shall include in the proration schedule any well which it finds is being unreasonably discriminated against through denial of access to a gas transportation facility, which is reasonably capable of handling the type of gas produced by such well.

C. ALLOCATION AND GRANTING OF ALLOWABLES

RULE 8(A): The total allowable to be allocated to each gas pool regulated by this order each month shall be equal to the sum of the "Preliminary" or "Supplemental Nominations" (whichever is applicable) for each pool, together with any adjustment which the Commission deems advisable. A monthly allowable shall be assigned to each well entitled to an allowable by allocating the pool allowable among all such wells in that pool in accordance with the procedure set out in the Special Pool Rules.

RULE 8(B): Allowables to newly completed gas wells shall commence in accordance with the provisions of the Special Pool Rules. No gas well shall be given an allowable until Form C-104 and Form C-110 have been filed, together with a plat (Form C-128) showing acreage attributed to said well and the location of all wells on the lease.

RULE 9(A): A well's "Acreage Factor" shall be determined to the nearest hundredth of a unit by dividing the acreage assigned to the well by 160 acres. However, the acreage tolerances provided in Rule 5(A) shall apply.

RULE 9(B): If, during a proration month, the acreage assigned to a well is increased, the operator shall notify the Commission in writing (Box 2045, Hobbs, New Mexico) of such increase by filing a revised plat (Form C-128). The increased allowable assigned the gas proration unit for the well shall be effective on the first day of the month following receipt of the notification by the Commission.

RULE 10(A): A marginal well shall be assigned an allowable equal to its maximum production during any month of the preceding gas proration period.

CASE No. 1937
Order No. R-1670

RULE 10(B): The pool allowable remaining after deducting the total allowable assigned to marginal wells shall be allocated among the non-marginal wells entitled to an allowable in such pool as provided for in the Special Pool Rules.

RULE 11: After notice and hearing, the Commission may assign minimum allowables in order to prevent the premature abandonment of wells.

RULE 12: The full production of gas from each well shall be charged against the well's allowable regardless of what disposition has been made of the gas; provided, however, that gas used on the lease for consumption in lease houses, treaters, compressors, combustion engines and other similar lease equipment shall not be charged against the well's allowable.

D. BALANCING OF PRODUCTION

RULE 13: The dates 7:00 a.m., January 1, and 7:00 a.m., July 1, shall be known as balancing dates, and the periods of time bounded by these dates shall be known as gas proration periods.

RULE 14(A): Underproduction: Any non-marginal well which has an underproduced status as of the end of a gas proration period shall be allowed to carry such underproduction forward into the next gas proration period and may produce such underproduction in addition to the allowable assigned during such succeeding period. Any allowable carried forward into a gas proration period and remaining unproduced at the end of such gas proration period shall be cancelled.

RULE 14(B): Production during any one month of a gas proration period in excess of the allowable assigned to a well for such month shall be applied against the underproduction carried into such period in determining the amount of allowable, if any, to be cancelled.

RULE 15(A): Overproduction: Any well which has an overproduced status as of the end of a gas proration period shall carry such overproduction forward into the next gas proration period, provided that such overproduction shall be made up during such succeeding period. Any well which has not made up the overproduction carried into a gas proration period by the end of such proration period shall be shut-in until such overproduction is made up. If, at any time, a well is overproduced an amount equalling six times

CASE No. 1937
Order No. R-1670

its current monthly allowable, it shall be shut-in during that month, and each succeeding month until the well is overproduced less than six times its current monthly allowable.

RULE 15(B): Allowable assigned to a well during any one month of a gas proration period in excess of the production for the same month shall be applied against the overproduction carried into such period in determining the amount of overproduction, if any, which has not been made up.

RULE 15(C): The Commission may allow overproduction to be made up at a lesser rate than would be the case if the well were completely shut-in upon a showing at public hearing after due notice that complete shut-in of the well would result in material damage to the well.

RULE 15(D): Any allowable accrued to a well at the end of a proration period due to the cancellation of underage and the redistribution thereof shall be applied against the overproduction carried into said proration period.

E. CLASSIFICATION OF WELLS

RULE 16(A): After the production data is available for the last month of each gas proration period, any well which had an underproduced status at the beginning of the preceding gas proration period and which did not produce its allowable during at least one month of such preceding gas proration period may be classified as a marginal well, unless, prior to the end of said preceding gas proration period, the operator or other interested party presents satisfactory evidence to the Commission showing that the well should not be so classified. However, a well which in any month of said proration period has demonstrated its ability to produce its allowable for said proration period shall not be classified as a marginal well.

RULE 16(B): The Secretary-Director may reclassify a marginal or non-marginal well at any time the well's production data, deliverability data, or other evidence as to the well's producing ability justifies such reclassification.

RULE 17: A well which is classified as a marginal well shall not be permitted to accumulate underproduction, and any underproduction accrued to a well prior to its classification as a marginal well shall be cancelled.

RULE 18: If, at the end of a proration period, a marginal well has produced more than the total allowable assigned a non-marginal unit of corresponding size, for that period, the marginal well shall be reclassified as a non-marginal well and its allowable and net status adjusted accordingly.

RULE 19: A well which has been reworked or recompleted shall be classified as a non-marginal well as of the date of reconnection to a pipeline until such time as production data, deliverability data, or other evidence as to the well's producing ability indicates that the well should be classified as a marginal well.

RULE 20: All wells not classified as marginal wells shall be classified as non-marginal wells.

F. REPORTING OF PRODUCTION

RULE 21(A): The monthly gas production from each well shall be metered separately and the gas production therefrom shall be reported to the Commission on Form C-115 in accordance with Rule 1114 of the Commission Rules and Regulations, so as to reach the Commission on or before the 24th day of the month next succeeding the month in which the gas was produced. The operator shall show on such report what disposition has been made of the gas produced.

RULE 21(B): Each purchaser or taker of gas in each of the designated gas pools regulated by this order shall submit a report to the Commission so as to reach the Commission on or before the 15th day of the month next succeeding the month in which the gas was purchased or taken.

RULE 21(C): Such report shall be filed on either Form C-111 or Form C-114 (whichever is applicable) with the wells being listed in approximately the same order as they are listed on the proration schedule.

RULE 21(D): Forms C-111 and C-114 referred to herein shall be submitted in duplicate, the original being sent to the Commission at Box 871, Santa Fe, New Mexico, the other copy being sent to Box 2045, Hobbs, New Mexico.

G. GENERAL

RULE 22: No gas, either dry gas or casinghead gas, produced from the gas pools regulated by this order shall be flared or vented except as provided in the Special Pool Rules.

CASE No. 1937
Order No. R-1670

RULE 23: Failure to comply with the provisions of this order or the rules contained herein shall result in the cancellation of allowable assigned to the affected well. No further allowable shall be assigned to the affected well until all rules and regulations are complied with. The Proration Manager shall notify the operator of the well and the purchaser, in writing, of the date of allowable cancellation and the reason therefor.

RULE 24: All transporters or users of gas shall file gas well connection notices with the Commission as soon as possible after the date of connection, in accordance with the provisions of Rule 8(B) of the Special Pool Rules. (Rule 24 does not actually appear in pool rules, but is Commission policy and added for information and clarification.)

(See Special Pool Rules for each pool for orders applicable to that pool only. Special Pool Rules will be found in the same classification order as in the General section, and, unless the special rules conflict with the general rule, the general rule is also applicable.)

CASE No. 1937
Order No. R-1670

II. SPECIAL RULES AND REGULATIONS FOR THE BLINEBRY GAS POOL

(The Blinebry Gas Pool was created February 17, 1953, and prorationing was instituted January 1, 1954.)

A. WELL LOCATION AND ACREAGE REQUIREMENTS

RULE 5(A): A standard gas proration unit in the Blinebry Gas Pool shall be 160 acres.

(Also see Rule 29 below.)

C. ALLOCATION AND GRANTING OF ALLOWABLES

RULE 8(A): The pool allowable remaining each month after deducting the total allowable assigned to marginal wells shall be allocated among the non-marginal wells entitled to an allowable in the proportion that each well's acreage factor bears to the total of the acreage factors for all non-marginal wells in the pool.

RULE 8(B): Allowables to newly completed gas wells shall commence on the date of connection to a gas transportation facility, as determined from an affidavit furnished to the Commission (Box 2045, Hobbs, New Mexico) by the purchaser, or the date of filing of Form C-104 and C-110 and a plat (Form C-128), whichever date is the later.

(Also see Rule 29 below.)

RULE 12: The production of intermediate or low pressure gas derived from the staging of the well fluids need not be charged against the well's gas allowable, provided that the said intermediate or low pressure gas is utilized in accordance with the provisions of Rule 34 below.

G. GENERAL

RULE 22: No gas, either dry gas or casinghead gas, shall be flared, vented or otherwise wasted in the Blinebry Gas Pool at any time after ninety (90) days from the date of completion of a well in said pool.

Any operator desiring to obtain an exception to the foregoing provision of this rule shall submit to the Secretary-Director of the Commission an application for such exception accompanied by a sworn statement setting forth the facts and circumstances which justify such exception. The Secretary-Director is hereby authorized to grant such exception when the granting of such is necessary to protect correlative rights, prevent waste, or prevent undue hardship on the applicant. The

CASE No. 1937
Order No. R-1670

II. SPECIAL RULES AND REGULATIONS FOR THE BLINEBRY GAS POOL
(CONT'D)

Secretary-Director shall (a) grant the exception within 15 days following receipt of the application and statement, or (b) set the application for hearing before the Commission at a regularly scheduled monthly hearing; provided, however, that no such applicant shall incur any penalty by reason of a delay in setting the application for hearing. Public notice of the hearing of the application shall be published in the manner provided by law.

Should the Secretary-Director grant an exception to the provision of Rule 22, notification of such exception shall be distributed to the Commission's regular mailing list.

H. MISCELLANEOUS SPECIAL POOL RULES

RULE 25: The vertical limits of the Blinebry Gas Pool shall extend from a point 75 feet above the "Blinebry Marker" to a point 300 feet below the "Blinebry Marker."

The "Blinebry Marker" shall be that point encountered in the Humble Oil and Refining Company State "S" Well No. 20, SW/4 NW/4 of Section 2, Township 22 South, Range 37 East, NMPM, at a depth of 5457 feet (Elevation 3380, Subsea Datum Minus 2077).

RULE 26: Any well drilled and completed in good faith prior to April 11, 1955, which well is situated within the horizontal boundaries of the Blinebry Gas Pool as herein defined, but which produces gas from a depth interval exceeding the vertical limits of the Blinebry Gas Pool as herein defined, is hereby validated and shall be classified as a gas well in the Blinebry Gas Pool, provided that said well conforms to the definition of a gas well in said pool as set out in Rule 27(A) of these rules, and provided that the well is classified as a gas well in the Blinebry Gas Pool under the rules, regulations and orders in effect on April 10, 1955.

RULE 27(A): A gas well in the Blinebry Gas Pool shall mean a well producing from within the vertical and horizontal limits of the Blinebry Gas Pool which:

1. Produces liquid hydrocarbons possessing a gravity of 51° API or greater, or
2. Produces liquid hydrocarbons possessing a

CASE No. 1937
Order No. R-1670

II. SPECIAL RULES AND REGULATIONS FOR THE BLINEBRY GAS POOL
(CONT'D)

gravity of less than 51° API but with a producing gas-liquid ratio of 32,000 cubic feet of gas or more per barrel of liquid hydrocarbon.

RULE 27 (B): A well producing from within the horizontal and vertical limits of the Blinebry Gas Pool and not classified as a gas well, as defined in Section (A) of this rule, shall be classified as an oil well in the Blinebry Oil Pool.

RULE 28: The Proration Manager may reclassify a well under Rule 27 if production data, gas-oil ratio tests or other evidence reflects the need for such reclassification.

For proration purposes, the effective date of such reclassification shall be the first day of the next succeeding month.

The Proration Manager will notify the operator of the reclassified well of such reclassification and the effective date thereof; provided, however, that operator may appeal such reclassification to the Secretary-Director of the Commission in writing.

RULE 29: In the event an oil well in the Blinebry Oil Pool is reclassified as a gas well in the Blinebry Gas Pool, the operator of such well will be afforded the opportunity to form a non-standard gas proration unit for the well; provided, however, that, until such unit is formed, such well shall be allocated a gas allowable commensurate with the acreage contained in the unit formerly dedicated to the oil well in the Blinebry Oil Pool.

In the event such reclassification should cause the occurrence of two gas wells producing from the Blinebry Gas Pool within a single proration unit, the sum total of the allowables allocated to the two wells shall be equivalent to the volume of gas allocated to a single proration unit; provided, however, that the operator of such wells shall have the option to determine the proportion of the assigned allowable to be produced by each individual well.

RULE 30: Acreage dedicated to a gas well in the Blinebry Gas Pool shall not be simultaneously dedicated to an oil well in the Blinebry Oil Pool, and the dual completion of a well so as to produce gas from the Blinebry Gas Pool and oil from the Blinebry Oil Pool is hereby prohibited.

CASE No. 1937
Order No. R-1670

II. SPECIAL RULES AND REGULATIONS FOR THE BLINEBRY GAS POOL
(CONT'D)

RULE 31: At no time will the horizontal boundaries of the Blinebry Gas Pool conflict with or overlap the horizontal boundaries of the Terry-Blinebry Oil Pool.

RULE 32: Gas-liquid ratio tests and determination of the gravity of that liquid hydrocarbon recovered from wells in the Blinebry Gas Pool shall be conducted semiannually during the months of May and October on all wells located in and producing from the Blinebry Gas Pool. Results of such tests will be reported to the Commission on Form C-116 on or before the 15th day of June and the 15th day of November of each calendar year.

RULE 33: Bottom-hole pressure tests will be conducted semiannually during the months of May and October on all gas wells located to the north of an east-west line coinciding with the north lines of Sections 21, 22, 23 and 24, Township 21 South, Range 37 East, NMPM, Lea County, New Mexico, such wells to be producing from within the vertical and horizontal boundaries of the Blinebry Gas Pool and classified as gas wells under the rules contained in this order. Results of such tests will be reported to the Commission on Form C-124 on or before the 25th day of June and the 25th day of November of each calendar year.

All bottom-hole pressure tests, except tests on dually completed wells producing from the Blinebry Gas Pool, will be conducted in accordance with Rule 302 of the Rules of the Commission. Shut-in period will be 48 hours, datum elevation will be 2400 feet subsea, (-2400), and base temperature will be 100° Fahrenheit.

Bottom-hole pressures on dually completed wells producing gas from the Blinebry Gas Pool may be calculated from a 72-hour shut-in pressure at the wellhead, provided that an accurate determination of the fluid level in the hole is made employing sonic or other methods of equivalent accuracy. The gravity of the fluid in the hole shall be that gravity determined by averaging the gravities of those fluids produced on official test in the Blinebry Gas Pool during the regular semiannual gas-liquid ratio and gravity testing period next preceding the subject bottom-hole pressure test period. The gravity to be employed in the calculation of bottom-hole pressures during a particular testing period shall be determined by the Commission. All interested operators shall be duly notified of such determination by the Commission.

CASE No. 1937
Order No. R-1670

II. SPECIAL RULES AND REGULATIONS FOR THE BLINEBRY GAS POOL
(CONT'D)

RULE 34: The following shall apply to all producing wells in the Blinebry Gas Pool:

(A) Gas produced from each well shall be produced into a separate high-pressure separator. The high-pressure gas shall then be metered separately prior to its entering a gas transportation facility.

(B) The distillate separated from the high-pressure gas in the high-pressure separator shall then be directed into a low-pressure separator. The distillate may be commingled with other distillate produced by any other well or wells producing from the Blinebry or Tubb Gas Pools following its separation from the high-pressure gas in the high-pressure separator, provided gas-distillate test facilities are available and periodic tests are made.

Following the separation of distillate and low-pressure gas in the low-pressure separator, the low-pressure gas shall be directed into a low-pressure gas gathering system, and said low-pressure gas need not be measured separately from other low-pressure gas produced on the lease, provided that certain test facilities are available and certain periodic tests made.

(C) Each year during the months of June and July each operator of each gas well producing from the Blinebry Gas Pool shall cause to be taken an annual gas-distillate ratio test. The results of such test shall be submitted to the Commission office (P. O. Box 2045, Hobbs, New Mexico) on or before August 15 following the test. The test shall outline the amount of high-pressure gas produced during the 24-hour test period, the amount of low-pressure gas produced during the test period, the high-pressure gas-distillate ratio, and the low-pressure gas-distillate ratio.

Failure to submit the required test by August 15 shall result in suspension of any further gas allowable until the date the required information is submitted.

(D) In submitting Form C-115 (Operator's Monthly Report) on wells producing from the Blinebry zone in which distillate is commingled and/or the low-

CASE No. 1937
Order No. R-1670

II. SPECIAL RULES AND REGULATIONS FOR THE BLINEBRY GAS POOL
(CONT'D)

pressure gas is commingled with other low-pressure gas produced on the lease, the operator shall estimate if necessary the volume produced by each well in each pool by using the ratios as reflected in the most recent tests submitted.

(E) The Secretary-Director of the Commission shall have authority to grant exception to the provisions set forth in Sections (A) through (D) of this rule, inclusive, where it can be shown that compliance with these rules is not economic or is impractical. Applications for exception shall be submitted in triplicate to the Oil Conservation Commission, P. O. Box 871, Santa Fe, New Mexico, with a copy of each application being furnished offset operators.

(General Pool Rules also apply unless in conflict with these
Special Pool Rules)

CASE No. 1937
Order No. R-1670

III. SPECIAL RULES AND REGULATIONS FOR THE CROSBY-DEVONIAN GAS POOL

(The Crosby-Devonian Gas Pool was created May 27, 1955, and gas prorationing was instituted April 1, 1957.)

A. WELL LOCATION AND SPACING REQUIREMENTS

RULE 5(A): A standard gas proration unit in the Crosby-Devonian Gas Pool shall be 160 acres. (Note: The General Rules regarding administrative approval of non-standard units do not apply to the Crosby-Devonian Gas Pool.)

C. ALLOCATION AND GRANTING OF ALLOWABLES

RULE 8(A): The pool allowable remaining each month after deducting the total allowable assigned to marginal wells shall be allocated among the non-marginal wells entitled to an allowable in the proportion that each well's acreage factor bears to the total of the acreage factors for all non-marginal wells in the pool.

RULE 8(B): Allowables to newly completed gas wells shall commence on the date of connection to a gas transportation facility, as determined from an affidavit furnished to the Commission (Box 2045, Hobbs, New Mexico) by the purchaser, or the date of filing of Form C-104, Form C-110 and Form C-128 or the approval of a non-standard proration unit or filing of an affidavit of communitization, whichever date is the later.

RULE 8(C): The allowable revision for a well after work-over or recompletion shall become effective:

(a) On the date of reconnection after workover, such date to be determined from Form C-104 as filed by the operators, or

(b) A date 15 days prior to the approval of Form C-104 by the Commission's office, (Box 2045, Hobbs, New Mexico); (Form C-104 shall specify the exact nature of the workover or remedial work; if the nature of the work cannot be explained on Form C-104, in that event, Form C-103 shall be also filed in accordance with Rule 1106 of the Commission's Statewide Rules and Regulations.)

whichever date is later.

H. MISCELLANEOUS SPECIAL POOL RULES

RULE 25: The vertical limits of the Crosby-Devonian Gas

CASE No. 1937
Order No. R-1670

III. SPECIAL RULES AND REGULATIONS FOR THE CROSBY-DEVONIAN GAS POOL
(CONT'D)

Pool shall include all the formations that can reasonably be considered to be of Devonian age.

RULE 26: Gas-liquid ratio tests shall be taken in accordance with the provisions of Rule 301 of the Commission Rules and Regulations as scheduled by the Commission.

RULE 27: The casing program for the field shall include three strings of casing set in accordance with the following plan:

(A) The surface string shall be new or reconditioned pipe with a mill test of not less than two thousand (2,000) pounds per square inch and shall be set and cemented at a depth of approximately five hundred (500) feet, such depth being sufficient to protect the fresh water bearing sands of the Santa Rosa formation.

Cementing shall be by the pump-and-plug method, and sufficient cement shall be used to fill the annular space back of the pipe to the surface of the ground or the bottom of the cellar. Cement shall stand a minimum of sixteen (16) hours under pressure and a total of twenty-four (24) hours before drilling the plug or initiating pressure tests. Before drilling the plug, this string shall be tested by the application of at least one thousand (1,000) pounds per square inch and, if at the end of thirty (30) minutes the pressure shows a drop of one hundred fifty (150) pounds per square inch or more, the cementing job shall be condemned. After corrective measures have been taken, the pipe shall again be tested in the same manner.

(B) The intermediate string shall consist of new or reconditioned pipe that has been tested to two thousand (2,000) pounds per square inch and shall be set at approximately thirty-six hundred (3,600) feet. Cementing shall be by the pump-and-plug method, and sufficient cement shall be used to fill the calculated annular space back of the pipe to a point one hundred (100) feet above the top of the Salado formation. The cement shall stand a minimum of twenty-four (24) hours under pressure and a total of thirty (30) hours before drilling plug or initiating tests. Casing shall be tested by the application of at least twelve hundred (1,200) pounds per square inch pump pressure. If, at the end of thirty (30) minutes, the pump pressure shows a drop of one hundred (100) pounds per square inch or more, the cementing job shall be condemned. After corrective measures have been taken,

CASE No. 1937
Order No. R-1670

III. SPECIAL RULES AND REGULATIONS FOR THE CROSBY-DEVONIAN GAS POOL
(CONT'D)

the pipe shall again be tested in the same manner.

(C) The producing or oil string shall be new or reconditioned casing that has been tested to four thousand (4,000) pounds per square inch and shall be set at a depth not less than the top of the Devonian formation. Cementing shall be with a minimum of three hundred fifty (350) sacks of cement applied by the pump-and-plug method and shall stand a minimum of twenty-four (24) hours under pressure and a total of forty-eight (48) hours before drilling the plug or initiating tests. After cementing, the casing shall be tested by pump pressure of at least thirty (30) minutes. If, at the end of 30 minutes the pressure shows a drop of one hundred (100) pounds per square inch or more, the cementing job shall be condemned. After corrective measures have been taken, the pipe shall again be tested in the same manner.

(General Pool Rules also apply unless in conflict with these Special Pool Rules)

CASE No. 1937
Order No. R-1670

IV. SPECIAL RULES AND REGULATIONS FOR THE EUMONT GAS POOL

(The Eumont Gas Pool was created February 17, 1953, and proration was instituted January 1, 1954. The Eumont Gas Pool now includes portions of the acreage once included in the Jalco and Langmat Pools (now Jalmat) and all of the acreage formerly in the Arrow and Hardy Pools.)

A. WELL LOCATION AND ACREAGE REQUIREMENTS

RULE 5(A): A standard gas proration unit in the Eumont Gas Pool shall be 640 acres.

RULE 5(B): Any well drilled to and producing from the Eumont Gas Pool, as defined herein, prior to August 12, 1954 at a location conforming with the spacing requirements effective at the time said well was drilled, shall be granted a tolerance not exceeding 330 feet with respect to the required distance from the boundary lines.

C. ALLOCATION AND GRANTING OF ALLOWABLES

RULE 8(A): The pool allowable remaining each month after deducting the total allowable assigned to marginal wells shall be allocated among the non-marginal wells entitled to an allowable in the proportion that each well's acreage factor bears to the total of the acreage factors for all non-marginal wells in the pool.

RULE 8(B): Allowables to newly completed gas wells shall commence on the date of connection to a gas transportation facility, as determined from an affidavit furnished to the Commission (Box 2045, Hobbs, New Mexico) by the purchaser, or the date of filing of Form C-104, Form C-110, and a plat (Form C-128), whichever date is the later.

G. GENERAL

RULE 22: No gas, either dry gas or casinghead gas, shall be flared or vented from any well at any time after ninety (90) days from the date such well is completed. Any operator who desires to obtain an exception to the provisions of Rule 22 of Section I of this order shall submit to the Secretary-Director of the Commission an application for such exception with a sworn statement setting forth the facts and circumstances justifying such exception. The Secretary-Director is hereby authorized to grant such an exception whenever the granting of the exception is reasonably necessary to protect correlative rights, prevent waste, or prevent undue hardship on the applicant under all the acts and circumstances as set forth in the statement. The Secretary-Director shall either (a) grant

CASE No. 1937
Order No. R-1670

IV. SPECIAL RULES AND REGULATIONS FOR THE EUMONT GAS POOL (CONT'D)

the exception within 15 days after receipt of the application and statement or (b) thereafter set the application for hearing by the Commission at a regular monthly hearing; provided, however, that no such applicant shall incur any penalty by reason of a delay in setting the application for hearing. Notice of hearing of the application shall be published in the manner provided by law and the Rules of the Commission. If the exception is granted by the Secretary-Director, a list of such exceptions shall be distributed in the Commission's regular mailing list.

The flaring or venting of gas from any well in violation of any provision of this rule will result in suspension of any further allowable until further order of the Commission.

RULE 22(A): Within 15 days after any oil or gas well within the boundaries of the Eumont Gas Pool is connected to a gas transportation facility, the operator shall file Form C-110 designating the disposition of gas from the well.

RULE 22(B): No extraction plant processing any gas from the Eumont Gas Pool shall flare or vent such gas unless such flaring or venting is made necessary by mechanical difficulties or unless the gas flared or vented is of no commercial value.

H. MISCELLANEOUS SPECIAL POOL RULES

RULE 25: The vertical limits of the Eumont Gas Pool shall extend from the top of the Yates formation to the base of the Queen formation, thereby including all of the Yates, Seven Rivers and Queen formations.

RULE 26(A): A gas well shall mean a well producing with a gas-oil ratio in excess of 100,000 cubic feet of gas per barrel of oil.

RULE 26(B): A well producing from the Eumont Gas Pool and not classified as a gas well, as defined in Section (A) of this rule, shall be classified as an oil well.

RULE 26(C): Oil wells producing from the Eumont Gas Pool shall be allowed to produce a volume of gas each day not exceeding the daily normal unit oil allowable multiplied by 10,000; provided, however, that such well shall not be allowed to produce oil in excess of the normal unit allowable as ordered by the Commission under the provisions of Statewide Rule 505.

CASE No. 1937
Order No. R-1670

V. SPECIAL RULES AND REGULATIONS FOR THE JALMAT GAS POOL

(The Jalmat Gas Pool was created effective September 1, 1954 from a consolidation of the Jalco and Langmat Pools, which were created February 7, 1953. Gas prorationing was instituted in Jalco and Langmat January 1, 1954 and was continued after consolidation to form the Jalmat Gas Pool. The Jalmat Gas Pool now includes acreage that was formerly included in the Jal, Cooper-Jal, Eaves, Falby-Yates, Jalco, and Langmat Pools.)

A. WELL LOCATION AND ACREAGE REQUIREMENTS

RULE 5(A): A standard gas proration unit in the Jalmat Gas Pool shall be 640 acres.

RULE 5(B): Any well drilled to and producing from the Jalmat Gas Pool, as defined herein, prior to September 1, 1954 at a location conforming with the spacing requirements effective at the time said well was drilled shall be granted a tolerance not exceeding 330 feet with respect to the required distance from the boundary lines.

C. ALLOCATION AND GRANTING OF ALLOWABLES

RULE 8(A): 1. The pool allowable remaining after deducting the total allowable assigned to marginal wells shall be allocated among the non-marginal wells in the pool as follows:

(a) Twenty-five percent (25%) of the remaining pool allowable shall be allocated among the non-marginal wells in the pool in the proportion that each well's "Acreage Factor" bears to the total "Acreage Factor" for all non-marginal wells in the pool.

(b) Seventy-five percent (75%) of the remaining pool allowable shall be allocated among the non-marginal wells in the pool in the proportion that each well's "AD Factor" bears to the total "AD Factor" for all non-marginal wells in the pool.

2. A well's "AD Factor" shall be determined by multiplying the well's "Acreage Factor" by its "Calculated Deliverability" (expressed in MCF per day). The "AD Factor" shall be computed to the nearest whole unit. In those instances where there is more than one well on a proration unit, the "Calculated Deliverability" for the unit shall be determined by averaging the "Calculated Deliverabilities" of all the wells on the unit.

3. Annual deliverability tests shall be taken on all gas wells in the Jalmat Gas Pool in a manner and at

V. SPECIAL RULES AND REGULATIONS FOR THE JALMAT GAS POOL (CONT'D)

such time as the Commission may prescribe. The results of such tests shall determine a well's "Calculated Deliverability". The annual deliverability tests taken each year shall be used in calculating allowables for wells in the Jalmat Gas Pool for the succeeding twelve month period beginning July 1 of that year.

4. No well shall be assigned an allowable until a deliverability test has been filed with the Commission and approved.

5. The Secretary-Director of the Commission shall have authority to exempt marginal wells from the requirement of taking an annual deliverability test in those instances where the deliverability of the well is of such low volume as to have no significance in the determination of the well's allowable.

RULE 8(B): Allowables to newly completed gas wells shall commence:

1. On the date of connection to a gas transportation facility, such date to be determined from an affidavit furnished to the Commission (Box 2045, Hobbs, New Mexico) by the purchaser;

2. The latest filing date of Form C-104, C-110 or C-128; or

3. A date 45 days prior to the date upon which the well's deliverability and shut-in pressure test is reported to the Commission on Form C-122-C;

whichever date is later.

RULE 8(C): Retests and tests taken after recompletion or workover shall be taken in the same manner as provided in Rule 8(A) 3 above, and any change in the well's "Calculated Deliverability" resulting therefrom shall become effective:

1. On the date of reconnection after workover, such date to be determined from Form C-104 as filed by the operator; or

2. A date 45 days prior to the date upon which a well's deliverability and shut-in pressure test is reported to the Commission on Form C-122-C; or

3. A date 45 days prior to the receipt and approval of Form C-104 by the Commission Office (Box

CASE No. 1937
Order No. R-1670

V. SPECIAL RULES AND REGULATIONS FOR THE JALMAT GAS POOL (CONT'D)

2045, Hobbs, New Mexico). (Form C-104 shall specify the exact nature of the workover or remedial work. If the nature of the work cannot be explained on Form C-104, in that event, Form C-103 shall also be filed in accordance with Rule 1106 of the Commission's Statewide Rules and Regulations. Form C-128 (Well Location and Acreage Dedication Plat) shall be submitted by the operator at any time there is a change in the acreage dedicated to said well.),

whichever date is later.

G. GENERAL

RULE 22: No gas, either dry gas or casinghead gas, shall be flared or vented from any well at any time after ninety (90) days from the date such well is completed. Any operator who desires to obtain an exception to the provisions of Rule 22 of Section I of this order shall submit to the Secretary-Director of the Commission an application for such exception with a sworn statement setting forth the facts and circumstances justifying such exception. The Secretary-Director is hereby authorized to grant such an exception whenever the granting of the exception is reasonably necessary to protect correlative rights, prevent waste, or prevent undue hardship on the applicant under all the acts and circumstances as set forth in the statement. The Secretary-Director shall either (a) grant the exception within 15 days after receipt of the application and statement or (b) thereafter set the application for hearing by the Commission at a regular monthly hearing; provided, however, that no such applicant shall incur any penalty by reason of a delay in setting the application for hearing. Notice of hearing of the application shall be published in the manner provided by law and the Rules of the Commission. If the exception is granted by the Secretary-Director, a list of such exceptions shall be distributed in the Commission's regular mailing list.

The flaring or venting of gas from any well in violation of any provision of this rule will result in suspension of any further allowable until further order of the Commission.

RULE 22(A): Within 15 days after any oil or gas well within the boundaries of the Jalmat Gas Pool is connected to a gas transportation facility, the operator shall file Form C-110 designating the disposition of gas from the well.

RULE 22(B): No extraction plant processing any gas from

CASE No. 1937
Order No. R-1670

V. SPECIAL RULES AND REGULATIONS FOR THE JALMAT GAS POOL (CONT'D)

the Jalmat Gas Pool shall flare or vent such gas unless such flaring or venting is made necessary by mechanical difficulties or unless the gas flared or vented is of no commercial value.

H. MISCELLANEOUS SPECIAL POOL RULES

RULE 25(A): The vertical limits of the Jalmat Gas Pool shall extend from the top of the Tansill formation to a point 100 feet above the base of the Seven Rivers formation, thereby including all of the Yates formation, except,

RULE 25(B): In the area described immediately below, the vertical limits of the Jalmat Gas Pool shall extend from the top of the Tansill formation to a point 250 feet above the base of the Seven Rivers formation, thereby including all of the Yates formation:

TOWNSHIP 24 SOUTH, RANGE 36 EAST, NMPM

Section 13: SE/4 NE/4, SE/4

Section 23: E/2 E/2

Section 24: All

Section 25: N/2

Section 26: E/2 NE/4

TOWNSHIP 24 SOUTH, RANGE 37 EAST, NMPM

Section 18: SW/4 NW/4, W/2 SW/4

Section 19: W/2

Section 30: NW/4

RULE 26(A): A gas well shall mean a well producing with a gas-oil ratio in excess of 100,000 cubic feet of gas per barrel of oil.

RULE 26(B): A well producing from the Jalmat Gas Pool and not classified as a gas well shall be classified as an oil well.

RULE 26(C): Oil wells producing from the Jalmat Gas Pool shall be allowed to produce a volume of gas each day not exceeding the daily normal unit oil allowable multiplied by 10,000; provided, however, that such wells shall not be allowed to produce oil in excess of the normal unit allowable as ordered by the Commission under the provisions of Rule 505.

RULE 27: That portion of the Rhodes Storage Area lying within the defined limits of the Jalmat Gas Pool shall be exempted from the applicable provisions of the Jalmat Gas Pool Rules. The Rhodes Storage Area shall include the

CASE No. 1937
Order No. R-1670

V. SPECIAL RULES AND REGULATIONS FOR THE JALMAT GAS POOL (CONT'D)

following described area:

TOWNSHIP 26 SOUTH, RANGE 37 EAST, NMPM
Section 4: W/2 NW/4, SE/4 SE/4, W/2 SE/4, SW/4
Section 5: All
Section 6: NE/4 NW/4, NE/4, SE/4 SE/4, N/2 SE/4
Section 7: NE/4 NE/4
Section 8: N/2, N/2 S/2, SE/4 SW/4, S/2 SE/4
Section 9: All
Section 10: W/2 NW/4, SE/4 NW/4, S/2
Sections 15 and 16: All
Section 17: E/2 NW/4, E/2
Sections 21 and 22: All
Section 23: SW/4 NW/4, SW/4
Sections 26, 27, and 28: All
Section 29: E/2 NE/4

RULE 28: The dual completion of a well so as to produce oil from the Yates and oil from the Seven Rivers or Queen formations is hereby prohibited.

RULE 29: Acreage dedicated to a gas well in the Jalmat Gas Pool shall not be simultaneously dedicated to an oil well in the Jalmat Gas Pool.

(General Pool Rules also apply unless in conflict with these Special Pool Rules)

CASE No. 1937
Order No. R-1670

VI. SPECIAL RULES AND REGULATIONS FOR THE JUSTIS GAS POOL

(The Justis Gas Pool was created January 1, 1950, and gas proration was instituted January 1, 1954. The standard proration unit was changed from 160 acres to 320 acres October 3, 1957.)

A. WELL LOCATION AND ACREAGE REQUIREMENTS

RULE 5(A): A standard gas proration unit in the Justis Gas Pool shall be 320 acres.

C. ALLOCATION AND GRANTING ALLOWABLES

RULE 8(A): The pool allowable remaining each month after deducting the total allowable assigned to marginal wells shall be allocated among the non-marginal wells entitled to an allowable in the proportion that each well's acreage factor bears to the total of the acreage factors for all non-marginal wells in the Pool.

RULE 8(B): Allowables to newly completed gas wells shall commence on the date of connection to a gas transportation facility, as determined from an affidavit furnished to the Commission (Box 2045, Hobbs, New Mexico) by the purchaser, or the date of filing of Form C-104, Form C-110 and a plat (Form C-128), or the date of application for a non-standard gas proration unit as provided in Rule 5-C, of the General Rules.

H. MISCELLANEOUS SPECIAL POOL RULES

RULE 25(A): The vertical limits of the Justis Gas Pool shall be defined as follows:

From the top of the Glorieta formation, found at a depth of 4599 feet (Elevation 3080, Subsea Datum - 1519) in the Gulf Oil Corporation McBuffington Well No. 8, located 350 feet from the South line and 1980 feet from the West line of Section 13, Township 25 South, Range 37 East, NMPM, Lea County, New Mexico, to a point 40 feet above the marker encountered at 4879 feet (Subsea Datum - 1799) in said McBuffington Well No. 8.

RULE 25(B): The Hamilton Dome Westates Carlson Federal "A" Well No. 1, located in the NW/4 of Section 25, Township 25 South, Range 37 East, NMPM, Lea County, New Mexico, as the completion existed on April 22, 1959, shall be considered to be completed within the vertical limits of the Justis Gas Pool.

(General Pool Rules also apply unless in conflict with these Special Pool Rules)

CASE No. 1937
Order No. R-1670

VII. SPECIAL RULES AND REGULATIONS FOR THE TUBB GAS POOL

(The Tubb Gas Pool was created February 17, 1953, and proration was instituted January 1, 1954.)

A. WELL LOCATION AND ACREAGE REQUIREMENTS

RULE 5(A): A standard gas proration unit in the Tubb Gas Pool shall be 160 acres.

C. ALLOCATION AND GRANTING OF ALLOWABLES

RULE 8(A): The pool allowable remaining each month after deducting the total allowable assigned to marginal wells shall be allocated among the non-marginal wells entitled to an allowable in the proportion that each well's acreage factor bears to the total of the acreage factor for all non-marginal wells in the pool.

RULE 8(B): Allowables to newly completed gas wells shall commence on the date of connection to a gas transportation facility, as determined from an affidavit furnished to the Commission (Box 2045, Hobbs, New Mexico) by the purchaser, or the date of filing of Form C-104, Form C-110 and the plat (Form C-128), or the date of application for a non-standard gas proration unit as provided in Rule 5(C) of the General Rules, whichever date is the later.

RULE 12: The production of intermediate or low pressure gas derived from the staging of the well fluids need not be charged against the well's gas allowable, provided that the said intermediate or low pressure gas is utilized in accordance with the provisions of Rule 27 below.

H. MISCELLANEOUS SPECIAL POOL RULES

RULE 25: The vertical limits of the Tubb Gas Pool shall extend from a point 100 feet above the "Tubb Marker" to a point 225 feet below the "Tubb Marker". Said "Tubb Marker" shall be that point encountered in the Humble Oil and Refining Company State "S" Well No. 20 at a depth of 5921 feet (Elevation 3380, Subsea Datum Minus 2541).

RULE 26(A): An oil well in the Tubb Gas Pool shall be defined as a well which produces hydrocarbons possessing a gravity of 45° API or less.

RULE 26(B): An oil well in the Tubb Gas Pool shall have dedicated thereto a proration unit consisting of 40 acres, more or less, being a governmental quarter-quarter section legal subdivision of the United States Public Land Surveys.

CASE No. 1937
Order No. R-1670

VII. SPECIAL RULES AND REGULATIONS FOR THE TUBB GAS POOL (CONT'D)

RULE 26(C): No acreage shall be simultaneously dedicated to an oil well and to a gas well in the Tubb Gas Pool.

RULE 26(D): The limiting gas-oil ratio for oil wells in the Tubb Gas Pool shall be 2000 cubic feet of gas for each barrel of oil produced.

RULE 27: The following shall apply to all producing wells in the Tubb Gas Pool:

(A) Gas produced from each well shall be produced into a separate high-pressure separator. The high-pressure gas shall then be metered separately prior to its entering a gas transportation facility.

(B) The distillate separated from the high-pressure gas in the high-pressure separator shall then be directed into a low-pressure separator. The distillate may be commingled with other distillate produced by any other well or wells producing from the Tubb or Blinbry Gas Pools following its separation from the high-pressure gas in the high-pressure separator, provided gas-distillate test facilities are available and periodic tests are made.

Following the separation of distillate and low-pressure gas in the low-pressure separator, the low-pressure gas shall be directed into a low-pressure gas gathering system, and said low-pressure gas need not be measured separately from other low-pressure gas produced on the lease, provided that certain test facilities are available and certain periodic tests made.

(C) Each year during the months of June and July each operator of each gas well producing from the Tubb Gas Pool shall cause to be taken an annual gas-distillate ratio test. The results of such test shall be submitted to the Commission office (P. O. Box 2045, Hobbs, New Mexico) on or before August 15 following the test. The test shall outline the amount of high-pressure gas produced during the 24-hour test period, the amount of low-pressure gas produced during the test period, the high-pressure gas-distillate ratio, and the low-pressure gas-distillate ratio. Failure to submit the required test by August 15 shall result in suspension of any further gas allowable until the date the required information is submitted.

(D) In submitting Form C-115 (Operator's Monthly

CASE No. 1937
Order No. R-1670

VII. SPECIAL RULES AND REGULATIONS FOR THE TUBB GAS POOL (CONT'D)


Report) on wells producing from the Tubb zone in which distillate is commingled and/or the low-pressure gas is commingled with other low-pressure gas produced on the lease, the operator shall estimate if necessary the volumes produced by each well in each pool by using the ratios as reflected in the most recent tests submitted.

(E) The Secretary-Director of the Commission shall have authority to grant exception to the provisions set forth in Sections (A) through (D) of this rule, inclusive, where it can be shown that compliance with these rules is not economic or is impractical. Applications for exception shall be submitted in triplicate to the Oil Conservation Commission, P. O. Box 871, Santa Fe, New Mexico, with a copy of each application being furnished offset operators.

(General Pool Rules also apply unless in conflict with these Special Pool Rules)

DONE at Santa Fe, New Mexico, on the day and year hereinabove designated.

STATE OF NEW MEXICO
OIL CONSERVATION COMMISSION


JOHN BURROUGHS, Chairman


MURRAY E. MORGAN, Member


A. L. PORTER, Jr., Member & Secretary

S E A L

esr/

BEFORE THE OIL CONSERVATION COMMISSION
OF THE STATE OF NEW MEXICO

IN THE MATTER OF THE HEARING
CALLED BY THE OIL CONSERVATION
COMMISSION OF NEW MEXICO FOR
THE PURPOSE OF CONSIDERING:

CASE No. 2095
Order No. R-1670-C

APPLICATION OF THE OIL CONSERVATION
COMMISSION ON ITS OWN MOTION TO
CONSIDER PRORATING THE GAS PRODUCTION
FROM THE DAKOTA PRODUCING INTERVAL,
SAN JUAN AND RIO ARriba COUNTIES,
NEW MEXICO.

ORDER OF THE COMMISSION

BY THE COMMISSION:

This cause came on for hearing at 9 o'clock a.m. on October 13, 1960, at Farmington, New Mexico, before the Oil Conservation Commission of New Mexico, hereinafter referred to as the "Commission."

NOW, on this 4th day of November, 1960, the Commission, a quorum being present, having considered the testimony presented and the exhibits received at said hearing, and being fully advised in the premises,

FINDS:

(1) That due public notice having been given as required by law, the Commission has jurisdiction of this cause and the subject matter thereof.

(2) That by Order Nos. R-1287 and R-1287-A, the Commission created and defined the Dakota (gas) Producing Interval, San Juan and Rio Arriba Counties, New Mexico.

(3) That the producing capacity of the wells in the Dakota Producing Interval is in excess of the market demand for gas from said common source of supply, and that for the purpose of preventing waste and protecting correlative rights, appropriate procedures should be adopted to provide a method of allocating gas among proration units in the area encompassed by the Dakota Producing Interval, commencing February 1, 1961.

(4) That since the evidence presented established that there is a general correlation between the deliverabilities of the gas wells in the Dakota Producing Interval and the recoverable gas in place under the tracts dedicated to the wells, the gas allocation formula for the pool should be based on seventy-five (75) percent acreage times deliverability plus twenty-five (25) percent acreage. Such a formula will protect correlative rights and will, insofar as

is practicable, prevent drainage between producing tracts which is not equalized by counter-drainage.

(5) That after three (3) months production history under the allocation formula mentioned above, a hearing should be called to determine whether a minimum and maximum per well allowable is necessary to protect correlative rights and prevent waste.

(6) That the provisions set forth in Order No. R-1287 and Order No. R-1287-A relative to acreage dedication, well location requirements, and vertical and horizontal limits should be incorporated in this order.

(7) That the common source of supply presently classified and defined as the Dakota Producing Interval should henceforth be denominated the Basin-Dakota Gas Pool.

(8) That special rules and regulations governing the drilling, spacing and proration of wells in said Basin-Dakota Gas Pool should be promulgated.

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED:

(1) That Order Nos. R-1287 and R-1287-A be and the same are hereby superseded.

(2) That the following Dakota gas pools be and the same are hereby abolished:

Angels Peak-Dakota
Blanco-Dakota
South Blanco-Dakota
West Blanco-Dakota
Companero-Dakota
East Companero-Dakota
Huerfanito-Dakota
Huerfano-Dakota
West Kutz-Dakota
Largo-Dakota
North Los Pinos-Dakota
South Los Pinos-Dakota
Otero-Dakota

(3) That a new gas pool for Dakota production be and the same is hereby created and designated as the Basin-Dakota Gas Pool with the vertical and horizontal limits as shown in Rule 25 below, and which shall be prorated commencing February 1, 1961.

(4) That the General Rules applicable to prorated gas pools in Northwest New Mexico, as set forth in Order No. R-1670, shall apply to the Basin-Dakota Gas Pool, unless in conflict with the

Special Rules and Regulations for the Basin-Dakota Gas Pool hereinafter set forth, in which event the Special Rules shall apply.

(5) That Special Rules and Regulations for the Basin-Dakota Gas Pool be and the same are hereby promulgated as hereinafter set forth.

SPECIAL RULES AND REGULATIONS FOR THE
BASIN-DAKOTA GAS POOL

A. WELL LOCATION AND ACREAGE REQUIREMENTS

RULE 2: That all wells drilled to or completed in the Basin-Dakota Gas Pool shall be located no nearer than 790 feet to the boundary line of the proration unit and shall be located no nearer than 130 feet to a governmental quarter-quarter section line or subdivision inner boundary line.

In the event any such well is completed as an oil well at a location nearer than 330 feet to a governmental quarter-quarter section line, said well shall not be produced unless and until such time as the unorthodox oil well location has been approved by the Commission after notice and hearing.

RULE 3: The Secretary-Director of the Commission shall have authority to grant an exception to Rule 2 without notice and hearing where an application therefor has been filed in due form and the Secretary-Director determines that good cause exists for granting such exception.

Applicants shall furnish all offset operators and all operators within the section in which the subject well is located a copy of the application to the Commission, and applicant shall include with his application a list of names and addresses of all such operators, together with a stipulation that proper notice has been given said operators at the addresses given. The Secretary-Director of the Commission shall wait at least 20 days before approving any such unorthodox location, and may approve such unorthodox location only in the absence of objection from any offset operator or any operator within the section in which the well is located. In the event such an operator objects to the unorthodox location, the Commission shall consider the matter only after proper notice and hearing.

RULE 5(A): A standard gas proration unit in the Basin-Dakota Gas Pool shall be 320 acres.

RULE 5(B): The Secretary-Director of the Commission shall have authority to grant an exception to Rule 5(A) without notice and hearing where an application has been filed in due form and

where the unorthodox size or shape of the tract is due to a variation in the legal subdivision of the United States Public Lands Survey, or where the following facts exist and the following provisions are complied with:

1. The non-standard unit consists of contiguous quarter-quarter sections or lots.

2. The non-standard unit lies wholly within a single governmental section.

3. The entire non-standard unit may reasonably be presumed to be productive of gas.

4. The length or width of the non-standard unit does not exceed 5280 feet.

5. That applicant presents written consent in the form of waivers from all offset operators and from all operators owning interests in the section in which any part of the non-standard unit is situated and which acreage is not included in said non-standard unit.

6. In lieu of Paragraph 5 of this Rule, the applicant may furnish proof of the fact that all of the aforesaid operators were notified by registered mail of his intent to form such non-standard unit. The Secretary-Director of the Commission may approve the application, if, after a period of 30 days following the mailing of said notice, no such operator has made objection to the formation of such non-standard unit.

E. CLASSIFICATION OF WELLS

RULE 16(A): After the production data is available for the last month of each gas proration period, any well which had an underproduced status at the beginning of the preceding gas proration period and which did not produce its average allowable during the preceding six-month gas proration period may be classified as a marginal well, unless, prior to the end of said preceding gas proration period, the operator or other interested party presents satisfactory evidence to the Commission showing that the well should not be so classified.

H. MISCELLANEOUS SPECIAL POOL RULES

RULE 25: The vertical limits of the Basin-Dakota Gas Pool shall be from the base of the Greenhorn Limestone to a point 400 feet below the base of said formation and consisting of the Graneros formation, the Dakota formation and the productive upper portion of the Morrison formation.

The horizontal limits of the Basin-Dakota Gas Pool shall be San Juan and Rio Arriba Counties, New Mexico, with the exception of the Barker-Creek-Dakota Gas Pool and the Ute Dome-Dakota Gas Pool together with any extensions thereof.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED:

That the foregoing Special Rules and Regulations shall have no application in any area which is now or may hereafter be classified by the Commission as an oil pool in the Dakota formation.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED:

That all purchasers of gas in the Basin-Dakota Gas Pool shall file preliminary nominations for the purchase of gas from said pool during the initial six-month period commencing February 1, 1961, said nominations to be filed with the Santa Fe office of the Commission on or before December 9, 1960.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED:

That a case is hereby docketed for the Regular Commission Hearing in June, 1961, at which time the Commission will consider the necessity or desirability for establishing a maximum and minimum per well allowable in the Basin-Dakota Gas Pool.

DONE at Santa Fe, New Mexico, on the day and year hereinabove designated.

STATE OF NEW MEXICO
OIL CONSERVATION COMMISSION

JOHN BURROUGHS, Chairman

MURRAY E. MORGAN, Member

A. L. PORTER, Jr., Member & Secretary

S E A L

esr/

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW MEXICO

EL PASO NATURAL GAS COMPANY,
a corporation, PAN AMERICAN PETRO-
LEUM CORPORATION, a corporation,
MARATHON OIL COMPANY, a corpora-
tion, BETA DEVELOPMENT COMPANY,
and SUNSET INTERNATIONAL PETROLEUM
CORPORATION, a corporation,

Petitioners and Appellants,

v.

No. 7727

OIL CONSERVATION COMMISSION OF
NEW MEXICO, JACK M. CAMPBELL,
Chairman, E. S. WALKER, Member,
A. L. PORTER, JR., Member and
Secretary; CONSOLIDATED OIL & GAS,
INC., a corporation,

Respondents and Appellees.

Appeal From The District Court of
San Juan County

C. C. McCulloh, District Judge
Division I

BRIEF-IN-CHIEF OF APPELLANTS

Atwood & Malone
P. O. Drawer 700
Roswell, New Mexico

Kent B. Hampton
Marathon Oil Company
Casper, Wyoming

Ben R. Howell
Garrett C. Whitworth
El Paso Natural Gas Company
El Paso, Texas

J. K. Smith
Pan American Petroleum Corporation
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Santa Fe, New Mexico

Attorneys for Appellants

INDEX TO BRIEF-IN-CHIEF OF APPELLANTS

	<u>Page</u>
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES	ii
STATEMENT OF THE CASE	1
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS	3
THE POINTS RELIED ON FOR REVERSAL	9
ARGUMENT AND AUTHORITIES	10
Point I	10
Point II.	16
Point III	21
CONCLUSION	28

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

New Mexico Cases

	<u>Page</u>
Continental Oil Company v. Oil Conservation Commission, 70 N.M. 310, 319, 321, 324, 373 P.2d 809, 814, 816, 818 (1962)	4, 10, 12, 13, 14, 23, 24

Statutes

§65-3-13(c), N.M.S.A., 1953 Comp.	17
§65-3-14(a), N.M.S.A., 1953 Comp.	11, 17
§65-3-29(h), N.M.S.A., 1953 Comp.	11, 4, 23

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

This is an appeal from a judgment of the District Court of San Juan County, New Mexico, in Case No. 11,685, affirming Order No. R-2259-B entered by the Oil Conservation Commission of New Mexico in Case No. 2504, on the docket of the Commission. The proceeding before the District Court of San Juan County was on Petition For Review filed by Petitioners El Paso Natural Gas Company, Pan American Petroleum Corporation, Marathon Oil Company, Southwest Production Company and Sunset International Petroleum Corporation, who are Appellants in this court, except for Southwest Production Company.

Case No. 2504 on the docket of the Oil Conservation Commission was initiated by the Application of Appellee Consolidated Oil & Gas, Inc., filed on February 23, 1962, requesting the Commission to change the gas proration formula applicable to the Basin-Dakota Gas Pool from the existing "25-75" formula (25% acreage plus 75% acreage times deliverability) to a "60-40" formula (60% acreage plus 40% acreage times deliverability) (Comm. Tr., Inst. 1). **The Commission's hearing on Consolidated's application was held on April 18-21, 1962. On June 7, 1962, Order No. R-2259 denying the Application of Consolidated was promulgated by the Commission (Comm. Tr., Inst. 8).

**The original transcript of record and proceedings in Case No. 2504 before the Oil Conservation Commission, which are a portion of the record in this appeal, consist of one volume containing original instruments and eight volumes of testimony before the Commission. There are no page numbers on the original instruments but each is numbered in the Certificate of the Secretary-Director of the Commission appearing at pages 1-4 of the volume of original instruments. In this brief this volume will be referred to as "Comm. Tr." Individual instruments will be referred to by the number assigned in the Certificate of the Secretary-Director. Thus, Order No. R-2259 would be cited "(Comm. Tr., Inst. 9)." References to testimony before the Commission will be by date of hearing and page number; thus, "(Hearing 11/18/26, pg. 25)."

The single volume transcript of the record from the District Court of San Juan County will be cited "Tr." with page number added, i. e., "(Tr. 44)."

On June 27, 1962, Consolidated filed an Application for Rehearing (Comm. Tr. Inst. 9). On July 7, 1962, the Commission granted the Application For Rehearing by Order No. R-2259-A (Comm. Tr. Inst. 11), limiting the rehearing to the matter of recoverable gas reserves in the Basin-Dakota Gas Pool. The rehearing was held on February 4, 1963, and on July 9, 1963, Order No. R-2259-B (Tr. 10), was entered by the Commission terminating the existing 25-75 formula and changing to a 60-40 formula, effective August 1, 1963. On July 26, 1963, Appellants filed their Applications for Rehearing (Tr. 30-40), directed to Order R-2259-B, which was overruled by the Commission's Order R-2259-C of August 1, 1963 (Tr. 29).

On August 20, 1963, Appellants filed their Petition for Review of Order No. R-2259-B and R-2259-C (Tr. 1) in the District Court of San Juan County. Answers to the Petition For Review were filed by the Oil Conservation Commission (Tr. 70), Consolidated Oil & Gas, Inc. (Tr. 65), Texaco, Inc. (Tr. 79), and Sunray-DX Oil Company (Tr. 82). Southern Union Gas Company appeared as amicus curiae in support of the Commission Order (Tr. 95).

Hearing on the Petition for Review was held at Aztec, New Mexico, on March 5, 1964, at the conclusion of which the court announced his decision affirming the Order of the Commission (Tr. 152).

Requested Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law were filed by the parties (Tr. 98, 105, 114). The Court filed its Decision (Tr. 123) and Judgment was filed on April 2, 1964 (Tr. 131). Notice of Appeal was filed April 27, 1964 (Tr. 132). The time therefor having been duly extended, the Transcript of Record was filed and this case docketed in this court on September 29, 1964.

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS

The Basin-Dakota Gas Pool consists of all of the known productive areas of the Dakota formation lying in San Juan, Rio Arriba and Sandoval Counties, New Mexico. At the times pertinent to this appeal, Appellants were the operators of 283 producing gas wells in the Basin-Dakota Gas Pool (Tr. 14 et seq). Appellees, other than the New Mexico Oil Conservation Commission, were operators of 50 wells in this pool (Tr. 14 et seq).

By its Order No. R-1670-C entered November 4, 1960, the Oil Conservation Commission first limited the production of natural gas from the Basin-Dakota Gas Pool (Tr. 124). This Order, which established Special Rules and Regulations for the Basin-Dakota Gas Pool, adopted by reference Rule 9 (C) of the General Rules Applicable to Prorated Gas Pools in Northwest New Mexico, as set forth in the Commission's Order No. R-1670 (Tr. 124). Rule 9 (C) established a formula for the allocating of allowable gas production to non-marginal wells in prorated gas pools in Northwestern New Mexico on the basis of 25% acreage plus 75% acreage times deliverability (Tr. 124). On January 1, 1958, there were 20 Dakota wells in the San Juan Basin. This increased to 146 wells on January 1, 1960. On January 1, 1961, there were 301 gas wells in the Basin-Dakota Pool (Hearing 4/19/62, pg. 500). On February 14, 1963, the date of the rehearing in Case No. 2504, there were 941 wells in the Basin-Dakota Pool. (Hearing 2/14/63, pg. 144).

From the inception of proration in the Basin-Dakota Pool on November 4, 1960, until August 1, 1963, at which time it was changed by the Order appealed from, all production from the Basin-Dakota Pool

was allocated under the 25-75 formula which was applicable to the gas wells in all prorated gas pools in Northwestern New Mexico. During that period 640 new wells were drilled in the Basin-Dakota Pool under this formula.

On February 23, 1962, Consolidated Oil & Gas, Inc., filed its Application in Case No. 2504 seeking to have the 25-75 formula changed to a formula of 60% acreage plus 40% acreage times deliverability. (Comm. Tr. Inst. 1). During the course of the hearing and rehearing on this application thirteen operators, operating one hundred eleven (111) wells in the Basin-Dakota Pool, supported the change sought by Consolidated, while fourteen operators, operating four hundred forty-two (442) wells in the pool opposed the change and supported the existing 25-75 formula. (Hearing 4/19/62, pg. 657 et seq.; Hearing 2/14/63, pg. 215 et seq.)

After hearing, the Commission on June 7, 1962, entered its Order No. R-2259 denying the application of Consolidated and continuing the 25-75 formula (Comm. Tr. Inst. 8). During the period that the Commission had the case under consideration the opinion of this court in Continental Oil Company, et al., v. Oil Conservation Commission, et al., 70 N.M. 310, 373 P. 2d 809 (1962) was filed on May 16, 1962.

That the opinion in Continental Oil Company, had a substantial impact upon the further proceedings in the case at bar is apparent. Thus, paragraph 6 of Consolidated's Application for Rehearing of Order R-2259 (Comm. Tr. Inst. 9) substantially quoted the opinion as follows:

"(6). From available data it is practicable for the Commission to determine (a) the amount of recoverable gas

under each producer's tract, (b) the total amount of recoverable gas in the pool, (c) the proportion that (a) bears to (b); and (d) what portion of the arrived at proportion can be recovered without waste, and from such determinations the correlative rights of interested parties can be determined. "

This is also evidenced by the fact that Order R-2259-A of the Commission granting the rehearing (Comm. Tr. Inst. 1) limited the scope of the rehearing to "matters concerning recoverable gas reserves in the Basin-Dakota Gas Pool." See also Hearing 9/14/62, pg. 14; Hearing 2/14/63 pg. 97.

Following an extended rehearing, the Commission on July 9, 1963, issued its Order No. R-2259-B, to be effective August 1, 1963, changing the formula for the Basin-Dakota Pool from 25-75 to 60-40 as sought by Consolidated Oil & Gas, Inc. (Tr. 10).

Exhibit A attached to the Commission's Order No. R-2259-B (Tr. 14) and forming a part of the order, contains the entire basis for the findings included in the order and the computations which it reflects were the basis for the change of formula made in the order. Exhibit A reflects statistical data for each of the 699 non-marginal wells listed therein. *object to this*

The nature of the information reflected by the data composing Exhibit A, and the use made of the data by the Commission are basic to a consideration of the questions presented by this appeal. For that reason the following explanation of Exhibit A is included:

Exhibit A
Order R-2259-B

Column A - Acreage Factor.

The figures in this column represent the acreage factor (AF)

for each of the 699 non-marginal wells. This is the ratio (expressed in terms of percent) of the surface acreage attributed to the well to a standard spacing or proration unit of 320 acres, fixed by the Commission for a well in this pool. Thus, a non-marginal tract with exactly 320 surface acres has an acreage factor of 100; and a non-marginal tract of more than 320 acres has an acreage factor of more than 100.

Column B - Daily Deliverability.

This column shows the current ability of each well to deliver gas under stated conditions. It is expressed in units of 1,000 cubic feet (MCF) per day for each of the 699 non-marginal wells as of December, 1962.

Column C - Tract Reserves, MMCF.

In this column the Commission has set forth its findings as to the initial recoverable gas reserves, expressed in units of one million cubic feet (MMCF), for each of the 699 non-marginal tracts. These figures do not represent the portion of these reserves which can be produced without waste. *obj*

Column D - Percentage of Pool Reserves.

This column sets out the Commission's findings as to the percentage of the total reserves of all non-marginal tracts which underlies each of the 699 non-marginal tracts.

Column H - MCF Allowable.

This column sets forth, in terms of thousands of cubic feet (MCF) what the allowable would have been for each of the 699 non-marginal wells for the month of December, 1962, if the 60-40 formula had been used to prorate pool production for that month. The acreage factor for each non-marginal tract and the current deliverability of each non-marginal well, set forth in Columns A and B, respectively, were used in making this 60-40 formula calculation.

Column I - Percentage of Pool Allowable.

This column sets forth the percentage of total pool allowable which would have been allocated to each of the 699 non-marginal wells for the month of December, 1962, if the 60-40 formula had been used to prorate pool production for that month.

Column J - A/R Factor.

This column sets forth the ratio under the 60-40 formula between (1) the percentage of total pool allowable which would have been allocated to each of the 699 non-marginal tracts if the 60-40 formula

had been used to prorate pool production for the month of December, 1962; and (2) the percentage of the total pool reserves of non-marginal tracts which the Commission found in Column D to be attributable to each non-marginal tract. In other words, this column sets forth the ratio between Column I and Column D, this ratio being the Allowable Reserve Factor (A/R Factor) for each non-marginal well for the month of December, 1962.

Columns E, F, and G - 25-75 Formula.

In Columns E, F, and G data identical to that appearing in Columns H, I, and J is set forth, except that the computations reflected in these columns are on the basis of the 25-75 formula, rather than the 60-40 formula.

Exhibit A to Order R-2259-B was substantially identical with figures included in Consolidated's Exhibit 4. Before the Commission Consolidated took the position that if the percentage of pool allowable for a well was exactly equal to its percentage of pool reserves so that the A/R Factor for that well was equal to one, or 100%, then the particular formula used for the computation of such A/R Factor afforded that well its exact share of the pool reserves (Hearing 2/14/63, pg. 22, 23, 25). It was conceded by Consolidated that its determination as to the reserves lying under each non-marginal tract could be in error by as much as 30% due to reasonable differences in interpretation of the data on which the estimates of the reserves were based (Hearing 2/14/63, pg. 26, 27). On that basis Consolidated concluded that if the A/R Factor for a well was between .7 or 70% and 1.3 or 130%, an abuse of correlative rights would not necessarily result, but that as to wells falling outside this range, abuses of correlative rights would tend to result (Hearing 2/14/63, pg. 26, 27).

The Commission obviously accepted these contentions of Consolidated and promulgated Order R-2259-B on the basis of them.

It was testified before the Commission that the effect of this change in formula from 25-75 to 60-40 would be to take roughly one-half million dollars annually from seventeen operators in the field and to redistribute it to thirty-three other operators in the pool (Hearing 4/19/62, pg. 413).

Appellants, believing the Order of the Commission to be invalid for the reasons herein stated, sought review in the District Court and perfected this appeal from the adverse judgment of the District Court of San Juan County.

THE POINTS RELIED ON FOR REVERSAL

POINT I

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN SUSTAINING THE COMMISSION ORDER WHICH WAS INVALID AND VOID FOR LACK OF BASIC FINDINGS OF JURISDICTIONAL FACTS.

POINT II

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN SUSTAINING THE COMMISSION ORDER WHICH WAS INVALID AND VOID BY REASON OF THE AFFIRMATIVE FINDINGS ON WHICH IT WAS BASED.

POINT III

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN SUSTAINING THE COMMISSION ORDER WHICH WAS NOT BASED ON SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE.

ARGUMENT AND AUTHORITIES

POINT I.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN SUSTAINING
THE COMMISSION ORDER WHICH WAS INVALID
AND VOID FOR LACK OF BASIC FINDINGS OF
JURISDICTIONAL FACTS.

In Appellants' Applications for Rehearing filed with the Commission following entry of Order No. 2259-B, the fatal deficiency of said order was pointed out as follows (Tr. , 33, 37):

"The Commission in its Order has failed to make a finding which under the law must be made in order to change an existing proration order, to-wit: the portion of each tract's proportion of the total pool reserves which can be recovered without waste. The record contains no evidence upon which such a finding can be made."

In the trial court, Appellants requested the following finding of fact (Petitioners' Requested Finding of Fact No. 12; (Tr. 101):

"12. The Commission, having purported to find (1) the amount of recoverable gas under each producers tract in the Basin Dakota Pool, (2) a total amount of recoverable gas in the Pool and (3) the proportion that (1) bears to (2) wholly failed to make any finding or determination as to what portion of the proportion so arrived at could be recovered without waste."

Appellants also requested the trial court to adopt a conclusion of law as follows (Petitioners' Requested Conclusion of Law No. 2, Tr. 103):

"2. Order No. R-2259-B is unreasonable and unlawful and void by reason of the failure of the Oil Conservation Commission to make required findings of jurisdictional fact as to the portion of the reserves of the Basin Dakota Pool and the individual tracts therein which can be produced without waste."

These requested findings and conclusions were denied by the trial court (Decision of the Court, Tr. 123 at p. 130). The Court's refusal to make such findings and conclusions is clearly reversible error under the authority of Continental Oil Company v. Oil Conservation Commission, 70 N.M. 310, 373 P.2d 809 (1962), which directly governs the case at bar.

The Continental case involved prorationing in a large, well

developed gas pool, and arose from facts strikingly similar to the case at bar. There, as here, hundreds of wells had been drilled under an allocation formula that had been in effect since establishment of prorationing in the pool, and, when the Commission attempted to change the formula, the order establishing a new formula was attacked on the ground that the Commission had not met the statutory standards applicable to gas prorationing and, in any event, had not shown in its order that proper procedures had been followed to protect correlative rights.

The Court in the Continental case considered the statutory definition of the term "correlative rights" (§65-3-29 (h) N.M.S.A., 1953 Comp.) which is as follows:

"Correlative rights" means the opportunity afforded, so far as it is practicable to do so, to the owner of each property in a pool to produce without waste his just and equitable share of the oil or gas, or both, in the pool, being an amount, so far as can be practically determined, and so far as can be practicably obtained without waste, substantially in the proportion that the quantity of recoverable oil or gas, or both, under such property bears to the total recoverable oil or gas, or both, in the pool, and for such purpose to use his just and equitable share of the reservoir energy."

The Court also considered §65-3-14(a), N.M.S.A., 1953 Comp., which defines the duty of the Commission in allocating production among the owners of property in a pool:

"The rules, regulations or orders of the commission shall, so far as it is practicable to do so, afford to the owner of each property in a pool the opportunity to produce his just and equitable share of the oil or gas, or both, in the pool, being an amount, so far as can be practically determined, and so far as such can be practically obtained without waste, substantially in the proportion that the quantity of the recoverable oil or gas, or both, under such property bears to the total recoverable oil or gas, or both in the pool, and for this purpose to use his just and equitable share of the reservoir energy."

The Court, after carefully reviewing these and other statutes governing Commission action, set out the basic procedure the Commission must follow in order validly to change a proration formula. The

Court observed that the Commission order did not contain basic findings of jurisdictional fact showing that the necessary procedure had been followed, and held the order invalid and void.

The basic procedure specified by the Court in the Continental case requires that the Commission first determine the extent of each owner's correlative rights and then establish a proration formula that will protect those rights. The Court stated succinctly the procedure to be followed and the four basic findings indispensable to a determination of each owner's correlative rights (70 N.M. 310, 319, 373 P.2d 809, 814):

"Therefore, the commission, by 'basic conclusions of fact' (or what might be termed 'findings'), must determine, insofar as practicable, (1) the amount of recoverable gas under each producer's tract; (2) the total amount of recoverable gas in the pool; (3) the proportion that (1) bears to (2); and (4) what portion of the arrived at proportion can be recovered without waste. That the extent of the correlative rights must first be determined before the commission can act to protect them is manifest." (Emphasis by the Court)

Again, the Court reiterates (70 N.M. 310, 324, 373 P.2d 809, 818):

"To state the problem in a different way, if the commission had determined, from a practical standpoint, that each owner had a certain amount of gas; and that a determined amount of gas could be produced and obtained without waste; then the commission would have complied with the mandate of the statute...."

In the face of this clear and unequivocal language of the statutes and of this Court as to the requirements that must be met in an order of the Commission changing an existing gas proration formula, it is difficult to understand the failure of the Commission in the case at bar to meet all of these requirements. Yet, fail it did.

In order No. R-2259-B (Tr. p. 160) the amount of recoverable gas under each producer's tract is shown by Finding No. 6 which states (Tr. 161):

"(6) That the initial recoverable gas reserve underlying each non-marginal tract in the Basin-Dakota Gas Pool are as shown in Column C, Tract Reserves, of Exhibit A attached hereto and made a part hereof."

The total amount of recoverable gas in the pool is shown by Finding No. 5 which states (Tr. 161):

"(5) That the initial recoverable gas reserves in the Basin-Dakota Gas Pool, insofar as can be determined, total approximately 2.255 trillion cubic feet, of which approximately 96 billion cubic feet is attributed to marginal wells, which are permitted to produce at capacity."

The proportion that the amount of recoverable gas under each producer's tract bears to the total amount of recoverable gas in the pool is shown by Finding No. 7 which states (Tr. 161):

"(7) That the percent of the total pool reserves attributable to each non-marginal tract in the Basin-Dakota Gas Pool is as shown in Column D, Percent of Pool Reserves, of Exhibit A."

These preliminary findings constitute the first three steps of the four step procedure specified by the Continental case for determining the extent of each owner's correlative rights. Correlative rights have not been determined, however, because the Commission failed to take the fourth step and make the basic jurisdictional finding as to what portion of the arrived at proportion could be produced without waste. The Commission simply failed to make the required finding, and there was no evidence in the record to support such a finding even if it had been made.

In its finding (7) the Commission finds that Column D of Exhibit A states the percent of the total pool reserves which are attributable to each non-marginal tract in the pool. (Tr. 160, 161, 164). This is basic finding (3) of the Continental case as to the proportion that the recoverable gas under each producer's tract bears to the total recoverable gas in the pool; it is not required basic finding (4) of the Continental case as to "what portion of the arrived at proportion can be produced without waste."

There is no such finding. Nonetheless, the Commission has used these figures to determine the proration formula (Findings 11, 13, 14, Order No. R-2259-B; Tr. 161, 162). The effect of so doing is to use the total recoverable gas under each tract as the basis for testing the effect of the 60-40 and 25-75 proration formulas in the Order, rather than the portion of the recoverable gas under each tract which can be produced without waste, which is the measure of each owner's correlative rights. In so doing the Commission has fallen into fatal error, for it has not determined the extent of the correlative rights before it has attempted to establish a formula to protect them.

The Court in the Continental case left no room for doubt as to the effect of failure to make one or more of the "basic findings of jurisdictional fact" which it found to be essential to the validity of a commission order changing a gas proration formula. It said (70 N M. 310, 321, 373 P.2d 809, 816):

"...basic jurisdictional findings, supported by evidence, are required to show that the Commission has heeded the mandate and the standards set out by statute."

and it there concluded:

"We therefore find that the order of the commission lacked the basic findings necessary to and upon which jurisdiction depended, and that therefore Order No. R-1092-C and Order No. R-1092-A are invalid and void."

The legislature, in §65-3-29(h), determined that the correlative right of an owner in a gas pool is the opportunity "to produce without waste his just and equitable share of the oil or gas in the pool, being an amount so far as can be practicably determined and so far as can be practicably obtained without waste **" (Emphasis supplied) This Court determined in the Continental Oil Co., case that this statute requires a

finding as to the owner's portion of the recoverable gas in place which can be recovered without waste, as a basis for a valid allocation order. The Commission's action in ignoring that requirement, resulted in an invalid proration order which should have been so declared by the trial court. In failing to so invalidate the Commission's order the trial court erred and its judgment should be reversed.

POINT II.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN SUSTAINING THE COMMISSION ORDER WHICH WAS INVALID AND VOID BY REASON OF THE AFFIRMATIVE FINDINGS ON WHICH IT WAS BASED.

In addition to asserting the invalidity of Order R-2259-B in the trial court because of lack of required jurisdictional findings, Appellants submitted the following Requested Findings of Fact which were refused by the trial court (Tr. 101):

"14. The Commission's order is unreasonable and unlawful because it is based on affirmative findings which were illusory and which do not meet the statutory standards for a valid allocation of gas production.

"15. The Commission's order does not equitably protect correlative rights insofar as is practicable in accordance with statutory standards."

The Order of the Commission adopted the 60-40 formula solely because it found that its use resulted in a larger member of wells receiving a percentage of pool allowable equal to their percentage of pool reserves (or within what the Commission found to be a reasonable tolerance hereof) than did the 25-75 formula. (Finding (11), Tr. 11). It based this determination upon each tract's reserves as set out in Column C of the Order (Tr. 14). Yet these are the very figures which the Commission, in its Finding 8, had found to be so subject to fluctuation that it was impracticable to allocate allowable on the basis of them.

If the reserve figures in Column C were the product of fluctuation to such an extent as to be impracticable as the basis for allocation of production, it is difficult to understand how, nonetheless, they could provide a valid standard against which to test the results of the 60-40 formula as against the results of the 25-75 formula. Yet the Commission used the percentage figures in Column D, and hence, the reserves in Column C, as

the sole basis for judging the relative merits of the two formulas.

If the reserve figures in Column C were the correct measure of the correlative rights of the owners in the pool, then the Commission was obligated to use them as the sole measure for allocating allowable in the pool unless it was impracticable to do so. This is clearly true since the statute requires the Commission to allocate allowable on the basis of correlative rights insofar as "it is practicable to do so." §65-3-14(a) and §65-3-13(c) N.M.S.A., 1953.

If, as the Commission found (Finding 8, Tr. 11), it was impracticable to so use them because of continuous fluctuation in these figures, the identical impracticality extended to their use as the sole standard for judging which of two formulas under consideration would best protect correlative rights. Yet that is the use which the Commission made of the figures in Column C when it determined in Finding 14 that the 60-40 formula would better protect correlative rights. (See Findings 11 & 14, Tr. 11 & 12).

It is difficult to understand how the Commission can "have it both ways" on this issue of the use of the tract reserve figures in Column C, and have a valid order result. Appellants submit that it cannot, and that the result which followed evidences this invalidity.

The Commission conceivably might urge in support of its Order that it was the "use" of reserve percentages that was impracticable because of fluctuation, rather than any unreliability or error in the figures themselves which resulted in impracticability. Such a position is hardly tenable. It was "initial reserves" that the Commission found for both the pool and the tracts in the pool (Tr. 11). Actual initial reserves do not change. It is the reserve figures available at any given time, which reflect the information available at that time, which change. As the

Commission recognized in its Finding (8), that occurs every time a new well is drilled in the pool.

It follows that it was not the "use" of reserve figures in a mechanical sense, which the Commission found to be impracticable, but rather that the particular figures appearing in Column C had no validity for any sufficient period of time to provide a basis for a formula governing the allocation of production from the pool. Appellants take no position on that question but if that was true, they were equally impracticable as a sole criterion for judging the proposed 60-40 formula against the existing 25-75 formula, and that is the use which the Commission made of them.

Either the reserves found by the Commission and listed in Column C of Exhibit A to Order R-2259-B were, or they were not, the measure of the correlative rights of the tracts in the pool. If they were, the Commission was required by the statute to use them as the basis of allocation of allowable, which it did not do. If they were not, because of fluctuation as the Commission found in its Finding No. 8, then it could not validly make them the sole criterion for determining whether the 60-40 or the 25-75 formula better protected correlative rights. To do so had all of the vice and none of the virtue of using the reserve figures themselves. The resulting Order of the Commission was clearly invalid.

That a formula so selected should result in allowables in the pool which are grossly inequitable and a serious abuse of correlative rights is not surprising. Even if the Commission's arbitrary decision that the 0.7 to 1.3 range was within an acceptable tolerance is accepted as sound, the resulting allowables obviously fail to meet the requirements of the statute as to the protection of correlative rights.

The schedule of wells included in Exhibit A to the Commission's Order (Tr. 14) includes 699 wells in the Basin-Dakota Pool. Of that

total number only 352 wells in Column J fall within the Commission's acceptable tolerance, leaving 347 out of 699 wells, or substantially one-half, which are suffering a serious abuse of correlative rights under the 60-40 formula, when tested by the Commission's own standards.

Furthermore, by its Finding 15, the Commission finds (Tr. 12):

"(15) That numerous wells in the Basin-Dakota Gas Pool are capable of draining more than their just and equitable share of the gas in the pool, and that an allocation formula of 60 percent acreage plus 40 percent acreage times deliverability will, insofar as is practicable, prevent drainage between producing tracts which is not equalized by counter drainage."

Drainage, not equalized by counter-drainage, occurs when a well withdraws more than its proportionate share of the underlying gas in the pool. As the Commission found, numerous wells in the pool are capable of draining other tracts in this manner.

It would follow that a proration formula which is to minimize such drainage must hold to a minimum the number of wells receiving an allowable greater in relation to the total pool allowable than the relation of their reserves to the total pool reserves. In Finding 15 the Commission finds that its proposed 60-40 formula will "insofar as practicable" prevent such drainage.

The fact is, however, that it appears from the face of the Order itself (Column J) that under the 60-40 formula 371 of the 699 wells will receive more than 100% of their just and equitable shares of the pool allowable, and hence, drain adjoining tracts. Under the 25-75 formula, (Column G), however, the Order shows that only 277 wells will receive more than the 100% which the statute fixes as their just and equitable share of the pool reserves.

If the comparison is limited to wells exceeding the Commission's

acceptable tolerance of 1.3 or 130%, a comparable result occurs (Column J). Under the 60-40 formula, 200 wells receive more than 130% of their just and equitable shares of the allowable, whereas, under the 25-75 formula, only 173 of the 699 wells fall in this category. Substantially increased drainage under the 60-40 formula is thus inevitable, with resulting waste and injury to the correlative rights of the tracts in the pool.

The conclusion seems apparent. The arbitrary and unreasonable character of Finding No. 15 is established by the contents of the Order itself. The Commission refused to use the tract reserve figures of Exhibit A as the basis for allocating allowable on the ground that they fluctuated too much, yet made them the sole criterion for judging the two formulas under consideration, and adopted the one which it found to most closely approximate the use of those very reserve figures. If those figures were a reliable measure of the correlative rights in the pool, as the Commission accepted them to be by the use it made of them, the statute required their use directly, not through a formula which gave only half the wells in the pool the allowable to which they were thus entitled. The findings and data contained in Order R-2259-B clearly establish the failure of the Commission to protect correlative rights as required by the statute, and hence the invalidity of the Order. The failure of the trial court to so hold was error which requires reversal of the trial court's judgment.

POINT III.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN SUSTAINING
THE COMMISSION ORDER WHICH WAS NOT
BASED ON SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE.

In the trial court, Appellants requested the following findings of fact to the effect that Order R-2259-B was not supported by substantial evidence (Tr. 102, 103):

"16. Order No. R-2259-B is not supported by substantial evidence."

"18. Findings No. (9), (10), (11), (13), (14), (15), (16), and (17), of Order R-2259-B are not supported by substantial evidence in that each is based directly, or indirectly, upon a comparison of initial recoverable reserves for the individual tracts in the Basin Dakota Pool with current deliverabilities of the wells located upon said tracts. The comparison so made is not meaningful, is illusory and discriminatory, and does not constitute substantial evidence to support the findings so based upon it."

"19. There is no substantial evidence to support Finding No. 13 of the Commission that correlative rights are not being adequately protected under the present 25-75 formula and that waste will result unless the Commission acts to protect correlative rights."

"21. There is no substantial evidence in the record to support Commission's Findings 9, 10, 11, 13, 14, 15, 16 and 17, in that each is based upon a determination of the initial recoverable gas reserves in the Basin Dakota Gas Pool and the initial recoverable gas reserves underlying each non-marginal tract which fails to take into account the portion of the recoverable gas in place which can be produced without waste."

Appellants also requested the trial court to make a conclusion of law, as follows (Tr. 103):

"3. Order No. R-2259-B is unreasonable and unlawful and void by reason of the fact that the findings of fact upon which it is predicated are not supported by substantial evidence."

These requested findings and conclusions were denied by the

trial court (Decision of the Court, Tr. 123 at 130), which refusal constitutes reversible error.

The findings contained in Order No. R-2259-B which are attacked as being unsupported by substantial evidence are as follows (Tr. 161, 162):

"(11) That the most reasonable basis for allocating production in the Basin-Dakota Gas Pool is to determine, for each proposed formula, the percentage of total pool allowable apportioned to each non-marginal tract as compared to its percentage of total pool reserves, said relationship hereinafter referred to as the tract's A/R Factor, and to select the allocation formula that will allow the maximum number of wells in the pool to produce with an ideal tract A/R Factor of 1.0, or with a tract A/R Factor of from 0.7 to 1.3 which, due to inherent variance in interpreting and computing reserves, is within a reasonable tolerance."

"(13) That under the present 25-75 formula, correlative rights are not being adequately protected; that the protection of correlative rights is a necessary adjunct to the prevention of waste, and that waste will result unless the Commission acts to protect correlative rights."

"(14) That, based upon the December 1962 pool allowable, a comparison of the number of non-marginal wells producing with a tract A/R Factor of from 0.7 to 1.3 under each formula as identified by an asterisk in Columns G and J of Exhibit A, and of the total volume of gas allocated to the wells in the 0.7 to 1.3 range under each formula, established that the proposed formula of 60 percent acreage plus 40 percent acreage times deliverability will more adequately protect correlative rights and prevent waste by permitting wells to receive their just and equitable share of the gas in the pool, insofar as can be determined."

"(15) That numerous wells in the Basin-Dakota Gas Pool are capable of draining more than their just and equitable share of the gas in the pool, and that an allocation formula of 60 percent acreage plus 40 percent acreage times deliverability will, insofar as is practicable, prevent drainage between producing tracts which is not equalized by counter drainage."

"(16). That an allocation formula of 60 percent acreage plus 40 percent acreage times deliverability will, insofar as it is practicable to do so, afford to the owner of each property in the pool the opportunity to use his just and

equitable share of the reservoir energy."

"(17) That Order No. R-1670-C should be amended to provide an allocation formula for the Basin-Dakota Gas Pool in San Juan, Rio Arriba, and Sandoval Counties, New Mexico, based 60 percent on acreage and 40 percent on acreage times deliverability."

Finding No. 11 of Order No. R-2259-B set forth above (Tr. 161) describes the procedure used by the Commission to determine the weight to be given to the factors of acreage and deliverability in the proration formula. Under this procedure the Commission determined for each tract the allowables it would receive under the 25-75 and 60-40 formulae. These allowables were then expressed as percentages of the total pool allowable and compared to the tract's reserves, expressed as a percentage of total pool reserves. From such a comparison the Commission determined that more tracts would receive allowables commensurate with their reserves under the 60-40 formula than under the 25-75 formula (Finding No. 16; Tr. 162). The Commission then concluded that correlative rights were not being adequately protected under the 25-75 formula (Finding No. 13; Tr. 161), that correlative rights would be more adequately protected under the 60-40 formula (Finding No. 14; Tr. 162), and that the proration formula for the pool should be revised accordingly (Finding No. 17; Tr. 162).

This procedure would not have been objectionable if allowables had been compared with reserves expressed as the portion of the percentage of total pool reserves which could be recovered without waste, for then, but only then, would each formula have been tested as to its effectiveness to protect correlative rights.¹ But reserves were not

1. As shown under Point I of this brief, each owner's correlative rights are measured by the portion of the amount of recoverable gas under his tract which can be produced without waste, not merely by the amount of recoverable gas under his tract. Continental Oil Company v. Oil Conservation Commission, 70 N.M. 310, 373 P.2d 809 (1962); §65-3-29(h), N.M.S.A., 1953 Comp.

expressed in this manner, and only appear in terms of recoverable gas reserve under each tract (Findings 5, 6, 7 of Order No. R-2259-B; Tr. 161). It is clear, therefore, that the formulae were not tested for their effectiveness to protect correlative rights. It is also clear that the comparison made between allowables and reserves cannot support any finding concerning the effect of either formula on correlative rights.

Simply stated, the Commission could make no finding concerning the effect of either formula upon correlative rights because the Commission had failed to find what those rights were. As stated in Continental Oil Company v. Oil Conservation Commission, 70 N.M. 310, 319, 373 P.2d 809, 814 (1962):

"That the extent of the correlative rights must first be determined before the Commission can act to protect them is manifest."

The Commission failed to determine the extent of the correlative rights before attempting to devise a proration order to protect them. Since Findings 11, 13 and 14 are integral parts of the procedure followed by the Commission to devise a proration order, and since each of these findings proceeds upon the erroneous assumption that correlative rights have been determined, it follows that said findings are not supported by substantial evidence and are invalid.

It should be noted here that the record is devoid of any evidence that waste was occurring under the 25-75 formula or would be prevented more effectively by the 60-40 formula. The lack of evidence on this point seems to have been recognized by the Commission for in Finding 13 of its order, after purporting to find the 25-75 formula was not adequately protecting correlative rights, it states as a conclusion of law that waste will result unless the Commission acts to protect correlative rights.

We do not argue with this conclusion of law (See Continental Oil

P.2d 809, 818) but merely reiterate that its effectiveness is entirely dependent on the Commission first having validly determined the extent of each owner's correlative rights. Since the Commission has failed in this regard, the finding as to waste is ineffective.

Findings 11, 13 and 14 are subject to further attack as being unsupported by substantial evidence. As shown previously, the procedure followed by the Commission to determine the proration formula involved the computation of an allowable for each tract under each formula and the comparison of that allowable (expressed as a percentage of total pool allowable) with the recoverable reserves for each tract (expressed as a percentage of total pool reserves).

In making the computation of allowables, the Commission used the most current deliverability available for each well or tract. (Finding No. 9, Order No. R-2259-B; Tr. 161). The reserves to which the allowables were compared, however, were initial recoverable reserves (Finding Nos. 5 and 6, Order No. R-2259-B, Tr. 161), with the result that the comparison was meaningless, arbitrary and discriminatory.

An example will show that such a comparison was that of "apples to oranges." Tracts A and B have identical initial reserves and deliverabilities. Tract A is drilled and begins producing gas in the year 1958, but Tract B is not drilled until 1962 and had not begun to produce at the time of the Commission hearing. By 1962, Tract A had produced 15% of its reserves and its deliverability had declined 20%. The Commission, in making its calculation as to the effectiveness of each formula to provide allowables commensurate with reserves, uses current deliverabilities and computes an allowable for Tract A which, under both the

25-75 and 60-40 formulae, would be lower than the allowable for Tract B. Also, Tract A's percentage of total pool allowable will be lower than that for Tract B. So far in the procedure nothing is amiss since a lower percentage of allowable for Tract A is to be expected in view of the decline in its deliverability. These percentages of allowable are then compared, not to the current amount of remaining recoverable reserves (expressed as a percentage), but to the initial recoverable reserves for each tract (expressed as a percentage). For Tract B, the percentage of allowable under one formula is found to coincide with its percentage of reserves and under the other formula its percentage of allowable is slightly more or less than its percentage of reserves. For Tract A, however, the percentage of allowable will not compare favorably with its percentage of initial reserves under either formula, for the allowable has decreased while initial reserves are held as a constant. Furthermore, the apparent discrepancy is more flagrant under the 25-75 formula than the 60-40 formula since the former emphasizes the effect of a reduction in deliverability. The result is to make it appear that the 60-40 formula is more effective than the 25-75 formula to achieve a percentage of allowable commensurate with a tract's percentage of reserves.

Taking a more extreme example may illustrate the fallacy of the comparison of allowables computed from current deliverabilities to initial reserves. Assuming a well to have produced 90% of the recoverable reserves under a tract and assuming the well's deliverability also to have substantially declined, the effect of such a comparison necessarily would be that the allowable under either formula, and especially under the 25-75 formula, would be far below the proper level when compared to initial reserves, whereas if compared to remaining recoverable reserves the

comparison would be much more favorable.

The Commission's failure to use current reserves as well as current deliverabilities in its computations affects more than the weight of the evidence; it renders the entire computation meaningless and leaves Findings 11, 13 and 14 of Order R-2259-B without evidentiary support.

Findings 11, 13 and 14 are the heart of the Commission's order for it is in these findings that the procedure for testing the formulae is devised and the conclusions of such tests stated. Without these findings the order cannot stand. It having been shown that these findings are not based on substantial evidence, it follows that Order No. R-2259-B is invalid, and, accordingly, the decision of the trial court should be reversed.

CONCLUSION

It is respectfully submitted that the judgment of the trial court affirming Order R-2259-B of the Oil Conservation Commission was erroneous and should be reversed.

The Order was fatally defective in that the Commission wholly failed to determine the correlative rights of the tracts in the pool when it failed to meet the requirements of this court's decision in Continental Oil Company, et al., v. Oil Conservation Commission, supra, that it find what portion of each tract's proportion of the recoverable gas in the pool could be produced without waste. Having failed to determine the extent of the correlative rights in the pool, it had no valid standard by which to judge the effect of the 60-40 formula which it adopted. Further, it thus failed to make one of the "basic conclusions of fact" which this court found to be essential in its opinion in the Continental Oil Company case.

When the Commission used as its allocation standard the initial recoverable gas reserves underlying each tract, as set out in Column C, of Exhibit A, attached to the Order, it fell into further error. The statute requires that allowable be prorated "recognizing correlative rights" and that an Order afford each owner the right to produce on the basis of those rights, insofar as practicable. The adoption of the 60-40 formula on the basis that it more closely approximated the effect of using the initial reserves in Column C, gave no recognition to correlative rights, because the portion of those reserves which could be produced without waste was ignored.

Furthermore, even if Column C were accepted as measuring the correlative rights in the pool, as the Commission accepted it, the Order

is invalid because it did not adopt a formula based upon them, but instead, one which only gave approximately one-half of the wells in the pool the allowable to which those reserves would entitle them. In addition, by the Commission's own figures, the formula resulted in 33% more wells producing in excess of their just and equitable shares, and draining adjoining tracts, than under the existing 25-75 formula, with resulting waste and abuse of correlative rights.

In discarding the reserves in Column C as impracticable for use in allocating allowable, yet using them nonetheless as the sole basis for deciding between the two formulas under consideration, the Commission adopted inconsistent positions, which result in the order being inherently defective. The Commission cannot "have it both ways."

Finally, the further result of the failure of the Commission to find the portion of each tract's reserves which could be produced without waste, is that the critical findings on which the Order is based are not supported by substantial evidence, a situation which results in addition, from the error of the Commission in comparing initial reserves to current deliverabilities in testing the formulas under consideration.

That an order which so flaunts the express requirements of the statute and of this court in the Continental Oil Company case, and results in such patent abuses of correlative rights, could be valid and have been correctly affirmed by the trial court seems unlikely. The judgment of the trial court should be reversed.

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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW MEXICO

EL PASO NATURAL GAS COMPANY,
a corporation, PAN AMERICAN PETRO-
LEUM CORPORATION, a corporation,
MARATHON OIL COMPANY, a corpora-
tion, BETA DEVELOPMENT COMPANY,
and SUNSET INTERNATIONAL PETROLEUM
CORPORATION, a corporation,

Petitioners and Appellants,

v.

OIL CONSERVATION COMMISSION OF
NEW MEXICO, JACK M. CAMPBELL,
Chairman, E. S. WALKER, Member,
A. L. PORTER, JR., Member and
Secretary; CONSOLIDATED OIL & GAS,
INC., a corporation,

Respondents and Appellees.

No. 7727

Appeal From The District Court of
San Juan County

C. C. McCulloh, District Judge
Division I

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INDEX TO REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANTS

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES	<u>Page</u> ii
REPLY TO APPELLEES' OBJECTIONS TO STATEMENT OF THE FACTS	1
REPLY TO APPELLEES' ANSWER TO POINT I OF THE APPELLANTS	4
REPLY TO APPELLEES' ANSWER TO POINT II OF APPELLANTS	9
REPLY TO APPELLEES' ANSWER TO POINT III OF APPELLANTS	13
REPLY TO APPELLEES' POINT IV	15
CONCLUSION	18

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

New Mexico Cases

	<u>Page</u>
Continental Oil Company v. Oil Conservation Commission of New Mexico, et al. 70 N.M. 310, 373 P.2d 809 (1962)	4, 6, 7, 8, 9, 14, 15
Ferguson-Steere Motor Company v. State Corporation Commission, 63 N.M. 137, 314 P.2d 894 (1957)	16
Henderson v. Texas-New Mexico Pipeline Company, 46 N.M. 458, 461, 131 P.2d 269 (1942)	3
Hopkins v. Martinez, 73 N.M. 275, 387 P.2d 852 (1963)	2
Johnson v. Sanchez, 67 N.M. 41, 351 P.2d 449 (1960)	16
Ross v. State Racing Commission 64 N.M. 478, 330 P.2d 701	16
Stanton v. Bokum 66 N.M. 256, 259, 346 P.2d 1039 (1959) . . .	1
Wilson v. Employment Security Commission, 74 N.M. 3, 389 P.2d 855 (1963)	17

Statutes

§65-3-13(c), N.M.S.A., 1953	11
Rule 15(6) New Mexico Supreme Court Rules	13, 14

REPLY TO APPELLEES' OBJECTIONS TO
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS

The attack by Appellants on the Statement of the Facts in Appellants' Brief-in-Chief is without merit. Under the unusual circumstances of this case, only by the inclusion of the material which appears in the Statement of Facts was it possible to serve the purpose of the Statement of Facts described by this Court in Stanton v. Bokum, 66 N.M. 256, 259, 346 P.2d 1039 (1959), where the Court said:

"Counsel for the Appellant as well as many other attorneys apparently sometimes lose sight of the purpose of this statement which is to make known to the appellate court the trial court's appraisal of the facts and disposition of the issues and to aid the court in determining the questions at issue in the appeal. All pertinent facts should be included in this statement, not just the evidence most favorable to ones own client. If counsel fails to appraise the court of all the facts then we are compelled to search the record or to do without a complete or correct knowledge of the facts. We are loath to do either." (Emphasis supplied).

The case at bar is unusual in two respects insofar as preparation of a Statement of the Facts is concerned. First, the issues arise in an appeal from an order of an administrative agency, in this instance the Oil Conservation Commission. Under the decisions of this court, review of that decision by the District Court is limited to the record before the Oil Conservation Commission. In this case and in other such appeals with which the authors of this brief are familiar, the findings of fact of the trial court alone do not provide the information which is required to acquaint the court with the issues presented on the appeal and the facts bearing upon them. In such cases a narrative statement limited to the facts found by the District Court is insufficient to "appraise the court of all the facts."

In the case at bar, Appellants sought to present to the court, in an

objective fashion, the issues before the Commission and the disposition of them. Anything less than the Statement of the Facts included in Appellants' Brief-in-Chief would not have been adequate to serve the purpose. The basic obligation in such a situation was stated by this court in Hopkins v. Martinez, 73 N.M. 275, 387 P.2d 852 (1963), in these words:

"When the statement of facts is made in narrative form, however, it ~~must~~ neither be contrary to nor inconsistent with facts found by the court. "

The facts stated by Appellants in their Brief-in-Chief were consistent with, and in no respect contrary to, the facts found by the court. It is not asserted in Appellees' Objection To The Statement of Facts that any fact stated by Appellants was "contrary to or inconsistent with facts found by the court." Only in the reference to the testimony of Consolidated as to the 30% tolerance at page 4 of the Answer Brief is there any disagreement as to the construction placed upon the testimony by Appellees. In that instance the objection is strictly a matter of semantics.

The Statement of the Facts in this case was unique in another respect. This is as it relates to the requirement that the statement be a narrative of what the trial court found. In this case the trial court itself found nothing as to the crucial questions in the case. The Decision of the trial court appears at Tr. 123 et seq. Findings of Fact of the court numbered 1 to 8, inclusive, are findings as to the procedure by which the case was initiated and heard by the Commission and the proceedings before the Commission. Appellants' Statement of the Facts is a narrative statement of the findings of the court as to these proceedings. Finding No. 10 which deals with the basic issues in the case contains 15 sub-paragraphs dealing with Findings No. 1 to 18 of the Commission. It

makes no finding of fact of the court itself on these issues. It merely finds that "Order No. R-2259-B contained 18 findings to substantiate the adoption of the new formula," and then proceeds to find what the Commission determined by its findings 1 to 18, inclusive, in Order No. R-2259-B.

It is respectfully submitted that taken alone, findings of the trial court in this case provide no adequate means for making "known to the Appellate Court the trial court's appraisal of the facts and disposition of the issues." For the foregoing reasons it is believed that this case is included in the exception recognized by this court in Henderson v. Texas-New Mexico Pipeline Company, 46 N. M. 458, 461, 131 P.2d 269 (1942) under which testimony, not contrary to, nor inconsistent with, the facts found by the court, may properly be reviewed.

Appellants further submit that an explanation of Exhibit "A", attached to Order R-2259-B, was indispensable "to aid the court in determining the questions at issue in the appeal," that the explanation was appropriately included in the Statement of the Facts by Appellants and that Appellees' attack thereon is groundless.

In numbered paragraph 2 on page 3 of the Answer Brief, Appellees challenged the statement that Column J sets out an A/R factor determined on the basis of the allowable for the month of December, 1962. Yet the Commission itself in finding 14 of the Order said:

"that, based upon the December, 1962, pool allowable
a comparison of the number of non-marginal wells
producing with a tract A/R factor, etc." (Emphasis
supplied)

It is apparent that Appellees challenged this statement solely in order to provide an opportunity to argue that the A/R factor would be constant for all months until the deliverability of an individual well, or the acreage

dedicated to the well, was found by the Commission to have changed. The argument is clearly fallacious. Each time that a new well is completed, its deliverability determined and the well placed on the proration schedule, a change in the A/R factor of all wells in the pool necessarily will occur as a result of the reallocation of allowable among the wells in the pool on a basis which Appellees admit has no direct correlation with reserves.

REPLY TO APPELLEES' ANSWER
TO POINT I OF APPELLANTS

The principal thrust of this appeal insofar as Appellants are concerned is directed to the failure of the Commission to make the fourth finding of fact which this court said in Continental Oil Company v. Oil Conservation Commission, 70 N.M. 310, 373 P.2d 809 (1962), was jurisdictional and hence, essential to the validity of an order changing a gas proration formula.

The arguments and ingenious analyses of Order R-2259-B which are included in Appellees' Answer Brief, do not change the fact that the Commission wholly failed to consider this fourth and final requirement of the Continental Oil Company case and wholly failed to determine "what portion of the proportion so arrived at could be recovered without waste. In all probability the reason that the omission occurred was that Appellees had presented no evidence on the question and, hence, the Commission could not make a finding on the subject which would be supported by evidence of any character.

As this court so clearly pointed out in the Continental Oil Company Opinion, "if the Commission had determined, from a practical standpoint, that each owner had a certain amount of gas; and that a determined amount

of gas could be produced and obtained without waste; then the Commission would have complied with the mandate of the statute. . . ." But it did not do so.

The determinations which the Commission did make as to (1), the amount of recoverable gas under each producer's tract; (2), the total amount of recoverable gas in the pool; and (3), the proportion that (1) bears to (2), are of no consequence whatever until the Commission determines what portion of the arrived at proportion can be recovered without waste. It is that "portion of the arrived at proportion which can be recovered without waste" that measures the correlative rights of each owner in the pool, and, hence, measures the extent to which protection of his correlative rights entitles him to participate in the allowable allocated by the Commission. By the same token a determination that one proration formula protects the correlative rights of the owners in a pool better than another can only be made on the basis of a comparison of the result of the use of each formula upon the recovery of the "portion of the arrived at proportion" so determined which can be produced without waste.

Because operators have no right under the law to commit waste in the production of the reserves under their properties, no valid proration formula can be selected on the basis that it is better correlated to reserves, irrespective of waste. Yet, that is exactly what the Commission did when it selected the 60-40 formula on the basis that it was better correlated to the tract reserves in Column C of Exhibit A, when no consideration was given to whether they could be produced without waste.

Even if the Commission had made the fourth required finding, if

it had then selected a formula on the basis of its effect on the reserves in Column C, rather than on the reserves which could be produced without waste, an invalid order clearly would have resulted. In the case at bar, both violations occurred, the one as the inevitable result of the other. No finding as to the portion which could be produced without waste was made, so necessarily the new formula was selected on the basis of this effect upon all reserves, and not just the portion which could be produced without waste. The resulting order is doubly invalid under both the statute and the Continental Oil Company decision.

Appellees have tried several means of evading this result. At the top of page 10 of their Answer Brief they say "the fourth finding, simply stated, arises out of findings No. 11 and 14 of Order No. R-2259-B and is specifically itemized for each tract in Column J of Exhibit A. . . ." The concept that a finding which is expressly required as a prerequisite for the validity of an order can be found to "arise out of" the order when not contained therein is unique. Again, at the top of page 11 Appellees assert:

"Stated even more exactly, the A/R factor for each tract is a mathematical definition of 'what portion of the arrived proportion can be recovered . . . ' from that tract under that allocation formula. Thus, Column J of Exhibit A which sets forth the A/R factor for each well under the 60-40 allocation formula is a precise and complete fulfillment by the Commission of the above quoted portion of the Fourth Finding listed in the Continental case."

It is obvious that the deficiency in Order R-2259-B cannot be cured by such an analysis. Column J sets forth the A/R factor from the wells under the 60-40 formula. Under the 75-25 formula the different A/R factors shown in Column G result. But the "portion of the arrived at proportion which can be produced without waste" measures the correlative rights of the owners in the pool. Therefore, if Appellees are correct in their position, correlative rights change with each formula

and would be determined by the formula adopted. The fact is that the rights are fixed and the formula is to be adopted on the basis of its effect on those rights. The statute provides that the formula adopted shall protect those rights as fully as practicable, not that it shall change them.

It is the function of the four jurisdictional findings to provide the measure of the correlative rights of the operators. Those rights do not vary with the proration formula adopted. Column J, therefore, does not and cannot provide the required fourth finding of the Continental Oil Company case, which the Commission failed to make.

Appellants devote a large portion of their argument to establishing that the Commission considered waste in issuing Order R-2259-B. Appellants at no time asserted that the Commission did not give consideration to waste in the promulgation of this Order. Appellants did assert, and do assert, that the Commission failed to determine the correlative rights of the parties when they failed to determine "the portion of the arrived at proportion" of the reserves that could be produced without waste. Consideration given by the Commission to the waste that may or may not be inherent in any particular proration formula is not the equivalent of determining the correlative rights of the owners and the Order remains fatally defective.

Appellees themselves apparently entertain some doubt as to their ability to convince this Court that the fourth finding is to be found in Order R-2259-B. Having devoted eight pages of their brief an effort to show that the required finding was made by the Commission, they then assert in Part B of their Answer To Point I that the finding is not necessary anyhow because neither the statute nor the Continental case in fact require it.

This argument does not seem to merit a detailed answer. The statutory language clearly contemplates such a determination and this court has unequivocally held in the Continental Oil Company v. Oil Conservation Commission that it is the law of New Mexico that this finding is jurisdictional. Any argument that the finding should not be necessary should be addressed to the legislature unless Appellees seek to have this court retract its opinion in the Continental Oil Company case. The latter would seem unlikely in the light of the record in this case and the statements in Appellees' briefs.

At page 20 of the Answer Brief, Appellees complain that Appellants have failed to define their contention as to what procedure the Commission should have followed in making the fourth finding, and speculate that Appellants contend for some "ritualistic sequence" in order to make a valid order. It was the obligation of Appellees, seeking to change the proration formula in the Basin-Dakota Pool, to present evidence to the Commission meeting the requirements of the decision of this court in the Continental Oil Company case. Thereafter, if the Commission concluded that the proration formula should be changed it was required by the Continental Oil Company decision to make the four findings set out in that case in order to establish the correlative rights of the parties and, hence, demonstrate the validity of the proposed new order. It is obvious that Appellees had competent, expert engineering and geological testimony available at the hearing. No doubt it was their failure to interrogate their witnesses on this aspect of the correlative rights of the owners that resulted in the failure of the Commission to make the required finding. In no event, however, can any such failure be laid at the door of Appellants, neither are Appellants obliged to instruct Appellees in the appropriate

methods of meeting the requirements of the New Mexico law for determination of correlative rights as implied by the statements in Appellees' Brief.

At page 23 of their Brief Appellees assert that to meet the requirement of the Continental Oil Company's Opinion as to the fourth finding "is not only impracticable but is an insoluble anomaly." There is no evidence to that effect in the record by witnesses qualified to testify to such a conclusion. It is respectfully suggested that such an assertion could only be made appropriately in a case where evidence to that effect had been presented by qualified witnesses as to a particular pool. In no event can such an assertion be entertained for the first time on appeal in ex parte statements of Counsel.

In concluding their reply to Appellees' Answer to Point No. I, Appellants submit that it has been shown in their Brief-in-Chief and in this Reply Brief that the failure to determine that portion of the recoverable reserves under each tract which can be produced without waste is far more than a technical omission. It is a failure to find the extent of each owners' correlative rights, a determination which must be made before the Commission can act to protect them. It also is a failure to comply with the mandate of the Supreme Court in the Continental Oil Company case. These failures are fatal to the validity of Order R-2259-B and the trial court erred in so holding.

REPLY TO APPELLEES' ANSWER TO
POINT II OF APPELLANTS

The A portion of Appellees' Answer to Point II of Appellants is devoted to a straw-man issue erected by Appellees and wholly fails to meet

or answer Appellants' proposition that the affirmative findings of Order R-2259-B demonstrate that the Order is unlawful and unreasonable. Nowhere in their brief did Appellants oppose or criticize the making of reserve determinations. Neither did they assert that to do so is "impracticable," "foolish" or "useless." In so implying at page 26 of the Answer Brief, Appellees erect a straw man which they then demolish with great skill and effectiveness. It is difficult to understand, however, the relevance of a discussion of the desirability of the making of reserve studies when no contention to the contrary has been made by Appellants.

Appellants did contend in their Point II, and here reassert, that Appellees placed the Commission on the horns of a dilemma. They induced the Commission to find (Finding No. 8):

"That it is impracticable to allocate production solely on the basis of the percentage of pool reserves due to the continuous fluctuation in reserve computations resulting from new completions in the pool and re-evaluation of reserves of existing wells." (Emphasis supplied)

At the same time they induced it to accept the 60-40 formula on the basis that it resulted in allowables more closely correlated to the same unreliable, fluctuating tract reserves as they were computed at the time of the hearing.

In selecting the 60-40 formula because of its alleged closer correlation to reserves as then computed, the Commission "cemented in" these reserve computations as the measure of the correlative rights of tracts in the pool for as long as the 60-40 formula remains in use. Yet its use of those reserve figures in this manner is subject to the identical vices which the Commission, in its finding No. 8, found prevented the use of reserve figures as the measure of the right of the operators to receive allocations of allowable.

If, as the Commission found, the 60-40 formula was preferable

because it came closer to giving each owner the allowable to which he was entitled on the basis of the tract reserves in Column C of Exhibit A, then allocation on the basis of those reserves was more preferable because it would have given each tract the exact allowable to which it was entitled on that basis. True, to have done so would have "cemented in" those reserve calculations until the formula was changed, but that is exactly what the Commission did in Order R-2259-B, as pointed out above.

The impracticality of using tract reserve figures because of fluctuation in computations exists to the same extent in either use of Column C, yet the Commission selected the use (the 60-40 formula) which gave only approximately half of the wells in the pool the allowable to which they are entitled when the other use would have given 100% of the wells the correct allowable. The statute requires that in allocating allowable correlative rights shall be protected insofar as practicable. The Commission, by its own findings in Order R-2259-B, established that it has not done so. Such an order does not meet the requirements of the statute and should have been vacated by the trial court on the basis of the findings in the order itself.

There is no question but that Section 65-3-13 (c) N.M.S.A., 1953 permits the Commission, in protecting correlative rights, to give equitable consideration to "acreage, pressure, open flow, porosity, permeability, deliverability, quality of the gas and other pertinent factors." This permission, however, is not in derogation of the obligation and duty of the Commission to "afford to the owner of each property in the pool the opportunity to produce his just and equitable share of the oil or gas, or both, in the pool," so far as it is practicable to do so. (Section 65-3-14 N.M.S.A., 1953) Thus these factors can only be used to the extent that

they protect correlative rights so far as practicable. They cannot be used, as the Commission here used them, to do injury to the correlative rights of approximately half of the wells in the pool.

The answer to proposition C included in Appellees' Answer To Point II of Appellants (Answer Brief page 30) is obvious. In the first place, the fact that more wells will receive in excess of their correlative rights under the 60-40 formula, than would be the case under the 75-25 formula, with the resulting drainage and abuse of correlative rights, is not an erroneous conclusion and does not proceed from false premises. It is an arithmetic fact that is established by the Order itself. Appellees suggest that Appellants' argument proceeds on a false premise in that it considers the number of wells which receive more or less than their share of the allowable rather than the quantities of gas involved. This is not the case. Finding 11 of the Commission which accepts the comparison of the tract A/R factors obtained through use of the two formulas as the basis for deciding between them, expressly does so on the basis of the statement in the finding that the Commission's objective is "to select the allocation formula which will allow the maximum number of wells in the pool to produce with an ideal tract A/R factor of one," not the maximum amount of gas.

By way of summary, it is again pointed out that Appellees have not, and cannot, escape the fact that under the 60-40 formula promulgated by the Order under review, 347 out of 699 wells, by the Commission's own figures, are suffering a serious abuse of correlative rights when tested by the Commission's own standards which accept the range between .7 and 1.3 as the acceptable protection of correlative rights. Neither can Appellees escape the fact that, under the 60-40 formula, 371 of 699 wells in the pool will receive more than their just and equitable share of the pool

allowable, with resulting drainage of adjoining tracts, as against 277 under the 75-25 formula. Furthermore, as pointed out in Appellant's Brief-in-Chief, if consideration is given only to those wells which exceed the 1.3 upper limit of tolerance, under the 60-40 formula 200 wells will receive in excess of the maximum amount to which they are entitled, whereas, under the 75-25 formula, only 173 wells fall in this category.

Appellants reassert that the contents of Order R-2259-B itself demonstrate that it is arbitrary, unreasonable and unlawful.

REPLY TO APPELLEES' ANSWER TO
POINT III OF APPELLANTS

Subdivision A of Appellees' Answer to this point is devoted entirely to urging that Appellants failed to comply with Rule 15 (6) of the Supreme Court Rules which provides in part:

"***A contention that a ** finding of fact is not supported by substantial evidence will not ordinarily be entertained, unless the party so contending shall have stated in his brief the substance of all evidence bearing upon the proposition, with proper references to the transcript."

Appellants are aware of the requirements of this Rule but they have no application in the case at bar.

Appellants' attack on the validity of Order R-2259-B, under its Point III, was based on the proposition that there was no evidence before the Commission as to the portion of the tract reserves tabulated in Column C of Exhibit "A" which could be produced without waste. Lacking evidence of any kind as to what "portion of the arrived at proportion" could be produced without waste and, hence, lacking proof as to the correlative rights of the parties, Appellants asserted, and here re-assert, that all findings in the order which purported to determine the effect of

the 60-40 and 75-25 proration formulas on the correlative rights of the parties lacked support of substantial evidence. There being no evidence as well as no finding on that subject, all findings purporting to deal with the correlative rights of the owners, or the effect of proration formulas upon them, likewise are not supported by substantial evidence.

In answer to Appellees' contention that there was no summary of evidence bearing upon the proposition, Appellants state that there was no evidence presented to the Commission bearing upon the "portion of the arrived at proportion" of the gas in the pool which could be produced without waste, and, hence, there was no evidence which Appellants were required to summarize under Rule 15 (6).

Appellees, in their Answer to Point I, set out in great detail certain portions of the Order which they urged constituted required Finding No. 4. No doubt they will assert that the evidence on which Column J was based bore upon the proposition and should have been summarized. For the reasons pointed out in this reply brief Appellees do not acquiesce in the statement that any of that evidence was intended to or did bear upon the "portion of the arrived at proportion" which could be produced without waste and therefore assert that Appellants were under no obligation to summarize this, or any other of the evidence before the Commission.

Undoubtedly, it was this same failure to introduce evidence upon which the required fourth finding might have been based that resulted in the failure of the Commission to meet the requirements of the Continental Oil Company case that the Commission find ". . . that each owner had a certain amount of gas; and that a determined amount of gas could be produced and obtained without waste; . . ." (Emphasis supplied)

If Appellants are correct in their position that the Commission

wholly failed to make required finding No. 4, the question of whether or not there was evidence in the record which would have supported such a finding is of secondary importance. It is submitted, however, that the language of this court in the Continental Oil Company case at 70 N. M. 326 is equally applicable to the case at bar:

"Ordinarily, the result would be to remand the case for another hearing before the trial court with the Commission as an adverse party and the court merely considering whether the action of the Commission was fraudulent, arbitrary or capricious, whether the order was supported by substantial evidence, and whether the action of the administrative body was within the scope of its authority. However, in this particular instance, we can conceive of no benefit which would result in such action, because there can be only one final conclusion based on the record before the Commission, and that is that the order of the Commission is void."
(Emphasis added)

REPLY TO APPELLEES' POINT IV

Appellees' Point IV is not in answer to any of Appellants' points relied on for reversal, as such. It asserts that all attacks made by Appellants in its Brief-in-Chief are upon the findings of the Commission in this case when they should have been on the findings of the trial court. From that premise Appellees reason that the trial court's findings have not been attacked and are conclusive on appeal.

The general proposition that the trial court's findings are conclusive on appeal unless attacked is too well established to require comment. The application of that rule in that case at bar, however, can provide no solace for Appellees.

Examination of the findings made by the trial court in its Decision (Tr. 123) discloses that these findings consist entirely of a recitation of the proceedings before the Commission (Findings 1 to 9 inclusive) followed by a "Mother Hubbard finding" (Finding No. 10, Tr. 126) which

finds no facts whatever bearing upon the issues in this case. Instead, it enumerates the findings of the Commission and in each instance the court merely recites what the Commission determined by its findings. There is no issue here as to what the Commission found. The issue is as to the validity of its findings.

Such unorthodox findings of fact in an appeal from a decision of an administrative agency are highly unusual and of questionable validity. Whether or not valid, however, it must be conceded that it would have been absolutely impossible for Appellants to attack on appeal any portion of the court's finding No. 10 because the Commission in fact did determine by its findings the various matters which are there recited. However, that did not make the determinations valid. The issue on appeal was not whether the Commission determined those things by its order, but whether or not those findings of the Commission were supported by substantial evidence. That question is one of law and not of fact.

It was when the trial court concluded as a matter of law in its Conclusion No. 5 that "the findings contained in Oil Conservation Commission Order R-2259-B are based upon, and supported by, substantial evidence," that it made the crucial determination so far as the Commission's order was concerned. That determination was a judicial conclusion on a question of law. Johnson v. Sanchez, 67 N.M. 41, 351 P.2d 449 (1960); Ferguson-Steere Motor Company v. State Corporation Commission, 63 N.M. 137, 314 P.2d 894 (1957); Ross v. State Racing Commission, 64 N.M. 478, 330 P.2d 701 (1958). As such it was subject to review in this court irrespective of whether an attack was made upon the findings of fact which accompanied it.

The determination of whether or not there was substantial evidence

before the Commission to support the findings of the Commission being a question of law, it was subject to review by the trial court. A decision on that question required the trial court to determine, as it did, whether the Commission's findings were supported by substantial evidence. A review of the correctness of that decision by this Court required this Court to consider whether there was substantial evidence before the Commission and, hence, required Appellants to support the negative of that issue as it has done.

As above pointed out, to have attacked the "Mother Hubbard findings" of the trial court in this case would have been the ultimate in futility in view of the fact that the only issue which they raise was whether the Commission in fact made the determinations stated, and nothing more.

In Wilson v. Employment Security Commission, 74 N. M. 3, 389 P.2d 855 (1963), this court was considering the function of the trial court on review of an order of an administrative agency where the Commission's findings of fact were attacked. Its decision in that case conclusively demonstrates the error in Appellees' Point IV. At page 858 of the Pacific report this court said:

"In so determining, the reviewing court must determine whether the commission's findings of fact are supported by substantial evidence. The trial court shall adopt as its own such of the commission's findings of fact as it determines to be supported by substantial evidence and shall make such conclusions of law and decision as lawfully follow therefrom. If the district court determines that the legal evidence before the commission fails to substantially support such findings or decision, then the district court shall make its own findings of fact, conclusions of law and decision based only upon the legal evidence before the commission."

Two conclusions are indicated by foregoing statement of this Court. The first is that the trial court in the case at bar did not perform the function required of it in entering judgment in this review proceeding.

It failed to "adopt as its own such of the Commission's findings of fact as it determines to be supported by substantial evidence. . ." Had it done so, an attack on the trial court's findings would have been proper. Because it did not do so and merely found that the Commission had determined "thus and so" by its Order, any attack on Findings had to be on the findings of the Commission.

Irrespective of the foregoing considerations, however, the conclusion of the trial court that the findings of the Commission were supported by substantial evidence was the decision of a question of law. As such, it was subject to review in this Court whether or not the trial court's findings of fact were directly attacked also. Appellees' Point IV is without merit.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated in Appellants' Brief-in-Chief and in this Reply Brief, the judgment of the trial court was in error and should be reversed.

Respectfully submitted,

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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW MEXICO

EL PASO NATURAL GAS COMPANY,
a corporation, PAN AMERICAN
PETROLEUM CORPORATION, a
corporation, MARATHON OIL
COMPANY, a corporation,
BETA DEVELOPMENT COMPANY, and
SUNSET INTERNATIONAL PETROLEUM
CORPORATION, a corporation,

Petitioners and Appellants,

vs.

NO. _____

7727

OIL CONSERVATION COMMISSION OF
NEW MEXICO, JACK M. CAMPBELL,
Chairman, E. S. WALKER, Member,
A. L. PORTER, JR., Member and
Secretary; CONSOLIDATED OIL &
GAS, INC., a corporation,

Respondents and Appellees.

APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF

SAN JUAN COUNTY

C. C. McCulloh, District Judge

Division I

TRANSCRIPT OF RECORD

SUPREME COURT OF NEW MEXICO

FILED

SEP 29 1934

Luella C. Green
CLERK

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW MEXICO

EL PASO NATURAL GAS COMPANY,
a corporation, PAN AMERICAN
PETROLEUM CORPORATION, a
corporation, MARATHON OIL
COMPANY, a corporation,
BETA DEVELOPMENT COMPANY, and
SUNSET INTERNATIONAL PETROLEUM
CORPORATION, a corporation,

Petitioners and Appellants,

vs.

NO. _____

OIL CONSERVATION COMMISSION OF
NEW MEXICO, JACK M. CAMPBELL,
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A. L. PORTER, JR., Member and
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GAS, INC., a corporation,

Respondents and Appellees.

APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF
SAN JUAN COUNTY

C. C. McCulloch, District Judge

Division I

TRANSCRIPT OF RECORD

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Santa Fe, New Mexico

For Pan American Petroleum Corporation and Marathon Oil
Company

Atwood and Malone
Roswell, New Mexico

For Beta Development Company

Verity, Burr, Cooley & Jones
Farmington, New Mexico

For Respondents:

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For Humble Oil and Refining Company

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For Intervenor:

Sunray DX Oil Company and Texaco, Inc.

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Santa Fe, New Mexico

I N D E X

	Page No.
Petition for Review	1
Motion to Issue Notice	41
Notice of Appeal	43
Motion	45
Answer of Tidewater Oil Company	47
Acceptance of Service	52
Acceptance of Service	53
Affidavit of Service	54
Affidavit of Service	55
Affidavit of Service	56
Affidavit of Service	58
Affidavit of Service	59
Acceptance of Service	60
Certificate of Service	61
Letter from John Quinn, U. S. Attorney	62
Affidavit of Service	63
Answer to Petition for Review	65
Entry of Appearance	69
Answer to Petition for Review	70
Petition to Intervene	72
Order Granting Leave to Intervene as Respondent . .	76
Petition to Intervene	77
Response to Petition for Review	79
Order Granting Leave to Intervene as Respondent . .	81
Response to Petition for Review	82
Response to Petition for Review	85
Certificate of Mailing	87
Motion	89
Petition to Intervene	90
Order	92
Motion	94

Order	95
Letter from John Quinn, U. S. Attorney	96
Acceptance of Service	97
Petitioners Requested Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law	98
Requested Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law of Respondents Oil Conservation Commission, Texaco, Inc., and Sunray DX Oil Company	105
Requested Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law of Respondent Consolidated Oil & Gas, Inc.	114
Decision of the Court	123
Judgment	131
Notice of Appeal	132
Notice	134
Praecipe	136
Certificate	138
Stipulation	139
Order	142
Order	144
Order	145
Waiver of Notice	146
Waiver of Notice	147
Waiver of Notice	147A
Waiver of Notice	147B
Order Settling Bill of Exceptions	147C
Clerk's Certificate	147D
Clerk's Certificate of Cost	147E
Index to Court Reporter's Transcript of Testimony	148

DISTRICT COURT
SAN JUAN COUNTY, N. M.
FILED AUG 20 1963
Virginia A. Kittell
CLERK

STATE OF NEW MEXICO COUNTY OF SAN JUAN IN THE DISTRICT COURT

EL PASO NATURAL GAS COMPANY,
a corporation, PAN AMERICAN
PETROLEUM CORPORATION, a
corporation, MARATHON OIL
COMPANY, a corporation,
SOUTHWEST PRODUCTION COMPANY,
a partnership, and SUNSET
INTERNATIONAL PETROLEUM
CORPORATION, a corporation,

Petitioners,

-vs-

No. 11685

OIL CONSERVATION COMMISSION
OF NEW MEXICO, JACK M. CAMPBELL,
Chairman, E. S. WALKER, Member,
A. L. PORTER, JR., Member and
Secretary; CONSOLIDATED OIL &
GAS, INC., a corporation,

Respondents.

PETITION FOR REVIEW

Come now El Paso Natural Gas Company, Pan American
Petroleum Corporation, Marathon Oil Company, Southwest
Production Company and Sunset International Petroleum
Corporation, by their attorneys, and state:

1. Petitioners El Paso Natural Gas Company, Pan American
Petroleum Corporation and Sunset International Petroleum
Corporation are corporations organized under the laws of the
State of Delaware and authorized to do business in the state
of New Mexico; petitioner Marathon Oil Company is a corporation
organized under the laws of the State of Ohio and authorized
to do business in the State of New Mexico; petitioner Southwest
Production Company is a partnership consisting of Joseph P.
Driscoll and John H. Hill, doing business as a partnership in the
State of New Mexico.

2. Respondent Oil Conservation Commission of New Mexico
is a duly organized agency of the State of New Mexico, whose
members are Jack M. Campbell, Chairman, E. S. Walker, and A. L.

Porter, Jr., Secretary; respondent Consolidated Oil & Gas, Inc. is a corporation organized under the laws of the State of Colorado and authorized to do business in the State of New Mexico.

3. On April 18 through April 21, 1962, respondent Oil Conservation Commission of New Mexico considered at hearing the application of respondent Consolidated Oil & Gas, Inc. to change the proration formula for the Basin-Dakota Gas Pool located in San Juan, Rio Arriba and Sandoval Counties, New Mexico, from a formula based twenty-five percent upon acreage and seventy-five percent upon acreage multiplied by deliverability to a formula based sixty percent upon acreage and forty percent upon acreage multiplied by deliverability. By its Order No. R-2259, dated June 7, 1962, the Commission denied the application. Consolidated Oil & Gas, Inc. then applied for rehearing which was granted by Commission Order No. R-2259-A, dated July 7, 1962. On July 9, 1963, following rehearing, respondent Oil Conservation Commission of New Mexico, acting by its members, respondents herein, entered its Order No. R-2259-B changing the proration formula for the Basin-Dakota Gas Pool in accordance with the application of respondent Consolidated Oil & Gas, Inc. On July 26, 1963, petitioner El Paso Natural Gas Company filed with the Commission its Application for Rehearing setting forth the respect in which such Order was believed to be erroneous, which Application for Rehearing was denied by the Commission in its Order No. R-2259-C dated August 1, 1963. On July 29, 1963, petitioners Pan American Petroleum Corporation, Marathon Oil Company, Southwest Production Company and Sunset International Petroleum Corporation filed with the Commission their Applications for Rehearing setting forth the respect in which Order No. R-2259-B was believed to be erroneous, which Applications for Rehearing also were denied

by the Commission in its Order No. R-2259-C, dated August 1, 1963. Copies of said Orders Nos. R-2259-B and R-2259-C are attached hereto as Exhibits "A" and "B" respectively and are incorporated herein by reference. Copies of the Applications for Rehearing filed with the Commission by El Paso Natural Gas Company, Pan American Petroleum Corporation, Marathon Oil Company, Southwest Production Company and Sunset International Petroleum Corporation are attached hereto as Exhibits "C", "D", "E", "F" and "G" respectively and are incorporated herein by reference.

4. Petitioners, having filed their Applications for Rehearing, as stated above, are dissatisfied with the Commission's disposition of said applications and hereby appeal therefrom.

5. Petitioners each own property in San Juan County, New Mexico, which is affected by said Orders Nos. R-2259-B and R-2259-C.

6. Petitioners complain of said Order No. R-2259-B, attached hereto as Exhibit "A" and incorporated herein by reference, and as grounds for asserting the invalidity of said Order petitioners adopt the grounds set forth in their respective Applications for Rehearing, attached hereto and incorporated herein by reference, and state:

a. Finding 6 of said Order No. R-2259-B, which Finding is to the effect that the initial recoverable gas reserves underlying each nonmarginal tract are the reserves shown in Column C of Exhibit "A" attached to said Order, is erroneous for the following reasons:

(1) The evidence in the record does not support such Finding and the Commission's determinations of individual tract figures are apparently obtained from calculations made on rehearing by Consolidated Oil & Gas, Inc. which were based upon data as to average reserves obtained at the time of the original

Hearing by Consolidated Oil & Gas, Inc. from estimates in the files of El Paso Natural Gas Company, which data is shown by the undisputed evidence to have been revised and replaced by different data as more information became available from drilling of additional wells, resulting in changing the estimates of average reserves. The parameters used in making estimates for entire townships were often based upon core data obtained from one well which data was shown by core data obtained from subsequent wells not to be representative of the entire area.

(2) The conclusions offered by Consolidated Oil & Gas, Inc., which have been adopted as Findings by the Commission, were based upon estimates made by El Paso Natural Gas Company as a portion of a continuing reserve study of reserves underlying the entire Basin, which studies, as testified by the witness, David H. Rainey, are the best available for determining total pool reserves and for establishing the general relationship between well reserves and well deliverabilities for the pool but are not designed for or accurate to determine the reserves underlying any particular tract.

(3) The determinations of fact are based solely upon the conclusions of Consolidated Oil & Gas, Inc.; are not supported by evidence in the record and such determinations are erroneously used by the Commission by reaching the further conclusions contained in Findings Nos. 7 and No. 10, thus basing one set of conclusions upon another set of conclusions without direct support in the record.

b. Since the initial recoverable gas reserves for each individual tract are in error, the percentages of pool reserves attributable to each nonmarginal tract and the tract acreage factors listed in said Exhibit "A" are also in error; accordingly, said Order No. R-2259-B fails to afford to the owner of each property in the pool the opportunity to produce his just and equitable share of the gas in the pool, insofar as this can be

done without waste, and for such purpose to use his just and equitable share of the reservoir energy, and is therefore violative of correlative rights.

c. Findings Nos. 10, 12 and 13 of the Commission's Order are not supported by the evidence for the reason that the deliverabilities shown in Column B of Exhibit "A" of the Commission's Order are the most recent deliverabilities while the reserves shown in Column C of said Exhibit "A" are estimates of initial reserves and a comparison of the relationship between reserves and deliverability is discriminatory when the ratio of initial reserves to current deliverability of one tract which has produced over a period of several years is compared with the ratio of initial reserves to initial deliverability of another tract. Since the Commission has obviously used initial reserves in comparison with current deliverabilities in making its Findings Nos. 10, 12 and 13, such Findings are clearly erroneous and are in conflict with undisputed evidence that such comparison is discriminatory.

d. The Commission's Order, which the statute requires be predicated upon the prevention of waste, is not based upon any evidence in the record that waste is occurring under the present 25-75 formula or that waste will be prevented by the 60-40 formula proposed by Consolidated and adopted by the Commission. The Commission's effort to predate its Order upon waste in Finding No. 13 proceeds upon the erroneous theory, unsupported by evidence, that waste is being caused wherever a violation of correlative rights is found to exist. Finding No. 14 that waste will be prevented by the 60-40 formula is unsupported by any evidence in the record.

e. The Commission in its Order has failed to make a finding which under the law must be made in order to change an existing proration order, to-wit: the portion of each tract's proportion of the total pool reserves which can be recovered

without waste. The record contains no evidence upon which such finding can be made.

f. The record does not contain evidence upon which the findings required by the statute to be made before changing the existing proration order can be based, and the rights acquired by the owners of tracts who have developed their properties under an existing order have been prejudiced by changing the basis of allocation without evidence to support such changes. Specifically, there is no evidence to support the Commission's finding as to the reserves underlying each individual tract; there is no evidence to support a finding, and none was made, as to the portion of each tract's proportion or the total pool reserves which can be recovered without waste; there is no evidence to support the Commission's finding that the protection of correlative rights is a necessary adjunct to the prevention of waste and that waste will result unless the Commission acts to protect correlative rights; and there is no evidence in the record that waste is occurring or will occur under the existing allocation formula.

g. That Order No. R-2259-B was improperly entered by the Commission contrary to the rules of the Commission and the law of the State of New Mexico.

h. That Order No. R-2259-B determines in Finding No. 10 that there is no direct correlation between acreage and reserves and yet such Order, irrespective of such finding, bases the proration formula sixty percent upon acreage. That this manifestly demonstrated the invalidity of such Order. That Finding No. 11 specifically determines that the formula in the Order is merely a makeshift so that the average tract in the pool will receive an allowable relatively close to that to which it is entitled and thereby manifestly demonstrates that the Order is invalid as to all tracts which do not happen to fit the average norm of the pool. That it is improper for the

proper factor and that a statement that the application of such improper factor will do justice in the average instance, does not lend validity to the Order based on such admitted improper factors.

i. That Order No. R-2259-B was entered by the Commission without proper findings as required by law and that such Order is not supported by evidence required to give the Commission power and authority to enter and promulgate such Order.

j. That Order No. R-2259-B was entered by the Commission changing a previous proration order for the Basin-Dakota Pool without any showing that there was any change of condition between the entry of Order No. R-1670-C and the entry of said Order No. R-2259-B, or any showing that would justify the Commission in changing a proration order previously entered by the Commission after application and hearing. That it is improper for the Commission to promulgate a proration order after due and proper notice to all parties and hearing upon the merits and then later set such order aside without any showing of change of condition or any other grounds to justify the Commission in changing an order previously entered.

k. That this Commission improperly conducted the rehearing upon which Order No. R-2259-B was founded, in that it admitted improper evidence and testimony over the objection of petitioners, all of which renders said Order invalid.

l. That Order No. R-2259-B promulgates a proration order which will result in waste being committed and which does not protect the correlative rights of all producers in the Pool but to the contrary, destroys correlative rights and interferes with and destroys the correlative rights of petitioners.

7. Petitioners further complain of said Order No. R-2259-C,

attached hereto as Exhibit "B" and incorporated by reference, which Order denies their Applications for Rehearing, and as grounds for asserting the invalidity of said Order show that Finding No. 3 of said Order "That Order No. R-2259-B is proper in all respects" is erroneous for the reasons set forth in said Application for Rehearing; said Order also is erroneous in failing to grant petitioners' Applications for Rehearing and the relief prayed for therein.

8. Inasmuch as Order No. R-2259-B is erroneous, invalid and void, and inasmuch as said Order will cause irreparable harm to petitioners, the operation of said Order should be stayed and suspended during the pendency of this proceeding to review.

WHEREFORE, petitioners pray:

1. That the Court review the Orders complained of and declare them erroneous, invalid and void.
2. That the Court stay and suspend the operation of said Orders during the pendency of this proceeding to review.
3. For such further relief as the Court deems proper.

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Santa Fe, New Mexico

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s/ Ben Howell
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BEFORE THE OIL CONSERVATION COMMISSION
OF THE STATE OF NEW MEXICO

IN THE MATTER OF THE HEARING
CALLED BY THE OIL CONSERVATION
COMMISSION OF NEW MEXICO FOR
THE PURPOSE OF CONSIDERING:

CASE No. 2504
Order No. R-2259-B

APPLICATION OF CONSOLIDATED OIL & GAS, INC.,
FOR AN AMENDMENT OF ORDER NO. R-1670-C,
CHANGING THE ALLOCATION FORMULA FOR THE
BASIN-DAKOTA GAS POOL, SAN JUAN, RIO ARRIBA
AND SANDOVAL COUNTIES, NEW MEXICO.

ORDER OF THE COMMISSION

BY THE COMMISSION:

This cause came on for rehearing at 9 o'clock a.m. on February 14, 1963, at Santa Fe, New Mexico, before the Oil Conservation Commission of New Mexico, hereinafter referred to as the "Commission."

NOW, on this 3rd day of July, 1963, the Commission, a quorum being present, having considered the testimony presented and the exhibits received at said hearing, and being fully advised in the premises,

FINDS:

(1) That due public notice having been given as required by law, the Commission has jurisdiction of this cause and the subject matter thereof.

(2) That Order No. R-1670-C, entered by the Commission on November 4, 1960, established Special Rules and Regulations for the Basin-Dakota Gas Pool and adopted, by reference, Rule 9(C) of the General Rules applicable to prorated gas pools in Northwest New Mexico, as set forth in Order No. R-1670.

(3) That Rule 9(C) of the General Rules applicable to prorated gas pools in Northwest New Mexico, as set forth in Order No. R-1670, allocates production on the basis of 25 percent acreage plus 75 percent acreage times deliverability, hereinafter referred to as the 25-75 formula.

(4) That the applicant, Consolidated Oil & Gas, Inc., seeks amendment of the Special Rules and Regulations for the Basin-Dakota Gas Pool to allocate production on the basis of 60 percent acreage plus 40 percent acreage times deliverability.

EXHIBIT "A"

- 10 -

(5) That the initial recoverable gas reserves in the Basin-Dakota Gas Pool, insofar as can be determined, total approximately 2.255 trillion cubic feet, of which approximately 96 billion cubic feet is attributed to marginal wells, which are permitted to produce at capacity.

(6) That the initial recoverable gas reserves underlying each non-marginal tract in the Basin-Dakota Gas Pool are as shown in Column C, Tract Reserves, of Exhibit A attached hereto and made a part hereof.

(7) That the percent of the total pool reserves attributable to each non-marginal tract in the Basin-Dakota Gas Pool is as shown in Column D, Percent of Pool Reserves, of Exhibit A.

(8) That it is impracticable to allocate production solely on the basis of the percentage of pool reserves due to the continuous fluctuation in reserve computations resulting from new completions in the pool and re-evaluation of reserves of existing wells.

(9) That the tract acreage factor for each non-marginal well in the Basin-Dakota Gas Pool is as shown in Column A of Exhibit A; that the deliverability for each non-marginal well, insofar as can be determined, is as shown in Column B of Exhibit A.

(10) That in the Basin-Dakota Gas Pool there is no direct correlation between deliverability and reserves, or acreage and reserves, and that, therefore, neither should be used as the sole criterion for distributing the total pool allowable among the tracts.

(11) That the most reasonable basis for allocating production in the Basin-Dakota Gas Pool is to determine, for each proposed formula, the percentage of total pool allowable apportioned to each non-marginal tract as compared to its percentage of total pool reserves, said relationship hereinafter referred to as the tract's A/R Factor, and to select the allocation formula that will allow the maximum number of wells in the pool to produce with an ideal tract A/R Factor of 1.0, or with a tract A/R Factor of from 0.7 to 1.3, which, due to inherent variance in interpreting and computing reserves, is within a reasonable tolerance.

(12) That the percentage of deliverability and the percentage of acreage included in the allocation formula affect the percentage of the total pool allowable assigned to each non-marginal well in the pool, thereby affecting the number of wells in the pool producing with a tract A/R Factor of from 0.7 to 1.3.

(13) That under the present 25-75 formula, correlative rights are not being adequately protected; that the protection of correlative rights is a necessary adjunct to the prevention of waste, and that waste will result unless the Commission acts to protect correlative rights.

-3-

CASE No. 2504

Order No. R-2259-B

(14) That, based upon the December 1962 pool allowable, a comparison of the number of non-marginal wells producing with a tract A/R Factor of from 0.7 to 1.3 under each formula as identified by an asterisk in Columns G and J of Exhibit A, and of the total volume of gas allocated to the wells in the 0.7 to 1.3 range under each formula, establishes that the proposed formula of 60 percent acreage plus 40 percent acreage times deliverability will more adequately protect correlative rights and prevent waste by permitting more wells to receive their just and equitable share of the gas in the pool, insofar as can be determined.

(15) That numerous wells in the Basin-Dakota Gas Pool are capable of draining more than their just and equitable share of the gas in the pool, and that an allocation formula of 60 percent acreage plus 40 percent acreage times deliverability will, insofar as is practicable, prevent drainage between producing tracts which is not equalized by counter drainage.

(16) That an allocation formula of 60 percent acreage plus 40 percent acreage times deliverability will, insofar as it is practicable to do so, afford to the owner of each property in the pool the opportunity to use his just and equitable share of the reservoir energy.

(17) That Order No. R-1670-C should be amended to provide an allocation formula for the Basin-Dakota Gas Pool in San Juan, Rio Arriba, and Sandoval Counties, New Mexico, based 60 percent on acreage and 40 percent on acreage times deliverability.

(18) That, due to the time required to administer a new allocation formula for a prorated gas pool, this order should not be effective until August 1, 1963, the beginning of the next six-month proration period for the Basin-Dakota Gas Pool.

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED:

(1) That the Special Rules and Regulations for the Basin-Dakota Gas Pool, as promulgated by Order No. R-1670-C, are hereby amended by adoption of the following:

RULE 9(C): The pool allowable remaining each month after deducting the total allowable assigned to marginal wells shall be allocated among the non-marginal wells entitled to an allowable in the following manner:

1. Forty percent (40%) of the pool allowable remaining to be allocated to non-marginal wells shall be allocated among such wells in the proportion that each well's "AD Factor" bears to the total "AD Factor" for all non-marginal wells in the pool.

-4-

CASE No. 2504

Order No. R-2259-B

2. Sixty percent (60%) of the pool allowable remaining to be allocated to non-marginal wells shall be allocated among such wells in the proportion that each well's acreage factor bears to the total acreage factor for all non-marginal wells in the pool.

(2) That Order No. R-2259 is hereby superseded.

(3) That jurisdiction of this cause is retained for the entry of such further orders as the Commission may deem necessary.

(4) That this order shall be effective August 1, 1963, the beginning of the next six-month proration period for the Basin-Dakota Gas Pool.

DONE at Santa Fe, New Mexico, on the day and year hereinabove designated.

STATE OF NEW MEXICO
OIL CONSERVATION COMMISSION

JACK M. CAMPBELL, Chairman

E. S. WALKER, Member

A. L. PORTER, Jr., Member & Secretary

S E A L

esr/

EXHIBIT

ORDER NO. R-2259-3

ACREAGE TIMES DELIVERABILITY

AND

DELIVERABILITY

BASIN DAKOTA TRACT/POOL RESERVES AND ALLOCATION
ARRANGED IN THE ORDER OF PIPELINE AND OPERATOR

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

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DESEL	COL A	COL B	COL C	COL D	COL E	COL F	COL G	COL H	COL I	COL J
33	1000	4202	2220	1355	3555	0683	2:98	71631	10359	76:16
LA	1111	4172	9560	5577	6539	1431	84	9885	1434	84
GU	1111	4172	9560	5577	6539	1431	84	9885	1434	84
W	1111	4172	9560	5577	6539	1431	84	9885	1434	84
KA	1111	4172	9560	5577	6539	1431	84	9885	1434	84
K	1111	4172	9560	5577	6539	1431	84	9885	1434	84
LA	1111	4172	9560	5577	6539	1431	84	9885	1434	84
MA	1111	4172	9560	5577	6539	1431	84	9885	1434	84
MO	1111	4172	9560	5577	6539	1431	84	9885	1434	84

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

J O U	25951530008272582	8H95	340149422225	4624	0	25951530008272582
	7H801214394346078	2080	355445647422	3995	1	001035102705

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J O U	5H5050143H502233H	9744	150131033545	0195	6	5817171H227
	58403000225H25925	7605	839722533455	2580	7	35039450435
	1350533222271H222	4204	575021113311	0413	6	49100911100
	121111111111111111	1111	11111111111111	1111	1	101010111101
J O U	40252455820414425	3497	355580122505	8712	8	53509433305
	1H258478H2H231458	9311	955951000555	3999	4	90851033355
	043455291H5770845	1790	899342972222	0919	5	85545595845
	85120022588178588	0850	010788749978	7988	11	95757577757
J O U	HHHH H H	1 1	HHH H		11	
J O U	75947305087105452	1555	524978047571	2798	3	78544539545
	55921207172514567	3850	355334556412	2976	2	05859895350

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J O U	25251580277255345	25847	575455325347	4108	4	45897708294
	20214555825442040	41125	0925471444508	5678	8	33008101089
	92815001100989501	15154	797709972229	6491	8	45847598847
	051211121111100011	21101	111010021100	0101	1	10000000000
J O U	0
J O U	55458944933133333	8308	128341020025	5146	0	127094010901
	555505059398225591	93000	558902998030	0788	8	48053250333
	30551431742483115	24731	778127225722	5061	7	127544525040
	52241976777556477	-0740	111576588888	04068	22	09333333333
J O U	2111 H H	01 1	HHH H	11 1	41 1	11
J O U	05775010837777225	09535	029835497050	45175	25	0149471100747
	159333770030571515	07099	525795742285	11108	08	075953333054
	25711549393933333	15528	5991121105755	00430	02	232423072529
	50873103039275855	11213	721580808717	00727	5	-39988591595
J O U	12111111111110100011	11111	4332221151154	15010	21	10000001000
J O U	1	0	0
J O U	00200545450737040	-0080	070273400090	00070	-0	470100004500
	04700000000857210	00030	950582200059	28053	10	980500005000
	54970439208750043	5740	299503900012	-4555	03	80008311405
	34333322231211333	22223	705554314510	6121	13	022221122121
J O U	4	21	2	0	2
J O U	85905009155478088	05573	459270859254	05617	00	404531592333
	331159220951833297	-1945	1549100225812	-8408	10	11385000888
	77925308889067388	15934	2717598711118	13480	00	142515275614
	3121112	11 1	0121 311	4 1 1	2 2	11
J O U	2	0	1	2	0
J O U	00010044800000000	40000	000000000000	00000	00	000000000000
	00000099000000000	0000	100000000000	10000	-0	000000000000
	1111111 1111111111	11111	11111111111111	11111	21	1111111111111

J O U	20009999999999999	91111	0555555555555	53333	11	1233333333333
	11111 11 11	11111	1111111	11111	1	4111 111 1
J O U	98888888888097777	77777	9555556775555	9000	29	011115555555
	22222222222322222	-2222	222222222222	92222	12	-333333333333
J O U	299088997772188977	17553	-943333452225	94555	15	184555927455
	1111111 132 1	82212	5 11 331 11	4 222	13	01 212 2122
J O U	712845412102502520	1081	1044474424210	08224	14	94142742045
	185188901033225721	12359	2440834812333	21112	14	211111111133
J O U	112222	11	404458 25153	0	0	0
	0221	3	5	0

[illegible]

BEFORE THE OIL CONSERVATION COMMISSION
OF THE STATE OF NEW MEXICO

CASE No. 2504
Order No. R-2259-C

APPLICATION OF CONSOLIDATED OIL & GAS, INC.,
FOR AN AMENDMENT OF ORDER NO. R-1670-C,
CHANGING THE ALLOCATION FORMULA FOR THE
BASIN-DAKOTA GAS POOL, SAN JUAN, RIO ARriba
AND SANDOVAL COUNTIES, NEW MEXICO.

ORDER OF THE COMMISSION

BY THE COMMISSION:

This cause came on for reconsideration upon Applications of
El Paso Natural Gas Company, Pan American Petroleum Corporation,
Marathon Oil Company, Sunset International Petroleum Corporation,
and Southwest Production Company for Rehearing in Case No. 2504,
Order No. R-2259-B,

NOW, on this 1st day of August, 1963, the Oil Conserva-
tion Commission, a quorum being present, having considered the
Applications for Rehearing,

FINDS:

- (1) That the Applications for Rehearing do not allege that
the applicants for rehearing have new or additional evidence to
present in this case.
- (2) That the Commission has carefully considered the evi-
dence presented in this case and is fully advised in the premises.
- (3) That Order No. R-2259-B is proper in all respects.
- (4) That the Applications for Rehearing should be denied.

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED:

That the Applications of El Paso Natural Gas Company, Pan
American Petroleum Corporation, Marathon Oil Company, Sunset
International Petroleum Corporation, and Southwest Production
Company for Rehearing in Case No. 2504, Order No. R-2259-B, are
hereby denied.

DONE at Santa Fe, New Mexico, on the day and year herein-
above designated.

STATE OF NEW MEXICO
OIL CONSERVATION COMMISSION

Jack M. Campbell
JACK M. CAMPBELL, Chairman

E. S. Walker
E. S. WALKER, Member

A. L. Porter, Jr.
A. L. PORTER, Jr., Member & Secretary

S E A L

esr/

BEFORE THE OIL CONSERVATION COMMISSION

STATE OF NEW MEXICO

IN THE MATTER OF THE APPLICATION OF
EL PASO NATURAL GAS COMPANY FOR A
REHEARING BEFORE THE OIL CONSERVATION
COMMISSION OF THE STATE OF NEW MEXICO
TO RECONSIDER CASE NO. 2504, ORDER NO.
R-2259-B OF SAID COMMISSION, BEING THE
APPLICATION OF CONSOLIDATED OIL AND GAS,
INC. FOR AN AMENDMENT OF ORDER NO. R-
1670-C, CHANGING THE ALLOCATION FORMULA
FOR THE BASIN-DAKOTA GAS POOL, SAN JUAN,
RIO ARriba AND SANDOVAL COUNTIES, NEW
MEXICO.

Case No. 2504

APPLICATION FOR REHEARING

Comes now EL PASO NATURAL GAS COMPANY, a Delaware Corporation, with license to do business in the State of New Mexico, hereinafter called "Applicant," and files this, its application for rehearing before the New Mexico Oil Conservation Commission, hereinafter called "Commission," in the above styled and numbered cause, and, for grounds therefor, would respectfully show:

I.

Hearing was held on this case before the Commission on April 18 through April 21, 1962. By Order No. R-2259, dated June 7, 1962, the Commission denied the Application. Consolidated Oil and Gas, Inc. filed an application for rehearing which was heard by the Commission on February 14, 1963, and by Order No. R-2259-B dated July 3, 1963, and entered on July 9, 1963, the Commission granted the application changing the proration formula for the Basin-Dakota Gas Pool from 25 percent acreage plus 75 percent acreage times deliverability to 60 percent acreage plus 40 percent acreage times deliverability by amending the Special Rules and Regulations for the Basin-Dakota Gas Pool, as promulgated by Order No. R-1670-C.

The Commission's Order No. R-2259 did not affect applicant in the sense of Rule 1222 of the Statewide Rules of the Commission (Rehearings) in that there was no part of that Order believed by applicant to be erroneous. Applicant is affected in the sense of Rule 1222 for the first time by Order No. R-2259-B issued by the Commission as a result of the rehearing in that said order is believed by applicant to be erroneous in many particulars hereinafter set forth.

II.

Finding 6 of said Order No. R-2259-B, which Finding is to the effect that the initial recoverable gas reserves underlying each non-marginal tract are the reserves shown in Column C of Exhibit A attached to said Order, is erroneous for the following reasons:

A. The evidence in the record does not support such Finding and the Commission's determinations of individual tract figures is apparently obtained from calculations made on rehearing by Consolidated Oil & Gas, Inc. which were based upon data as to average reserves obtained at the time of the original Hearing by Consolidated Oil and Gas, Inc. from estimates in the files of El Paso Natural Gas Company, which data is shown by the undisputed evidence to have been revised and replaced by different data as more information became available from drilling of additional wells, resulting in changing the estimates of average reserves. The parameters used in making estimates for entire townships were often based upon core data obtained from one well which data was shown by core data obtained from subsequent wells not to be representative of the entire area.

B. The conclusions offered by Consolidated Oil and Gas, Inc., which have been adopted as Findings by the Commission, were based upon estimates made by El Paso Natural Gas Company as a portion of a continuing reserve study of reserves underlying the entire Basin, which studies, as testified by the witness David H. Rainey, are the best

available for determining total pool reserves and for establishing the general relationship between well reserves and well deliverabilities for the pool but are not designed for or accurate to determine the reserves underlying any particular tract.

C. The determinations of fact are based solely upon the conclusions of Consolidated Oil & Gas, Inc.; are not supported by evidence in the record and such determinations are erroneously used by the Commission by reaching the further conclusions contained in Findings No. 7 and No. 10, thus basing one set of conclusions upon another set of conclusions without direct support in the record.

III.

Since the initial recoverable gas reserves for each individual tract are in error, the percentages of pool reserves attributable to each nonmarginal tract and the tract acreage factors listed in said Exhibit A are also in error; accordingly, said Order No. R-2259-B fails to afford to the owner of each property in the pool the opportunity to produce his just and equitable share of the gas in the pool, insofar as this can be done without waste, and for such purpose to use his just and equitable share of the reservoir energy, and is therefore violative of correlative rights.

IV.

Findings Nos. 10, 12 and 13 of the Commission's Order are not supported by the evidence for the reason that the deliverabilities shown in Column B of Exhibit A of the Commission's Order are the most recent deliverabilities while the reserves shown in Column C of said Exhibit A are estimates of initial reserves and a comparison of the relationship between reserves and deliverability is discriminatory when the ratio of initial reserves to current deliverability of one tract which has produced over a period of several years is compared with the ratio of initial reserves to initial deliverability of

another tract. Since the Commission has obviously used initial reserves in comparison with current deliverabilities in making its Findings Nos. 10, 12 and 13, such Findings are clearly erroneous and are in conflict with undisputed evidence that such comparison is discriminatory.

V.

The Commission's Order, which the statute requires be predicated upon the prevention of waste, is not based upon any evidence in the record that waste is occurring under the present 25-75 formula or that waste will be prevented by the 60-40 formula proposed by Consolidated and adopted by the Commission. The Commission's effort to predicate its order upon waste in Finding No. 13 proceeds upon the erroneous theory, unsupported by evidence, that waste is being caused wherever a violation of correlative rights is found to exist. Finding No. 14 that waste will be prevented by the 60-40 formula is unsupported by any evidence in the record.

VI.

The Commission in its Order has failed to make a finding which under the law must be made in order to change an existing proration order, to wit: the portion of each tract's proportion of the total pool reserves which can be recovered without waste. The record contains no evidence upon which such finding can be made.

VII.

The record does not contain evidence upon which the findings required by the statute to be made before changing the existing proration order can be based, and the rights acquired by the owners of tracts who have developed their properties under an existing order have been prejudiced by changing the basis of allocation without evidence to support such changes. Specifically, there is no evidence to support the Commission's finding as to the reserves underlying each individual tract; there is no evidence to support a finding, and none was made,

of the portion of each tract's proportion of the total pool reserves which can be recovered without waste; there is no evidence to support the Commission's finding that the protection of correlative rights is a necessary adjunct to the prevention of waste and that waste will result unless the Commission acts to protect correlative rights; and there is no evidence in the record that waste is occurring or will occur under the existing allocation formula.

WHEREFORE, Applicant requests that, pursuant to Rule 1222 of the Rules and Regulations of the New Mexico Oil Conservation Commission and Section 65-3-22(a), New Mexico Statutes Annotated, 1953 Compilation, that the Commission grant a rehearing in Case No. 2504 and that, following such rehearing the Commission set aside its Order No. R-2259-B and in all respects deny the application of Consolidated Oil and Gas, Inc. to amend Order No. R-1670-C. Your Applicant further requests that the Commission grant an opportunity for interested parties to present oral argument upon this application for rehearing prior to taking action thereon.

/S/ Ben R. Howell
Ben R. Howell

/S/ Garrett C. Whitworth
Garrett C. Whitworth

SETH, MONTGOMERY, FEDERICI & ANDREWS

By /S/ Wm. Federici
Attorneys for El Paso Natural
Gas Company

BEFORE THE OIL CONSERVATION COMMISSION

STATE OF NEW MEXICO

IN THE MATTER OF THE APPLICATION OF
PAN AMERICAN PETROLEUM CORPORATION,
MARATHON OIL COMPANY, AND SUNSET
INTERNATIONAL PETROLEUM CORPORATION
FOR A REHEARING BEFORE THE OIL
CONSERVATION COMMISSION OF THE STATE
OF NEW MEXICO TO RECONSIDER CASE NO.
2504, ORDER NO. R-2259-B OF SAID
COMMISSION, BEING THE APPLICATION OF
CONSOLIDATED OIL AND GAS, INC. FOR AN
AMENDMENT OF ORDER NO. R-1670-C,
CHANGING THE ALLOCATION FORMULA FOR
THE BASIN-DAKOTA GAS POOL, SAN JUAN,
RIO ARRIBA AND SANDOVAL COUNTIES, NEW
MEXICO.

Case No. 2504

APPLICATION FOR REHEARING

Come now PAN AMERICAN PETROLEUM CORPORATION, a Delaware corporation, MARATHON OIL COMPANY (formerly THE OHIO OIL COMPANY), an Ohio corporation, and SUNSET INTERNATIONAL PETROLEUM CORPORATION, a Delaware corporation, all licensed to do business in the State of New Mexico, hereinafter collectively referred to as "Applicants," and apply to the New Mexico Oil Conservation Commission for rehearing in the above styled cause, and for grounds therefor state:

I.

Hearing was held on this case before the Commission on April 18 through April 21, 1962. By Order No. R-2259, dated June 7, 1962, the Commission denied the Application. Consolidated Oil and Gas, Inc. filed an application for rehearing which was heard by the Commission on February 14, 1963, and by Order No. R-2259-B dated July 3, 1963, and entered on July 9, 1963, the Commission granted the application changing the proration formula for the Basin-Dakota Gas Pool from 25 percent acreage plus 75 percent acreage times deliverability to 60 percent acreage plus 40 percent acreage times deliverability by amending the Special Rules and Regulations for the Basin-Dakota Gas Pool, as promulgated by Order No. R-1670-C.

Commission Order R-2259, dated June 7, 1962, did not affect applicants in that no part of that Order was believed by applicants to be erroneous; Applicants are affected by Order No. R-2259-B issued by the Commission as a result of the rehearing in that said Order is believed by applicants to be erroneous as hereinafter set forth.

II.

Finding No. 6 of Order No. R-2259-B, which adopts by reference certain figures as being the initial recoverable gas reserves underlying each non-marginal tract in the Basin-Dakota Gas Pool, is erroneous in that (a) these figures do not represent the best evidence or the most recent evidence available to the Commission and to the proponents of the change in the proration formula at the time of the rehearing; and (b) these figures were derived from evidence submitted by El Paso Natural Gas Company at the original hearing of this case, which evidence was suitable to show total pool reserves and for establishing the general relationship between well reserves and well deliverabilities in the pool but which was not designed for or accurate to determine the reserves underlying any particular tract.

III.

Inasmuch as the Commission has based Finding No. 6 upon erroneous data, all findings and conclusions, including Findings Nos. 7 and 10, which follow upon Finding No. 6, are necessarily erroneous also. No independent evidence exists in the record upon which Findings Nos. 7 and 10 can be based.

IV.

Inasmuch as the figures adopted by the Commission as the initial recoverable gas reserves for each individual tract are in error, the percentages of pool reserves attributable to each non-marginal tract and the tract acreage factors listed in Exhibit A are also in error; accordingly, said Order No. R-2259-B is unsupported by substantial evidence showing that the 60-40 formula, which it promulgates, will protect the correlative rights of operators in the Basin-Dakota Gas Pool.

V.

Findings Nos. 10, 12, 13 and 14 of said Order are not supported by substantial evidence in that the Commission has based said Findings upon a comparison of initial reserves with current, rather than initial, deliverabilities, such comparison being clearly discriminatory.

VI.

The Commission's order, which the statute requires be predicated upon the prevention of waste, is not based upon any evidence in the record that waste is occurring under the present 25-75 formula or that waste will be prevented by the 60-40 formula proposed by Consolidated and adopted by the Commission. The Commission's effort to predicate its Order upon waste in Finding No. 13 proceeds upon the erroneous theory, unsupported by evidence, that waste is being caused wherever a violation of correlative rights is found to exist. Finding No. 14 that waste will be prevented by the 60-40 formula is unsupported by any evidence in the record.

VII.

The Commission in its Order has failed to make a finding which under the law must be made in order to change an existing proration order, to wit: the portion of each tract's proportion of the total pool reserves which can be recovered without waste. The record contains no evidence upon which such a finding can be made.

VIII.

The rights acquired by the owners and operators of tracts in the Basin-Dakota Gas Pool who have developed their properties under the existing 25-75 formula are prejudiced and violated by the Commission's Order No. R-2259-B changing the basis of allocation without any evidence that waste is occurring under the existing formula or that waste will be prevented by the new formula.

IX.

Findings Nos. 15, 16 and 17 of said Order No. R-2259-B are erroneous in that they are not supported by substantial evidence and are based upon other findings which are without support in evidence as hereinbefore stated.

WHEREFORE, Applicants request that the Commission grant a rehearing in Case No. 2504 and that following such rehearing the Commission set aside its Order No. R-2259-B and in all respects deny the application of Consolidated Oil and Gas, Inc. to amend Order No. R-1670-C. Applicants further request that the Commission grant an opportunity for all interested parties to present oral argument upon this application for rehearing prior to taking action thereon.

ATWOOD & MALONE

By: _____
Ross L. Malone
Roswell, New Mexico
Attorneys for Pan American Petroleum
Corporation

KENT B. HAMPTON
Division Attorney
Marathon Oil Company
Casper, Wyoming

ATWOOD & MALONE

By: _____
Ross L. Malone
Roswell, New Mexico
Attorneys for Marathon Oil Company

SETH, MONTGOMERY, FEDERICI & ANDREWS

By: _____
Wm. R. Federici
Attorneys for Sunset International
Petroleum Corporation

BEFORE THE OIL CONSERVATION COMMISSION
OF THE STATE OF NEW MEXICO

IN THE MATTER OF THE HEARING
CALLED BY THE OIL CONSERVATION
COMMISSION OF NEW MEXICO FOR
THE PURPOSE OF CONSIDERING:

CASE NO. 2504

APPLICATION OF CONSOLIDATED OIL & GAS, INC.
FOR AN AMENDMENT OF ORDER NO. R-1670-C,
CHANGING THE ALLOCATION FORMULA FOR THE
BASIN-DAKOTA GAS POOL, SAN JUAN, RIO ARriba
AND RAINOVAL COUNTIES, NEW MEXICO.

APPLICATION FOR REHEARINGS

Comes now Southwest Production Company, one of the pro-
testants to the application of Consolidated Oil & Gas, Inc. for
an amendment to Order R-1670-C of this Commission, and requests
that a rehearing be granted in such cause and in support thereof
would show to the Commission the following:

1. That this Commission has entered its Order No.
R-2259-B wherein is granted the prayer of the application of
Consolidated Oil & Gas, Inc. for an amendment to Order R-1670-C
and thereby changed the proration formula for the Basin-Dakota
Gas Pool.
2. That Order No. R-2259-B was improperly entered by
the Commission contrary to the rules of the Commission and the
law of the State of New Mexico.
3. That Order No. R-2259-B determines in Finding #10
that there is no direct correlation between acreage and reserves
and yet such order, irrespective of such finding, bases the pro-
ration formula 60% upon acreage. That this manifestly demonstrates
the invalidity of such order. That Finding #11 specifically deter-
mines that the formula in the order is merely a makeshift so that
the average tract in the pool will receive an allowable relatively
close to that to which it is entitled and thereby manifestly demon-
strates that the order is invalid as to all tracts which do not
happen to fit the average norm of the pool. That it is improper
for the Commission to promulgate an order based on a determined
improper factor and that a statement that the application of such
improper factor will do justice in the average instance, does not
lend validity to the order based on such admitted improper factors.
4. That Order No. R-2259-B was entered by the Commission
without proper findings as required by law and that such order
is not supported by evidence, required to give the Commission
power and authority to enter and promulgate such order.
5. That Order No. R-2259-B was entered by the Commission
changing a previous proration order for the Basin-Dakota Pool
without any showing that there was any change of condition between

ILLEGIBLE

the entry of Order No. R-1570-C and the entry of said Order No. R-2259-B, or any showing that would justify the Commission in changing a prorotation order previously entered by the Commission after application and hearing. That it is improper for the Commission to promulgate a prorotation order after due and proper notice to all parties and hearing upon the merits and then later set such order aside without any showing of change of condition or any other grounds to justify the Commission in changing an order previously entered.


6. That this Commission improperly conducted the rehearing upon which Order No. R-2259-B was founded, in that it admitted improper evidence and testimony over the objection of Protestant, all of which renders said order invalid and entitles this Protestant to a rehearing.

7. That Order No. R-2259-B promulgates a prorotation order which will result in waste being committed and which does not protect the correlative rights of all producers in the Pool but to the contrary, destroys correlative rights and interferes with and destroys the correlative rights of this Protestant.

8. That after considering the allegations herein contained, this Commission should withdraw and set aside Order No. R-2259-B, thereby once again giving effect to Order No. R-1670-C.

Respectfully submitted,

VORITY, BURN, COOLEY & JONES

By 
Geo. L. VORITY

Attorneys for Protestant,
Southwest Production Company

ILLEGIBLE

DISTRICT COURT
SAN JUAN COUNTY, N. M.
FILED AUG 22 1963
Virginia A. Kittell
CLERK

STATE OF NEW MEXICO

COUNTY OF SAN JUAN

IN THE DISTRICT COURT

EL PASO NATURAL GAS COMPANY,
a corporation; PAN AMERICAN
PETROLEUM CORPORATION, a
corporation; MARATHON OIL
COMPANY, a corporation;
SOUTHWEST PRODUCTION COMPANY,
a partnership; and SUNSET
INTERNATIONAL PETROLEUM
CORPORATION, a corporation,

Petitioners,

-vs-

No. 11,685

OIL CONSERVATION COMMISSION of
NEW MEXICO, JACK M. CAMPBELL,
Chairman; E. S. WALKER, Member;
A. L. PORTER, JR., Member and
Secretary; CONSOLIDATED OIL &
GAS, INC., a corporation,

Respondents.

MOTION TO ISSUE NOTICE

Comes now Southwest Production Company, a co-partnership
composed of Joseph P. Driscoll and John H. Haill, one of the
Petitioners in the above styled and numbered cause, and moves
the Court to issue a Notice of Appeal in accord with the pro-
visions of N.M.S.A. 65-3-22, to be served upon the following
named adverse parties in said cause, to-wit:

OIL CONSERVATION COMMISSION OF NEW MEXICO

JACK M. CAMPBELL, Chairman

E. S. WALKER, Member

A. L. PORTER, JR., Member and Secretary

CONSOLIDATED OIL & GAS, INC.

HUMBLE OIL & REFINING COMPANY

SKELLY OIL COMPANY

THE ATLANTIC REFINING COMPANY

SOUTHERN UNION GAS COMPANY


BENJAMIN K. HORTON & ASSOCIATES
R & G DRILLING CO.
THE UNITED STATES GEOLOGICAL SURVEY
TIDEWATER OIL COMPANY
BRUCE ANDERSON OIL & GAS PROPERTIES
THE FRONTIER REFINING COMPANY
KAY KIMBELL OIL COMPANY
TEXACO, INC.
AMERADA PETROLEUM CORPORATION
SUNRAY MID-CONTINENT OIL COMPANY
CONTINENTAL OIL COMPANY
BEARD OIL COMPANY

Said Petitioner does hereby further move the Court to set a time for hearing the prayer of said Petition that Order No. R-2259-B of the Oil Conservation Commission of New Mexico be stayed pending the proceedings for review.

VERITY, BURR, COOLEY & JONES

By s/ Geo L Verity
Geo. L. Verity

Attorneys for Petitioner,
Southwest Production Company



STATE OF NEW MEXICO

COUNTY OF SAN JUAN

IN THE DISTRICT COURT

Virginia A. Kittell
CLERK

EL PASO NATURAL GAS COMPANY,
a corporation; PAN AMERICAN
PETROLEUM CORPORATION, a
corporation; MARATHON OIL
COMPANY, a corporation;
SOUTHWEST PRODUCTION COMPANY,
a partnership; and SUNSET
INTERNATIONAL PETROLEUM
CORPORATION, a corporation,

Petitioners,

-vs-

No. 11,685

OIL CONSERVATION COMMISSION of
NEW MEXICO, JACK M. CAMPBELL,
Chairman; E. S. WALKER, Member;
A. L. PORTER, JR., Member and
Secretary; CONSOLIDATED OIL &
GAS, INC., a corporation,

Respondents.

NOTICE OF APPEAL

TO THE FOLLOWING NAMED ADVERSE PARTIES:

OIL CONSERVATION COMMISSION OF NEW MEXICO
JACK M. CAMPBELL, Chairman
E. S. WALKER, Member
A. L. PORTER, JR., Member and Secretary
CONSOLIDATED OIL & GAS, INC.
HUMBLE OIL & REFINING COMPANY
SKELLY OIL COMPANY
THE ATLANTIC REFINING COMPANY
SOUTHERN UNION GAS COMPANY
BENJAMIN K. HORTON & ASSOCIATES
R & G DRILLING CO.
THE UNITED STATES GEOLOGICAL SURVEY
TIDEWATER OIL COMPANY
BRUCE ANDERSON OIL & GAS PROPERTIES
THE FRONTIER REFINING COMPANY
KAY KIMBELL OIL COMPANY
TEXACO, INC.
AMERADA PETROLEUM CORPORATION
SUNRAY MID-CONTINENT OIL COMPANY
CONTINENTAL OIL COMPANY
BEARD OIL COMPANY

TAKE NOTICE that the above named Petitioners,
being dissatisfied with the Oil Conservation Commission of New
Mexico's promulgation of Order No. R-2259-B, which changed the
proration formula for the Basin Dakota Gas Pool, and with Order
No. R-2259-C, which denied the above named parties a rehearing,
have appealed therefrom in accord with the provisions of N.M.S.A.
65-3-22, having filed their Petition for review in the District

Court for San Juan County, New Mexico on the 20th day of August, 1963, said appeal being docketed under No. 11,685 in said Court; that by such petition for review the said petitioners have prayed the said District Court to review said orders, declare them to be erroneous, invalid and void and to suspend the operation of said orders during the pendency of the proceedings for review.

TAKE FURTHER NOTICE that said District Court has set Petitioners' prayer that said orders be suspended during the pendency of such proceedings for review for hearing at 9 o'clock A.M. on the 20th day of September, 1963 and that the Court will consider staying the effect of said orders at said time.

TAKE FURTHER NOTICE that the names and addresses of the attorneys representing said Petitioners are as follows:

Representing El Paso Natural Gas Company and
Sunset International Petroleum Corporation:

SETH, MONTGOMERY, FEDERICI & ANDREWS,
Santa Fe, New Mexico

BEN HOWELL, El Paso, Texas

GARRETT C. WHITWORTH, El Paso, Texas

Representing Pan American Petroleum Corporation and
Marathon Oil Company:

ATWOOD AND MALONE, Roswell, New Mexico

Representing Southwest Production Company:

VERITY, BURR, COOLEY & JONES,
Farmington, New Mexico

WITNESS the Honorable C. C. McCulloh,
District Judge of the Eleventh Judicial
District Court of the State of New Mexico
and the seal of the District Court of
San Juan County, this 22 day of
August, 1963.

Virginia A. Kittell, Clerk

DISTRICT COURT
SAN JUAN COUNTY, N. M.
FILED AUG 30 1963
Virginia A. Kittell
CLERK

STATE OF NEW MEXICO

COUNTY OF SAN JUAN

IN THE DISTRICT COURT

PUBCO PETROLEUM CORPORATION,

Petitioner,

-vs-

No. 11,637

OIL CONSERVATION COMMISSION
of NEW MEXICO and CONSOLIDATED
OIL & GAS, INC., a corporation,

Respondents.

EL PASO NATURAL GAS COMPANY,
a corporation; PAN AMERICAN
PETROLEUM CORPORATION, a
corporation; MARATHON OIL
COMPANY, a corporation;
SOUTHWEST PRODUCTION COMPANY,
a partnership; and SUNSET
INTERNATIONAL PETROLEUM
CORPORATION, a corporation,

Petitioners,

-vs-

No. 11,685

OIL CONSERVATION COMMISSION of
NEW MEXICO, JACK M. CAMPBELL,
Chairman; E. S. WALKER, Member;
A. L. PORTER, JR., Member and
Secretary; Consolidated Oil &
Gas, Inc., a corporation,

Respondents.

M O T I O N

Come now Pubco Petroleum Corporation, Petitioner in the above styled cause No. 11,637; and Southwest Production Company, one of the Petitioners in above styled cause No. 11,685, and move the Court that said two causes be consolidated, and in support thereof would show to the Court that each of said causes is an appeal from Order No. 2259-B of the Oil Conservation Commission of New Mexico and that each of said causes should therefore be consolidated and heard together.

VERITY, BURR, COOLEY & JONES

By s/ Geo L Verity
Geo. L. Verity

Attorneys for Petitioner
Southwest Production Company

KELEHER & McLEOD

By s/ John B Tittman
John B. Tittman

Attorneys for Petitioner,
Pubco Petroleum Corporation

CERTIFICATE

I certify that I caused a copy of the above ing to be mailed
to opposing counsel this 29 day of August 1963

s/ William B Keleher

DISTRICT COURT
SAN JUAN COUNTY, N. M.
FILED SEP 9 1963
Virginia A. Kittell
CLERK

STATE OF NEW MEXICO

COUNTY OF SAN JUAN

IN THE DISTRICT COURT

EL PASO NATURAL GAS COMPANY, a
corporation; PAN AMERICAN PETROLEUM
CORPORATION, a corporation; MARATHON
OIL COMPANY, a corporation; SOUTHWEST
PRODUCTION COMPANY, a partnership; and
SUNSET INTERNATIONAL PETROLEUM CORPORA-
TION, a corporation,

Petitioners,

-VS-

NO. 11,685

OIL CONSERVATION COMMISSION OF NEW
MEXICO, JACK M. CAMPBELL, Chairman;
E. S. WALKER, Member; A. L. PORTER, JR.,
Member and Secretary; CONSOLIDATED OIL
& GAS, INC., a corporation,

Respondents.

ANSWER OF TIDEWATER OIL COMPANY

COMES NOW TIDEWATER OIL COMPANY, one of the named Adverse Parties in the above-styled cause, and for answer in such cause would respectfully show the Court that at the hearing before the Oil Conservation Commission of New Mexico, which hearing preceded the issuance of Order No. R-2259-B, that said Tidewater Oil Company took the position that such order was justified by the evidence before the Commission, and that such order should be issued. Tidewater Oil Company continues to believe that the order is proper and valid and that it should not be suspended, styled, or overruled by this Court.

Respectfully submitted,

TIDEWATER OIL COMPANY

By s/ Clyde E Willbern
Clyde E. Willbern

Tidewater Oil Company



Box 1404

Houston 1, Texas

LLOYD ARMSTRONG
Division Attorney

CLYDE E. WILLBERN
General Attorney

OSCAR J. CADWALLADER, JR.

CLOY D. MONZINGO

JACK L. BRANDON

JOHN F. SULLIVAN

September 5, 1963


Clerk of the District Court
of San Juan County
County Court House
Aztec, New Mexico

Dear Sir:

Re: El Paso Natural Gas Company, et al.,
v. Oil Conservation Commission of
New Mexico, et al., No. 11,685
District Court of San Juan County,
New Mexico

Enclosed please find the Answer of Tidewater Oil Company,
one of the named Adverse Parties in the captioned cause,
which we would appreciate your filing in this suit.

Very truly yours,


Clyde E. Willbern

JLB:cc

cc: To all parties listed
on attached list.

ADDRESS LIST

Anderson, Bruce, Oil & Gas Properties
930 Petroleum Club Building
Denver 2, Colorado

Amerada Petroleum Corporation
P. O. Drawer 601
Durango, Colorado

Beard Oil Company
Cameron Building
2901 Classen Blvd.
Oklahoma City, Oklahoma

Consolidated Oil & Gas, Inc.
P. O. Box 2038
Farmington, New Mexico

Continental Oil Company
P. O. Box 3312
Durango, Colorado

El Paso Natural Gas Company
P. O. Box 1560
Farmington, New Mexico

Humble Oil & Refining Company
P. O. Box 3082
Durango, Colorado

Kimbell, Kay, Oil Company
415 South Behrend Ave.
Farmington, New Mexico

Marathon Oil Company
1211 Main Avenue
Durango, Colorado

Oil Conservation Commission of New Mexico
Santa Fe, New Mexico
Attention Mr. Jack M. Campbell, Chairman
Mr. E. S. Walker, Member
Mr. A. L. Porter, Jr., Member and Secretary

Pan American Petroleum Corporation
P. O. Box 480
Farmington, New Mexico

R & G Drilling Co.
208 West Main
Farmington, New Mexico

Skelly Oil Company
P. O. Drawer 510
Farmington, New Mexico

Southern Union Gas Company
P. O. Box 750
Farmington, New Mexico

Southwest Production Company
Petroleum Club Plaza
Farmington, New Mexico

Sunray Mid-Continent Oil Company
200 Petroleum Club Plaza
Farmington, New Mexico

Sunset International Petroleum Corporation
501 Midland Savings Building
Denver 2, Colorado

Texaco Inc.
P. O. Box 810
Farmington, New Mexico

The Atlantic Refining Company
P. O. Box 2197
Farmington, New Mexico

The Frontier Refining Company
4040 East Louisiana Avenue
Denver, Colorado

The United States Geological Survey
616 South Boston Avenue
Tulsa, Oklahoma

DISTRICT COURT
SAN JUAN COUNTY, N. M.
FILED SEP 23 1963
Virginia A. Kittell
CLERK

STATE OF NEW MEXICO COUNTY OF SAN JUAN IN THE DISTRICT COURT

EL PASO NATURAL GAS COMPANY,
a corporation; PAN AMERICAN
PETROLEUM CORPORATION, a
corporation; MARATHON OIL
COMPANY, a corporation;
SOUTHWEST PRODUCTION COMPANY,
a partnership; and SUNSET
INTERNATIONAL PETROLEUM
CORPORATION, a corporation,

Petitioners,

-vs-

No. 11685

OIL CONSERVATION COMMISSION OF
NEW MEXICO, JACK M. CAMPBELL,
Chairman; E. S. WALKER, Member;
A. L. PORTER, JR., Member and
Secretary; CONSOLIDATED OIL &
GAS, INC., a corporation,

Respondents.

ACCEPTANCE OF SERVICE

Comes now Jason W. Kellahin, one of the attorneys for
respondent, Consolidated Oil & Gas, Inc., and accepts service
of a copy of Notice of Appeal herein on behalf of said
respondent.

s/ Jason W. Kellahin
Jason W. Kellahin
Kellahin & Fox
Santa Fe, New Mexico

DISTRICT COURT
SAN JUAN COUNTY, N. M.
FILED SEP 23 1963
Virginia A. Kittell
CLERK

STATE OF NEW MEXICO

COUNTY OF SAN JUAN

IN THE DISTRICT COURT

EL PASO NATURAL GAS COMPANY,
a corporation; PAN AMERICAN
PETROLEUM CORPORATION, a
corporation; MARATHON OIL
COMPANY, a corporation;
SOUTHWEST PRODUCTION COMPANY,
a partnership; and SUNSET
INTERNATIONAL PETROLEUM
CORPORATION, a corporation,

Petitioners,

-vs-

No. 11,685

OIL CONSERVATION COMMISSION OF
NEW MEXICO, JACK M. CAMPBELL,
Chairman; E. S. WALKER, Member;
A. L. PORTER, JR., Member and
Secretary; CONSOLIDATED OIL &
GAS, INC., a corporation,

Respondents,

ACCEPTANCE OF SERVICE

Comes now Oliver E. Panye, Assistant Attorney General for
the State of New Mexico, and accepts service of a copy of Notice
of Appeal herein on behalf of the Oil Conservation Commission
of New Mexico, Jack M. Campbell, Chairman, E. S. Walker,
Member, and A. L. Porter, Jr., Member and Secretary.

s/ C. E. Payne
O. E. Payne
Assistant Attorney General
State of New Mexico

DISTRICT COURT
SAN JUAN COUNTY, N. M.
FILED SEP 23 1963
Virginia A. Kittell
CLERK

STATE OF NEW MEXICO

COUNTY OF SAN JUAN

IN THE DISTRICT COURT

EL PASO NATURAL GAS COMPANY,
a corporation; PAN AMERICAN
PETROLEUM CORPORATION, a
corporation; MARATHON OIL
COMPANY, a corporation;
SOUTHWEST PRODUCTION COMPANY,
a partnership; and SUNSET
INTERNATIONAL PETROLEUM
CORPORATION, a corporation,

Petitioners,

-vs-

No. 11,685

OIL CONSERVATION COMMISSION OF
NEW MEXICO, JACK M. CAMPBELL,
Chairman; E. S. WALKER, Member;
A. L. PORTER, JR., Member and
Secretary; CONSOLIDATED OIL &
GAS, INC., a corporation,

Respondents.

AFFIDAVIT OF SERVICE

H. F. Kelly, Deputy Sheriff of Denver, County, State of
Colorado, being first duly sworn upon his oath states that on
the 3rd day of September, 1963, he served a copy of Notice
Of Appeal herein upon Bruce Anderson Oil & Gas Properties
by delivering same to Bruce Anderson, its owner, personally,
at Suite 930, Petroleum Club Building, Denver, Colorado.

s/ H Kelly
Deputy Sheriff

STATE OF COLORADO)
COUNTY OF DENVER) ss.

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 3rd day of
September, 1963.

(SEAL) s/ R. L. Smith
Notary Public
For the State of Colorado

My Commission Expires:

August 23, 1964

DISTRICT COURT
SAN JUAN COUNTY, N. M.
FILED SEP 23 1963
Virginia A. Kittell
CLERK

STATE OF NEW MEXICO

COUNTY OF SAN JUAN

IN THE DISTRICT COURT

EL PASO NATURAL GAS COMPANY,
a corporation; PAN AMERICAN
PETROLEUM CORPORATION, a
corporation; MARATHON OIL
COMPANY, a corporation;
SOUTHWEST PRODUCTION COMPANY,
a partnership; and SUNSET
INTERNATIONAL PETROLEUM
CORPORATION, a corporation,

Petitioners,

-vs-

No. 11,685

OIL CONSERVATION COMMISSION OF
NEW MEXICO, JACK M. CAMPBELL,
Chairman; E. S. WALKER, Member;
A. L. PORTER, JR., Member and
Secretary; CONSOLIDATED OIL &
GAS, INC., a corporation,

Sheriff Fee's	
First Person	0.50
1 copy	0.25
Mileage 21	2.10
Total	<u>\$2.85</u>
Clerk's Fee	1.00
	<u>\$3.85</u>

Respondents.

AFFIDAVIT OF SERVICE

G. E. Etheridge, Deputy Sheriff of Oklahoma County, State
of Oklahoma County, State of Oklahoma, being first duly sworn
upon his oath states that on the 3 day of Sept., 1963, he
served a copy of Notice of Appeal herein upon Beard Oil Company
by delivering same to L. G. Petering, he being secretary and
treasurer of said company at ~~466-Cameron-Building~~, Oklahoma City,
610 2000 Classen Bldg.
Oklahoma.

s/ G. E. Etheridge

STATE OF OKLAHOMA }
 } ss.
COUNTY OF OKLAHOMA }

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 3rd day of
September, 1963.

My Commission Expires:

July 13th 1967

(S E A L)

s/ F S Brown
Notary Public

DISTRICT COURT
SAN JUAN COUNTY, N. M.
FILED SEP 23 1963
Virginia A. Kittell
CLERK

STATE OF NEW MEXICO

COUNTY OF SAN JUAN

IN THE DISTRICT COURT

EL PASO NATURAL GAS COMPANY,
a corporation; PAN AMERICAN
PETROLEUM CORPORATION, a
corporation; MARATHON OIL
COMPANY, a corporation;
SOUTHWEST PRODUCTION COMPANY,
a partnership; and SUNSET
INTERNATIONAL PETROLEUM
CORPORATION, a corporation,

RECEIVED AUG 27 1963
Santa Fe County
Sheriff's Office

Petitioners,

-vs-

No. 11,685

OIL CONSERVATION COMMISSION of
NEW MEXICO, JACK M. CAMPBELL,
Chairman; E. S. WALKER, Member;
A. L. PORTER, JR., Member and
Secretary; CONSOLIDATED OIL &
GAS, INC., a corporation,

Respondents.

AFFIDAVIT OF SERVICE

I ARTHUR GARCIA, DEPUTY sheriff of Santa Fe County, State
of New Mexico, being first duly sworn upon his oath, states
that on the 27th day of AUGUST, 1963, he served a copy of
notice of appeal herein upon Skelly Oil Company, the Atlantic
Refining Company, Tidewater Oil Company, the Frontier Refining
Company, Amerada Petroleum Corporation, Sunray Mid-Continent Oil
Company, and Continental Oil Company by delivering same to the
Corporation Company, 123 West Palace Avenue, Santa Fe, New
Mexico, which company is the statutory agent for service of pro-
cess in New Mexico for each of the above-named foreign corpora-
tions.

s/ Arthur Garcia

FEES:
SERVICE & RETURN \$15.00
NOTARY FEES .50
TOTAL \$15.50

COUNTY OF SANTA FE }
STATE OF NEW MEXICO } ss.

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 30th day of
August, 1963.

s/ Fred West, Justice of the Peace
Notary-Public

My Commission expires:

12-31-1964

(SEAL)

DISTRICT COURT
SAN JUAN COUNTY, N. M.
FILED SEP 23 1963
Virginia A. Kittell
CLERK

STATE OF NEW MEXICO COUNTY OF SAN JUAN
IN THE DISTRICT COURT

EL PASO NATURAL GAS COMPANY, a corporation; PAN AMERICAN PETROLEUM CORPORATION, a corporation; MARATHON OIL COMPANY, a corporation; SOUTHWEST PRODUCTION COMPANY, a partnership; and SUNSET INTERNATIONAL PETROLEUM CORPORATION, a corporation,

RECEIVED AUG 27 1963
Santa Fe County
Sheriff's Office

Petitioners,

-VS-

No. 11,685

OIL CONSERVATION COMMISSION OF
NEW MEXICO, JACK M. CAMPBELL,
Chairman; E. S. WALKER, Member;
A. L. PORTER, JR., Member and
Secretary; CONSOLIDATED OIL &
GA, INC., a corporation.

Respondents.

AFFIDAVIT OF SERVICE

I, ARTHUR GARCIA, DEPUTY sheriff of Santa Fe County, State of New Mexico, being first duly sworn upon his oath, states that on the 27 day of AUGUST, 1963, he served a copy of notice of appeal herein upon Texaco, Inc., by delivering same to L. C. White, 123 West Palace Avenue, Santa Fe, New Mexico, who is Texaco, Inc.'s statutory agent for service of process in New Mexico.

s/ Arthur Garcia

FEE	
SERVICE & RETURN	\$3.00
NOTARY FEE	.50
TOTAL	<u>\$3.50</u>

COUNTY OF SANTA FE)
STATE OF NEW MEXICO) ss.

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 30th day of August,
1963. s/ Fred West Justice of the Peace

My commission expires:

12-31-1964

(SEAL)

s/ Fred West Justice of the Peace
Notary Public

DISTRICT COURT
SAN JUAN COUNTY, N. M.
FILED SEP 23 1963
Virginia A. Kittell
CLERK

STATE OF NEW MEXICO COUNTY OF SAN JUAN
IN THE DISTRICT COURT

EL PASO NATURAL GAS COMPANY,
a corporation; PAN AMERICAN
PETROLEUM CORPORATION, a
corporation; MARATHON OIL
COMPANY, a corporation;
SOUTHWEST PRODUCTION COMPANY,
a partnership; and SUNSET
INTERNATIONAL PETROLEUM
CORPORATION, a corporation,

RECEIVED AUG 27 1963
Santa Fe County
Sheriff's Office

Petitioners,

-vs-

No. 11,685

OIL CONSERVATION COMMISSION of
NEW MEXICO, JACK M. CAMPBELL,
Chairman; E. S. WALKER, Member;
A. L. PORTER, JR., Member and
SECRETARY; CONSOLIDATED OIL &
GAS, INC., a corporation,

Respondents.

AFFIDAVIT OF SERVICE

I. ARTHUR GARCIA, DEPUTY sheriff of Santa Fe County, State
of New Mexico, being first duly sworn upon his oath, states
that on the 27 day of AUGUST, 1963, he served a copy of notice
of appeal herein upon Southern Union Gas Company by delivering
same to Manuel Sanchez, Batts Building, Santa Fe, New Mexico,
who is Southern Union Gas Company's statutory agent for service
of process in New Mexico.

s/ Arthur Garcia

FEES:
SERVICE & RETURN \$3.00
NOTARY FEES .50
TOTAL \$3.50

COUNTY OF SANTA FE)
STATE OF NEW MEXICO) ss.

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 30th day of August,
1963.

s/ Fred West, Justice of the Peace
Notary Public

My commission expires:
12-31-1964

(SEAL)

DISTRICT COURT
SAN JUAN COUNTY, N. M.
FILED SEP 23 1963
Virginia A. Kittell
CLERK

STATE OF NEW MEXICO COUNTY OF SAN JUAN IN THE DISTRICT COURT

EL PASO NATURAL GAS COMPANY,
a corporation; PAN AMERICAN
PETROLEUM CORPORATION, a
corporation; MARATHON OIL
COMPANY, a corporation;
SOUTHWEST PRODUCTION COMPANY,
a partnership; and SUNSET
INTERNATIONAL PETROLEUM
CORPORATION, a corporation,

Petitioners,

-vs-

No. 11685

OIL CONSERVATION COMMISSION OF
NEW MEXICO, JACK M. CAMPBELL,
Chairman; E. S. WALKER, Member;
A. L. PORTER, JR., Member and
Secretary; CONSOLIDATED OIL &
GAS, INC., a corporation,

Respondents.

ACCEPTANCE OF SERVICE

Comes now Howard C. Bratton and accepts service of a
copy of Notice of Appeal herein on behalf of Humble Oil and
Refining Company.

s/ Howard C. Bratton
Howard C. Bratton
Hervey, Dow & Hinkle
Roswell, New Mexico

DISTRICT COURT
SAN JUAN COUNTY, N. M.
FILED SEP 23 1963
Virginia A. Kittell
CLERK

STATE OF NEW MEXICO

COUNTY OF SAN JUAN

IN THE DISTRICT COURT

EL PASO NATURAL GAS COMPANY,
a corporation; PAN AMERICAN
PETROLEUM CORPORATION, a
corporation; MARATHON OIL
COMPANY, a corporation;
SOUTHWEST PRODUCTION COMPANY,
a partnership; and SUNSET
INTERNATIONAL PETROLEUM
CORPORATION, a corporation,

Petitioners,

-vs-

No. 11, 685

OIL CONSERVATION COMMISSION OF
NEW MEXICO, JACK M. CAMPBELL,
Chairman; E. S. WALKER, Member;
A. L. PORTER, JR., Member and
Secretary; CONSOLIDATED OIL &
GAS, INC., a corporation,

Respondents.

CERTIFICATE

XXXXXXXXXX OF SERVICE

Harvey A. Woodmansee, Deputy Sheriff of Bernalillo County,

State of New Mexico, ~~being first duly sworn upon his oath~~

states that on the 29th day of Aug., 1963, he served a copy
of Notice Of Appeal herein upon Benjamin K. Horton & Associates
by delivering same to Benjamin K. Horton at 406 San Mateo
N. E., Albuquerque, New Mexico.

Fee \$4.00

s/ Harvey A. Woodmansee

STATE OF NEW MEXICO)
) ss.
COUNTY OF BERNALILLO)

Subscribed and sworn to before me this _____ day of
_____, 1963.

Notary Public

My Commission Expires:

(S E A L)

-61-

United States Department of Justice

UNITED STATES ATTORNEY

DISTRICT OF NEW MEXICO

P. O. Box 607

ALBUQUERQUE

87103


September 2,

RECEIVED

SEP 10 P.M.

SETH & MONTGOMERY

DISTRICT COURT
SAN JUAN COUNTY, N. M.



Virginia A. Kittell
CLERK

Mr. Richard S. Morris
Attorney at Law
301 Don Gaspar Avenue
Santa Fe, New Mexico

Re: El Paso Natural Gas Company et al, v.
Oil Conservation Commission et al.,
No. 11685, San Juan County, New Mexico

Dear Mr. Morris:

I have received your letter of August 23, 1963,
in which you enclosed Petition for Review and Accept-
ance of Service in captioned matter.

Contact has been made with the United States
Geological Survey and they have stated to this office
that they are not interested or concerned with the
matters covered in the captioned proceedings and
that the orders of the State Oil Conservation Com-
mission do not involve or affect the United States
Geological Survey in New Mexico.

Therefore, I do not feel that it would be proper
for an entry of an appearance to be made by this
office under these circumstances.

Sincerely yours,

John Quinn
JOHN QUINN
United States Attorney

JL:dt

ILLEGIBLE

DISTRICT COURT
SAN JUAN COUNTY, N. M.
FILED SEP 24 1963
Virginia A. Kittell
CLERK

STATE OF NEW MEXICO

COUNTY OF SAN JUAN

IN THE DISTRICT COURT

EL PASO NATURAL GAS COMPANY,
a corporation; PAN AMERICAN
PETROLEUM CORPORATION, a
corporation; MARATHON OIL
COMPANY, a corporation;
SOUTHWEST PRODUCTION COMPANY,
a partnership; and SUNSET
INTERNATIONAL PETROLEUM
CORPORATION, a corporation,

Petitioners,

-vs-

No. 11,685

OIL CONSERVATION COMMISSION OF
NEW MEXICO, JACK M. CAMPBELL,
Chairman; E. S. WALKER, Member;
A. L. PORTER, JR., Member and
Secretary; CONSOLIDATED OIL &
GAS, INC., a corporation,

Respondents.

AFFIDAVIT OF SERVICE

W E Woodard, Deputy Sheriff of Tarrant County, State of
Texas, being first duly sworn upon his oath states that on
the 31 day of Aug, 1963, he served a copy of Notice Of Appeal
herein upon Kay Kimbell Oil Operator by delivering same to
Kay Kimbell at 1929 South Main, Fort Worth, Texas.

s/ W E Woodard

STATE OF TEXAS }
COUNTY OF TARRANT } ss.

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 31st day of
August, 1963.

My Commission Expires:

s/ Otis Mayer
Notary Public

June 1, 1965
(SEAL)

Serving	1.50
Mileage	1.00
Notary	<u>.50</u>
	3.00

return

To Kay Kimbell
1929 So. Main

10:40 AM

S

17/163

RECEIVED
Aug 30 5 03 PM '63

TARRANT COUNTY
SHERIFF'S DEPT

Woody

DISTRICT COURT
SAN JUAN COUNTY, N. M.
FILED SEP 25 1963
Virginia A. Kittell
CLERK

STATE OF NEW MEXICO)
)
COUNTY OF SAN JUAN)

IN THE DISTRICT COURT

EL PASO NATURAL GAS COMPANY,
a corporation, PAN AMERICAN PET-
ROLEUM CORPORATION, a corporation,
MAATHON OIL COMPANY, a corpora-
tion, SOUTHWEST PRODUCTION COM-
PANY, a partnership, and SUNSET
INTERNATIONAL PETROLEUM CORPORA-
TION, a corporation,

Petitioners,

-vs-

No. 11685

OIL CONSERVATION COMMISSION OF
NEW MEXICO, JACK M. CAMPBELL,
Chairman, E. S. WALKER, Member,
A. L. PORTER, JR., Member and
Secretary, CONSOLIDATED OIL &
GAS INC., a corporation,

Respondents.

ANSWER TO PETITION FOR REVIEW

Comes now Consolidated Oil & Gas, Inc., named a respondent
herein, and for its reply to petitioners petition for review,
states:

First Defense

1. Respondent admits the allegations of paragraphs 1, 2,
and 5 of the petition for review.

2. In answer to paragraph 3 of the petition for review,
respondent denies that Order No. R-2259-B changing the proration
formula for the Baskin-Dakota Gas Pool was entered on July 9,
1963, and states the fact to be that said order, as appears
on the face thereof, was entered on July 3, 1963. Respondent
admits the other allegations of paragraph 3 of the petition for
review.

3. In answer to paragraph 4 of the petition for review
respondent states it is without knowledge or information
sufficient to form a belief as to the truth thereof, and

therefore denies the same.

4. Respondent denies the allegations of paragraph 6 of the petition for review and each of them, and denies the allegations contained in each and every subdivision thereof, and denies those matters and things set forth in petitioners' respective applications for rehearing, attached to the petition for review and incorporated therein by reference. Respondent further states in respect to the allegations of paragraph 6 a (1) that the record does, in fact, support finding 6 of Order No. R-2259-B and that if, in fact, the petitioner El Paso Natural Gas Company has or had revised and replaced by different data, any estimates of reserves it might have, such figures were not offered in evidence before the Commission. The petitioner El Paso Natural Gas Company having declined to produce any revised estimates of reserves before the Commission, cannot now be heard to complain of the use of other and different figures. Respondent further states in respect to the allegations of paragraph 6, subdivisions d, e, f, and j, that there was no valid proration order issued by the Oil Conservation Commission of New Mexico prior to the entry of Order No. R-2259-B on July 3, 1963.

5. Respondent denies the allegations of paragraph 7 and 8 of the petition for review, and each of them.

Second Defense

The Court is without jurisdiction of the subject matter of this action for the following reasons:

1. Petitioners have failed to exhaust their administrative remedy in that their application for rehearing before the Oil Conservation Commission of New Mexico was not timely filed as required by law.

2. Humble Oil & Refining Company, Skelly Oil Company, The Atlantic Refining Company, Southern Union Gas Company,

Benjamin K. Horton & Associates, R & G Drilling Company, The United States Geological Survey, Tidewater Oil Company, Bruce Anderson Oil & Gas Properties, The Frontier Refining Company, Kay Kimbell Oil Company, Texaco, Inc., Amerada Petroleum Corporation, Sunray Mid-Continent Oil Company, Continental Oil Company, Beard Oil Company, Delhi Oil Corporation, Western Natural Gas Company, Compass Exploration Co., Tenneco Oil Company, Caulkins Oil Company, Pioneer Production Co., and The British-American Oil Producing Company are, and each of them is, an indispensable party to this action whose interest in the controversy is such that no final judgment can be entered which will do justice between the parties without injuriously affecting the rights of said parties. Said parties are owners and operators of gas properties in the Basin-Dakota Gas Pool and will be directly affected by and subject to any order entered by the Court in this proceeding.

Third Defense

The petition fails to state a claim against respondents upon which relief can be granted.

WHEREFORE, respondent Consolidated Oil & Gas, Inc., prays:

1. That the petition for review be dismissed.
2. That Commission Orders No. R-2259-B and No. R-2259-C be affirmed.
3. That the Court grant respondent such other and further relief as the Court deems just.

CONSOLIDATED OIL & GAS, INC.

By s/ Jason W. Kellahin
KELLAHIN & FOX
P. O. Box 1713
Santa Fe, New Mexico

T. P. STOCKMAR
Holme, Roberts, More & Owen
1700 Broadway
Denver, 2, Colorado

ATTORNEYS FOR RESPONDENT,
CONSOLIDATED OIL & GAS, INC.

I hereby certify that a true copy of the foregoing instrument
was mailed to opposing counsel of record this 24th day of
Sept. 1963.

s/ Jason W. Kellahin

DISTRICT COURT
SAN JUAN COUNTY, N. M.
FILED SEP 26 1963
Virginia A. Kittell
CLERK

STATE OF NEW MEXICO

COUNTY OF SAN JUAN

IN THE DISTRICT COURT

EL PASO NATURAL GAS COMPANY,
et al.,

Petitioners,

vs.

No. 11,685

OIL CONSERVATION COMMISSION
OF NEW MEXICO, et al.,

Respondents.

ENTRY OF APPEARANCE

J. M. Durrett, Jr., Special Assitant Attorney General,
hereby enters his appearance on behalf of the respondent,
Oil Conservation Commission of New Mexico, in the above
entitled and numbered cause.

s/ J M Durrett Jr.
J. M. DURRETT, Jr.
Special Assistant Attorney General
representing the Oil Conservation
Commission of New Mexico, P. O. Box
871, Santa Fe, New Mexico

I hereby certify that on the 25th day of September, 1963,
a copy of the foregoing pleading was mailed to opposing
counsel of record.

s/ J M Durrett Jr.

DISTRICT COURT
SAN JUAN COUNTY, N. M.
FILED SEP 26 1963
Virginia A. Kittell
CLERK

STATE OF NEW MEXICO

COUNTY OF SAN JUAN

IN THE DISTRICT COURT

EL PASO NATURAL GAS COMPANY,

et al.,

Petitioners,

vs.

No. 11,685

OIL CONSERVATION COMMISSION
OF NEW MEXICO, et al.,

Respondents.

ANSWER TO PETITION FOR REVIEW

Respondent, Oil Conservation Commission of New Mexico,
answering the petition for Review, states:

1. Respondent admits the allegations in paragraphs 1
and 2 of the Petition for Review.

2. Respondent denies the allegation in paragraph 3 of
the Petition for Review that petitioner, El Paso Natural Gas
Company, filed its application for re-hearing with the Commission
on July 26, 1963, and states to the Court that said application
for rehearing was filed with the Commission on July 25, 1963;
respondent admits all other allegations in paragraph 3 of the
Petition for Review.

3. Respondent admits the allegations in paragraphs 4 and
5 of the Petition for Review.

4. Respondent denies each and every allegation in para-
graphs 6, 7, and 8 of the petition for Review, including all
conclusions of fact and law stated therein.

WHEREFORE, Respondent prays:

1. That the Petition for Review be dismissed.

2. That Commission Orders No. R-2259-B and No. R-2259-C
be affirmed.

3. That the Court grant respondent such other and further relief as the Court deems just.

AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES

1. As its first affirmative defense, respondent states that petitioners have failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.

2. As its second affirmative defense, respondent states that the petitioners have failed to join indispensable parties.

WHEREFORE, Respondent prays:

1. That the Petition for Review be dismissed.

2. That Commission Orders No. R-2259-B and No. R-2259-C be affirmed.

3. That the Court grant respondent such other and further relief as the Court deems just.

s/ J M Durrett Jr.
J. M. DURRETT, Jr.
Special Assistant Attorney General
representing the Oil Conservation
Commission of New Mexico, P. O.
Box 871, Santa Fe, New Mexico

I hereby certify that on the 25th day of September, 1963, a copy of the foregoing pleading was mailed to opposing counsel of record.

s/ J M Durrett Jr.

DISTRICT COURT
SAN JUAN COUNTY, N. M.
FILED SEP 26 1963
Virginia A. Kittell
CLERK

STATE OF NEW MEXICO COUNTY OF SAN JUAN IN THE DISTRICT COURT

EL PASO NATURAL GAS COMPANY,
a corporation; PAN AMERICAN
PETROLEUM CORPORATION, a corporation;
MARATHON OIL COMPANY, a corporation;
SOUTHWEST PRODUCTION COMPANY, a
partnership; and SUNSET INTERNATIONAL
PETROLEUM CORPORATION, a corporation,

Petitioners,

vs.

No. 11685

OIL CONSERVATION COMMISSION OF
NEW MEXICO, JACK M. CAMPBELL,
Chairman; E. S. WALKER, Member;
A. L. PORTER, JR., Member and
Secretary; CONSOLIDATED OIL & GAS,
INC., a corporation,

Respondents.

PETITION TO INTERVENE

Comes now Sunray DX Oil Company, a corporation, formerly
Sunray Mid-Continent Oil Company, and respectfully seeks leave
of Court to intervene in the above-entitled cause, and in
support thereof states:

1. That is an owner and operator of gas properties in the
Basin-Dakota Gas Pool and will be directly affected by and sub-
ject to any Order entered by the Court in this proceeding;

2. And for the further reason that it is an indispensable
party to the cause whose interest in the controversy is such
that no final judgment can be entered which will do justice
between the parties without injuriously affecting the rights
of Petitioner.

That a copy of Petitioner's Response which it seeks leave
to file is attached hereto and marked Exhibit A.

WHEREFORE, Petitioner seeks leave to intervene in the above
cause and that it be granted leave to file the proposed
Response, and for such other and further relief as the Court

may deem proper in the premises.

GILBERT, WHITE & GILBERT

By s/ L C White
L. C. White, PO Box 787,
Santa Fe, NM

John Curran, Esq., Attorney
Sunray DX Oil Co. PO Box 2039
Tulsa, Okla.

STATE OF NEW MEXICO COUNTY OF SAN JUAN IN THE DISTRICT COURT

EL PASO NATURAL GAS COMPANY,
a corporation, PAN AMERICAN PET-
ROLEUM CORPORATION, a corporation,
MARATHON OIL COMPANY, a corpora-
tion, SOUTHWEST PRODUCTION COM-
PANY, a partnership, and SUNSET
INTERNATIONAL PETROLEUM CORPORA-
TION, a corporation,

Exhibit A

Petitioners,

vs

No. 11685

OIL CONSERVATION COMMISSION OF
NEW MEXICO, JACK M. CAMPBELL,
Chairman, E. S. WALKER, Member,
A. L. PORTER, JR., Member and
Secretary, CONSOLIDATED OIL &
GAS INC., a corporation,

Respondents.

RESPONSE TO PETITION FOR REVIEW

Comes now Sunray DX Oil Company, a corporation, formerly
Sunray Mid-Continent Oil Company, intervenor herein and for
its reply to petitioner's Petition for Review states:

First Defense

1. Intervenor admits the allegations of paragraphs 1,
2, and 5 of the petition for review.
2. Intervenor admits the allegations of paragraph 3 of
the petition for review.
3. In answer to paragraph 4 of the petition for review
intervenor states it is without knowledge or information
sufficient to form a belief as to the truth thereof, and
therefore denies the same.
4. Intervenor denies the allegations of paragraph 6 of
the petition for review and each of them, and denies the allega-
tions contained in each and every subdivision thereof, and
denies those matters and things set forth in petitioners'
respective applications for rehearing, attached to the petition
for review and incorporated therein by reference. Intervenor
further states in respect to the allegations of paragraph 6 a (1)

EXHIBIT A

that the record does, in fact, support finding 6 of Order No. R-2259-B and that if, in fact, the petitioner El Paso Natural Gas Company has or had revised and replaced by different data, any estimates of reserves it might have, such figures were not offered in evidence before the Commission. The petitioner El Paso Natural Gas Company having declined to produce any revised estimates of reserves before the Commission, cannot now be heard to complain of the use of other and different figures.

5. Intervenor denies the allegations of paragraph 7 and 8 of the petition for review, and each of them.

Second Defense

The Court is without jurisdiction of the subject matter of this action for the following reason:

1. Petitioners have failed to exhaust their administrative remedy in that their application for rehearing before the Oil Conservation Commission of New Mexico was not timely filed as required by law.

Third Defense

The petition fails to state a claim against intervenors upon which relief can be granted.

WHEREFORE, Intervenor Sunray DX Oil Company, a corporation, formerly Sunray Mid-Continent Oil Company, prays:

1. That the petition for review be dismissed.
2. That Commission Orders No. R-2259-B and No. R-2259-C be affirmed_
3. That the Court grant intervenor such other and further relief as the Court deems just.

SUNRAY DX OIL COMPANY, a corporation,
formerly SUNRAY MIC-CONTINENT OIL
COMPANY
By GILBERT, WHITE AND GILBERT

By _____
P. O. Box 787, Santa Fe, N.M.
MR. JOHN CURRAN
P. O. Box 2039
Tulsa 2, Oklahoma

DISTRICT COURT
SAN JUAN COUNTY, N. M.
FILED SEP 26 1963
Virginia A. Kittell
CLERK

STATE OF NEW MEXICO COUNTY OF SAN JUAN IN THE DISTRICT COURT

EL PASO NATURAL GAS COMPANY,
a corporation; PAN AMERICAN
PETROLEUM CORPORATION, a
corporation; MARATHON OIL
COMPANY, a corporation;
SOUTHWEST PRODUCTION COMPANY,
a partnership; and SUNSET
INTERNATIONAL PETROLEUM
CORPORATION, a corporation,

RECORDED BOOK B-2
PAGE 50

Petitioners,

vs.

No. 11,685

OIL CONSERVATION COMMISSION OF
NEW MEXICO, JACK M. CAMPBELL,
Chairman; E. S. WALKER, Member;
A. L. PORTER, JR., Member and
Secretary; CONSOLIDATED OIL &
GAS, INC., a corporation,

Respondents.

ORDER GRANTING LEAVE TO INTERVENE AS RESPONDENT

This cause having come on for hearing upon the motion of Sunray DX Oil Company for leave to intervene in the above-entitled action as a party respondent thereof, and it appearing to the Court that Sunray DX Oil Company has an interest in the above-entitled proceeding sufficient to warrant it to become a party to this action:

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Sunray DX Oil Company be and it hereby is granted leave to intervene in said proceeding as a party respondent and to file its response herein.

s/ C. C. McCulloh
District Judge

DISTRICT COURT
SAN JUAN COUNTY, N. M.
FILED SEP 26 1963
Virginia A. Kittell
CLERK

STATE OF NEW MEXICO COUNTY OF SAN JUAN IN THE DISTRICT COURT

EL PASO NATURAL GAS COMPANY,
a corporation; PAN AMERICAN
PETROLEUM CORPORATION, a corporation;
MARATHON OIL COMPANY, a corporation;
SOUTHWEST PRODUCTION COMPANY, a
partnership; and SUNSET INTERNATIONAL
PETROLEUM CORPORATION, a corporation,

Petitioners,

vs.

No. 11685

OIL CONSERVATION COMMISSION OF
NEW MEXICO, JACK M. CAMPBELL,
Chairman; E. S. WALKER, Member;
A. L. PORTER, JR., Member and
Secretary; CONSOLIDATED OIL & GAS,
INC., a corporation,

Respondents.

PETITION TO INTERVENE

Comes now Texaco Inc., a corporation, and respectfully
seeks leave of Court to intervene in the above-entitled cause,
and in support thereof states:

1. That it is an owner and operator of gas properties
in the Basin-Dakota Gas Pool and will be directly affected
by and subject to any Order entered by the Court in this
proceeding;

2. And for the further reason that it is an indispensable
party to the cause whose interest in the controversy is such
that no final judgment can be entered which will do justice
between the parties without injuriously affecting the rights
of Petitioner.

That a copy of Petitioner's Response which it seeks leave
to file is attached hereto and marked Exhibit A.

WHEREFORE, Petitioner seeks leave to intervene in the above
cause that it be granted leave to file the proposed Response,
and for such other and further relief as the Court may deem

proper in the premises.

GILBERT, WHITE & GILBERT

By s/ L C White
L. C. White, PO Box 787
Santa Fe, New Mexico

Walter E. Will, Esq.
Texaco Inc.
PO Box 2100, Denver 1, Colorado.

STATE OF NEW MEXICO COUNTY OF SAN JUAN IN THE DISTRICT COURT

EL PASO NATURAL GAS COMPANY,
a corporation, PAN AMERICAN PET-
ROLEUM CORPORATION, a corporation,
MARATHON OIL COMPANY, a corpora=
tion, SOUTHWEST PRODUCTION COM-
PANY, a partnership and SUNSET
INTERNATIONAL PETROLEUM CORPORA-
TION, a corporation,

EXHIBIT A

Petitioners,

vs

No. 11685

OIL CONSERVATION COMMISSION OF
NEW MEXICO, JACK M. CAMPBELL,
Chairman, E. S. WALKER, Member,
A. L. PORTER, JR., Member and
Secretary, CONSOLIDATED OIL &
GAS INC., a corporation,

Respondents.

RESPONSE TO PETITION FOR REVIEW

Comes now Texaco Inc. Intervenor herein and for its reply
to petitioners' petition for review states:

First defense

1. Intervenor admits the allegations of paragraphs 1, 2
and 5 of the petition for review.

2. Intervenor admits the allegations of paragraph 3
of the petition for review.

3. In answer to paragraph 4 of the petition for review
intervenor states it is without knowledge or information suf-
ficient to form a belief as to the truth thereof, and therefore
denies the same.

4. Intervenor denies the allegations of paragraph 6
of the petition for review and each of them, and denies the
allegations contained in each and every subdivision thereof,
and denies those matters and things set forth in petitioners'
respective applications for rehearing, attached to the petition
for review and incorporated therein by reference. Intervenor
further states in respect to the allegations of paragraph 6 a
(1) that the record does, in fact, support finding 6 of Order
No. R-2259-B and that if, in fact, the petitioner El Paso

Natural Gas Company has or had revised and replaced by different data, any estimates of reserves it might have, such figures were not offered in evidence before the Commission. The petitioner El Paso Natural Gas Company having declined to produce any revised estimates of reserves before the Commission, cannot now be heard to complain of the use of other and different figures.

5. Intervenor denies the allegations of paragraph 7 and 8 of the petition for review, and each of them.

Second Defense

The Court is without jurisdiction of the subject matter of this action for the following reason: Petitioners have failed to exhaust their administrative remedy in that their application for rehearing before the Oil Conservation Commission of New Mexico was not timely filed as required by law.

Third Defense

The petition fails to state a claim against intervenors upon which relief can be granted.

WHEREFORE, intervenor Texaco Inc. prays:

1. That the petition for review be dismissed.
2. That Commission Orders No. R-2259-B and R-2259-C be affirmed.
3. That the Court grant intervenor such other and further relief as the Court deems just.

TEXACO INC.
By GILBERT, WHITE AND GILBERT

By _____
P. O. Box 787, Santa Fe, New Mexico

MR. WALTER E. WILL
P. O. Box 2100
Denver, Colorado

Attorneys for Texaco Inc.

DISTRICT COURT
SAN JUAN COUNTY, N. M.
FILED SEP 26 1963
Virginia A. Kittell
CLERK

STATE OF NEW MEXICO COUNTY OF SAN JUAN IN THE DISTRICT COURT

EL PASO NATURAL GAS COMPANY,

RECORDED BOOK B-2
PAGE 51

a corporation; PAN AMERICAN
PETROLEUM CORPORATION, a
corporation; MARATHON OIL
COMPANY, a corporation;
SOUTHWEST PRODUCTION COMPANY,
a partnership; and SUNSET
INTERNATIONAL PETROLEUM
CORPORATION, a corporation,

Petitioners,

vs.

No. 11,685

OIL CONSERVATION COMMISSION OF
NEW MEXICO, JACK M. CAMPBELL,
Chairman; E. S. WALKER, Member;
A. L. PORTER, JR., Member and
Secretary; CONSOLIDATED OIL &
GAS, INC., a corporation,

Respondents.

ORDER GRANTING LEAVE TO INTERVENE AS RESPONDENT

This cause having come on for hearing upon the motion of Texaco Inc. for leave to intervene in the above-entitled action as a party respondent thereof and it appearing to the Court that Texaco Inc. has an interest in the above-entitled proceeding sufficient to warrant it to become a party to this action:

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Texaco Inc. be and it hereby is granted leave to intervene in said proceeding as a party respondent and to file its response herein.

s/ C. C. McCulloh
District Judge

DISTRICT COURT
SAN JUAN COUNTY, N. M.
FILED SEP 26 1963
Virginia A. Kittell
CLERK

STATE OF NEW MEXICO COUNTY OF SAN JUAN IN THE DISTRICT COURT

EL PASO NATURAL GAS COMPANY,
a corporation, PAN AMERICAN PET-
ROLEUM CORPORATION, a corporation,
MARATHON OIL COMPANY, a corpora-
tion, SOUTHWEST PRODUCTION COM-
PANY, a partnership, and SUNSET
INTERNATIONAL PETROLEUM CORPORA-
TION, a corporation,

Petitioners,

vs

No. 11685

OIL CONSERVATION COMMISSION OF
NEW MEXICO, JACK M. CAMPBELL,
Chairman, E. S. WALKER, Member,
A. L. PORTER, JR., Member and
Secretary, CONSOLIDATED OIL &
GAS INC., a corporation,

Respondents.

RESPONSE TO PETITION FOR REVIEW

Comes now Sunray DX Oil Company, a corporation, formerly
Sunray Mid-Continent Oil Company, intervenor herein and for
its reply to petitioner's Petition for Review states:

First Defense

1. Intervenor admits the allegations of paragraphs 1, 2,
and 5 of the petition for review.

2. Intervenor admits the allegations of paragraph 3
of the petition for review.

3. In answer to paragraph 4 of the petition for review
intervenor states it is without knowledge or information
sufficient to form a belief as to the truth thereof, and
therefore denies the same.

4. Intervenor denies the allegations of paragraph 6
of the petition for review and each of them, and denies the
allegations contained in each and every subdivision thereof,
and denies those matters and things set forth in petitioners'
respective applications for rehearing, attached to the

petition for review and incorporated therein by reference. Intervenor further states in respect to the allegations of paragraph 6 a (1) that the record does, in fact, support finding 6 of Order No. R-2259-B and that if, in fact, the petitioner El Paso Natural Gas Company has or had revised and replaced by different data, any estimates of reserves it might have, such figures were not offered in evidence before the Commission. The petitioner El Paso Natural Gas Company having declined to produce any revised estimates of reserves before the Commission, cannot now be heard to complain of the use of other and different figures.

5. Intervenor denies the allegations of paragraph 7 and 8 of the petition for review, and each of them.

Second Defense

The Court is without jurisdiction of the subject matter of this action for the following reason:

1. Petitioners have failed to exhaust their administrative remedy in that their application for rehearing before the Oil Conservation Commission of New Mexico was not timely filed as required by law.

Third Defense

The petition fails to state a claim against intervenors upon which relief can be granted.

WHEREFORE, intervenor Sunray DX Oil Company, a corporation, formerly Sunray Mid-Continent Oil Company, prays:

1. That the petition for review be dismissed.
2. That Commission Orders No. R-2259-B and No. R-2259-C be affirmed_
3. That the Court grant intervenor such other and further relief as the Court deems just.

SUNRAY DX OIL COMPANY, a corporation,
formerly SUNRAY MID-CONTINENT OIL
COMPANY
By GILBERT, WHITE AND GILBERT

By s/ L C White
P. O. Box 787, Santa Fe, N.M.

MR. JOHN CURRAN
P. O. Box 2039
Tulsa 2, Oklahoma

Attorneys for Intervenor

DISTRICT COURT
SAN JUAN COUNTY, N. M.
FILED SEP 26 1963
Virginia A. Kittell
CLERK

STATE OF NEW MEXICO COUNTY OF SAN JUAN IN THE DISTRICT COURT

EL PASO NATURAL GAS COMPANY,
a corporation, PAN AMERICAN PET-
ROLEUM CORPORATION, a corporation,
MARATHON OIL COMPANY, a corpora-
tion, SOUTHWEST PRODUCTION COM-
PANY, a partnership and SUNSET
INTERNATIONAL PETROLEUM CORPORA-
TION, a corporation,

Petitioners,

vs

No. 11685

OIL CONSERVATION COMMISSION OF
NEW MEXICO, JACK M. CAMPBELL,
Chairman, E. S. WALKER, Member,
A. L. PORTER, JR., Member and
Secretary, CONSOLIDATED OIL &
GAS INC., a corporation,

Respondents.

RESPONSE TO PETITION FOR REVIEW

Comes now Texaco Inc. Intervenor herein and for its reply
to petitioners' petition for review states:

First defense

1. Intervenor admits the allegations of paragraphs 1, 2
and 5 of the petition for review.
2. Intervenor admits the allegations of paragraph 3
of the petition for review.
3. In answer to paragraph 4 of the petition for review
intervenor states it is without knowledge or information suf-
ficient to form a belief as to the truth thereof, and therefore
denies the same.
4. Intervenor denies the allegations of paragraph 6 of
the petition for review and each of them, and denies the allega-
tions contained in each and every subdivision thereof, and
denies those matters and things set forth in petitioners'
respective applications for rehearing, attached to the petition
for review and incorporated therein by reference. Intervenor
further states in respect to the allegations of paragraph 6 a

(1) that the record doesn, in fact, support finding 6 of Order No. R-2259-B and that if, in fact, the petitioner El Paso Natural Gas Company has or had revised and replaced by different data, any estimates of reserves it might have, such figures were not offered in evidence before the Commission. The petitioner El Paso Natural Gas Company having declined to produce any revised estimates of reserves before the Commission, cannot now be heard to complain of the use of other and different figures.

5. Intervenor denies the allegations of paragraph 7 and 8 of the petition for review, and each of them.

Second Defense

The Court is without jurisdiction of the subject matter of this action for the following reason: Petitioners have failed to exhaust their administrative remedy in that their application for rehearing before the Oil Conservation Commission of New Mexico was not timely filed as required by law.

Third Defense

The petition fails to state a claim against intervenors upon which relief can be granted.

WHEREFORE, intervenor Texaco Inc. prays:

1. That the petition for review be dismissed.
2. That Commission Orders No. R-2259-B and R-2259-C be affirmed.
3. That the Court grant intervenor such other and further relief as the Court deems just.

TEXACO INC.
By GILBERT, WHITE AND GILBERT
By s/ L C White
P. O. Box 787, Santa Fe, New Mexico

MR. WALTER E. WILL
P. O. Box 2100
Denver, Colorado

Attorneys for Texaco Inc.

DISTRICT COURT
SAN JUAN COUNTY, N. M.
FILED OCT 1 - 1963
Virginia A. Kittell
CLERK

STATE OF NEW MEXICO COUNTY OF SAN JUAN IN THE DISTRICT COURT

EL PASO NATURAL GAS COMPANY,
a corporation; PAN AMERICAN
PETROLEUM CORPORATION, a corporation;
MARATHON OIL COMPANY, a corporation;
SOUTHWEST PRODUCTION COMPANY, a
partnership; and SUNSET INTERNATIONAL
PETROLEUM CORPORATION, a corporation,

Petitioners,

v.

No. 11,685

OIL CONSERVATION COMMISSION OF NEW
MEXICO, JACK M. CAMPBELL, Chairman;
E. S. WALKER, Member; A. L. PORTER,
JR., Member and Secretary; CONSOLIDATED
OIL & GAS, INC., a corporation,

Respondents.

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

The undersigned, as one of the attorneys for Texaco Inc.
and Sunray DX Oil Company, hereby certifies that he mailed
copies of the respective Petition to Intervene, Order granting
Leave to Intervene, and Response to Petition for Review to
the following:

Seth, Montgomery, Federici & Andrews, 301 Don Gaspar Avenue,
Santa Fe, New Mexico, attorneys for El Paso Natural Gas
Company and Sunset International Petroleum Company;

Atwood & Malone, P. O. Box 700, Roswell, New Mexico, attorneys
for Pan American Petroleum Corporation and Marathon Oil
Company;

Verity, Burr, Cooley & Jones, Petroleum Center Building,
Farmington, New Mexico, attorneys for Southwest Production
Company;

James M. Durrett, Jr. Esq., State Land Office Building, Santa
Fe, New Mexico, Attorney for Oil Conservation Commission
of New Mexico;

Kellahin & Fox, 54½ East San Francisco, Santa Fe, New Mexico,
Attorneys for Consolidated Oil & Gas, Inc.
on the 30th day of September, 1963.

s/ L C White
L. C. White

Gilbert, White & Gilbert
Post Office Box 787
Santa Fe, New Mexico

DISTRICT COURT
SAN JUAN COUNTY, N. M.
FILED OCT 11 1963
Virginia A. Kittell
CLERK

STATE OF NEW MEXICO

COUNTY OF SAN JUAN

IN THE DISTRICT COURT

EL PASO NATURAL GAS COMPANY,
a corporation; PAN AMERICAN
PETROLEUM CORPORATION, a corporation;
MARATHON OIL COMPANY, a corporation;
SOUTHWEST PRODUCTION COMPANY, a
partnership; and SUNSET INTERNATIONAL
PETROLEUM CORPORATION, a corporation,

Petitioners,

-vs-

No. 11,685

OIL CONSERVATION COMMISSION OF NEW
MEXICO, JACK M. CAMPBELL, Chairman;
E. S. WALKER, Member; A. L. PORTER,
JR., Member and Secretary; CONSOLIDATED
OIL & GAS, INC., a corporation,

Respondents.

M O T I O N

Comes now Southwest Production Company, a co-partnership consisting of John Hill and Joseph P. Driscoll and Beta Development Co., a Texas corporation under the provisions of Rule 25 (c) of the Rules of Civil Procedure and moves the Court to substitute Beta Development Co. in the place of Southwest Production Company as a Petitioner in the captioned action and in support represents to the Court that Southwest Production Company has transferred all of the properties which gave it an interest in the captioned controversy to Beta Development Company.

VERITY, BURR, COOLEY & JONES

By s/ Geo L Verity
Geo. L. Verity

I hereby certify that a copy of the foregoing pleading was mailed to opposing counsel of record on Oct. 10, 1963

Signed: Geo L Verity

DISTRICT COURT
SAN JUAN COUNTY, N. M.
FILED OCT 24 1963
Virginia A. Kittell
CLERK

STATE OF NEW MEXICO

COUNTY OF SAN JUAN

IN THE DISTRICT COURT

EL PASO NATURAL GAS COMPANY,
a corporation; PAN AMERICAN
PETROLEUM CORPORATION, a corporation;
MARATHON OIL COMPANY, a corporation;
SOUTHWEST PRODUCTION COMPANY, a
partnership; and SUNSET INTERNATIONAL
PETROLEUM CORPORATION, a corporation,

Petitioners,

vs.

No. 11685

OIL CONSERVATION COMMISSION OF
NEW MEXICO, JACK M. CAMPBELL,
Chairman; E. S. WALKER, Member;
A. L. PORTER, JR., Member and
Secretary; CONSOLIDATED OIL &
GAS, INC., a corporation,

Respondents.

PETITION TO INTERVENE

Comes now PUBCO PETROLEUM CORPORATION, a corporation, and respectfully seeks leave of Court to intervene in the above entitled cause, and in support thereof, states:

1. That it is an owner and operator of gas properties in the Basin-Dakota Gas Pool and will be directly affected by and subject to any Order entered by the Court in this proceeding.

2. That Pubco Petroleum Corporation should be permitted to adopt as its own, the pleading now filed by petitioners in this cause.

WHEREFORE, petitioner seeks leave to intervene in the above cause, and for such other and further relief as the Court may deem proper in the premises.

W. A. KELEHER, JOHN B. TITTMANN
and WILLIAM B. KELEHER

By s/ William B Keleher
Attorneys for Petitioner
PUBCO PETROLEUM CORPORATION
First National Bank Bldg. W.
Albuquerque, New Mexico

I hereby certify that a copy of the foregoing Petition to Intervene has been forwarded by mail on this 23 day of October, 1963 to all counsel of record.

s/ William B Keleher

DISTRICT COURT
SAN JUAN COUNTY, N. M.
FILED DEC 17 1963
Virginia A. Kittell
CLERK

STATE OF NEW MEXICO

COUNTY OF SAN JUAN

IN THE DISTRICT COURT

EL PASO NATURAL GAS COMPANY,
et al.,

RECORDED BOOK D-2
PAGE 57

Petitioners,

vs.

OIL CONSERVATION COMMISSION
OF NEW MEXICO, et al.,

Respondents.

ORDER

This matter having come before the Court on the Petition to Intervene filed by Pubco Petroleum Corporation, the petitioner, Pubco Petroleum Corporation, being represented by John B. Tittmann and William B. Keleher, the respondent, Consolidated Oil & Gas, Inc., being represented by Jason W. Kellahin, and the respondent, Oil Conservation Commission, being represented by James M. Durrett, Jr., and the Court having read the petition and having heard argument of counsel and being otherwise fully advised in the premises, FINDS:

1. That the Petition to Intervene should be denied.
2. That Pubco Petroleum Corporation should be permitted to participate in the above cause only as amicus curiae.

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED:

1. That the Petition to Intervene filed by Pubco Petroleum Corporation shall be and the same hereby is denied.
2. That Pubco Petroleum Corporation shall be and it hereby is permitted to participate in the above cause only as amicus curiae.

To all of which petitioner, Pubco Petroleum Corporation, excepts and objects.

s/ C. C. McCulloh
District Judge

Submitted:

s/ J M Durrett Jr

Attorney for Respondent

Oil Conservation Commission

s/ Jason W. Kellahin

One of the attorneys for

Consolidated Oil & Gas, Inc.

Submitted:

s/ William B Keleher,

one of the attorneys for Pubco

DISTRICT COURT
SAN JUAN COUNTY, N. M.
FILED FEB 26 1964
Virginia A. Kittell
CLERK

STATE OF NEW MEXICO)
)
COUNTY OF SAN JUAN)

IN THE DISTRICT COURT

EL PASO NATURAL GAS COMPANY,
a corporation, et al.,

Petitioners,

-vs-

No. 11,685

OIL CONSERVATION COMMISSION OF
NEW MEXICO, et al.,

Respondents.

M O T I O N

Comes now Southern Union Gas Company, a corporation duly admitted to do business in New Mexico, by its attorneys, and respectfully requests leave to appear before the court as amicus curiae and states that it was a participant in the case before the Oil Conservation Commission of New Mexico; that it was not named as a party in this proceeding, but will be affected by any decision therein; and that it seeks leave of the Court to appear as amicus curiae in support of the order of the Commission.

Respectfully submitted,

SOUTHERN UNION GAS COMPANY

By: A. S. Grenier
William S. Jameson
Fidelity Union Tower
Dallas 1, Texas

Kellahin & Fox
P. O. Box 1769
Santa Fe, New Mexico

s/ Jason W. Kellahin

I hereby certify that a true copy of the foregoing instrument was mailed to opposing counsel of record this 18th day of Feb, 1964

s/ Jason W. Kellahin

DISTRICT COURT
SAN JUAN COUNTY, N. M.
FILED FEB 26 1964
Virginia A. Kittell
CLERK

STATE OF NEW MEXICO }
COUNTY OF SAN JUAN }

IN THE DISTRICT COURT

EL PASO NATURAL GAS COMPANY,
a corporation, et al.,

RECORDED BOOK D-2
PAGE 384

Petitioners,

-vs-

No. 11,685

OIL CONSERVATION COMMISSION OF
NEW MEXICO, et al.,

Respondents.

O R D E R

This matter coming before the Court on the motion of Southern Union Gas Company for leave to appear before the Court as amicus curiae, and the Court having considered the same and having satisfied itself that the said Southern Union Gas Company, by its attorneys, can serve in such capacity and that such service would be helpful to the court,

It is, therefore, ORDERED, that the leave requested by the said Southern Union Gas Company to appear before this court in the capacity of amicus curiae for the purposes requested should be, and the same is hereby, granted in all things.

s/ C. C. McCulloh
DISTRICT JUDGE

United States Department of Justice

UNITED STATES ATTORNEY

DISTRICT OF NEW MEXICO

P. O. Box 607

ALBUQUERQUE

87103

RECEIVED

SEP 10 P.M.

SETH & MONTGOMERY

September 9, 1963 DISTRICT COURT
SAN JUAN COUNTY, N. M.

Mr. Richard S. Morris
Attorney at Law
301 Don Gaspar Avenue
Santa Fe, New Mexico

MAR 5 - 1964

Virginia A. Kittell
CLERK

Re: El Paso Natural Gas Company et al, v.
Oil Conservation Commission et al.,
No. 11685, San Juan County, New Mexico

Dear Mr. Morris:

I have received your letter of August 23, 1963, in which you enclosed Petition for Review and Acceptance of Service in captioned matter.

Contact has been made with the United States Geological Survey and they have stated to this office that they are not interested or concerned with the matters covered in the captioned proceedings and that the orders of the State Oil Conservation Commission do not involve or affect the United States Geological Survey in New Mexico.

Therefore, I do not feel that it would be proper for an entry of an appearance to be made by this office under these circumstances.

Sincerely yours,

John Quinn
JOHN QUINN
United States Attorney

JQ:dt

DISTRICT COURT
SAN JUAN COUNTY, N. M.
FILED MAR 5 - 1964
Virginia A. Kittell
CLERK

STATE OF NEW MEXICO

COUNTY OF SAN JUAN

IN THE DISTRICT COURT

EL PASO NATURAL GAS COMPANY,
a corporation; PAN AMERICAN
PETROLEUM CORPORATION, a
corporation; MARATHON OIL
COMPANY, a corporation;
SOUTHWEST PRODUCTION COMPANY,
a partnership; and SUNSET
INTERNATIONAL PETROLEUM
CORPORATION, a corporation,

Petitioners,

-vs-

No. 11,685

OIL CONSERVATION COMMISSION OF
NEW MEXICO, JACK M. CAMPBELL,
Chairman; E. S. WALKER, Member;
A. L. Porter, Jr., Member and
Secretary; CONSOLIDATED OIL &
GAS, INC., a corporation,

Respondents.

ACCEPTANCE OF SERVICE

Comes now John Loehr, statutory agent and attorney for
R & G Drilling Company, and accepts service of a copy of
Notice of Appeal herein on behalf of said respondent on this
29th day of August, 1963.

s/ John F. Loehr
John Loehr, statutory agent
and attorney for R & G
Drilling Company

DISTRICT COURT
SAN JUAN COUNTY, N. M.
FILED APR 2- 1964
Virginia A. Kittell
CLERK

STATE OF NEW MEXICO COUNTY OF SAN JUAN IN THE DISTRICT COURT

EL PASO NATURAL GAS COMPANY,
a corporation, PAN AMERICAN
PETROLEUM CORPORATION, a
corporation, MARATHON OIL
COMPANY, a corporation, BETA
DEVELOPMENT COMPANY, and
SUNSET INTERNATIONAL PETROLEUM
CORPORATION, a corporation,

Petitioners,

vs.

No. 11685

OIL CONSERVATION COMMISSION OF
NEW MEXICO, JACK M. CAMPBELL,
Chairman, E. S. WALKER, Member,
A. L. PORTER, JR., Member and
Secretary, CONSOLIDATED OIL &
GAS, INC., a corporation,

Respondents.

PETITIONERS REQUESTED FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

REQUESTED FINDINGS OF FACT

1. Petitioners El Paso Natural Gas Company, Pan American Petroleum Corporation and Sunset International Petroleum Corporation are corporations organized under the laws of the State of Delaware and authorized to do business in the State of New Mexico; petitioner Marathon Oil Company is a corporation organized under the laws of the State of Ohio and authorized to do business in the state of New Mexico; petitioner Beta Development Company is a partnership doing business in the State of New Mexico.

2. Respondent Oil Conservation Commission of New Mexico is a duly organized agency of the State of New Mexico, whose members are Jack M. Campbell, Chairman, E. S. Walker, and A. L. Porter, Jr., Secretary; respondent Consolidated Oil & Gas, Inc., is a corporation organized under the laws of the State of Colorado and authorized to do business in the State of New Mexico.

3. Petitioners each own property in San Juan County, New Mexico, which is affected by Orders Nos. R-2259-B and R-2259-C of the New Mexico Oil Conservation Commission.

4. Proration of gas production from the Basin Dakota Pool was initiated by Order R-1670-C promulgated by the Oil Conservation Commission of New Mexico on November 4, 1960. That Order established the so called "25-75 formula" for the allocation of allowable between wells in the pool. Under the formula allowable was allocated 25% upon the acreage attributable to the well and 75% upon the acreage attributable to the well multiplied by the deliverability factor of the well. This formula was applicable to all production from the Basin Dakota Pool from the initiation of proration of its production until the promulgation of Order R-2259-B. During the period that Order R-1670-C was in effect 372 wells were drilled by operators in the pool under the provisions of, and in reliance upon, the 25-75 formula.

5. On April 18 through April 21, 1962, Respondent Oil Conservation Commission of New Mexico considered at hearing the application of Respondent Consolidated Oil & Gas, Inc., to change the proration formula for the Basin Dakota Gas Pool located in San Juan, Rio Arriba and Sandoval Counties, New Mexico, from a formula based twenty-five percent upon acreage and seventy-five percent upon acreage multiplied by deliverability to a formula based sixty percent upon acreage and forty percent upon acreage multiplied by deliverability. By its Order No. R-2259, dated June 7, 1962, the Commission denied the application. Consolidated Oil & Gas, Inc., then applied for rehearing which was granted by Commission Order No. R-2259-A, dated July 7, 1962. On July 9, 1963, following rehearing, Respondent Oil Conservation Commission of New Mexico entered its Order No. R-2259-B changing the proration formula for the Basin Dakota Gas Pool to sixty per cent acreage and

forty per cent acreage times deliverability as requested by Respondent Consolidated Oil & Gas, Inc.

6. The facts with reference to the signing and promulgation of Order R-2259-B were these. On July 3, 1963, two members of the New Mexico Oil Conservation Commission met and signed an original and one copy of Oil Conservation Commission Order No. R-2259-B; that said original order was forwarded to the printer for reproduction; upon the return of the original order from the printer, both the original and the copy of said order were signed by the third member of the Commission; the signed copy of said Order No. R-2259-B, upon being signed by the third member of the Commission, was placed in the file of Case No. 2504; the original order was then placed in full, as required by Sec. 65-3-6, N.M.S.A., 1953 Comp., in a book kept in the Commission office for such purpose, this action being taken at the direction of A. L. Porter, Jr., Secretary-Director of the Commission, and said A. L. Porter, Jr., thereupon endorsed on the order placed in said book the following:

"Entered July 9, 1963
A. L. P."

upon the first page of such original order.

7. On July 26, 1963, Petitioner El Paso Natural Gas Company filed with the Commission its Application for Rehearing setting forth the respect in which such Order was believed to be erroneous, which Application for Rehearing was denied by the Commission in its Order No. R-2259-C, dated August 1, 1963. On July 29, 1963, Petitioners Pan American Petroleum Corporation, Marathon Oil Company, Southwest Production Company and Sunset International Petroleum Corporation filed with the Commission their Applications for Rehearing setting forth the respect in which Order No. R-2259-B was believed to be erroneous, which Applications for Rehearing also were denied by the Commission in its Order No. R-2259-C, dated August 1, 1963.

TELEPHONE MESSAGE Rev. 1-60

M. RLSn

a.m.
p.m.

You were called at _____ Date _____

By <u>Pop Gator</u>	
<input type="checkbox"/> Is Waiting On Line	
<input type="checkbox"/> Please Call _____	Ext. _____
<input type="checkbox"/> Returned Your Call	<input type="checkbox"/> Will Call Again

Please Call _____	
<small>OPERATOR NO.</small>	<small>CITY</small>
And Ask for M. _____	
At Telephone No. _____	Ext. _____

Left this Message

(Over)

Use Your "Blue Book"

FOR FASTER LONG DISTANCE SERVICE-CALL BY NUMBER

8. Beta Development Company has succeeded to the interest of Petitioner Southwest Production Company in the Basin Dakota Pool and has been substituted for Southwest Production Company as a party hereto.

9. That a copy of said Order No. R-2259-B was mailed by the Commission to the Supreme Court Library and to all interested parties on July 9, 1963, and that no notice of said order was given to any party prior to said date, nor did any party have actual knowledge of said order prior to July 9, 1963.

10. That on August 20, 1963, Petitioners filed herein their Petition for Review of Order Nos. R-2259-B and R-2259-C.

11. That notice of appeal to the District Court of San Juan County, New Mexico, was served by Petitioners upon the Respondent Consolidated Oil & Gas, Inc., upon the Respondent Oil Conservation Commission, and upon all adverse parties, in the manner provided by law.

12. The Commission, having purported to find (1) the amount of recoverable gas under each producers tract in the Basin Dakota Pool, (2) a total amount of recoverable gas in the Pool and (3) the proportion that (1) bears to (2), wholly failed to make any finding or determination as to what portion of the proportion so arrived at could be recovered without waste.

13. The Commission, in its Order No. R-2259-B made no finding what waste was occurring under the original 25-75 formula, or that waste could be prevented by the 60-40 formula.

14. The Commission's order is unreasonable and unlawful because it is based on affirmative findings which were illusory and which do not meet the statutory standards for a valid allocation of gas production.

15. The Commission's order does not equitably protect correlative rights insofar as is practicable in accordance with statutory standards.

16. Order No. R-2259-B is not supported by substantial evidence.

17. Findings No. (5), (6), (7), (9), (11), (14), (15), (16), and (17), of Order R-2259-B are not supported by substantial evidence in that each is based directly, or indirectly, upon a determination of initial recoverable reserves which was based on out of date data designed to determine the recoverable reserves in the pool as a whole and not suitable or reliable as a basis for determining the recoverable gas in place under individual tracts in the pool, which data was erroneously received in evidence over the timely objection of Petitioner El Paso Natural Gas Company.

18. Findings No. (9), (10), (11), (13), (14), (15), (16), and (17), of Order R-2259-B are not supported by substantial evidence in that each is based directly, or indirectly, upon a comparison of initial recoverable reserves for the individual tracts in the Basin Dakota Pool with current deliverabilities of the wells located upon said tracts. The comparison so made is not meaningful, is illusory and discriminatory, and does not constitute substantial evidence to support the findings so based upon it.

19. There is no substantial evidence to support Finding No. 13 of the Commission that correlative rights are not being adequately protected under the present 25-75 formula and that waste will result unless the Commission acts to protect correlative rights.

20. There is no substantial evidence in the record to support the Commission's Findings Nos. 14, 15 and 16, in that the record affirmatively shows that approximately half of the wells in the Basin Dakota Pool will not be permitted to recover their just and equitable share of the gas in the pool, as defined by applicable statutes, or a figure within a reasonable tolerance thereof, under the 60-40 formula promulgated by the Commission.

21. There is no substantial evidence in the record to support Commission's Findings, 9, 10 , 11, 13, 14, 15, 16 and 17, in that each is based upon a determination of the initial recoverable gas reserves in the Basin Dakota Gas Pool and the initial recoverable gas reserves underlying each non-marginal tract which fails to take into account the portion of the recoverable gas in place which can be produced without waste.

22. The Commission's Findings Nos. (11), (12), (13), (14), (15), (16), and (17), are not supported by substantial evidence in that each is based directly, or indirectly, upon a calculation of initial recoverable gas reserves in the Basin Dakota Gas Pool and initial recoverable gas reserves underlying each non-marginal tract in the Pool which, as found by the Commission, is impracticable as a basis for allocation of production due to continuous fluctuation which will result therein during the life of Order R-2259-B.

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

1. The Court has jurisdiction of the subject matter of this action and of all necessary and indispensable parties thereto.

2. Order No. R-2259-B is unreasonable and unlawful and void by reason of the failure of the Oil Conservation Commission to make required findings of jurisdictional fact as to the portion of the reserves of the Basin Dakota Pool and the individual tracts therein which can be produced without waste.

3. Order No. R-2259-B is unreasonable and unlawful and void by reason of the fact that the findings of fact upon which it is predicated are not supported by substantial evidence.

4. Petitioners in this proceeding exhausted their administrative remedy before the Oil Conservation Commission of New Mexico and are entitled to review of the validity of Order No. R-2259-B in this proceeding.

5. The validity of Order R-1670-C and of the 25-75 formula promulgated by it has not been passed upon by the Oil Conservation Commission of New Mexico, is not an issue in this case and is not material to the validity of Order No. R-2259-B which has been issued in this case.

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Attorneys for Petitioners

DISTRICT COURT
SAN JUAN COUNTY, N. M.
FILED APR 2 - 1964
Virginia A. Kittell
CLERK

STATE OF NEW MEXICO

COUNTY OF SAN JUAN

IN THE DISTRICT COURT

EL PASO NATURAL GAS COMPANY,
et al.,

Petitioners,

vs.

No. 11,685

OIL CONSERVATION COMMISSION
OF NEW MEXICO, et al.,

Respondents.

REQUESTED FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW OF RESPONDENTS
OIL CONSERVATION COMMISSION, TEXACO INC.,
AND SUNRAY DX OIL COMPANY

Respondents Oil Conservation Commission of New Mexico,
Texaco Inc., and Sunray DX Oil Company respectfully submit to
the Court the following:

FINDINGS OF FACT

1. Petitioners El Paso Natural Gas Company, Pan American Petroleum Corporation, Marathon Oil Company, and Sunset International Petroleum Corporation are corporations authorized to do business in the State of New Mexico; Petitioner Southwest Production Company is a partnership consisting of Joseph P. Driscoll and John H. Hill, doing business as a partnership in the State of New Mexico.
2. After commencement of this cause, Beta Development Co., a Texas corporation, was substituted for Southwest Production Company as a petitioner.
3. Respondent Oil Conservation Commission of New Mexico is a duly organized agency of the State of New Mexico, whose members are Jack M. Campbell, Chairman, E. S. Walker, and A. L. Porter, Jr., Secretary; Respondent Consolidated Oil & Gas, Inc., is a corporation authorized to do business in the State of New Mexico.

4. By Order of the Court, Texaco Inc. and Sunray DX Oil Company, corporations authorized to do business in the State of New Mexico, were granted leave to intervene as parties respondent in this cause, and Pubco Petroleum Corporation and Southern Union Gas Company were permitted to appear amicus curiae.

5. In November 1960, the Oil Conservation Commission issued Order No. R-1670-C which established Special Rules and Regulations for the Basin-Dakota Gas Pool in San Juan, Rio Arriba, and Sandoval Counties, New Mexico, and adopted, by reference, Rule 9 (C) of the General Rules applicable to prorated gas pools in Northwest New Mexico as set forth in Order No. R-1670. Rule 9 (C) of Order No. R-1670 established a formula for allocating gas production from prorated gas pools in Northwest New Mexico on the basis of 25 percent acreage plus 75 percent acreage times deliverability. Until August 1, 1963, the effective date of Order No. R-2259-B, the allocation of allowable production of gas from the Basin-Dakota Gas Pool was determined by this formula. Since the effective date of Order No. R-2259-B, the allocation of allowable gas production in the Basin-Dakota Gas Pool has been determined by a formula of 60 percent acreage plus 40 percent acreage times deliverability.

6. On February 23, 1962, Consolidated Oil & Gas, Inc., filed its application with the Commission to change the formula for allocating the allowable gas production in the Basin-Dakota Gas Pool from a formula of 25 percent acreage plus 75 percent acreage times deliverability to a formula of 60 percent acreage plus 40 percent acreage times deliverability. This application was docketed by the Commission as its Case No. 2504. The case was duly advertised and heard by the Commission as its Case No. 2504. The case was duly advertised and heard by the Commission on April 18 and 19, 1962. On June 7, 1962, the Commission issued Order No. R-2259- which found that the evidence presented at the

hearing of the case concerning recoverable gas reserves in the pool was insufficient to justify any change in the allocation formula and denied the application, retaining jurisdiction for the entry of such further orders as the Commission might deem necessary.

7. On June 27, 1962, Consolidated Oil & Gas, Inc., filed a petition for rehearing, and on July 7, 1962, the Commission issued Order No. R-2259-A which found that a rehearing should be granted and that the scope of the rehearing should be limited to matters concerning recoverable gas reserves in the pool. Order No. R-2259-A granted a rehearing and limited the scope of the rehearing to matters concerning recoverable gas reserves in the Basin-Dakota Gas Pool.

8. On February 14 and 15, 1963, the Commission reheard Case No. 2504 and subsequently issued Order No. R-2259-B. By Order No. R-2259-B, the Commission superseded Order No. R-2259, which had denied Consolidated's application, and amended the Special Rules and Regulations for the Basin-Dakota Gas Pool as promulgated by Order No. R-1670-C. The new formula allocated the allowable assigned to non-marginal wells in the following manner:

- (1) Forty percent in the proportion that each well's acreage times deliverability factor bears to the total of the acreage times deliverability factors for all non-marginal wells in the pool.
- (2) Sixty percent in the proportion that each well's acreage factor bears to the total of the acreage factors for all non-marginal wells in the pool.

9. In Finding No. 3 of Order No. R-1670-C, the Commission determined that the producing capacity of the wells in the Dakota Producing Interval was in excess of the market demand for

gas from said common source of supply, and that for the purpose of preventing waste and protecting correlative rights, appropriate procedures should be adopted to provide a method of allocating gas among proration units in the area.

10. Order No. R-2259-B contained 18 findings to substantiate adoption of the new formula.

In Findings No. 1 through 4, the Commission determined that it had jurisdiction of the cause, that the Commission had adopted a formula for allocating allowable production from the Basin-Dakota Gas Pool on the basis of 25 percent acreage plus 75 percent acreage times deliverability, and that Consolidated sought to amend the formula to allocate the allowable production on the basis of 60 percent acreage plus 40 percent acreage times deliverability.

In Finding No. 5, the Commission determined the total initial recoverable gas reserves in the Basin-Dakota Gas Pool and the amount which was attributed to marginal wells which were permitted to produce at capacity.

In Finding No. 6, the Commission determined, in million cubic feet, the initial recoverable gas reserves underlying each non-marginal tract in the Basin-Dakota Gas Pool.

In Finding No. 7, the Commission determined the percent of total pool reserves attributable to each non-marginal tract in the pool.

In Finding No. 8, the Commission determined that it was not practicable to allocate production solely on the basis of each well's percentage of pool reserves because of the continuous fluctuation in reserve computations resulting from new completions in the pool and the re-evaluation of reserves attributed to existing wells.

In Finding No. 9, the Commission determined a tract acreage factor and the deliverability for each non-marginal well in the pool.

In Finding No. 10, the Commission determined that neither acreage nor deliverability should be used as the sole criterion for allocating production as there was no direct correlation between deliverability and reserves, or acreage and reserves.

In Finding No. 11, the Commission determined that the most reasonable basis for allocating production in the Basin-Dakota Gas Pool was to determine, for each proposed formula, the percentage of total pool allowable apportioned to each non-marginal tract as compared to its percentage of total pool reserves, and to select the allocation formula that would allow the maximum number of wells in the pool to produce with an ideal ratio of 1.0, or with a ratio of from 0.7 to 1.3, which was reasonable due to inherent variance in interpreting and computing reserves.

In Finding No. 12, the Commission determined that the number of wells in the pool producing with a desired ratio was affected by the percentage of deliverability and the percentage of acreage included in the formula.

In Finding No. 13, the Commission determined that correlative rights were not being adequately protected under the formula then in effect, that the protection of correlative rights was a necessary adjunct to the prevention of waste, and that waste would result unless the Commission acted to protect correlative rights.

The Commission identified each non-marginal well producing with the desired ratio under each formula with an asterisk and determined, in Finding No. 14, that a comparison of the total number of wells producing with the desired ratio under each formula and the total volume of gas allocated to the wells producing with the desired ratio under each formula established that the proposed formula of 60 percent acreage plus 40 percent acreage times deliverability would more adequately

protect correlative rights and prevent waste by permitting more wells to receive their just and equitable share of the gas in the pool.

In Finding No. 15, the Commission determined that numerous wells in the pool were capable of draining more than their just and equitable share of the gas and that the proposed formula would, insofar as practicable, prevent drainage between producing tracts which was not equalized by counter-drainage.

In Finding No. 16, the Commission determined that the proposed formula would, insofar as practicable, afford to the owner of each property in the pool the opportunity to use his just and equitable share of the reservoir energy.

In Finding No. 17, the Commission determined that Order No. R-1670-C should be amended to provide an allocation formula based 60 percent on acreage and 40 percent on acreage times deliverability.

In Finding No. 18, the Commission determined that Order No. R-2259-B should not be effective until August 1, 1963.

11. Following the issuance of Order No. R-2259-B, Applications for Rehearing in Case No. 2504 were filed with the Commission by all of the Petitioners in this case.

12. On August 1, 1963, the Commission issued Order No. R-2259-C which determined that the applications for Rehearing did not allege that the applicants for rehearing had new or additional evidence to present, that the Commission had carefully considered the evidence presented in the case and was fully advised in the premises, and that Order No. R-2259-B was proper in all respects. By Order No. R-2259-C, the Commission denied the Applications for Rehearing.

13. Petitions for Review were thereafter duly filed by all of the Petitioners in this case.

14. The Oil Conservation Commission did not act fraudulently,

arbitrarily or capriciously in issuing Order No. R-2259-B and R-2259-C.

15. The Transcript of Record and Proceedings in Case No. 2504 before the Oil Conservation Commission contains substantial evidence to support the Commission's findings in Order No. R-2259-B.

16. The Oil Conservation Commission did not exceed its authority in issuing Orders No. R-2259-B and R-2259-C.

17. Oil Conservation Commission Orders No. R-2259-B and R-2259-C are not erroneous, invalid, improper, or discriminatory.

18. The formula adopted by the Oil Conservation Commission in its Order No. R-2259-B allocates the allowable production among the gas wells in the Basin-Dakota Gas Pool upon a reasonable basis, recognizing correlative rights, and, insofar as practicable, prevents drainage between producing tracts in the pool which is not equalized by counter-drainage.

19. The formula adopted by the Oil Conservation Commission in its Order No. R-2259-B affords to the owner of each property in the Basin-Dakota Gas Pool the opportunity to produce without waste his just and equitable share of the gas in the pool, insofar as it is practicable to do so, and for this purpose to use his just and equitable share of the reservoir energy.

20. Oil Conservation Commission Order No. R-2259-B and R-2259-C will prevent waste and protect correlative rights.

21. Petitioners have failed to join parties whose interests will necessarily be affected by a decree in this case.

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

1. The Court has jurisdiction over the subject matter of this suit and the parties thereto.

2. Oil Conservation Commission Order No. R-2259-B contains the basic jurisdictional findings required by law to issue a valid

order allocating allowable gas production among the producers in a pool.

3. Oil Conservation Commission Order No. R-2259-B contains findings which fully comply with all statutory requirements concerning allocation of allowable gas production among producers in a pool.

4. The findings contained in Oil Conservation Commission Order No. R-2259-B are based upon and supported by substantial evidence.

5. Oil Conservation Commission Order No. R-2259-B and R-2259-C will prevent waste and protect correlative rights.

6. The Oil Conservation Commission did not act fraudulently, arbitrarily or capriciously in issuing Orders No. R-2259-B and R-2259-C.

7. The Oil Conservation Commission did not exceed its authority in issuing Order No. R-2259-B and R-2259-C.

8. The Oil Conservation Commission had jurisdiction to enter Orders No. R-2259-B and R-2259-C.

9. The Petitioners have failed to sustain the burden of proof placed upon them by law and therefore the Petition for Review should be dismissed and Oil Conservation Commission Orders No. R-2259-B and R-2259-C should be affirmed.

10. The Petition for Review must be dismissed and judgment entered for the Respondents as Petitioners have failed to join necessary and indispensable parties.

s/ J M Durrett Jr
J. M. DURRETT, Jr.
Special Assistant
Attorney General

Attorney for Respondent
Oil Conservation Commission
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Santa Fe, New Mexico

s/ L C White
GILBERT, WHITE & GILBERT
Attorneys for Respondents
Texaco Inc., and Sunray DX
Oil Company, P. O. Box 787,
Santa Fe, New Mexico

I certify that a copy of this pleading was mailed to opposing counsel of record on March 30, 1964.

s/ J M Durrett Jr
J. M. Durrett, Jr.

DISTRICT COURT
SAN JUAN COUNTY, N. M.
FILED APR 2 - 1964
Virginia A. Kittell
CLERK

STATE OF NEW MEXICO)
COUNTY OF SAN JUAN)

IN THE DISTRICT COURT

EL PASO NATURAL GAS COMPANY,
et al.,

Petitioners,

-vs-

No. 11,685

OIL CONSERVATION COMMISSION
OF NEW MEXICO, et al.,

Respondents.

REQUESTED FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW OF RESPONDENT
CONSOLIDATED OIL & GAS, INC.

Comes now the Respondent Consolidated Oil & Gas, Inc.,
in the above styled and numbered cause and respectfully requests
the Court to adopt the following:

FINDINGS OF FACT

1. Petitioners El Paso Natural Gas Company, Pan American Petroleum Corporation, Marathon Oil Company, and Sunset International Petroleum Corporation are corporations authorized to do business in the State of New Mexico; Petitioner Southwest Production Company is a partnership consisting of Joseph P. Driscoll and John H. Hill, doing business as a partnership in the State of New Mexico.
2. After commencement of this cause, Beta Development Co., a Texas Corporation, was substituted for Southwest Production Company as a petitioner.
3. Respondent Oil Conservation Commission of New Mexico is a duly organized agency of the State of New Mexico, whose members are Jack M. Campbell, Chairman, E. S. Walker, and A. L. Porter, Jr., Secretary; Respondent Consolidated Oil & Gas, Inc., is a corporation authorized to do business in the State of New Mexico.

4. By order of the Court, Texaco, Inc., and Sunray DX Oil Company, corporations authorized to do business in the State of New Mexico, were granted leave to intervene as parties respondent in this cause, and Pubco Petroleum Corporation and Southern Union Gas Company were permitted to appear *amicus curiae*.

5. In November, 1960, the Oil Conservation Commission issued Order No. R-1670-C which established Special Rules and Regulations for the Basin-Dakota Gas Pool in San Juan, Rio Arriba, and Sandoval Counties, New Mexico, and adopted, by reference, Rule 9 (C) of the General Rules applicable to prorated gas pools in Northwest New Mexico as set forth in Order No. R-1670. Rule 9 (C) of Order No. R-1670 established a formula for allocating gas production from prorated gas pools in Northwest New Mexico on the basis of 25 percent acreage plus 75 percent acreage times deliverability. Until August 1, 1963, the effective date of Order No. R-2259-B, the allocation of allowable production of gas from the Basin-Dakota Gas Pool was determined by this formula. Since the effective date of Order No. R-2259-B, the allocation of allowable gas production in the Basin-Dakota Gas Pool has been determined by a formula of 60 percent acreage plus 40 percent acreage times deliverability.

6. On February 23, 1962, Consolidated Oil & Gas, Inc., filed its application with the Commission to change the formula for allocating the allowable gas production in the Basin-Dakota Gas Pool from a formula of 25 percent acreage plus 75 percent acreage times deliverability to a formula of 60 percent acreage plus 40 percent acreage times deliverability. This application was docketed by the Commission as its Case No. 2504. The case was duly advertised and heard by the Commission on April 18 and 19, 1962. On June 7, 1962, the Commission issued Order No. R-2259 which found that the evidence presented at the hearing of the case concerning recoverable gas reserves in the pool was

insufficient to justify any change in the allocation formula and denied the application, retaining jurisdiction for the entry of such further orders as the Commission might deem necessary.

7. On June 27, 1962, Consolidated Oil & Gas, Inc., filed a Petition for Rehearing, and on July 7, 1962, the Commission issued Order No. R-2259-A which found that a rehearing should be granted and that the scope of the rehearing should be limited to matters concerning recoverable gas reserves in the Basin-Dakota Gas pool.

8. On February 14 and 15, 1963, the Commission reheard Case No. 2504 and subsequently issued Order No. R-2259-B. By Order No. R-2259-B, the Commission superseded Order No. R-2259, which had denied Consolidated's application, and amended the Special Rules and Regulations for the Basin-Dakota Gas Pool as promulgated by Order No. R-1670-C. The new formula allocated the allowable assigned to non-marginal wells in the following manner:

(1) Forty percent in the proportion that each well's acreage times deliverability factor bears to the total of the acreage times deliverability factors for all non-marginal wells in the pool.

(2) Sixty percent in the proportion that each well's acreage factor bears to the total of the acreage factors for all non-marginal wells in the pool.

9. In Finding No. 3 of Order No. R-1670-C, the Commission determined that the producing capacity of the wells in the Dakota Producing Interval was in excess of the market demand for gas from said common source of supply, and that for the purpose of preventing waste and protecting correlative rights, appropriate procedures should be adopted to provide a method of allocating gas among proration units in the area.

10. Order No. R-2259-B contained 18 findings to substantiate

adoption of the new formula.

In Findings No. 1 through 4, the Commission determined that it had jurisdiction of the case, that the Commission had adopted a formula for allocating allowable production from the Basin-Dakota Gas Pool on the basis of 25 percent acreage plus 75 percent acreage times deliverability, and that Consolidated sought to amend the formula to allocate the allowable production on the basis of 60 percent acreage plus 40 percent acreage times deliverability.

In Finding No. 5, the Commission determined the total initial recoverable gas reserves in the Basin-Dakota Gas Pool and the amount which was attributed to marginal wells which were permitted to produce at capacity.

In Finding No. 6, the Commission determined, in million cubic feet, the initial recoverable gas reserves underlying each non-marginal tract in the Basin-Dakota Gas Pool.

In Finding No. 7, the Commission determined the percent of total pool reserves attributable to each non-marginal tract in the pool, and in Exhibit A attached to Order No. R-2259-B, Column I, is a determination by the Commission of the percent of the total pool allowable attributable to each non-marginal tract in the pool under Order No. R-2259-B.

In Finding No. 8, the Commission determined that it was not practicable to allocate production solely on the basis of each well's percentage of pool reserves because of the continuous fluctuation in reserve computations resulting from new completions in the pool and the re-evaluation of reserves attributed to existing wells.

In Finding No. 9, the Commission determined a tract acreage factor and the deliverability for each non-marginal well in the pool.

In Finding No. 10, the Commission determined that neither acreage nor deliverability should be used as the sole criterion

for allocating production as there was no direct correlation between deliverability and reserves, or acreage and reserves.

In Finding No. 11, the Commission determined that the most reasonable basis for allocating production in the Basin-Dakota Gas Pool was to determine, for each proposed formula, the percentage of total pool allowable apportioned to each non-marginal tract as compared to its percentage of total pool reserves, and to select the allocation formula that would allow the maximum number of wells in the pool to produce with an ideal ratio of 1.0, or with a ratio of from 0.7 to 1.3, which was reasonable due to inherent variance in interpreting and computing reserves.

In Finding No. 12, the Commission determined that the number of wells in the pool producing with a desired ratio was affected by the percentage of deliverability and the percentage of acreage included in the formula.

In Finding No. 13, the Commission determined that correlative rights were not being adequately protected under the formula then in effect, that the protection of correlative rights was a necessary adjunct to the prevention of waste, and that waste would result unless the Commission acted to protect correlative rights.

The Commission identified each non-marginal well producing with the desired ratio under each formula with an asterisk and determined, in Finding No. 14, that a comparison of the total number of wells producing with the desired ratio under each formula and the total volume of gas allocated to the wells producing with the desired ratio under each formula established that the proposed formula of 60 percent acreage plus 40 percent acreage times deliverability would more adequately protect correlative rights and prevent waste by permitting more wells to receive their just and equitable share of the gas in the pool.

In Finding No. 15, the Commission determined that numerous wells in the pool were capable of draining more than their just and equitable share of the gas and that the proposed formula would, insofar as practicable, prevent drainage between producing tracts which was not equalized by counter-drainage.

In Finding No. 16, the Commission determined that the proposed formula would, insofar as practicable, afford to the owner of each property in the pool the opportunity to use his just and equitable share of the reservoir energy.

In Finding No. 17, the Commission determined that Order No. S-1670-C should be amended to provide an allocation formula based 60 percent on acreage and 40 percent on acreage times deliverability.

In Finding No. 18, the Commission determined that Order No. R-2259-B should not be effective until August 1, 1963.

11. Following the issuance of Order No. R-2259-B, Applications for Rehearing in Case No. 2504 were filed with the Commission by all of the Petitioners in this case.

12. On August 1, 1963, the Commission issued Order No. R-2259-C which determined that the applications for Rehearing did not allege that the applicants for rehearing had new or additional evidence to present, that the Commission had carefully considered the evidence presented in the case and was fully advised in the premises, and that Order No. R-2259-B was proper in all respects. By Order No. R-2259-C, the Commission denied the Applications for Rehearing.

13. Petitions for Review were thereafter duly filed by all of the Petitioners in this case.

14. The Oil Conservation Commission did not act fraudulently, arbitrarily or capriciously in issuing Orders No. R-2259-B and R-2259-C.

15. The Transcript of Record and Proceedings in Case No. 2504 before the Oil Conservation Commission contains sub-

stantial evidence to support the Commission's findings in Order No. R-2259-B.

16. The Oil Conservation Commission did not exceed its authority in issuing Orders No. R-2259-B and R-2259-C.

17. Oil Conservation Commission Orders No. R-2259-B and R-2259-C are not erroneous, invalid, improper, or discriminatory.

18. The formula adopted by the Oil Conservation Commission in its Order No. R-2259-B allocates the allowable production among the gas wells in the Basin-Dakota Gas Pool upon a reasonable basis, recognizing correlative rights, and, insofar as practicable, prevents drainage between producing tracts in the pool which is not equalized by counter-drainage.

19. The formula adopted by the Oil Conservation Commission in its Order No. R-2259-B affords to the owner of each property in the Basin-Dakota Gas Pool the opportunity to produce without waste his just and equitable share of the gas in the pool, insofar as it is practicable to do so, and for this purpose to use his just and equitable share of the reservoir energy.

20. Oil Conservation Commission Orders No. R-2259-B and R-2259-C will prevent waste and protect correlative rights.

21. Humble Oil & Refining Company, Skelly Oil Company, The Atlantic Refining Company, Benjamin K. Horton & Associates, R. & G. Drilling Company, The United States Geological Survey, Tidewater Oil Company, Bruce Anderson Oil & Gas Properties, The Frontier Refining Company, Kay Kimbell Oil Company, Amerada Petroleum Corporation, Continental Oil Company, Beard Oil Company, Delhi Oil Corporation, Western Natural Gas Company, Compass Exploration Co., Tenneco Oil Company, Caulkins Oil Company, Pioneer Production Co., and The British American Oil Producing Company, and each of the, participated in the hearings before the Oil Conservation Commission as appears on

the face of the record, and they are, and each of them is, a necessary and indispensable party to this action, whose interest in the controversy is such that no final judgment can be entered which will do justice between the parties without injuriously affecting the rights of said parties. Said parties are owners and operators of gas properties in the Basin-Dakota Gas Pool and will be directly affected by, and be subject to, any order entered by the Court in this proceeding, and said parties have not been brought before the Court in this proceeding.

22. Petitioners have failed to exhaust their administrative remedy in that their petition for rehearing before the Oil Conservation Commission was not timely filed.

23. Unless implemented by Oil Conservation Commission Order No. R-2259-B, Orders No. R-1670 and No. R-1670-C are invalid and void for the reason they do not contain the jurisdictional findings required by law.

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

1. The Court is without jurisdiction to grant the relief sought by Petitioners by reason of the fact Petitioners have failed to name indispensable parties in this proceeding.

2. The Court is without jurisdiction to grant the relief sought by Petitioners by reason of the fact petitioners failed to exhaust their administrative remedy.

3. The Court has jurisdiction over the subject matter of this suit and the parties hereto.

4. Oil Conservation Commission Order No. R-2259-B contains the basic jurisdictional findings required by law to issue a valid order allocating allowable gas production among the producers in a pool.

5. Oil Conservation Commission Order No. R-2259-B contains findings which fully comply with all statutory requirements concerning allocation of allowable gas production among producers

in a pool.

6. The findings contained in Oil Conservation Commission Order No. R-2259-B are based upon and supported by substantial evidence.

7. Oil Conservation Commission Orders No. R-2259-B and R-2259-C will prevent waste and protect correlative rights.

8. The Oil Conservation Commission did not act fraudulently, arbitrarily or capriciously in issuing Orders No. R-2259-B and R-2259-C.

9. The Oil Conservation Commission did not exceed its authority in issuing Orders No. R-2259-B and R-2259-C.

10. The Oil Conservation Commission had jurisdiction to enter Orders No. R-2259-B and R-2259-C.

11. The Petitioners have failed to sustain the burden of proof placed upon them by law and therefore the Petition for Review should be dismissed and Oil Conservation Commission Orders No. R-2259-B and R-2259-C should be be affirmed.

12. Insofar as it relates to the Basin-Dakota Gas Pool, Commission Orders No. R-1670 and R-1670-C were invalid and void.

13. As amended and implemented by Order No. R-2259-B, Orders No. R-1670 and R-1670-C became and now are valid orders allocating gas production among the producers of the Basin-Dakota Gas Pool.

14. The petition for review should be dismissed and judgment entered for the Respondents herein.

CONSOLIDATED OIL & GAS, INC.

T. P. Stockmar
Holme, Roberts, More & Owen
Denver, Colorado

Kellahin & Fox
54½ East San Francisco
Santa Fe, New Mexico

By s/ Jason W. Kellahin

I hereby certify that a true copy of the foregoing instrument was mailed to opposing counsel of record this 30th day of March, 1964

s/ Jason W. Kellahin

STATE OF NEW MEXICO }
COUNTY OF SAN JUAN }

IN THE DISTRICT COURT

EL PASO NATURAL GAS COMPANY,
a corporation, PAN AMERICAN
PETROLEUM CORPORATION, a
corporation, MARATHON OIL
COMPANY, a corporation, BETA
DEVELOPMENT COMPANY, and SUNSET
INTERNATIONAL PETROLEUM CORPORA-
TION, a corporation,

DISTRICT COURT
SAN JUAN COUNTY, N. M.
FILED APR 2 - 1964
Virginia A. Kittell
CLERK

Petitioners,

vs.

No. 11685

OIL CONSERVATION COMMISSION OF
NEW MEXICO, JACK M. CAMPELL,
Chairman, E. S. WALKER, Member,
A. L. PORTER, JR., Member and
Secretary, CONSOLIDATED OIL AND
GAS, INC., a corporation,

RECORDED BOOK E-2
PAGE 74

Respondents.

DECISION OF THE COURT

The above-entitled cause having come on for trial and the Court having heard all of the evidence, arguments of counsel, and the parties having submitted Requested Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, and being sufficiently advised in the premises, the Court makes the following,

FINDINGS OF FACT

1. Petitioners El Paso Natural Gas Company, Pan American Petroleum Corporation, Marathon Oil Company, and Sunset International Petroleum Corporation are corporations authorized to do business in the State of New Mexico; Petitioner Southwest Production Company is a partnership consisting of Joseph P. Driscoll and John H. Hill, doing business as a partnership in the State of New Mexico.
2. After commencement of this cause, Beta Development Co., a Texas Corporation was substituted for Southwest Production Company as a Petitioner.
3. Respondent Oil Conservation Commission of New Mexico is a duly organized agency of the State of New Mexico, whose members are Jack M. Campbell, Chairman, E. S. Walker and A. L.

Porter, Jr., Secretary; Respondent Consolidated Oil & Gas, Inc., is a corporation authorized to do business in the State of New Mexico.

4. By Order of the Court, Texaco, Inc., and Sunray DX Oil Company corporations authorized to do business in the State of New Mexico, were granted leave to intervene as parties respondent in this cause, and Pubco Petroleum Corporation and Southern Union Gas Company were permitted to appear amicus curiae.

5. In November, 1960, the Oil Conservation Commission issued Order No. R-1670-C which established Special Rules and Regulations for the Basin-Dakota Gas Pool in San Juan, Rio Arriba and Sandoval Counties, New Mexico, and adopted, by reference, Rule 9 (C) of the General Rules applicable to pro-rated gas pools in Northwest New Mexico as set forth in Order No. R-1670. Rule 9 (C) of Order No. R-1670 established a formula for allocating gas production from pro-rated gas pools in Northwest New Mexico on the basis of 25 percent acreage plus 75 percent acreage times deliverability. Until August 1, 1963, the effective date of Order No. R-2259-B, the allocation of allowable production of gas from the Basin-Dakota Gas Pool was determined by this formula. Since the effective date of Order No. R-2259-B, the allocation of allowable gas production in the Basin-Dakota Gas Pool has been determined by formula of 60 percent acreage plus 40 percent acreage times deliverability.

6. On February 23, 1962, Consolidated Oil & Gas, Inc., filed its application with the Commission to change the formula for allocating the allowable gas production in the Basin-Dakota Gas Pool from a formula of 25 percent acreage plus 75 percent acreage times deliverability to a formula of 60 percent acreage plus 40 percent acreage times deliverability. This application was docketed by the Commission as its Case No. 2504. The case was duly advertised and heard by the Commission on April 18 and 19, 1962. On June 7, 1962, the Commission issued Order No. R-2259

which found that the evidence presented at the hearing of the case concerning recoverable gas reserves in the pool was insufficient to justify any change in the allocation formula and denied the application, retaining jurisdiction for the entry of such further orders as the Commission might deem necessary.

7. On June 27, 1962, Consolidated Oil & Gas, Inc., filed a Petition for Rehearing, and on July 7, 1962, the Commission issued Order No. R-2259-A which found that a rehearing should be granted and that the scope of the rehearing should be limited to matters concerning recoverable gas reserves in the Pool. Order No. R-2259-A granted a rehearing and limited the scope of the rehearing to matters concerning recoverable gas reserves in the Basin-Dakota Gas Pool.

8. On February 14, and 15, 1963, the Commission reheard Case No. 2504 and subsequently issued Order No. R-2259-B. By Order No. R-2259-B, the Commission superseded Order No. R-2259, which had denied Consolidated's application and amended the Special Rules and regulations for the Basin-Dakota Gas Pool as promulgated by Order No. R-1670-C. The new formula allocated the allowable assigned to non-marginal wells in the following manner:

(1) Forty percent in the proportion that each well's acreage times deliverability factor bears to the total of the acreage times deliverability factors for all non-marginal wells in the pool.

(2) Sixty percent in the proportion that each well's acreage factor bears to the total of the acreage factors for all non-marginal wells in the pool.

9. In Finding No. 3 of Order No. R-1670-C, the Commission determined that the producing capacity of the wells in the Dakota Producing Interval was in excess of the market demand for

gas from said common source of supply, and that for the purpose of preventing waste and protecting correlative rights, appropriate procedures should be adopted to provide a method of allocating gas among proration units in the area.

10. Order No. R-2259-B contained 18 findings to substantiate adoption of the new formula.

In Findings No. 1 through 4, the Commission determined that it had jurisdiction of the cause, that the Commission had adopted a formula for allocating allowable production from the Basin-Dakota Gas Pool on the basis of 25 percent acreage plus 75 percent acreage times deliverability, and that Consolidated sought to amend the formula to allocate the allowable production on the basis of 60 percent acreage plus 40 percent acreage times deliverability.

In Finding No. 5, the Commission determined the total initial recoverable gas reserves in the Basin-Dakota Gas Pool and the amount which was attributed to marginal wells which were permitted to produce at capacity.

In Finding No. 6, the Commission determined, in million cubic feet, the initial recoverable gas reserves underlying each non-marginal tract of the Basin-Dakota Gas Pool.

In Finding No. 7, the Commission determined the percent of total pool reserves attributable to non-marginal tract in the pool.

In Finding No. 8, the Commission determined that it was not practicable to allocate production solely on the basis of each well's percentage of pool reserves because of the continuous fluctuation in reserve computations resulting from new completions in the pool and the re-evaluation of reserves attributed to existing wells.

In Finding No. 9, the Commission determined a tract acreage factor and the deliverability for each non-marginal well in the pool.

In Finding No. 10, the Commission determined that neither acreage nor deliverability should be used as the sole criterion for allocating production as there was no direct correlation between deliverability and reserves, or acreage and reserves.

In Finding No. 11, the Commission determined that the most reasonable basis for allocating production in the Basin-Dakota Gas Pool was to determine, for each proposed formula, the percentage of total pool allowable apportioned to each non-marginal tract as compared to its percentage of total pool reserves, and to select the allocation formula that would allow the maximum number of wells in the pool to produce with an ideal ratio of 1.0, or with a ratio of from 0.7 to 1.3, which was reasonable, due to inherent variance in interpreting and computing reserves.

In Finding No. 12, the Commission determined that the number of wells in the pool producing with a desired ratio was affected by the percentage of deliverability and the percentage of acreage included in the formula.

In Finding No. 13, the Commission determined that correlative rights were not being adequately protected under the formula then in effect, that the protection of correlative rights was a necessary adjunct to the prevention of waste, and that waste would result unless the Commission acted to protect correlative rights.

The Commission identified each non-marginal well producing with the desired ratio under each formula with an asterisk and determined, in Finding No. 14, that a comparison of the total number of wells producing with the desired ratio under each formula and the total volume of gas allocated to the wells producing with the desired ratio under each formula established that the proposed formula of 60 percent acreage plus 40 percent acreage times deliverability would more adequately protect correlative rights and prevent waste by permitting more wells to receive their just and equitable share of the gas in the pool.

In Finding No. 15, the Commission determined that numerous wells in the pool were capable of draining more than their just and equitable share of the gas and that the proposed formula would, insofar as practicable, prevent drainage between producing tracts which was not equalized by counter-drainage.

In Finding No. 16, the Commission determined that the proposed formula would, insofar as practicable, afford to the owner of each property in the pool the opportunity to use his just and equitable share of the reservoir energy.

In Finding No. 17, the Commission determined that Order No. R-1670-C should be amended to provide an allocation formula based on 60 percent on acreage and 40 percent on acreage times deliverability.

In Finding No. 18, the Commission determined that Order No. R-2259-B should not be effective until August 1, 1963.

11. Following the issuance of Order No. R-2259-B, Applications for Rehearing in Case No. 2504 were filed with the Commission by all of the Petitioners in this case.

12. On August 1, 1963, the Commission issued Order No. R-2259-C which determined that the Applications for Rehearing did not allege that the applicants for rehearing had new or additional evidence to present, that the Commission had carefully considered the evidence presented in the case and was fully advised in the premises, and that Order No. R-2259-B was proper in all respects. By Order No. R-2259-C, the Commission denied the Application for Rehearing.

13. Petitions for Review were thereafter duly filed by all of the Petitioners in this case.

14. The Oil Conservation Commission did not act fraudulently, arbitrarily or capriciously in issuing Order No. R-2259-B and R-2259-C.

15. The Transcript of Record and Proceedings in Case No. 2504 before the Oil Conservation Commission contains substantial

evidence to support the Commission's findings in Order No. R-2259-B.

16. The Oil Conservation Commission did not exceed its authority in issuing Orders No. R-2259-B and R-2259-C.

16. The Oil Conservation Commission did not exceed its authority in issuing Orders No. R-2259-B and R-2259-C.

17. Oil Conservation Commission Order No. R-2259-B and R-2259-C are not erroneous, invalid, improper or discriminatory.

18. The formula adopted by the Oil Conservation Commission in its Order No. R-2259-B allocates the allowable production among the gas wells in the Basin-Dakota Gas Pool upon a reasonable basis, recognizing correlative rights, and, insofar as practicable, prevents drainage between producing tracts in the pool which is not equalized by counter-drainage.

19. The formula adopted by the Oil Conservation Commission in its Order No. R-2259-B affords to the owner of each property in the Basin-Dakota Gas Pool the opportunity to produce without waste his just and equitable share of the gas in the pool, insofar as it is practicable to do so, and for this purpose to use his just and equitable share of the reservoir energy.

20. Oil Conservation Commission Orders No. R-2259-B and R-2259-C will prevent waste and protect correlative rights.

From the foregoing Findings of Fact, the Court makes the following,

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

1. The Court has jurisdiction over the subject matter of this action and of all necessary and indispensable parties thereto.

2. Petitioners in this proceeding exhausted their administrative remedy before the Oil Conservation Commission of New Mexico and are entitled to review of the validity of Order No. R-2259-B in this proceeding.

3. Oil Conservation Commission Order No. R-2259-B contains the basic jurisdictional findings required by law to issue a valid order allocating allowable gas production among the pro-

ducers in a pool.

4. Oil Conservation Commission Order No. R-2259-B contains findings which fully comply with all statutory requirements concerning allocation of allowable gas production among producers in a pool.

5. The findings contained in Oil Conservation Commission Order No. R-2259-B are based upon and supported by substantial evidence.

6. Oil Conservation Commission Orders No. R-2259-B and R-2259-C will prevent waste and protect correlative rights.

7. The Oil Conservation Commission did not act fraudulently, arbitrarily or capriciously in issuing Order No. R-2259-B and R-2259-C.

8. The Oil Conservation Commission did not exceed its authority in issuing Orders No. R-2259-B and R-2259-C.

9. The Oil Conservation Commission has jurisdiction to enter Orders No. R-2259-B and R-2259-C.

10. The Petitioners have failed to sustain the burden of proof placed upon them by law and therefore the Petition for Reiview should be dismissed and Oil Conservation Commission Orders No. R-2259-B and R-2259-C should be affirmed.

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, that all Requested Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law submitted by either party and not made and entered herein by the Court are hereby refused and denied.

s/ C. C. McCulloh
DISTRICT JUDGE

DISTRICT COURT
SAN JUAN COUNTY, N. M.
FILED APR 2 - 1964
Virginia A. Kittell
CLERK

STATE OF NEW MEXICO)
COUNTY OF SAN JUAN)

IN THE DISTRICT COURT

EL PASO NATURAL GAS COMPANY,
a corporation, PAN AMERICAN
PETROLEUM CORPORATION, a
corporation, MARATHON OIL
COMPANY, a corporation, BETA
DEVELOPMENT COMPANY, and SUNSET
INTERNATIONAL PETROLEUM CORPORA-
TION, a corporation,

RECORDED BOOK E-2
PAGE 79

Petitioners,

vs.

No. 11685

OIL CONSERVATION COMMISSION OF
NEW MEXICO, JACK M. CAMPBELL,
Chairman, E. S. WALKER, Member,
A. L. PORTER, JR., Member and
Secretary, CONSOLIDATED OIL AND
GAS, INC., a corporation,

Respondents.

J U D G M E N T

This matter coming on to be heard on Petition for Review, filed herein, and after considering the transcript, summary and briefs submitted by the parties, and hearing oral argument, and after the parties submitted their Requested Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, and the Court has entered its Decision, and being sufficiently advised in the premises, the Court FINDS that the Petition herein should be dismissed.

IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED, that Judgment be entered herein in favor of Respondents and that the Petition be and it is hereby dismissed.

s/ C. C. McCulloh
DISTRICT JUDGE

DISTRICT COURT
SAN JUAN COUNTY, N. M.
FILED APR 27 1964
Virginia A. Kittell
CLERK

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF SAN JUAN COUNTY

STATE OF NEW MEXICO

EL PASO NATURAL GAS COMPANY,
a corporation, PAN AMERICAN PETROLEUM
CORPORATION, a corporation, MARATHON
OIL COMPANY, a corporation, BETA
DEVELOPMENT COMPANY, and SUNSET INTER-
NATIONAL PETROLEUM CORPORATION, a
corporation,

Petitioners,

vs.

No. 11,685

OIL CONSERVATION COMMISSION OF NEW
MEXICO, JACK M. CAMPBELL, Chairman,
E. S. WALKER, Member, A. L. PORTER,
JR., Member and Secretary, CONSOLIDATED OIL & GAS, INC., a
corporation,

Respondents.

NOTICE OF APPEAL

Come now the Petitioners, El Paso Natural Gas Company,
Pan American Petroleum Corporation, Marathon Oil Company, and
Sunset International Petroleum Corporation, and hereby give
notice that they are appealing to the Supreme Court of the
State of New Mexico from the Judgment, Order, and Decision of
the Court in this action, which was filed on April 2, 1964.

s/ Ben R Howell
BEN R. HOWELL

s/ Garrett C. Whitworth
GARRETT C. WHITWORTH

SETH MONTGOMERY, FEDERICI & ANDREWS

By s/ Wm R Federici
Attorneys for El Paso Natural
Gas Company

s/ J K Smith
J. K. SMITH

ATWOOD & MALONE

By s/ Ross L Malone
Attorneys for Pan American
Petroleum Corporation.

s/ Kent B Hampton
KENT B. HAMPTON

ATWOOD & MALONE

By s/ Ross L. Malone
Attorneys for Marathon Oil Company

SETH, MONTGOMERY, FEDERICI & ANDREWS

By s/ Wm R Federici
Attorneys for Sunset International
Petroleum Corporation

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

I certify that I caused to be mailed one each true and correct copy of the foregoing Notice of Appeal to Jason Kellahin of Kellahin & Fox, 54½ E. San Francisco Street, Santa Fe, New Mexico, to J. M. Durrett, Jr., Special Assistant Attorney General, representing the New Mexico Oil Conservation Commission, and to Gilbert, White & Gilbert, Bishop Building, Santa Fe, New Mexico, opposing counsel of record, on the 24th day of April, 1964.

s/ Wm R Federici

akm

DISTRICT COURT
SAN JUAN COUNTY, N. M.
FILED MAY 8 - 1964
Virginia A. Kittell
CLERK

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF SAN JUAN COUNTY

STATE OF NEW MEXICO

EL PASO NATURAL GAS COMPANY, a
corporation, PAN AMERICAN PETROLEUM
CORPORATION, a corporation, MARATHON
OIL COMPANY, a corporation, BETA
DEVELOPMENT COMPANY, and SUNSET INTER-
NATIONAL PETROLEUM CORPORATION, a
corporation,

Petitioners,

vs

No. 11,685

OIL CONSERVATION COMMISSION OF NEW
MEXICO, JACK M. CAMPBELL, Chairman,
E. S. WALKER, Member, A. L. PORTER,
JR., Member and Secretary, CONSOLIDATED
OIL & GAS, INC., a corporation,

Respondents.

N O T I C E

TO:

J. M. Durrett, Jr.
Special Assistant Attorney General
Representing the New Mexico Oil
Conservation Commission
State Land Office Building
Santa Fe, New Mexico;

Jason Kellahin
Kellahin & Fox
Attorneys for Consolidated Oil & Gas, Inc.
54½ East San Francisco Street
Santa Fe, New Mexico;

Wm. B. Kelly
Gilbert, White & Gilbert
Attorneys for Texaco, Inc., and Sunray DX
Oil Company
Bishop Building
Santa Fe, New Mexico

Please take notice that petitioners El Paso Natural Gas
Company, Pan American Petroleum Corporation, Marathon Oil
Company and Sunset International Petroleum Corporation, by
Notice of Appeal filed herein on April 27, 1964, have appealed
to the Supreme Court of the State of New Mexico from the judg-
ment, order and decision of the Court filed herein on April 2,
1964.

SETH, MONTGOMERY, FEDERICI & ANDREWS

By s/ Wm R Federici
Attorneys for El Paso Natural Gas
Company and Sunset International
Petroleum Corporation.

ATWOOD & MALONE

By s/ Ross L. Malone
Attorneys for Pan American Petroleum
Corporation and Marathon Oil Company

PROOF OF SERVICE

I certify that I caused to be mailed one each true and correct copy of the foregoing Notice to J. M. Durrett, Jr., Special Assistant Attorney General, representing the New Mexico Oil Conservation Commission, and to Jason Kellahin, of Kellahin & Fox, 54½ East San Francisco Street, Santa Fe, New Mexico, and Wm. B. Kelly, of Gilbert, White & Gilbert, Bishop Building, Santa Fe, New Mexico, opposing counsel of record, on this 7th day of May 1964.

s/ Wm R Federici

DISTRICT COURT
SAN JUAN COUNTY, N. M.
FILED MAY 8 - 1964
Virginia A. Kittell
CLERK

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF SAN JUAN COUNTY

STATE OF NEW MEXICO

EL PASO NATURAL GAS COMPANY,
a Corporation, PAN AMERICAN PETROLEUM
CORPORATION, a Corporation, MARATHON
OIL COMPANY, a Corporation, BETA
DEVELOPMENT COMPANY, and SUNSET INTER-
NATIONAL PETROLEUM CORPORATION, a
Corporation,

Petitioners,

vs.

No. 11,685

OIL CONSERVATION COMMISSION OF NEW
MEXICO, JACK M. CAMPBELL, Chairman,
E. S. WALKER, Member, A. L. PORTER, JR.,
Member and Secretary, CONSOLIDATED OIL
& GAS, INC., a Corporation,

Respondents.

P R A E C I P E

TO: Clerk of the District Court of

San Juan County, State of New Mexico:

Please prepare a transcript of the record proper and of the proceedings in this cause to be filed with the Supreme Court of the State of New Mexico in support of the appeal heretofore taken by petitioners; the complete record and proceedings shall include, but not be limited to, the following specified matters:

- (1) Complete transcript of all proceedings before the Oil Conservation Commission in OCC Case No. 2504, including transcript of testimony and all orders, petitions, applications, pleadings, and exhibits therein;
- (2) Petitions for review filed by petitioners in this case;
- (3) Petitioners' requested findings of fact and conclusions of law;
- (4) Judgment, order, and decision of the Court in this action;

- (5) Notice of Appeal (filed April 27, 1964);
- (6) Notice of Appeal (to counsel), and Proof of Service;
- (7) This Praecipe; and
- (8) Certificate of Clerk of the District Court and Court Stenographer, showing that satisfactory arrangements have been made with them by petitioners-appellants for the payment of their compensation.

In addition to the complete record proper and proceedings in this cause, there shall be included in the transcript the notice of appeal to the district court from the New Mexico Oil Conservation Commission, and all affidavits of service and acceptances of service with respect thereto.

SETH, MONTGOMERY, FEDERICI & ANDREWS

By s/ Wm R Federici
Attorneys for El Paso Natural Gas
Company and Sunset International
Petroleum Corporation.

ATWOOD & MALONE

By s/ Ross L Malone
Attorneys for Pan American Petroleum
Corporation and Marathon Oil Company

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

I certify that I caused to be mailed one each true and correct copy of the foregoing Praecipe to J. M. Durrett, Jr., Special Assistant Attorney General, representing the New Mexico Oil Conservation Commission, and to Jason Kellahin, of Kellahin & Fox, 54½ East San Francisco Street, Santa Fe, New Mexico, and Wm. B. Kelly, of Gilbert, White & Gilbert, Bishop Building, Santa Fe, New Mexico, opposing counsel of record on this 7th day of May 1964.

s/ Wm R Federici

DISTRICT COURT
SAN JUAN COUNTY, N. M.
FILED MAY 8 - 1964
Virginia A. Kittell
CLERK

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF SAN JUAN COUNTY

STATE OF NEW MEXICO

EL PASO NATURAL GAS COMPANY, a
Corporation, PAN AMERICAN PETROLEUM
CORPORATION, a Corporation, MARATHON
OIL COMPANY, a Corporation, BETA
DEVELOPMENT COMPANY, and SUNSET INTER-
NATIONAL PETROLEUM CORPORATION, a
Corporation,

Petitioners,

vs.

No. 11,685

OIL CONSERVATION COMMISSION OF NEW
MEXICO, JACK M. CAMPBELL, Chairman,
E. S. WALKER, Member, A. L. PORTER, JR.,
Member and Secretary, CONSOLIDATED OIL
& GAS, INC., a Corporation,

Respondents.

CERTIFICATE

VIRGINIA A. KITTELL, Clerk of the District Court of San
Juan County, New Mexico, and VASTI FOWLER, Court Stenographer,
hereby certify that satisfactory arrangements have been made
with them by the petitioners-appellants herein for the payment
of their compensation to be incurred in connection with prepar-
ing a transcript of the record proper, proceedings, and other
matters in this cause, in support of petitioners-appellants'
appeal to the Supreme Court of the State of New Mexico from
the judgment, order, and decision of the court in this action.

s/ Virginia A. Kittell
Clerk of the District Court of
San Juan County, New Mexico

s/ Vasti Fowler
Court Stenographer

DISTRICT COURT
SAN JUAN COUNTY, N. M.
FILED JUN 29 1964
Virginia A. Kittell
CLERK

STATE OF NEW MEXICO COUNTY OF SAN JUAN IN THE DISTRICT COURT

EL PASO NATURAL GAS COMPANY,
a corporation, PAN AMERICAN
PETROLEUM CORPORATION, a
corporation, MARATHON OIL
COMPANY, a corporation, BETA
DEVELOPMENT COMPANY, and
SUNSET INTERNATIONAL PETROLEUM
CORPORATION, a corporation,

Petitioners,

vs.

No. 11685

OIL CONSERVATION COMMISSION OF
NEW MEXICO, JACK M. CAMPBELL,
Chairman, E. S. Walker, Member,
A. L. PORTER, JR., Member and
Secretary, CONSOLIDATED OIL &
GAS, INC., a corporation,

Respondents.

S T I P U L A T I O N

WHEREAS, Petitioners have heretofore filed their Notice of Appeal in the above cause permitting and allowing an Appeal to the Supreme Court of the State of New Mexico from the Judgment entered therein; and

WHEREAS, Petitioners and Respondents desire that the original transcript only, with exhibits and attachments thereto, of the hearing before the Oil Conservation Commission of New Mexico be submitted to the Supreme Court of New Mexico.

NOW, THEREFORE, the undersigned attorneys of record for the respective parties hereto hereby stipulate and agree that the original transcript only, with all attachments and exhibits thereto, of the hearing before the Oil Conservation Commission of New Mexico in the matter of the Application of Consolidated Oil & Gas, Inc., For An Amendment of Order No. R-1670-C, Changing The Allocation Formula For The Basin-Dakota Gas Pool, San Juan, Rio Arriba And Sandoval Counties, New Mexico, Case No. 2504,

Order No. R-2259-B, on the docket of said Commission, which transcript of proceedings was filed in evidence in the District Court of San Juan County, New Mexico, subject to objections by the parties, and received by the said District Court in evidence as an exhibit in Cause No. 11685 in the said District Court, shall be considered by the Court as if the same had been included in the transcript, bill of exceptions and record, as prepared and certified by the Clerk of the court relating to the appeal herein now pending.

IT IS FURTHER STIPULATED AND AGREED that except for the matters included in this stipulation, all other matters requested in the praecipe heretofore filed in this cause shall be included in the transcript of the record proper, subject to settlement as a bill of exceptions as in other cases provided.

s/ Ben R Howell
BEN R. HOWELL

s/ Garrett C Whitworth
GARRETT C. WHITWORTH

SETH, MONTGOMERY, FEDERICI & ANDREWS

By s/ William R Federici
Attorneys for El Paso Natural Gas
Company

s/ J. K. Smith
J. K. SMITH

ATWOOD & MALONE

By s/ Ross L. Malone
Attorneys for Pan American Petroleum
Corp.

s/ Kent B. Hampton
KENT B. HAMPTON

ATWOOD & MALONE

By s/ Ross L. Malone
Attorneys for Marathon Oil Company

SETH, MONTGOMERY, FEDERICI & ANDREWS

By s/ William R Federici
Attorneys for Sunset International
Petroleum Corporation

PETITIONERS-APPELLANTS

s/ J M Durrett Jr
J. M. Durrett, Jr.

Special Assitant Attorney General
Representing the New Mexico Oil
Conservation Commission

KELLAHIN & FOX

By s/ Jason W. Kellahin
Attorneys for Consolidated Oil & Gas, Inc.

GILBERT, WHITE & GILBERT

By s/ William B Kelly
William B. Kelly

Attorneys for Texaco, Inc. and
Sunray DX Oil Company

RESPONDENTS-APPELLEES

DISTRICT COURT
SAN JUAN COUNTY, N. M.
FILED JUN 29 1964
Virginia A. Kittell
CLERK

STATE OF NEW MEXICO COUNTY OF SAN JUAN IN THE DISTRICT COURT

EL PASO NATURAL GAS COMPANY,
a corporation, PAN AMERICAN
PETROLEUM CORPORATION, a
corporation, MARATHON OIL
COMPANY, a corporation, BETA
DEVELOPMENT COMPANY, and
SUNSET INTERNATIONAL PETROLEUM
CORPORATION, a corporation,

Petitioners,

vs.

OIL CONSERVATION COMMISSION OF
NEW MEXICO, JACK M. CAMPBELL,
Chairman, E. S. WALKER, Member,
A. L. PORTER, JR., Member and
Secretary, CONSOLIDATED OIL &
GAS, INC., a corporation,

Respondents.

RECORDED BOOK F-2
PAGE 141

No. 11685

O R D E R

This matter having come on to be heard upon Stipulation of counsel for preparation of the record herein, and the Court being advised in the premises,

IT IS ORDERED that permission is hereby granted to prepare and submit the original transcript only, with exhibits and attachments thereto, of the hearing before the Oil Conservation Commission of New Mexico in the matter of the Application of Consolidated Oil & Gas, Inc. For An Amendment of Order No. R-1670-C, Changing The Allocation Formula For The Basin-Dakota Gas Pool, San Juan, Rio Arriba And Sandoval Counties, New Mexico, Case No. 2504, Order No. R-2259-B, on the docket of said Commission, which transcript of proceedings was filed in evidence in the District Court of San Juan County, New Mexico, subject to objections by the parties, and received by the said District Court of San Juan County, New Mexico, subject to objections by the parties, and received by the said District Court in evidence as an exhibit in Cause No. 11685 in the said

District Court, and that the same shall be considered by the Court as if it had been included in the transcript, bill of exceptions and record, as prepared and certified by the clerk of the court relating to the appeal herein now pending.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that except for the matters included in the Stipulation, all other matters requested in the Praecipe heretofore filed in this cause shall be included in the transcript of the record proper, subject to settlement as a bill of exceptions as in other cases provided.

s/ C. C. McCulloh
DISTRICT JUDGE

DISTRICT COURT
SAN JUAN COUNTY, N. M.
FILED JUL 20 1964
Virginia A. Kittell
CLERK

STATE OF NEW MEXICO)
COUNTY OF SAN JUAN)

IN THE DISTRICT COURT

EL PASO NATURAL GAS COMPANY,
a corporation, PAN AMERICAN
PETROLEUM CORPORATION, a
corporation, MARATHON OIL COM-
PANY, a corporation, and SUNSET
INTERNATIONAL PETROLEUM CORPORA-
TION, a corporation,

RECORDED BOOK F-2
PAGE 267

Petitioners,

vs.

No. 11685

OIL CONSERVATION COMMISSION OF NEW
MEXICO, JACK M. CAMPBELL, CHAIRMAN,
E. S. WALKER, Member, A. L. PORTER,
JR., Member and Secretary and
CONSOLIDATED OIL & GAS, INC., a
corporation,

Respondents.

O R D E R

This matter having come on to be heard before the Court
on Motion of Appellants, for an Order extending the time
within which to file the transcript upon appeal, and the
Court being otherwise fully advised in the premises,

IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED, that the time within which
to file the transcript upon appeal be and the same hereby
is extended until the 1st day of September, 1964.

s/ C. C. McCulloh
DISTRICT JUDGE

DISTRICT COURT
SAN JUAN COUNTY, N. M.
FILED AUG 26 1964
Virginia A. Kittell
CLERK

STATE OF NEW MEXICO }
COUNTY OF SAN JUAN }

IN THE DISTRICT COURT

EL PASO NATURAL GAS COMPANY,
a corporation, PAN AMERICAN
PETROLEUM CORPORATION, a
corporation, MARATHON OIL COM-
PANY, a corporation, and SUNSET
INTERNATIONAL PETROLEUM CORPORA-
TION, a corporation,

RECORDED BOOK G-2
PAGE 40

Petitioners,

vs.

No. 11685

OIL CONSERVATION COMMISSION OF NEW
MEXICO, JACK M. CAMPBELL, CHAIRMAN,
E. S. WALKER, Member, A. L. PORTER,
JR., Member and Secretary, and
CONSOLIDATED OIL & GAS, INC., a
corporation,

Respondents.

O R D E R

This matter having come on to be heard before the Court
on Motion of Appellants, for an Order extending the time within
which to file the transcript upon appeal, and the Court being
otherwise fully advised in the premises,

IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED, that the time within which to
file the transcript upon appeal be and the same hereby is ex-
tended until the 1st day of October, 1964.

s/ C. C. McCulloh
DISTRICT JUDGE

DISTRICT COURT
SAN JUAN COUNTY, N. M.
FILED SEP 24 1964
Virginia A. Kittell
CLERK

STATE OF NEW MEXICO COUNTY OF SAN JUAN IN THE DISTRICT COURT

EL PASO NATSRAL GAS COMPANY,
a corporation, PAN AMERICAN
PETROLEUM CORPORATION, a
corporation, MARATHON OIL COM-
PANY, a corporation, and SUNSET
INTERNATIONAL PETROLEUM CORPORA-
TION, a corporation,

Petitioners,

vs.

No. 11685

OIL CONSERVATION COMMISSION OF NEW
MEXICO, JACK M. CAMPBELL, CHAIRMAN,
E. S. WALKER, Member, A. L. PORTER,
JR., Member and Secretary, and
CONSOLIDATED OIL & GAS, INC., a
corporation,

Respondents.

WAIVER OF NOTICE

Comes now the attorney for the Respondents in the above
entitled cause and waives notice of the time and place of the
settling of the Bill of Exceptions herein, and does hereby con-
sent that without any further notice, the Honorable C. C.
McCulloh may sign and settle said Bill of Exceptions.

s/ J M Durrett Jr
J. M. Durrett, Jr.
Special Assistant Attorney General
Representing the New Mexico Oil
Conservation Commission

DISTRICT COURT
SAN JUAN COUNTY, N. M.
FILED SEP 24 1964
Virginia A. Kittell
CLERK

STATE OF NEW MEXICO COUNTY OF SAN JUAN IN THE DISTRICT COURT

EL PASO NATURAL GAS COMPANY,
a corporation, PAN AMERICAN
PETROLEUM CORPORATION, a
corporation, MARATHON OIL COM-
PANY, a corporation, and SUNSET
INTERNATIONAL PETROLEUM CORPORA-
TION, a corporation,

Petitioners,

vs.

No. 11685

OIL CONSERVATION COMMISSION OF NEW
MEXICO, JACK M. CAMPBELL, CHAIRMAN,
E. S. WALKER, Member, A. L. PORTER,
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settling of the Bill of Exceptions herein, and does hereby con-
sent that without any further notice, the Honorable C. C.
McCulloh may sign and settle said Bill of Exceptions.

GILBERT, WHITE & GILBERT

By s/ William B Kelly
William B. Kelly
Attorneys for Texaco, Inc. and
Sunray DX Oil Company

DISTRICT COURT
SAN JUAN COUNTY, N. M.
FILED SEP 24 1964
Virginia A. Kittell
CLERK

STATE OF NEW MEXICO COUNTY OF SAN JUAN IN THE DISTRICT COURT

EL PASO NATURAL GAS COMPANY,
a corporation, PAN AMERICAN
PETROLEUM CORPORATION, a
corporation, MARATHON OIL COM-
PANY, a corporation, and SUNSET
INTERNATIONAL PETROLEUM CORPORA-
TION, a corporation,

Petitioners,

vs.

OIL CONSERVATION COMMISSION OF NEW
MEXICO, JACK M. CAMPBELL, CHAIRMAN,
E. S. WALKER, Member, A. L. PORTER,
JR., Member and Secretary, and
CONSOLIDATED OIL & GAS, INC., a
corporation,

Respondents.

No. 11685

WAIVER OF NOTICE

Comes now the attorney for the Respondents in the above
entitled cause and waives notice of the time and place of the
settling of the Bill of Exceptions herein, and does hereby
consent that without any further notice, the Honorable C. C.
McCulloh may sign and settle said Bill of Exceptions.

KELLAHIN & FOX

By s/ Jason W. Kellahin
Jason W. Kellahin
Attorneys for Consolidated
Oil & Gas, Inc.

DISTRICT COURT
SAN JUAN COUNTY, N. M.
FILED SEP 24 1964
Virginia A. Kittell
CLERK

STATE OF NEW MEXICO COUNTY OF SAN JUAN IN THE DISTRICT COURT

EL PASO NATURAL GAS COMPANY,
a corporation, PAN AMERICAN
PETROLEUM CORPORATION, a
corporation, MARATHON OIL COM-
PANY, a corporation, and SUNSET
INTERNATIONAL PETROLEUM CORPORA-
TION, a corporation,

Petitioners,

vs.

OIL CONSERVATION COMMISSION OF NEW
MEXICO, JACK M. CAMPBELL, CHAIRMAN,
E. S. WALKER, Member, A. L. PORTER,
JR., Member and Secretary, and
CONSOLIDATED OIL & GAS, INC.,
a corporation,

Respondents.

No. 11685

WAIVER OF NOTICE

Comes now the attorney for the Petitioners in the above
entitled cause and waives notice of the time and place of the
settling of the Bill of Exceptions herein, and does hereby con-
sent that without any further notice, the Honorable C. C.
McCulloh may sign and settle said Bill of Exceptions.

SETH, MONTGOMERY, FEDERICI & ANDREWS

By s/ Wm Federici
Attorneys for El Paso Natural
Gas Company

DISTRICT COURT
SAN JUAN COUNTY, N. M.
FILED SEP 24 1964
Virginia A. Kittell
CLERK

STATE OF NEW MEXICO

COUNTY OF SAN JUAN

IN THE DISTRICT COURT

EL PASO NATURAL GAS COMPANY,
a corporation, PAN AMERICAN
PETROLEUM CORPORATION, a
corporation, MARATHON OIL COMPANY,
a corporation, and SUNSET
INTERNATIONAL PETROLEUM CORPORATION,
a corporation,

Petitioners,

vs.

OIL CONSERVATION COMMISSION OF NEW
MEXICO, JACK M. CAMPBELL, CHAIRMAN,
E. S. WALKER, Member, A. L. PORTER,
JR., Member and Secretary, and
CONSOLIDATED OIL & GAS, INC., a
corporation,

Respondents.

RECORDED BOOK G-2
PAGE 189

No. 11685

ORDER SETTLING BILL OF EXCEPTIONS

The Petitioners in the above entitled cause, having moved the Court that the official transcript now on file of the court reporter's shorthand notes taken by said reporter in the progress of the hearing of said cause, be settled, sealed and delivered as Petitioners' Bill of Exceptions to be used in the above entitled cause on appeal to the Supreme Court of the State of New Mexico.

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED, that said reporter's transcript, consisting of pages numbered 148 to 178, inclusive, duly certified by the official court reporter, as aforesaid, be filed as Petitioners' Bill of Exceptions in said cause and that said transcript be and the same is hereby signed, sealed, settled and delivered by the Court and the presiding judge thereof, who was the trial judge in said cause, as Petitioners' Bill of Exceptions therein.

DONE this 24 day of September, 1964.

s/ C. C. McCulloh
DISTRICT JUDGE

STATE OF NEW MEXICO

IN THE DISTRICT COURT

COUNTY OF SAN JUAN

EL PASO NATURAL GAS COMPANY,
a corporation, PAN AMERICAN
PETROLEUM CORPORATION, a
corporation, MARATHON OIL COMPANY,
a corporation, and SUNSET
INTERNATIONAL PETROLEUM CORPORATION,
a corporation,

Petitioners,

vs.

No. 11685


OIL CONSERVATION COMMISSION OF NEW
MEXICO, JACK M. CAMPBELL, CHAIRMAN,
E. S. WALKER, Member, A. L. PORTER,
JR., Member and Secretary, and
CONSOLIDATED OIL & GAS, INC., a
corporation,

Respondents.

CLERK'S CERTIFICATE

I, Virginia A. Kittell, Clerk of the District Court in
and for the above named County do hereby certify that the
above and foregoing pages 1 to 147C inclusive, constitute a
full, true, correct and complete Transcript of the records
in the above entitled cause.

Witness my hand and seal of said Court this 28 day
of September, 1964.


Clerk District Court
San Juan County

STATE OF NEW MEXICO

IN THE DISTRICT COURT

COUNTY OF SAN JUAN

EL PASO NATURAL GAS COMPANY,
a corporation, PAN AMERICAN
PETROLEUM CORPORATION, a
corporation, MARATHON OIL COMPANY,
a corporation, and SUNSET
INTERNATIONAL PETROLEUM CORPORATION,
a corporation,

Petitioners,

vs.

No. 11685

OIL CONSERVATION COMMISSION OF NEW
MEXICO, JACK M. CAMPBELL, CHAIRMAN,
E. S. WALKER, Member, A. L. PORTER,
JR., Member and Secretary, and
CONSOLIDATED OIL & GAS, INC., a
corporation,

Respondents.

CLERK'S CERTIFICATE OF COST

I, Virginia A. Kittell, Clerk of the District Court in
and for the above named County do hereby certify that the
costs in preparing the foregoing transcript is \$139¹⁰,
which said amount has been paid by the Appellant.

I further certify that the cost of preparing the
transcript of all testimony by the Court Reporter in the
above entitled cause is \$44⁹⁰, which said amount has
been paid by the Appellant.

Witness my hand and seal of said Court this 28
day of September, 1964.

Virginia A. Kittell
Clerk/District Court
San Juan County

I N D E X

	<u>P A G E</u>
Offer of Exhibits and objections to Exhibits	149 - 152
Stipulated Exhibit 1 -----	153 - 154
Respondents' Exhibit 1-----	155 - 158
Petitioners' Exhibit 1-----	159 - 178

STATE OF NEW MEXICO)
COUNTY OF SAN JUAN)

IN THE DISTRICT COURT

EL PASO NATURAL GAS COMPANY,
a corporation, PAN AMERICAN
PETROLEUM CORPORATION, a
corporation, MARATHON OIL
COMPANY, a corporation, and
SUNSET INTERNATIONAL PETROLEUM
CORPORATION, a corporation,

Petitioners,

vs.

No. 11685

OIL CONSERVATION COMMISSION OF
NEW MEXICO, JACK M. CAMPBELL,
Chairman, E. S. WALKER, Member,
A. L. PORTER, JR., Member and
Secretary, and CONSOLIDATED OIL
& GAS, INC., a corporation,

Respondents.

Proceedings in the above-entitled cause had before The
Honorable C. C. McCulloch, District Judge of the Eleventh
Judicial District, Division 1, at Aztec, New Mexico, on March
5, 1964:

APPEARANCES:

George L. Verity - Beta Production and Southwest Production
Company.

Rosa L. Malone - Pan American Petroleum Corporation and Marathon.

Seth, Montgomery, Federici
and Andrews -

By William Federici - El Paso Natural Gas Company and Sunset
International.

Ben Howell)
Garrett Whitworth) El Paso Natural Gas Company

J. M. Durrett, Jr. - Oil Conservation Commission

Jason Kellahin - Consolidated Oil and Gas, Inc.

E. P. Stockmar - Consolidated Oil & Gas, Inc.

Booker Kelly - Texaco, Inc., and Sunray DX

John B. Tittmann, Amicus Curae

BY MR. DURRETT: Transcript tendered to the Court by James M. Durrett, Jr., Cause No. 2504 before the Oil Conservation Commission, certified by Mr. A. L. Porter, Secretary Director of New Mexico Oil Conservation Commission, copies of certification have been served to opposing counsel.

Copy of each transcript of every hearing before the Commission on this case is tendered. I wish to state to the Court in connection with this record we are tendering to the Court at this time the entire record of proceedings before the Oil Conservation Commission, we did not have a formal request for specific portions of the record, although we were contacted informally and asked to certify the record, and in that connection we certified the entire record.

COURT: Any objection?

MR. MALONE: I understand Mr. Durrett is now offering that in evidence in this case?

MR. DURRETT: Yes, we offer it to the Court as an official record before the Commission.

MR. MALONE: On behalf of the Petitioners, as we understand the Statute relating to review of proceedings, the transcript is admitted subject to objection by either party as to portions of it. The Petitioners object to the portion of the record offered by the Commission which is composed of Consolidated Exhibits 1 through 9, inclusive, offered in the rehearing; for the reasons stated in the transcript at the time objection was made to the admission of those Exhibits, and for the following additional reasons:

First; That the Exhibits are incompetent for the purposes for which offered and used. Second; For the reason that insufficient predicate was laid for the introduction of the Exhibits, and the basic Exhibit upon which subsequent Exhibits were predicated. Third; For the reason that the Exhibits constitute hearsay, or are based on hearsay, and for that reason inadmissible. Fourth; For the reason that the material on which the Exhibits were predicated, and which was incorporated in them has not been properly substantiated.

If it please the Court, just as a suggestion, those objections and defects of the testimony really I think will be involved in the argument of the case as a whole and I would suggest as a possible means of proceeding if the Court would reserve his ruling on the question of the admissibility until after the entire argument has been heard, and we will be prepared to discuss the problems raised.

MR. KELLAHIN: Yes, I agree with Mr. Malone's request a ruling be withheld. Exhibits 1 through 9 have been objected to and the record shows 1 and 2 were not objected to.

MR. MALONE: I intended to state, and I believe I stated that they were objected to. At this time, for the reasons in the transcript and for additional reasons - and if there are no objections - the additional objections will go to those Exhibits. I should have added, we of course also object to all testimony predicated upon those Exhibits, because if those Exhibits should be ruled out testimony of necessity will follow.

MR. DURRETT: Your Honor, the Oil Conservation Commission would urge the Court to withhold any ruling on these objections until the argument is completed, and in connection with this we certainly feel all the evidence in the record is proper to be considered by the Court, all proceedings before the Oil Conservation Commission, and it may be alleged here today some of that testimony is incompetent and hearsay, and if so the Commission did not so find and did not consider it, and we submit the Court is permitted to arrive at that conclusion.

COURT: Very well, the Court will reserve a ruling on this until after the argument.

(ARGUMENT OF COUNSEL)

COURT: The transcripts and Exhibits which were offered are admitted in evidence and the Court finds the issues in favor of Respondents on the basis that the Order is supported by substantial evidence and the findings are sufficient to support the Order. I am holding with you on all the consolidated defenses - I say all of them - - most of them.

STATE OF NEW MEXICO, COUNTY OF SAN JUAN, IN THE DISTRICT COURT

EL PASO NATURAL GAS COMPANY, a Corporation,
et al,


Petitioners,

vs

No. 11685

OIL CONSERVATION COMMISSION OF NEW MEXICO,
JACK M. CAMPBELL, Chairman, et al,

Respondents.



STIPULATION

It is stipulated and agreed between undersigned counsel for the parties to this action that on July 3, 1963 two members of the New Mexico Oil Conservation Commission met and signed an original and one copy of Oil Conservation Commission Order No. R-2259-B; that said original order was forwarded to the printer for reproduction; upon the return of the original order from the printer, both the original and the copy of said order were signed by the third member of the Commission; the signed copy of said order No. R-2259-B, upon being signed by the third member of the Commission, was placed in the file of Case No. 2504; the original order was then ~~placed~~ ^{placed} in full, as required by Sec. 65-3-6, N.M.S.A., 1953 Compl., in a book kept in the Commission office for such purpose, this action being taken at the direction of A. L. Porter, Jr., Secretary-Director of the Commission, and said A. L. Porter, Jr., thereupon endorsed on the order placed in said book the following:

"Entered July 9, 1963
A. L. P."

upon the first page of such original order.

It is further stipulated and agreed that a copy of said order No. R-2259-B was mailed by the Commission to the Supreme Court Law Library and to all interested parties on July 9, 1963, and that no notice of said order was given to any party prior to said date, nor did any party have actual knowledge of said order prior to July 9, 1963.

SETH, MONTGOMERY, FEDERICI & ANDREWS

By [Signature]
Attorneys for El Paso Natural Gas Company
and Sunset International Petroleum Corporation

ATWOOD & MALONE

By *Atwood & Malone*
Attorneys for Marathom Oil Company
and Pan American Petroleum Company

VERITY, BURR, COOLEY & JONES

By *Verity, Burr, Cooley & Jones*
Attorneys for Beta Development
Company

James M. Durrett, Jr.
James M. Durrett, Jr.
Special Assistant Attorney General
representing the New Mexico Oil
Conservation Commission

KELLAHIN & FOX

By *Faxon W. Kellahin*
Attorneys for Consolidated Oil &
Gas, Inc.

GILBERT, WHITE & GILBERT

By *M. B. Kell*
Attorneys for Texaco, Inc., and
Sunray DX Oil Company

GOVERNOR
JACK M. CAMPBELL
CHAIRMAN

State of New Mexico
Oil Conservation Commission



LAND COMMISSIONER
E. B. JOHNNY WALKER
MEMBER

P. O. BOX 871
SANTA FE



STATE GEOLOGIST
A. L. PORTER, JR.
SECRETARY - DIRECTOR

TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN:

I, A. L. PORTER, Jr., Secretary-Director of the New Mexico Oil Conservation Commission hereby certify that the attached is a true and correct copy of Commission Order No. AG-N-18.

A. L. PORTER, Jr.
Secretary-Director

MARCH 3, 1964



IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have affixed my hand and notarial seal this 3rd day of March, 1964.

Notary Public

My Commission Expires:

September 22, 1965

Original December 20
C.L.P.

BEFORE THE OIL CONSERVATION COMMISSION
OF THE STATE OF NEW MEXICO

ORDER NO. AG-N-18

GAS PRORATION ORDER FOR PERIOD FEBRUARY 1, 1964
THROUGH JULY 31, 1964

The Commission held public hearing at Santa Fe New Mexico, on December 18, 1963, at 9 o'clock a.m., pursuant to legal notice, for the purpose of setting the allowable production of gas from the following nine gas pools in San Juan, Rio Arriba, and Sandoval Counties, New Mexico, for the six-month period, February 1, 1964 through July 31, 1964.

Blanco-Mesaverde, Basin-Dakota, Aztec-Pictured Cliffs, Ballard-Pictured Cliffs, South Blanco-Pictured Cliffs, Fulcher Kutz-Pictured Cliffs, Tapacito-Pictured Cliffs, West Kutz-Pictured Cliffs, and Devils Fork-Gallup.

NOW, on this 23rd day of December, 1963, the Commission, a quorum being present, having considered the nominations of purchasers, the capacity of producing wells, and being otherwise fully advised in the premises,

FINDS:

(1) That the total nomination of purchasers of gas produced from the above-listed nine gas pools for the period February 1, 1964, through July 31, 1964, is 164,955,350 MCF. The individual pool nominations, which total 164,955,350 MCF, are as follows:

Blanco-Mesaverde	64,441,300 MCF
Basin-Dakota	64,413,850 MCF
Aztec-Pictured Cliffs	4,171,300 MCF
Ballard-Pictured Cliffs	4,534,600 MCF
South Blanco-Pictured Cliffs	17,162,300 MCF
Fulcher Kutz-Pictured Cliffs	1,969,400 MCF
Tapacito-Pictured Cliffs	4,932,000 MCF
West Kutz-Pictured Cliffs	1,826,500 MCF
Devils Fork-Gallup	1,504,100 MCF

(2) That the potential producing capacity of all gas wells in the nine gas pools listed above is in excess of the nominations of purchasers of gas, and in order to prevent waste and protect correlative rights, the production of gas from the above-listed nine gas pools should be limited, allocated and distributed during the six-month proration period commencing February 1, 1964.

(3) That all the producing gas wells, together with the expected completed or recompleted wells in the nine gas pools listed above, can produce a total of 164,955,350 MCF without causing waste within the six-month proration period commencing February 1, 1964, and an allocation based upon such production would be reasonable and protect correlative rights.

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED:

(1) That for the six-month proration period commencing February 1, 1964, the total allowable production to be assigned the nine allocated gas pools in San Juan, Rio Arriba, and Sandoval Counties, New Mexico, be and the same hereby is as follows:

Blanco-Mesaverde	64,441,300 MCF
Basin-Dakota	64,413,850 MCF
Aztec-Pictured Cliffs	4,171,300 MCF
Ballard-Pictured Cliffs	4,534,600 MCF
South Blanco-Pictured Cliffs	17,162,300 MCF
Fulcher Kutz-Pictured Cliffs	1,969,400 MCF
Tapacito-Pictured Cliffs	4,932,000 MCF
West Kutz-Pictured Cliffs	1,826,500 MCF
Devils Fork-Gallup	1,504,100 MCF

(2) That the allocation hereby set for said six-month proration period in the nine allocated pools in San Juan, Rio Arriba, and Sandoval Counties, New Mexico, shall be in accordance with the Commission Rules and Regulations, and Orders.

(3) That the total allowable production for each pool as set forth shall be allocated on a monthly basis in accordance with Schedule "A" attached hereto and said schedule shall be adjusted monthly to meet changes in market conditions as reflected by purchasers' supplemental nominations and actual gas production, in accordance with the Commission Rules and Regulations, and Orders.

The foregoing order shall remain effective until further order of the Commission.

DONE at Santa Fe, New Mexico, on the day and year hereinabove designated.

STATE OF NEW MEXICO
OIL CONSERVATION COMMISSION

Jack M. Campbell
JACK M. CAMPBELL, Chairman

E. S. Walker
E. S. WALKER, Member

A. L. Porter, Jr.
A. L. PORTER, Jr., Member & Secretary



km/


SCHEDULE "A"

	FEBRUARY 1964	MARCH 1964	APRIL 1964	MAY 1964	JUNE 1964	JULY 1964	TOTAL
Blanco-Mesaverde	13,193,700	13,748,900	10,441,100	10,203,700	8,923,600	7,930,300	64,441,300
Basin-Dakota	13,473,600	13,545,000	10,464,450	9,917,000	8,936,700	8,077,100	64,413,850
Aztec-Pictured Cliffs	850,900	823,900	658,000	639,300	612,400	586,800	4,171,300
Ballard-Pictured Cliffs	928,700	895,700	716,000	693,200	663,900	637,100	4,534,600
South Blanco-Pictured Cliffs	3,444,800	3,373,900	2,719,500	2,670,300	2,532,200	2,421,600	17,162,300
Fulcher Kutz-Pictured Cliffs	423,700	389,700	313,900	290,300	279,500	272,300	1,969,400
Tapacito-Pictured Cliffs	1,035,700	975,000	782,400	740,400	711,000	687,500	4,932,000
West Kutz-Pictured Cliffs	377,700	360,900	288,900	277,200	265,900	255,900	1,826,500
Devils Fork-Gallup	322,600	297,600	239,500	222,200	214,000	208,200	1,504,100
TOTAL	34,051,400	34,410,600	26,623,750	25,653,600	23,139,200	21,076,800	164,955,350

All figures are in MCF @ 60°F and 15.025 psia.

GOVERNOR
JACK M. CAMPBELL
CHAIRMAN

State of New Mexico
Oil Conservation Commission




LAND COMMISSIONER
E. S. JOHNNY WALKER
MEMBER

P. O. BOX 671
SANTA FE

STATE GEOLOGIST
A. L. PORTER, JR.
SECRETARY - DIRECTOR

TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN

I, A. L. PORTER, Jr., Secretary-Director of the New Mexico
Oil Conservation Commission hereby certify that the attached is
a true and correct copy of Commission Order No. R-2259-B.


A. L. PORTER, Jr.
Secretary-Director

FEBRUARY 28, 1964



IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have affixed my hand and notarial
seal this 28th day of February, 1964.

Notary Public

My Commission Expires:

September 22, 1965

BEFORE THE OIL CONSERVATION COMMISSION
OF THE STATE OF NEW MEXICO

IN THE MATTER OF THE HEARING
CALLED BY THE OIL CONSERVATION
COMMISSION OF NEW MEXICO FOR
THE PURPOSE OF CONSIDERING:

CASE No. 2504
Order No. R-2259-B

APPLICATION OF CONSOLIDATED OIL & GAS, INC.,
FOR AN AMENDMENT OF ORDER NO. R-1670-C,
CHANGING THE ALLOCATION FORMULA FOR THE
BASIN-DAKOTA GAS POOL, SAN JUAN, RIO ARRIBA
AND SANDOVAL COUNTIES, NEW MEXICO.

ORDER OF THE COMMISSION

BY THE COMMISSION:

This cause came on for rehearing at 9 o'clock a.m. on February 14, 1963, at Santa Fe, New Mexico, before the Oil Conservation Commission of New Mexico, hereinafter referred to as the "Commission."

NOW, on this 3rd day of July, 1963, the Commission, a quorum being present, having considered the testimony presented and the exhibits received at said hearing, and being fully advised in the premises,

FINDS:

(1) That due public notice having been given as required by law, the Commission has jurisdiction of this cause and the subject matter thereof.

(2) That Order No. R-1670-C, entered by the Commission on November 4, 1960, established Special Rules and Regulations for the Basin-Dakota Gas Pool and adopted, by reference, Rule 9(C) of the General Rules applicable to prorated gas pools in Northwest New Mexico, as set forth in Order No. R-1670.

(3) That Rule 9(C) of the General Rules applicable to prorated gas pools in Northwest New Mexico, as set forth in Order No. R-1670, allocates production on the basis of 25 percent acreage plus 75 percent acreage times deliverability, hereinafter referred to as the 25-75 formula.

(4) That the applicant, Consolidated Oil & Gas, Inc., seeks amendment of the Special Rules and Regulations for the Basin-Dakota Gas Pool to allocate production on the basis of 60 percent acreage plus 40 percent acreage times deliverability.

-2-

CASE No. 2504

Order No. R-2259-B

(5) That the initial recoverable gas reserves in the Basin-Dakota Gas Pool, insofar as can be determined, total approximately 2.255 trillion cubic feet, of which approximately 96 billion cubic feet is attributed to marginal wells, which are permitted to produce at capacity.

(6) That the initial recoverable gas reserves underlying each non-marginal tract in the Basin-Dakota Gas Pool are as shown in Column C, Tract Reserves, of Exhibit A attached hereto and made a part hereof.

(7) That the percent of the total pool reserves attributable to each non-marginal tract in the Basin-Dakota Gas Pool is as shown in Column D, Percent of Pool Reserves, of Exhibit A.

(8) That it is impracticable to allocate production solely on the basis of the percentage of pool reserves due to the continuous fluctuation in reserve computations resulting from new completions in the pool and re-evaluation of reserves of existing wells.

(9) That the tract acreage factor for each non-marginal well in the Basin-Dakota Gas Pool is as shown in Column A of Exhibit A; that the deliverability for each non-marginal well, insofar as can be determined, is as shown in Column B of Exhibit A.

(10) That in the Basin-Dakota Gas Pool there is no direct correlation between deliverability and reserves, or acreage and reserves, and that, therefore, neither should be used as the sole criterion for distributing the total pool allowable among the tracts.

(11) That the most reasonable basis for allocating production in the Basin-Dakota Gas Pool is to determine, for each proposed formula, the percentage of total pool allowable apportioned to each non-marginal tract as compared to its percentage of total pool reserves, said relationship hereinafter referred to as the tract's A/R Factor, and to select the allocation formula that will allow the maximum number of wells in the pool to produce with an ideal tract A/R Factor of 1.0, or with a tract A/R Factor of from 0.7 to 1.3, which, due to inherent variance in interpreting and computing reserves, is within a reasonable tolerance.

(12) That the percentage of deliverability and the percentage of acreage included in the allocation formula affect the percentage of the total pool allowable assigned to each non-marginal well in the pool, thereby affecting the number of wells in the pool producing with a tract A/R Factor of from 0.7 to 1.3.

(13) That under the present 25-75 formula, correlative rights are not being adequately protected; that the protection of correlative rights is a necessary adjunct to the prevention of waste, and that waste will result unless the Commission acts to protect correlative rights.

-3-

CASE No. 2504

Order No. R-2259-B

(14) That, based upon the December 1962 pool allowable, a comparison of the number of non-marginal wells producing with a tract A/R Factor of from 0.7 to 1.3 under each formula as identified by an asterisk in Columns G and J of Exhibit A, and of the total volume of gas allocated to the wells in the 0.7 to 1.3 range under each formula, established that the proposed formula of 60 percent acreage plus 40 percent acreage times deliverability will more adequately protect correlative rights and prevent waste by permitting more wells to receive their just and equitable share of the gas in the pool, insofar as can be determined.

(15) That numerous wells in the Basin-Dakota Gas Pool are capable of draining more than their just and equitable share of the gas in the pool, and that an allocation formula of 60 percent acreage plus 40 percent acreage times deliverability will, insofar as is practicable, prevent drainage between producing tracts which is not equalized by counter drainage.

(16) That an allocation formula of 60 percent acreage plus 40 percent acreage times deliverability will, insofar as it is practicable to do so, afford to the owner of each property in the pool the opportunity to use his just and equitable share of the reservoir energy.

(17) That Order No. R-1670-C should be amended to provide an allocation formula for the Basin-Dakota Gas Pool in San Juan, Rio Arriba, and Sandoval Counties, New Mexico, based 60 percent on acreage and 40 percent on acreage times deliverability.

(18) That, due to the time required to administer a new allocation formula for a prorated gas pool, this order should not be effective until August 1, 1963, the beginning of the next six-month proration period for the Basin-Dakota Gas Pool.

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED:

(1) That the Special Rules and Regulations for the Basin-Dakota Gas Pool, as promulgated by Order No. R-1670-C, are hereby amended by adoption of the following:

RULE 9(C): The pool allowable remaining each month after deducting the total allowable assigned to marginal wells shall be allocated among the non-marginal wells entitled to an allowable in the following manner:

1. Forty percent (40%) of the pool allowable remaining to be allocated to non-marginal wells shall be allocated among such wells in the proportion that each well's "AD Factor" bears to the total "AD Factor" for all non-marginal wells in the pool.

-4-

CASE No. 2504

Order No. R-2259-B

2. Sixty percent (60%) of the pool allowable remaining to be allocated to non-marginal wells shall be allocated among such wells in the proportion that each well's acreage factor bears to the total acreage factor for all non-marginal wells in the pool.

(2) That Order No. R-2259 is hereby superseded.

(3) That jurisdiction of this cause is retained for the entry of such further orders as the Commission may deem necessary.

(4) That this order shall be effective August 1, 1963, the beginning of the next six-month proration period for the Basin-Dakota Gas Pool.

DONE at Santa Fe, New Mexico, on the day and year hereinabove designated.

STATE OF NEW MEXICO
OIL CONSERVATION COMMISSION

JACK M. CAMPBELL, Chairman

E. S. WALKER, Member

A. L. PORTER, Jr., Member & Secretary

S E A L

esr/

ORDER NO. 21259-1B

AND

[illegible]

BASIN DAKOTA TRACT/POOL RESERVES AND ALLOCATION
ARRANGED IN THE ORDER OF PIPELINE AND OPERATOR

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REPORTER'S CERTIFICATE

I, Vastie Fowler, Official Court Reporter of the Eleventh Judicial District Court, Division 1, hereby certify that I took the foregoing notes regarding offer of Exhibits and objections thereto, and have transcribed same into typewritten material, and have prepared copies of all Exhibits offered and admitted into evidence at the time of hearing of the above-entitled cause on March 5, 1964, consisting of pages 148 to 178 inclusive, and that this is the extent of my record in this cause.

I further certify that the charge for this record is \$44.90, which amount has been paid by Appellants.

Vastie Fowler

Vastie Fowler
Official Court Reporter
Aztec, New Mexico

STATE OF NEW MEXICO

COUNTY OF SAN JUAN

IN THE DISTRICT COURT

EL PASO NATURAL GAS COMPANY,
a corporation, PAN AMERICAN PET-
ROLEUM CORPORATION, a corporation,
MARATHON OIL COMPANY, a corpora-
tion, SOUTHWEST PRODUCTION COMPANY,
a partnership, and SUNSET INTERNATIONAL
PETROLEUM CORPORATION, a corporation,

Petitioners,

vs.

No. 11,685

OIL CONSERVATION COMMISSION OF
NEW MEXICO, JACK M. CAMPBELL,
Chairman, E. S. WALKER, Member,
A. L. PORTER, JR., Member and
Secretary, CONSOLIDATED OIL & GAS,
INC., a corporation,

Respondents.

TRIAL BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS

OIL CONSERVATION COMMISSION, TEXACO INC.,

AND SUNRAY DX OIL COMPANY

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Attorney General)	vation Commission
Santa Fe, New Mexico)	

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Santa Fe, New Mexico)	Sunray DX Oil Company

INDEX

	Page
STATEMENT OF THE CASE	1
STATEMENT OF FACTS	2
ARGUMENT AND AUTHORITIES	14
POINT I	6
POINT II	7
POINT III	10
POINTS IV AND V	14
POINT VI	21
POINT VII	23
CONCLUSION	27

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

CASES

	<u>Page</u>
<u>American Trust and Savings Bank of Albuquerque v. Scobee</u> , 29 N.M. 436, 224 P. 783 (1924).....	24
<u>Batte v. Stanley's</u> , 70 N.M. 364, 374 P.2d 124 (1962)....	22
<u>Boston and M.R.R. v. U.S.</u> , 203 Fed. supp. 661 (D.C. Mass., 1962).....	22
<u>Brown v. Cobb</u> , 53 N.M. 169, 204 P.2d 264 (1949).....	22
<u>Burquette v. Del Curto</u> , 49 N.M. 292, 163 P.2d 257 (1945)	24
<u>Cities Service Oil Company v. Anglin</u> , 204 Okla. 171,.... 228 P.2d 191 (1951)	23
<u>Coastal Claims Oil Company v. Douglas</u> , 69 N.M. 69, 364.. P.2d 131 (1961)	21
<u>Colorado Interstate Gas Company v. State Corporation Commission</u> , 386 P.2d 266, (Kan. 1963).....	16
<u>Continental Oil Company, et al., v. Oil Conservation Commission, et al.</u> , 70 N.M. 310, 373 P.2d 809 (1962).....	7, 8, 13, 15, 18, 20
<u>Corzelius v. Harrell</u> , 143 Tex. 509, 186 S.W. 2d 961 (1945)	15
<u>Craig v. Ribicoff</u> , 192 Fed. supp. 479 (M.D.N.C. 1961)...	23
<u>Davis v. State Department of Public Health and Welfare</u> , 274 SW 2d (Mo. 1955).....	23
<u>Delaney et al. v. Osborn</u> , 265 P.2d 481, (Okla. 1953)....	11, 22, 23
<u>Edwards v. Peterson</u> , 61 N.M. 104, 295 P.2d 858. (1956)..	21
<u>Ex parte Morris</u> , 263 Ala. 664, 83 So. 2d 716 (1955).....	22
<u>Ferguson-Stears Motor Company v. State Corporation Commission</u> , 60 N.M. 114, 283 P.2d 440.....	8, 15
<u>Freud v. Davis</u> , 64 N.J. Super. 242, 165 A.2d 350 (1960)..	23
<u>Gateway City Transfer Company v. Public Service Commission</u> , 253 Wis. 397, 34 N.W. 2d 238 (1948).....	23
<u>Heine v. Reynolds</u> , 69 N.M. 398, 367 P.2d 708 (1962).....	22

	<u>Page</u>
<u>Hines v. Hines</u> , 64 N.M. 377, 328, P2d 944 (1958).....	21
<u>In re Application of Peppers Refining Company</u> , 272 P.2d 416, (Okla. 1954).....	11 & 13
<u>Johnson v. Sanchez</u> , 67 N.M. 41, 351 P.2d 449 (1960).....	7
<u>John W. McGrath Corp. v. Hughes</u> , 264 F. 2d 314 (2nd Cir. 1959)	22
<u>Larnay v. Hobby</u> , 132 Fed. Supp. 738 (E.D. Wis. 1955)....	23
<u>Little v. Johnson</u> , 56 N.M. 232, 242 P.2d 1000 (1952)....	21
<u>Pittsburgh and L.E.R. Company v. Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission</u> , 170 Pa. Super 411, 85 A2d 646 (1952)	23
<u>Railroad Commission et al. v. Aluminum Company</u> 363 S.W. 2d 818, (Tex. 1963).....	12
<u>Railroad Commission et al. v. Humble Oil & Refining Company, et al.</u> 193 S.W. 2d 824, (Tex. 1946).....	12
<u>Railroad Commission et al. v. Phillips et al.</u> 364 S.W. 2d 408 (Tex. 1963).....	12
<u>Reid v. Brown</u> , 56 N.M. 65, 240 P. 2d 213 (1952).....	21
<u>Saporiti v. Zoning Board</u> , 137 Conn 478, 78 A2d 741 (1951)	15
<u>Securities & Exchange Commission v. Chennery Corp.</u> 318 U.S. 80, 63 S. Ct. 454, 87 L. Ed. 626 (1942).....	15
<u>Silva v. Haake</u> , 56 N.M. 497, 245 P2d 835 (1952).....	21
<u>Sinclair Oil & Gas Company v. Corporation Commission</u> , 378, P. 2d 847, (Okla 1963).....	12, 13 and 16
<u>State ex rel State Highway Commission v. Tanny</u> , 68 N.M. 117 359 P.2d 350 (1961).....	21
<u>State Game Commission v. Tackett</u> , 71 N.M. 400, 379 P.2d 54 (1962).....	24
<u>State v. W. S. Ranch Company</u> , 69 N.M. 169, 364 P.2d 1036 (1961).....	26
<u>Swaks v. Council of City of Vallejo</u> 33 Cal. 2d 867, 206 P.2d 355 (1949).....	15
<u>Transport Trucking Co. v. First National Bank in Albuquerque</u> , 61 N.M. 320, 300 P.2d 476 (1956).....	21
<u>Tri-Bullion Corporation v. American Smelting and Refining Company</u> , 58 N.M. 787, 277 P.2d 293 (1954).....	21
<u>Trujillo v. Clark</u> , 71 N.M. 288, 377 P.2d 958 (1963).....	21
<u>Woody v. State Corporation Commission</u> , 265 P.2d 1102, (Okla. 1954).....	22, 23

STATUTES

Section 65-3-22, NMSA 1953 Comp.	6
Section 65-3-13(c) NMSA 1953 Comp.	7, 17, 18
Section 65-3-3(e) NMSA 1953 Comp.	9, 10
Section 65-3-22(b) NMSA 1953 Comp.	15
Section 65-3-29 (h) NMSA 1953 Comp.	18, 20
Section 65-3-14(a) NMSA 1953 Comp.	18, 20

TREATISES

Williams, Nature and Effect of Conservation Orders,
Eighth Annual Rocky Mountain Mineral Law Institute, 433..10,12,13

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

On February 23, 1962, Consolidated Oil & Gas, Inc., filed an application with the New Mexico Oil Conservation Commission seeking the establishment of a gas allocation formula for the Basin-Dakota Gas Pool based 60 percent on acreage and 40 percent on acreage times deliverability. The Commission docketed the case to be heard on March 14, 1962. At the March 14 hearing appearances were entered, preliminary statements were made, and the case was continued to April 18, 1962. (Mar. Tr.)* On April 18 additional appearances were entered, the Commission heard opening statements, heard testimony and received evidence in favor of and in opposition to the application, and heard closing argument of counsel. (Apr. Tr.) On June 7, 1962, the Commission issued Order No. R-2259 which denied the application. Consolidated Oil & Gas, Inc., filed a Petition for Rehearing on June 27, 1962, and on July 7, 1962, the Commission issued Order No. R-2259-A which granted a rehearing limiting the scope of the rehearing to matters concerning recoverable gas reserves in the Basin-Dakota Gas Pool. On August 15, 1962, the rehearing was continued to September 13, 1962. (Aug. Tr.) On September 13 the Commission heard argument on objections to granting of the order for rehearing and on a motion to vacate, and denied the objections and the motion. (Sept. Tr. 1-29). The Commission also heard argument on motions to quash subpoenas duces tecum that had been issued by the Commission and continued the case to the regular November hearing. (Sept. Tr. 29-74). On October 18, 1962, the Commission issued a Ruling On Motions To Quash Subpoenas Duces Tecum. The ruling ordered subpoenaed persons, subject to a determination of custody

*Reference will be made to the transcript of proceedings before the Commission by month of the hearing.

and control, to produce all core analysis reports and all electric and radioactivity logs concerning any and all wells that had been cored in the Basin-Dakota Gas Pool by their respective companies. At the hearing on November 14, 1962, it was stipulated that the Commission's Ruling on Motions to Quash Subpoenas Duces Tecum would be complied with and the case was continued to December 19, 1962. (Nov. Tr.) On December 19 the case was continued to February 14, 1963. (Dec. Tr.) On February 14, 1963, appearances were entered, counsel presented opening statements, the Commission heard testimony and received evidence in support of and in opposition to the application, and counsel presented closing argument. (Feb. Tr.) On July 3, 1963, the Commission issued Order No. R-2259-B, which superseded Order No. R-2259, and established an allocation formula for the Basin-Dakota Gas Pool based 60 percent on acreage and 40 percent on acreage times deliverability. Applications for Rehearing were filed by the Petitioners in this case and on August 1, 1963, the Commission issued Order No. R-2259-C which denied the Applications for Rehearing. Petitions for Review were filed with this Court by El Paso Natural Gas Company, Pan American Petroleum Corporation, Marathon Oil Company, Southwest Production Company, and Sunset International Petroleum Corporation.

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS

On November 4, 1960, the New Mexico Oil Conservation Commission issued Order No. R-1670-C. This order established Special Rules and Regulations for the Basin-Dakota Gas Pool in San Juan, Rio Arriba, and Sandoval Counties, New Mexico, and adopted, by reference, Rule 9(C) of the General Rules applicable to prorated gas pools in Northwest New Mexico as set forth in Order No. R-1670. Rule 9(C) of Order No. R-1670 allocates gas production from prorated gas pools in Northwest New Mexico on

the basis of 25 percent acreage plus 75 percent acreage times deliverability. Until August 1, 1963, the effective date of Order No. R-2259-B, the allocation of the allowable production of gas from the Basin-Dakota Gas Pool was determined by a formula of 25 percent acreage plus 75 percent acreage times deliverability. Since the effective date of Order No. R-2259-B, the allocation of allowable gas production in the Basin-Dakota Gas Pool has been determined by a formula of 60 percent acreage plus 40 percent acreage times deliverability. The validity of Order No. R-2259-B is the subject matter of this appeal.

Order No. R-2259-B granted an application by Consolidated Oil & Gas, Inc., which sought the establishment of an allocation formula for the Basin-Dakota Gas Pool based 60 percent on acreage and 40 percent on acreage times deliverability. Consolidated's application was filed with the Commission on February 23, 1962, and docketed by the Commission as Case No. 2504 to be heard on March 14, 1962. The case was continued to April 18, 1962, and heard by the Commission on that date. (Apr. Tr.) On June 7, 1962, the Commission issued Order No. R-2259 which found that the evidence presented at the hearing of the case concerning recoverable gas reserves in the pool was insufficient to justify any change in the allocation formula and denied the application, retaining jurisdiction for the entry of such further orders as the Commission might deem necessary. On June 27, 1962, Consolidated Oil & Gas, Inc., filed a Petition for Rehearing, and on July 7, 1962, the Commission issued Order No. R-2259-A which found that a rehearing should be granted and that the scope of the rehearing should be limited to matters concerning recoverable gas reserves in the pool. Order No. R-2259-A granted a rehearing, set the same for August 15, 1962, and limited the scope of the rehearing to matters concerning recoverable gas reserves in the Basin-Dakota Gas Pool. The rehearing was subsequently continued

to February 14, 1963. On February 14, 1963, the Commission reheard Case No. 2504. (Feb. Tr.) On July 3, 1963, the Commission issued Order No. R-2259-B. By Order No. R-2259-B, the Commission superseded Order No. R-2259, which had denied Consolidated's application, and amended the Special Rules and Regulations for the Basin-Dakota Gas Pool as promulgated by Order No. R-1670-C. The new formula allocated the allowable assigned to non-marginal wells in the following manner:

1. Forty percent in the proportion that each well's acreage times deliverability factor bears to the total of the acreage times deliverability factors for all non-marginal wells in the pool.
2. Sixty percent in the proportion that each well's acreage factor bears to the total of the acreage factors for all non-marginal wells in the pool.

In Order No. R-2259-B, the Commission determined, in million cubic feet, the initial recoverable gas reserves underlying each non-marginal tract in the Basin-Dakota Gas Pool. (Finding No. 6). The Commission also determined the total initial recoverable gas reserves in the Basin-Dakota Gas Pool and the amount which was attributed to marginal wells which were permitted to produce at capacity. (Finding No. 5). The percent of total pool reserves attributable to each non-marginal tract in the pool was then determined. (Finding No. 7). The Commission found that it was not practicable to allocate production solely on the basis of each well's percentage of pool reserves because of the continuous fluctuation in reserve computations resulting from new completions in the pool and the re-evaluation of reserves attributed to existing wells. (Finding No. 8). A tract acreage factor for each non-marginal well in the pool and the deliverability for each non-marginal well was determined. (Finding No. 9). The Commission concluded that neither acreage nor deliverability should be used as the sole criterion for allocating production as it found that there was no direct correlation between deliverability and reserves, or acreage and reserves. (Finding No. 10). The

Commission concluded that the most reasonable basis for allocating production in the Basin-Dakota Gas Pool was to determine, for each proposed formula, the percentage of total pool allowable apportioned to each non-marginal tract as compared to its percentage of total pool reserves, and to select the allocation formula that would allow the maximum number of wells in the pool to produce with an ideal ratio of 1.0, or with a ratio of from 0.7 to 1.3, which the Commission found was reasonable due to inherent variance in interpreting and computing reserves.

(Finding No. 11). The Commission determined that the number of wells in the pool producing with a desired ratio was affected by the percentage of deliverability and the percentage of acreage included in the formula. (Finding No. 12). The Commission also determined that correlative rights were not being adequately protected under the formula then in effect and concluded that the protection of correlative rights is a necessary adjunct to the prevention of waste, and that waste would result unless the Commission acted to protect correlative rights. (Finding No. 13). The Commission identified each non-marginal well producing with the desired ratio under each formula by an asterisk in Columns G and J of Exhibit A of Order No. R-2259-B. The Commission then found that a comparison of the total number of wells producing with the desired ratio under each formula and the total volume of gas allocated to the wells producing with the desired ratio under each formula established that the proposed formula of 60 percent acreage plus 40 percent acreage times deliverability would more adequately protect correlative rights and prevent waste by permitting more wells to receive their just and equitable share of the gas in the pool. (Finding No. 14). The Commission found that numerous wells in the pool were capable of draining more than their just and equitable share of the gas and concluded that the proposed formula would prevent drainage between producing tracts which was not equalized by counter

drainage. (Finding No. 15). The Commission also concluded that the proposed formula would afford to the owner of each property in the pool the opportunity to use his just and equitable share of the reservoir energy (Finding No. 16) and that Order No. R-1670-C should be amended to provide an allocation formula based 60 percent on acreage and 40 percent on acreage times deliverability. (Finding No. 17).

Following the issuance of Order No. R-2259-B, the Petitioners in this case filed Applications for Rehearing in Case No. 2504. On August 1, 1963, the Commission issued Order No. R-2259-C which found that the Applications for Rehearing did not allege that the applicants for rehearing had new or additional evidence to present, that the Commission had carefully considered the evidence presented in the case and was fully advised in the premises, and that Order No. R-2259-B was proper in all respects. Order No. R-2259-C denied the Applications for Rehearing and this appeal followed.

ARGUMENT AND AUTHORITIES

POINT I

THE ORDER IS PRIMA FACIE VALID AND THE PETITIONERS HAVE THE BURDEN OF ESTABLISHING THAT THE ACTION OF THE COMMISSION WAS FRAUDULENT, ARBITRARY OR CAPRICIOUS, THAT THE ORDER WAS NOT SUPPORTED BY SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE, OR THAT THE COMMISSION DID NOT ACT WITHIN THE SCOPE OF ITS AUTHORITY.

The Court's attention is called to Section 65-3-22, NMSA, 1953 Comp., which provides that, on appeal, "The commission action complained of shall be prima facie valid and the burden shall be upon the party or parties seeking review to establish the invalidity of such action of the Commission." The Legislature has specifically delegated to the Commission the duty of prorating

or distributing the allowable production from prorated gas pools upon a reasonable basis and recognizing correlative rights. Section 65-3-13(c), NMSA, 1953 Comp. The Commission purported to follow the legislative mandate by the issuance of Order No. R-2259-B. As the Court cannot substitute its discretion for that of the Commission, the presumption of the validity of the Commission's order prevails and cannot be overcome unless Petitioners clearly show that the Commission acted fraudulently, arbitrarily or capriciously, that the order was not supported by substantial evidence, or that the Commission did not act within the scope of its authority. Johnson v. Sanchez, 67 N.M. 41, 351 P.2d 449 (1960); Continental Oil Company et al. v. Oil Conservation Commission et al., 70 N.M. 310, 373 P.2d 809 (1962). Petitioners have alleged that Orders No. R-2259-B and No. 2259-C are erroneous in many respects. We submit that these orders are not erroneous and that a mere showing that the orders were erroneous would not overcome the presumption of the validity of the orders. In order to set the Commission's action aside, the Petitioners must clearly show that the action of the Commission was fraudulent, arbitrary or capricious, that the order was not supported by substantial evidence, or that the Commission did not act within the scope of its authority. Plummer v. Johnson and Continental Oil Company et al. v. Oil Conservation Commission et al., supra.

POINT II

THE LACK OF A SPECIFIC FINDING THAT WASTE IS OCCURRING UNDER AN EXISTING GAS ALLOCATION FORMULA DOES NOT INVALIDATE AN ORDER ESTABLISHING A NEW FORMULA; IN THE ALTERNATIVE, THE ORDER CONTAINS FINDINGS THAT WASTE WAS OCCURRING UNDER THE PRIOR GAS ALLOCATION FORMULA.

In considering the Petitioners' allegation that the order

is unreasonable and unlawful because it does not contain a finding that waste was occurring under the original formula, the Court should note Ferguson-Steere Motor Company v. State Corporation Commission, 60 N.M. 114, 117, 288 P.2d 440, wherein the Court said:

"If findings, or more adequate findings, by the administrative board or commission be desired, a duty rests on the party complaining of their absence to have made a request for them."

It is pointed out that the Petitioners did not submit such a finding and that they did not tender any requested findings to the Commission at any stage of the proceedings.

The legislative mandate concerning allocation of allowable gas production is set out in Section 65-3-13(c), NMSA, 1953 Comp., wherein the Commission is directed to "allocate the allowable production among the gas wells in the pool delivering to a gas transportation facility upon a reasonable basis and recognizing correlative rights." There is no legislative mandate that the Commission make a specific finding that waste is occurring in order to issue a valid order allocating production. In this connection it should be noted that the New Mexico Supreme Court has stated that it is not necessary for the Commission to make formal and elaborate findings. Continental Oil Company et al. v. Oil Conservation Commission et al., supra.

If a finding that waste is occurring under an existing gas allocation formula is necessary to issue a valid order establishing a new formula, it is submitted that the order did contain such a finding. Finding No. 13 of Order No. R-2259-B reads as follows:

"That under the present 25-75 formula, correlative rights are not being adequately protected; that the protection of correlative rights is a necessary adjunct to the prevention of waste, and that waste will result unless the Commission acts to protect correlative rights."

In commenting on the Commission's duty to protect correlative rights, the New Mexico Supreme Court has said:

"The prevention of waste is of paramount interest, and protection of correlative rights is interrelated and inseparable from it. The very definition of 'correlative rights' emphasizes the term 'without waste.' However, the protection of correlative rights is a necessary adjunct to the prevention of waste. Waste will result unless the commission can also act to protect correlative rights."

As the Commission concluded that waste would result unless the Commission acted to protect correlative rights, it necessarily follows that waste was occurring under the existing gas allocation formula.

In Finding No. 14 the Commission concluded that the proposed formula would more adequately protect correlative rights and prevent waste by permitting more wells to receive their just and equitable share of the gas in the pool. It also is obvious from this finding that if waste was to be prevented, waste was occurring under the existing formula.

Respondents submit that although Findings No. 13 and No. 14 may not be formal and elaborate findings they are sufficient findings that waste was occurring under the ruling in the Continental case, supra.

In any event it should be pointed out that Order No. R-2259-B merely amends Order No. R-1670-C by the addition of a paragraph providing for the application of a new proration formula based on 60 percent acreage plus 40 percent deliverability. In all other respects Order No. R-1670-C remains in full force and effect. It also contains all necessary findings concerning the prevention of waste. In Finding No. 3 of Order No. R-1670-C, the Commission stated:

"That the producing capacity of the wells in the Dakota Producing Interval is in excess of the market demand for gas from said common source of supply, and that for the purpose of preventing waste and protecting correlative rights, appropriate procedures should be adopted to provide a method of allocating gas among proration units in the area encompassed by the Dakota Producing Interval, commencing February 1, 1961."

This finding, predicated on Section 65-3-3(e), NMSA,

1953 Comp., is all the finding needed to authorize the action of the Commission, and constitute a statutory, jurisdictional finding on the part of the Commission. It has not been abrogated or rescinded.

POINT III

THE LACK OF A SPECIFIC FINDING THAT A CHANGE OF CONDITION HAS OCCURRED DOES NOT INVALIDATE AN ORDER CHANGING A GAS ALLOCATION FORMULA; IN THE ALTERNATIVE, THE ORDER CONTAINS FINDINGS THAT A CHANGE OF CONDITION HAD OCCURRED REQUIRING A CHANGE IN THE FORMULA.

The finality of a Commission order must be considered in determining whether or not a finding that a change of conditions had occurred was necessary in order to issue a valid proration order. The legislative function of the Commission must be considered in determining the finality of a Commission order. In discussing the legislative character of a conservation order, Williams, in Nature and Effect of Conservation Orders, Eighth Annual Rocky Mountain Mineral Law Institute, 433, 439, states:

"The legislature, acting through the regulatory agency, has assumed the continuing responsibility to prevent waste or protect correlative rights. The regulatory agency, therefore, cannot by a so-called final order today preclude itself from modifying or setting such order aside next week, or at any time in the future, if, for any reason, it finds at such future time that the order should be set aside or modified to prevent waste or protect correlative rights. Just as a regulatory agency, while acting to prevent waste or to protect correlative rights, can disturb and change rights which were fixed and vested at the time the original conservation order was entered, it can likewise later disturb and change rights established by the original order if such change is necessary to accomplish the same objective."

The necessity of a showing of a change in conditions has been raised in several cases concerning the validity of conservation orders. The question was raised in Delaney et al. v. Osborn,

265 P.2d 481, 484, (Okla. 1953), which attacked the validity of a Commission order amending an order establishing a gas-oil ratio in a pool. In affirming the action of the Commission, the Court stated:

"We find no merit in respondents' contention that the commission was without authority to modify its previous order. This contention is based upon a fallacious conception that where the commission has once acted it is impotent to act again."

In re Application of Peppers Refining Company, 272 P.2d 416, 424, (Okla. 1954), reversed a Commission order which had denied an application for exceptions to a spacing order. The Commission based its denial upon a finding that the evidence introduced by the applicant was insufficient to indicate any substantial change in the facts considered by the Commission in the granting of the original spacing orders. The Court said:

"To hold that the commission could never modify a well spacing pattern established by a previous order not appealed from, upon a showing of characteristics about a common source of supply, and the withdrawals therefrom, that were not known or anticipated at the time of the original order, would 'tie the hands' of the commission and often prevent it from performing its statutory duties under our Oil and Gas Conservation Act."

It should be noted, in connection with this case, that if a showing of change in conditions was required, the Court held that changed conditions include a change in knowledge of conditions as they actually existed at the time of the prior order. Although Respondents submit that no change in conditions is necessary to issue a valid order reallocating gas production, if the Court should determine that such a showing is necessary, the Commission's findings and the evidence to support the same certainly establish that there was a change in knowledge of conditions as they actually existed at the time of the prior order.

The question of the necessity of a change in conditions was also raised in Southern Oklahoma Royalty Owners Association v. Stanolind Oil & Gas Company et al., 266 P.2d 633, 637,

(Okla. 1954), another case concerning exceptions to spacing rules, wherein the Court stated:

"No change of conditions need be shown. The problem could not be decided before it arose; it was only after drilling the wells that the information was obtained upon which the applications are based. It was contemplated by the Legislature in providing for exceptions to be made upon application, notice, and hearing that problems would arise from time to time in the development of a field which would require amendment or readjustment of the original spacing and drilling unit order."

In Sinclair Oil & Gas Company v. Corporation Commission, 378 P.2d 847, 854, (Okla 1963), a recent case involving the validity of a gas allocation order, the Court said:

"We know of no sound reason why the Commission should any more be prevented from changing a common source of supply (in an orderly and legally prescribed manner) from one allowable formula to another (which in the light of changing conditions and more and better knowledge about the reservoir will more likely fulfill the objects of waste prevention and protection of correlative rights) than it is prevented from changing well-spacing sizes and/or patterns, or well-spaced areas, in the light of new knowledge accumulated by the progressive development of such reservoirs."

The rule in Texas is well established. In Railroad Commission et al. v. Humble Oil & Refining Company et al, 193 S.W.2d 824, 828, (Tex 1946), the Court stated:

"The commission's power to regulate oil production in the interest both of conservation and of protecting correlative rights is a continuing one and its proration orders are subject to change, modification or amendment at any time upon due notice and hearing, either upon the commission's own motion or upon application of an interested party. This principal is now so well established as to require no citation of authority."

Also see Railroad Commission et al. v. Phillips et al., 364 S.W.2d 408, (Tex. 1963), and Railroad Commission et al. v. Aluminum Company, 368 S.W.2d 818, (Tex. 1963).

Williams, in Nature and Effect of Conservation Orders, supra at 444, makes the following statement:

"To say that an agency having made an order is powerless to change or set it aside, however erroneous or ill-advised it may have been, is to deny the continuing authority and responsibility of the agency to prevent waste or to protect correlative rights."

The Court's attention is also called to the prospective nature of a Commission order and specifically the order in question. The Commission's powers are legislative in nature and derived solely from the authority conferred by the Legislature. Continental Oil Company et al. v. Oil Conservation Commission et al., supra. Just as no one would contend that the Legislature could not change or appeal its legislative enactments at any time for any reason, the same must, of necessity, be true of a regulatory agency acting under delegated legislative authority. Williams, in Nature and Effect of Conservation Orders, supra.

Although Respondents strongly urge that the weight of authority supports the proposition that a specific finding concerning a change of conditions is not necessary to issue a valid order establishing a new gas allocation formula, it is submitted that the order in question contains sufficient findings to establish that a change of conditions had occurred.

Finding No. 8 indicates that there have been new completions in the pool causing fluctuation in reserve computations and that the reserves of existing wells have been re-evaluated. It is submitted that this constitutes a change in knowledge of underground conditions which would be sufficient to meet a requirement concerning a change in conditions. In Re Application of Peppers Refining Company, supra and Sinclair Oil & Gas Company v. Corporation Commission, supra.

In Finding No. 13, the Commission determined that under the 25-75 formula correlative rights were not being adequately protected and concluded that waste would result unless the Commission acted to protect correlative rights. As it must be assumed

that the original formula protected correlative rights and prevented waste at the time it was adopted by the Commission, it necessarily follows that conditions had changed if the original formula was not adequately protecting correlative rights and preventing waste. A reading of Finding No. 14 leads to the same conclusion as the Commission determined that the 60-40 formula would permit more wells to receive their just and equitable share of the gas in the pool.

In Finding No. 15, the Commission determined that numerous wells in the pool were capable of draining more than their just and equitable share of the gas in the pool. The only reasonable inference that can be drawn from this finding is that a change in conditions had occurred concerning the number of wells in the pool that were capable of draining more than their just and equitable share of the gas.

Respondents submit that if a finding that a change of condition had occurred was necessary, any of the above findings will satisfy the requirement and, if not, the above findings combined clearly establish that a change of condition had occurred requiring a change in the formula.

POINTS IV AND V

THE ORDER CONTAINS THE BASIC FINDINGS OF JURISDICTIONAL FACTS REQUIRED BY STATUTE; IT ALSO CONTAINS FINDINGS WHICH MEET THE STATUTORY REQUIREMENTS FOR A VALID ALLOCATION OF GAS PRODUCTION.

As the above points are believed to be synonymous, they will be discussed together in the interest of orderly presentation.

Some discussion concerning the general requirements placed upon a regulatory agency to make findings of fact would seem appropriate prior to an analysis of the specific order in

question. The Court's attention is again called to Ferguson-Steere Motor Company v. State Corporation Commission, supra, wherein the Court held that the duty rests on the party complaining of the adequacy of findings to have made a request for them.

The Court's attention is called to the fact that there is no statutory requirement that the Oil Conservation Commission make findings of fact. It has been held that in the absence of such a legislative mandate, an administrative agency need name no findings of fact. Saporiti v. Zoning Board, 137 Conn. 478, 78 A.2d 741 (1951). It also has been held that necessary findings of fact will be implied in orders of the Oil & Gas Division of the Texas Railroad Commission. Corzelius v. Harrell, 143 Tex. 509, 186 S.W.2d 961 (1945). Respondents do not strongly contend that it is not necessary for the Commission to make findings of fact as we are aware that such findings enable the Court to intelligently review the agency decision by ascertaining whether the facts provided a reasonable basis for the agency's action and they enable the Court to determine whether the decision was based upon proper legal principles and supported by substantial evidence. Swars v. Council of City of Vallejo, 33 Cal.2d 867, 206 P.2d 355 (1949); Securities and Exchange Commission v. Chenery Corp., 318 U.S. 80, 63 S.Ct. 454, 87 L.Ed. 626 (1942). However, it is strongly urged that every inference should be drawn in favor of the sufficiency of the findings, particularly in view of the legislative determination in Section 65-3-22(b), NMSA, 1953 Comp., that the order is prima facie valid. In Continental Oil Company et al. v. Oil Conservation Commission et al., supra at 320, the New Mexico Supreme Court set out the findings necessary to issue a valid gas allocation order and stated:

"Lacking such findings, or their equivalents, a supposedly valid order in current use cannot be replaced." (Emphasis added.)

The Court also stated in the Continental case, *supra*, that formal and elaborate findings are not absolutely necessary.

In Sinclair Oil & Gas Company v. Corporation Commission, *supra* at 856, a recent case involving the validity of a gas allocation order, the Court stated:

"We think it would have been impractical, and would have added nothing to the validity of the order, if the Commission had undertaken to detail therein the many considerations that went into making up the findings announced therein. We think the Order's findings are sufficient under the circumstances here."

The Court's attention is also called to a recent Kansas case involving the validity of a gas allocation order, Colorado Interstate Gas Co. v. State Corporation Commission, 386 P.2d 266, 280, (Kan. 1963), wherein the Court said:

"What facts are to be considered and the relative weight to be accorded them are matters left to the Commission's discretion."

To properly evaluate the sufficiency of the findings of fact contained in the order, it is necessary to examine the applicable statutes to determine the legislative mandate and intent concerning allocation of gas production. Section 65-3-13(c), NMSA, 1953 Comp., is the basic statute concerning allocation of allowable gas production in a field or pool. The statute provides:

"Whenever, to prevent waste, the total allowable natural gas production from gas wells producing from any pool in this state is fixed by the commission in an amount less than that which the pool could produce if no restrictions were imposed, the commission shall allocate the allowable production among the gas wells in the pool delivering to a gas transportation facility upon a reasonable basis and recognizing correlative rights, and shall include in the proration schedule of such pool any well which it finds is being unreasonably discriminated against through denial of access to a gas transportation facility which is reasonably capable of handling the type of gas produced by such well. In protecting correlative rights, the commission may give equitable consideration to acreage, pressure, open flow, porosity, permeability, deliverability and quality of the gas and to such other pertinent factors as may from time to time exist, and in so far as is

practicable, shall prevent drainage between producing tracts in a pool which is not equalized by counter-drainage"

It should be noted that the duty imposed upon the Commission by the above statute is to "allocate the allowable production among the gas wells in the pool delivering to a gas transportation facility upon a reasonable basis and recognizing correlative rights." (Emphasis added.) Respondents submit that the order certainly contains a finding that the proposed 60-40 formula will allocate production upon a reasonable basis. Finding No. 11 specifically states that the most reasonable basis for allocating production in the pool is to determine for each proposed formula the percentage of total pool allowable apportioned to each non-marginal tract as compared to its percentage of total pool reserves and to select the allocation formula that will allow the maximum number of wells in the pool to produce within a reasonable tolerance of the ideal ratio. Findings No. 13, 14, 15, and 16 concerning the protection of correlative rights, the prevention of waste, drainage, and the opportunity to produce a just and equitable share of the reservoir energy also establish that the formula will allocate the allowable production upon a reasonable basis.

Section 65-3-13(c), NMSA, 1953 Comp., also requires the Commission to recognize correlative rights in allocating production and specifically authorizes the Commission, in protecting correlative rights, to give equitable consideration to acreage, pressure, open flow, porosity, permeability, deliverability, and quality of the gas and to such other pertinent factors as may from time to time exist, and insofar as is practicable, to prevent drainage between producing tracts in a pool which is not equalized by counter-drainage. As the legislative mandate concerning these factors is permissive rather than mandatory, it certainly cannot be argued that a failure to make a specific

finding concerning any of the above factors would be fatal to the order. And it should be noted that the order contains specific findings concerning acreage, deliverability, drainage, and other pertinent factors. Findings No. 10, 11, 12, 14, 15, and 16.

As the legislative mandate set out in Section 65-3-13(c), NMSA, 1953 Comp., requires the Commission to allocate the allowable production recognizing correlative rights, it also is necessary to consider Section 65-3-29(h) which defines correlative rights and Section 65-3-14(a) concerning equitable allocation of allowable production. These two statutory provisions are substantially similar. Section 65-3-29(h) reads as follows:

"'Correlative rights' means the opportunity afforded, so far as it is practicable to do so, to the owner of each property in a pool to produce without waste its just and equitable share of the oil or gas, or both, in the pool, being an amount, so far as can be practically determined, and so far as can be practicably obtained without waste, substantially in the proportion that the quantity of recoverable oil or gas, or both, under such property bears to the total recoverable oil or gas, or both, in the pool, and for such purpose to use his just and equitable share of the reservoir energy."

Section 65-3-14(a) reads as follows:

"The rules, regulations or orders of the commission shall, so far as it is practicable to do so, afford to the owner of each property in a pool the opportunity to produce his just and equitable share of the oil or gas, or both, in the pool, being an amount so far as can be practically determined, and so far as such can be practicably obtained without waste, substantially in the proportion that the quantity of the recoverable oil or gas, or both, under such property bears to the total recoverable oil or gas, or both, in the pool, and for this purpose to use his just and equitable share of the reservoir energy."

The New Mexico Supreme Court commented on the findings necessary to meet the legislative mandate set out above in Continental Oil Company v. Oil Conservation Commission, supra at 318, wherein it stated:

"The commission was here concerned with a formula for computing allowables, which is obviously directly related to correlative rights. In order to protect correlative rights, it is incumbent upon the commission to determine, 'so far as it is practicable to do so,' certain foundationary matters,

without which the correlative rights of the various owners cannot be ascertained. Therefore, the commission, by 'basic conclusions of fact' (or what might be termed 'findings'), must determine, insofar as practicable, (1) the amount of recoverable gas under each producer's tract; (2) the total amount of recoverable gas in the pool; (3) the proportion that (1) bears to (2); and (4) what portion of the arrived at proportion can be recovered without waste."

The Commission's order contains findings concerning each requirement set out by the Court. Finding No. 6 refers to Column C, Tract Reserves of Exhibit A, which specifically sets out the initial recoverable gas reserves underlying each non-marginal tract in the pool. As set out in Finding No. 5, marginal wells are permitted to produce at capacity; therefore, it was not practicable to compute individual tract reserves for marginal wells. Marginal wells are permitted to produce at capacity as they are not capable of making the allowable assigned to them. In Finding No. 5, the Commission, insofar as practicable, determined the total amount of recoverable gas in the pool, and in Finding No. 7, determined the proportion that the recoverable gas under each tract bears to the total amount of recoverable gas in the pool. The Commission then determined the proportion of the arrived at proportion that could be recovered without waste. This is the volume of gas that will be allocated to each well under a formula that will allow the maximum number of wells in the pool to produce the proper percentage of total pool allowable as compared to percentage of total pool reserves. (Finding No. 11). In Finding No. 13, the Commission determined that correlative rights were not being protected and that waste would result unless the Commission acted to protect correlative rights. Its adoption of the formula is such action and application of the formula and the gas volumes calculated thereby determine the amount of gas that each well in the pool can produce without waste. This is further substantiated by Finding No. 14 that the

proposed formula of 60 percent acreage plus 40 percent acreage times deliverability will prevent waste. Finding No. 15 also establishes that the allowable calculated by application of the 60-40 formula is the amount of gas that can be produced without waste as this finding concludes that application of the formula will prevent drainage between producing tracts which is not equalized by counter-drainage. The total amount of gas that can be produced from the pool without waste is established when the Commission determines reasonable market demand for the pool and the total volume of gas that each well can produce without waste is determined when the Commission allocates production pursuant to the allocation formula.

In Continental Oil Company v. Oil Conservation Commission, supra at 319, the Court stated:

"Additionally, it should be observed that the commission, 'insofar as is practicable, shall prevent drainage between producing tracts in a pool which is not equalized by counter-drainage,' under the provisions of Section 65-3-13(c)."

As the Commission specifically found in Finding No. 15 that the 60-40 formula would, insofar as is practicable, prevent drainage between producing tracts which was not equalized by counter-drainage, it cannot be contended that the order is invalid for failure to contain such a finding.

Respondents submit that the order clearly contains findings which meet the legislative standard set out in Sections 65-3-14(a) and 65-3-29(h), supra. In Finding No. 14, the Commission determined that the proposed 60-40 formula would more adequately protect correlative rights and prevent waste by permitting more wells to receive their just and equitable share of the gas in the pool, insofar as could be determined. In Finding No. 15, the Commission determined that the 60-40 formula would, insofar as practicable, prevent drainage between producing tracts which was not equalized by counter-drainage, and in Finding No. 16,

the Commission determined that the 60-40 formula would, insofar as practicable, afford to the owner of each property in the pool the opportunity to use his just and equitable share of the reservoir energy.

POINT VI

THE COMMISSION'S FINDINGS AND ORDER ARE BASED ON AND SUPPORTED BY SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE.

The New Mexico Supreme Court has recently commented on the manner in which a reviewing court must determine the question of substantial evidence to support findings of fact. In Trujillo v. Clark, 71 N.M. 288, 291, 377 P.2d 958 (1963), the Court stated:

"When appellant asserts that the evidence does not substantially support findings of fact made by the trial court, this court must view the evidence together with all reasonable inferences to be deduced therefrom in the light most favorable to the successful party, and all evidence to the contrary must be disregarded."

Many New Mexico decisions have held that in reviewing the evidence on appeal, all evidence and inferences contrary to the disputed facts will be disregarded and the evidence viewed in the aspect most favorable to the judgment. Reid v. Brown, 56 N.M. 65, 240 P.2d 213 (1952); Little v. Johnson, 56 N.M. 232, 242 P.2d 1000 (1952); Silva v. Haake, 56 N.M. 497, 245 P.2d 835 (1952); Edwards v. Peterson, 61 N.M. 104, 295 P.2d 858 (1956); Hines v. Hines, 64 N.M. 377, 328 P.2d 944 (1958). Our Court has stated on numerous occasions that every presumption is indulged in favor of the correctness of regularity of the decision below. Coastal Claims Company v. Douglas, 69 N.M. 68, 364 P.2d 131 (1961); State ex rel State Highway Commission v. Tanny, 68 N.M. 117, 359 P.2d 350 (1961); Tri-Bullion Corporation v. American Smelting and Refining Company, 58 N.M. 787, 277 P.2d 293 (1954); Transport Trucking Company v. First National Bank in Albuquerque, 61 N.M. 320,

300 P.2d 476 (1956); Heine v. Reynolds, 69 N.M. 398, 367 P.2d 708, 1962); Batte v. Stanley's, 70 N.M. 364, 374 P.2d 124 (1962).

In Delaney v. Osborn, supra at 484, which was an appeal from an order of the Oklahoma Corporation Commission changing the gas-oil ratio applicable to a certain field, the Court said:

"In determining the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain the present findings of the commission and its order, we cannot review and weigh the evidence to determine its preponderance. Our review is limited to the question of whether the findings and conclusions are sustained by substantial evidence and the law."

In Woody v. State Corporation Commission, 265 P.2d 1102, 1106, (Okla. 1954), which was also an appeal from a conservation order, the Court stated:

"Neither are we required to weigh and measure the evidence in an endeavor to determine its preponderance. Our duty ends with the finding that there is evidence of a probative value reasonably and substantially sustaining the corporation's findings and order."

Consideration should also be given to the definition of substantial evidence adopted in New Mexico. In Brown v. Cobb, 53 N.M. 169, 172, 204 P.2d 264 (1949), the New Mexico Supreme Court stated:

"In Marchbanks v. McCullough, supra, we define substantial evidence in the following language: 'if reasonable men all agree, or if they may fairly differ, as to whether the evidence establishes such facts, then it is substantial.'

"Substantial evidence may also be defined as evidence of substance which establishes facts and from which reasonable inferences may be drawn. International Ry. Co. v. Boland, 169 Misc. 926, 8 N.Y.S.2d 643."

Numerous courts in decisions involving findings by administrative agencies have defined substantial evidence as such evidence as reasonable a man or a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. Boston and M.R.R. v. U.S., 208 Fed.Supp. 661 (D.C. Mass. 1962); Ex parte Morris, 263 Ala. 664, 83 So.2d 716 (1955); John W. McGrath Corp. v. Hughes, 264 F.2d 314 (2nd Cir. 1959);

Freud v. Davis, 64 N.J.Super. 242, 165 A.2d 850 (1960); Davis v. State Department of Public Health and Welfare, 274 S.W.2d (Mo. 1955); Pittsburgh and L.E.R. Company v. Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission, 170 Pa.Super. 411, 85 A.2d 646 (1952). Other courts have stated that substantial evidence to support findings of an administrative agency means enough evidence to justify, if a trial were to a jury, a refusal to direct a verdict. Larmay v. Hobby, 132 Fed.Supp. 738 (E.D.Wis. 1955); Craig v. Ribicoff, 192 Fed.Supp. 479 (M.D.N.C. 1961). And it should be noted that the Court should not review and weigh the evidence to determine its preponderance. Delaney v. Osborn, supra; Woody v. State Corporation Commission, supra; Cities Service Oil Company v. Anglin, 204 Okla. 171, 228 P.2d 191 (1951); Gateway City Transfer Company v. Public Service Commission, 253 Wis. 397, 34 N.W.2d 238 (1948).

As respondents do not wish to burden the Court with duplicate recitals of the evidence, the parties to this brief adopt in full the Summaries of Testimony, Parts I, II, and III of the brief filed by Respondents, Consolidated Oil & Gas, Inc., and submit that the Commission's findings and order are based on and supported by substantial evidence.

POINT VII

THE COURT DOES NOT HAVE JURISDICTION OVER THE SUBJECT MATTER OF THIS ACTION AS THE PETITIONERS HAVE FAILED TO JOIN INDISPENSABLE PARTIES.

It is Respondents position that the Court does not have jurisdiction over the subject matter of this action, because Petitioners have failed to join indispensable parties. The validity of this point is, of course, tied to the question of who is an indispensable party. Petitioners apparently take the position that only the Commission, plus the original applicant,

Consolidated Oil & Gas, Inc., are indispensable, as they are the only named Defendants. Apparently Petitioners have decided that the adverse parties of record before the Commission are not indispensable, for they have not joined them. Petitioners have merely served them with notice of appeal, which is certainly not the same as being made an actual party.

The Supreme Court of New Mexico has adopted a very broad definition of indispensable party. In the early case of American Trust and Savings Bank of Albuquerque v. Scobee, 29 N.M. 436, 224 P. 788 (1924), the Court adopted the following test for indispensable party:

"There is a general rule that all persons whose interests will necessarily be affected by any decree in a given case, are necessary and indispensable parties, and the Court will not proceed to a decree without them."

This rule has been specifically affirmed in the more recent case of Burquette v. Del Cuerto, 49 N.M. 292, 163 P.2d 257 (1945), and again in State Game Commission v. Tackett, 71 N.M. 400, 379 P.2d 54 (1962). In both of these recent cases, the above-quoted language of the Scobee case has been specifically adopted. The result of failure to join an indispensable party is, of course, a lack of jurisdiction of the Court that prohibits it from proceeding with the case.

Though the above-cited cases may be distinguished on the facts from the present situation, the general test set out above certainly is applicable to our situation. Petitioners cannot argue that operators other than Consolidated Oil & Gas, Inc., do not have an interest "that will necessarily be affected by any decree". In fact, when one looks to discover who would necessarily be affected by this decree, the Petitioners conclusion that only Consolidated, among the many operators in the Basin-Dakota Gas Pool, meets this test, is extraordinary.

The basic bone of contention in this case is a formula that allocates allowable gas production among all operators in

the Basin-Dakota Gas Pool. A change in the formula will therefore directly affect the amount of gas every operator is permitted to produce.

Applying the accepted standard for establishing indispensable parties to the present fact situation, it becomes apparent that not only operators who advocate the new formula will be affected by the Court's decision, but also those operators who appeared in opposition to the formula will be equally affected. Despite this, many of the protestants in the hearing are not joined, either as party plaintiffs or defendants. By the same token, all operators in the Basin-Dakota Gas Pool, whether parties in the hearing before the Commission or not, will obviously be affected by the Court's decree. An examination of Exhibit "A" attached to the order appealed from shows how many additional parties Petitioners have left out of this suit. Exhibit "A" also shows to what extent the formula affects each non-marginal well in the pool.

Petitioners might well argue the hardship of joining all operators in this pool. This type of argument has never impressed the Supreme Court, for in all three of the cases cited above the State of New Mexico was determined to be an indispensable party. Yet, in each case the Court recognized that the State could not be joined without its consent, which it would not give. This fact did not change the result.

The Court in the Burguete case, on Page 260 of the Pacific Report states:

"It has been suggested that some courts have announced a rule to the effect that where the State should be a party, but cannot under the law be sued and does not voluntarily come in, it need not be joined as a necessary party. Whether or not some courts have applied such a rule, we have foreclosed its application in New Mexico under our decision in American Trust & Savings Bank of Albuquerque v. Scobee, supra. See this case, 29 N.M. at page 453, 224 P. 790, where we said that:

"* * * * *Where such necessary parties cannot for any reason be brought before the court, there is nothing to be done except to dismiss the bill, for the suit is inherently defective."

At first glance, the conclusion reached above that possibly all operators in the Basin-Dakota Gas Pool would be necessary and indispensable parties seems extreme. However, the Supreme Court of New Mexico has already reached such a conclusion in a case amazingly similar on its facts. This is the case of State v. W. S. Ranch Company, 69 N.M. 169, 364 P.2d 1036 (1961), where the State Engineer had attempted to enjoin the Ranch Company from using waters from the Costilla Creek above the Costilla Reservoir, claiming that the Ranch Company never had a license to appropriate waters from the creek. The Ranch Company in its answer set up the defence of failure to join indispensable parties, to-wit: all the water users on the creek below the Costilla Reservoir. The Court agreed and dismissed the suit and the State Engineer appealed. The Supreme Court affirmed and held that all water users below the reservoir would necessarily be affected by any decree and were, therefore, necessary and indispensable parties.

The reason that the Court found the water users were necessary and indispensable was that any adjudication of the Ranch Company's water rights would necessarily mean more or less water to the users below. By the same token, any change in the proration formula would necessarily mean more or less gas to the respective operators.

The implications of the W. S. Ranch Company case are admittedly far-reaching and Respondents do not claim to know the extent of the effect. What Respondents do argue is that obviously, under the definition of "necessary and indispensable parties" as established in New Mexico and as applied to the W. S. Ranch case, *supra*, something more is required than joining the Commission and one out of approximately 78 operators in the Basin-Dakota

INDEX OF POINTS

	<u>Page</u>
<u>POINT I</u>	
The order is prima facie valid and the petitioners have the burden of establishing that the action of the Commission was fraudulent, arbitrary or capricious, that the order was not supported by substantial evidence, or that the Commission did not act within the scope of its authority. -----	6
<u>POINT II</u>	
The lack of a specific finding that waste is occurring under an existing gas allocation formula does not invalidate an order establishing a new formula; in the alternative, the order contains findings that waste was occurring under the prior gas allocation formula. -----	7
<u>POINT III</u>	
The lack of a specific finding that a change of condition has occurred does not invalidate an order changing a gas allocation formula; in the alternative, the order contains findings that a change of condition had occurred requiring a change in the formula. -----	10
<u>POINTS IV AND V</u>	
The order contains the basic findings of jurisdictional facts required by statute; it also contains findings which meet the statutory requirements for a valid allocation of gas production. -----	14
<u>POINT VI</u>	
The Commission's findings and order are based on and supported by substantial evidence. -----	21
<u>POINT VII</u>	
The Court does not have jurisdiction over the subject matter of this action as the petitioners have failed to join indispensable parties. -----	23

I. I first would like to make a brief comment concerning our objection to the Appellants' Statement of the Facts.

A. As we have pointed out in our brief, the Appellants' Statement of the Facts is argumentative, incomplete, and contains a resumé of evidence with emphasis against the Court's findings and conclusions.

B. Although we do not wish to burden the Court with a detailed recital of each specific objection, we call the Courts attention to pages 1 - 5 of our brief and renew our objections.

C. We submit that the Appellants have not complied with the rules of this Court and that their Statement should be disregarded.

II. This is the second time in the history of the OCC that this Court has been asked to rule on the validity of a Commission order which changed a formula for allocating natural gas production.

III. In considering the validity of this order, it should be noted that the OCC is an administrative body created by the legislature and charged with the responsibility of preventing waste of oil and gas and protecting correlative rights.

A. Basically, the Commission is charged with the responsibility of preventing three kinds of waste:

1. Surface waste.
2. Underground waste.
3. Production in excess of market demand.

B. The Commission has several methods of fulfilling this statutory obligation.

1. One of the most important methods is the promulgation of General Rules and Regulations.

- a. These rules have statewide application.
 - b. They are adopted and amended by order of the Commission only after notice and hearing.
 - c. They are designed to prevent waste and protect correlative rights.
 - d. The general rules regulate all phases of production and operation such as the size of drilling units, well locations, proration and allocation, secondary recovery, purchasing, transporting, refining, and rules of procedure before the Commission.
2. In addition to the general rules and regulations, the Commission promulgates rules and regulations of limited application.
- a. These too are promulgated and amended by order of the Commission only after notice and hearing.
 - b. These rules apply to specific problems on a regional basis such as oil and gas operations in the Potash Area, the flaring of gas in certain areas, the disposal of produced salt water in certain areas, and gas proration procedures in certain areas.
 - c. Like the general rules, these rules are promulgated to prevent waste and protect correlative rights.
 - d. Order R-1670, which appears in the record as Instrument 36 of the Commission transcript, is an order adopting general rules and regulations of limited application.
 - e. This order promulgated General Rules and Regulations governing all prorated gas pools in Northwest New Mexico, including the pool which is the subject matter of this case.
 - f. Order R-1670 established the procedure for prorating ^{all prorated gas pools in} gas in Northwest New Mexico, including the Basin-Dakota Gas Pool.

g. This order established a procedure for determining reasonable market demand and ~~assigned~~^{assigning} allowables to individual wells in prorated gas pools in Northwest New Mexico.

3. The Commission also promulgates special rules and regulations governing oil and gas production and operating practices in specific pools.

a. The special rules are also promulgated and amended in order to prevent waste and protect correlative rights only after notice and hearing.

b. Order R-1670-C, which appears in the record as Instrument 37 of the Commission transcript, promulgated special rules and regulations governing the Basin-Dakota Gas Pool.

c. This order adopted by reference the procedure contained in Order R-1670 for allocating production and assigning allowables to individual wells.

d. Order R-1670-C is the order which distributes the allowable production to individual wells in the Basin-Dakota Gas Pool.

IV. In the case before the Court, the statewide rules and regulations, Order R-1670, and Order R-1670-C are not under attack.

A. The procedure for prorating gas in the Basin-Dakota Gas Pool has not been attacked by Appellants.

B. The Appellants' attack is limited to Order R-2259-B.

1. This order did not establish a new procedure for prorating gas in the Basin-Dakota Gas Pool.

2. Order R-2259-B amended Order R-1670-C by adopting a new formula for allocating production.

3. This was an amendment to the Special Rules and Regulations governing the Basin-Dakota Gas Pool, and this amendment was made in order to prevent waste and protect correlative rights only after notice and hearing.

C. In considering the Appellants' contention that the Commission failed to determine the amount of gas that could be produced from each tract without waste, it should be noted that the findings contained in Order R-2259-B are not the only findings the Commission has made and does make concerning this matter.

65-3-13
(c)

1. Pursuant to the statutes, the statewide rules, Order R-1670 and Order R-1670-C at least 30 days prior to the beginning of a gas proration period, the Commission holds a hearing and issues an order which finds that a determined amount of gas can be produced from the Basin-Dakota Gas Pool without waste during that six-month proration period.

2. In addition, the Commission holds a hearing under these rules prior to each month of a gas proration period and issues an order correcting its preliminary determination of the amount of gas that can be produced from the pool during the following month.

a. This order establishes a pool allowable for the month and adopts a proration schedule which assigns a MCF allowable to each well in the pool.

b. By this order, the Commission finds that a specific MCF of gas can be produced from each well in the pool without waste during the following month.

c. As the Court can see from this discussion, in addition to the findings contained in Order R-2259-B, the

Commission has made findings that determine the amount of gas that can be produced from each tract without waste in Orders R-1670 and R-1670-C and continually makes this finding under the procedures contained in these orders.

V. As I have previously stated, the Appellants have here attacked only the sufficiency of Order R-2259-B, and one of the principal points of attack is the sufficiency of the findings contained in that Order.

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2. We submit that in reaching this conclusion, the Appellants have completely ignored findings 8 through 16 of Order R-2259-B and the calculations contained in Exhibit A.

VI. The Appellants contend that the Commission should have determined the specific amount of gas that could be produced from each well without waste before comparing the allocation formulas.

A. We submit that comparison of the two formulas was the method utilized by the Commission to determine the amount of gas each individual tract could produce without waste.

B. This was the method utilized by the Commission to determine the portion of the arrived at proportion that could be recovered without waste.

C. When the Commission determined the A/R factor for each well under the 25-75 formula in Column G of Exhibit A and the A/R factor for each well under the 60-40 formula in Column J of

Exhibit A this was a precise determination of the volume of gas that each well would produce under each formula.

- D. When the pool is depleted each well would have received that portion of its tract reserves that is set out in Column G if the 25-75 formula were adopted and that portion of its tract reserves that is set out in Column J if the 60-40 formula were adopted.

VII. Having made this calculation, the Commission proceeded to determine whether the volumes of gas determined by the A/R factors contained in Column G of Exhibit A could be produced without waste or whether the volumes of gas determined by the A/R factors contained in Column J of Exhibit A could be produced without waste.

- A. In findings 11 and 14, the Commission compared the number of wells that would produce with a proper A/R factor under each formula and the volume of gas that would be allocated to wells with a proper A/R factor under each formula.
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"To state the problem in a different way if the Commission had determined, from a practical standpoint, that each owner had a certain amount of gas underlying his acreage; that the pool contained a certain amount of gas; and that a determined amount of gas could be produced and obtained without waste; then the Commission would have complied with the mandate of the statute . . . "

Comparison of the two formulas was the Commission's method of determining, from a practical standpoint, that a determined amount of gas could be produced and obtained without waste.

D. In reality, the Appellants are not attacking the Commission's failure to make a finding. They are attacking the Commission's method of making a finding. We strongly urge the Court to reject this attack for the Appellants are requesting the Court to substitute its judgment as to the best method for determining the amount of gas that could be produced without waste for the judgment of the Commission. We call the Court's attention to *Pickens v. R. R. Commission*, 387 S.W.2d 35, a decision reported subsequent to the preparation of our brief. This was a case involving the validity of a Texas Railroad Commission order changing the proration formula for an oil field. In sustaining the Commission's order, the Court stated:

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VIII. When the Commission found that the 60-40 formula would more adequately protect correlative rights and prevent waste in finding 14, that the 60-40 formula would prevent drainage between producing tracts in finding 15, and that the 60-40 formula would afford to the owner of each property the opportunity to use his just and equitable share of the reservoir energy in finding 16, they completely satisfied the 4th requirement of the Continental decision.

A. These findings are basic conclusions of fact which determined through Column J of Exhibit A what portion of the arrived at proportion could be recovered without waste.

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- Oral Argument - EPNG v. OCC

- I. I first would like to make a brief comment concerning our objection to the Appellants' Statement of the Facts.
 - A. As we have pointed out in our brief, the Appellants' Statement of the Facts is argumentative, incomplete, and contains a resumé of evidence with emphasis against the Court's findings and conclusions.
 - B. Although we do not wish to burden the Court with a detailed recital of each specific objection, we call the Courts attention to pages 1 - 5 of our brief and renew our objections.
 - C. We submit that the Appellants have not complied with the rules of this Court and that their Statement should be disregarded.
- II. This is the second time in the history of the OCC that this Court has been asked to rule on the validity of a Commission order which changed a formula for allocating natural gas production.
- III. In considering the validity of this order, it should be noted that the OCC is an administrative body created by the legislature and charged with the responsibility of preventing waste of oil and gas and protecting correlative rights.
 - A. Basically, the Commission is charged with the responsibility of preventing three kinds of waste:
 1. Surface waste.
 2. Underground waste.
 3. Production in excess of market demand.
 - B. The Commission has several methods of fulfilling this statutory obligation.
 1. One of the most important methods is the promulgation of General Rules and Regulations.

- a. These rules have statewide application.
 - b. They are adopted and amended by order of the Commission only after notice and hearing.
 - c. They are designed to prevent waste and protect correlative rights.
 - d. The general rules regulate all phases of production and operation such as the size of drilling units, well locations, proration and allocation, secondary recovery, purchasing, transporting, refining, and rules of procedure before the Commission.
2. In addition to the general rules and regulations, the Commission promulgates rules and regulations of limited application.
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 - b. These rules apply to specific problems on a regional basis such as oil and gas operations in the Potash Area, the flaring of gas in certain areas, the disposal of produced salt water in certain areas, and gas proration procedures in certain areas.
 - c. Like the general rules, these rules are promulgated to prevent waste and protect correlative rights.
 - d. Order R-1670, which appears in the record as Instrument 36 of the Commission transcript, is an order adopting general rules and regulations of limited application.
 - e. This order promulgated General Rules and Regulations governing all prorated gas pools in Northwest New Mexico, including the pool which is the subject matter of this case.
 - f. Order R-1670 established the procedure for prorating gas in Northwest New Mexico, including the Basin-Dakota Gas Pool.

g. This order established a procedure for determining reasonable market demand and ~~assigned~~^{assigning} allowables to individual wells in prorated gas pools in Northwest New Mexico.

3. The Commission also promulgates special rules and regulations governing oil and gas production and operating practices in specific pools.

a. The special rules are also promulgated and amended in order to prevent waste and protect correlative rights only after notice and hearing.

b. Order R-1670-C, which appears in the record as Instrument 37 of the Commission transcript, promulgated special rules and regulations governing the Basin-Dakota Gas Pool.

c. This order adopted by reference the procedure contained in Order R-1670 for allocating production and assigning allowables to individual wells.

d. Order R-1670-C is the order which distributes the allowable production to individual wells in the Basin-Dakota Gas Pool.

IV. In the case before the Court, the statewide rules and regulations, Order R-1670, and Order R-1670-C are not under attack.

A. The procedure for prorating gas in the Basin-Dakota Gas Pool has not been attacked by Appellants.

B. The Appellants' attack is limited to Order R-2259-B.

1. This order did not establish a new procedure for prorating gas in the Basin-Dakota Gas Pool.

2. Order R-2259-B amended Order R-1670-C by adopting a new formula for allocating production.

3. This was an amendment to the Special Rules and Regulations governing the Basin-Dakota Gas Pool, and this amendment was made in order to prevent waste and protect correlative rights only after notice and hearing.

C. In considering the Appellants' contention that the Commission failed to determine the amount of gas that could be produced from each tract without waste, it should be noted that the findings contained in Order R-2259-B are not the only findings the Commission has made and does make concerning this matter.

1. Pursuant to the statutes, the statewide rules, Order R-1670 and Order R-1670-C at least 30 days prior to the beginning of a gas proration period, the Commission holds a hearing and issues an order which finds that a determined amount of gas can be produced from the Basin-Dakota Gas Pool without waste during that six-month proration period.

2. In addition, the Commission holds a hearing under these rules prior to each month of a gas proration period and issues an order correcting its preliminary determination of the amount of gas that can be produced from the pool during the following month.

a. This order establishes a pool allowable for the month and adopts a proration schedule which assigns a MCF allowable to each well in the pool.

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Jim?

An additional note re the attached: I don't mean to tell you how to handle this, and the attached is only intended to be helpful. I hope you will find it so, and if not tear it ~~it~~ up. I got carried away at the end with a buch of stuff with which ~~h~~ you may, or may not agree. In any event use this in any way, or not at all, as you see fit. I'm not the least worried about how ;your argument will turn out.

Joan

Jim:

Here is a rough outline I took down while you and Ted were talking about your opening on explanation of the business of gas prorationing. I may have got some of it messed up, but I hope you will find it helpful.

Preliminary outline

I. Commission a creature of statute, directed to prevent waste of natural resources

1. Prevention of Waste

2. Kinds of waste

- A. Surface Waste
- B. Production in excess of market demand
- C. Underground waste.

3. How these kinds of waste are prevented

A. Rules of state-wide application

- (1) govern methods of operation, procedures before the commission
 - (a) general rules of production and operating drilling, proration and allocation, secondary recovery, oil purchasing and transporting.
- (2) all directed toward the prevention of waste

B. Rules of limited application

- (1) Orders directed to specific problems on a state or regional basis.

C. Pool Rules

- (1) Drilling, completing, operating, producing, spacing, etc., within a specific pool.

4. Which problem are we concerned with here.

A. State-wide rules are not under attack

B. Rules of general application in the area, and the specific rules of the pool are not under attack.

~~E. xx Only x Rober xxx R-1670 xxx and x R-1670-C xxx which xxx establish~~
Orders ~~1670 xxx and x~~ R-1670 and R-1670-C, which establish the procedure for prorating gas in the state ~~and xxx~~ as a whole, and in the Basin-Dakota Gas Pool specifically, are not under attack.

~~C.~~ Only Order R-2259-B, the order which adopts a formula on the basis of which the pool ~~x~~ allowable ~~xxxxxx~~ is distributed back to the ~~individual~~ individual wells, is under attack.

The allowable itself -- the amount of ~~xxx~~ gas that can be produced from the ~~xxxx~~ pool, and hence from

the wells within the pool, without waste, is determined by the Commission pursuant to the provisions of the State Wide rules, and specifically Rules 601, 602 and 603, and under the provisions of Commission Orders R-1670, 1670-C, ~~xxx~~ none of which are under attack in this case.

The duty of the Commission to determine the amount of gas that can be produced from the Basin Dakota Pool without waste is carried on within the framework of all of these orders -- not just ~~x~~ under Order R-2259-B, which is under attack here.

Thus it is clear the only quarrel ~~with~~ that appellants have with the Commission is the formula adopted -- the tool used by the Commission -- to allocate to the individual wells that amount of gas they shall be permitted to produce which is an amount determined by the commission, under orders not under attack here, which the commission has ~~x~~ already determine may be produced from the Basin Dakota Pool without waste.

STATE OF NEW MEXICO)
COUNTY OF SAN JUAN) IN THE DISTRICT COURT

EL PASO NATURAL GAS COMPANY,
a corporation, PAN AMERICAN
PETROLEUM CORPORATION, a cor-
poration, MARATHON OIL COMPANY,
a corporation, SOUTHWEST PRO-
DUCTION COMPANY, a partnership,
and SUNSET INTERNATIONAL PETROL-
EUM CORPORATION, a corporation,

Petitioners,

vs.

No. 11685

OIL CONSERVATION COMMISSION OF
NEW MEXICO, JACK M. CAMPBELL,
Chairman, E. S. WALKER, Member,
A. L. PORTER, JR., Member and
Secretary, CONSOLIDATED OIL AND
GAS, INC., a corporation,

Respondents.

APPEARANCES:

Ross L. Malone
Atwood and Malone
Roswell, New Mexico - On behalf of Petitioners, Marathon Oil
and Pan American Petroleum.

George L. Verity
Verity, Burr, Cooley & Jones
Farmington, New Mexico - On behalf of Petitioner Beta Development
Company.

Kent B. Hampton
Casper, Wyoming - On behalf of Petitioners.

William Federici
Seth, Montgomery, Federici & Andrews
Santa Fe, New Mexico - On behalf of El Paso Natural Gas Company and
Sunset International Production Corporation.

Garrett Whitworth
El Paso, Texas - On behalf of El Paso Natural Gas Company

J. M. Durrett, Jr.
Special Assistant Attorney General
Santa Fe, New Mexico - On behalf of Oil Conservation Commission

Booker Kelly
Gilbert, White & Gilbert
Santa Fe, New Mexico - On behalf of Texaco, Inc., and Sunray.

Jason Kellahin
Kellahin and Fox
Santa Fe, New Mexico - On behalf of Consolidated Oil and Gas, Inc.

T. P. Stockmar
Denver Colorado
Member of Colorado Bar - On behalf of Southern Union Gas Company

A. S. Grenier and
William E. Jameson
Dallas, Texas - On behalf of Southern Union Gas Company

John B. Tittmann
Keleher and McLeod
Albuquerque, New Mexico - Appearing as Amicus Curiae and will
not participate.

The above-entitled and numbered cause came on for hearing
on legal issues before the Honorable C. C. McCulloh, District
Judge of the Eleventh Judicial District, Division 1, at Aztec,
New Mexico, on March 5, 1964:

BY MR. J. M. DURRETT, JR: The transcript is now being
tendered to the Court by James M. Durrett, Jr., Cause No. 2504,
before the Oil Conservation Commission, certified by Mr. A. L.
Porter, Secretary-Director of the New Mexico Oil Conservation
Commission. Copies of certificates have been served to opposing
counsel.

Copy of each transcript of hearing before the Commission
in this case I tender to the Court. In connection with this
record we are tendering to the Court at this time the entire
record of proceedings before the Oil Conservation Commission.
We did not have a formal request for specific portions of the
record, although, we were contacted informally and asked to
certify the record, and in that connection we certified it as
recorded.

COURT: Any objection?

MR. ROSS MALONE: I understand Mr. Durrett is now offering that in evidence in this case?

MR. DURRETT: Yes, we offer it to the Court as the official record before the Commission.

MR. MALONE: On behalf of the Petitioners, as we understand the Statute relating to review of proceedings the transcript is admitted subject to objection by either party as to portions of it. The Petitioners object to the portion of the record offered by the Commission which is composed of Consolidated Exhibits one through nine inclusive, offered at the re-hearing, for the reasons stated in the transcript. At the time objection was made to the admission of those Exhibits and for the following additional reasons:

First, that the Exhibits are incompetent for the purposes for which offered and used; second, for the reason that insufficient predicate was laid for the introduction of the Exhibits and the Basin Exhibit upon which subsequent Exhibits were predicated; third, for the reason that the Exhibits constitute hearsay, or are based on hearsay and for that reason are inadmissible; fourth, for the reason that the material on which the Exhibits were predicated and which was incorporated in it, has not been properly substantiated.

If it please the Court, just as a suggestion, those objections and this question of the testimony really I think will be involved in the argument of the case as a whole and I would suggest as a possible means of proceeding, if the Court would reserve his ruling on the question of the admissibility

until after the entire argument has been heard, and we will be prepared to discuss the problems raised.

MR. KELLAHIN: I agree with Mr. Malone's request that a ruling be withheld, and Exhibits one through nine have been objected to and the record shows one and two were not objected to.

MR. MALONE: I intended to state, and I believe I should, that they were objected to at this time for the reasons stated in the transcript and additional reasons, and if there are no objections, the additional objections will go to those Exhibits. I should have added we of course also object to all testimony predicated upon those Exhibits, because if those Exhibits should be ruled out the testimony of necessity will follow.

MR. DURRETT: Your Honor, the Oil Conservation Commission would urge the Court to withhold any ruling on these objections until the argument is completed, and in connection with this we certainly feel all the evidence in the record is proper to be considered by the Court, all proceedings before the Oil Conservation Commission, and it may be alleged here today some of that testimony is incompetent and hearsay, if so, the Commission did not so find and did not consider it, and we submit the Court is permitted to arrive at that conclusion.

COURT: Very well, the Court will reserve a ruling on this until after the argument - after I hear some statements of points relied on by parties in submitting their briefs. These have not been filed, do you wish those filed - one from Mr. Kellahin, Mr. Durrett and L. C. White.

MR. MALONE: I believe there is one from Petitioners also, your Honor.

COURT: I don't believe there was, I don't see it here, it is probably on my desk.

MR. MALONE: Insofar as the Petitioners are concerned, I doubt that those points would add any thing to the record in the case. They were submitted as a basis for the filing of the simultaneous briefs, and inasmuch as the briefs will not be a part of the record insofar as the Petitioners are concerned, we will not offer those.

MR. DURRETT: The same will hold true for the Respondents.

MR. KELLY: Sunray and DX don't want them entered.

MR. KELLAHIN: Will not ask it be made a part of the record.

MR. FEDERICI: When Mr. Malone was stating the objections in the record he was speaking for all the Petitioners, including the El Paso Natural Gas Company and others.

MR. MALONE: I referred earlier to Stipulation of Fact that had been entered into in which all counsel have joined, which I will ask to have identified as Stipulated Exhibit No. 1.

(Stipulated Exhibit No. 1, marked for identification)
I take it the Exhibit offered by Oil Conservation Commission has been admitted in evidence subject to the objections on which the Court reserves ruling, so we may be able to refer to the Exhibit in our argument?

COURT: Yes.

MR. MALONE: I offer in evidence Stipulated Exhibit No. 1, which has been signed by counsel.

COURT: It will be admitted.

MR. MALONE: A question arose in connection with one of the defenses, as to the date on which the Order appealed from, No. 2259-B, was entered in the records of the Oil Conservation Commission. The Statute provides for the filing of an application for re-hearing within twenty days from the entry of the Order. The question of when that entry occurred arose, and this stipulation with reference to the facts in that respect was entered into:

"It is stipulated and agreed between undersigned counsel for the parties to this action that on July 3, 1963 two members of the New Mexico Oil Conservation Commission Order No. R-2259-B; that said original order was forwarded to the printer for reproduction; upon the return of the original order from the printer, both the original and the copy of said order were signed by the third member of the Commission; the signed copy of said order No. R-2259-B, upon being signed by the third member of the Commission, was placed in the file of Case No. 2504; the original order was then placed in full, as required by Sec. 65-3-6, N.M.S.A., 1953 Compl., in a book kept in the Commission office for such purpose, this action being taken at the direction of A. L. Porter, Jr., Secretary-Director of the Commission, and said A. L. Porter, Jr., thereupon endorsed on the order placed in said book the following:

"Entered July 9, 1963
A. L. P."

upon the first page of such original order.

It is further stipulated and agreed that a copy of said order No. R-2259-B was mailed by the Commission to the Supreme

Court Law Library and to all interested parties on July 9, 1963, and that no notice of said order was given to any party prior to said date, nor did any party have actual knowledge of said order prior to July 9, 1963."

(Petitioners' Exhibit No. 1 marked for identification)

MR. MALONE: Petitioners' Exhibit 1 is a copy of Order R-2259-B, Case No. 2504, certified by A. L. Porter, Jr., Secretary-Director of the Commission, on which there appears "Entered July 9, 1963, A.L.P." which was referred to in the Stipulation offered by Petitioners, the copy in the transcript does not show that endorsement and feel it should be supplemented in that regard.

COURT: Any objections?

MR. DURRETT: I would like to state for the record, the Oil Conservation Commission is not entering into this dispute over the date the Order was entered into the record, and for that reason we have no objection.

MR. KELLAHIN: We are a party to the stipulation. As to the copy of the Order of Petitioners' Exhibit No. 1, we have no objection to it, although I feel it serves no purpose since it is fully covered in the stipulation. I think it is a matter in which the Court could take judicial notice, and therefore we have no objection.

COURT: It will be admitted.

MR. MALONE: May it please the Court, this is an appeal from the Order of the Oil Conservation Commission of New Mexico, No. R-2259-B, which was entered in Case No. 2504 on July 9, 1963.

The Order, as the Court is aware, changed the gas pro-
ration formula which had been in effect for the Basin-Dakota
gas pool in Rio Arriba, Sandoval and San Juan Counties for
a period of thirty-two months, which was the entire period
since the pro-rating of gas in the Basin-Dakota pool was
originally inaugurated. During the period that that original
order No. R-1670-C was in effect, the thirty-two months' per-
iod, operators in the Dakota gas pool had drilled some 640
producing wells in reliance upon the formula which was pro-
mulgated at the outset of allocation of production and which
had remained in effect until the order appealed from changed
it. The original order provided for the allocation of pro-
duction within the pool on the basis of a formula 25% acreage
and 75% acreage times deliverability. This was the formula
that was promulgated at the outset of the allocation of pro-
duction in this pool, it was the formula that was applicable
in all other gas pools in Northwestern New Mexico. At the
time it was adapted and applicable in all Northwestern pools
in New Mexico it was developed on a 350 acre spacing pattern
so that the standard tract allocated to a well is 320 acres.
As the Court knows, a marginal tract, or marginal well, is
one which is unable to produce the top allowable allocated

in that pool; as the Court also knows the mechanics of allocating production under a pro-ration order are that, first, the amount of gas that will be produced by the marginal wells that cannot make a top allowable is totaled and subtracted from the total allowable that is allocated to that pool. The remaining portion of the allowable after subtraction of what is allocated to the marginal tracts is then allocated between the non-marginal tracts, or wells in the pool and the formula by which that allocation is accomplished is the formula which is in issue here.

I think that the record shows that at the time the record was closed in this case there were some 900 producing wells in the Basin-Dakota gas pool and I believe the Court can take judicial notice of the records of the Oil Conservation Commission, which would show approximately 1200 wells in that pool which have been completed as producing wells at the present time, so it is one of the largest producing gas pools in the State of New Mexico. I am sure that no one in this proceeding minimizes in any respect the difficulty of the problem that the Oil Conservation Commission has in trying to allocate production and pro-rate gas pools in New Mexico, and in particular the gas pools in the size and complexity of the Basin-Dakota pool, so that everything we may have to say about the order that was actually entered in this case, and which is under review in this proceeding is said in a highly sympathetic manner insofar as the problem facing the Commission is concerned, but because the validity of the order

has to be tested against the Statutes of New Mexico as they have been construed in the State of New Mexico, and against the constitutional rights and the rights of the producers in that pool, it is the position of Petitioners that Order R-2259-B is invalid and for the reasons which will be outlined in argument.

Perhaps it might be helpful to point out that the record shows in the hearing before the Commission there were thirteen operators who appeared in support of the change in the formula which was ultimately made, by the Commission to a 60-40 formula, and those thirteen operators operated a total of 111 wells. Fourteen operators in the Basin-Dakota gas pool appeared in support of the retention of the existing 25-75 formula, or in opposition to 60-40 formula and those 14 operators were operators of 442 wells in the Basin-Dakota pool. In this hearing before the Commission the record shows that the Petitioners in this proceeding are the operators of 283 wells in the Basin-Dakota pool and that the Respondents and those who had intervened on the side of the Respondents are the operators of fifty wells in the pool, so that we are dealing here with a change in the pro-ration formula which affects severely the correlative rights of the producers in that pool as to which, by a great preponderance of operators, appeared both before the Commission and before this Court are in opposition to the 60-40 formula. When those operators are numbered in accordance with the wells that they operate in that pool.

After the 25-75 formula was promulgated the Basin-Dakota gas pool was developed very extensively. In the sixteen months between the time the 25-75 formula was promulgated and the filing of Consolidated application to change that to a 60-40 formula, there were 372 wells drilled in the Basin-Dakota pool, all in reliance on the existing formula and without knowledge or anticipation a new formula would be promulgated. The application of Consolidated to change the 25-75 formula to a 60-40 formula was originally filed February 23, 1962, and on April 18, 1962 the original hearing on that application came on before the Oil Conservation Commission. After that original hearing and prior to the entry of an order on that hearing, the case which I am sure will be referred to as the Jelmat Decision, Continental Oil Company vs. Oil Conservation Commission, 73 N.M. 310, was handed down by the Supreme Court of New Mexico. As the Court is aware, this was the first case in which an appeal from the Oil Conservation Commission of New Mexico reached the Supreme Court, and was decided by the Supreme Court; so for the first time there was outlined for the benefit and assistance of the Commission the standards which the Court felt the Statutes of New Mexico required to be observed in order to retain a proration order. I have heard it said by various personnel of the Commission at various times while the industry has taken a lot of satisfaction in the fact we produced oil thirty years before a case got to the Supreme Court, that was a tribute to the Commission, but it also left the Commission without any guide lines as to the action it was taking from day to day.

On May 16, 1962 the Jelmat decision came down, and the

Supreme Court held in that case that the change in the pro-
ration formula in the Jelmat pool of Southeastern New Mexico
did not meet the conditions of the Statute, and that the new
order was declared to be void. Subsequent to the time that
decision came down, Consolidated's application was denied by
the Commission. Consolidated then applied for a re-hearing,
and on July 7, 1962 a re-hearing was granted and the Order
of the Commission granting that re-hearing, which was R-2259-A,
limited the evidence as to the reserves underlying the tracts
in the Basin-Dakota pool and the Basin-Dakota pool as a whole.
That, then, was the occasion for the re-hearing in which most
of the testimony in issue in this present case was presented.
Re-hearing occurred on February 4, 1963, and on July 9, 1963,
Order No. 2259-B of the Commission, which is here under review,
was promulgated changing the existing formula from 25% acreage
and 75% acreage times deliverability, to 60% acreage and 30%
acreage times deliverability.

The Petitioners, on July 26th, applied for re-hearing and
an application for hearing was denied August 1st, and Petition
filed here on August 20th, and Petition filed in San Juan County
on August 22nd. This is the case which is before the Court for
decision, and chronology by which it has arrived here. An
order of the Commission, which is under attack, will have changed
the pro-ration formula to the so-called 60-40 formula had attached
to the Exhibit A in which all the 699 non-marginal wells then
in the pool were listed, with various information as to the wells
on the basis of testimony which has been presented at the hearing.

We have as a visual aid enlarged the first page of Exhibit A, and have it here for reference for use by counsel in referring to the various columns for the assistance of the Court. Because Exhibit A is the subject of a great deal of controversy in this case as to the validity of the conclusions which are reached there as to the effect by them, it will be well in the introductory portion of the argument to go through and outline what is actually shown in the various columns in this Exhibit, which is a part of the order changing the formula and which is actually a basis of the Commission changing the formula. In other words, the Commission said because of what the Exhibit shows in these A/R factor columns, "we are going to change the formula". As it is rather apparent, this is a product of modern technology. It occurred to me that this case might be sub-titled "Automation vs. Correlative Rights". In any event, on this tabulation there is mentioned first the operator and under the operator the wells operated. Then in the first column, Column A and AF, and Af refers to the acreage factor of each well and the acreage factor is merely how the tract assigned to that well relates to the 320 acre standard operation unit that the Commission had promulgated. So if a tract had 320 acres attributable to a well, the acreage factor is 100 or one; if it had less than 320 acres attributed to it, it would be placed on less the first well, which is 92, and if it had more than 320 acres attributable to it, it would have more than 100 acreage factor. In the Brief of Petitioners filed with the Court there was a line omitted in our discussion of this column

which caused it not to make sense in this factor, but in any event, as I have described it in Column A. Column B is the daily deliverability of the wells listed. That deliverability is determined by a deliverability point which is made under the direction of the Oil Conservation Commission in New Mexico, and is the amount of gas in thousands of cubic feet that a well can produce under conditions promulgated by the Commission and be applicable in a sense - the deliverability of a gas well can be said to be somewhat synonymous of the potential of an oil well, it indicates what that well can do.

Column C is tract reserves in millions of cubic feet, and this is a very vital column in consideration of this Order. That is as determined by the Commission on the basis of the testimony and Exhibit of Consolidated, the amount of recoverable gas in place which the Commission finds to be under the tract assigned to each one of these wells. I hasten to point out that that is not the amount of recoverable gas in place which can be produced without waste, it is the total tract reserve, the total recoverable gas in place under each of these tracts. Obviously the correlative rights of a tract owner in any pool are measured under the Statute by the amount of recoverable gas in place under his tract which can be produced without waste, and it is the relationship of gas under his tract to all of the gas in the pool, which provides the percentage of the formula of the allocation of gas allowable which he is entitled to receive - to use an example - if a man had ten percent of the reserves in the pool and got ten percent of the

allowable, he would produce his part of the recoverable gas in the pool disregarding the waste, and there would be a producing allocation of the formula under Column C was intended by the Commission to indicate the extent of the rights of the operator, as we will develop in the argument, and as we developed in the brief. We feel it was in the use of this tract that the Commission fell into fatal error in promulgating this order, because of the fact that gas reserves of the tracts for the recoverable gas in place under the tract in toto, and not the recoverable gas in place under the tract that can be produced without waste. I pointed it out so the significance of tract will be apparent.

Column D is percentage of pool reserves that shows what percentage these tract reserves of each well bear to the total reserves of the entire pool. In other words, when they got Tract C finished, they just added up that total and let the computer divide that into the reserves of each individual tract, into the total for the whole pool and came up with a percentage each tract had of the total recoverable gas in the pool. Then we come over to the situation of two columns each, which is the basis of the decision that the Commission reached. It applied the factors it had gotten through its computer operation to the 25-75 formula and the 60-40 formula and came up with the conclusion on the basis of these figures the 60-40 formula was better than the 25-75 formula. Lets refer first to the 60-40 formula, because that is the formula that is an

issue in this case, and we will look at the columns on the basis on which it was promulgated. This is the allowable on which each of the wells listed and received in December, 1962, as an allowable that was indicated to Basin-Dakota pool for that month, were divided on a 60-40 formula. Column I is the percentage of the endorsed pool allowable which this figure amounts to, they again added up the total of the allowable of all the wells in millions or thousands of cubic feet of gas and divided each well's portion into the total, to come up with the percentage of the pool allowable that well would get on the basis of December 1, 1962 - that well would get. It wasn't tested against any other month's allocation, but against this single month's allocation.

Finally, Column J, which is an A/R factor that is arrived at on a basis of a comparison of these figures, it is a comparison of the allowable which this well gets under a 60-40 formula to the reserves which was found over here in Column C, that that well had under it. I said awhile ago if you had 10% of the reserves and got 10% of the allowable you would have a perfect pro-ration formula, and if that happens you would have a 0.0 factor because the percentage allowable and the allowable and what the pool as a whole would be identical. They made that comparison here to see if all the figures in this column were 0.0 - you would have a perfect pro-ration figure. The man with 10% of the reserves under

his tract would be getting 10% of the allowable. Actually the figures start out at 2.09, which would indicate that this well is getting twice as much as it is allowed on the basis of the Commission's allowable. This one is getting one-fifth less than it is allowed to have according to the Commission's finding, the next one over half as much and the next one over one and one-half times as much, and here is one getting 4.45, almost four and one-half times of the amount it is allowed under this 60-40 pro-ration formula. The Commission, in arriving at a final decision, did the same thing to the 25-75, took December 21, 1962 and made this column to show the amount of allowable it would receive under 25-75 formula - Column F to show the total percentage of pool allowable that would amount to, and this Column G for the 25-75 formula or how the percentage of allowable compares with what the Commission finds in Column C and it will be noted it likewise has variations on this page, which go from 14 to 3 to 7. Now it was - - the Commission then said, "Well, since an A/R Factor, or one which gave us a fair percentage of allowable of reserves, for proof we will compare 60-40 and 25-75 formula and which one of them has more wells close to one has the best formula", and they did that and came up with the fact that slightly more than one-half of the wells in the pool would be in the acceptable tolerance of one, and on that basis promulgated the new order - I should mean acceptable tolerance - there was testimony

they thought because of variations or interpretations of information that these were not absolutes and there had to be some margin for error there, and they thought a reasonable tolerance was from 70 to 130, that is 30% below or 30% above was acceptable. So they grouped these wells between 70 and 130 and came up with this conclusion slightly over one half of the wells in the pool fell in there and that was the best formula. We will show in due course in this argument why that is a fallacious conclusion, and as we see it, results in an abuse of correlative rights and not validity of the order.

In the course of the hearing before the Commission there was a great deal of testimony presented by the Respondent, Consolidated, in which they undertook to arrive at what the reserves in this column C, this critical column I mentioned awhile ago - they undertook to arrive at what those figures were and introduced them in evidence in Consolidated's Exhibit 4 before the Commission, and the Commission accepted them verbatim, and these are actually the figures, what Consolidated worked up as to the reserves in the pool were, not what could be produced without waste, but total replacement of gas under the tract.

Now, the testimony on which that was arrived at will be discussed in detail in the course of the argument, but I think I should mention, as we did in our preliminary statement and in the Petitioners' brief, that this was arrived

at by Consolidated without having done any original work of its own to determine the actual reserves under these tracts. There are two means by which engineers undertake to calculate the amount of recoverable gas under a particular tract in a pool, the first is called Volumetric Method, and it certainly, in our opinion, is for these purposes the only acceptable method, and that is the study of the actual amount of the thickness of the producing horizon under that tract, the permeability, well porosity, the space there is for the gas to accumulate and how it moves through the formation and the water in the formation, and how it takes up space the gas cannot occupy, all in the course of locations on the lease; and on the basis of that they compute the actual amount of gas under the tracts in the pool; and the other means is called Extrapolator, or a decline curve. In that action they take plotting paper and on the vertical they put the pressure at which the well produced, and they start up here with the pressure that that gas well had at the time production originally began, and they run out here the volumes of gas the well produced, and as the well produced gas the pressure declines, so they plot here in a series of points what the pressure was at the time this amount had been produced and at the time this amount had been, and that curve goes down - and lets say on January 1, 1964 that will denote how much more gas is going through by producing and they extrapolate or extend

the curve and say that is the amount of gas which will be produced from this well. Same as those calculations offered by Consolidated. I should also mention the fact that the testimony before the Commission - the El Paso Natural Gas Company, which is the principal in this pool, they conduct a continuing study of the gas reserve in the pool, has to constantly provide the Federal Power Commission as to its reserves and support its right for a line or additional line and satisfy them it has a reserve to meet their demands - the testimony of El Paso was they conducted a continuing study for that purpose but it was made not to determine the amount of gas under any individual tract, but merely so they would be informed as to the amount of gas in the pool as a whole, and for that purpose instead of studying the pool tract by tract they study it township by township, on the basis of their volumetric studies as to the gas that can be attributed to that township. That was the basis of the studies used to arrive at the reserve. It was the position of the Petitioners it wasn't prepared for that purpose, it was entirely illusory insofar as it was to indicate the reserves under a particular tract, because so far as El Paso is concerned if one tract is over and one is under that figure they will average out, so it does not make any difference to them so far as individual tracts are concerned, and El Paso pointed that out, but nonetheless all the calculations were made and on this order were

calculations made on that information. That is the information on which we have renewed the objection as to its admissibility and competence and which would support this order, and should not be admitted in evidence in this review proceeding. I should add that the information which El Paso had available at the time and was used by Consolidated for this purpose was out of date, there had been some over 200 wells drilled since these computations had been made, and the information provided by these additional 200 wells wasn't used by Consolidated and wasn't reflected in the studies which they presented to the Commission. They merely undertook to construct a contour map on the basis of the original information obtained and extended those contours across the areas on which wells had not been drilled, at the time El Paso's study was cut off. Then on the basis of the arbitrary contour lines to arrive at a basis in Column C, it is the contention of the Petitioners this does not constitute the Commission's order and that question will be further followed by Mr. Verity.

I believe with that preliminary statement, I will turn the rostrum over to Mr. Federici who will discuss the first two points for argument, which were submitted to the Court. Following that, Mr. Verity will discuss the points three and four, which were submitted and covered in the brief of Petitioners - Thank you very much, your Honor.

(RECESS)

MR. FEDERICI: May it please the Court - I will argue points 1 and 2 set forth in the Petitioners' brief, I will not recite the points at this time, and I may not argue them as set forth in the brief, but I will cover all substance of them in my argument.

The fact remains under this point that our contention that the order of the Oil Conservation Commission, the last one, R-2259-B, is invalid and void because the Commission failed to make a basic finding of jurisdictional fact required to be made by the Commission under the Statute and by our Supreme Court in decisions construing those Statutes. The order under attack changing the pro-ration formula, as Mr. Malone stated, from 25-75 to 60-40 - this order is valid only if the Oil Conservation Commission acted within its jurisdiction, and the Oil Conservation Commission acted within its jurisdiction only as it acted under those standards set up by the Statutes, as those standards have been interpreted by the Supreme Court in two cases which I will cite, and in particular the Jelmat case. The pertinent Statutes involved are 65-3-10 sub-paragraph (8) of the N.M.S.A. I will not quote the Statutes extensively, as the Supreme Court has interpreted those Statutes on those cases and set forth plainly what they mean. Briefly, 65-3-10, in substance provides it is the duty of the Oil Conservation Commission to prevent waste and to protect correlative rights. All of these Statutes make the prevention of waste the paramount duty of the Commission. Under Section 65-3-14, certain standards are specifically set forth which must be

made and followed in pro-rating gas. First, under that Statute each owner must be given an opportunity to produce his fair and equitable share of the gas in the pool. That Statute also defines just and equitable shares as the proportion that the recoverable gas under each tract bears to the recoverable gas in the entire pool, as far as such can be practicably obtained without waste. Now, the New Mexico Supreme Court in the recent case decided in 1962, has determined the meaning of these statutes. It has interpreted them, it has clarified them, it has clearly delineated the duty of the Oil Conservation Commission in respect thereto, it set the standards which must be made by the Commission, otherwise, the order is invalid. It clearly stated what the findings must be, the findings that must be made by the Commission before they could issue an order changing the formula for pro-rating gas in any pool.

This first case is Continental Oil Company vs. Oil Conservation Commission, 70 N.M., 310; 353 Pac. 2d, 809. This is known as the Jalmat case because it involved the Jalmat gas pool. The situation in that case is similar and comparable to the case at bar and the Commission therein undertook to change the gas pro-ration formula after the wells had been drilled. The Court considered these facts of the Statute which I just mentioned to the Court and then measured the order changing the formula in that case against the standard set forth in those Statutes. The Court held that the Oil Conservation Commission not only must meet statutory requirements

in order to effect a valid change in the allocation formula, but also the Supreme Court said that the Oil Conservation Commission order must show affirmatively that this has been done. That is exactly what the Commission has failed to do in this case, the order of the Commission does not affirmatively show that it has met the standards set forth by the Statutes, set forth by the Supreme Court. Therefore, the case was held invalid since the Oil Conservation Commission failed to meet the basic findings. Now, what are the basic findings - first of all, I will quote briefly with reference to 65-3-10, page 318 of the Report, "The Oil Conservation Commission is a creature of statute, expressly defined, limited and empowered by the laws creating it. The Commission has jurisdiction over matters related to the conservation of oil and gas in New Mexico, but the basis of its powers is founded on the duty to prevent waste and to protect correlative rights." 65-14 (a), "The Commission was here concerned with a formula for computing allowables, which is obviously directly related to correlative rights. In order to protect correlative rights, it is incumbent upon the Commission to determine, 'so far as it is practical to do so,' certain foundationary matters, without which the correlative rights of the various owners cannot be ascertained. Therefore, the commission, by 'basic conclusions of fact', (or what might be termed 'findings'), must determine, insofar as practicable, (1) the amount of recoverable gas under each producer's tract; (2) the total amount of recoverable gas

in the pool; (3) the proportion that (1) bears to (2); and (4) what portion of the arrived at proportion can be recovered without waste. * * *."

What the Commission failed to do in this case is meet number 4. Now, lets take the Commission's order - they find in Finding No. 6, for example, that the initial recoverable gas reserves underlying each non-marginal tract in the Basin-Dakota gas pool, and shown in Column C, Tract Reserves, follow this Exhibit A attached to the order, and in Column C, shows the amount of recoverable gas under each producer's tract. So you have a column for that, we do not say that is supported by evidence, but they did make the finding. They do not say in that finding, however, that it can be produced without waste. Number 2, the total amount of recoverable gas in the pool - they made a finding with reference to that, in Finding No. 5, that the initial recoverable gas reserves in the Basin-Dakota gas pool known, approximately 2.255 trillion cubic feet, of which approximately 96 billion cubic feet is attributable to marginal wells which are permitted to produce at capacity so that would make a finding with reference to number 2, whether again it is supported by evidence, that is a question for argument, but they made the finding.

Then, in Finding No. 7, they arrived at what is required by No. 3, that the percent of the total pool reserves attributable to each non-marginal tract in the Basin-Dakota gas pool is as shown in Column D, percent of pool reserves in Exhibit A. So they take the figures in Column C which are tract

reserves, they have added them up and got their figure for No. 2, and in Column D they set forth the proportions that Column C bears to Column D, or in Column 1 and 2, and set forth in Column D; but where is the Column representing No. 4? A producer is not entitled to receive this portion, he is only entitled to receive that portion of this proportion which can be recovered without waste.

Now, the Commission in this Exhibit needed another column, and which would have to meet the requirements of the Supreme Court decision, should have placed another column here showing what this figure would be and then computed for comparison shown in the last six columns. Now, why the Commission did not do it I don't think is a matter for consideration. No one questioned the intelligence or capability of the Staff of the Commission or the Commission. They didn't make that finding because there wasn't any evidence on which they could sustain it, so they left it, and having done so the error is fatal, it is jurisdictional, and the order is completely invalid and void. Also, as you do not have the proper column in here in Exhibit A, then the results they show here are fallacious because they are not based on the proper column which was eliminated in this Exhibit. They are based on the proper figures - in other words a producer is not entitled to receive this, he is only entitled to receive this - No. 4. What portions of the arrived at proportions can be recovered without waste. I would like the Court to bear in mind that the Supreme Court

would like the Court to bear in mind that the Supreme Court

said that the Commission must make such a finding and there isn't such a finding in the order. In fact the Commission didn't make such a finding ever, insofar as is practicable, which the Court was talking about in its opinion. Nowhere in the briefs of the Respondents do they state that such a finding has been made.

The Respondent, Consolidated Oil and Gas Company, in its brief, on page 10, falls in the exact error that the Commission fell into. Their citation of the Jalmat case, the Respondent introduced the situation, found these requirements and then says this - on page 11 of the brief: In the instant case this is exactly what the Commission has done in its Order No. R-2259-B, in its side number 5 the Commission found the acreage recoverable gas reserves in the Dakota gas pool were so much. In column 6 and column 7 the Commission found, under Exhibit A attached to the order the recoverable gas underlying each marginal tract and the recoverable gas reserves underlying each non-marginal tract and the percent underlying each non-marginal tract, and they found C, and added C and found number 2, and that difference as against the total recoverable gas, and come up with number 3, the proportion, and set forth in D and says this is exactly what the Jalmat decision would require the Commission to do, which is in error. You have got to determine what part - portion of the arrived at proportion can be recovered without waste and then make a recovery for that.

The brief, likewise, on page 19 of their brief the Commission states "In Finding No. 5, the Commission insofar as

practicable determined the total amount of recoverable gas in the pool they would take, and in Finding No. 7 determined the proportion that the recoverable gas under each tract bears to the recoverable gas in the pool, that is D - we don't quarrel with that. "The Commission then determined the portion of arrived at proportion that could be recovered without waste". Where is the finding, certainly there is no such finding - in other words no Finding No. 4, as shown and required in the Jalmat case.

If it please the Court, it seems quite clear under the Jalmat decision the order of the Commission is invalid and void for failure on the part of the Commission to make a finding, which is No. 4, what portion of the arrived at proportion can be recovered without waste - they did not show in their Exhibit A attached to the order, it does not appear in the findings in that - it does not appear in the findings at all. Now, I know that they try to justify it on the basis that there are other findings which mention waste and which mention correlative rights. Well, lets take a look at that, that does not satisfy that requirement at all. You are talking about correlative rights, not prevention of waste, but when the Court is talking about correlative rights they are talking about No. 4, and you have got to determine correlative rights first. Right in the same paragraph as the Court set forth these requirements, in the last sentence of this paragraph, the Court said this; "that the extent of the correlative rights must be

determined before the Commission can act to protect them is manifest". They are talking about No. 4, to arrive at proportions that can be recovered without waste, that is the rights to which the producer is entitled and you cannot arrive at that until you have made Finding No. 4, you cannot proceed further unless you have made Finding No. 4. The Commission says "we protect correlative rights" but you cannot arrive at a formula until you have arrived at No. 4, which is the extent of the correlative rights the Commission should protect.

Now, again, with reference to correlative rights, and the statement by the Court in its opinion, the Statutes also have a definition of correlative rights, 65-3-29 (h): "Correlative Rights" means the opportunity afforded, sofar as it is practicable to do so, to the owner of each property in a pool to produce without waste his just and equitable share of the oil or gas, or both, in the pool, * * * * " That Statute only must be read in the light of the opinion which interprets the particular Statutes, so when we are talking about correlative rights we are talking about Jalmat No. 4 requirement and not Jalmat No. 3 requirement. It is obvious that the Commission has not found the extent of each owner's correlative rights and yet has proposed and set forth a formula without first having determined Jalmat No. 4, which is what the correlative rights would be, so, if they hadn't found that to start with, then the use of the term correlative rights in subsequent

findings Numbers 13 and 14 are meaningless and without foundation.

In Finding No. 13, the Commission says that correlative rights are not being adequately protected by the 25-75 formula, but it does not say anything about the protection under the 60-40 formula. They couldn't so find because they hadn't found what the producers' rights were in the first instance, so the same error is found in Finding No. 14, the term "Correlative Rights" is used but it could not be properly used in that particular finding because the correlative rights of each producer had never been determined in this order. The Commission cannot determine one formula will more adequately protect correlative rights unless it has first determined what those correlative rights are, which it has not done. And also if the Court will note that Finding No. 14, the statement there at the end of the finding that the new formula will more adequately protect correlative rights, will prevent waste, and followed by this language "but permit more wells to receive their adequate and just rights in the pool, insofar as can be determined". This has nothing to do with the waste, the fact that more wells receive more than their share has nothing to do with their finding that that portion can be produced without waste.

Now, in the Jalmat case the Court recognized the duty of the Oil Conservation Commission to protect correlative rights and to prevent waste, but it stated the prevention of waste was the paramount thing and that the extent therein and the protection

of correlative rights must first be determined, but the Commission was to protect them.

Sims vs. Mechem, which is the other case the Supreme Court decided, which states the rules involved that case involved - 72 N. M. 186; 382 Pac. 2nd 183, the Court did rely heavily on the Jalmat case and stated the decision must be predicated on the prevention of waste, and state, "We conclude the Commission's Order R-1310 contains no finding as to the estimation of waste or that pooling would prevent waste. The Commission was without jurisdiction to enter Order R-1310 and the order is void". We do not take exception to the right of the Commission to change formulas if they change them in accordance with the standard set up in the Statutes and as those standards have been interpreted, clarified and set forth by the Supreme Court, in the opinions which I have cited to the Court, so that as a conclusion, the Jalmat decision requires the Commission first determine the extent of the correlative rights before attempting to protect them, and in order for the Commission to determine the extent of the correlative rights, the Commission must find and determine the extent to Jalmat No. 4, that the Commission must determine what portion of the arrived at proportion can be arrived at. The Commission has failed to determine what the correlative rights were, and further failed to find they can be protected without waste. The Order is nil and void and cannot enter its order in R-2259-B - I have stated to the Court basically the first

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argument was on the proposition that the Order of the Commission was invalid and void because it failed to make a jurisdictional finding, which must be made in the order before it is valid. They never did make Finding No. 4, and I think that point itself, if the Court concludes they have not made such a finding, which they did not, resolves the case favorable to the Petitioners.

ARGUMENT BY MR. VERITY:

May it please the Court - Mr. Federici has demonstrated to you that the Commission's order is invalid because it is inadequate in that there is no finding with regards to waste. My portion of this argument which has been presented to you in the prepared written brief under Points 3 and 4, I propose to show the Court that the Commission order in its findings affirmatively demonstrated that it was contrary to the same Statutes Mr. Federici was talking about, that they make affirmative findings, they show that they have not allocated and given to each tract and each tract owner his pro-rata share of the pool reserves. They make an affirmative finding to show they have violated the correlative rights and that they have not represented that they are protecting each owner's correlative rights, but rather they are endeavoring to protect more owners' rights than they might otherwise do; secondly, I would like to discuss with the Court a little bit some of the evidence taken by the Commission which is inadmissible evidence, and that such evidence, even though admitted, did

not substantially support the findings of the order with regard to our first point. On the first point I mentioned, and want to argue, it is three-fold - the findings of the Commission that they violate the Statute and don't give each one his pro-rata share the energy to produce reserves, and that they violated correlative rights and the order declares factors with regard to pool reserves are unreliable and elsewhere uses such pool reserves to arrive at the 60-40 formula, that the order comes up with. I would like to read all of 65-3-14 of the N.M.S.A., it is headed "EQUITABLE ALLOCATION OF ALLOWABLE PRODUCTION - POOLING - SPACING. - (a) The rules, regulations or orders of the Commission shall, so far as it is practicable to do so, afford to the owner of each property in a pool the opportunity to produce his just and equitable share of the oil or gas, or both, in the pool, being an amount, so far as can be practically determined, and so far as such can be practically obtained without waste, substantially in the proportion that the quantity of the recoverable oil or gas, or both, under such property bears to the total recoverable oil or gas or both in the pool, and for this purpose to use his just and equitable share of the reservoir energy.

(b) The commission may establish a proration unit for each pool, such being the area that can be efficiently and economically drained and developed by (1) well, and in so doing the commission shall consider the economic loss caused by the drilling of unnecessary wells, the protection of correlative rights, including those of royalty owners, the prevention of waste, the avoid-

ance of the augmentation of risks arising from the drilling of an excessive number of wells, and the prevention of reduced recovery which might result from the drilling of too few wells.

(c) The pooling of properties or parts thereof shall be permitted, and, if not agreed upon, may be required in any case when and to the extent that the smallness or shape of a separately owned tract would, under the enforcement of a uniform spacing plan or proration unit, otherwise deprive or tend to deprive the owner of such tract of the opportunity to recover his just and equitable share of the crude petroleum or natural gas, or both, in the pool; Provided, that the owner of any tract that is smaller than the drilling unit established for the field, shall not be deprived of the right to drill on and produce from such tract, if same can be done without waste; but in such case, the allowable production from such tract, as compared with the allowable production from such tract, as compared with the allowable production therefrom if such tract were a full unit, shall be in ratio of the area of such tract to the area of a full unit. All orders requiring such pooling shall be upon terms and conditions that are just and reasonable, and will afford to the owner of each tract in the pool the opportunity to recover or receive his just and equitable share of the oil or gas, or both, in the pool as above provided, so far as may be practicably recovered without waste. In the event such pooling is required, the costs of development and operation of the pooled unit shall be limited to the lowest actual expenditures required for such purpose including a reasonable charge for supervision; and in

case of any dispute as to such costs, the Commission shall determine the proper costs.

(d) Minimum allowable for some wells may be advisable from time to time, especially with respect to wells already drilled when this act takes effect, to the end that the production will repay reasonable lifting cost and thus prevent premature abandonment and resulting waste.

(e) Whenever it appears that the owners in any pool have agreed upon a plan for the spacing of wells, or upon a plan or method of distribution of any allowable fixed by the commission for the pool, or which plan, in the judgment of the commission, has the effect of preventing waste as prohibited by this act and is fair to the royalty owners in such pool, then such plan shall be adopted by the commission with respect to such pool; however, the commission, upon hearing and after notice, may subsequently modify any such plan to the extent necessary to prevent waste as prohibited by this act.

(f) After the effective date of any rule, regulation or order fixing the allowable production, no person shall produce more than the allowable production applicable to him, his wells, leases or properties determined as in this act provided, and the allowable production shall be produced in accordance with the applicable rules, regulations or orders."

Your Honor, all in the world that is saying is that each one in the pool has got to be given the right to produce his pro-rata share of what the whole pool is, in other words, it says each owner must be given his constitutional guaranteed

right to produce his own property and you can't liquidate it or take it away from him, and the Statute would not be valid if it did not have such a provision, and it does have it, and the Court has told the Commission it must follow this Statute; in the Jalmat case they pointed out this Statute, then they cited the United States Supreme Court cases and quoted from them, and I would like to quote briefly - to read this same quote the Supreme Court quote in Jalmat, from the Supreme Court in Opp Cotton Mills vs. Administrator:

"The essentials of the legislative function are the determination of the legislative policy and its formulation as a rule of conduct. These essentials are preserved when Congress (in this case the Legislature) specifies the basic conclusions of fact upon ascertainment of which, from relevant data by a designated administrative agency, it ordains that its statutory demand is to be effective."

That is what this Statute says, that is what the Supreme Court says, the Commission must do; so that the Supreme Court in the Jalmat case said, "The Oil Conservation Commission is a creature of Statute, expressly defined, limited and empowered by the laws creating it", and it went on to say it must make these jurisdictional findings of fact and must be in the Statute.

I refer particularly to findings 10, 11 and 14.

Number 10, "That in the Basin-Dakota gas pool there is no direct correlation between deliverability and reserves, or acreage and reserves, and that, therefore, neither should be used as the sole criterion for distributing the total pool allowable

among the tracts." That saying in itself might be all right if they did not turn right back around and show they were not giving each tract its pro-rata share of allowable.

In Finding No. 11, after finding deliverability and acreage from the proper criteria, they say: "That the most reasonable basis for allocating production in the Basin-Dakota gas pool is to determine, for each proposed formula, the percentage of total pool allowable apportioned to each non-marginal tract as compared to its percentage of total pool reserves, said relationship hereinafter referred to as the tract's A/R Factor of 1.0, or with a tract A/R Factor of from 0.7 to 1.3, which, due to inherent variance in interpreting and computing reserves, is within a reasonable tolerance."

What they have now said is that each tract is not going to be given its pro-rata share of pool reserves which the Statute said they must do, and the Jalmat case said they must do, but they say, "We are going to find an arbitrary figure of 70 to 130". I suppose the reason the Commission used 70 to 130 is because Consolidated said that was going to be all right. If they got 70% of what they were entitled to. Petitioners do not agree if they get 70% that is all right. Petitioners do not agree that it is adequate if they are given 70% of their pro-rata share for a tract, of what they are entitled to, and Petitioners do not agree the formula is all right if they are given 130%. We think the Statute says each tract is entitled to his pro-rata share insofar as it is practicable and can be determined, and insofar as it can be given, but inasmuch as

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this order has set up this arbitrary 70 to 130 percent and said this is the standard into which it falls, it is all right. Lets look and see what it does, and Positioners have prepared an aid to the Court that shows in a barograph on the left the number of wells that fall within this arbitrary factor of 70 to 130 percent, and you will see those 352 wells in the red, and on the green, right beside it you would have to put a straight edge to see there are any difference in the two. There are almost as many wells outside the 70 to 130 arbitrary factor as in it, being 347 outside. In other words the Commission in its order (and borne out by Exhibit A to the order) has set up the 70 to 130 percent arbitrary factor, then there are only half of the wells that matter not on arbitrary standard - for the sake of argument we agree it is adequate if you get 70% of what you are entitled to - turning to Exhibit A of the Commission's Order, lets look at the very first page on the first well it comes out 209% of what it is entitled to under the 60-40 formula that they promulgated and they say is proper under the Statute, and we come to a well for Bayview Oil Corporation and it only gets 20% and we submit each of these tracts is within this pool and each tract comes within the language of the Statute which says each each tract is entitled to its pro-rata share, and this affirmatively demonstrates the order is outside the Statutes and that they did not come up with the Statutes which is what the case required. Next, these two findings 10 and 11, they were to go with

finding No. 14, again affirmatively demonstrate that the Commission has not protected the correlative rights of the parties in the pool. Let me read the statute with regard to correlative rights and see what it is they are supposed to do: 65-3-10 N.M.S.A. provides - "The commission is hereby empowered, and it is its duty, to prevent waste prohibited by this act and to protect correlative rights, as in this act provided. * * * *." Reading only a part of that statute, then turning to where this act provides the protection of correlative rights, 65-3-29(h) - will have divided them with this language: "Correlative rights' means the opportunity afforded, so far as is practicable to do so, to the owner of each property (again we are talking about each property) in a pool to produce without waste his just and equitable share of the oil or gas, or both, in the pool, being an amount, so far as can be practicably determined, and so far as can be practicably obtained without waste, substantially in the proportion that the quantity of recoverable oil or gas, or both, under such property bears to the total recoverable oil or gas, or both, in the pool, and for such purpose to use his just and equitable share of the reservoir energy."

And what this says again, your Honor, isn't how the fact that it is emphasized in the law again and again. The Legislature says the Commission give each individual his pro-rata share of the pool and that you not only violate the Statute, it says the Commission violates his correlative rights if you

don't do this.

Well, lets turn to Finding No. 14 and see what the Commission did - in Finding No. 14, I quote: "Based upon the December, 1962, pool allowable, a comparison of the number of non-marginal wells producing with a tract A/R Factor of from 0.7 to 1.3 under each formula as identified by an asterisk in Columns G and J of Exhibit A, and of the total volume of gas allocated to the wells in the 0.7 to 1.3 range under each formula, establishes that the proposed formula of 60 percent acreage plus 40 percent acreage times deliverability will prevent waste (or protect correlative rights) by permitting more wells to receive their just and equitable share of the gas in the pool, insofar as can be determined."

We submit that that finding, and the last half of it makes a record in this order that it does not follow the Statute, that they have never had correlative rights, and to the man who gets 60% of what he is entitled to he is not one of the more, he is one of the last, and that this order is invalid. Almost as many are outside the 130% factor as they are in it, and 352 wells fall within this arbitrary figure and 347 outside. Three-hundred forty-seven rights are invaded, even if we grant - which we do not - that 70% protection is adequate protection.

The Commission, in Finding No. 8, has declared that it is impracticable to allocate production solely on the basis of percentage of pool reserves due to the continuous fluctuation in reserve computations resulting from new completions

in the pool and re-evaluation of reserves of existing wells.

Now, your Honor, Petitioners can sympathize with the problems the Commission has, and we sympathize with the problem pro-ration is not a simple matter, and we can also sympathize with the problems that Consolidated has a lot of wells, they have got a lot of acreage, and we understand why they would urge upon the Commission that this be a 60% acreage, which has got nothing whatsoever to do with reserves, and under 40% acreage to deliverability, which is proportionate of the reserves, but this does not mean the order becomes proper or valid. If you sympathize with those people and endeavor to write an order that will help them, neither does the fact that a difficult problem mean the Commission can grope outside of the law for an order which they feel is proper and reasonable, and as previous counsel have pointed to you, as I understand and appreciate that the Commission was striving and trying to come up with an order that would do what is equitable, but it so happens this is a prerogative of Legislature and Supreme Court, as to the proper method that they go about making an order and allocating production, and the fact that they have a difficult problem does not justify them going outside the rules and make an order for more wells. It is contrary to the Statute and to law and to the 14th Amendment of the United States Constitution, which is the reason for the Statute in the Jalmit case, and was a

most similar situation because the Commission had an order in force and someone did not like it, they were on the end, like Consolidated finds itself with very good wells, possibly, so the Commission set aside this order and promulgated a new order, and in the new order they did not follow the Statute, and they had some language in that order which the Supreme Court struck down. In the Jalmat case that was very similar to this finding; referring to the Commission's Finding No. 5 which is to the effect that the new formula will result "more equitable allocation" of the gas production in said pool than under the present gas pro-ration formula. We do not believe it is a substitute for or the equivalent of a finding that the present gas pro-ration formula does not protect correlative rights.

In that order they said more adequate application, and here they say more adequately protect more wells. The same language applies to each finding and there is more than one conclusion that the order violates correlative rights. Now, your Honor, the Court has the finding in Finding No. 8 that the two factors were not reliable, they then used these factors in Exhibit No. 8 in coming up with the 60-40 formula, and making a comparison between 60-40 and 25-75, and we submit the Commission cannot be on both sides of the point, and we believe that this affirmatively demonstrates that the order is contrary to the Statute.

Turning now to Point No. 4, which has to do with the evidence that the Commission heard in this case, whether

or not it is admissible and whether or not, even if it is admissible, it is substantially able to support the findings of the order. Mr. Malone went through in some detail with you the nature of the evidence presented, and in going briefly over this same thing I would like to read some excerpts from the transcript of testimony which we believe this testimony is inadmissible. The record will show this, your Honor. We pointed out in our brief that Consolidated's case, and the only testimony in this case with regard to reserves at all, the C and D Columns, that they came up with in Exhibit A - the only evidence at all with regard to these points and on which the Commission could make those findings, came from Consolidated's witness and this evidence that appeared wasn't evidence where he had gone and examined the records with regards to each tract and come up with a conclusion and proper expert opinion testimony and deductions as to what the reserves are under each tract. Rather, what took place was this - they subpoenaed work papers that El Paso Natural Gas Engineers had made and then used these work papers as though there was no question about their authenticity, no question about their propriety, in order to come up with the tract reserve factor that is in Columns C and D.

Now, we submit that this is purely hearsay testimony because what they have done is repeat in court - before the Commission, what someone else concluded, outside the Court.

Now, it so happens, your Honor, and the record will so show this, because Mr. Dave Rainey testified in detail with regard to the figures and the work papers that they used which the El Paso Natural Gas Company engineer had come up with, were not designed for the purpose to which they termed it in making reserve determinations for each tract, rather, these figures were made so that El Paso would know what the reserves for the entire pool were and if they had used for Finding No. 5 concerning reserves in the entire pool it might be admissible and it might be substantial evidence to prove that, but for proving individual tract reserves it isn't so designed and it wasn't so reliable.

Here is the way it is arrived at, they took townships and calculated from wells available therein for the over-all average in township data concerning pressures, interspacial water, gas analysis and various other factors that they needed. These are the average use to each well on the basis of the thickness of the Basin-Dakota sand in that well. That was the only factor that they had from this particular well, so what they were endeavoring to do was to come up with the township reserve, and for this purpose was adequate, but to take and say it represents evidence as to the tract reserve under each tract, it wasn't admissible, it was hearsay and improper herasay. When you traced it back to what it really meant - let me read from page 14 of the transcript of the hearing - This is testimony by Mr. Trueblood:

Question: (By Mr. Stockmar) "Mr. Trueblood, I hand you two tabulations. Will you identify them, please, for the record?

"A. This first tabulation is a group of eight pages which is a photocopy of the 460 wells which El Paso Natural Gas handed us in the previous hearing and later produced to the Commission, and which we made a copy of subsequent to the issuance of the subpoenas.

"The second tabulation is one of numerous pages which has put the wells, has identified the wells by township that had appeared previously only by deliverability and reserves under the original eight pages of information previously referred to. These were delivered to the Oil and Gas Conservation Commission in response to the subpoenas issued, and we then got a copy of them."

MR. VERITY: These are only work papers, something someone else had done, and the fact that they had been subpoenaed did not make it proper evidence, and someone concluded from someone else's conclusion. We submit it wasn't proper evidence, and we further show it wasn't proper to take these papers and apply them to individual tracts.

Page 15 of the Transcript: (Mr. Trueblood) "This Exhibit is a breakdown of the wells which appeared in the El Paso Natural Gas review by township, with each well described and with the captions showing the initial deliverability of the wells, 1961 deliverability based on 1960 tests, the 1962 deliverabilities based on 1961 tests, the net feet of pay, the

number of acres in the unit, the acre feet of sand, the township recovery factor, the initial reserves in place, the cumulative production through December 31st or to January 1, 1962, and the then current reserve as of January 1, 1962."

MR. VERITY: This answer right here from Mr. Trueblood's testimony shows what I have said to the Commission or explains in detail Mr. Rainey's testimony, this was unreliable testimony to be admitted and it was improper to allocate and calculate tract reserves from it - Page 18 of the transcript -

Testimony by Mr. Trueblood: "All of the 460 wells which El Paso had on our Exhibit 2 were then plotted throughout the Basin. The Commission will notice that there's a great deal of empty void space yet to be developed in the field within the outline of this situation. However, we have for the most part mechanically contoured with an eye to the overall situation and an eye to the recovery factors that an engineer would normally expect to receive in this type of arrangement. From that point, we were able to construct or to pick reserves from this map as if the remaining missing wells in the December production schedule had been done by El Paso Engineers."

MR. VERITY: And let me explain to you what he is apologizing for here. You will recall we had 352 plus 347 wells, whereas they only had 360 from the work papers of El Paso which were already out of date, so they wanted to come up with a tract factor, not have just these 460 wells, they wanted to also come set up for the other 249 - so did they go out and get these

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locations from the wells and make a proper calculation of the reserves under each tract - no. "We just contoured it and examined each of the other 239 wells, added the reserve that had been calculated from the arbitrary line we drew, basing it on the best information closest to the unknown factor" - - and we submit this was inadmissible testimony. We submit it isn't substantial evidence also, but let me turn with some particularity to this evidence - and a little bit further analysis into the evidence also we might pass the point it isn't admissible, and we do admit it, and by some imagination say it is admissible; and counsel for respondents will tell you, I am sure, there were 58 wells we did not have accurate information on in this pool, of the 352 and 347, and we looked at these 58 wells and we checked the accuracy of this work paper and concluded it was correct, and the accuracy of the extrapolator of the other wells and we say there is still no substantial evidence to support the findings in this order, and particularly we would like to point out the information they had by the record and by the admission of Mr. Trueblood, at the time they were introducing it to the Commission. Page 199 of the transcript, Mr. Stockmar interrogating Mr. Trueblood:

"A. If the Commission please, first of all, in response to Mr. Rainey's testimony concerning the fact that his Exhibit No. R-1, if it were presented, would look like somebody shot it with some buckshot; so it just so happens that we have got our Exhibit No. 9, that purports to show the buckshot."

(On Page 199 and 200) "If the Commission please, Ben Howell on behalf of El Paso. Before this witness testifies, I would like to inquire as to the basis with which he grouped his wells within reserve groups. How did you determine that you put a particular well between the three billion and four billion?"

"A. Mr. Howell, this is a plot of every single well, 460 wells which we had information and access to, of El Paso. This is an actual plot."

"MR. HOWELL: Is it based upon the data which was furnished you in April?"

"A. It's based upon the data on your Exhibit No. 2, which I believe listed all the wells by township, the wells, the initial reserves, the initial deliverability; and this is a plot of initial deliverability and initial reserves for the 460 wells."

"MR. HOWELL: Based upon that April reserve study?"

"A. Yes, I presume that is correct."

"MR. HOWELL: Then El Paso moves to exclude this testimony because it is based upon evidence which the people who did the work, namely, El Paso, say is out of date, has been revised, and has been replaced by other and new estimates as to the reserves for the particular wells shown on there. We move to exclude testimony relating to such an exhibit."

MR. VERITY: Your Honor, you just cannot take the conclusion of someone else and turn it around and come to conclusions on the purpose for which it was designed in the first place.

you cannot take and use dead testimony and come up with what must be done in Columns C and D, and it was improper for the Commission to do it. In addition to this, the evidence presented to the Commission in support of the 60-40 formula makes a comparison which we say is fallacious, they compared initial reserves with current deliverability. They went back in El Paso's work papers and these were made on initial reserve calculations from back at the time the well started producing, and in order to make comparisons for the order they compare the most current deliverability with the initial reserve factor. This was incorrect and, as Petitioners' brief points out, we think this is like comparing an eight year old automobile with 70,000 miles, with one just off the floor, it is illusory, capricious and misleading the Commission into an improper and invalid order. Findings 10, 12 and 13 are all based on the improper comparison and illusory information.

We submit this evidence is not in support of the order, it does not support substantially Finding 14, and had the language "more adequately protected more correlative rights and prevented waste" and we would like to show to you there is no substantial evidence in this route that the 60-40 order will prevent waste. The only place where there is any language about the 60-40 order preventing waste at all was when Mr. Trueblood was asked the question - "whether or not the non-development of the Basin-Dakota pool would result in waste".

At this point objection was interposed to the question as being improper because it supposed and implied that there was non-development, and the record showed no evidence of any non-development, so the question at that time was withdrawn and counsel said he would come back to it later, but never did come back to it. You will find that in the transcript, Page 21 and 22. Never did come back to the testimony and there is no place in that record that this 60-40 formula will prevent waste.

Findings 15 and 16 regarding - Finding 15 refers to prevention of waste, to prevention of drainage, and Finding No. 16 providing the 60-40 formula will afford every tract owner to use his share of pool energy. At no place is there substantial evidence in the record that will support those findings. The only evidence with regard to this point was by Mr. Trueblood, Mr. , and Mr. Haseltine. To start Mr. Trueblood started (Page 27) - - -

MR. KELLY(Interrupting) Could we get a better reference, they are broken up into two hearings?

MR. VERITY: February 14, 1963 - rehearing.

"With this in mind, what we're asking for, mind you, is a 60-40; a 60-40 would leave something like this and still create drainage".

Elsewhere he said the percentage of deliverability in the formula should be not 60-40 but 25%.

Mr. Haselton;(Page 176 and 177) "I am certain in my own

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to go to the 60-40 formula that is before the Commission is just a step in the right direction, it isn't far enough to be equitable, based on what I have seen in the Dakota pool, but how far we should go in that direction I just wouldn't try to say. Certainly farther than the 60-40."

And that is not stated in these points, on the contrary the evidence is against this, and the Petitioners' witness said just the contrary - one of the Petitioners' witnesses made this statement: "Under this formula the low reserve wells will deplete their reserves in about seven years, after which time they would recover in excess of the reserves properly equitable to the tract where they produce. In doing this correlative rights would be violated".

Your Honor we think we have shown to you that there are not proper findings of waste in this order, we further think we have shown you that this order in Findings 10, 11, 12, 13 and 14 affirmatively establish that they have deviated from the Statute in order to come up with something they felt was more adequate and we think the Commission heard testimony so that the entire case of Consolidated, which is the only evidence that the Commission had to make these findings in its order based on this inadmissible testimony, and even if we admitted the inadmissible testimony still it isn't substantially adequate to support the findings of the order. We believe there is only one conclusion that can come from this, and that is the order is invalid, and we respectfully

submit to the Court that the order is invalid.

One other thing, the previous order of this Commission is in here in controversy. We have got this order right here, that is the only one here in controversy, that is the only one in this Court - the 25-75 order was previously made whether or not it is valid or invalid is not now before this Court, and this again was exactly analogous to the Jalmat case and the Court there said; "We will have to assume until a proper attack is made that that order is valid". We submit this 60-40 order is definitely invalid for the reasons we have shown, and we request the Court to overrule it.

COURT: We will be in recess until 1:30 P.M.

1:30 P.M., March 5, 1964:

MR. SLOAN: Nothing further from Petitioners at this time, we would, of course, like rebuttal.

ARGUMENT OF RESPONDENTS

BY MR. BOOKER KELLY: May it please the Court. The point that I am going to argue is listed under Point 7 in the Commission and Sunray's brief, also joined by Consolidated. We are raising it first since it is a matter that does not go to the merits of the appeal and if our contention is correct, would dispose of the appeal. This is the argument that the Court does not have jurisdiction over the subject matter of this action, as Petitioners have failed to join indispensable

parties. The Court will note from the style of the case the only Respondents, the Oil Conservation Commission and Consolidated Oil and Gas, and five companies in all, so in effect in this suit has the six companies and something like 78 operators in the field, it is our contention that at least the operators in the field would be indispensable parties. The testimony on indispensable parties as set forth in New Mexico, and a very general one and one I can safely say is distinct from all other jurisdiction.

The first case set out this testimony is American Trust and Savings Bank vs. Scobee, 29 N.M.: "It is a general rule that all persons whose interest will necessarily be affected by any decree in a given case are necessary and indispensable parties and the Court will not proceed to a decree without them". This case has been cited in recent cases, 49 N.M., 292; State Game Commission vs. Tackett 71 N.M. 400, where this particular phraseology, where all persons who will necessarily be affected by any decree in a given case. The result of this has been a lack of jurisdiction in the Supreme Court which the Court held prohibited it from proceeding with the case.

I might bring out New Mexico is also unique in that it has eliminated the distinction between necessary and indispensable parties. A necessary party though a final decree will not affect their rights, the court cannot proceed without them, an indispensable party the Court loses jurisdiction.

The case of Sellman vs. Haddock eliminated this and ruled there is no difference between necessary and indispensable

parties.

Looking at this particular case, judging by the language of New Mexico cases on this point we see right off by Exhibit A the effect that this decision has had on every well in the pool of 699 wells. In fact the Petitioners here arguing shows us the Adobe Oil Company Well 2.09, they show this company was getting more than its share, in their argument it is getting less than their share, and you go down to Bayview Oil Corporation; counsel pointed out to the Court is only getting 2.6 and they do not raise these questions but they point out it is not getting its part. On every page they have pulled out companies that is not a party to the suit - not one oil company that is a party to the suit, looking at the Statute which covers appeals from the decision of the Oil Conservation Commission, I refer to 65-3-22, Section B of this reads: "Any party to such rehearing proceeding, dissatisfied with the disposition of the application for rehearing, may appeal therefrom to the district court of the county wherein is located any property of such party affected by the decision" * *

Then it goes on to say "Notice of such appeal shall be served upon the adverse party or parties and the Commission in the manner provided by summons in civil proceedings" It is important to note this does not give us any guide as to who must be a party. The fact that this is true and the Petitioners recognize this, is shown by their actions that both the Commission and Consolidated Oil and Gas Company how they decided to join those two.

However they sent notice of appeal to those parties along with the operators who appeared in opposition. They did not consider notice of appeal was the same as joinder, as the requirement for joining parties, because they included some of the parties and left out others. It is certainly my contention this section does not give us any information as to who is a party, but we must rely on the common law of New Mexico for that. However, the Supreme Court of New Mexico, in a recent case, has given us, in case of State vs. W. S. Ranch Company, 69 N.M., 169. This case is startling in its implications for the present case. Either the State Engineer had attempted to enjoin a water user on Costilla Reservoir, claiming they had never properly appropriated the water. The Ranch Company raises as a defense the fact that the State Engineer did not join on the other users on the River. The District Court dismissed the case, and on appeal the Supreme Court ruled all other users would be necessary and indispensable parties. The reason that the Court found the water users were necessary and indispensable parties was that any adjudication of the Ranch Company's water rights would necessarily mean more or less water to the users below. This is the exact situation we have here, any change in the formula will necessarily mean more or less gas to each well in the pool. The Petitioners might argue this is not the same situation since it isn't an appeal from an administrative agency, however, let me

refer the Court to Section 75-6-1: "Any applicant or other party dissatisfied with any decision, act or refusal to act of the state engineer may take an appeal to the district court of the county wherein such work, or point of desired appropriation, is situated; Provided, notice of such appeal shall be served by appellant upon the state engineer and all parties interested, * * * "

It is almost exactly the same language and I ask the Court if the Ranch Company had appeared under the Section as provided - this would be 75-5-1 - and claimed a right to use water and agreed to get a permit for the use of their water, and the state engineer had refused and the Ranch Company had been the one that appealed - certainly this is no different, the effect on other users would have been the same, the engineer could have raised points because the effect on other water users would be exactly the same, so I contend there can be no difference between the situation here for a given amount of water distributed by the users which might have been hundreds of miles long, and a gas pool which takes in a certain area. You have a certain amount of gas there to distribute among those operators. Certainly the Petitioners have stressed the importance to individual operators and have stressed how unfair it is to some and what a benefit it is to others. They cannot say these operators are not interested - we state it in the form of a Motion to ask the Court to dismiss the action for failure to bring in these indispensable parties. Thank you.

BY MR. J. M. DURRETT, JR.:

May it please the Court, your Honor, I would like to very briefly summarize for the Court's benefit the presentation that will be given here by points by the remainder of the Respondents to speak here today. I will discuss very briefly the question of burden of proof. We have noticed that the Commission has raised in its brief the fact they have not carried the burden of proof placed upon them. I will also discuss the necessity of specific findings concerning waste and the changing conditions. This was raised also by Consolidated and Mr. Kellahin, and discuss the production, that the order contains jurisdictional facts and findings which met the statutory requirements. I also will discuss the points raised in his brief that were not raised by the Commission, the failure to exhaust administrative remedy, and I will touch on the proposition of substantial evidence, and this will be covered by Mr. Stockmar. Mr. Stockmar, who also will discuss the necessity of the finding of waste and the fact that it is there.

My first point I would present to the Court today, or Point 1, that the order is prima facie valid and that the Petitioners have the burden of establishing that the action of the Commission was fraudulent, arbitrary or capricious, that the order wasn't supported by substantial evidence or that the Commission did not act within the scope of its authority in this case. I call the Court's attention to Section 65-3-22, N.M.S.A., 1953 Compilation, concerning rehearings and appeals

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I quote from this Statute: " * * * The Commission action complained of shall be prima facie valid and the burden shall be upon the party or parties seeking review, to establish the invalidity of such action of the commission. * * *

We respectfully state to the Court that this Statute specifically places the burden of proof in this case on the Petitioners. Of course as petitioners they always would have the burden of proof. We also would point to the Court that our Supreme Court has held on numerous occasions that it is necessary to show fraudulent, arbitrary or capricious, not supported by substantial evidence, or within the scope of authority, in order to overturn an administrative decision or order, and for this proposition we cite to the Court Johnson vs. Sanchez, 67 N.M. 41, 1960 decision, and the Continental Oil Company vs. Oil Conservation Commission, 70 N.M., 310, 1962 decision. The Jalmat case that has been referred to here today, with the thought in mind that the Petitioners do have the burden and that the burden has to establish fraudulent, arbitrary or capricious, not supported by substantial evidence, and not within the scope of authority; I would like to call the Court's attention to the definition of some of these words. In Black's Law Dictionary, "fraudulent" is "based on fraud proceeding from or characterized by fraud". We submit to the Court that there is no allegation in this case of fraud, so they certainly have not carried their burden so far as this, and their part of the burden is concerned.

Definition of arbitrary defines as "fixed or done capriciously or at pleasure". We submit to the Court that this is a synonym with capricious, and although capricious is not defined by Black, Webster defines it as "fantastic whim or fancy". We certainly submit to the Court that the Petitioners have not established this order as capricious, have not established it was arbitrary, and they certainly have not established it was fraudulent. Then, we come to the question of what are they left with, in order to carry their burden, and that is they must show the order is not supported by substantial evidence, or within the scope of authority of the Commission. They admit the Commission has authority to pro-rate the Basin-Dakota gas pool, and we call the Court's attention to their brief at Page 4, and they state the Commission does have the authority. Then they are left with the production, there is no substantial evidence, we submit to the Court, they have not carried the burden of proof in any manner of speaking, concerning a question of substantial evidence. They viciously attack the weight to be given to the evidence, but they do not show the Court that it isn't substantial. They contend El Paso did not believe their reserves were valid for the purpose that the Commission believed them to be valid, but there is testimony in the record that it was valid for the purpose, for the purpose used - the Commission chose to believe the testimony in the record. Their whole attack on direct purpose to this Court today has been to the weight to be given to the evidence, not to the proposition that there isn't substantial evidence in the record.

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We submit to the Court they have not established the lack of substantial evidence and that they therefore have not carried their burden. We submit, in viewing the evidence discussed by the Petitioners and all reasonable inferences that must be drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the validity of the order, which is a usual presumption that goes along with an attack against any administrative order, we submit in viewing the evidence as they have discussed in this light establishes that there was substantial evidence in the record. They themselves have mentioned the evidence although they say no weight should be given to it, the court should not believe it. On this basis we submit that they have not carried their burden, they have not overcome the presumption of the validity of the action and the Court must therefore dismiss the suit in connection with this.

I also would like to call the Court's attention to the weight to be given to the various arguments that the Petitioners have put before the Court here today, and their statement of the case. In their brief they state, and they have commented here today that they operate 283 wells and that the respondents operate 50 wells. They also state to the Court they have stated on direct that operators of 111 wells supported the change, operators of 442 opposed, and they also point out in their brief that there is approximately the same number of companies on each side. Now, apparently this discussion insinuates that this has more bearing on the case, the number

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of operators on each side and the number of wells involved. The only apparent relevance I can see in this discussion is that some weight should be given to the arguments that they have presented to the Court in that "we can count more wells on our side than we can count on the other side". We submit this is completely irrelevant and has nothing to do with the merits of the case. We also submit in this connection if it is relevant in any manner that the Oil Conservation Commission issued the order here complained of today and that the Oil Conservation Commission is interested in every well in the Dakota gas pool, so we have all the wells on our side. I would like to point out to the Court that the indication is the real motives of the Petitioners might be as they purport them to be, they claim their correlative rights have been violated, that they have been discriminated against. We have also heard some mention there might be a constitutional question involved. Although that has not been mentioned in this case, they may be aggrieved, but we submit their real motives are not such as stated on the record. The proper wells receiving the allowable under the Commission's order in Exhibit A, indicates that each company involved here as a Petitioner has more wells receiving a proper share of the allowable under the 60-40 formula than they did under the 25-74 formula.

Just briefly I would state to the Court that a tabulation by merely counting the asterisks involved under each formula which establishes your 25-75 - El Paso had 53 wells receiving

their proper share under the new formula, they had 63; Pan American had 25 under the old formula, under the new formula they had 30; Marathon had no well receiving the proper allowance under either formula; Southwestern had 31 under 25-75, and 36 under the new formula; Sunset three under the old and six under the new; now we submit to the Court that this tabulation may certainly be used by the Court to show if they are aggrieved and may be an additional motive that has not been brought to the Court's attention, and I would like to state to the Court that a tabulation of volumes of gas going to each company under each formula considered here today establishes El Paso and Pan American will receive greater volumes of gas under the 60-40 than they received under the 25-75. So far as El Paso is concerned 15% can be calculated by just totalling the volumes of gas involved on the Exhibit. Now, we submit that the Court should keep this in mind when considering the weight to be given to their argument, consider whether they may have been aggrieved or there may be a hidden motive and some of these companies may be purchasers and want a higher deliverability, and submit this should be depressed because we are concerned with producers. I would like to turn to the point concerning a lack of specific finding of waste. It is our contention that a lack of specific finding of waste does not invalidate an allocation order, an order that establishes a new formula. Now, I am here speaking of a finding of waste was occurring under the old formula. I would like to state

at the outset of this presentation that apparently the Petitioners may have abandoned this argument that they raised specifically in their points to be relied upon, and if they have not abandoned it here this morning they certainly have indicated that they are not too strongly impressed with it as it has not even been mentioned, and I would like to state we are not impressed with his argument, you must have a specific finding that waste is occurring and in this connection I would like to point out to the Court the legislative nature of the Commission and the fact that its duties are delegated by the legislature, and as has been discussed earlier today, the Supreme Court in the Jal-mat case commented on this by stating, "The Oil Conservation Commission is a creature of statute, operations defined and limited by the laws or powers creating it". We submit to the Court that the duties imposed on the Oil Conservation Commission are set out in the statute concerning allocation and production which is Section 65-3-13(c). This statute defines the duties that are imposed upon the Commission and it reads, "Whenever, to prevent waste, the total allowable natural gas production from gas wells producing from any pool in this state is fixed by the commission in an amount less than that which the pool could produce if no restrictions were imposed, the commission shall allocate a gas transportation facility upon a reasonable basis and recognizing correlative rights, * * *." Then it goes on to

state we shall include any well in the schedule, any well that is being discriminated against the statute - the Commission shall allocate on a reasonable basis and recognize correlative rights. It does not say that the Commission shall allocate to prevent waste, the statute says the Commission shall pro-rate to prevent waste.

Now, I would like to point out to the Court at this time that the Basin-Dakota pool and all pools in northwest New Mexico are pro-rated every six months by the Commission. The Commission pro-rates all of the pools, they determine market demand - they also determine market demand and pro-rate the pools every month by a supplemental order which is based upon supplemental findings that determines the amount of gas that can be produced from the pool without waste. We submit the only specific findings necessary to allocate production are as stated in the statute - reasonable and recognize correlative rights.

Now, I would like to also call the Court's attention to the Jalmat decision concerning this point. The Jalmat decision does not say that the Commission must find No. 4. We have heard all sorts of argument here this morning that the Jalmat decision says the Commission must find No. 4. We submit to the Court that is a very cursory reading of the Jalmat opinion. The Jalmat opinion says, "The Commission must determine the amount of gas" and for this I would quote

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from the Jalmat decision: "Therefore the Commission by basic conclusions of fact or what might term findings must determine insofar as practicable * * *", the various things, 1, 2, 3, and 4, that have been discussed here today. The Jalmat decision does not say the Commission must find and write in its order what proportion can be arrived at without waste; it says the Commission must determine this. We submit to the Court the Commission did determine this, and it made the findings necessary and required by the Jalmat decision. The Petitioners have admitted here today in their argument that the 1, 2 and 3 required by the Jalmat decision have been met, they say "you did not make the 4th". We submit that the Commission did make No. 4. Four is the amount of gas for each specific well that is determined each month under pro-rating by applying the formula. We submit to the Court that it is absolutely impossible to set out a specific MCF, million cubic feet or thousand cubic feet for each well, that can be produced, without waste. Now, I call to the Court's attention that even this Exhibit A did not purport to set out the MCF of gas that can be produced this month. That is not even involved in this Exhibit A. Exhibit A concluded - the Commission concluded from Exhibit A that the most reasonable formula was 60-40, and made the findings necessary concerning waste and correlative rights in that order, and this gas allocation order. Of course the Commission did not make any specific finding concerning

a specific well and the MCF that could be produced from it, because it was impossible for the Commission to do so.

That has to be determined when the pool is pro-rated, the amount that can be produced without waste. First, the Commission determines the market demand for the pool, then it applies the formula it has found to be the best formula, in question here today, the application of this formula to the total gas in the pool results in a MCF allocation for each well, that is the amount that can be produced without waste. If one will produce one MCF more than it has been allocated under the formula then the market demand has been over-produced and waste has resulted, and we have a statute that specifically states production in excess of market demand is waste. I would also like to call attention to the Continental case that stated formal and elaborate findings are not necessary. Also, would like to call the Court's attention again to the presumption of the validity of the order in the Continental case. The Jalmat decision said, "Lacking such findings or their equivalent a supposedly valid order in current use cannot be replaced". If the Supreme Court did not mean to say "or the equivalent" then they certainly slipped because they said "lacking such findings or their equivalent" and we submit to the Court that the phrase "or their equivalent" wasn't just thrown in there. The Supreme Court knew what they were talking about, they were not trying to hold the Commission to a rigid standard. The Court indicated in the Jalmat case that you look at the Commission's order and see if they have the basic conclusions necessary after they made

the determination. That is what the Court stated. Now, as an alternative, we have submitted as one of our points, and we submit again to the Court that the order contains numerous findings of waste - I would like to call the Court's attention to Finding No. 11, which seeks out the most reasonable basis for allocating production, and this finding reads in part, as follows: "That the most reasonable basis for allocating production in the Basin-Dakota gas pool is to determine for each proposed formula the percentage of the total pool allowable apportioned to each non-marginal tract as compared to its percentage of total pool reserves". And I will quit there because that has made the point I am talking about right at the instant, and that is where the Commission determined was the most reasonable basis for the 60-40 formula, the most reasonable basis for allocating production. And after the Commission found that is the most reasonable basis for allocating production standard, it is a necessary inference it will prevent waste - that is the 60-40 formula - insofar as practicable, and that this is the basis of the order. We submit to the Court that the necessary inference that attaches to every order that the Commission issues is that the order will prevent waste and certainly in a situation that we have today it will prevent waste, as we have found. The Commission has found at several places that waste will be prevented. Now, it would seem almost ludicrous to argue that the Commission that waste will be prevented by an order and

then allow an order that will allow waste. There are conditions in the order that waste will be prevented and that waste was occurring at that time. If there was no waste occurring there would be no ground upon which the Commission could have acted. Of course the Supreme Court said that in the Jalmat case. We call the Court's attention to Finding No. 14, which specifically states that the 60-40 formula will prevent waste - "the 60-40 formula will more adequately correct correlative rights and prevent waste by permitting more wells to receive their just and equitable share of the gas in the pool, insofar as can be determined". Now, if waste was to be prevented then it necessarily follows that waste was occurring. There was waste and the Commission acted to prevent it and this No. 14 even sets out the way it will prevent waste - by permitting more wells to receive their just and equitable share of the gas. Now, there is testimony in the record which I do not propose to cover specifically because it will be covered later on by co-counsel. There is ample testimony in the record to support the conclusion that by allowing the wells to receive their allowable will prevent waste, there is testimony in the record that will support the finding, and the testimony is to the effect that allowing some wells to receive more than their fair share of the gas in the pool causes premature abandonment of wells and non-development of tracts. Mr. Trueblood testified to this pages 26 through 30 in the transcript of the first hearing, and it was also testified to

by several other witnesses directly and indirectly, and this will be covered later. At any rate, we submit to the Court that it is a valid point, that permitting more wells to receive their just and equitable share of the gas necessarily prevents waste. In this connection I would also call the Court's attention to Finding No. 15 which specifically says the 70-40 formula will prevent drainage. There is some testimony in the record, as I spoke of earlier, that this prevents drainage, and drainage is waste.

Also, Finding No. 16 as to the just and equitable shares of reservoir energy. This finding sets out that the 60-40 formula, insofar as practicable, afforded to the owner of each property in the pool the opportunity to use his just and equitable share of the reservoir energy. We submit to the Court that this also allowed him to his just and equitable shares of the energy and prevents waste. The same testimony was discussed earlier establishes this. The testimony concerning drainage and premature abandonment of wells, non-developed tracts. I would like to specifically call the Court's attention to Finding No. 13 of the Commission's order, which appears on Page 2 of the printed order, which reads as follows:

"That under the present 25-75 formula correlative rights are not being adequately protected; that the protection of correlative rights is a necessary adjunct to the prevention of waste and that waste will result unless the Commission acts to protect correlative rights".

Now, we submit to the Court it certainly cannot be argued this is not a specific finding that waste was occurring and that waste would occur unless the Commission acted, it specifically says so. Now the Petitioners have alleged in their brief and here this morning that this is not a valid theory, that this is not correct, that the Commission proceeded upon an erroneous presumption. For the Court to consider the validity of this argument, I would like to call the Court's attention to the Jalmat case - the decision wherein the Court said: "The prevention of waste is the paramount interest, and the protection of correlative rights in interrelated and inseparable from it. The very definition of correlative rights emphasizes the term without waste." However, the protection of correlative rights is a necessary adjunct to the prevention of waste. Waste will result unless the Commission acts to protect correlative rights." The Supreme Court of New Mexico has found this is a valid theory, that Finding No. 13 is a valid finding, insofar as the prevention of waste. The Supreme Court itself says waste will occur unless the Commission can act to protect correlative rights. We submit that the Commission did act to protect correlative rights, by the issuance of Order No. R-2259-B, and specifically has set out in Finding No. 13 therein, and are now so far as the validity of this theory is concerned.

I would like to compare a hypothetical situation to

the one they submit establishes conclusively the violation of correlative rights - this is 3: I take the situation of two wells, one well A, and one well B; and assume for the purposes of this discussion that both of these wells have exactly the same amount of reserves, which would of course be very difficult to come up with an actual situation like that. But in reality there would be at least a ratio that would be considered. If you assume each has the same reserves and each has the same energy to produce those reserves, and say our A has assumed ten units of reserve and takes ten units of energy to produce those reserves. Assume well B is identical, ten units of reserve and ten units of energy, has to have perfect protection of correlative rights. If well A produces two units of reserves it will consume two units of energy to get that out of the ground; the same will hold true of well B, two units of reserves, two units of energy. On the theory the well can produce all of its reserves, when it is depleted it will have no energy left in the well and no reserve, or substantially no reserve and on correlative rights one well gets to produce more than the other well, and we will have to assume these wells are in communication with each other; and there is testimony in the record the wells are within communicating depths of each other - if well A, when correlative rights are violated in producing 7 units of reserves and 7 units of energy, it takes 7 units of energy to get those reserves

out of the ground, then the contrasting tract will have three of each left, but when it did that it produced more than a proportionate share. It is a scientific fact the law of nature, the Court could take judicial notice of that - a low pressure area is created any time a gas well is produced in excess of the wells surrounding it, and that gas migrates toward low pressure areas. The gas from the well they got to produce two and two with no increase in the allowable is going to necessarily migrate toward the low pressure area, toward the well that produced more than its fair share. We submit to the Court that gas does not travel through a formation like water, it flows in the ground, it takes energy, it takes some type of energy for water to flow on the ground. This is a basic scientific fact, it takes energy to move gas through rock, through sandstone. There is testimony in the record by almost every witness presented to the Commission that discussed the characteristics of the pool, that pool is a type of sandstone. The Court is aware that sandstone rock is very, very thick, I would say, and very difficult to move anything through it - specifically gas. It takes energy to move gas through that rock. When this gas moves from the well that produced a lesser amount to the well that produced a greater amount it will take energy to move the gas through the rock. That energy is lost because it has been consumed; when that energy is consumed it necessarily

follows that some of the gas will be left in the ground as it travels between the two wells, because the energy will be expended moving through the rock and will not be able to be utilized when and if the gas reaches the other well. Some of the gas, we submit, will be left in the ground due to the loss of energy in traveling between the two wells. And assume all the gas did arrive at the well, some of the energy has been utilized in moving it, and so you would have an equal amount of energy left for the gas and there is no way to produce it and it necessarily must be left in the ground.

We submit to the Court that this establishes just what the Supreme Court said in violation of correlative rights, considers waste, the protection of correlative rights, is an adjunct to the prevention of waste. We would also like to call the Court's attention to the fact that order R-15-B merely amends R-1670-C and R-1670-C also contains a specific finding concerning waste. We have quoted this order in our brief, at page 9. I would like to call the Court's attention to the fact that R-1670-C states, "for the purpose of preventing waste and correct correlative rights", and we would submit to the Court this is all the finding that is necessary to issue a valid allocation of gas production order and that 1670-C is already in effect, it has not been rescinded.

I also would like to talk very briefly concerning an

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allegation that the Petitioners have made in their brief and once again which they have not followed up, in their argument here today, and we might assume have been abandoned. The allegation that the order was invalid as it did not contain a finding concerning a change in conditions. We submit to the Court that such finding concerning a change in conditions absolutely is not necessary to issue a gas allocation order, and further we submit it isn't necessary to issue any kind of valid order. The Commission never has to find changing conditions. I call the Court's attention to Mr. Williams' article on the nature and effect of conservation orders which we have cited. He discusses to some length the proposition that a commission, and particularly a conservation commission can never be bound with the proposition it has to find changing conditions before it can change an order. He ties this to the legislative nature of the commission, that it is an arm of the legislature and it can never be bound by what it has done prior, just as the legislature can never be bound by its prior actions. The legislature can pass a new law tomorrow that will be valid, that is radically different from the law in existence today. We submit that the Commission's function is identical as it is an arm of the legislature, and it also cannot be bound by its prior orders to the extent that it has to find a change of conditions.

Not to burden the Court with citations concerning this point, I would like to cite one case and point to our brief and call the Court's attention to the fact that we have set

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out in our brief numerous quotations stating such a finding requiring changing conditions is not necessary. From a very recent Oklahoma case, 1963, concerning a valid pro-ration order, a gas allocation order: Sinclair Oil and Gas Company vs. Corporation Commission, 378 Pac. 2d, 847: "We know of no sound reason why the Commission should any more be prevented from changing a common source of supply (in an orderly and legally prescribed manner) from one allowable formula to another (which in the light of changing conditions and more and better knowledge about the reservoir will more likely fulfill the objects of waste prevention and protection of correlative rights) than it is prevented from changing well-spacing sizes and/or patterns, or well-spaced areas, in the light of new knowledge accumulated by the progressive development of such reservoirs." And we submit to the Court that this is an Oklahoma 1963 decision and there has been at least one old case in Oklahoma which has indicated change of conditions might have been necessary for the Oklahoma Commission, and even in that case, and in this reference case is the showing the change of conditions is not necessary because if there is new knowledge of the reservoir for a sufficient showing of change of conditions, and certainly new knowledge is replete in the record in this case.

Concerning the specific findings, I do not propose to go into them in detail, but I would like to point out to the Court we certainly have findings showing a change of conditions

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Finding No. 8 establishes a change in the knowledge concerning underground conditions. This concerns re-evaluation of reserves and we submit to the Court that this certainly is adequate to show there has been a change in conditions because we found there had been re-evaluation of reserves, and as a matter of fact, although it isn't a specific finding concerning this, it is common knowledge a gas reservoir conditions change with every MCF of gas produced out of that reservoir. If it does not do anything else, it reduces the reserves.

Finding No. 13, we submit - " If correlative rights are not being protected the only possible inference that there has been a change of conditions, because it must be presumed the 25-75 formula , when that order was issued protected correlative rights". Petitioners made an issue of that, I submit to the Court if the Commission now finds that correlative rights are not being protected there must have been a change in conditions. The same conclusion can be reached in Finding No. 14, which says more wells are receiving a proper share of gas under the 60-40 formula, and the same conclusion can be reached in Finding No. 15, which concerns a proper share of the energy. All of these must have been done when the prior order was issued and if a new order is going to give a re-allocation there must have been a change in conditions.

This will conclude my portion of the presentation, Mr. Kellahin will now present his argument to the Court.

COURT: After we take a short recess.

BY MR. KELLAHIN: Some of the points I had intended to discuss have been touched on by Mr. Durrett, and I will be able to cut my discussion down somewhat.

At the outset I would like to state we do not waive any material presented in our brief which are not argued here. I would also like to comment on the opening remarks made by Mr. Malone, in which he discussed the number of wells and number of operators involved. Thirteen operators on 111 wells supported the change, fourteen operators in 142 wells being against the change. I trust the Commission did not consider the weight of the operators as evidence, but rather considered the weight of the testimony and found substantial testimony to support the change.

The initial point I would like to discuss is the failure of Petitioners here to exhaust their administrative remedy. I would point out again that the Commission does not join with us in this argument and this one point is solely the presentation of Consolidated Oil and Gas. A stipulation has been entered in the record on the basis of that stipulation we lay the foundation for argument here, on both sides of the question. We feel it a legitimate question as to what constitutes an order is presented to the Court at this time. The stipulation points out the order was signed by two members of the Commission, which because of the statute constitutes a majority of the Commission. On July 3rd, it further points out a copy of the order was also signed by these two members, that the

original of the copy went to the printer for production, and on return to the Commission at some unspecified date the third member of the Commission signed. The order was docketed in a book as required by the New Mexico statutes and the same copy was placed in the case files in this case. On the copy placed in the book, which we have stipulated was placed by Mr. A. L. Porter, Mr. Porter endorsed on the face of it, "Entered July 9, 1963, A.L.P." It was also further stipulated on July 9th a copy was mailed to the State Supreme Court and that the parties were notified on that date and no parties had actual knowledge of the order before July 9th. What we are considering is what constitutes delayed order. The statute requiring the party aggrieved to seek a rehearing within twenty (20) days after the entry of the order. It is admitted, and I think the record will so show that the application for rehearing was filed on July 9th, and we consider this Court would be without jurisdiction to consider this case at this time.

COURT: Did you make a statement the application was filed July 9th?

MR. KELLAHIN: Yes, sir.

COURT: You mean 29th?

MR. KELLAHIN: Twenty-ninth, I am sorry.

Now there is considerable law on both sides of the case on this question. Some say "entered in the docket book", some say "when an order is signed it means entered". I will cite only two cases - 207 Federal Supplement 554, in which the

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Court said a judgment is entered for relief, other than for a jury verdict or money judgment, when the judge approves the form of judgment. Wren vs. Walsh, 14 NW 2nd, 902, a Wisconsin case. In this case the statute made it the duty of the clerk to keep a minute book, to keep an entry of all properly signed orders and entries and that the time for appeal runs from the time the notation of the order is made. It is interesting to note in this particular case that in their brief the Petitioners in outlining the chronological developments in this case, referred to the dates of the various and sundry orders. On page 4 of their brief they say November 4, 1960, June 7, 1962, Order No. R-2259-, June 7th is the date that appears on the face of the order. July 7, 1962; Order No. R-2259-A, that is the date that appears on the face of the order; August 1, 1963, Order No. R-2259-C, and again that is the date that appears on the face of the order. It is only when they come to Order No. R-2259-B, the one challenged in this proceeding, that they contend it is a different date than appears on the face of the order. A quorum of the Commission met on July 3, 1963 and that they there and then filed the order involved here, we submit this constitutes the date of the order.

I will read from 73 C.J.S., Page 490, Sec. 156:

"Within the recent case of Colorado Interstate Gas Company vs. State Corporation Commission, a Kansas case,

386 Pac. 2d, 275, page 284 the Court said: "The appellants contend that the allowable orders issued prior to November 1957 are not subject to judicial review because no timely application for rehearing was filed with the Commission. We agree with Appellants' contention." And on the next page went on to say, "The Court had no authority to review the order of the Commission except as the statute gave it such authority". The Courts of New Mexico gave authority only as to the orders submitted to the Commission during the time for order for rehearing.

Getting to the question of substantial evidence, Mr. Stockmar will cover it some length. Testimony supports the various findings in the order, and discuss the question of the findings as to waste which is contained in the record before the Commission, which is now before the Court; but to discuss the matter briefly I think we should analyze just what is required of the Commission in order for the Court to find that the order is supported by substantial evidence. It is conceded that the findings must be supported by substantial evidence, by the same token we assume it will also be conceded the findings supported by substantial evidence will not be overturned, but actually what we are talking about here, about a portion of the scope of review to be given an administrative order by the Courts. The case of Johnson vs. Sanchez, 67 N.M. page 41, this was an action against the Motor Vehicle Commissioner to set aside the suspension of driver's license. The Court found the scope to be: "It has long been the policy of the State of New Mexico as borne by the various decisions

of this Court that on appeals from administrative bodies questions to be answered by the Court are questions of law, and are actually restricted as to whether an administrative body acted arbitrarily, capriciously and whether the order was supported by substantial evidence, and generally whether the administrative head acted within his authority."

The Court cannot review and has no power to review reasonably exercised discretion. It can of course direct arbitrary or capricious acts but it cannot interfere with the proper exercise of discretion by an administrative agency. In 64 N.M., at 478, Mandamus Action - one of the major questions presented in this proceeding is the question of whether the findings of the Commission are supported by substantial evidence. To have a finding set aside it must be shown there is no substantial evidence to support it. It isn't sufficient merely to show there was evidence to support the finding had it been made the other way. *Renahan vs. Lobato*, 55 N.M., 532, in *Brown vs. Cobb*, 53 N.M., 169; the Court defines substantial evidence, "case turns on the sufficiency of the evidence to support the findings, the evidence must be considered in the aspect most favorable to appellees and all evidence to the contrary must be disregarded. All evidence to the contrary is presumed to be untrue." In *Banks vs. McCulloh* we define substantial evidence in the following language: "If reasonable

men all agree, or if reasonable men may fairly differ as to whether the evidence establishes the facts found, and term may also be defined, as evidence of substance, which establishes facts and from which reasonable inferences may be drawn".

I think it formally can be said that substantial evidence in New Mexico requires enough evidence to show the agency or Commission has not reached an arbitrary or capricious reason or fact, but has acted rationally. It simply determines if the decision by the administrative agency is a proper and rational one, in light of the evidence most favorable to this decision.

Now, in connection with our attack on the substantial evidence in the cases here by the Petitioners, they have made objection to the reserve evidence which was presented to the Commission by Consolidated Oil and Gas Company, and this has been discussed at some length by both Mr. Malone and Mr. Verity in their brief and again at this hearing, and as I recall the objections, ad Mr. Malone stated, renewed at this hearing, their objection was made to the Exhibit offered by Consolidated at the hearing.

In the first place there was no objection to the introduction in evidence of the reserve calculations that had been made by El Paso Natural Gas Company from 460 individual wells in the Basin-Dakota pool. In the February 1963 hearing, pages 32 and 33, Mr. Howell, Attorney for El Paso had objected

to the introduction of the Exhibits offered by Consolidated Oil and Gas Company;

"MR. KELLAHIN: I would like to point out in response to Mr. Howell's argument that he casts some doubt on the accuracy of Exhibit No. 1.

"MR. HOWELL: It should have been Exhibit No. 3.

"MR. KELLAHIN: You said No. 1, and that is your exhibit.

"MR. HOWELL: No. 3 is what I referred to. I mis-named it.

"MR. KELLAHIN: You do not quarrel with Exhibit No. 1?

"MR. HOWELL: That is correct.

"MR. KELLAHIN: You do not quarrel with Exhibit No. 2?

"MR. HOWELL: I do not know, because that represents work done by other people other than ourselves.

"MR. KELLAHIN: It is my opinion that the Exhibit No. 2 was furnished by El Paso under subpoena.

"MR. HOWELL: I would like to correct my motion, thinking the map was Exhibit No. 1. It is the exhibits from 3 on that we object to.

"MR. PORTER: The record will show the objections by Mr. Howell, Mr. Kelleher to the admission of these exhibits. The objections are overruled. The exhibits will be admitted to the record, and the Commission will determine, of course, the proper weight to be given to those exhibits; and, of course, the opposing counsel will have the opportunity to cross examine the witness now concerning any phase of his testimony or anything that appears in these exhibits."

Now, just what were these Exhibits to which objections were made?

Exhibit No. 1 to which there was no objection and to which was introduced and accepted in evidence without objection was a tabulation of 460 wells which El Paso Natural Gas Company furnished Consolidated, and again these were furnished to us under subpoena prior to the hearing in February, 1963. On this Exhibit there was a group of 460 wells grouped by reserve ranges, 460 wells showing El Paso's calculation of their initial reserves and initial deliverability and current reserves and their current deliverability. As I stated, this pertains to wells, it does not pertain to contrasts, it does not pertain to sections, it pertains to individual wells and these are calculations of El Paso, and on this Exhibit no wells are identified.

Exhibit No. 2 was produced by El Paso Natural Gas Company in response to a subpoena issued by the Oil Conservation Commission, and again was admitted in evidence without objection, and is a part of the record before this Court. It was a tabulation which identified wells on a brief exhibit and it gave their location by township and range. The Exhibit was delivered prior to the February hearing and it showed again the initial deliverability of the wells, the net feet of pay, the number of acres in the unit, the acre feet of sand, the township recovery

factor, the initial reserves in place, the cumulative production through December 31st to January 1, 1962, and the then current reserves as of January 1, 1962. Again, this is in townships, it isn't sections, it is wells, all information as to each one of these individual wells.

Now, was this accepted blindly by Mr. Harry Trueblood as contended by the Petitioners here - - Mr. Trueblood was qualified before the Commission as an expert petroleum engineer and his qualifications were not questioned, and he also has trained petroleum engineers in his employ and he was testifying - appearing before an expert Commission, a Commission which also has trained experts, trained expert gas engineers in its own employ. Mr. Trueblood applied information as required by the decision of the Supreme Court, as shown by Exhibit A, which was attached to the order.

Certainly the Commission was competent to pass on the manner in which this was done, and the competence of the testimony and the weight to be given to it. It should also be pointed out that this was the only information that was made available to the Commission at either one of the hearings on which the calculation of reserves or either one of the individual tracts could have been made. It has been stated here time and time again the information was stale, it was old, it was out of date and new calculations should

have been made after this time to work the new calculations remain in the brief cases of El Paso engineers because it wasn't submitted to the Commission.

Page 16 of the February hearing: "We met with absolutely zero success in this attempt, but we did ask and receive through subpoenas a great deal of information; namely, core analyses and logs on 58 wells that had been cored in reservoir. We compared the El Paso work on the 460 wells that appeared on Exhibit 2, Consolidated's Exhibit 2 in this case, with a certain amount of our work, and also with respect to the cored data which was available. We found that of the 58 wells that had been cored, that by comparing the reserves we calculated from the cored information that the average reserve that we computed without regard to cutoff points, which have previously been testified to as six percent, and log interpretations and what have you, we found that we ranged on the order of between 70 percent to a high of 130 percent, as compared to the El Paso numbers which were in this group of 460 wells. Quite frankly, with the amount of information and the lack of information from core data and what have you, we felt that the El Paso work had been remarkably accurate, that all of the engineers in this room all realize that there are several ways to go to arrive at reserves under a given tract, and any one of these several ways would be reasonable".

Petitioners have seemed to contend the 30% figure above or below actual reserves was a figure just pulled out of the

air. Their basis of this was the calculations made by Mr. Trueblood on the basis of core information and location fell within this range of the calculations made on the same information by competent engineers by El Paso Natural Gas Company.

Exhibit No. 3 - the information available was applied to the pool as a whole. In order to get the necessary information from the wells on which no calculation was available this was done by not drawing lines on a map, but by mechanical contouring engineers figures. It was accepted by the Commission, adopted by the Commission and certainly I think the Commission is competent to pass on the competency of the manner in which it was done. This wasn't done blindly. It is also contended because these figures were prepared by the El Paso Natural Gas Company they were hearsay and were not admissible. Their objections come too late and Mr. Trueblood adopted the figures as his own, as an expert after having testified he checked them himself and was convinced of their accuracy, and submitted himself to cross-examination on them based on his work.

Exhibit 4 was a tabulation of individual reserves for each tract from 699 wells.

Exhibit 5 is wells falling there under various categories.

Exhibit 6 a graphic group of wells under advance production formula.

Exhibit 7 is a curve showing the number of tabulations

of correlative rights vs. the percent of deliverability in the formula. Now it is contended further that the information is incompetent because based solely on the contention that this information was suitable only for a pool wide study and not for determining reserves underlying individual tracts. It is significant that El Paso, in making studies itself assigned reserve figures in two pools in two contrasts, by individual wells and grouping these wells by reserve groups, in an effort to show the 25 75 formula gave each operator his allowance. Now, they wish to say this evidence cannot be used for this purpose. It wasn't until this was used by Consolidated for the same purpose that El Paso began to cast doubt upon the validity of its own calculations. As previously pointed out, Harry Trueblood adopted the figures as his own, he further testified as an expert that he considered this as a fair and reasonable approach to the problem. At least we have the opinion of one expert against another before an expert Commission. It cannot be said the Commission acted arbitrarily and capriciously.

In 2 Am. Jur. "The opinions of qualified experts with reference to their particular fields constitute evidence which will support a decision * * * * if one of the opinions of such witness are contradicted by other experts, which is the usual case". We submit that the objections raised by Petitioners here to the competence of this evidence in the first place comes too late and the second place is groundless. They made no objection to Exhibits 1 and 2, which are

the basis to all the Exhibits through 7, and they cannot be heard now to raise an objection in this Court when they waived the objections before the Commission. In addition to that, this Court can review only matters presented to the Commission, in a rehearing and this matter wasn't submitted to the Commission.

The findings required by the Jalmat decision have been discussed at some length by Mr. Federici, in which he has admitted that the Commission did make findings 1, 2 and 3, as shown on the visual aid chart. A quarrel with Finding No. 4 was made, the only attack made on the other findings is whether they were supported by substantial evidence, and that will be discussed further by Mr. Stockmar.

Actually, this entire case is based on two contentions, the order of the Commission No. R-2259-B is invalid because it is not based on proper findings, and (2) it isn't supported by substantial evidence. The general proposition and purpose of these findings is to aid the Court in measuring the work done by the Commission. However we would like to point out the statement of the Court in Ferguson-Steere vs State Corporation Commission, the Court stated; "If findings of men attack findings by the administrative Board or Commission, the duty rests on the party complaining of their absence to have made a request for them".

Now there was no request for any findings made by Petitioners in this case. In the Jalmat case the Court stated, (page 322, New Mexico Reports) "We would add, although formal and elaborate findings are not absolutely necessary, nevertheless basic jurisdictional findings supported by

by evidence are required to show that the Commission has heeded the mandate and the standards set out by statute."

In Sinclair Oil Company - Sinclair Oil and Gas Company vs. Corporation Commission, an Oklahoma case, 378 Pac. 2d, 857, the Court had an identical situation as they presented here and the question of the findings required there an order changing the pro-ration formula, and the finding in that case was this - finding of the Oklahoma Commission was, "And that in order to prevent waste and protect correlative rights field rules and regulations are necessary". The Oklahoma Court held that was an adequate sufficient finding, and went on to point out that generally. They stated in reference to the allowable formula the order involved some very technical subjects - engineering and physics and mathematics were all involved. The record here will show we have an identical situation of several days hearing and many pages of testimony.

Now, tested by any standard we may measure it, we submit the basic jurisdictional findings required by the statute as interpreted by the Jalmat decision have been made, and that all the findings necessary to constitute a valid allocation formula have been made. This has been discussed considerably by Mr. Durrett and I will not elaborate on it at this point.

However, I would like to briefly refer to the findings in the order and discuss them, as Mr. Federici has already admitted we have the proper findings in Finding No. 7, No. 5 No. 6. I believe 1957 and 1957 covers his items for 2 and 3

in the Jalmat decision. In Finding No. 8 the Commission said it was impractical to allocate production solely on the basis of pool reserves due to the continuous fluctuation of reserves of new completions in the pool and new evaluations in the reserve, and existing wells. That is merely a recognition by the Commission, every time a new well is drilled, by data obtained as a result of drilling of that well, must be taken into consideration and a new pool calculation will have to be made. The Commission said this cannot be the sole basis for pro-rating. Certainly the statute would lend you to be able, insofar as it can be done the Commission must determine the reserves under a tract and can get no more. That is the argument presented by Mr. Verity as his interpretation and requirements of the statute as laid down by the Jalmat decision is correct we would have no decision in New Mexico because it would be an impossibility, no Commission would have the time. All the exact reserves that underlay this tract of land, and then as contended by Mr. Verity, apply a formula which would give each well an opportunity to produce those exact reserves. This is an impossible situation, the Commission can only adopt a formula which will most adequately meet this requirement and that is as far as it can go, and that is what it has done here. If we follow the rule contended by Mr. Verity the Commission would not only have to allocate the reserves, by an allocation for each individual well in order for each

well to get its reserves, and certainly the Commission cannot be expected to do such a foolish and tedious thing and impose it.

In Finding No. 9, I am sure there would be no disagreement there because the tract acreage factor is an easily established factor, although one counsel said it had nothing to do with reserves, but I think any amount of acreage owned by an operator has something to do with the underlying reserves.

Finding No. 10, the Commission found that there is no direct correlation between deliverability and reserves, they did not say this was to deliverability, they said - - and certainly the Petitioners were there contending for 75% deliverability, now they want this Court to believe the Commission objected to deliverability. The Commission did no such thing, and that in acreage and reserves the same situation existed, that the best solution is to use a combination of both in the proper proportions, and the Commission in this case found that to be a 60-40 division.

Finding No. 11 - Mr. Durrett has discussed this quite ably. Mr. Stockmar will discuss the other findings, I believe, with the exception of the last one.

Finding No. 16, where it says due to the time required to administer a new allocation summary for a pro-rated gas pool this order should not be effective until August 1, 1963, and beginning the next six months pro-ration period

that in itself is a recognition on the part of the Commission that it is dealing with a pool that had already been prorated. We ask the Court to take notice of Section 65-3-13 Paragraph (c) "Whenever, to prevent waste, the total allowable natural gas production from gas wells producing from any pool in this state is fixed by the commission in an amount less than that which the pool could produce if no restrictions were imposed, the commission shall allocate the allowable production among the gas wells in the pool delivering to a gas transportation facility upon a reasonable basis and recognizing correlative rights, and shall include in the proration schedule of such pool any well which it finds is being unreasonably discriminated against through denial of access to a gas transportation facility which is reasonably capable of handling the type of gas produced by such well. In protecting correlative rights the commission may give equitable consideration to acreage, pressure, open flow, porosity, permeability, deliverability and quality of the gas and to such other pertinent factors as may from time to time exist, and in so far as is practicable, shall prevent drainage between producing tracts in a pool which is not equalized by counter-drainage. In allocating production pursuant to the provisions of section 12(c) the commission shall fix proration periods of not less than six (6) months. It shall determine reasonable market demand and make allocation of production during each such period, upon notice and hearing, at least 30 days prior to the beginning of each proration period". It cannot be presumed the Commission in changing the proration of this pool failed to follow the statute. Every

six months an allocation order is entered by the Commission. I have one such order here and I ask the Court to take judicial notice of the official actions of the Commission. Order No. AGN-18, Gas Proration Order for the period February 1, 1964 through July 31, 1964. This is a typical order of the Commission.

Finding No. 2 - the number of pools, including the Basin-Dakota gas pool. "That the potential producing capacity of all gas wells in the nine gas pools listed above is in excess of the nominations of purchasers of gas, and in order to prevent waste and protect correlative rights, the production of gas from the above-listed nine gas pools should be limited, allocated and distributed during the six-month proration period commencing February 1, 1964".

(Respondents' Exhibit No. 1 marked for identification)

We offer that.

MR. MALONE: No objection.

COURT: It will be admitted.

MR. KELLAHIN: Now, it should be pointed out that the allocation formula adopted by the Commission in its Order No. 2259-B is not the only order entered by the Commission affecting proration, the order, Respondents' Exhibit No. 1 is typical, the order is entered by the Commission in which it makes findings for proration of gas in order to prevent waste, and order No. R-2259-B merely implements this and determines whether this could be produced without waste, and

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whether waste is going to occur. Necessarily it is designed to implement the distribution of that allowable production which the Commission has determined may be produced without waste, and that determination was made in that order right there.

There is only one other item I would like to discuss, and that is the statement made by, I believe Mr. Verity, who said there is no contention here that the old order is under attack - that is not true, the old order R-1670 is made applicable to the Basin-Dakota gas pool by order R-1670-C. Those two orders were attacked by Consolidated, the issue was presented to the Commission in its petition for rehearing - Consolidated's petition for rehearing, which is a part of this record. These orders are part of this record and the validity of these two orders was attacked in the proceedings before this Court in the answers filed on the part of Consolidated. If they are valid today, they are valid because of the adoption of order R-2259-B, which made the findings the Supreme Court said are necessary under the Jalmat decision. If order No. R-2259-B is not a valid order, it is submitted now order 1670 or 1670-C contain no findings whatever which made the testimony of the Jalmat decision - now this is a direct attack on the validity of these orders, we emphasized this before this Commission and again before this Court, the attack is almost identical to the situation raised in the Sims case where the validity of the order wasn't even questioned until it was tested and the Supreme Court finds it void because it

does not contain waste. If they be valid then we can look to order R-1670-C for all the findings necessary in connection with a finding of waste for the purposes in our situation here in R-1670-C, in Finding No. 3, the Commission stated, "That the producing capacity of the wells in the Dakota Producing Interval is in excess of the market demand for gas from said common source of supply, and that for the purpose of preventing waste and protecting correlative rights, appropriate procedures should be adopted to provide a method of allocating gas among proration units in the area encompassed by the Dakota Producing Interval, commencing February 1, 1961".

We submit the adoption of order R-2259-B implemented this order and made it valid. All R-1670-C or 2259-B does is amend this order. The one provision is the manner in which the gas is going to be allocated, if as contended by Petitioners, 1670-C is a valid order.

COURT: We will take a short recess.

ARGUMENT BY MR. TED STOCKMAR:

If the Court please, the Petitioners have been helpful with these physical aids, and have set up here all four basic findings of fact the Jalmat case seems to require. I think though we should add under the heading required by the Jalmat case the rest of the language which says the Commission must determine, insofar as practicable, these things. Mr. Durrett and Mr. Kellahin have already indicated that these findings must not rigidly adhere to this pattern, that there is a

certtain amount of flexibility, and that their equivalent findings are acceptable. In addition, at page 323 of the New Mexico Reports the Court said: " * * * * However, as we said, certain basic findings must be made before correlative rights can be effectively protected. From a practical standpoint, the legislature cannot define, in cubic feet, the property right of each owner of natural gas in New Mexico. It must, of necessity, delegate this legislative duty to an administrative body such as the commission. The legislature, however, has stated definitively the elements contained in such right. It is not absolute or unconditional. Summarizing, it consists merely (1) an opportunity to produce, (2) only insofar as it is practicable to do so, (3) without waste, (4) a proportion, (5) insofar as it can be practically determined and obtained without waste, (6) of the gas in the pool."

It is submitted by the Respondents all the Court's references in these matters to gas produced without waste is a simple recognition by the Court by other features of the Jalmat case which are interwoven with these bits of language that the statute clearly requires that the correction of correlative rights be subservient or the Commission is not empowered to protect correlative rights of private parties at the expense of private parties, -at the expense of paramount parties in the prevention of waste. This is really what they are saying when they say the findings must do this.

we must clearly recognize the prevention of waste is paramount. In the Jalmat case, not a single one of the findings that the Petitioners discussed mention the waste or correlative rights, so the Court is being instructive when it says you must make these definitions a part of your order. Prevention of waste and protection or correlative rights - how different is that from this case - how clear the history of this pool has been gone into by the Commission here. First, as has been stated by Mr. Durrett and Mr. Kellahin, Finding No. 3 of the 1670 order is a finding with respect to the prevention of waste. That order has been made valid by order 2259-B, clearly states the purpose of the Commission is to prevent waste. Second, you have been asked to take judicial notice of the six months proration schedule in which the Commission at intervals makes findings of all of the gas that is produced from the field and recoverable without waste. So this finding has already been taken care of, that at least is perfectly clear insofar as the word "waste" means, surface waste. There isn't any production of gas which has been simply flared, it has all been fed into the pipeline, there is no excess waste involved. Third, although not framed in the specific language of Item 4, the Petitioners have made a great to-do that this item is lacking, it must be stated in the finding. We contend it need not be stated in that way

at all, it can be stated in many ways. Mr. Federici was pointing out, following Column D there should be another column which shows the proportions of the pool reserves they should be permitted to be produced - Column "I" is the proportions of the pool allowable that under the 60-40 formula, the Commission has said can be produced. Yes, there is some waste, Mr. Verity has said there is some waste because it isn't exactly equal to this. Insofar as practicable the Commission has found from Consolidated's Exhibit 4, which submitted eight sets of data like this that in the protection of correlative rights the 60-40 formula, insofar as practicable, prevented waste. There is a column which gives the numbers, the proportions just as stated in Item 4 of the Jalmat decision. When we speak of underground waste, which is all that is really left to be considered, it certainly is underground waste if recoverable gas is left in the ground under tracts never drained because of the allowable formula, a tract of economic failure before the well is drained underground waste occurs. If gas is left in the ground due to the premature abandonment of wells, which could have been produced under an appropriate formula. As Mr. Durrett explained, waste occurs if you have gas in a reservoir that is not drained out and it moves a mile through this rock to be produced through a well that is not the proper well for that to be produced through.

Notice how intimately each of these underground wastes are connected with correlative rights. If the owner of a tract in a poor section of the field, the allowable will not give him a fair part of his gas, will not drill - the owner is faced with an order which will give him such a low allowable that it will not pay him to produce the well, leaving gas to be recovered that could be recovered had the proper formula been in existence. Then I feel when the Commission finds as it did in its Finding 13 that correlative rights were not being adequately protected, then that is a clear finding waste occurs. It is the contention the formula will perpetuate the situation when it further states, as it did, that the protection of correlative rights is a necessary adjunct of the prevention of waste. It is simply stating a truism. We have just demonstrated when it states waste will result unless the Commission acts to prevent waste of correlative rights, that is all that needs to be said. It is a conclusion that will be incurred if correlative rights are not protected, if it is an untenable conclusion it is one that is maintained by the Supreme Court, of this case. The same reasoning can be applied to Finding 14. Here the Commission stated affirmatively the 60-40 formula would more adequately protect the correlative rights and would prevent waste.

The Petitioners have conceded the efficiency of findings 1, 2 and 3. They simply say the order is defective

because Item 4 is missing. We say Findings 13, 14 and 15 and 16 are not only not deficient, but they are expansive of this, they are strong findings that the Commission has considered what it takes to permit the production of gas insofar as practicable, without waste. It seems obvious to me that the Commission must have proceeded somewhat as follows: It recognized because we are dealing with a pro-rated gas pool that they cannot produce waste, it concerned itself with preventing underground waste for the reason we have just stated. This is accomplished by the best practicable protection of correlative rights on substantial evidence. It has made the findings 1, 2 and 3 that is a necessary prerequisite to determining how to adjust correlative rights, and having done that will find that waste would result if they did not alter it. The Commission could only have asked itself what can we do so all the recoverable gas can be recovered, not just some portion of it - but the recoverable gas, insofar as it is practicable for us to do it can be produced without waste - all this can become the same if a good factor and reliable formula is the result.

In their brief, at least, I did not hear so much this morning, but the Petitioners attached a great deal of importance on the discussion of recoverable gas, or recoverable gas that could be produced without waste. In their brief they say these are not equivalents. We say they are equiva-

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lents, they are the proper formula if it is practicable to eliminate underground waste then there is no difference because of underground waste. I really don't know what Petitioners are recommending the Commission should have said in Number 4, it seems it would have been silly to say, having arrived at 12 or 3 to state 50% of that gas can be produced without waste. That would certainly be a finding that the other 50% can be produced only with waste.

Some of these arguments may not be what the Commission was thinking when it made the order, we are not the Commission, we can only read the language, but I think if we would go back to the various findings in the present order where it contains correlative rights here and substitute some, which I am satisfied we are privileged to do, the statutory definition of those words had to be redundant. By reading this again you will see every time the Commission uses the term "correlative rights" it simply is a short cut for the fuller statement, that it is speaking of the opportunity afforded, sofar as is practicable to do so, to the owner of each property in the pool to produce without waste his just and equitable share of oil or gas in the pool - if it believes it practicable to obtain it without waste again - every time you see the words "correlative rights" in a finding, if you go back and read this full definition of it, it is a finding that gas can be produced without waste. Correlative rights are protected.

The hour grows late and I know the Reporter has had a

full day. The other major facets of the case seems to be related to the substantial evidence question. Mr. Kellahin indicated what was a substantial part of testimony - - it might be a bore to read the testimony, but it might be we could save a great deal of that reading if we recognized a great bulk of that testimony, most of it presented by the Petitioners, and a great deal of that presented by the Respondents, was in fighting over the question of whether or not there is a direct relationship between deliverabilities and reserves. This particular concept has been noticeable but it is absent in the brief of Petitioners, it is barely mentioned that this has been our case since 1960, has not been mentioned this morning, so a lot of this goes to something that seems to be abandoned. I think if we went through the summaries of testimony which we have prepared, a great deal of that could be left out as useless reading, that that is no longer an issue in this case. We probably have left in the case the question of whether we have substantial evidence as to the reserves in the pool. I think Mr. Kellahin's statements with respect to that are all that need to be said. Mr. Trueblood tested the data that was available, he measured it against all other data, he was able to dig out and he found to his own satisfaction, as an expert, that it was good, and adopted it as his own testimony. That is the basis for all the other Exhibits, and that is his word, not ours.

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There are statements in the brief and the arguments of Petitioners that there is no evidence in the record on this point and none on that - our summary of the testimony has disclosed many items of testimony on all of these points, I am reluctant to take the time of the Court when it isn't even our burden to do this, the burden is on them to show the testimony is not in there. Maybe we do have to proceed somewhat, maybe we can limit ourselves to the points. Waste would occur if the 25-75 order was continued, correlative rights would also be abused and waste would be prevented and correlative rights protected by the 60-40 formula. I don't want to go through through hundreds of references here. Maybe if we turn to the testimony of Finding No. 13 and take a few samples, and I will confess in writing this and the transcript of it there may be one or two places where we have over stated the support, but not very many.

For example in Finding No. 13, we state it is not only supported as to the correlative rights issue, but the testimony of witness Trueblood on Page 22 - for example - excuse me, 21:

Well the objection as made formerly to this as it is the only way to absolutely and completely protect correlative rights is to divide it up under the reserves found in each pool, and later states this is impracticable to do. Page 24, he makes it very clear under the current 25-75 formula there is a great disparity of the number of wells receiving their proper allowables. Going to page 36, states - talking

about complete elimination of abuse, and their elimination can only be done by exercising a tract factor, a thing stated I fear to be almost impossible. Finally come to the point on - about page 41, on cross examination he was asked if he was willing to agree that acreage and deliverability formula would accomplish the result. The only quarrel is the weight to be given to the reserve value of the two, and he says, "That is correct, that the Commission chooses to use those factors and to reach a minimum of use to correlative rights". The point is then the only question is the weight to be given to each one; and the issues of waste have been raised in Finding No. 13. - -

I am going to have to apologize, I have been a little bit confused here and struggling to justify some of my own statements - to start again on page 22 of the April, 1962, hearing, Mr. Trueblood very clearly stated with respect to the drainage question in the long life of this field will permit redistribution of the gas in the reservoir if this disproportionate of withdrawals are made. This is one of the statements in support of the drainage concept. Page 24, in speaking of waste and correlative rights he testifies that the field is less than 10%, or approximately 10% developed at the time, but the loss and life of hydrocarbons in the ground untapped that are producible hydrocarbons is waste. Under a 320 acre tract; to allow hydrocarbons from under a 320 acre tract that is not developed to be produced

through a 320 acre tract which is, strictly because the allowable formula would not permit the development of that 320 acre tract, is an obvious abuse of correlative rights. After making that mistake I don't want to take up too many of these things again - Page 36, Mr. Trueblood again testified clearly that unless the order premitted the production of gas in some reasonable relationship and within reasonable ranges to the allowables or to the reserves, then there cannot be any protection of correlative rights.

In the summary of testimony we have stated many, many of these items here, and on page 128 states that the allocation formula as it exists today is discriminatory and does not protect correlative rights. Other witnesses have carried on in much the same vein here. Mr. Weidekehr, speaking of drainage, page 195, testified that the drainage rate of these wells could be up to two miles, again supporting the concept under invalid order. Page 199, he said, "* * if we maintain our present formula we are not protecting correlative rights as between wells within the Basin-Dakota pool". Page 200 - "In your opinion, then, does the present formula cause a violation of correlative rights?" (answer) "Yes".

There is opposing testimony obviously, throughout, of the Petitioners' case, at that time was just to the reverse. We do not deny that, and in our transcript of the testimony we have attempted to show where they took the other position.

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the Commission, however, has weighed this testimony, has given the appropriate weight to it, the same citations in here are equivalent support for the affirmative finding, many of them, that the 60-40 formula is a good one, particularly in the Exhibits in the rehearing Consolidated put on that measure. Eight different formulas and showed the effect of each one. The Commission has weighed those and has come up with this existing order. If this is not substantial evidence, a difficult case with many experts and many exhibits on both sides, testifying before an expert Commission; if this is not substantial evidence, then there never will be a valid pro-ration order or allowable order in this State. Thank you, sir.

MR. JOHN TITTMANN:

I have already entered my appearance as amicus curiae representing Pubco Petroleum, but as amicus curiae, in view of certain development of which happened here I would ask the Court's permission to point out in the record certain questions that may be of some interest. Do I have that permission, your Honor?

COURT: Yes.

MR. TITTMANN: Mr. Kelly raised the question of the entry - of the time of entry of the order here being proposed.

COURT: Is this by way of rebuttal?

A. No, it is merely my position, not to answer but just

to point out a procedural question, while technical, may be of interest and I submit could be persuasive.

There has been introduced in this case a stipulation on what occurred on the entry of the order. I wasn't aware of that stipulation. The Court received several exhibits without objection and while we do not object, I just want the record to show under the statute the Court is limited to the record by law, but be that as it may, there is another case, and I am sure your Honor is familiar with, in which Pubco appealed from this order within the time allowed after what was entered on the 9th. That appeal was dismissed, as I understand it, on the ground that Pubco had not exhausted its administrative remedies by asking for a second rehearing. Pubco's position at the time was it was in a dilemma to either appeal by the time permitted by statute, and all counsel agreed the Oil Conservation Commission is strictly bound by its statutory laws and that you either appeal within the time or you have no appeal. This being a jurisdictional matter, two choices, appeal now, apply for a second rehearing and appeal later; I think the Court probably remembers Tatsch before the Supreme Court in which the Court's order allowing appeal was mailed in time but it wasn't entered by the Clerk because it happened to be Christmas-eve. The matter wasn't raised by the counsel for either party but the Supreme Court itself picked it up as being beyond the jurisdiction because it was one day late. They later reconsidered, on a proper showing. But the issue posed in this case by procedure to appeal

timeliness of appeal with any rehearings because the Oil Conservation Commission - I am not familiar with oil - now my question, they have followed the transcript on the first case on appeal in this court's rule, was filed in the Supreme Court February 28th, briefs are due in thirty days - they will be filed in fifteen. The Supreme Court may be called upon to decide whether this Court has jurisdiction of this hearing, because if it decides that the appeal in the first case was the proper procedure, it will deny the Court had jurisdiction and it must necessarily in that decision decide that this proceeding was untimely and that this Court has no jurisdiction here. This is the same dilemma we were faced with, and I hate to suggest after all these manpower hours and most able counsel there could be some technical reason of jurisdiction, which is technical but I would suggest to the Court in my capacity as amicus curiae that the Supreme Court probably in its next term of oral argument will hear this question as to whether you will have jurisdiction of this case, or whether you will have jurisdiction in the first case, and I would suggest to the Court, in my capacity as amicus curiae - and I trust I am not overstepping my capacity, that should this Court decide this issue as presented in this case, and should the Supreme Court rule that this proceeding on a second rehearing granted by the oil people, that they have no power - that this proceeding is not properly here and

send it back and ask your Honor to rule on the first appeal; we re-introduce all this record, we re-argue, with all eminent counsel, with the same issue that has been presented here - as amicus I might ask the Court in that stature of the case, having decided once, would the Court conclude its decision again on a new proceeding, and I am only presenting this question in the capacity in which I am permitted to appear of record. Thank you, your Honor.

COURT: Does this conclude argument of respondents - I presume you would like some rebuttal argument.

MR. MALONE: There will be your Honor, in view of the length of presentation of respondents I would very much like an opportunity to organize my rebuttal a bit. I think it would be much better if we took it up in the morning. If the Court wishes us to continue this evening I would like a 15 minute recess to confer with counsel.

COURT: I would prefer to hear it in the morning. Court will be in recess until 9:00 o'clock in the morning.

9:00 A.M., FRIDAY, MARCH 6, 1964:

REBUTTAL ARGUMENT - BY MR. MALONE:

COURT: I presume there will be no question raised about these three items marked Exhibits, they really could be part of the pleadings. I believe no additional evidence is to be considered, but if counsel all agree we will let them go the way they are.

MR. MALONE: I think there is no objection to any of them.

MR. MALONE: May it please the Court. It will be my purpose to reply in rebuttal argument on behalf of the Petitioners, not to impose unduly on the Court's generosity time-wise, and to discuss points, all major points in the argument. In doing so I would like to take the same position that opposing counsel did yesterday, and that is the matters they have discussed in our brief that have not been treated in oral argument or included in the rebuttal today, we do not waive and would still urge on the Court.

Secondly, by way of preliminary I might suggest while we have no objection whatever to the summary of testimony offered by Respondents' being considered as part of the brief, we respectfully suggest it is so argumentative in character it can hardly be referred to as a summary of testimony, but actually is a further argument of the position of Respondents and should be viewed in the light, and I might suggest for the benefit of counsel, we had about as much trouble with the right transcript as he did with the wrong transcript.

Turning first to the question of the exhaustion of administrative remedy which was urged by Mr. Kellahin on the question of whether or not the application for rehearing before the Commission was timely filed within the twenty days provided by the statute. The statute itself in this regard provides, Section 65-3-22 - "Any party to such rehearing proceeding, dissatisfied with the disposition of the application for rehearing, may appeal therefrom to the district court

of the county wherein is located any property of such party affected by the decision, by filing a petition for the review of the action of the commission within twenty days after the entry of the order following rehearing or after the refusal or rehearing as the case may be * * *".

We would turn to the portion of the statute which contains provision for the facilities that the Commission must provide as the public record all of its orders, and that is 65-3-6: " * * * All rules, regulations and orders made by the commission shall be entered in full by the secretary thereof in a book to be kept for such purpose by the commission, which shall be a public record and open to inspection at all times during reasonable office hours", * * *

If there was any question as to whether placing a copy of the order in the case file or entering it in this book is the entry required by the statute, the action of the director himself, Mr. Porter, has dissolved any question, because only on the copy of the order which went into the permanent record did the Director in his own handwriting note the date of entry. I don't know how he could have spoken more clearly as the Commission itself determines of which record is the official record upon entry of which the twenty days for application for rehearing begins to run. That statement entered "Entered, July 9, 1963, A.L.P." in the long hand of the director himself certainly establishes the date of entry. It is interesting to note he used the very wording the

statute provides. He did not say "filed" he said "entered July 9, 1963". I might point out this construction which we urge is entirely consistent with the opinion of the Supreme Court of New Mexico, is in connection with the judgment before it is formally entered. 46 N. M., 200: "The 'Judgment and decree', so entitled, although dated June 9, 1941, was actually filed with the clerk on July 16, 1941, until which time, at least, ignoring the thirty day period thereafter during which by 1929 Comp.St. Sec 105-801, it is given control over its judgment, the trial court might have given and presumably did give consideration to the findings proposed by defendants. There was still time to set aside the findings already adopted and to withhold the judgment tentatively, although not effectively, ordered".

And the Court points out "until filed and it is entered on the minutes of the court, the document so denominated was no judgment". Presumably it was under the control of the Court until that event occurred - in other words, in the case at bar until this order was actually entered the Commission could have changed its mind, torn it up and written a new order, and no one would have known the difference, none of the parties affected by it. And that is the reason, until that order is entered in the record and becomes a part of the permanent record of the Commission it is effective, and that entry then puts it beyond the power of the Commission to tear it up. Until that occurs it has not been entered and when it

has been entered the twenty day time begins to run, and the application for reconsideration was filed within that twenty day period, thus it is respectfully submitted that there is no merit whatever to the contention that this filing was not timely made.

The second is the matter of indispensable parties who are alleged to be absent in this proceeding. We would respectfully suggest that the proposition is wholly without merit and that the authorities cited in support of it are inapplicable to the situation.

Looking again at Section 65-3-22 of the statute with reference to how you shall file a petition for review or obtain reviews of an order, the statute says, "Any party to such rehearing proceeding, dissatisfied with the disposition of the application for rehearing, may appeal therefrom to the district court of the county wherein is located any property of such party affected by the decision, * *." How does he appeal? By filing a petition for review of the action of the Commission within twenty days of the entry of the order following rehearing or after refusal of rehearing. What would such petition include? "Such petition shall state briefly the nature of the proceedings before the commission and shall set forth the order or decision of the commission complained of and the grounds of invalidity thereof upon which the applicant will rely; Provided, however, that the questions reviewed on appeal shall be only questions presented to the Commission by

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application for rehearing." Then this controlling sentence - "Notice of such appeal shall be served upon the adverse party or parties in the manner provided for the service of summons in civil proceedings." And that is the court statutory provision with reference to the statutory appeal to obtain review on the order of the Oil Conservation Commission. The requirement is that you file your petition within the allotted time and that you serve the Commission and all adverse parties. You appear before the Commission - there is no contention here, I assume there is no contention that all adverse parties, and the file shows all were served - served upon the adverse party or parties. There is nothing whatsoever as to what you shall put on the case style. They are complaining we consolidated the style but we didn't put in other adverse parties who were served. Insofar as this statute is concerned, we respectfully submit you do not have to put the Commission, Consolidated or anybody else in the case style. This appeal could just as well been styled "In the matter of the appeal of El Paso Natural Gas Company in Order 2259-B from the Oil Conservation Commission of New Mexico;" and in the Fifth Judicial District that is the way they are styled, there is no reference to the parties because this is a review proceeding and is the civil action to which the authorities are cited by counsel are applicable, so that the only thing required to obtain this review is to meet the requirements of this statute, to serve notice on the adverse parties and the Commission, and that was served.

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It is only by virtue of the statute, and without the statute there would be no review proceeding, and this is the reason this is a review of an action that was initiated before the Oil Conservation Commission. At that time all parties who had any interest in this pool were served with notice and made parties to that hearing by the publication of notice or the mails as provided by the rules of the Commission. Those parties all had an opportunity to come to the hearing before the Commission. The statute then said, if, when the Commission has disposed of the case and appeal is taken only those parties adverse to the appeal parties need be served, and those were the parties who were served and the other interested parties in the pool had their opportunity before the Commission if their position was adverse to that of the appealing party.

Counsel has cited the W.S. Ranch case in an effort to sustain his proposition. The W. S. Ranch Company case is completely distinct because it is a civil action and not a statutory appeal from a decision of an administrative agency. W. S. Ranch Company was an application for an injunction, it was a civil hearing and there had not been any prior hearing before a Commission. Perhaps counsel's own argument - he knows his position, because if his position was correct and the ruling in the W. S. Ranch Company case was applicable to an appeal from the State Engineer, every water owner in the Roswell Basin would be a party to an appeal to the State

Engineer for making water rights, and that is not the law. As the Court knows, everybody who has a right in a stream system or underground water system is not made a party to an appeal from the State Engineer, yet if counsel were correct and all persons were indispensable parties, that would be required. We therefore respectfully submit that the normal rule as to indispensable parties in a civil action has no application; that the requirement is that the statute be complied with to obtain this review and that the statute has been complied with in this case. On the general question and not cited to the Court as being conclusive at all because it involves the statute of another State, but this question has been up in Texas in regard to the Railroad Commission in Trapp vs. Shell, 198 SW 2nd, 424, it was held in Texas that the Commission itself is the only indispensable party to an appeal from its decision. We think that under the circumstances all the parties required by the statute are before the Court, at least were served and had an opportunity to be before this Court, and the suggestion there is no jurisdiction in the Court because of the absence of indispensable parties, is without merit.

Turning now to several matters mentioned by counsel for the Commission, to which I would like to allude. Certain of them I will withhold for treatment in connection with the subsequent points to follow, but we have found at least one proposition in which we are in agreement; we are in agreement we have the burden in this proceeding. If we do not discharge

that burden we are not entitled to a decision from this Court, but if we do discharge that burden we are entitled to it. We consider it desirable they be showed the order of the Commission is arbitrary, capricious, not supported by substantial evidence, beyond the authority of the Commission. Any or all of those will result in the invalidity of the order. Certainly we have the burden insofar as the establishment is concerned and we have to establish them before the Court and we submit we have clearly established them and have established the order as being arbitrary, capricious, not supported by substantial evidence and beyond the authority of the Commission, not supported by jurisdictional findings, and being unlawful and unreasonable, as application not having been made to figures, to which I will allude further. Counsel suggested we admit the Commission had authority to take the action which it took. We are in disagreement on that subject. It is agreed the Commission has the power to pro-rate natural gas pools. The exercise of that under the Jalmat case is dependent on certain findings and in the absence of those the Commission has acted without jurisdiction, its order is void, and that is the situation with which we are faced here. I frankly had considerable doubt as to whether I should make any mention of the next matter, which I have concluded I will mention very briefly.

I do not think counsel for the Commission really intended to impliedly and expressly reflect upon the motives of the

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Petitioners in this case, it is just as much beneath the dignity of the Commission to do so as it would be for us to imply the Commission acted for ulterior motives in deciding this case, and we certainly have no such idea in mind any time. Motives, as the Court knows and counsel knows have nothing to do with the validity of this order. If it meets the requirements of the statute it is a valid order, if it does not meet them, meet the validity of the statute it isn't a valid order. The Court can take judicial notice of the fact that El Paso Natural Gas Company, in addition to being a pipeline company is the operator of more than half of the producing gas wells in the San Juan Basin, and it has not only a right, but a duty to those royalty owners, and its cooperation to come before this Court and defend them for that, which they feel is an abuse. Authorization having been given it and to its co-owners. The Petitioners are here for one reason and only one reason, and they sincerely believe this order of the Commission has denied them rights guarded them under the statute and courts, because they sincerely believe the order is invalid and motives should never have been brought into this case.

It was suggested further that perhaps the Petitioners had abandoned the proposition that the order wasn't supported by substantial evidence and that really all we had talked about was the weight of the evidence; if anything that was said in the argument of the Petitioners was so understood, it was

badly misunderstood. We have asserted in our brief, as we asserted in the argument, as stated by Mr. Verity at great length and very clearly. It seems to me we do very vigorously contend that the order is not supported by substantial evidence as to the existence of waste, under the old order, the prevention of waste under the new order, the protection of correlative rights by the new order. I think everything has been said in the brief and argument that can be said and I am not going to prolong this, this morning, on that subject, but there are two aspects of substantial evidence I would like to briefly mention, on which we strongly rely.

The first is the matter which was pointed out by Mr. Verity, which is briefed at some length, that the order is not supported by substantial evidence because the conclusion reached by the Commission was based entirely upon the application of the so-called A.R. Factor to these two formulas. The result of that application, as the Commission concluded, showed that 60-40 was the best formula. The evidence to support that conclusion is not substantial as required by all of the authorities for the reason that it appears from the face of the order and from the testimony in this case that Consolidated - this isn't the Commission's fault, nothing that happened here is the Commission's fault - Consolidated led the Commission into fatal error, it came in with this application, it put on the case, it supported it, the Commission adopted it as its case, it analyzed those Exhibits

and entered the order. The deficiencies in support of that order are the deficiencies of testimony by Consolidated, and not the Commission. It is admitted the figures which went into those columns were based upon an application of current deliverabilities, 1962-63 deliverabilities, of the wells involved. Whereas, the reserves which are the other part of the comparison, the reserves were not current reserve figures, but were reserves that these tracts each had before any gas was produced from any of them. In other words, before the first well was drilled in the Basin-Dakota pool these were the reserves that were under the tracts involved in this controversy. The deliverabilities usage factor used in this 40% and 75% formula to make the comparison were not the deliverabilities of those wells when they first came in at the time there had been no production, they were all deliverabilities of those wells when they first came in at the time there had been no production, they were all deliverabilities in the latter part of 1962 after some of these wells had produced seven or eight years. Now, it is admitted there is the testimony and it is certainly a known scientific fact, that as gas is produced from a reservoir the pressure declines and as the pressure declines the deliverability declines, so that they have taken the deliverabilities after they had declined - for various periods in various wells - and used them as against tract reserves that existed before any well had been drilled. Now, what was the result of doing that -

would result in a false A.R. Factor for the 60-40 formula and the 25-75 formula, and that falsity is present and inevitable because of the use Consolidated made of these figures. The testimony I have here, Mr. Trueblood testified that these figures he got from El Paso Natural Gas Company by subpoena, and offered in evidence as Consolidated's Exhibit 1, it had both the initial reserves which they used, and the current reserves. It had initial deliverability and current deliverability, so they had the option of comparing application to application, or ranges to ranges, initial reserve to initial deliverability, current reserves to current deliverability.

What did they do - they compared initial reserves to current deliverabilities. When Mr. Trueblood was asked on the stand why he did it, he said he didn't really know, but he admitted he had done it. What is the effect of that as the deliverabilities decline after production from the wells - the result is that in this formula the deliverabilities which purported to be 75% deliverability times acreage was actually less than 75% as compared to initial reserves, and the 40% here was actually less than 40% as compared to initial reserves, because that figure would have been higher if they had used initial deliverability. So the result is, instead of having a reliable A/R Factor by the application of these two formulas they have got the result of a formula which is not

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25-75, but is - I don't know - 25-65, maybe 60-35 - nobody knows and it may well be that that flow fraction of one half which just barely got over in a deliverable tolerance would have been completely lost if that mistake had been made, and that is present in this order, and there is a patent fallacy that absolutely makes unreliable that Consolidated reached and led the Commission to reach, in the use of those figures. The other aspect of substantial evidence which I would like to allude relates to these Exhibits 1 and 2 of Consolidated which were the subject of some discussion yesterday. I think we finally got cleared up, and if we didn't the record clears up what happened with reference to these - and let me just recount it so we will have it before us in considering the substantial evidence question.

These Exhibits constitute the background work done by El Paso in connection with its continuing study of the reserves in the Basin-Dakota pool. They were delivered to Consolidated as a result of a subpoena, Consolidated put them in evidence as their Exhibits 1 and 2 and predicated all the rest of their Exhibits upon the figures in 1 and 2. As stated to the Court yesterday, our objection insofar as Consolidated and the Commission were concerned, these were hearsay. They were not competent for the purpose for which used by Consolidated and they so having been inadmissible

with it falls all of the Exhibits introduced by Consolidated

Now, what was Consolidated's answer to that - as I understood Mr. Kellahin's answer, it was "you are too late you didn't object to the admission of these before the Commission as hearsay and you are too late to do it now for the first time". We didn't agree for a moment we are too late to do it. Now for the first time Mr. Kellahin inadvertently was in error in saying we made no such objection before the Commission.

I refer now to the transcript of the hearing before the Commission in February of 1963, or rehearing, and I will read, starting at Page 29:

"Mr. Stockmar: I would like to ask that the Commission accept in evidence the exhibits offered.

"Mr. Keleher: We object to the exhibits.

"Mr. Stockmar: I would like to have the remaining five exhibits numbered and marked for identification.

"Mr. Porter: You have seven exhibits, and you are moving admission, that Consolidated Exhibits 1 through 7 be admitted into the record?

"Mr. Keleher: To which we object on the ground they are irrelevant, immaterial and incompetent. The witness testifies that they're based on exhibits in the former case tried here before the Commission April 18, 19, 20, 21; no evidence here of independent investigation. These exhibits are based entirely on hearsay, on what some other witnesses have testified."

Then on page 33, after considerable colloquy:

"Mr. Porter: The record will show the objections by Mr.

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Howell, Mr. Keleher to the admission of these exhibits. The objections are overruled. The objections will be admitted to the record, and the Commission will determine, of course, the proper weight to be given to those exhibits; and, of course, the opposing counsel will have the opportunity to cross examine the witness now concerning any phase of his testimony or anything that appears in these exhibits.

"Mr. Stockmar: I would like then to offer --

"Mr. Keleher: May the record show an exception on the part of Pubco?

"Mr. Porter: The record will show an exception on the part of Mr. Keleher for Pubco."

Then on Page 47:

"Mr. Porter: The hearing will come to order. Mr. Howell, did your group come to a decision?

"Mr. Howell: I believe Mr. Keleher is ready to proceed with them.

"Mr. Porter: Mr. Keleher.

"Mr. Federici: May it please the Commission and Mr. Keleher, before you proceed, on behalf of Aztec Oil Company and Calkins Oil Company and Sunset International, I assume and understand that the objections made by Pubco and El Paso are concurred in, and that the record will show that these companies which I represent also make the same objection. If there is some objection by Mr. Kellahin, I'll make a motion at this time that Exhibits 1 through 8 be stricken on the grounds stated by Pubco and El Paso and on the additional

ground that there was no sufficient foundation.

"Mr. Kellahin: We have no objection to the companies represented by Mr. Federici. We certainly do object to his motion to strike the exhibits.

"Mr. Porter: The record will show the objection as stated by Mr. Federici. They are also denied. * *"

So that it is clear from the record that the objection was clearly made, not once, but twice, and a motion to strike the exhibits as they were admitted, then on the ground they were hearsay, that they were based on hearsay and were hearsay. Those exhibits were taken for the basis of all the rest of the exhibits, but not by Consolidated. They were admitted in evidence without the man who prepared them testifying as to what was in them, how they were prepared, vouching for them, doing any of the things necessary to get a written instrument of this type into evidence. Apparently Consolidated felt because these exhibits were personal and subject to a subpoena that is all that was necessary to get them into evidence. As the Court well knows, that is not the rule insofar as hearsay exhibits are concerned, and these were admitted under that situation- what was the answer Consolidated gave us in an effort to escape that fact - they said "Well, in addition to the fact that we did not think there was any objection made before the Commission as to hearsay or any objection as to 1 and 2, we think Mr. Trueblood made those exhibits his own and he was on the witness stand, and so those exhibits are

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admissible, what counsel is saying is that the deficiency that makes hearsay it is inadmissible can be cured by somebody else getting on the witness stand, under oath, and saying "I think it is all true". If there is any authority supporting such a proposition I will be willing to toss in the towel. The fact is, those exhibits were hearsay, they were not admissible, they are not admissible in this Court because I made an objection to hearsay, and the Commission is wholly without substantial evidence to support it.

Next, I would like to refer to the proposition urged by Mr. Kellahin that the 25-75 formula which was originally promulgated and was in effect at the time Consolidated filed this application, is in issue before this Court and can be declared invalid by this Court. Now, the first and complete answer to that proposition is that whether the 25-75 formula and the order that promulgated it are valid or invalid, doesn't make the 60-40 formula and Order R-2259-C valid. There isn't any escaping that proposition. The 60-40 formula is valid on the record before the Commission, and the findings the Commission made, or it isn't valid, and the prior order has nothing to do with it, and it isn't going to breathe life into a dead horse if that horse is as dead as we think it is; but there is a further answer to that proposition, that answer is this: - and it is always gratifying in a lawsuit to take a statement opposing counsel made and turn it around - It is suggested by Consolidated that they raised the question on the validity of the 25-75 order before the Commission in

their petition for rehearing after the original order of the Commission which denied their application for a 60-40 formula after that petition for rehearing. The portion to which they refer is Paragraph 9 which reads as follows:

"Order No. R-1670-C is based upon a finding that 'there is a general correlation between the deliverabilities of the gas wells in the Dakota Producing Interval and the recoverable gas in place under the tracts dedicated to the wells,' Evidence presented at the April 18, 1962 hearing of this matter conclusively shows that no such correlation exists, and that the Commission's Order No. R-1670-C is void insofar as it establishes an allowable allocation formula for the Basin-Dakota pool and should be rescinded by the Commission".

True, they did raise it in their petition for reconsideration, but the Commission failed to consider that aspect of the case. The Commission entered an order based on this petition for rehearing that they would grant a rehearing, but it would be limited to the reserve tracts under the pool. When that position was taken, Consolidated was aggrieved because they contended the Commission should hold it invalid, they should take an appeal from that order, they had another opportunity to after the order here involved had come out, after they contended the Commission should have held the 25-75 order was invalid they had an opportunity to take a cross appeal in this proceeding because that aspect had not been decided by the Commission.

The Oil Conservation Commission has not ruled on the question of whether the 25-75 order is valid or invalid.

Under the State ex rel McCord vs. Zinn decision, the Commission has got the primary administrative jurisdiction to determine even questions of jurisdiction, and until the case is exhausted the administrative remedy has not been exhausted and they failed to obtain a ruling of the Commission on the validity or invalidity on this order, and this Court now is not in a position to pass on it until the Commission passes on that question the Court cannot review it.

We respectfully suggest that that situation clearly exists and the 25-75 order is not before this Court for review at all, and I repeat again my initial statement - even if it were and even if it were invalid it wouldn't breathe life into the dead horse that we have got here.

The next proposition to which I would like to allude, mentioned by Mr. Kellahin, was with reference as I noted the statement to the fact even with computers it would be impossible for the Commission to determine and allocate allowables on the basis of reserves - - -

MR. KELLAHIN: If the Court please, I am being misquoted;

COURT: All right.

MR. KELLAHIN: The statement was that all the computers in Los Alamos could not compute the allowable, based on the contention of Mr. Verity that the reserve figure had to be determined for each tract in the pool, and in addition to

that, for a particular order which would enable each tract to determine its reserves would require a different formula for each separate tract in the pool.

MR. MALONE: Thank you. What we are talking about is reserves, the statute and the Jalmat case decisions say that the measure of correlative rights of an owner in an oil or gas pool is the recoverable gas in place under his tract, the portion of all the gas in the pool under his tract which can be produced without waste. That is what the statute guarantees him. Now, for the moment I want to forget about this argument for a moment and allude to the matter that the Commission failed to make a finding as to what could be produced without waste; but assume Consolidated's figures can be taken as they contend they can be taken, if Tract C, Tract reserves has the measure of correlative rights under each tract, this is the number of cubic feet under each pool at the time it started to be produced, that is what the portion of that can be produced without waste, and for the moment forgetting waste that is what the statute and Jalmat decision says each of these men is entitled to produce. Not, it is suggested, even though everybody admits, Mr. Truesblood himself - and let me read what he said on this subject. He was talking about this question of how to get the best pro-ration formula - Page 22 on rehearing: "Now I would like to point out at this particular time that the whole purpose of establishing the rights allowable is that the allowable percentage that a well is granted be exactly that same percentage that it bears

to the total reserves; hence the column percent allowable."

What he says is that perfect pro-ration - and everybody agrees with this - perfect pro-ration would take the tract reserve figure out of the percentage, they are after the reserves as a whole, and give you that percentage of the allowable if you had 10% of the reserves and took 10% of the allowable you get a perfect pro-ration formula.

Mr. Trueblood, on page 23: "Now if a formula could be constructed where in every instance this ratio were unity," that is where you get one for every well over here because it was getting the same percent of allowable it had in the pool reserve. " * * then there would be absolutely no abuse of correlative rights".

The position of Consolidated, apparently, those reserves cannot be determined and used as a basis for a pro-ration order, but they have determined them, they have come in to the Commission and proved, and the Commission has accepted this column which finds those reserves. Exactly what the statute decision - waste, what the measure of each of these tract owners - and got the percentage of all the reserves and everybody agrees if these figures are right, all you have to do is to take these percentages of allowable and allocate it to each well, then you have got it for every well in this column. This is what statute says is the measure. Now, the Commission came in and said it isn't practicable to allocate on the basis of it and counsel says it isn't practicable to allocate on them because it is too hard to find

them, they are too much subject to change, but they accepted these on the basis of data two years out of date and they thought it was all right, they did not think the reserves changed each month. Didn't affect the Commission, affected the correlative rights of every operator in that pool. At least for December all the month agreed, the promulgation of this order they could have used that, but they didn't, they said, "We are going to take another formula and we are going to compare it to this one and the one that compares most closely we will use it". They should have known in the beginning which was the best formula, and was this formula and these percentages they had to begin with, they said the one that comes the closest is the one we are going to accept - and if this is the closest, how can the Commission excuse themselves for not using it - these reserves they have accepted, the correlative rights of every man in the pool, and refused to use them, and have turned around and used the 60 - 40 formula and it is all right - that formula gave barely half the wells a tolerance of 60% of what they would have gotten if they had used these percentages to begin with. The idea of discarding every basis for measuring the allowable of tracts in this pool, the figure in the statute for measuring allowable, and turned around and accepted a formula because it comes closer to this than the other one, and still does not give barely half the wells in the pool what it was entitled to have,

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and we say that is arbitrary, capricious and not supported by substantial evidence and is completely avaricious, but it is all demonstrable.

And before I close on this I would just like to say again, if Consolidated had not come in here and vouched for these figures and sold them to the Commission, which established the extent of the rates of each owner in that pool perhaps there would have been some basis for using an approximation - a comparison, but they established here what each well in that pool was entitled to get, and as Mr. Verity said - as our counsel took exception to, with all the computers in Los Alamos - we knew and the Commission knew and they knew just what percentage of that they were entitled to get, and the failure to give it to them is a direct violation of the statute.

Now Consolidated and the Commission say "but the trouble is, these figures change". That same trouble exists sofar as the 60-40 formula is concerned, because they only adopted the 60-40 formula because it corresponded more closely to those figures, and they say those change and "we cannot make a basis of allocation", but they accepted another formula because it is better for their formula than this one. I respectfully submit it is capricious. It would have seemed in the argument yesterday we touched an exposed nerve when we mentioned the fact that they were the owners of 50 wells

out of some 1200 who are in here before the Court supporting this new formula, and about the owners of - of about eight or nine times that many wells are opposing it, but the fact is that the effect of this formula is felt in each individual well. I said we touched an exposed nerve because each of the three counsel on the other sides undertook that and attempted to offset it, but it is a fact that cannot be completely ignored, and to supplement it is the fact that the record shows by the testimony of one of the witnesses in the record that the change of formula made in his calculations would redistribute the ownership of \$500,000.00 worth of gas here as long as that formula is in effect. It took the owners from the formula from which this pool was developed, had drilled wells, gone to banks and borrowed money, predicated and planned on a 25-75 formula; and on an order such as this they have been deprived of \$500,000.00 a year income, and in reliance under the Commission's former order they were entitled to - I agree the Commission has a right to change it, but in that situation the reason for changing it and the proof. The new order is - for all the people in the pool becomes extremely important. The testimony further was as a result of this change Consolidated would get an increase of \$12,000.00 a month in the gas it would produce in its wells, gas that theretofore had been allocated in other wells. We are not talking about chicken feed, we are talking about

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Fifteen Million Dollars of property values which have been redistributed by the Commission, based on the reason we have just discussed.

I have one final point, and that relates to the first point that was discussed in our argument yesterday, and was presented so ably by Mr. Federici. I would hate to have to guess how many times the word "Jalmat" has been mentioned in the argument in this case, but it is appropriate it should be, because the Jalmat decision I think everybody agrees is going to be the standard by which it is going to be determined. Whether this order is valid or invalid, and when this case gets to the Supreme Court, as it inevitably will, the measuring stick which the Supreme Court is going to apply, and the measuring stick which we are using in this Court will apply for the Jalmat case, and if the Supreme Court said an exact situation as this had to be done in order to get a change in pro-ration formula.

I think before discussing the argument that was made in an effort to show really if the Commission did make Finding No. 4 - what proportions of the arrived at proportions can be arrived at without waste, what proportions of the gas under each tract can be recovered without waste - I think everybody but Mr. Kelly took a crack at it, trying to answer that proposition - we were interested in the answer - what the answer was going to be, because the finding wasn't there, the first three findings were there but

fourth one just wasn't there, and I must say I pay great tribute to the ingenuity of counsel in showing up every reason in the world and every excuse in the world, but the fact is the answer isn't there. The others are there but that fourth one is just not there. Now, what did the Jalmat decision say about these orders - I think it might provide a platform to look at them if we would look for a minute at just what the Court said in Jalmat, Page 318; "Proceeding to Appellants argument that the order does not rest upon authorized statutory basis," that was the attack, that is the attack here, the Supreme Court then said what that authorized statutory basis is, and they said (1) it requires findings of certain preliminary matters on the basis of which the correlative rights of the tracts in the pool will be determined and then we have to test the formula to see whether the formula - to see whether the formula protects those correlative rights as the statute requires, but the Court said "until you have made the finding to measure the correlative rights it is impossible to determine whether the order protects it"; and it is Finding No. 4 that does that. Findings 1, 2 and 3 are of no importance whatever in testing the validity of a pro-ration order except as they provide the information from which Finding No. 4 can be made, and that is what portion of the arrived at proportion

between 1 and 2, between the gas under the tract and all the gas in the pool and what can be gotten out without waste. The tract owner is only entitled to the gas under his tract that can be produced without waste, so the three findings above are of no consequence, they can add nothing to the validity of this order because they were not used to make the one finding that the whole testimony of findings was established - what is the correlative rights, what is the proportion each tract can produce without waste - they just didn't find it.

In Jalmat, the Court says: "In order to protect correlative rights, it is incumbent upon the commission to determine, 'so far as it is practical to do so', certain foundationary matters, without which the correlative rights of the various owners cannot be ascertained." "Therefore," says the Court, "the commission by 'basic conclusions of fact' (or what might be termed 'findings'), must determine insofar as practicable, (1) the amount of recoverable gas under each producer's tract; (2) the total amount of recoverable gas in the pool; (3) the proportion that (1) bears to (2); and (4) what portion of the arrived at proportion can be recovered without waste". In other words, what is the measure of the correlative rights to be protected, and the Court said: "That the extent of the correlative rights must first be determined before the commission can act to protect them is manifest".

Now, can you imagine the Supreme Court having stated that and looked at this order and at the total failure of that finding and saying, as it is suggested here, "Well, this is an equivalent". The pro-ration order that will come out six months from now will find what can be produced without waste and that will supply the deficiency - in that event it will not be until six months because one comes out every six months. There just isn't any answer to it and the Supreme Court has an order laid down and it is listed in this order: "The practical necessity for findings such as those mentioned is made evident, under the provisions of Section 65-3-14(b) and (f) pertaining to allocation of allowable production) and Section 65-3-29(h) (defining 'correlative rights')."

And again the Court said, at Page 320: "Further, that portion of the same finding that there is a 'general correlation between deliverabilities of the gas wells in the Jalmat Gas Pool and the recoverable gas in place under the tracts dedicated to said wells is not tantamount to a finding that the new formula is based on the amounts of recoverable gas in the pool and under the tracts, insofar as these amounts can be practically determined and obtained without waste." And once more they said you have got to find the reserves under each tract that can be recovered without waste. "Such findings are necessary requisites to the validity of the order, for it is upon them that the very power of the commission to act depends."

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I just don't know how the Court could have said it in plainer language what was going to happen to the first order that got up there, that didn't meet these requirements, and meet all four of them and said, "We, therefore find the order lacked the basic findings, which were necessary." And you would have thought when they said all that made this thing clear, but sure enough they got over to whether the Commission was a necessary party and went back to it again.

Page 323, Jalmat Decision: "Inasmuch as there is no express mention of prevention of waste in the commission's findings, insofar as they concern correlative rights, it is obvious that the order must have been principally concerned with protecting correlative rights. However, as we have said, certain basic findings must be made before correlative rights can be effectively protected."

You would have thought then they had certainly made it as plain as they could, and on page 324, came and again said; "To state the problem in a different way, if the commission had determined from a practical standpoint, that each owner had a certain amount of gas underlying his acreage; (1) that the pool contained a certain amount of gas; (2) and that a determined amount of gas could be produced and obtained without waste; " number 4, but it isn't there - "then the commission would have complied with the mandate of the statute and its actions would have been protecting the public interest *."

It seems to be here it didn't make that finding, it wasn't protecting the interest of the public and the order is invalid. I don't want to labor that proposition any further, except to say we had every kind of suggestion in the world yesterday as to how the Respondents would like to meet this deficiency, it was suggested a pro-ration order a month from now, and one at six month intervals would meet this deficiency, but it doesn't get it. It says you have got to find the correlative rights in this order, and secondly, that six months' pro-ration order finds what portion of the allowable can be produced without waste, not what portion of the reserves can be produced without waste. The two are as different as day and night, they have no relation to each other and they certainly cannot provide this deficiency.

Mr. Stockmar suggested - insisted in saying correlative rights in the Jalmat case and the statute if you put in the definition in the statute you get out the waste in there and that will take care of it and he would be exactly right if the Commission had found that these reserves, or whatever reserves there are constitute the correlative rights of the parties, then there would have been the portion that could have been produced without waste, and Mr. Stockmar's argument would have been sound, but there is no finding of the correlative rights of the parties and the argument is just

as fallacious as the one that preceded it. Mr. Stockmar suggested if a good fair pro-ration order comes out of it the No. 4 will be taken care of, and the only thing you have got to have a good opinion. Now, what I just read from the case, the Commission has got to find those correlative rights and they are not found until No. 4 is found in the order. That No. 4 wasn't found in the order and that the order for that reason is invalid.

Thank you very much your Honor.

COURT: Do you have any thoughts on Mr. Tittmann's suggestion yesterday, about the other case in relation to this case?

MR. MALONE: Speaking for myself, Mr. Tittmann felt the other case was going to be decided in a few months, and I think it is a good thing to have in mind, but I say we have done the work, the Judge has listened to the arguments and this case will have to be on its way to the Supreme Court later. Now we should go on with this case because if this Court is firm with this case that will have no effect on this case, and if it is reversed there are so many ways it might be reversed I think we should ignore it, with all deference to my amicus curiae.

MR. TITTMANN: May I make my suggestion plainer - We support the Petitioners here and adopt all of their arguments. The order being appealed from, it would make our appeal in the other case moot, and that may be a technical and persuasive reason why the Court would adopt the

arguments of the Petitioners in this case.

MR. FEDERICI: I join in Mr. Malone's feelings.

MR. VERITY: We think it would certainly be improper to delay this decision, and this order has gone into effect and because of all the complications it is almost - it certainly is an impractical thing to do, and for this reason it becomes imperative that the Court does render an early decision in appeal, for that reason we urge you do determine it.

COURT: I presume all counsel are agreed?

MR. KELLAHIN: We certainly are in agreement that this case should proceed, and we are not in agreement with Mr. Tittmann's suggestion that rendering the other case moot.

MR. KELLY: May it please the Court, my argument yesterday was actually an affirmative defense, it wasn't raised by the Petitioners in their argument, I would like to be allowed rebuttal.

COURT: No, I have heard considerable argument, you can present it to the Supreme Court.

The transcript and Exhibits which were offered are admitted in evidence, and the Court finds the issues in favor of Respondents on the brief that the order is supported by substantial evidence and the findings are sufficient to support the order - I am holding with you on all your Consolidated defenses - I say all of them; most of them.

Railroad Commission of Texas

OIL AND GAS DIVISION

ARTHUR H. BARBECK
Chief Engineer

COMMISSIONERS

BEN RAMSEY
Chairman

ERNEST O. THOMPSON
JIM C. LANGDON

MAIN OFFICE OCC



1964 APR 8 PM 1:36

AUSTIN, TEXAS

April 6, 1964

Mr. J. M. Durrett, Jr.
Attorney
Oil Conservation Commission
P. O. Box 2088
Santa Fe, New Mexico

Dear Mr. Durrett:

Your inquiry of February 14, 1964 has been lodged on my desk for a considerable length of time. The delay, in part, was because the order was not available at the time your letter arrived, and I just recently uncovered it in the mass of debris on my desk.

As you can see the order carries no statement or conclusions, other than that the Commission order was supported by substantial evidence. Appeal was taken, but no setting has been made at this time. I will try to get copies of briefs filed when they are available and send them on to you.

I regret that this reply has been so long delayed.

Very truly yours,

Fred Young
Fred Young
Legal Counsel

FY:jn

NO. 130,893

W. L. PICKENS, ET AL

v.

RAILROAD COMMISSION OF TEXAS,
ET AL

) IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF

) TRAVIS COUNTY, TEXAS

) 98TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT

JUDGMENT

On the 9th day of December, A.D. 1963, came on regularly to be heard the above-entitled and numbered cause, and thereupon came the Plaintiffs and the Defendant, the Railroad Commission of Texas, and the members thereof, and in addition thereto came also W. F. Westbrook, John W. Melton, O. C. (Clyde) Ellis, W. A. Campbell, Mrs. Eva Hurt, W. E. Burton, Helen H. Burton, C. A. Walker, Stella Mae Walker, L. L. Parrott, Nadine Parrott, B. F. Douglas, Callie Dickerson, N. J. Dickerson, J. C. House, Perry Travis, Merle S. Travis, R. H. Venable, Paul C. Teas, J. M. Hazelwood, W. E. Hamilton and wife, Ola Mae Hamilton, J. B. Kitchens and wife, Cynthia Kitchens, Emily Richardson, Lela Lade, Ella Collier, Carroll Dansby and wife, Lora Dansby, Clarence C. Morton and wife, Emma V. Morton, Elizabeth S. Ellis, Thomas P. Padgitt, and Ruby N. Pagitt, individually and as guardian for Patsy Christine Pagitt, each of whom had filed pleas of intervention in said cause, joining Plaintiffs in praying that the Commission's allocation order dated March 6, 1963, be held invalid and that said Defendant Commission be enjoined from enforcing said allocation order as against Plaintiffs as well as against said Intervenor-Plaintiffs, and came also W. C. Perryman, W. R. Hughey, Albert Sklar, Leonard Phillips, Gerald Rauch, Gallant Floyd, G. William Floyd, Fred M.

Garrett, Veda Mae Glesby, B. F. Phillips Petroleum Company, Colony Gas Company, Greenbrier 60 Limited, Greenbrier 61 Limited, Jack Frost, Winwell Exploration Company, Bracken Oil Company, J. A. Dykes, individually and as attorney in fact for C. H. Lyons, Sr., C. H. Lyons, Jr., Hall M. Lyons, G. F. Abendroth, E. L. Hilliard, and J. T. Palmer, Texaco Inc., Hunt Oil Company, Amerada Petroleum Corporation and Cities Service Oil Company, each of whom had intervened in said cause and alligned themselves with the Defendant Railroad Commission, praying that Plaintiffs take nothing by reason of their suit and that said Intervenor-Defendants be awarded their costs and such other and further relief as they may show themselves to be entitled.

And thereafter, all parties, Plaintiffs and Defendant, Intervenor-Plaintiffs and Intervenor-Defendants, announced ready for trial, and during the course of the trial J. B. Kitchens and wife, Cynthia Kitchens, Lela Lade, Ella Collier, Emily Richardson, Stella Mae Walker, C. A. Walker and Joe C. House, Intervenor-Plaintiffs, were permitted to withdraw as parties to said cause, and Frank G. Evans, O. B. Mobley, Joseph J. Stephens, C. S. McCain, Jr., and Wiggins Brothers, Inc., were permitted to intervene in said cause as Intervenor-Defendants.

And no request for jury having been made, all matters of fact and of law were submitted to the Court, and the Court proceeded to consider the pleadings and the evidence, and it appearing to the Court that the law and the facts are with the Defendant and that the order of the Defendant Railroad Commission dated March 6, 1963, being Special Order No. 5 & 6-51,175, is lawful and valid and supported by substantial evidence.

IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that all relief prayed for by Plaintiffs and Intervenor-Plaintiffs be and the same is hereby denied, that Plaintiffs and Intervenor-Plaintiffs take nothing hereby, and that the Defendant Railroad Commission and Intervenor-Defendants herein do have and recover from Plaintiffs and Intervenor-Plaintiffs herein all costs of suit, for which let execution issue.

To all of which action the Plaintiffs and the Intervenor-Plaintiffs duly excepted in open Court and gave notice of appeal directly to the Supreme Court of Texas at Austin, Texas, pursuant to Article 1738a, V.A.C.S., and Rule 499-a, Texas Rules of Civil Procedure.

SIGNED, RENDERED AND ENTERED as of this, the 19th day of February, A.D. 1964.

/s/ Chas. O. Betts

Judge, 98th District Court,
Travis County, Texas

APPROVED AS TO FORM:

Prentice Wilson
Prentice Wilson, Attorney for
Plaintiffs

Fred Erisman
Fred Erisman, Attorney for W. E.
Westbrook, et al, Intervenor-
Plaintiffs

John L. Roach
John L. Roach, Attorney for Paul
C. Teas, Intervenor-Plaintiff

Robert B. Payne

Robert B. Payne, Attorney for
W. E. Perryman, et al, Intervenor-
Defendants

/s/ Joseph Trimble

Joseph Trimble, Assistant
Attorney General, Attorney for the
Railroad Commission of Texas,
Defendant

William P. Gibson

William P. Gibson, Attorney for
Texaco Inc., Intervenor-Defendant

Robert C. McGinnis

Robert C. McGinnis, Attorney for
Hunt Oil Company, Amerada Petroleum
Corporation and Cities Service Oil
Company, Intervenor-Defendants

73 C.J.S. PUBLIC ADMINISTRATIVE BODIES AND PROCEDURE

Section 98. In the absence of a statute requiring it to do so, a public administrative agency need not grant a hearing, or make findings, in order to support the rules and regulations it adopts, since there is no constitutional right to a hearing with respect to such a matter. However, under some statutes, a hearing, as well as findings, may be necessary, as where the legislature authorizes an administrative officer to ascertain certain facts and to make a regulation containing the result of those facts. Where a statute requires that there be a hearing in order to adopt and administrative rule or regulation, the requirements of the hearing should be tested solely by the provisions of the statute.

Section 104. In passing on the validity of administrative rules and regulations, the only concern of the court is to ascertain whether the will of the legislature has been obeyed. Thus the court should consider such rules and regulations in the light of the evil which the statute under which they are promulgated seeks to eliminate or control. While a regulation of a public administrative body purporting to construe an ambiguous provision of a statute is not automatically to be deemed valid merely because it is not plainly interdicted by the terms of the particular provision construed, especially where the legislature indicates its concern that the regulations of such administrative body be subject to more than casual judicial scrutiny when they are based on a controverted construction of the statute, the court will not declare that an administrative regulation is void merely because it believes such regulation to be excessive or unsuited to its ostensible end, or because it is based on conceptions of morality with which the court disagrees.

The test of the validity of an administrative rule or regulation is not what might be done, but what can be done, under it, and only in a

clear case will the court interfere and say that such a rule or regulation is invalid because it is unreasonable or because it is in excess of the authority of the agency promulgating it. Moreover, an administrative rule or regulation must be clearly illegal, or plainly and palpably inconsistent with law, or clearly in conflict with a statute relative to the same subject matter, such as the statute it seeks to implement, in order for the court to declare it void on such ground.

It is only where an administrative rule or regulation is completely without a rational basis, or where it is wholly, clearly, or palpably arbitrary, that the court will say that it is invalid for such reason. Moreover, one who claims rights under an administrative rule may not assert the invalidity of the rule under which the rights he claims arise.

Where a rule or regulation of a public administrative agency is within the scope of the authority of such agency it is considered prima facie, or presumptively, valid and reasonable, and the one who raises the question has the burden of pleading and proving facts showing the invalidity of an administrative rule or regulation must be made so manifest by the one attacking it that the court has no choice except to hold that the administrative agency has exceeded the authority delegated. Thus he must show that such rule or regulation is clearly inconsistent with statute, or that it is clearly unreasonable, or that it is clearly inappropriate to carry out the end specified in the statute it is intended to implement.

DEFINITION OF SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE

"Ordinarily 'evidence' is deemed 'substantial' if it tips the scales in favor of the party on whom rests the burden of proof, even though it barely tips them, and he is then said to have established his case by a preponderance of the evidence and a finding in his favor on the decisive issue is thus said to be supported by substantial evidence."

Lumpkins v. McPhee, N.M. 280 P. 2d 299, 306

"Evidence is 'substantial evidence' within rule that findings of fact of trial court will be sustained on appeal if supported by substantial evidence, if reasonable men all agree, or if reasonable men may fairly differ as to whether the evidence establishes the facts found, and term may also be defined as evidence of substance, which establishes facts and from which reasonable inferences may be drawn."

Brown v. Cobb, 204 P. 2d 264, 266, 53 N.M. 169

"If reasonable men all agree or if they may fairly differ, evidence is substantial"

Marchbanks v. McCullough, 182 P. 2d 420, 429, 480,
47 N.M. 18

"Determination whether there is 'substantial evidence' to support an order by Corporation Commission does not require that evidence be weighed, but only that evidence tending to support order be considered to determine whether it induces conviction that order was proper or furnished substantial basis of fact from which issue tendered could be reasonably resolved. "

Cities Service Oil Co. v. Anglin, 228 P. 2d 191, 193,
204 Okl. 171

"'Substantial evidence' means evidence from which triers of fact reasonably could find issues in harmony therewith.

State v. Miller, Mo. 202 S. W. 2d 887, 889.

"Under rule that decision of Public Service Commission must be affirmed if supported by substantial evidence in view of the entire record, 'substantial evidence' does not include the idea of weight of evidence."

Gateway City Transfer Co. v Public Service Commission
34 N.W. 2d 238, 242, 253 Wis. 397.

1. "Substantial evidence" sufficient to sustain a finding of an administrative agency is such evidence as a reasonable man would accept as adequate to support a conclusion."

4 Pauline v. Lee, Fla. App. 147 So. 2d 359, 363.

5 "Findings of an administrative agency must be affirmed if, taking the record as a whole, they are supported by 'substantial evidence' which is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion."

8 Boston & M. R. R. vs U.S.D.C. Mass. 208 F. Supp. 661, 670

9 "'Substantial evidence' is a rational basis for the conclusion approved by the administrative board and is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion."

12 Ex Parte Morris, 83 So. 2d 716, 720, 263 Ala. 664

13 "Under the administrative Procedure Act provisions that no administrative order shall be issued unless it is supported by 'substantial evidence', quoted phrase means the kind of evidence a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion."

16 John W. McGrath Corp. v Hughes, C.A.N.Y, 264 F. 2d. 314, 316

17 "The conventional formula for judicial application of the 'substantial evidence rule' that factual findings of an administrative agency are final if supported by substantial evidence, is that there must be such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion."

20 Freud v. Davis 165 A. 2d 850, 852, 64 N.J. Super 242

22 "'Substantial evidence' which will sustain the finding of an administrator in an administrative proceeding means enough evidence to justify, if the trial were to a jury, a refusal to direct a verdict when conclusion sought to be drawn from it is one of fact for the jury."

25 Larmay v. Hobby, D.C. Wis. 132 F. Supp. 738, 740

27 "If there is substantial evidence to support a finding of the Federal Trade Commission, its order must be affirmed, and 'substantial evidence' means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion."

29 Edelmann & Co. v Federal Trade Commission, C.A. 239 F. 2d, 152, 154

1 "'Substantial evidence' supporting findings of the
2 Secretary mean enough evidence to justify if the
3 trial were to a jury, a refusal to direct a verdict
4 when the conclusion sought to be drawn from it is one of
5 fact for the jury."

Craig v. Ribicoff, D.C.N.C. 192 F. Supp. 479, 481

6 "'Substantial evidence is evidence which if true,
7 has probative force upon the issue, that is evidence
8 favoring facts which are such, that reasonable men
9 may differ as to whether it establishes them and it is
10 evidence from which the triers of fact reasonably could
11 find the issues in harmony therewith."

Davis v. State Dept. of Public Health and Welfare, Mo.
App. 274 S.W. 2d 615, 617

12 "The scope of judicial review of quasi-judicial
13 determination of administrative tribunals is governed
14 by the 'substantial evidence' rule which is whether
15 on whole record there is substantial evidence to support
16 the administrative determination."

Phinn v. Kross, 186 N.Y.S. 2d 469, 472, 8 A.D. 2d 132.

17 "On appeal from order of Public Utility Commission
18 granting motor carrier certificate of convenience and
19 necessity, inquiry of Superior Court is whether there is
20 'substantial evidence' to support the finding, and
21 'substantial evidence' means such relevant evidence as a
22 reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a
23 conclusion, or competent and relevant evidence having a
24 rational probative force."

Pittsburgh & L.E. R. Co. v. Pennsylvania Public Utility
Commission, 85 A. 2d 646, 649, 170 Pa. Super. 411

25 "To be 'substantial,' evidence must be strong enough to
26 raise a presumption of fact and must be sufficient when
27 undenied to establish the fact."

Otis & Co. vs Securities & Exchange Commission, C.A.D.C.,
176 F. 2d 34, 43.

28 See 364 P. 2d 349, 69 N.M. 91 for latest definition
29

MEMO RE: SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE

Our Supreme Court on appeals from administrative bodies states that the questions to be answered by the Court are questions of law and are actually restricted to whether the administrative body is acting fraudently, arbitrarily or capriciously, whether the order was supported by substantial evidence, and generally, whether the action of the administrative body was within the scope of its authority. (Johnson vs. Sanchez 351 P.2d 449, 67 N.M. 41)

It could well be contended that the substantial evidence rule applies to administrative bodies in instances where their order is based upon a finding where the administrative bodies' action was of a quasi judicial nature, but that the substantial evidence rule does not apply to administrative bodies where their action pertains to their rule-making authority, where their action is in the nature of an administrative or a legislative nature. This is particularly true where the standard of proof required for the administrative action has been set by statute as is the case at hand.

"The 'substantial evidence' rule was held not applicable on review of a determination as to which the legislature had specified a standard of proof required for the administrative determination, that is, where a commissioner was required to make a finding 'by the preponderance of the evidence.'" (2 Am.Jur. 2d, Sec. 661, p.527)

It can be argued that the portion of the order appealed from relating to findings of fact, such as jurisdiction over the parties, and to their proper notice having been given, etc., all of which are quasi judicial findings, must be supported by substantial evidence. On the other hand, the administrative findings upon which the rules and regulations are promulgated does not require substantial evidence to support them.

Section 65-3-14.

"Equitable allocation of allowable production--Pooling--Spacing.--(a) The rules, regulations or orders of the commission shall, so far as it is practicable to do so, afford to the owner of each property in a pool the opportunity to produce his just and equitable share of the oil or gas, or both, in the pool, being an amount, so far as can be practically determined, and so far as such can be practicably

obtained without waste, substantially in the proportion that the quantity of the recoverable oil or gas, or both, under such property bears to the total recoverable oil or gas or both in the pool, and for this purpose to use his just and equitable share of the reservoir energy."

Similarly, the Legislature defined correlative rights as follows:

Section 65-3-29

"(h) 'Correlative rights' means the opportunity afforded, so far as it is practicable to do so, to the owner of each property in a pool to produce without waste his just and equitable share of the oil or gas, or both, in the pool, being an amount, so far as can be practically determined, and so far as can be practicably obtained without waste, * * *."

Our Supreme Court in the case of

Continental Oil Co. v. Oil Conservation Commission of New Mexico, 373 P.2d 809, 70 N.M. 310

recognized the Commission's power to allocate allowables as being of a legislative nature and it recognized the legislature's specified standard of proof required.

"The commission was here concerned with a formula for computing allowables, which is obviously directly related to correlative rights, it is incumbent upon the commission to determine, 'so far as it is practical to do so,' certain foundationary matters, without which the correlative rights of the various owners cannot be ascertained. Therefore, the commission, by 'basic conclusions of fact' (or what might be termed 'findings'), must determine, insofar as practicable, (1) the amount of recoverable gas under each producer's tract; (2) the total amount of recoverable gas in the pool; (3) the proportion that (1) bears to (2); and (4) what portion of the arrived at proportion can be recovered without waste. That the extent of the correlative rights must first be determined before the commission can act to protect them is manifest.

* * * * *

"Additionally, it should be observed that the commission, 'in so far as in practicable, shall prevent drainage between producing tracts in a pool which is not equalized by counter-drainage,' under the provisions of Sec. 65-3-13 (c)."

The Court in the Continental Oil Company case found that the commission made no jurisdictional findings (in which instance it would be acting in a quasi judicial nature) but in regard to its authority to promulgate such rules said:

"We therefore find that the order of the commission lacked the basic findings necessary to and upon which jurisdiction depended, and that therefore Order No. R-1092-C and Order No. R-1092-A are invalid and void. We would add that although formal and elaborate findings are not absolutely necessary, nevertheless

basic jurisdictional findings, supported by evidence, are required to show that the commission has heeded the mandate and the standards set out by statute."

The Court did not say that the basis upon which the commission acted in promulgating its rules and regulations must be based upon substantial evidence.

The court concluded by saying:

"It is acting in an administrative capacity in following legislative directions, and not in a judicial or quasi-judicial capacity. The commission's actions are controlled by adequate legislative standards, and it is performing its functions to conserve a very vital natural resource."

MEMO RE: APPEAL AND ERROR

Upon doubtful or deficient record, every presumption is indulged in favor of correctness and regularity of decision of court below. Coastal Plains Oil Co. v. Douglas, 364 P.2d 131, 69 N.M. 68.

The Supreme Court on appeal will consider the features of the transcript most favorable to the party prevailing below. State ex rel. State Highway Commission v. Tanny, 359 P.2d 350, 68 N.M. 117.

In reviewing evidence on appeal to determine whether verdict is supported by evidence, court must view evidence in aspect most favorable to verdict, indulging in all reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom, and disregarding all unfavorable testimony and inferences. Reid v. Brown, 240 P.2d 213, 56 N.M. 65.

In reviewing evidence on appeal, all conflicts must be resolved in favor of successful party, and all reasonable inferences indulged in to support the judgment, and all evidence and inferences to the contrary will be disregarded. Little v. Johnson, 242 P.2d 1000, 56 N.M. 497.

When a verdict is attacked as being unsupported, it is the duty of the appellate court to view the evidence in the most favorable aspect, indulging in all reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom, and disregarding all unfavorable testimony and inferences, to sustain the verdict. Silva v. Haake, 245 P.2d 835, 56 N.M. 497.

All presumptions are in favor of the judgment. Tri-Bullion Corp. v. American Smelting & Refining Co., 277 P.2d 293, 58 N.M. 787.

Supreme Court will not reverse decision of trial court if there is substantial evidence to support findings, and in reviewing record, Supreme Court must consider evidence in light most favorable to appellee. Edwards v. Peterson, 295 P.2d 858, 61 N.M. 104.

Every presumption is indulged in favor of correctness of judgment. Transport Trucking Co. v. First Nat. Bank in Albuquerque 300 P.2d 476, 61 NM 320.

In reviewing evidence on appeal, all disputed facts are resolved in favor of the successful party and all reasonable inferences indulged in to support the judgment, and all evidence and inferences to the contrary will be disregarded and the evidence viewed in the aspect most favorable to the judgment. Hine v. Hines, 328 P.2d 944, 64 N.M. 377.

Under the "substantial evidence rule," Supreme Court on review will consider features of transcript most favorable to party prevailing below. Lindley v. Lindley, 356 P.2d 455, 67 N.M. 439

Appellate Court must reconcile any doubt or inconsistency in findings in favor of trial court's judgment. Heine v. Reynolds, 367 P.2d 708, 69 N.M. 398

In examining evidence to determine whether trial court's finding is supported by substantial evidence, Supreme Court will view evidence in light most favorable to supporting finding. Montano v. Saavedra, 373 P.2d 824, 70 N.M. 332.

Where findings are uncertain, doubtful or ambiguous, reviewing court should indulge all presumptions in favor of correctness of judgment. Batte v. Stanley's 374 P.2d 124, 70 N.M. 364.

Supreme Court must view evidence, together with all reasonable inferences to be deduced therefrom, in light most favorable to successful party, and all evidence to the contrary must be disregarded, where the appellant asserts that evidence does not substantially support trial court's findings of fact. Trujillo v. Clark, 377 P.2d 958, 71 N.M. 288.

Reviewing court will not weigh conflicting evidence, but will resolve conflict so as to uphold judgment. Moore v. Moore, 379 P.2d 784, 71 N.M. 495.


Where verdict is attacked on appeal as not being supported by substantial evidence, Supreme Court must view evidence and all inferences flowing therefrom in light most favorable to appellee and to validity of verdict. Ruiz v. Hedges, 364 P.2d 136, 69 N.M. 75.

VOLUME OF ALLOCATION OF BASIN DAKOTA STUDY, EXHIBIT-A, ORDER NO. R-22593.
SUMMARY TOTALS INCLUDE ALL WELLS WITHIN THE .7 TO 1.3 TOLERANCE AS
DEFINED BY THE ASTERISK.

25 - 75	60 - 40
VOLUME	VOLUME
2095366	2536502
2,324,252	3,277,641
	352

SAN JUAN BASIN GAS PRORATION SCHEDULE

**New Mexico
Oil Conservation Commission**



AUGUST, 1963

ORDER NO. AG-N-17-A

BEFORE THE OIL CONSERVATION COMMISSION
OF THE STATE OF NEW MEXICO

ORDER No. AG-N-17-A

SUPPLEMENTARY GAS PRORATION ORDER FOR THE MONTH
OF AUGUST, 1963

The Commission held public hearing at Santa Fe, New Mexico, on July 17, 1963, at 9 o'clock a.m., pursuant to legal notice, for the purpose of setting the allowable production of gas from the following nine gas pools in San Juan, Rio Arriba, and Sandoval Counties, New Mexico, for the month of August, 1963.

Blanco-Mesaverde, Basin-Dakota, Aztec-Pictured Cliffs,
Ballard-Pictured Cliffs, South Blanco-Pictured Cliffs,
Fulcher Kutz-Pictured Cliffs, Tapacito-Pictured Cliffs,
West Kutz-Pictured Cliffs, and Devils Fork-Gallup.

NOW, on this 17th day of July, 1963, the Commission a quorum being present, having considered the supplementary nominations of purchasers, the capacity of producing wells, and being otherwise fully advised in the premises,

FINDS:

(1) That the total nomination of purchasers of gas produced from the above-listed nine gas pools for the month of August, 1963, is 22,194,691 MCF. The individual pool nominations, which total 22,194,691 MCF, are as follows:

Blanco-Mesaverde	9,422,300 MCF
Basin-Dakota	7,651,500 MCF
Aztec-Pictured Cliffs	614,900 MCF
Ballard-Pictured Cliffs	678,800 MCF
South Blanco-Pictured Cliffs	2,598,200 MCF
Fulcher Kutz-Pictured Cliffs	305,400 MCF
Tapacito-Pictured Cliffs	513,400 MCF
West Kutz-Pictured Cliffs	248,400 MCF
Devils Fork-Gallup (adjusted)	164,791 MCF

(2) That the potential producing capacity of all gas wells in the nine gas pools listed above is in excess of the nominations of purchasers of gas, and in order to prevent waste and protect correlative rights, the production of gas from the above-listed nine gas pools should be limited, allocated, and distributed during the month of August, 1963.

(3) That all the producing gas wells, together with the expected completed or recompleted wells in the nine gas pools listed above, can produce a total of 22,194,691 MCF without causing waste during the month of August, 1963, and an allocation based upon such production would be reasonable and protect correlative rights.

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED:

(1) That for the month of August, 1963, the allowable production to be assigned the nine allocated gas pools in San Juan, Rio Arriba, and Sandoval Counties, New Mexico, is as follows:

dag

SEAL

A. L. PORTER, Jr., Member & Secretary

E. S. WALKER, Member

JACK M. CAMPBELL, Chairman

STATE OF NEW MEXICO
OIL CONSERVATION COMMISSION

(2) That the allocation hereby set for the month of August, 1963, in the nine allocated pools in San Juan, Rio Arriba, and Sandoval Counties, New Mexico, shall be in accordance with the Commission Rules and Regulations, and Orders.

(3) That a proration schedule, duly prepared by the Commission and thereafter adopted for the month of August, 1963, is hereto attached and made a part hereof; it distributes and allocates the allowable production among the gas wells in the nine gas pools listed above for the period stated, in accordance with the Commission Rules and Regulations, and Orders.

The foregoing order shall remain effective until further order of the Commission.

DONE at Santa Fe, New Mexico, on the day and year hereinabove designated.

Blanco-Mesaverde	9,422,300 MCF
Basin-Dakota	7,651,500 MCF
Aztec-Pictured Cliffs	614,900 MCF
Ballard-Pictured Cliffs	678,800 MCF
South Blanco-Pictured Cliffs	2,598,200 MCF
Fulcher Kutz-Pictured Cliffs	305,400 MCF
Tapacito-Pictured Cliffs	513,400 MCF
West Kutz-Pictured Cliffs	248,400 MCF
Devils Fork-Gallup	164,791 MCF

NORTHWEST GAS REORATION FACTORS BY PIPELINES
AUG. 1963
SUMMARY PAGE 1

CT.	ACREAGE FACTORS		DELIVERABILITY FACTORS		AX D FACTORS	NOMINATIONS	AUGUST ALLOCATION		COUNT	JUNE PROD.					
	NM	MARG	NM	MARG			MARG	NONMARG		TOTAL	NONMARG.	MARG			
DAKOTA SECTION															
60 PERCENT ACREAGE			40 PERCENT ACREAGE			PAGE 1									
BASIN DAKOTA GAS POOL	FACTORS		F1	3473.51	F2	1.794698									
EL PASO	34	58439	3408	707689	3042	707684	6462100	75077	3375039	586	2830391	2356649	51795		
KERN COUNTY	200			246	246				7389	2	7830	7830			
PAN AMERICAN GAS CO	800			11692	11692		1300000		48771	8	90013	85072			
PAN AMERICAN	200			4227	4227		600000		14533	2	32326	32326			
PLATEAU INC	100			1450	1450		140000		6076	1	14237	14237			
SOUTHERN UNION	300			383128	88	382376	910400	816	1550025	250	1297009	1268406	7246		
SOU UNION	300			33945	216	33261	750000	4435	197580	39	486953	484078	2875		
TOTAL	88425	4008	1142377			7651500		80328	5199413	888	4758759	4248598	61916		
GALLUP SECTION															
100 PERCENT ACREAGE					PAGE 26										
DEVILS FORK GALLUP POOL	FACTORS		F1	6597.94											
EL PASO	750					109600			67335	4	27167	27167			
SOU UNION	200					40200		7677	97457	5	44623	35243	9380		
TOTAL	1750	200				149800		7677	164792	9	71790	62410	9380		
MESAVERDE SECTION															
25 PERCENT ACREAGE			75 PERCENT ACREAGE			PAGE 27									
BLANCO MESA VERDE POOL	FACTORS		F1	1569.71	F2	5.256025									
EL PASO	24050		1235461	291361	2973067	9342700	413934	9353917	1458	7783106	7368104	301323			
SOU UNION	1255		6165	930	6156	69600	16822	78941	30	55489	30216	16002			
SOU UNION	2011		174617	2111	173634	100000	28959	1214167	176	1811185	1784662	26523			
TOTAL	27320	1435247		22177	1453657	9422300	459715	10647025	1654	9649780	9102983	343648			
PICTURE CLIFF SECTION															
25 PERCENT ACREAGE			75 PERCENT ACREAGE			PAGE 66									
ANTICLINAL CLIFF POOL	FACTORS		F1	433.30	F2	5.453065									
EL PASO	4057		55057	1721	55410	470306	47220	439455	344	552047	522709	24987			
SOU UNION	500		17000	875	17075	144600	7125	126408	60	24010	79423	4587			
SOU UNION	5000		5000	1111	5000		10000	37040	15	2792	1956	625			
TOTAL	5001	74948		5105	74925	614000	55277	603703	319	638339	604009	30400			

NORTHWEST GAS PRORATION FACTORS BY PIPELINES
AUG. 1963 SUMMARY PAGE 2

CT.	ACREAGE FACTORS			DELIVERABILITY FACTORS			A X D FACTORS	NOMINATIONS	AUGUST ALLOCATION		COUNT	JUNE PROD.		
	M	NM	MARG	NM	MARG	MARG			NONMARG	TOTAL		NONMARG.	MARG	
BALLARD PICTURED CLIFF POOL														
EL PASO				F1	472.60		F2	5,615,472						
71	27229	7105		67863	2568		67255	552800	64621	570984	285	559977	492140	37307
SOU UNION					214		16614	126000	8283	129881	62	210052	204663	3612
78	33218	7805		84628	2782		83869	678800	72904	700865	347	770029	696803	40919
FULCHER KUTZ PICTURED CLIFF POOL														
EL PASO				F1	259.72		F2	4,665,277						
51	6578	5147		9501	1896		8932	155500	43194	101953	77	123646	98896	24750
SOU UNION					3803		15058	149900	102547	193019	99	152143	87236	64907
136	14364	12992		26548	5699		23990	305400	145741	294972	176	275789	186132	89657
SOUTH BLANCO PICTURED CLIFF POOL														
EL PASO				F1	667.76		F2	5,359,048						
149	74077	15181		268395	13203		267906	2328400	183455	2113846	766	2169757	2024024	134384
SOU UNION					5009		38880	269800	45968	307704	85	224676	190919	33757
170	2070	17256		307521	18212		306786	2598200	229423	2421550	851	2394433	2214943	168141
TAPACITO PICTURED CLIFF POOL														
EL PASO				F1	835.94		F2	2,628,984						
14	8168	1385		56365	1295		56729	331300	18339	235759	81	259824	213102	17335
SOU UNION					114		57436	182100	2615	185379	38	219430	217237	2193
16	11968	1585		113801	1409		114165	513400	20954	421138	119	479254	430339	19528
WEST KUTZ PICTURED CLIFF POOL														
EL PASO				F1	258.48		F2	3,023,010						
52	7383	5186		20699	1570		18597	192700	53024	128324	100	141542	130791	10751
SOU UNION					275		9261	55700	6744	43730	37	16280	15293	987
62	10860	6180		30185	1845		27858	248400	59768	172054	137	157822	146084	11738

AUGUST 1963 NORTHWEST GAS PRORATION POOL BALANCING SCHEDULE

	<u>BASIN DAKOTA POOL</u>		<u>DEVIL'S FORK GALLUP</u>		<u>BLANCO MESAVERDE</u>	
August Nominations		7,651,500		149,800		9,422,300
Volumetric Withdrawal Adjustment				+ 14,991		
June Net Allowable	9,711,871		393,930		9,681,988	
June Production	<u>4,310,514</u> -	5,401,357	<u>71,790</u>		<u>9,526,830</u> -	155,158
July Nominations	7,025,000		146,800		8,378,900	
July Current Allowable	<u>4,075,724</u> +	2,949,276	<u>160,426</u>		<u>6,999,043</u> +	1,379,857
Total August Pool Allocation		5,199,419		164,791		10,646,999
Less: August Minimum Allowable TN	-0-		-0-		14,000	
Less: August Low Acreage NM	-0-		-0-		-0-	
Less: August Marginal Allocation	80,328	80,328	7,677	7,677	445,715	459,715
Total August Non Marginal Pool Allocation	3473.51	5,119,091	8977.94	157,114	1569.71	10,187,284
Non-Marginal A x D Allocation Factor	1.794698		-0-		5.256029	
Actual Pool Allocation						
August Supplements to June Net Allowable		5,199,413		164,792		10,647,025
August Supplements to July Current Allowable		- 455,995		- 5,625		- 93,076
Am't. August Minimum Allowable Acreage Factor TN		+ 89,548		- 4,364		+ 29,375
Am't. August Minimum Allowable A x D Factor TN		-0-		-0-		14.15
Am't. August Low Acreage Acre Factors NM		-0-		-0-		915
Am't. August Low Acreage A x D Factors NM		-0-		-0-		-0-
Number of Minimum Allowable Wells TN		-0-		-0-		-0-
Number of Low Acreage Wells NM		-0-		-0-		12
Total Participating Number of Wells		928		10		-0-
Total Participating Acreage Factors NM		884.25		17.50		1,928
Total Participating Deliverability Factors NM		1,142,377		-0-		1622.48
Total Participating A x D Factors NM		1,140,936		-0-		1,466,247
Number of Delinquent Wells NM		-0-		-0-		1,453,657
Am't. Delinquent Deliv. Acreage Factors NM		-0-		-0-		4.00
Total Marginal Production of Pool		61,916		9,380		343,848
Percent NM Allow. Distributed on Basis of Acreage		60		100		25
Percent NM Allow. Distributed on Basis of A x D		40		-0-		71

ALL VOLUMES ARE MCF GAS @ 15.025 PSIA @ 60° F.

AUGUST 1963 NORTHWEST GAS PRORATION POOL BALANCING SCHEDULE

	<u>AZTEC PC POOL</u>	<u>BALLARD PC POOL</u>	<u>FULCHER KUTZ PC POOL</u>
August Nominations	614,900	678,800	305,400
Volumetric Withdrawal Adjustment			
June Net Allowable	607,918	956,128	307,577
June Production	<u>634,488</u> +	<u>737,722</u> -	<u>275,789</u> -
July Nominations	604,000	669,300	290,000
July Current Allowable	<u>641,768</u> -	<u>428,839</u> +	<u>268,645</u> +
Total August Pool Allocation	603,702	700,855	294,967
Less: August Minimum Allowable TN	12,000	15,000	24,000
Less: August Low Acreage NM	-0-	-0-	7,500
Less: August Marginal Allocation	53,278	57,904	114,241
Total August Non Marginal Pool Allocation	538,424	72,904	145,741
Non-Marginal Acreage Allocation Factor	436.90	472.60	259.72
Non-Marginal A x D Allocation Factor	5.433065	5.615472	4.665277
Actual Pool Allocation	603,703	700,865	294,972
August Supplements to June Net Allowable	+ 1,509	+ 32	+ 4,251
August Supplements to July Current Allowable	+ 444	- 180	+ 1,353
Am't. August Minimum Allowable Acreage Factor TN	12.05	15.00	23.20
Am't. August Minimum Allowable A x D Factor TN	621	758	1,562
Am't. August Low Acreage Acre Factors NM	-0-	-0-	1.80
Am't. August Low Acreage A x D Factors NM	-0-	-0-	267
Number of Minimum Allowable Wells TN	12	15	24
Number of Low Acreage Wells NM	-0-	-0-	5
Total Participating Number of Wells	378	425	312
Total Participating Acreage Factors NM	308.09	332.18	143.64
Total Participating Deliverability Factors NM	74,942	84,628	26,548
Total Participating A x D Factors NM	74,326	83,869	23,990
Number of Delinquent Wells NM	-0-	-0-	2
Am't. Delinquent Deliv. Acreage Factors NM	-0-	-0-	2.00
Total Marginal Production of Pool	30,400	40,919	89,657
Percent NM Allow. Distributed on Basis of Acreage	25	25	25
Percent NM Allow. Distributed on Basis of A x D	75	75	75

ALL VOLUMES ARE MCF GAS @ 15.025 PSIA @ 60° F.

AUGUST 1963 NORTHWEST GAS PRODUCTION POOL BALANCING SCHEDULE

5

	<u>SOUTH BLANCO PC</u>	<u>TAFACITO PC</u>	<u>WEST KUTZ PC</u>
August Nominations			
Volumetric Withdrawal Adjustment			
June Net Allowable	2,598,200		248,400
June Production	3,226,395	640,071	311,243
July Nominations	<u>2,383,084</u> -	<u>449,867</u> -	<u>157,822</u> -
July Current Allowable	2,466,900	449,400	238,600
Total August Pool Allocation	1,800,258 +	351,459 +	161,525 +
Less: August Minimum Allowable TN	2,421,531	421,137	172,054
Less: August Low Acreage NM	29,000	-0-	27,000
Less: August Marginal Allocation	-0-	-0-	-0-
Total August Non Marginal Pool Allocation	200,423	20,954	32,768
Non-Marginal Acreage Allocation Factor	2,192,108	400,183	59,768
Non-Marginal A x D Allocation Factor	667.76	835.94	258.48
Actual Pool Allocation	5.359048	2.628984	3.023010
August Supplements to June Net Allowable	2,421,550	421,138	172,054
August Supplements to July Current Allowable	-	-	-
Am't. August Minimum Allowable Acreage Factor TN	13,602	14,013	1,686
Am't. August Minimum Allowable A x D Factor TN	+ 4,940	+ 4,270	+ 285
Am't. August Low Acreage Acre Factors NM	28.97	-0-	26.71
Am't. August Low Acreage A x D Factors NM	1,509	-0-	2,167
Number of Minimum Allowable Wells TN	-0-	-0-	-0-
Number of Low Acreage Wells NM	29	-0-	27
Total Participating Number of Wells	-0-	-0-	-0-
Total Participating Acreage Factors NM	1,021	135	199
Total Participating Deliverability Factors NM	820.70	119.68	108.60
Total Participating A x D Factors NM	307,521	113,801	30,185
Number of Delinquent Wells NM	306,786	114,165	27,858
Am't. Delinquent Deliv. Acreage Factors NM	3	-0-	1
Total Marginal Production of Pool	3.00	-0-	1.00
Percent NM Allow. Distributed on Basis of Acreage	168,141	19,528	11,738
Percent NM Allow. Distributed on Basis of A x D	25	25	25
	75	75	75

ALL VOLUMES ARE MCF GAS @ 15.025 PSIA @ 60° F.

EXPLANATION OF CURRENT STATUS CODE COLUMN

NORTHWEST GAS PRODUCTION SCHEDULE

A	ALLOWABLE CANCELLED	Signifies that the well's allowable has been cancelled for failure to file an annual deliverability test. Wells so classified may be produced unless ordered shut-in by the Commission.
XM	EXEMPT (MARGINAL)	Signifies a marginal well which is exempt from taking the annual deliverability test. This determination is made on the basis of the well's ability to produce.
IN	INTERFERENCE TEST (NON-MARGINAL)	Signifies a non-marginal well which is on "Communication" test in accordance with Order R-939.
BN	BUILD-UP TEST (NON-MARGINAL)	Signifies a non-marginal well which is on "Pressure Build-up" test in accordance with Orders R-939, and R-1055.
TN	MINIMUM ALLOWABLE (NON-MARGINAL)	This category is equivalent to the XM classification except that these wells will be assigned a minimum allowable of 1000 MCF/Mo. and will earn an over/under status.
N	NON-MARGINAL	Signifies a non-marginal well with allocation based upon the appropriate formula.
M	MARGINAL	Signifies a marginal well with a constant allowable granted on the basis of the highest producing month during the preceding six months period. This allowable is only a preliminary allowable. The actual allowable is equal to the well's production up to the well's calculated non-marginal allowable. A marginal well which produces more than its non-marginal allowable during the time it is classified as marginal will be subject to reclassification to non-marginal and the production in excess of its non-marginal allowable charged to its status.
X	SIX TIMES OVER-PRODUCED FLAG	This flag in the over/under produced field of the schedule signifies those wells which have over produced six or more times the latest current allowable shown in the schedule.
NC	NEW CONNECTION	Signifies newly connected non-marginal wells.
L, N OR M	LOW ACREAGE NON-MARGINAL OR MARGINAL	Signifies a well which has been granted a maximum allowable of 1500 MCF Mo. by order of the New Mexico Oil Conservation Commission to prevent premature abandonment. The N or M signifies non-marginal or marginal as the case may be.
NOTE:		Some of the wells listed on this schedule may have been shut-in by the Commission. In all such cases both the operator and transporter are individually notified by supplements which take precedence over this schedule. In no event shall a shut-in well be produced until released by the Commission.

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CO WATER
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CENTRAL COMPRESSOR
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DESCRIPTION	STATUS	ACREAGE FACTOR	JUNE		JULY		AUGUST		ACREAGE ON DELIVERABILITY
			BEGINNING NET ALLOWABLE ±	NCF PRODUCTION	OVER/UNDER PRODUCTION ±	CURRENT ALLOWABLE	ENDING NET ALLOWABLE ±	NEW ALLOCATION	
STAYING	113	1.00	1153	95	1058	2120	3178	4148	376
STAYING	113	1.00	7619	112	7507	2579	10086	4462	551
STAYING	113	1.00	23678	1555	22123	1596	23719	3789	176
STAYING	113	1.00	19300	1038	18262	1289	19551	3579	159
STAYING	113	1.00	7698	21824	14126	3392	10734	4910	915
STAYING	113	1.00	25510	3861	29371	5444	23927	6422	1643
STAYING	113	1.00	18572	322	18894	3733	15161	5252	991
STAYING	113	1.00	21059	3223	24282	4271	20011	5620	1196
STAYING	113	1.00	626	2457	3083	2936	147	4706	687
STAYING	113	1.00	11434	3785	15219	5194	10025	6252	1548
STAYING	113	1.00	22573	14413	8160	2655	10815	4514	580
STAYING	113	1.00	27432	186	27618	10220	17398	9690	3464
STAYING	113	1.00	5703	2961	2742	2975	5717	4733	702
STAYING	113	1.00	14211	14211	14211	12225	26436	11170	4049
STAYING	113	1.00	1758	1758	1758	8812	7054	8727	2927
STAYING	113	1.00	30822	30822	30822	10370	20452	9793	3521
STAYING	113	1.00	2451	179	2630	9680	7050	9321	3258
STAYING	113	1.00	6238	213	6451	9192	2741	8987	3072
STAYING	113	1.00	15826	3873	11953	4623	16576	5860	1330
STAYING	113	1.00	3931	18240	14309	3156	11153	4857	771
STAYING	113	1.00	73069	330	4435	9457	63612	9168	3173
STAYING	113	1.00	4765	26055	26055	8843	13278	8748	2939
STAYING	113	1.00	10094	10094	10094	8793	17262	8714	2920
STAYING	113	1.00	27851	27851	27851	6404	3690	7079	2009
STAYING	113	1.00	13272	1196	12076	1501	13577	3725	140
STAYING	113	1.00	19653	19653	19653	13685	5968	12061	4785
STAYING	113	1.00	6118	6118	6118	6055	63	6921	1809
STAYING	113	1.00	5966	5418	548	8452	9000	8481	2790
STAYING	113	1.00	22565	87	22652	4452	22652	5744	1265
STAYING	113	1.00	4063	131	3932	8578	5107	8567	2838
STAYING	113	1.00	3141	330	3471	2207	2896	4208	409
STAYING	113	1.00	2589	1900	689	2731	2853	4566	609
STAYING	113	1.00	5315	5193	122				

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DESCRIPTION	STATUS	ACREAGE FACTOR	JUNE		MCF PRODUCTION	OVER/UNDER PRODUCTION ±	JULY		AUGUST	ACREAGE OR DELIVERABILITY
			BEGINNING NET ALLOWABLE ±	ENDING NET ALLOWABLE ±			CURRENT ALLOWABLE	NEW ALLOCATION		
1 D 22912	N 100	60489	60489	60489	PRODUCING COMPANY	60489	3702	5231	979	
THE T 22912	N 100	78952	78952	78952	PRODUCING COMPANY	78952	5110	6194	1516	
DO 33000	N 100	7247	7247	7247	PRODUCING COMPANY	7247	3744	5259	1995	
F 50000	N 100	26437	26437	26437	PRODUCING COMPANY	26437	2708	4550	600	
S 50000	N 100	22404	22404	22404	PRODUCING COMPANY	22404	4945	6081	1453	
1 11000	N 100	27041	27041	27041	PRODUCING COMPANY	27041	2062	4109	1354	
AR 44000	N 100	18249	18249	18249	PRODUCING COMPANY	18249	6023	6819	1864	
OR 44000	N 100	29346	29346	29346	PRODUCING COMPANY	29346	9342	9089	3129	
3 33000	N 100	11077	11077	11077	PRODUCING COMPANY	11077	11437	10523	3928	
3 33000	N 100	11905	11905	11905	PRODUCING COMPANY	11905	5785	6656	1773	
3 33000	N 100	9508	9508	9508	PRODUCING COMPANY	9508	2700	4545	597	
3 33000	N 100	15270	15270	15270	PRODUCING COMPANY	15270	3361	4997	849	
3 33000	N 100	10586	10586	10586	PRODUCING COMPANY	10586	3912	5374	1059	
3 33000	N 100	26490	26490	26490	PRODUCING COMPANY	26490	3492	5087	1899	
3 33000	N 100	15340	15340	15340	PRODUCING COMPANY	15340	9334	9084	3126	
3 33000	N 100	15481	15481	15481	PRODUCING COMPANY	15481	4182	5559	1162	
3 33000	N 100	9616	9616	9616	PRODUCING COMPANY	9616	5771	6647	1176	
3 33000	N 100	13792	13792	13792	PRODUCING COMPANY	13792	3972	5415	1082	
3 33000	N 100	20348	20348	20348	PRODUCING COMPANY	20348	3274	4938	816	
3 33000	N 100	28891	28891	28891	PRODUCING COMPANY	28891	1900	3998	292	
3 33000	N 100	43400	43400	43400	PRODUCING COMPANY	43400	4796	5979	1396	
3 33000	N 100	39408	39408	39408	PRODUCING COMPANY	39408	3059	4791	1734	
3 33000	N 100	36057	36057	36057	PRODUCING COMPANY	36057	2500	4409	521	
3 33000	N 100	30520	30520	30520	PRODUCING COMPANY	30520	4696	5911	1358	
3 33000	N 100	28415	28415	28415	PRODUCING COMPANY	28415	1748	3893	234	
3 33000	N 100	5591	5591	5591	PRODUCING COMPANY	5591	3080	4805	742	
3 33000	N 100	15889	15889	15889	PRODUCING COMPANY	15889	1693	3856	213	
3 33000	N 100	34597	34597	34597	PRODUCING COMPANY	34597	2532	4430	533	
3 33000	N 100	32581	32581	32581	PRODUCING COMPANY	32581	43200	4430	533	
3 33000	N 100	7375	7375	7375	PRODUCING COMPANY	7375	2023	4082	339	
3 33000	N 100	26572	26572	26572	PRODUCING COMPANY	26572	1829	3949	265	
3 33000	N 100	21458	21458	21458	PRODUCING COMPANY	21458	2621	4491	567	
3 33000	N 100	15364	15364	15364	PRODUCING COMPANY	15364	1944	4028	309	
3 33000	N 100	31270	31270	31270	PRODUCING COMPANY	31270	3290	4949	822	
3 33000	N 100	25201	25201	25201	PRODUCING COMPANY	25201	1614	3802	183	

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DESCRIPTION		STATUS	ACREAGE FACTOR	BEGINNING NET ALLOWABLE ±	MCF PRODUCTION	OVER/UNDER PRODUCTION ±	CURRENT ALLOWABLE	ENDING NET ALLOWABLE ±	AUGUST NEW ALLOCATION	ACREAGE OR DELIVERABILITY
SOUTHERN GAS SYSTEM										
JUNE										
TEXAS CO. 33001	DO	0.00	65954	82273	65954	8704	74658	86553	28866	
TEXAS CO. 33002	DO	0.00	10330	32470	2057	4392	6449	5703	1242	
TEXAS CO. 33003	DO	0.00	61860	24168	29390	6055	35445	6840	1876	
TEXAS CO. 33004	DO	0.00	14199	9317	9969EX	7741	2228-	7994	2519	
TEXAS CO. 33005	DO	0.00	129-	9446EX	1968	1968	7478-	4044	318	
TEXAS CO. 33006	DO	0.00	37252		37252	7374	44626	7743	2379	
TEXAS CO. 33007	DO	0.00	19600	25222	5622EX	21316	15694	17282	7694	
TEXAS CO. 33008	DO	0.00	6591	23469	16878EX	20041	3163	16410	7208	
TEXAS CO. 33009	DO	0.00	42357-	6595	48952EX	4992	43960-	6114	1471	
TEXAS CO. 33010	DO	0.00	20296	1275652	205424	3341	23637	4930	867	
TEXAS CO. 33011	DO	0.00	981076	1275652	205424	3341	990944	1550025		
SOUTHERN GAS COMPANY										
TEXAS CO. 33012	DO	0.00	65954	82273	65954	8704	74658	86553	28866	
TEXAS CO. 33013	DO	0.00	10330	32470	2057	4392	6449	5703	1242	
TEXAS CO. 33014	DO	0.00	61860	24168	29390	6055	35445	6840	1876	
TEXAS CO. 33015	DO	0.00	14199	9317	9969EX	7741	2228-	7994	2519	
TEXAS CO. 33016	DO	0.00	129-	9446EX	1968	1968	7478-	4044	318	
TEXAS CO. 33017	DO	0.00	37252		37252	7374	44626	7743	2379	
TEXAS CO. 33018	DO	0.00	19600	25222	5622EX	21316	15694	17282	7694	
TEXAS CO. 33019	DO	0.00	6591	23469	16878EX	20041	3163	16410	7208	
TEXAS CO. 33020	DO	0.00	42357-	6595	48952EX	4992	43960-	6114	1471	
TEXAS CO. 33021	DO	0.00	20296	1275652	205424	3341	23637	4930	867	
TEXAS CO. 33022	DO	0.00	981076	1275652	205424	3341	990944	1550025		
SOUTHERN GAS COMPANY										
TEXAS CO. 33023	DO	0.00	65954	82273	65954	8704	74658	86553	28866	
TEXAS CO. 33024	DO	0.00	10330	32470	2057	4392	6449	5703	1242	
TEXAS CO. 33025	DO	0.00	61860	24168	29390	6055	35445	6840	1876	
TEXAS CO. 33026	DO	0.00	14199	9317	9969EX	7741	2228-	7994	2519	
TEXAS CO. 33027	DO	0.00	129-	9446EX	1968	1968	7478-	4044	318	
TEXAS CO. 33028	DO	0.00	37252		37252	7374	44626	7743	2379	
TEXAS CO. 33029	DO	0.00	19600	25222	5622EX	21316	15694	17282	7694	
TEXAS CO. 33030	DO	0.00	6591	23469	16878EX	20041	3163	16410	7208	
TEXAS CO. 33031	DO	0.00	42357-	6595	48952EX	4992	43960-	6114	1471	
TEXAS CO. 33032	DO	0.00	20296	1275652	205424	3341	23637	4930	867	
TEXAS CO. 33033	DO	0.00	981076	1275652	205424	3341	990944	1550025		
SOUTHERN GAS COMPANY										
TEXAS CO. 33034	DO	0.00	65954	82273	65954	8704	74658	86553	28866	
TEXAS CO. 33035	DO	0.00	10330	32470	2057	4392	6449	5703	1242	
TEXAS CO. 33036	DO	0.00	61860	24168	29390	6055	35445	6840	1876	
TEXAS CO. 33037	DO	0.00	14199	9317	9969EX	7741	2228-	7994	2519	
TEXAS CO. 33038	DO	0.00	129-	9446EX	1968	1968	7478-	4044	318	
TEXAS CO. 33039	DO	0.00	37252		37252	7374	44626	7743	2379	
TEXAS CO. 33040	DO	0.00	19600	25222	5622EX	21316	15694	17282	7694	
TEXAS CO. 33041	DO	0.00	6591	23469	16878EX	20041	3163	16410	7208	
TEXAS CO. 33042	DO	0.00	42357-	6595	48952EX	4992	43960-	6114	1471	
TEXAS CO. 33043	DO	0.00	20296	1275652	205424	3341	23637	4930	867	
TEXAS CO. 33044	DO	0.00	981076	1275652	205424	3341	990944	1550025		
SOUTHERN GAS COMPANY										
TEXAS CO. 33045	DO	0.00	65954	82273	65954	8704	74658	86553	28866	
TEXAS CO. 33046	DO	0.00	10330	32470	2057	4392	6449	5703	1242	
TEXAS CO. 33047	DO	0.00	61860	24168	29390	6055	35445	6840	1876	
TEXAS CO. 33048	DO	0.00	14199	9317	9969EX	7741	2228-	7994	2519	
TEXAS CO. 33049	DO	0.00	129-	9446EX	1968	1968	7478-	4044	318	
TEXAS CO. 33050	DO	0.00	37252		37252	7374	44626	7743	2379	
TEXAS CO. 33051	DO	0.00	19600	25222	5622EX	21316	15694	17282	7694	
TEXAS CO. 33052	DO	0.00	6591	23469	16878EX	20041	3163	16410	7208	
TEXAS CO. 33053	DO	0.00	42357-	6595	48952EX	4992	43960-	6114	1471	
TEXAS CO. 33054	DO	0.00	20296	1275652	205424	3341	23637	4930	867	
TEXAS CO. 33055	DO	0.00	981076	1275652	205424	3341	990944	1550025		
SOUTHERN GAS COMPANY										
TEXAS CO. 33056	DO	0.00	65954	82273	65954	8704	74658	86553	28866	
TEXAS CO. 33057	DO	0.00	10330	32470	2057	4392	6449	5703	1242	
TEXAS CO. 33058	DO	0.00	61860	24168	29390	6055	35445	6840	1876	
TEXAS CO. 33059	DO	0.00	14199	9317	9969EX	7741	2228-	7994	2519	
TEXAS CO. 33060	DO	0.00	129-	9446EX	1968	1968	7478-	4044	318	
TEXAS CO. 33061	DO	0.00	37252		37252	7374	44626	7743	2379	
TEXAS CO. 33062	DO	0.00	19600	25222	5622EX	21316	15694	17282	7694	
TEXAS CO. 33063	DO	0.00	6591	23469	16878EX	20041	3163	16410	7208	
TEXAS CO. 33064	DO	0.00	42357-	6595	48952EX	4992	43960-	6114	1471	
TEXAS CO. 33065	DO	0.00	20296	1275652	205424	3341	23637	4930	867	
TEXAS CO. 33066	DO	0.00	981076	1275652	205424	3341	990944	1550025		
SOUTHERN GAS COMPANY										
TEXAS CO. 33067	DO	0.00	65954	82273	65954	8704	74658	86553	28866	
TEXAS CO. 33068	DO	0.00	10330	32470	2057	4392	6449	5703	1242	
TEXAS CO. 33069	DO	0.00	61860	24168	29390	6055	35445	6840	1876	
TEXAS CO. 33070	DO	0.00	14199	9317	9969EX	7741	2228-	7994	2519	
TEXAS CO. 33071	DO	0.00	129-	9446EX	1968	1968	7478-	4044	318	
TEXAS CO. 33072	DO	0.00	37252		37252	7374	44626	7743	2379	
TEXAS CO. 33073	DO	0.00	19600	25222	5622EX	21316	15694	17282	7694	
TEXAS CO. 33074	DO	0.00	6591	23469	16878EX	20041	3163	16410	7208	
TEXAS CO. 33075	DO	0.00	42357-	6595	48952EX	4992	43960-	6114	1471	
TEXAS CO. 33076	DO	0.00	20296	1275652	205424	3341	23637	4930	867	
TEXAS CO. 33077	DO	0.00	981076	1275652	205424	3341	990944	1550025		
SOUTHERN GAS COMPANY										
TEXAS CO. 33078	DO	0.00	65954	82273	65954	8704	74658	86553	28866	
TEXAS CO. 33079	DO	0.00	10330	32470	2057	4392	6449	5703	1242	
TEXAS CO. 33080	DO	0.00	61860	24168	29390	6055	35445	6840	1876	
TEXAS CO. 33081	DO	0.00	14199	9317	9969EX	7741	2228-	7994	2519	
TEXAS CO. 33082	DO	0.00	129-	9446EX	1968	1968	7478-	4044	318	
TEXAS CO. 33083	DO	0.00	37252		37252	7374	44626	7743	2379	
TEXAS CO. 33084	DO	0.00	19600	25222	5622EX	21316	15694	17282	7694	
TEXAS CO. 33085	DO	0.00	6591	23469	16878EX	20041	3163	16410	7208	
TEXAS CO. 33086	DO	0.00	42357-	6595	48952EX	4992	43960-	6114	1471	
TEXAS CO. 33087	DO	0.00	20296	1275652	205424	3341	23637	4930	867	
TEXAS CO. 33088	DO	0.00	981076	1275652	205424	3341	990944	1550025		
SOUTHERN GAS COMPANY										
TEXAS CO. 33089	DO	0.00	65954	82273	65954	8704	74658	86553	28866	
TEXAS CO. 33090	DO	0.00	10330	32470	2057	4392	6449	5703	1242	
TEXAS CO. 33091	DO	0.00	61860	24168	29390	6055	35445	6840	1876	
TEXAS CO. 33092	DO	0.00	14199	9317	9969EX	7741	2228-	7994	2519	
TEXAS CO. 33093	DO	0.00	129-	9446EX	1968	1968	7478-	4044	318	
TEXAS CO. 33094	DO	0.00	37252		37252	7374	44626	7743	2379	
TEXAS CO. 33095	DO	0.00	19600	25222	5622EX	21316	15694	17282	7694	
TEXAS CO. 33096	DO	0.00	6591	23469	16878EX	20041	3163	16410	7208	
TEXAS CO. 33097	DO	0.00	42357-	6595	48952EX	4992	43960-	6114	1471	
TEXAS CO. 33098	DO	0.00	20296	1275652	205424	3341	23637	4930	867	
TEXAS CO. 33099	DO	0.00	981076	1275652	205424	3341	990944	1550025		
SOUTHERN GAS COMPANY										
TEXAS CO. 33100	DO	0.00	65954	82273	65954	8704	74658	86553	28866	
TEXAS CO. 33101	DO	0.00	10330	32470	2057	4392	6449	5703	1242	
TEXAS CO. 33102	DO	0.00	61860	24168	29390	6055	35445	6840	1876	
TEXAS CO. 33103	DO	0.00	14199	9317	9969EX	7741	2228-	7994	2519	
TEXAS CO. 33104	DO	0.00	129-	9446EX	1968	1968	7478-	4044	318	
TEXAS CO. 33105	DO	0.00	37252		37252	7374	44626	7743	2379	
TEXAS CO. 33106	DO	0.00	19600	25222	5622EX	21316	15694	17282	7694	
TEXAS CO. 33107	DO	0.00	6591	23469	16878EX	20041	3163	16410	7208	
TEXAS CO. 33108	DO	0.00	42357-	6595	48952EX	4992	43960-	6114	1471	
TEXAS CO. 33109	DO	0.00	20296	1275652	205424	3341	23637	4930	867	
TEXAS CO. 33110	DO	0.00	981076	1275652	205424	3341	990944	1550025		
SOUTHERN GAS COMPANY										
TEXAS CO. 33111	DO	0.00	65954	82273	65954	8704	74658	86553	28866	
TEXAS CO. 33112	DO	0.00	10330	32470	2057	4392	6449	5703	1242	
TEXAS CO. 33113	DO	0.00	61860	24168	29390	6055	35445	6840	1876	
TEXAS CO. 33114	DO	0.00	14199	9317	9969EX	7741	2228-	7994	2519	
TEXAS CO. 33115	DO	0.00	129-	9446EX	1968	1968	7478-	4044	318	
TEXAS CO. 33116	DO	0.00	37252		37252	7374	44626	7743	2379	
TEXAS CO. 33117	DO	0.00	19600	25222	5622EX	21316	15694	17282	7694	
TEXAS CO. 33118	DO	0.00	6591	23469	16878EX	20041	3163	16410	7208	
TEXAS CO. 33119	DO	0.00	42357-	6595	48952EX	4992	43960-	6114	1471	
TEXAS CO. 33120	DO	0.00	20296	1275652	205424	3341	23637	4930	867	

[illegible]

DESCRIPTION	STATUS	ACREAGE FACTOR	JUNE		JULY		AUGUST		ACREAGE OR DELIVERABILITY
			BEGINNING NET ALLOWABLE ±	MCF PRODUCTION	OVER/UNDER PRODUCTION ±	CURRENT ALLOWABLE	ENDING NET ALLOWABLE ±	NEW ALLOCATION	
XXXXXX	XXXXXX	XXXXXX	441091	19481	251065	132773	995582	711288	11704
XXXXXX	XXXXXX	XXXXXX	471881	5926	521948	327738	013745	153384	155836
XXXXXX	XXXXXX	XXXXXX	104689	13822	144831	32323	13445	5351	11335
XXXXXX	XXXXXX	XXXXXX	294786	7589	266308	438231	605764	537732	529320
XXXXXX	XXXXXX	XXXXXX	11836	2038	147595	402218	55757	77545	643140
XXXXXX	XXXXXX	XXXXXX	317524	39718	38658	302245	157787	863978	86677
XXXXXX	XXXXXX	XXXXXX	1243	1077	166	1000	1166	1000	62
XXXXXX	XXXXXX	XXXXXX	2108	5476	3688	3521	153	5485	745
XXXXXX	XXXXXX	XXXXXX	2402	1270	2488	1000	752	1000	131
XXXXXX	XXXXXX	XXXXXX	98707	34852	49855	803067	32514	738715	395382
XXXXXX	XXXXXX	XXXXXX	347747	7966	161064	300511	1189915	151137	17983
XXXXXX	XXXXXX	XXXXXX	166352	23055	4177	29160	0752	47003	8929
XXXXXX	XXXXXX	XXXXXX	8111	6294	460357	45318	1393	8817	10382
XXXXXX	XXXXXX	XXXXXX	432730	5720	9138	2478	1565	3861	436
XXXXXX	XXXXXX	XXXXXX	80075	7196	32075	352	723	9895	1584
XXXXXX	XXXXXX	XXXXXX	7396	2656	4642	1607	002	3071	1689
XXXXXX	XXXXXX	XXXXXX	427	411	8672	154	120	24	191
XXXXXX	XXXXXX	XXXXXX	1879	1879	4524	7899	139	499	916
XXXXXX	XXXXXX	XXXXXX	585620	755189	740397	179705	110899	373742	56376
XXXXXX	XXXXXX	XXXXXX	234457	234457	30378	118773	746172	306368	38040
XXXXXX	XXXXXX	XXXXXX	10231	8893	1338	970	5308	6185	878
XXXXXX	XXXXXX	XXXXXX	75386	12736	3361	54726	1661	59119	841
XXXXXX	XXXXXX	XXXXXX	12736	466	292	2639	78509	90199	1341

DESCRIPTION	STATUS	ACREAGE FACTOR	BEGINNING NET ALLOWABLE ±	MCF PRODUCTION	OVER/UNDER PRODUCTION ±	CURRENT ALLOWABLE	ENDING NET ALLOWABLE ±	NEW ALLOCATION	ACREAGE OR DELIVERABILITY
H O 1	0	0	12442		12442	8306	20748	12939	2163
H O 2	0	0	7337	5602	1735	6133	7868	9554	1519
H O 3	0	0	1883	2939	1056	2346	1190	3499	367
H O 4	0	0	3308	1567	2182	2381	4563	3709	407
H O 5	0	0	3084		3084	5150	1407	9533	1577
H O 6	0	0	4698		4698	5289	591	8240	1269
H O 7	0	0	3510	1060	2450	5468	7968	2098	3693
H O 8	0	0	1133	4333	7037	5890	1173	9175	1447
H O 9	0	0	3109	133	2976	2519	5495	3924	412
H O 10	0	0	7600	5097	1379	1933	6574	3102	226
H O 11	0	0	2072	2179	8328	4159	4169	6479	934
H O 12	0	0	7555	2026	7555	2345	4374	4580	474
H O 13	0	0	3209	6734	1932	2111	1128	4255	175
H O 14	0	0	3475	7354	2111	2111	842	4255	238
H O 15	0	0	4238	7354	2111	2111	842	4255	238
H O 16	0	0	1238	7354	2111	2111	842	4255	238
H O 17	0	0	7354	7354	2111	2111	842	4255	238
H O 18	0	0	7354	7354	2111	2111	842	4255	238
H O 19	0	0	7354	7354	2111	2111	842	4255	238
H O 20	0	0	7354	7354	2111	2111	842	4255	238
H O 21	0	0	7354	7354	2111	2111	842	4255	238
H O 22	0	0	7354	7354	2111	2111	842	4255	238
H O 23	0	0	7354	7354	2111	2111	842	4255	238
H O 24	0	0	7354	7354	2111	2111	842	4255	238
H O 25	0	0	7354	7354	2111	2111	842	4255	238
H O 26	0	0	7354	7354	2111	2111	842	4255	238
H O 27	0	0	7354	7354	2111	2111	842	4255	238
H O 28	0	0	7354	7354	2111	2111	842	4255	238
H O 29	0	0	7354	7354	2111	2111	842	4255	238
H O 30	0	0	7354	7354	2111	2111	842	4255	238
H O 31	0	0	7354	7354	2111	2111	842	4255	238
H O 32	0	0	7354	7354	2111	2111	842	4255	238
H O 33	0	0	7354	7354	2111	2111	842	4255	238
H O 34	0	0	7354	7354	2111	2111	842	4255	238
H O 35	0	0	7354	7354	2111	2111	842	4255	238
H O 36	0	0	7354	7354	2111	2111	842	4255	238
H O 37	0	0	7354	7354	2111	2111	842	4255	238
H O 38	0	0	7354	7354	2111	2111	842	4255	238
H O 39	0	0	7354	7354	2111	2111	842	4255	238
H O 40	0	0	7354	7354	2111	2111	842	4255	238
H O 41	0	0	7354	7354	2111	2111	842	4255	238
H O 42	0	0	7354	7354	2111	2111	842	4255	238
H O 43	0	0	7354	7354	2111	2111	842	4255	238
H O 44	0	0	7354	7354	2111	2111	842	4255	238
H O 45	0	0	7354	7354	2111	2111	842	4255	238
H O 46	0	0	7354	7354	2111	2111	842	4255	238
H O 47	0	0	7354	7354	2111	2111	842	4255	238
H O 48	0	0	7354	7354	2111	2111	842	4255	238
H O 49	0	0	7354	7354	2111	2111	842	4255	238
H O 50	0	0	7354	7354	2111	2111	842	4255	238
H O 51	0	0	7354	7354	2111	2111	842	4255	238
H O 52	0	0	7354	7354	2111	2111	842	4255	238
H O 53	0	0	7354	7354	2111	2111	842	4255	238
H O 54	0	0	7354	7354	2111	2111	842	4255	238
H O 55	0	0	7354	7354	2111	2111	842	4255	238
H O 56	0	0	7354	7354	2111	2111	842	4255	238
H O 57	0	0	7354	7354	2111	2111	842	4255	238
H O 58	0	0	7354	7354	2111	2111	842	4255	238
H O 59	0	0	7354	7354	2111	2111	842	4255	238
H O 60	0	0	7354	7354	2111	2111	842	4255	238
H O 61	0	0	7354	7354	2111	2111	842	4255	238
H O 62	0	0	7354	7354	2111	2111	842	4255	238
H O 63	0	0	7354	7354	2111	2111	842	4255	238
H O 64	0	0	7354	7354	2111	2111	842	4255	238
H O 65	0	0	7354	7354	2111	2111	842	4255	238
H O 66	0	0	7354	7354	2111	2111	842	4255	238
H O 67	0	0	7354	7354	2111	2111	842	4255	238
H O 68	0	0	7354	7354	2111	2111	842	4255	238
H O 69	0	0	7354	7354	2111	2111	842	4255	238
H O 70	0	0	7354	7354	2111	2111	842	4255	238
H O 71	0	0	7354	7354	2111	2111	842	4255	238
H O 72	0	0	7354	7354	2111	2111	842	4255	238
H O 73	0	0	7354	7354	2111	2111	842	4255	238
H O 74	0	0	7354	7354	2111	2111	842	4255	238
H O 75	0	0	7354	7354	2111	2111	842	4255	238
H O 76	0	0	7354	7354	2111	2111	842	4255	238
H O 77	0	0	7354	7354	2111	2111	842	4255	238
H O 78	0	0	7354	7354	2111	2111	842	4255	238
H O 79	0	0	7354	7354	2111	2111	842	4255	238
H O 80	0	0	7354	7354	2111	2111	842	4255	238
H O 81	0	0	7354	7354	2111	2111	842	4255	238
H O 82	0	0	7354	7354	2111	2111	842	4255	238
H O 83	0	0	7354	7354	2111	2111	842	4255	238
H O 84	0	0	7354	7354	2111	2111	842	4255	238
H O 85	0	0	7354	7354	2111	2111	842	4255	238
H O 86	0	0	7354	7354	2111	2111	842	4255	238
H O 87	0	0	7354	7354	2111	2111	842	4255	238
H O 88	0	0	7354	7354	2111	2111	842	4255	238
H O 89	0	0	7354	7354	2111	2111	842	4255	238
H O 90	0	0	7354	7354	2111	2111	842	4255	238
H O 91	0	0	7354	7354	2111	2111	842	4255	238
H O 92	0	0	7354	7354	2111	2111	842	4255	238
H O 93	0	0	7354	7354	2111	2111	842	4255	238
H O 94	0	0	7354	7354	2111	2111	842	4255	238
H O 95	0	0	7354	7354	2111	2111	842	4255	238
H O 96	0	0	7354	7354	2111	2111	842	4255	238
H O 97	0	0	7354	7354	2111	2111	842	4255	238
H O 98	0	0	7354	7354	2111	2111	842	4255	238
H O 99	0	0	7354	7354	2111	2111	842	4255	238
H O 100	0	0	7354	7354	2111	2111	842	4255	238

DESCRIPTION		STATUS	ACREAGE FACTOR	BEGINNING NET ALLOWABLE ±	MC PRODUCTION	OVER/UNDER PRODUCTION ±	CURRENT ALLOWABLE	ENDING NET ALLOWABLE ±	NEW ALLOCATION	ACREAGE OR DELIVERABILITY
UNIT										
1		2288	1	339	2627	EX	4810	2183	7493	1127
2		1953	1	1953	7805	EX	1954	1954	1954	82
3		3975	3	619	7805	EX	9293	7074	94	55
4		3071	3	359	7805	EX	9293	9874	4818	1753
5		5246	1	7618	7805	EX	8227	7505	235	497
6		4229	1	743	7805	EX	8227	7505	235	497
7		3171	1	215	7805	EX	8227	7505	235	497
8		941	1	408	7805	EX	8227	7505	235	497
9		0095	1	0320	7805	EX	8227	7505	235	497
10		0095	1	0320	7805	EX	8227	7505	235	497
11		0095	1	0320	7805	EX	8227	7505	235	497
12		0095	1	0320	7805	EX	8227	7505	235	497
13		0095	1	0320	7805	EX	8227	7505	235	497
14		0095	1	0320	7805	EX	8227	7505	235	497
15		0095	1	0320	7805	EX	8227	7505	235	497
16		0095	1	0320	7805	EX	8227	7505	235	497
17		0095	1	0320	7805	EX	8227	7505	235	497
18		0095	1	0320	7805	EX	8227	7505	235	497
19		0095	1	0320	7805	EX	8227	7505	235	497
20		0095	1	0320	7805	EX	8227	7505	235	497
21		0095	1	0320	7805	EX	8227	7505	235	497
22		0095	1	0320	7805	EX	8227	7505	235	497
23		0095	1	0320	7805	EX	8227	7505	235	497
24		0095	1	0320	7805	EX	8227	7505	235	497
25		0095	1	0320	7805	EX	8227	7505	235	497
26		0095	1	0320	7805	EX	8227	7505	235	497
27		0095	1	0320	7805	EX	8227	7505	235	497
28		0095	1	0320	7805	EX	8227	7505	235	497
29		0095	1	0320	7805	EX	8227	7505	235	497
30		0095	1	0320	7805	EX	8227	7505	235	497
31		0095	1	0320	7805	EX	8227	7505	235	497
32		0095	1	0320	7805	EX	8227	7505	235	497
33		0095	1	0320	7805	EX	8227	7505	235	497
34		0095	1	0320	7805	EX	8227	7505	235	497
35		0095	1	0320	7805	EX	8227	7505	235	497
36		0095	1	0320	7805	EX	8227	7505	235	497
37		0095	1	0320	7805	EX	8227	7505	235	497
38		0095	1	0320	7805	EX	8227	7505	235	497
39		0095	1	0320	7805	EX	8227	7505	235	497
40		0095	1	0320	7805	EX	8227	7505	235	497
41		0095	1	0320	7805	EX	8227	7505	235	497
42		0095	1	0320	7805	EX	8227	7505	235	497
43		0095	1	0320	7805	EX	8227	7505	235	497
44		0095	1	0320	7805	EX	8227	7505	235	497
45		0095	1	0320	7805	EX	8227	7505	235	497
46		0095	1	0320	7805	EX	8227	7505	235	497
47		0095	1	0320	7805	EX	8227	7505	235	497
48		0095	1	0320	7805	EX	8227	7505	235	497
49		0095	1	0320	7805	EX	8227	7505	235	497
50		0095	1	0320	7805	EX	8227	7505	235	497
51		0095	1	0320	7805	EX	8227	7505	235	497
52		0095	1	0320	7805	EX	8227	7505	235	497
53		0095	1	0320	7805	EX	8227	7505	235	497
54		0095	1	0320	7805	EX	8227	7505	235	497
55		0095	1	0320	7805	EX	8227	7505	235	497
56		0095	1	0320	7805	EX	8227	7505	235	497
57		0095	1	0320	7805	EX	8227	7505	235	497
58		0095	1	0320	7805	EX	8227	7505	235	497
59		0095	1	0320	7805	EX	8227	7505	235	497
60		0095	1	0320	7805	EX	8227	7505	235	497
61		0095	1	0320	7805	EX	8227	7505	235	497
62		0095	1	0320	7805	EX	8227	7505	235	497
63		0095	1	0320	7805	EX	8227	7505	235	497
64		0095	1	0320	7805	EX	8227	7505	235	497
65		0095	1	0320	7805	EX	8227	7505	235	497
66		0095	1	0320	7805	EX	8227	7505	235	497
67		0095	1	0320	7805	EX	8227	7505	235	497
68		0095	1	0320	7805	EX	8227	7505	235	497
69		0095	1	0320	7805	EX	8227	7505	235	497
70		0095	1	0320	7805	EX	8227	7505	235	497
71		0095	1	0320	7805	EX	8227	7505	235	497
72		0095	1	0320	7805	EX	8227	7505	235	497
73		0095	1	0320	7805	EX	8227	7505	235	497
74		0095	1	0320	7805	EX	8227	7505	235	497
75		0095	1	0320	7805	EX	8227	7505	235	497
76		0095	1	0320	7805	EX	8227	7505	235	497
77		0095	1	0320	7805	EX	8227	7505	235	497
78		0095	1	0320	7805	EX	8227	7505	235	497
79		0095	1	0320	7805	EX	8227	7505	235	497
80		0095	1	0320	7805	EX	8227	7505	235	497
81		0095	1	0320	7805	EX	8227	7505	235	497
82		0095	1	0320	7805	EX	8227	7505	235	497
83		0095	1	0320	7805	EX	8227	7505	235	497
84		0095	1	0320	7805	EX	8227	7505	235	497
85		0095	1	0320	7805	EX	8227	7505	235	497
86		0095	1	0320	7805	EX	8227	7505	235	497
87		0095	1	0320	7805	EX	8227	7505	235	497
88		0095	1	0320	7805	EX	8227	7505	235	497
89		0095	1	0320	7805	EX	8227	7505	235	497
90		0095	1	0320	7805	EX	8227	7505	235	497
91		0095	1	0320	7805	EX	8227	7505	235	497
92		0095	1	0320	7805	EX	8227	7505	235	497
93		0095	1	0320	7805	EX	8227	7505	235	497
94		0095	1	0320	7805	EX	8227	7505	235	497
95		0095	1	0320	7805	EX	8227	7505	235	497
96		0095	1	0320	7805	EX	8227	7505	235	497
97		0095	1	0320	7805	EX	8227	7505	235	497
98		0095	1	0320	7805	EX	8227	7505	235	497
99		0095	1	0320	7805	EX	8227	7505	235	497
100		0095	1	0320	7805	EX	8227	7505	235	497

DESCRIPTION	STATUS	ACREAGE FACTOR	JUNE		JULY		AUGUST		ACREAGE OR DELIVERABILITY
			BEGINNING NET ALLOWABLE ±	MCF PRODUCTION	OVER/UNDER PRODUCTION ±	CURRENT ALLOWABLE	ENDING NET ALLOWABLE ±	NEW ALLOCATION	
SUN	1	0	4622	1696	2926	1831	4757	2852	244
SUN	1	0	3603	3757	154EX	2090	1936	3257	321
SUN	1	0	137-	2145	137EX	2934	2797	4571	571
SUN	1	0	3433		1288	2381	3669	3709	407
SUN	1	0	2099-		2099EX	2185	86	3404	349
SUN	1	0	257-	5340	257EX	4135	3878	6428	927
SUN	1	0	6189		849	3228	4077	5028	658
SUN	1	0	21027-		21027EX	4807	16220-	7488	1126
SUN	1	0	5078	4104	974	2944	3918	4587	574
SUN	1	0	10346	13013	2667EX	3349	682	5217	694
T	1	0	310-	839	1149EX	1331	1825-	2074	96
T	1	0	20914-	9224	865EX	1699	19229	2647	205
T	1	0	5628		5628	3754	9382	5848	814
T	1	0	12064	6021	6043	7496	13539	11677	1923
T	1	0	7226	9729	2503EX	2772	269	4319	523
T	1	0	12732	5850	6882	2667	9549	4156	492
T	1	0	1675-		1675EX	12179	13854	18972	331
T	1	0	7415	2344	5071	1642	6713	2558	188
V	1	0	34177	57435	176742EX	8984	185726	13995	2364
V	1	0	10833	11941	1108EX	4672	35564	7278	1086
V	1	0	8531	7243	1288	3724	5012	5801	805
V	1	0	38448	151778	38235EXEXEX	1433	9955	4897	33
V	1	0	14248	18343	23905EXEXEX	1637	1102	10300	661
V	1	0	32027-	2109	130250	221157	18458	33999	155
V	1	0	13042	9758	3284	7860	11144	12245	2031
W	1	0	693	230	463	2816	3279	4387	536
W	1	0	9865-	198	10063EX	4564	5499-	7110	1054
W	1	0	756-	4057	3011EX	1520	17816	23699	24
W	1	0	36411-	8203	36411EX	1547	5177	31475	1094
W	1	0	104622	36101	21149EX	32729	11522	55339	525
W	1	0	24833	14601	1181	2345	3620-	4166	494
W	1	0	8307	16659	6294EX	2674	3958	6610	959
W	1	0	13374	2536	3285EX	4243	3110	3110	229
W	1	0	2536			3110	3110	8986	1411
W	1	0	7657-		7657EX	5768	1889-	21175	373
W	1	0	11990		11990	13593	25583	21175	373
Y	1	0	308	308		252	252	252	8

[illegible]

BLANCO MESA VERDE POOL EL PASO SYSTEM CTD										YEAR: 1963		PAGE: 60	
DESCRIPTION	STATUS	ACREAGE FACTOR	JUNE		OVER/UNDER PRODUCTION ±	JULY		AUGUST		ACREAGE OR DELIVERABILITY			
			BEGINNING NET ALLOWABLE ±	MCF PRODUCTION		CURRENT ALLOWABLE	ENDING NET ALLOWABLE ±	NEW ALLOCATION					
341333													

BLANCO ME SAVERDE POOL SQU UNION GATHERING CTD										YEAR: 1963	PAGE: 62
DESCRIPTION	STATUS	ACREAGE FACTOR	JUNE		OVER/UNDER PRODUCTION ±	CURRENT ALLOWABLE	JULY	ENDING NET ALLOWABLE ±	AUGUST		ACREAGE OR DELIVERABILITY
			BEGINNING NET ALLOWABLE ±	MCF PRODUCTION					NEW ALLOCATION		
111											

[illegible]

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BALLARD POOL										EL PASO SYSTEM CTD										YEAR: 1963										PAGE: 80									
JUNE										JULY										AUGUST										ACREAGE OR DELIVERABILITY									
STATUS										CURRENT ALLOWABLE										ENDING NET ALLOWABLE ±										NEW ALLOCATION									
DESCRIPTION										OVER/UNDER PRODUCTION ±										MCF PRODUCTION										BEGINNING NET ALLOWABLE ±									
ACREAGE FACTOR										MCF PRODUCTION										OVER/UNDER PRODUCTION ±										BEGINNING NET ALLOWABLE ±									
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DELIVERABILITY	NEW ALLOCATION	ENDING NET ALLOWABLE ±	CURRENT ALLOWABLE	OVER/UNDER PRODUCTION ±	MCF PRODUCTION	BEGINNING NET ALLOWABLE ±	FACTOR	STATUS	DESCRIPTION
662	4190	5012	2376	2636	6004	FEDERAL	US	AN	101 925 07
156	1349	524	765	241EX	COMPANY	PRODUCT	PROD	AN	101 925 07
29	1202	1202	1202		638	CONTRACT	CON	AN	101 925 07
					638	CONTRACT	CON	AN	101 925 07
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FULCHER KUTZ POOL EL PASO SYSTEM CTD

YEAR: 1963

PAGE: 86

DESCRIPTION	STATUS	ACREAGE FACTOR	JUNE		MCF PRODUCTION	OVER/UNDER PRODUCTION ±	JULY		ENDING NET ALLOWABLE ±	AUGUST		ACREAGE OR DELIVERABILITY
			BEGINNING NET ALLOWABLE ±	CURRENT ALLOWABLE			CURRENT ALLOWABLE	NEW ALLOCATION				
4282	XX	1111	4282	4282	429	1469	731	731	731	1000	731	35
7577	XX	1111	7577	7577	334	4229	1737	1737	5956	2092	2092	3774
851	XX	1111	851	851	851	3077	838	838	838	838	838	28
3099	XX	1111	3099	3099	989	2680	772	772	1908	3627	3627	1522
178	XX	1111	178	178	1016	3445	1739	1739	2706	1897	1897	1331
2989	XX	1111	2989	2989	2447	5436	759	759	4677	922	922	191
5211	XX	1111	5211	5211	376	904	564	564	340	4215	4215	1795
2342	XX	1111	2342	2342	4162	4104	1140	1140	587	1115	1115	3305
41	XX	1111	41	41	4248	4132	114	114	52	13	13	1341
1776	XX	1111	1776	1776	1275	1361	377	377	857	4567	4567	2558
983	XX	1111	983	983	7236	190	560	560	370	680	680	9
7926	XX	1111	7926	7926	935	190	1246	1246	1246	1246	1246	212
4863	XX	1111	4863	4863	322	733	254	254	574	5889	5889	7000
1156	XX	1111	1156	1156	329	112	775	775	232	5151	5151	111
78689	XX	1111	78689	78689	78689	396	1000	1000	1396	73065	73065	2123
1423	XX	1111	1423	1423	1027	396	1000	1000	1396	1000	1000	4
8468	XX	1111	8468	8468	5644	675	991	991	991	991	991	1120
5504	XX	1111	5504	5504	1528	339	639	639	267	1528	1528	1
65	XX	1111	65	65	74	753	740	740	50	740	740	24
312	XX	1111	312	312	312	588	464	464	464	464	464	199
538	XX	1111	538	538	538	538	501	501	501	501	501	122

FULCHER KUTZ POOL UNION SYSTEM CTD										YEAR: 1963	PAGE: 90
JUNE										JULY	AUGUST
DESCRIPTION	STATUS	ACREAGE FACTOR	BEGINNING NET ALLOWABLE ±	MCY PRODUCTION	OVER/UNDER PRODUCTION ±	CURRENT ALLOWABLE	ENDING NET ALLOWABLE ±	NEW ALLOCATION	ACREAGE OR DELIVERABILITY		
BRWY 1230	S	0.5	2593	1694	2767	1500	1500	1500	50		
BRWY 1230	X	0.5	4461	1694	2767	1500	4267	1500	50		
BRWY 1230	P	0.5	8835	7124	1711	1539	3250	1869	345		
BRWY 1230	T	0.5	2224	9774	2224	917	3141	1113	183		
BRWY 1230	N	0.5	45062	10102	34960	10113	19877	11230	208		
BRWY 1230	N	0.5	18200	INC	18200	1316	37891	3563	708		
BRWY 1230	N	0.5	25807	24511	25807	2559	19516	1599	287		
BRWY 1230	N	0.5	24511	24511	24511	2835	28366	3110	611		
BRWY 1230	N	0.5	6243-	INC	6243-	598	27346	3446	683		
BRWY 1230	N	0.5	6306	1323	4983	556	5645-	726	100		
BRWY 1230	N	0.5	422	422	422	479	5539	675	89		
BRWY 1230	N	0.5	200	200	200	500	479	479	103		
BRWY 1230	N	0.5	69	69	69	390	500	500	16		
BRWY 1230	N	0.5	2438-	58	2438EX	200	590	473	50		
BRWY 1230	N	0.5	58	58	58	522	200	200	7		
BRWY 1230	N	0.5	1120	1120	1120	128	1916-	633	80		
BRWY 1230	N	0.5	1137	1137	1137	3688	128	128	7		
BRWY 1230	N	0.5	763	763	763	13	3688	3688	162		
BRWY 1230	N	0.5	1132-	1132-	1132-	1000	13	13	38		
BRWY 1230	N	0.5	1045-	1045EX	1045EX	368	1012	1000	36		
BRWY 1230	N	0.5	2931-	1794	1794EX	1000	677-	446	40		
BRWY 1230	N	0.5	19743-	1974EX	1974EX	1000	2794-	1000	31		
BRWY 1230	N	0.5	22864-	763	763EX	3996	155796	6000	27		
BRWY 1230	N	0.5	17717	X022864EX	17717	4955	22711	6000	758		
BRWY 1230	N	0.5	4576	4576	4576	1500	6076	1500	77		
BRWY 1230	N	0.5	2279	2279	2279	1814	1814	1814	65		
BRWY 1230	N	0.5	892-	892EX	892EX	506	386-	614	76		
BRWY 1230	N	0.5	776	776	776	6029	13789	731	101		
BRWY 1230	N	0.5	249	249	249	229	229	229	11		

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107

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SOUTH BLANCO POOL EL PASO SYSTEM CTD

YEAR: 1963

PAGE: 108

AUGUST

DESCRIPTION	STATUS	ACREAGE FACTOR	JUNE BEGINNING NET ALLOWABLE ±	JUNE MCF PRODUCTION	OVER/UNDER PRODUCTION ±	JULY		AUGUST NEW ALLOCATION	ACREAGE OR DELIVERABILITY
						CURRENT ALLOWABLE	ENDING NET ALLOWABLE ±		
H CR	ZZGZ	11	4577	33068	2653EX	1590	1063-	2217	289
		00	1	7175	18491EX	6648	11843-	9264	1604
		00	3031	536	2495	7775	10270	10834	1897
		00	98088-	2499	956691EX	41058	136669-	57211	943
		00	45337	2428	5304EX	409514	1193600-	571168	943
		00	67308	1109	62377EX	136446	376490	150783	144
		00	20253	748010	52554EX	123298	129235	132033	273
		00	11236-	17594	75350EX	7556	128094-	10528	1840
		00	6249-	4841	11090EX	6044	5665-	8422	1447
		00	8751	2597	6154	5425	9844	7559	1286
		00	9735-		9735EX	3690	4976-	5143	835
		00	12740	16049	3309EX	4871	1562	6632	1113
		00	1888	2812	924EX	1836	912	2560	1353
		00	2535	6548	2535	955	3490	1332	124
		00	71401	4171	64853	9033	73886	12586	2224
		00	3508-	16433	4360EX	3090	2427	4307	794
		00	51127	2055	49032	7994	13474	11139	1954
		00	185098-	16433	20568EX	85608	134224	119378	21033
		00	227792	60495	288237	654544	642381	51535	1563705
		00	7879	1892	5987	3040	9027	4237	666
		00	1458	2449	991EX	1228	237	1713	195
		00	14666	3637	11029	4786	15815	6670	1120
		00	213681	3604	3604EX	20426	3604-	28460	5186
		00	2705	2975	270EX	890	620	1241	107
		00	205883	20416	18555EX	35718	54265	49762	804
		00	13718	60234	212754	42783	3947	76293	127986
		00							11116
		00							
		00	67610	20030	4758	9131	56711	1273	1137
		00	31634	69441	3780EX	84865	47075	11825	2084
		00	23813	2126	1124EX	12074	2231	2892	3415
		00	1406	1406		2094	2094	2094	41

STATE OF NEW MEXICO

COUNTY OF SAN JUAN

IN THE DISTRICT COURT

EL PASO NATURAL GAS COMPANY,
et al.,

Petitioners,

vs.

No. 11,685

OIL CONSERVATION COMMISSION
OF NEW MEXICO, et al.,

Respondents.

REQUESTED FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW OF RESPONDENTS
OIL CONSERVATION COMMISSION, TEXACO INC.,
AND SUNRAY DX OIL COMPANY

Respondents Oil Conservation Commission of New Mexico, Texaco Inc., and Sunray DX Oil Company respectfully submit to the Court the following:

FINDINGS OF FACT

1. Petitioners El Paso Natural Gas Company, Pan American Petroleum Corporation, Marathon Oil Company, and Sunset International Petroleum Corporation are corporations authorized to do business in the State of New Mexico; Petitioner Southwest Production Company is a partnership consisting of Joseph P. Driscoll and John H. Hill, doing business as a partnership in the State of New Mexico.

2. After commencement of this cause, Beta Development Co., a Texas corporation, was substituted for Southwest Production Company as a petitioner.

3. Respondent Oil Conservation Commission of New Mexico is a duly organized agency of the State of New Mexico, whose members are Jack M. Campbell, Chairman, E. S. Walker, and A. L.

Porter, Jr., Secretary; Respondent Consolidated Oil & Gas, Inc., is a corporation authorized to do business in the State of New Mexico.

4. By Order of the Court, Texaco Inc. and Sunray DX Oil Company, corporations authorized to do business in the State of New Mexico, were granted leave to intervene as parties respondent in this cause, and Pubco Petroleum Corporation and Southern Union Gas Company were permitted to appear amicus curiae.

5. In November 1960, the Oil Conservation Commission issued Order No. R-1670-C which established Special Rules and Regulations for the Basin-Dakota Gas Pool in San Juan, Rio Arriba, and Sandoval Counties, New Mexico, and adopted, by reference, Rule 9(C) of the General Rules applicable to prorated gas pools in Northwest New Mexico as set forth in Order No. R-1670. Rule 9(C) of Order No. R-1670 established a formula for allocating gas production from prorated gas pools in Northwest New Mexico on the basis of 25 percent acreage plus 75 percent acreage times deliverability. Until August 1, 1963, the effective date of Order No. R-2259-B, the allocation of allowable production of gas from the Basin-Dakota Gas Pool was determined by this formula. Since the effective date of Order No. R-2259-B, the allocation of allowable gas production in the Basin-Dakota Gas Pool has been determined by a formula of 60 percent acreage plus 40 percent acreage times deliverability.

6. On February 23, 1962, Consolidated Oil & Gas, Inc., filed its application with the Commission to change the formula for allocating the allowable gas production in the Basin-Dakota Gas pool from a formula of 25 percent acreage plus 75 percent acreage times deliverability to a formula of 60 percent acreage plus 40 percent acreage times deliverability. This application was docketed by the Commission as its Case No. 2504. The case was duly advertised and heard by the Commission on April 18 and 19, 1962. On June 7, 1962, the Commission issued Order No.

R-2259 which found that the evidence presented at the hearing of the case concerning recoverable gas reserves in the pool was insufficient to justify any change in the allocation formula and denied the application, retaining jurisdiction for the entry of such further orders as the Commission might deem necessary.

7. On June 27, 1962, Consolidated Oil & Gas, Inc., filed a Petition for Rehearing, and on July 7, 1962, the Commission issued Order No. R-2259-A which found that a rehearing should be granted and that the scope of the rehearing should be limited to matters concerning recoverable gas reserves in the pool. Order No. R-2259-A granted a rehearing and limited the scope of the rehearing to matters concerning recoverable gas reserves in the Basin-Dakota Gas Pool.

8. On February 14 and 15, 1963, the Commission reheard Case No. 2504 and subsequently issued Order No. R-2259-B. By Order No. R-2259-B, the Commission superseded Order No. R-2259, which had denied Consolidated's application, and amended the Special Rules and Regulations for the Basin-Dakota Gas Pool as promulgated by Order No. R-1670-C. The new formula allocated the allowable assigned to non-marginal wells in the following manner:

- (1) Forty percent in the proportion that each well's acreage times deliverability factor bears to the total of the acreage times deliverability factors for all non-marginal wells in the pool.
- (2) Sixty percent in the proportion that each well's acreage factor bears to the total of the acreage factors for all non-marginal wells in the pool.

9. In Finding No. 3 of Order No. R-1670-C, the Commission determined that the producing capacity of the wells in the Dakota Producing Interval was in excess of the market demand for gas from said common source of supply, and that for the purpose of preventing waste and protecting correlative rights, appropriate procedures should be adopted to provide a method of allocating gas among proration units in the area.

10. Order No. R-2259-B contained 18 findings to substantiate adoption of the new formula.

In Findings No. 1 through 4, the Commission determined that it had jurisdiction of the cause, that the Commission had adopted a formula for allocating allowable production from the Basin-Dakota Gas Pool on the basis of 25 percent acreage plus 75 percent acreage times deliverability, and that Consolidated sought to amend the formula to allocate the allowable production on the basis of 60 percent acreage plus 40 percent acreage times deliverability.

In Finding No. 5, the Commission determined the total initial recoverable gas reserves in the Basin-Dakota Gas Pool and the amount which was attributed to marginal wells which were permitted to produce at capacity.

In Finding No. 6, the Commission determined, in million cubic feet, the initial recoverable gas reserves underlying each non-marginal tract in the Basin-Dakota Gas Pool.

In Finding No. 7, the Commission determined the percent of total pool reserves attributable to each non-marginal tract in the pool.

In Finding No. 8, the Commission determined that it was not practicable to allocate production solely on the basis of each well's percentage of pool reserves because of the continuous fluctuation in reserve computations resulting from new completions in the pool and the re-evaluation of reserves attributed to existing wells.

In Finding No. 9, the Commission determined a tract acreage factor and the deliverability for each non-marginal well in the pool.

In Finding No. 10, the Commission determined that neither acreage nor deliverability should be used as the sole criterion for allocating production as there was no direct correlation between deliverability and reserves, or acreage and reserves.

In Finding No. 11, the Commission determined that the most reasonable basis for allocating production in the Basin-Dakota Gas Pool was to determine, for each proposed formula, the percentage of total pool allowable apportioned to each non-marginal tract as compared to its percentage of total pool reserves, and to select the allocation formula that would allow the maximum number of wells in the pool to produce with an ideal ratio of 1.0, or with a ratio of from 0.7 to 1.3, which was reasonable due to inherent variance in interpreting and computing reserves.

In Finding No. 12, the Commission determined that the number of wells in the pool producing with a desired ratio was affected by the percentage of deliverability and the percentage of acreage included in the formula.

In Finding No. 13, the Commission determined that correlative rights were not being adequately protected under the formula then in effect, that the protection of correlative rights was a necessary adjunct to the prevention of waste, and that waste would result unless the Commission acted to protect correlative rights.

The Commission identified each non-marginal well producing with the desired ratio under each formula with an asterisk and determined, in Finding No. 14, that a comparison of the total number of wells producing with the desired ratio under each formula and the total volume of gas allocated to the wells producing with the desired ratio under each formula established that the proposed formula of 60 percent acreage plus 40 percent acreage times deliverability would more adequately protect correlative rights and prevent waste by permitting more wells to receive their just and equitable share of the gas in the pool.

In Finding No. 15, the Commission determined that numerous wells in the pool were capable of draining more than their just and equitable share of the gas and that the proposed formula would, insofar as practicable, prevent drainage

between producing tracts which was not equalized by counter-drainage.

In Finding No. 16, the Commission determined that the proposed formula would, insofar as practicable, afford to the owner of each property in the pool the opportunity to use his just and equitable share of the reservoir energy.

In Finding No. 17, the Commission determined that Order No. R-1670-C should be amended to provide an allocation formula based 60 percent on acreage and 40 percent on acreage times deliverability.

In Finding No. 18, the Commission determined that Order No. R-2259-B should not be effective until August 1, 1963.

11. Following the issuance of Order No. R-2259-B, Applications for Rehearing in Case No. 2504 were filed with the Commission by all of the Petitioners in this case.

12. On August 1, 1963, the Commission issued Order No. R-2259-C which determined that the Applications for Rehearing did not allege that the applicants for rehearing had new or additional evidence to present, that the Commission had carefully considered the evidence presented in the case and was fully advised in the premises, and that Order No. R-2259-B was proper in all respects. By Order No. R-2259-C, the Commission denied the Applications for Rehearing.

13. Petitions for Review were thereafter duly filed by all of the Petitioners in this case.

14. The Oil Conservation Commission did not act fraudulently, arbitrarily or capriciously in issuing Orders No. R-2259-B and R-2259-C.

15. The Transcript of Record and Proceedings in Case No. 2504 before the Oil Conservation Commission contains substantial evidence to support the Commission's findings in Order No. R-2259-B.

16. The Oil Conservation Commission did not exceed its authority in issuing Orders No. R-2259-B and R-2259-C.

17. Oil Conservation Commission Orders No. R-2259-B and

R-2259-C are not erroneous, invalid, improper, or discriminatory.

18. The formula adopted by the Oil Conservation Commission in its Order No. R-2259-B allocates the allowable production among the gas wells in the Basin-Dakota Gas Pool upon a reasonable basis, recognizing correlative rights, and, insofar as practicable, prevents drainage between producing tracts in the pool which is not equalized by counter-drainage.

19. The formula adopted by the Oil Conservation Commission in its Order No. R-2259-B affords to the owner of each property in the Basin-Dakota Gas Pool the opportunity to produce without waste his just and equitable share of the gas in the pool, insofar as it is practicable to do so, and for this purpose to use his just and equitable share of the reservoir energy.

20. Oil Conservation Commission Orders No. R-2259-B and R-2259-C will prevent waste and protect correlative rights.

21. Petitioners have failed to join parties whose interests will necessarily be affected by a decree in this case.

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

1. The Court has jurisdiction over the subject matter of this suit and the parties thereto.

2. Oil Conservation Commission Order No. R-2259-B contains the basic jurisdictional findings required by law to issue a valid order allocating allowable gas production among the producers in a pool.

3. Oil Conservation Commission Order No. R-2259-B contains findings which fully comply with all statutory requirements concerning allocation of allowable gas production among producers in a pool.

4. The findings contained in Oil Conservation Commission Order No. R-2259-B are based upon and supported by substantial evidence.

5. Oil Conservation Commission Orders No. R-2259-B and R-2259-C will prevent waste and protect correlative rights.

6. The Oil Conservation Commission did not act fraudulently, arbitrarily or capriciously in issuing Orders No. R-2259-B and R-2259-C.

7. The Oil Conservation Commission did not exceed its authority in issuing Orders No. R-2259-B and R-2259-C.

8. The Oil Conservation Commission had jurisdiction to enter Orders No. R-2259-B and R-2259-C.


9. The Petitioners have failed to sustain the burden of proof placed upon them by law and therefore the Petition for Review should be dismissed and Oil Conservation Commission Orders No. R-2259-B and R-2259-C should be affirmed.

10. The Petition for Review must be dismissed and judgment entered for the Respondents as Petitioners have failed to join necessary and indispensable parties.




J. M. DURRETT, Jr.
Special Assistant
Attorney General

Attorney for Respondent
Oil Conservation Commission
P. O. Box 2088
Santa Fe, New Mexico



GILBERT, WHITE & GILBERT
Attorneys for Respondents
Texaco Inc., and Sunray DX
Oil Company, P. O. Box 787,
Santa Fe, New Mexico

I certify that a copy of this pleading
was mailed to opposing counsel of record
on March 30, 1964.



J. M. Durrett, Jr.

GOVERNOR
JACK M. CAMPBELL
CHAIRMAN

State of New Mexico
Oil Conservation Commission




LAND COMMISSIONER
E. S. JOHNNY WALKER
MEMBER

P. O. BOX 871
SANTA FE

STATE GEOLOGIST
A. L. PORTER, JR.
SECRETARY - DIRECTOR

TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN


I, A. L. PORTER, Jr., Secretary-Director of the New Mexico Oil Conservation Commission hereby certify that the attached is a true and correct copy of Commission Order No. R-2259.


A. L. PORTER, Jr.
Secretary-Director

FEBRUARY 28, 1964



IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have affixed my hand and notarial seal this 28th day of February, 1964.


Notary Public

My Commission Expires:

September 22, 1965

BEFORE THE OIL CONSERVATION COMMISSION
OF THE STATE OF NEW MEXICO

IN THE MATTER OF THE HEARING
CALLED BY THE OIL CONSERVATION
COMMISSION OF NEW MEXICO FOR
THE PURPOSE OF CONSIDERING:

CASE No. 2504
Order No. R-2259

APPLICATION OF CONSOLIDATED OIL & GAS, INC.
FOR AN AMENDMENT OF ORDER NO. R-1670-C,
CHANGING THE ALLOCATION FORMULA FOR THE
BASIN-DAKOTA GAS POOL, SAN JUAN, RIO ARRIBA
AND SANDOVAL COUNTIES, NEW MEXICO.

ORDER OF THE COMMISSION

BY THE COMMISSION:

This cause came on for hearing at 9 o'clock a.m. on April 18, 1962, at Santa Fe, New Mexico, before the Oil Conservation Commission of New Mexico, hereinafter referred to as the "Commission."

NOW, on this 7th day of June, 1962, the Commission, a quorum being present, having considered the testimony presented and the exhibits received at said hearing, and being fully advised in the premises,

FINDS:

(1) That due public notice having been given as required by law, the Commission has jurisdiction of this cause and the subject matter thereof.

(2) That by Order No. R-1670-C, entered in Case No. 2095 effective February 1, 1961, the Basin-Dakota Gas Pool was created and prorated under an allocation formula based on seventy-five (75) percent acreage times deliverability plus twenty-five (25) percent acreage.

(3) That the applicant, Consolidated Oil & Gas, Inc., seeks the amendment of said Order No. R-1670-C to establish an allocation formula for the Basin-Dakota Gas Pool based on forty (40) percent acreage times deliverability plus sixty (60) percent acreage.

(4) That the evidence presented at the hearing of this case concerning recoverable gas reserves in the subject pool is insufficient to justify any change in the present allocation formula.

-2-

CASE No. 2504

Order No. R-2259

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED:

- (1) That the subject application is hereby denied.
- (2) That jurisdiction of this cause is retained for the entry of such further orders as the Commission may deem necessary.

DONE at Santa Fe, New Mexico, on the day and year herein-above designated.

STATE OF NEW MEXICO
OIL CONSERVATION COMMISSION

EDWIN L. MECHEM, Chairman

E. S. WALKER, Member

A. L. PORTER, Jr., Member & Secretary

S E A L

esr/

GOVERNOR
JACK M. CAMPBELL
CHAIRMAN

State of New Mexico
Oil Conservation Commission




LAND COMMISSIONER
E. S. JOHNNY WALKER
MEMBER

P. O. BOX 871
SANTA FE

STATE GEOLOGIST
A. L. PORTER, JR.
SECRETARY - DIRECTOR

TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN


I, A. L. PORTER, Jr., Secretary-Director of the New Mexico Oil Conservation Commission hereby certify that the attached is a true and correct copy of Commission Order No. R-2259-A.


A. L. PORTER, Jr.
Secretary-Director

FEBRUARY 28, 1964



IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have affixed my hand and notarial seal this 28th day of February, 1964.


Notary Public

My Commission Expires:

September 22, 1965

BEFORE THE OIL CONSERVATION COMMISSION
OF THE STATE OF NEW MEXICO

CASE No. 2504
Order No. R-2259-A

APPLICATION OF CONSOLIDATED OIL & GAS, INC.
FOR AN AMENDMENT OF ORDER NO. R-1670-C,
CHANGING THE ALLOCATION FORMULA FOR THE
BASIN-DAKOTA GAS POOL, SAN JUAN, RIO ARRIBA
AND SANDOVAL COUNTIES, NEW MEXICO.

ORDER OF THE COMMISSION

BY THE COMMISSION:

This cause came on for reconsideration upon the petition of Consolidated Oil & Gas, Inc. for a rehearing in Case No. 2504, Order No. R-2259, heretofore entered by the Commission on June 7, 1962.

NOW, on this 7th day of July, 1962, the Commission, a quorum being present, having considered the petition for rehearing,

FINDS:

(1) That petitioner, Consolidated Oil & Gas, Inc., in its petition for rehearing proposes that rehearing in the subject case consist of two parts: (a) a preliminary hearing before an examiner to take evidence concerning basic factual data relating to each well in the Basin-Dakota Gas Pool, and (b) a subsequent hearing before the Commission itself at which time additional testimony, evidence and expert opinions would be received.

(2) That a rehearing in the subject case should be granted, and that the scope of such rehearing should be limited to matters concerning recoverable gas reserves in the pool.

(3) That the rehearing should be held before the full Commission; the referral of any matter to an examiner should be at the Commission's discretion upon motion made at such rehearing.

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED:

(1) That a rehearing in the subject case is hereby granted, and is set for the regular Commission hearing on August 15, 1962.

-2-

CASE No. 2504

Order No. R-2259-A

(2) That the scope of such rehearing shall be limited to matters concerning recoverable gas reserves in the Basin-Dakota Gas Pool.

DONE at Santa Fe, New Mexico, on the day and year herein-above designated.


STATE OF NEW MEXICO
OIL CONSERVATION COMMISSION



EDWIN L. MECHEM, Chairman



E. S. WALKER, Member



A. L. PORTER, Jr., Member & Secretary

S E A L

esr/

GOVERNOR
JACK M. CAMPBELL
CHAIRMAN

State of New Mexico
Oil Conservation Commission




LAND COMMISSIONER
E. S. JOHNNY WALKER
MEMBER

P. O. BOX 871
SANTA FE

STATE GEOLOGIST
A. L. PORTER, JR.
SECRETARY - DIRECTOR

TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN

I, A. L. PORTER, Jr., Secretary-Director of the New Mexico Oil Conservation Commission hereby certify that the attached is a true and correct copy of the Commission's Ruling on Motions to Quash Subpoenas Duces Tecum in Case No. 2504.


A. L. PORTER, Jr.
Secretary-Director

FEBRUARY 28, 1964



IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have affixed my hand and notarial seal this 28th day of February, 1964.


Notary Public

My Commission Expires:

September 22, 1965

BEFORE THE OIL CONSERVATION COMMISSION
OF THE STATE OF NEW MEXICO

IN THE MATTER OF THE HEARING
CALLED BY THE OIL CONSERVATION
COMMISSION OF NEW MEXICO FOR
THE PURPOSE OF CONSIDERING:

CASE NO. 2504
REHEARING

APPLICATION OF CONSOLIDATED OIL & GAS,
INC., FOR AN AMENDMENT OF ORDER NO.
R-1670-C, CHANGING THE ALLOCATION FORMULA
FOR THE BASIN-DAKOTA GAS POOL, SAN JUAN,
RIO ARriba, AND SANDOVAL COUNTIES, NEW MEXICO.

RULING ON MOTIONS TO QUASH SUBPOENAS DUCES TECUM

BY THE COMMISSION:

This matter came on for hearing at 9 o'clock a.m. on September 13, 1962, at Santa Fe, New Mexico, before the Oil Conservation Commission of New Mexico, hereinafter referred to as the "Commission," upon written Motions to Quash Subpoenas Duces Tecum filed by George Eaton, El Paso Natural Gas Company, Pubco Petroleum Corporation, and David H. Rainey, and upon oral Motions to Quash Subpoenas Duces Tecum by Aztec Oil & Gas Company and Frank Renard.

NOW, on this 18th day of October, 1962, the Commission, a quorum being present, having read and heard the Motions and heard the arguments of counsel thereon, and being otherwise fully advised in the premises,

FINDS:

- (1) That the Commission has jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties to this cause.
- (2) That during oral argument before the Commission, it was stipulated by counsel for the applicant, Consolidated Oil & Gas, Inc., and counsel for Southwest Production Company, that Carl Smith would not be called as a witness as Leon Wiederkehr had been subpoenaed and would appear in lieu of the said Carl Smith.
- (3) That during oral argument before the Commission, it was stipulated by counsel for the applicant, Consolidated Oil & Gas, Inc., and counsel for Aztec Oil & Gas Company that Joe Salmon would not be called as a witness as L. M. Stevens had been subpoenaed and would appear in lieu of the said Joe Salmon.

(4) That the Subpoenas Duces Tecum served in this cause upon the said Carl Smith and Joe Salmon should be quashed.

(5) That under the subpoenas served in this cause on George Eaton, Frank D. Gorham, David H. Rainey, Frank Renard, L. M. Stevens, and Leon Wiederkehr, and subject to a determination of custody and/or control, the Commission should require only the production of all core analysis reports and all electric and radioactivity logs concerning any and all wells that have been cored in the Basin-Dakota Gas Pool by the respective companies of the subpoenaed witnesses.

(6) That the Commission should allow all parties subpoenaed in this cause to present evidence concerning custody and/or control of core analysis reports and electric and radioactivity logs concerning any and all wells that have been cored in the Basin-Dakota Gas Pool by the respective companies of the subpoenaed witnesses.

(7) That all persons subpoenaed in this cause and determined by the Commission to have custody of core analysis reports and electric and radioactivity logs concerning any well or wells cored in the Basin-Dakota Gas Pool by their respective companies should appear before the Commission at 9 o'clock a.m., on December 19, 1962 in Morgan Hall, State Land Office Building, Santa Fe, New Mexico, and produce the aforesaid documents and/or reports in accordance with this ruling.

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED:

(1) That the Subpoenas Duces Tecum served in this cause upon Carl Smith and Joe Salmon, be, and they are hereby, quashed.

(2) That under the subpoenas served in this cause and subject to a determination of custody and/or control, George Eaton, Frank D. Gorham, David H. Rainey, Frank Renard, L. M. Stevens, and Leon Wiederkehr, shall be, and they are hereby ordered to appear before the Commission at 9 o'clock a.m., on December 19, 1962 in Morgan Hall, State Land Office Building, Santa Fe, New Mexico, and there produce all core analysis reports and all electric and radioactivity logs concerning any and all wells that have been cored in the Basin-Dakota Gas Pool by their respective companies.

(3) That all persons subpoenaed in this cause shall be allowed to present evidence concerning custody and/or control

-3-

Case No. 2504


Rehearing

of all core analysis reports and all electric and radioactivity logs concerning any and all wells that have been cored in the Basin-Dakota Gas Pool by their respective companies before the Commission at 9 o'clock a.m., on November 14, 1962 in Morgan Hall, State Land Office Building, Santa Fe, New Mexico.

(4) That jurisdiction of this matter is retained for the entry of such further orders as the Commission may deem necessary.


DONE at Farmington, New Mexico, on the day and year hereinabove designated.

STATE OF NEW MEXICO
OIL CONSERVATION COMMISSION




EDWIN L. MECHEM, Chairman

E. S. WALKER, Member



A. L. PORTER, Jr., Member & Secretary



ir/

GOVERNOR
JACK M. CAMPBELL
CHAIRMAN

State of New Mexico
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P. O. BOX 871
SANTA FE

STATE GEOLOGIST
A. L. PORTER, JR.
SECRETARY - DIRECTOR

TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN

I, A. L. PORTER, Jr., Secretary-Director of the New Mexico Oil Conservation Commission hereby certify that the attached is a true and correct copy of Commission Order No. R-1670.


A. L. PORTER, Jr.
Secretary-Director

FEBRUARY 28, 1964



IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have affixed my hand and notarial seal this 28th day of February, 1964.


Notary Public

My Commission Expires:

September 22, 1965

BEFORE THE OIL CONSERVATION COMMISSION
OF THE STATE OF NEW MEXICO

IN THE MATTER OF THE HEARING
CALLED BY THE OIL CONSERVATION
COMMISSION OF NEW MEXICO FOR
THE PURPOSE OF CONSIDERING:

CASE No. 1937
Order No. R-1670

APPLICATION OF THE OIL CONSERVATION
COMMISSION ON ITS OWN MOTION TO CON-
SIDER CONSOLIDATING THE SPECIAL RULES
GOVERNING THE SEVEN PRORATED GAS POOLS
IN NORTHWEST NEW MEXICO, AND TO CON-
SIDER CONSOLIDATING THE SPECIAL RULES
GOVERNING THE SIX PRORATED GAS POOLS
IN SOUTHEAST NEW MEXICO.

ORDER OF THE COMMISSION

BY THE COMMISSION:

This cause came on for hearing at 9 o'clock a.m., on April 13, 1960, at Hobbs, New Mexico, before the Oil Conservation Commission of New Mexico, hereinafter referred to as the "Commission."

NOW, on this 20th day of May, 1960, the Commission, a quorum being present, having considered the testimony presented and the exhibits received at said hearing, and being fully advised in the premises,

FINDS:

(1) That due public notice having been given as required by law, the Commission has jurisdiction of this cause and the subject matter thereof.

(2) That in the past the Commission has held numerous hearings and taken voluminous testimony from engineers, geologists, and other interested parties and entered many orders creating, delineating, spacing, prorating, and otherwise regulating the Pools now designated the Blinbry, Crosby-Devonian, Eumont, Jalmat, Justis, Tubb, Aztec-Pictured Cliffs, Ballard-Pictured Cliffs, Fulcher Kutz-Pictured Cliffs, South Blanco-Pictured Cliffs, Tapacito-Pictured Cliffs, West Kutz-Pictured Cliffs, and Blanco Mesaverde Gas Pools in the interests of conservation, prevention of waste, and protection of correlative rights.

(3) That it has been found by the Commission that one well will efficiently and economically drain the area of the proration units set out in the Special Pool Rules in each of the several gas pools listed above.

(4) That the total producing capacity of the wells in each of these pools has been found to be greater than the market demand for gas produced from each of these pools.

(5) That prorationing has been instituted in each of these pools.

(6) That it is both feasible and desirable that the Special Pool Rules for the seven prorated gas pools in Northwest New Mexico be consolidated and that the Special Pool Rules for the six prorated gas pools in Southeast New Mexico be consolidated.

(7) That the following orders should be superseded:

Aztec-Pictured
Cliffs Gas Pool

R-46
R-565
R-565-A
R-565-C
R-565-D
R-614
R-620
R-697

Ballard-Pictured
Cliffs Gas Pool

R-846
R-846-A
R-967

Fulcher Kutz-Pictured
Cliffs Gas Pool

748
R-59
R-565
R-565-A
R-565-C
R-565-D
R-614
R-620
R-697

South Blanco-
Pictured Cliffs
Gas Pool

R-565
R-565-A
R-565-B
R-565-C
R-565-D
R-614
R-620
R-967

Tapacito-Pictured
Cliffs Gas Pool

R-1193
R-1193-A

West Kutz-Pictured
Cliffs Gas Pool

R-46
R-566
R-566-A
R-566-B
R-566-C
R-566-D
R-566-E
R-967

Blanco Mesaverde
Gas Pool

R-799
R-110
R-128
R-128-A
R-128-B
R-128-C
R-128-D&E
R-967

Blanebry Gas Pool

R-264-A
R-356
R-372
R-372-A
R-464
R-610-C
R-610-D
R-967

Crosby Devonian Gas
Pool

R-639
R-639-A
R-639-B

-3-

CASE No. 1937

Order No. R-1670

Eumont Gas Pool

R-264-A
R-356
R-370
R-370-A
R-370-B
R-371
R-371-A
R-967

Jalmat Gas Pool

R-264-A
R-356
R-368
R-368-A
R-368-B
R-967

Justis Gas Pool

R-264-A
R-356
R-375
R-375-A
R-586-A
R-586-C
R-586-E
R-586-F
R-967

Tubb Gas Pool

R-356
R-373
R-373-A
R-464
R-967

(8) That all provisions in the following orders relative to the regulation of gas wells in prorated gas pools should be superseded:

Blinebry Gas Pool

R-264
R-610
R-610-A
R-610-B

Eumont Gas Pool

R-264
R-520
R-520-A
R-767
R-767-A

Jalmat Gas Pool

R-264
R-520
R-520-A
R-553
R-640
R-663
R-690

Justis Gas Pool

R-586

Tubb Gas Pool

R-264
R-586
R-586-B

-4-
CASE No. 1937
Order No. R-1670

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED:

(1) That the following orders be and the same are hereby superseded:

Aztec-Pictured
Cliffs Gas Pool

R-46
R-565
R-565-A
R-565-C
R-565-D
R-614
R-620
R-697

Ballard-Pictured
Cliffs Gas Pool

R-846
R-846-A
R-967

Fulcher Kutz-Pictured
Cliffs Gas Pool

748
R-59
R-565
R-565-A
R-565-C
R-565-D
R-614
R-620
R-697

South Blanco-
Pictured Cliffs
Gas Pool

R-565
R-565-A
R-565-B
R-565-C
R-565-D
R-614
R-620
R-967

Tapacito-Pictured
Cliffs Gas Pool

R-1193
R-1193-A

West Kutz-Pictured
Cliffs Gas Pool

R-46
R-566
R-566-A
R-566-B
R-566-C
R-566-D
R-566-E
R-967

Blanco Mesaverde
Gas Pool

R-799
R-110
R-128
R-128-A
R-128-B
R-128-C
R-128-D&E
R-967

Blinebry Gas Pool

R-264-A
R-356
R-372
R-372-A
R-464
R-610-C
R-610-D
R-967

Crosby Devonian Gas
Pool

R-639
R-639-A
R-639-B

-5-

CASE No. 1937

Order No. R-1670

Eumont Gas Pool

R-264-A
R-356
R-370
R-370-A
R-370-B
R-371
R-371-A
R-967

Jalmat Gas Pool

R-264-A
R-356
R-368
R-368-A
R-368-B
R-967

Justis Gas Pool

A-264-A
R-356
R-375
R-375-A
R-586-A
R-586-C
R-586-E
R-586-F
R-967

Tubb Gas Pool

R-356
R-373
R-373-A
R-464
R-967

-6-

CASE No. 1937

Order No. R-1670

(2) That all provisions in the following orders relative to the regulation of gas wells in prorated gas pools be and the same are hereby superseded:

Blinebry Gas Pool

R-264
R-610
R-610-A
R-610-B

Eumont Gas Pool

R-264
R-520
R-520-A
R-767
R-767-A

Jalmat Gas Pool

R-264
R-520
R-520-A
R-553
R-640
R-663
R-690

Justis Gas Pool

R-586

Tubb Gas Pool

R-264
R-586
R-586-B

(3) That the Special Pool Rules for the seven prorated gas pools in Northwest New Mexico, and the Special Pool Rules for the six prorated gas pools in Southeast New Mexico, be and the same are hereby consolidated as hereinafter set forth, in the following "Rules and Regulations Governing Prorated Gas Pools in New Mexico."

RULES AND REGULATIONS
GOVERNING
PRORATED GAS POOLS IN NEW MEXICO

* * *

Table of Contents

	<u>Page</u>
GENERAL RULES, NORTHWEST NEW MEXICO.....	1
Special Rules, Northwest New Mexico	
Aztec-Pictured Cliffs Gas Pool.....	11
Ballard-Pictured Cliffs Gas Pool.....	12
Fulcher Kutz-Pictured Cliffs Gas Pool.....	13
South Blanco-Pictured Cliffs Gas Pool.....	14
Tapacito-Pictured Cliffs Gas Pool.....	15
West Kutz-Pictured Cliffs Gas Pool.....	17
Blanco-Mesaverde Gas Pool.....	18
GENERAL RULES, SOUTHEAST NEW MEXICO.....	21
Special Rules, Southeast New Mexico	
Blinebry Gas Pool.....	30
Crosby-Devonian Gas Pool.....	36
Eumont Gas Pool.....	39
Jalmat Gas Pool.....	41
Justis Gas Pool.....	46
Tubb Gas Pool.....	47

CASE No. 1937
Order No. R-1670

I. GENERAL RULES AND REGULATIONS FOR THE PRORATED GAS POOLS OF NORTHWESTERN NEW MEXICO

(See Special Pool Rules in each pool for orders applicable to those pools only. Special Pool Rules will be found in the same classification order as in the General section, and, unless the special rules conflict with the general rule, the general rule is also applicable.)

A. WELL LOCATION AND ACREAGE REQUIREMENTS

RULE 1: Any well drilled to the producing formation of a gas pool regulated by this order and within said pool or within one mile outside the boundary of that pool, and not nearer to nor within the boundaries of another designated pool producing from the same formation, shall be spaced, drilled, operated, and prorated in accordance with the regulations in effect in that pool.

RULE 2: Except as provided in the Special Pool Rules, after the effective date of this order each well drilled or recompleted on a standard gas proration unit within a gas pool regulated by this order shall be located at least 990 feet from the outer boundary line of the proration unit, provided however, that a tolerance of 200, feet is permissible.

RULE 3: The Secretary-Director of the Commission shall have authority to grant exception to the requirements of Rule 2 where application has been filed in due form and such exception is required because of conditions resulting from previously drilled wells in the area or the necessity for exception is based upon topographic conditions.

Applicants shall furnish all operators of leases offsetting the lease containing subject well, a copy of the application to the Commission, and applicant shall include with his application a list of names and addresses of all such operators, together with a written statement that all such operators have been properly notified by registered mail. The Secretary-Director of the Commission shall wait at least 20 days before approving any such exception, and shall approve such exception only in the absence of objection of any offset operators. In the event any operator objects to the exception, the Commission shall consider the matter only after proper notice and hearing.

NOTE: Rule 3 does not apply to Blanco Mesaverde or Tapacito-Pictured Cliffs Gas Pools - See Special Pool Rules, Rule 2.

CASE No. 1937
Order No. R-1670

RULE 4: The provisions of Statewide Rule 104, Paragraph (k), shall not apply to the gas pools regulated by this order.

RULE 5(A): The acreage allocated to a gas well for proration purposes shall be known as the gas proration unit for that well. For the purpose of gas allocation in the gas pools regulated by this order, a standard proration unit shall consist of contiguous surface acreage and shall be substantially in the form of a square in pools having 160-acre standard proration units, and substantially in the form of a rectangle in pools having 320-acre standard proration units, and shall be a legal subdivision of the U. S. Public Land Surveys (quarter-section or half-section, as applicable). A proration unit shall be considered to be a standard gas proration unit when it meets the above requirements and consists of acreage within the appropriate tolerance set out below:

<u>Standard Proration Unit</u>	<u>Acreage Tolerance for Standard Unit</u>
160 acres	158-162 acres
320 acres	316-324 acres

Any gas proration unit containing acreage within the appropriate tolerance limit above shall be considered to contain the number of acres in a standard unit for the purpose of computing allowables.

RULE 5(B): The Secretary-Director of the Commission shall have authority to grant an exception to Rule 5(A) without notice and hearing where application has been filed in due form and where the following facts exist and the following provisions are complied with:

1. The proposed non-standard proration unit consists of less acreage than a standard proration unit, or where the unorthodox size or shape of the tract is due to a variation in legal subdivision of the U. S. Public Land Surveys.
2. The non-standard gas proration unit consists of contiguous quarter-quarter sections and/or lots.
3. The non-standard gas proration unit lies wholly within a single governmental section.
4. The entire non-standard gas proration unit may reasonably be presumed to be productive of gas from the designated gas pool.
5. The applicant presents written consent in the form

CASE No. 1937
Order No. R-1670

of waivers from:

(a) All operators owning interests outside the non-standard gas proration unit but in the same section in which any part of the non-standard gas proration unit is situated, and

(b) All operators owning interests in acreage offsetting the non-standard gas proration unit.

6. In lieu of subparagraph 5 of this rule, the applicant may furnish proof of the fact that said offset operators were notified by registered mail of his intent to form such non-standard gas proration unit. (This notification to offset operators should consist of the same information that is furnished to the Commission). The Secretary-Director of the Commission may approve the application if, after a period of 30 days following the mailing of said notice, no operator has made objection to formation of such non-standard gas proration unit. (See additional requirement for West Kutz-Pictured Cliffs Gas Pool)

B. NOMINATIONS AND PRORATION SCHEDULE

RULE 6(A): At least 30 days prior to the beginning of each gas proration period, the Commission shall hold a hearing after due notice has been given. The Commission shall cause to be submitted by each gas purchaser its "Preliminary Nominations" of the amount of gas which each in good faith actually desires to purchase within the ensuing proration period, by months, from each of the gas pools regulated by this order. The Commission shall consider the "Preliminary Nominations" of purchasers, actual production, and such other factors as may be deemed applicable in determining the amount of gas that may be produced without waste within the ensuing proration period. "Preliminary Nominations" shall be submitted on a form prescribed by the Commission.

RULE 6(B): The term "gas purchaser" as used in these rules shall mean any "taker" of gas either at the well-head or at any point on the lease where connection is made for gas transportation or utilization. It shall be the responsibility of said "taker" to submit a nomination in accordance with Rule 6(A) and Rule 7(A) of this order.

RULE 7(A): In the event a gas purchaser's market shall have increased or decreased, he may file with the Commission prior to the 10th day of the month a "Supplemental Nomination" showing the amount of gas he actually in good faith desires to purchase during the ensuing

CASE No. 1937
Order No. R-1670

proration month from the gas pools regulated by this order. The Commission shall hold a public hearing between the 13th and 20th days of each month to determine the reasonable market demand for gas for the ensuing proration month, and shall issue a proration schedule setting out the amount of gas which each well may produce during the ensuing proration month, along with such other information as is necessary to show the allowable-production status of each well on the schedule. "Supplemental Nominations" shall be submitted on a form prescribed by the Commission.

RULE 7(B): The Commission shall include in the proration schedule the gas wells in the gas pools regulated by this order delivering to a gas transportation facility, or lease gathering system, and shall include in the proration schedule any well which it finds is being unreasonably discriminated against through denial of access to a gas transportation facility, which is reasonably capable of handling the type of gas produced by such well.

C. ALLOCATION AND GRANTING OF ALLOWABLES

RULE 8(A): The total allowable to be allocated to each gas pool regulated by this order each month shall be equal to the sum of the "Preliminary" or "Supplemental Nominations" (whichever is applicable) for each pool, together with any adjustment which the Commission deems advisable. A monthly allowable shall be assigned to each well entitled to an allowable in each pool by allocating the pool allowable among all such wells in accordance with the procedure set out in Rule 9(C).

RULE 8(B)1: No gas well shall be given an allowable until Form C-104 and Form C-110 have been filed, together with a plat (C-128) showing acreage attributed to said well and the locations of all wells on the lease, and

2: Unless a deliverability test taken in conformance with the provisions of Order R-333-C and D as amended by R-333-E has been submitted, except as provided in Rule 10(C) below.

RULE 8(C): Allowables to newly completed gas wells shall commence:

1. On the date of connection to a gas transportation facility, such date to be determined from an affidavit furnished to the Commission (1000 Rio Brazos Road, Aztec, New Mexico) by the purchaser, or

CASE No. 1937
Order No. R-1670

2. The latest filing date of Form C-104, C-110, and C-128, or

3. A date 45 days prior to the date upon which the well's initial deliverability and shut-in pressure test is reported to the Commission on Form C-122-A in conformance with the provisions of Order R-333-C and D as amended by Order R-333-E,

whichever date is the later.

RULE 9(A): The product obtained by multiplying each well's acreage factor by the calculated deliverability (expressed as MCF per day) for that well shall be known as the AD factor for that well. The acreage factor shall be determined to the nearest hundredth of a unit by dividing the acreage within the proration unit by 160 in pools with 160 acre standard proration units and by 320 in pools with 320 acre standard gas proration units; however, the acreage tolerances provided in Rule 5(A) shall apply. The "AD Factor" shall be computed to the nearest whole unit.

RULE 9(B): The allowable to be assigned to each marginal well shall be equal to the maximum production of said well during any month of the preceding gas proration period except as provided in the Special Pool Rules.

RULE 9(C): The pool allowable remaining each month after deducting the total allowable assigned to marginal wells shall be allocated among the non-marginal wells entitled to an allowable in the following manner:

1. Seventy-five percent (75%) of the pool allowable remaining to be allocated to non-marginal wells shall be allocated among such wells in the proportion that each well's "AD Factor" bears to the total "AD Factor" for all non-marginal wells in the pool.

2. Twenty-five percent (25%) of the pool allowable remaining to be allocated to non-marginal wells shall be allocated among such wells in the proportion that each well's acreage factor bears to the total acreage factor for all non-marginal wells in the pool.

RULE 9(D): Annual deliverability tests taken each year shall be used in calculating allowables for wells in the gas pools regulated by this order for the twelve month period beginning February 1 of the following year.

RULE 10(A): If, during a proration month, the acreage

CASE No. 1937
Order No. R-1670

assigned to a well is increased, the operator shall notify the Commission in writing (1000 Rio Brazos Road, Aztec, New Mexico) of such increase by filing a revised plat (Form C-128). The increased allowable assigned the gas proration unit for the well shall be effective on the first day of the month following receipt of the notification by the Commission.

RULE 10(B): A change in a well's deliverability due to retest or test after recompletion or workover shall become effective:

1. On the date of reconnection after workover, such date to be determined from Form C-104 as filed by the operators, or
2. A date 45 days prior to the date upon which a well's initial deliverability and shut-in pressure test is reported to the Commission on Form C-122-A in conformance with the provisions of Order R-333-C and D as amended by Order R-333-E, or
3. A date 45 days prior to the receipt and approval of Form C-104 by the Commission's office (1000 Rio Brazos Road, Aztec, New Mexico); (Form C-104 shall specify the exact nature of the workover or remedial work. If the nature of the work cannot be explained on Form C-104, in that event, Form C-103 shall also be filed in accordance with Rule 1106 of the Commission's Statewide Rules and Regulations);

whichever is later.

RULE 10(C): The calculated deliverability at the "deliverability pressure" shall be determined in accordance with the provisions of Order R-333-C and D, as amended by Order R-333-E.

The Secretary-Director of the Commission shall have authority to allow exceptions to the annual deliverability test requirement for marginal wells where the deliverability of a well is of such volume as to have no significance in the determination of the well's allowable. Application for such exception may be submitted in writing by the operator of the well and, if granted, may be revoked by the Secretary-Director of the Commission at any time by requesting the well to be scheduled and tested in accordance with Order R-333-C and D as amended by Order R-333-E.

RULE 11: After notice and hearing, the Commission may assign minimum allowables in order to prevent the premature abandonment of wells.

RULE 12: Except as provided in the Special Pool Rules, the full production of gas from each well, including drilling gas, shall be charged against the well's allowable regardless of the disposition of the gas; provided, however, that gas used in maintaining the producing ability of the well shall not be charged against the allowable.

D. BALANCING OF PRODUCTION

RULE 13: The dates 7:00 a.m., February 1, and 7:00 a.m., August 1, shall be known as balancing dates, and the periods of time bounded by these dates shall be known as gas proration periods.

RULE 14(A): Underproduction: Any non-marginal well which has an underproduced status as of the end of a gas proration period shall be allowed to carry such underproduction forward into the next gas proration period and may produce such underproduction in addition to the allowable assigned during such succeeding period. Any allowable carried forward into a gas proration period and remaining unproduced at the end of such gas proration period shall be cancelled.

RULE 14(B): Production during any one month of a gas proration period in excess of the allowable assigned to a well for such month shall be applied against the underproduction carried into such period in determining the amount of allowable, if any, to be cancelled.

RULE 15(A): Overproduction: Any well which has an overproduced status as of the end of a gas proration period shall carry such overproduction forward into the next gas proration period, provided that such overproduction shall be made up during such succeeding period. Any well which has not made up the overproduction carried into a gas proration period by the end of such proration period shall be shut-in until such overproduction is made up.

RULE 15(B): Except as provided by the Special Pool Rules, if, at any time, a well is overproduced an amount equaling six times its current monthly allowable, it shall be shut-in during that month, and each succeeding month until the well is overproduced less than six times its current monthly allowable.

RULE 15(C): Allowable assigned to a well during any one

CASE No. 1937
Order No. R-1670

month of a gas proration period in excess of the production for the same month shall be applied against the overproduction carried into such period in determining the amount of overproduction, if any, which has not been made up.

RULE 15(D): The Commission may allow overproduction to be made up at a lesser rate than would be the case if the well were completely shut-in upon a showing at public hearing after due notice that complete shut-in of the well would result in material damage to the well.

RULE 15(E): Any allowable accrued to a well at the end of a proration period due to the cancellation of underage and the redistribution thereof shall be applied against the overproduction carried into said proration period.

E. CLASSIFICATION OF WELLS

RULE 16(A): After the production data is available for the last month of each gas proration period, any well which had an underproduced status at the beginning of the preceding gas proration period and which did not produce its allowable during at least one month of such preceding gas proration period may be classified as a marginal well, unless, prior to the end of said preceding gas proration period, the operator or other interested party presents satisfactory evidence to the Commission showing that the well should not be so classified. However, a well which in any month of said proration period has demonstrated its ability to produce its allowable for said proration period shall not be classified as a marginal well.

(Not applicable to Tapacito - See Special Pool Rules).

RULE 16(B): The Secretary-Director may reclassify a marginal or non-marginal well at any time the well's production data, deliverability data, or other evidence as to the well's producing ability justifies such reclassification.

RULE 17: A well which is classified as a marginal well shall not be permitted to accumulate underproduction, and any underproduction accrued to a well prior to its classification as a marginal well shall be cancelled.

RULE 18: If, at the end of a proration period, a marginal well has produced more than the total allowable for the period assigned a non-marginal unit of like deliverability and acreage, the marginal well shall be reclassified as a non-marginal well and its allowable and net status adjusted accordingly.

RULE 19: A well which has been reworked or recompleted shall be classified as a non-marginal well as of the date

CASE No. 1937
Order No. R-1670

of reconnection to a pipeline until such time as production data, deliverability data, or other evidence as to the well's producing ability indicates that the well should be classified as a marginal well.

RULE 20: All wells not classified as marginal wells shall be classified as non-marginal wells.

F. REPORTING OF PRODUCTION

RULE 21(A): The monthly gas production from each well shall be metered separately and the gas production therefrom shall be reported to the Commission on Form C-115 in accordance with Rule 1114 of the Commission's Rules and Regulations, so as to reach the Commission on or before the 24th day of the month next succeeding the month in which the gas reported was produced. The operator shall show on such report what disposition has been made of the gas produced.

RULE 21(B): Each purchaser or taker of gas in each of the designated gas pools regulated by this order shall submit a report to the Commission, so as to reach the Commission on or before the 15th day of the month next succeeding the month in which the gas was purchased or taken.

RULE 21(C): Such report shall be filed on either Form C-111 or Form C-114 (whichever is applicable) with the wells being listed in approximately the same order as they are listed on the proration schedule.

RULE 21(D): Forms C-111 and C-114 referred to herein shall be submitted in triplicate, the original being sent to the Commission at Box 871, Santa Fe, New Mexico, the remaining copies being sent to 1000 Rio Brazos Road, Aztec, New Mexico and Box 2045, Hobbs, New Mexico, respectively.

G. GENERAL

RULE 22: No gas, either dry gas or casinghead gas, produced from the gas pools regulated by this order shall be flared or vented except as provided in the Special Pool Rules.

RULE 23: Failure to comply with the provisions of this order or the rules contained herein shall result in the cancellation of allowable assigned to the affected well. No further allowable shall be assigned to the affected well until all rules and regulations are complied with. The Secretary-Director shall notify the operator of the well and the purchaser, in writing, of the date of allowable cancellation and the reason therefor.

CASE No. 1937
Order No. R-1670

RULE 24: All transporters or users of gas shall file gas well connection notices with the Commission as soon as possible after the date of connection or reconnection in accordance with the provisions of Rule 8(C) and 10(B), respectively.

(See Special Pool Rules for each pool for orders applicable to that pool only. Special Pool Rules will be found in the same classification order as in the General section, and, unless the special rules conflict with the general rule, the general rule is also applicable.)

CASE No. 1937
Order No. R-1670

II. SPECIAL RULES AND REGULATIONS FOR THE AZTEC-PICTURED CLIFFS
GAS POOL

(The Aztec-Pictured Cliffs Gas Pool was created March 15, 1950 and gas prorationing was instituted March 1, 1955)

A. WELL LOCATION AND ACREAGE REQUIREMENTS:

RULE 5(A): A standard gas proration unit in the Aztec-Pictured Cliffs Gas Pool shall be 160 acres.

G. GENERAL

RULE 22: No gas, either dry gas or casinghead gas, produced from the Aztec-Pictured Cliffs Gas Pool, except that gas used for "drilling-in" purposes, shall be flared or vented unless specifically authorized by order of the Commission after notice and hearing.

H. MISCELLANEOUS SPECIAL POOL RULES

RULE 25: The vertical limits of the Aztec-Pictured Cliffs Gas Pool shall be the Pictured Cliffs formation.

(General Pool Rules also apply unless in conflict with these Special Pool Rules)

III. SPECIAL RULES AND REGULATIONS FOR THE BALLARD-PICTURED CLIFFS GAS POOL

(The Ballard-Pictured Cliffs Gas Pool was created February 9, 1955 and gas prorationing was instituted October 1, 1956. The Otero-Pictured Cliffs and Canyon Largo-Pictured Cliffs Gas Pools were consolidated into the Ballard Pictured-Cliffs Gas Pool May 1, 1959. This pool also includes acreage that was formerly included in the Fulcher Kutz-Pictured Cliffs Gas Pool.)

A. WELL LOCATION AND ACREAGE REQUIREMENTS

RULE 5(A): A standard gas proration unit in the Ballard-Pictured Cliffs Gas Pool shall be 160 acres.

C. ALLOCATION AND GRANTING OF ALLOWABLES

RULE 12: Gas used on the lease shall not be charged against the allowable.

G. GENERAL

RULE 22: No gas, either dry gas or casinghead gas, produced from the Ballard-Pictured Cliffs Gas Pool, except that gas used for "drilling-in" purposes, shall be flared or vented unless specifically authorized by order of the Commission after notice and hearing.

MISCELLANEOUS SPECIAL POOL RULES

RULE 25: The vertical limits of the Ballard-Pictured Cliffs Gas Pool shall be the Pictured Cliffs formation.

(Rule 25 does not actually appear as such in any of the existing pool rules.)

(General Pool Rules also apply unless in conflict with these Special Pool Rules)

CASE No. 1937
Order No. R-1670

IV. SPECIAL RULES AND REGULATIONS FOR THE FULCHER KUTZ-PICTURED CLIFFS GAS POOL

(The Fulcher Kutz-Pictured Cliffs Gas Pool was created effective December 22, 1950 from a consolidation of the Fulcher Basin - Kutz Canyon Gas Pools. Gas prorationing was instituted March 1, 1955)

A. WELL LOCATION AND ACREAGE REQUIREMENTS

RULE 5(A): A standard gas proration unit in the Fulcher Kutz-Pictured Cliffs Gas Pool shall be 160 acres.

G. GENERAL

RULE 22: No gas, either dry gas or casinghead gas, produced from the Fulcher Kutz-Pictured Cliffs Gas Pool, except that gas used for "drilling-in" purposes, shall be flared or vented unless specifically authorized by order of the Commission after notice and hearing.

H. MISCELLANEOUS SPECIAL POOL RULES

RULE 25: The vertical limits of the Fulcher Kutz-Pictured Cliffs Gas Pool shall be the Pictured Cliffs formation.

(General Pool Rules also apply unless in conflict with these Special Pool Rules)

CASE No. 1937
Order No. R-1670

V. SPECIAL RULES AND REGULATIONS FOR THE SOUTH BLANCO-PICTURED
CLIFFS GAS POOL

(The South Blanco-Pictured Cliffs Gas Pool was created May 20, 1952 and prorationing was instituted March 1, 1955.)

A. WELL LOCATION AND ACREAGE REQUIREMENTS

RULE 5(A): A standard gas proration unit in the South Blanco-Pictured Cliffs Gas Pool shall be 160 acres.

G. GENERAL

RULE 22: No gas, either dry gas or casinghead gas, produced from the South Blanco-Pictured Cliffs Gas Pool, except that gas used for "drilling-in" purposes, shall be flared or vented unless specifically authorized by order of the Commission after notice and hearing.

H. MISCELLANEOUS SPECIAL POOL RULES

RULE 25: The vertical limits of the South Blanco-Pictured Cliffs Gas Pool shall be the Pictured Cliffs formation.

(Rule 25 does not actually appear as such in any of the existing pool rules.)

(General Pool Rules also apply unless in conflict with these Special Pool Rules)

CASE No. 1937
Order No. R-1670

VI. SPECIAL RULES AND REGULATIONS FOR THE TAPACITO-PICTURED CLIFFS GAS POOL

(The Tapacito-Pictured Cliffs Gas Pool was created April 18, 1956 and prorationing was instituted August 1, 1958.)

A. WELL LOCATION AND ACREAGE REQUIREMENTS

RULE 2: Wells shall be located at least 790 feet from the outer boundaries of the drilling tract and no closer than 25 feet from any quarter-quarter section line or subdivision inner boundary. The Secretary-Director shall have authority to grant exception without notice and hearing where the application has been filed in due form and where the following facts exist and the following provisions are complied with:

- (A) The necessity for the unorthodox location is based on topographical conditions, and
- (B) 1. The ownership of all oil and gas leases within a radius of 790 feet of the proposed location is common with the ownership of the oil and gas leases under the proposed location, or
2. All owners of oil and gas leases within such radius consent in writing to the proposed location.
- (C) In lieu of Paragraph (B) 2 of this Rule the applicant may furnish proof of the fact that said offset operators were notified by registered mail of his intent to drill an unorthodox location. The Secretary-Director of the Commission may approve the application if, after a period of twenty days following the mailing of said notice, no operator has made objection to the drilling of the unorthodox location.

RULE 5(A): A standard gas proration unit in the Tapacito-Pictured Cliffs Gas Pool shall be 160 acres.

C. ALLOCATION AND GRANTING OF ALLOWABLES

RULE 9(B): The allowable to be assigned to each marginal well shall be equal to the maximum production of said well during any month of the preceding six months.

RULE 12: Gas used on the lease shall not be charged against the allowable

D. BALANCING OF PRODUCTION

RULE 15(B): If at any time a well is overproduced in an

CASE NO. 1937
Order No. R-1670

VI. SPECIAL RULES AND REGULATIONS FOR THE TAPACITO-PICTURED CLIFFS GAS POOL (CONT'D)

amount equalling six times its average monthly allowable for the last six months, it shall be shut-in during that month and each succeeding month until it is overproduced less than 6 times its average monthly allowable.

E. CLASSIFICATION OF WELLS

RULE 16(A): A well shall be classified as marginal if it has failed for six consecutive months to produce its average monthly allowable for the six months immediately preceding such reclassification provided such failure was not occasioned by curtailment to compensate for over-production, unless prior to such reclassification the operator or other interested party presents satisfactory evidence showing that the well should not be classified as marginal. However, a well shall not be classified as marginal if, during any one month of the six-month period, said well has demonstrated its ability to produce its six months average allowable.

G. GENERAL

RULE 22: No gas, either dry gas or casinghead gas, produced from the Tapacito-Pictured Cliffs Pool, except that gas used for drilling purposes or for maintaining the productivity of a well, shall be flared or vented unless specifically authorized by order of the Commission after notice and hearing.

H. MISCELLANEOUS SPECIAL POOL RULES

RULE 25: The vertical limits of the Tapacito-Pictured Cliffs Gas Pool shall be the Pictured Cliffs formation.

(General Pool Rules also apply unless in conflict with these Special Pool Rules)

CASE No. 1937
Order No. R-1670

VII. SPECIAL RULES AND REGULATIONS FOR THE WEST KUTZ-PICTURED
CLIFFS GAS POOL

(The West Kutz-Pictured Cliffs Gas Pool was created September 29, 1950 and prorationing was instituted March 1, 1955.)

A. WELL LOCATION AND ACREAGE REQUIREMENTS

RULE 5(A): A standard gas proration unit in the West Kutz-Pictured Cliffs Gas Pool shall be 160 acres.

RULE 5(B): In order to qualify for exception to Rule 5(A) without notice and hearing a proposed non-standard gas proration unit in the West Kutz-Pictured Cliffs Gas Pool, in addition to the requirements of Rule 5(B) of the General Rules, may not exceed 2640 feet in length or width.

G. GENERAL

RULE 22: No gas, either dry gas or casinghead gas, produced from the West Kutz-Pictured Cliffs Gas Pool, except that gas used for "drilling-in" purposes, shall be flared or vented unless specifically authorized by order of the Commission after notice and hearing.

H. MISCELLANEOUS SPECIAL POOL RULES

RULE 25: The vertical limits of the West Kutz-Pictured Cliffs Gas Pool shall be the Pictured Cliffs formation.

(General Pool Rules also apply unless in conflict with these Special Pool Rules)

CASE No. 1937
Order No. R-1670

VIII. SPECIAL RULES AND REGULATIONS FOR THE BLANCO-MESAVERDE GAS POOL

(The Blanco Mesaverde Gas Pool was created February 25, 1949 and prorationing was instituted March 1, 1955. The Blanco-Mesaverde Gas Pool now includes acreage that was formerly included in the LaPlata Mesaverde, Northwest LaPlata Mesaverde, South LaPlata Mesaverde, and the Largo Mesaverde Gas Pools.)

A. WELL LOCATION AND ACREAGE REQUIREMENTS

RULE 2: Wells shall be located 990 feet from the outer boundary of either the Northeast or Southwest quarter of the section, subject to a variation of 200 feet for topographic conditions. Further tolerance shall be allowed by the Commission only in cases of extremely rough terrain where compliance would necessarily increase drilling costs.

RULE 5(A): A standard gas proration unit in the Blanco-Mesaverde Gas Pool shall be 320 acres.

G. GENERAL

RULE 22: No gas, either dry gas or casinghead gas, produced from the Blanco-Mesaverde Gas Pool, except that gas used for "drilling-in" purposes, shall be flared or vented unless specifically authorized by order of the Commission after notice and hearing.

H. MISCELLANEOUS SPECIAL POOL RULES

RULE 25: The general and special rules and regulations contained in this order pertaining to the Blanco-Mesaverde Gas Pool shall be limited in their application to the present 4200-5100 foot productive horizon where the productive sands are contained between the top of the Cliff House Sand and the base of the Point Lookout Sand of the Mesaverde.

RULE 26: Surface Pipe. The surface pipe shall be set to a minimum depth of 100 feet, and where shallow potable water-bearing beds are present, the surface pipe shall be set to such shallow potable water bearing beds and a sufficient amount of cement shall be used to circulate the cement behind the pipe to the bottom of the cellar. This surface casing shall stand cemented for at least 24 hours before drilling plug or initiating tests. The surface casing shall be tested after drilling plug by bailing the hole dry. The hole shall remain dry for one hour to constitute

CASE No. 1937
Order No. R-1670

VIII. SPECIAL RULES AND REGULATIONS FOR THE BLANCO-MESAVERDE
GAS POOL (CONT'D)

satisfactory proof of a water shut-off. In lieu of the foregoing test, the cement job shall be tested by building up a pressure of 1,000 psi, closing the valves, and allowing to stand thirty minutes. If the pressure does not drop more than 100 pounds during that period, the test shall be considered satisfactory. This test shall be made both before and after drilling the plug. The Commission shall be notified at least 24 hours prior to the conducting of any test.

RULE 27: Production String. The production string shall be set on top of the Cliff House Sand with a minimum of 100 sacks of cement and shall stand cemented not less than 36 hours before testing the casing. This test shall be made by building up a pressure of 1,000 psi, closing the valves, and allowing to stand thirty minutes. If the pressure does not drop more than 100 pounds during that period, the test shall be considered satisfactory.

RULE 28: All cementing shall be done by the pump-and-plug method. Bailing tests may be used on all casing and cement tests, and drill stem tests may be used on cement tests in lieu of pressure tests. In making bailing test, the well shall be bailed dry and remain approximately dry for thirty minutes. If any string of casing fails while being tested by pressure or by bailing tests herein required, it shall be recemented and retested or an additional string of casing should be run and cemented. If an additional string is used, the same test shall be made as outlined for the original string. In submitting Form C-101, "Notice of Intention to Drill," the number of sacks of cement to be used on each string of casing shall be stated.

RULE 29: Any completed well which produces any oil shall be tubed. This tubing shall be set as near the bottom of the hole as practicable, but in no case shall tubing perforations be more than 250 feet from the bottom. The bottom of the tubing shall be restricted to an opening of less than 1 inch or bullplugged in order to prevent the loss of pressure bombs or other measuring devices.

RULE 30: Any well which produces oil shall be equipped with a meter setting of adequate size to measure efficiently the gas, with this meter setting to be

CASE No. 1937
Order No. R-1670

VIII. SPECIAL RULES AND REGULATIONS FOR THE BLANCO-MESAVERDE
GAS POOL (CONT'D)

installed on the gas vent or discharge line. Well-head equipment for all wells shall be installed and maintained in first-class condition, so that static bottom hole pressures and surface pressures may be obtained at any time by a duly authorized agent of the Commission. Valves shall be installed so that pressures may be readily obtained on the casing and also on the tubing, wherever tubing is installed. All connections subject to well pressure and all wellhead fittings shall be of first-class material, rated at 2,000 psi working pressure and maintained in gas-tight condition. There shall be at least one valve on each bradenhead. Operators shall be responsible for maintaining all equipment in first-class condition and shall repair or replace equipment where gas leakage occurs.

RULE 31: Drilling boilers shall not be set closer than 200 feet to any well or tank battery. All electrical equipment shall be in first-class condition and properly installed.

RULE 32: Wells shall not be shot or chemically treated until the permission of the Commission is obtained. Each well shall be shot or treated in such a manner as will not cause injury to the sand or result in water entering the oil or gas sand, and necessary precautions shall be taken to prevent injury to the casing. If shooting or chemical treatment results in irreparable injury to the well or to the oil or gas sand, the well shall be properly plugged and abandoned.

RULE 33: Bradenhead gas shall not be used either directly or expansively in engines, pumps or torches, or otherwise wasted. It may be used for lease and development purposes and for the development of nearby leases, except as prohibited above. Wells shall not be completed as Bradenhead gas wells unless special permission is obtained from the Commission.

(General Pool Rules also apply unless in conflict with these
Special Pool Rules)

CASE No. 1937
Order No. R-1670

I. GENERAL RULES AND REGULATIONS FOR THE PRORATED GAS POOLS OF
SOUTHEASTERN NEW MEXICO

(See Special Pool Rules in each pool for orders applicable to those pools only. Special Pool Rules will be found in the same classification order as in the General section, and, unless the special rules conflict with the general rule, the general rule is also applicable.)

A. WELL LOCATION AND ACREAGE REQUIREMENTS

RULE 1: Any well drilled to the producing formation of a gas pool regulated by this order and within said pool or within one mile outside the boundary of that pool, and not nearer to nor within the boundaries of another designated pool producing the same formation, shall be spaced, drilled, operated, and prorated in accordance with the regulations in effect in that pool.

RULE 2: After the effective date of this order each well drilled or recompleted on a standard gas proration unit within a gas pool regulated by this order shall be located not closer than 330 feet to a quarter-quarter section line or subdivision inner boundary line and not closer to the outer boundary line than the footages set out in the table immediately below:

<u>Standard Proration Unit</u>	<u>Footage From Unit Outer Boundary</u>
160 acres	660 feet
320 acres	660 feet
640 acres	1,980 feet

RULE 3: The Secretary-Director of the Commission shall have authority to grant exception to the requirements of Rule 2 without notice and hearing where the application has been filed in due form and where the following facts exist and the following provisions are complied with:

1. The necessity for the unorthodox location is based on topographical conditions, or is occasioned by the recompletion of a well previously drilled to another horizon.

2. (a) The ownership of all oil and gas leases within a radius of 1,980 feet of the proposed location is common with the ownership of the oil and gas leases under the proposed location, or

(b) All owners of oil and gas leases within

CASE No. 1937
Order No. R-1670

such radius consent in writing to the proposed location.

(c) In lieu of Paragraph 2(b) of this rule, the applicant may furnish proof of the fact that said offset operators were notified by registered mail of his Application for Approval of an Unorthodox Location. (This information to offset operators should consist of the same information that is furnished to the Commission.) The Secretary-Director of the Commission may approve the application, if, after a period of at least 20 days following the mailing of said notice, no operator has made objection to the drilling of the unorthodox location. In the event an operator objects to the unorthodox location, the Commission shall consider the matter only after proper notice and hearing.

RULE 4: The provisions of Statewide Rule 104, Paragraph (k), shall not apply to the gas pools regulated by this order.

RULE 5(A): The acreage allocated to a gas well for proration purposes shall be known as the gas proration unit for that well. For the purpose of gas allocation in the gas pools regulated by this order, a standard proration unit shall consist of contiguous surface acreage and shall be substantially in the form of a square in pools having 160-acre or 640-acre standard proration units, and substantially in the form of a rectangle in pools having 320-acre standard proration units, and shall be a legal subdivision of the U. S. Public Land Surveys (quarter-section, section, or half-section, as applicable). A proration unit shall be considered to be a standard gas proration unit when it meets the above requirements and consists of acreage within the appropriate tolerance set out below:

<u>Standard Proration Unit</u>	<u>Acreage Tolerance For Standard Unit</u>
160 acres	158-162 acres
320 acres	316-324 acres
640 acres	632-648 acres

Any gas proration unit containing acreage within the appropriate tolerance limit above shall be considered to contain the number of acres in a standard unit for the purpose of computing allowables.

RULE 5(B): In establishing a non-standard gas proration

CASE No. 1937
Order No. R-1670

unit for gas pools regulated by this order where the standard gas proration unit is 640 acres, the location of the well with respect to the two nearest boundary lines thereof shall govern the maximum amount of acreage that may be assigned to the well for the purposes of gas proration as follows:

<u>Location</u>	<u>Maximum Acreage</u>
660-660	160 acres
660-1980	320 acres

RULE 5(C): The Secretary-Director of the Commission shall have authority to grant an exception to Rule 5(A) without notice and hearing where application has been filed in due form and where the following facts exist and the following provisions are complied with:

1. The proposed non-standard proration unit consists of less acreage than a standard proration unit, or where the unorthodox size or shape of the tract is due to a variation in legal subdivision of the U. S. Public Land Surveys.
2. The non-standard gas proration unit consists of contiguous quarter-quarter sections and/or lots.
3. The non-standard gas proration unit lies wholly within a single governmental quarter section in pools with 160-acre standard proration units except the Tubb Gas Pool, and within a single governmental section in the Tubb Gas Pool and in all pools with 320-acre or 640-acre standard proration units.
4. The entire non-standard gas proration unit may reasonably be presumed to be productive of gas from the applicable gas pool.
5. The length or width of the non-standard gas proration unit does not exceed 2,640 feet in pools with 160-acre standard proration units, and does not exceed 5,280 feet in pools with 320-acre or 640-acre standard proration units.
6. The applicant presents written consent in the form of waivers from:
 - (a) All operators owning interests outside the non-standard gas proration unit but in the same quarter section in pools having 160-acre standard proration units or in the same section in pools having 320-acre or 640-acre standard proration units, in which any part of the non-standard gas proration unit is situated, and

(b) All operators owning interests within 1,500 feet of the well to which such non-standard gas proration unit is proposed to be dedicated.

7. In lieu of subparagraph 6 of this rule, the applicant may furnish proof of the fact that said offset operators were notified by registered mail of his intent to form such non-standard gas proration unit. (This notification to offset operators should consist of the same information that is furnished to the Commission.) The Secretary-Director of the Commission may approve the application if, after a period of 30 days following the mailing of said notice, no operator has made objection to formation of such non-standard gas proration unit.

B. NOMINATIONS AND PRORATION SCHEDULE

RULE 6(A): At least 30 days prior to the beginning of each gas proration period, the Commission shall hold a hearing after due notice has been given. The Commission shall cause to be submitted by each gas purchaser its "Preliminary Nominations" of the amount of gas which each in good faith actually desires to purchase within the ensuing proration period, by months, from each of the gas pools regulated by this order. The Commission shall consider the "Preliminary Nominations" of purchasers, actual production, and such other factors as may be deemed applicable in determining the amount of gas that may be produced without waste within the ensuing proration period. "Preliminary Nominations" shall be submitted on a form prescribed by the Commission.

RULE 6(B): The term "gas purchaser" as used in these rules shall mean any "taker" of gas either at the well-head or at any point on the lease where connection is made for gas transportation or utilization. It shall be the responsibility of said "taker" to submit a nomination in accordance with Rule 6(A) and Rule 7 (A) of this order.

RULE 7(A): In the event a gas purchaser's market shall have increased or decreased, he may file with the Commission prior to the 10th day of the month a "Supplemental Nomination" showing the amount of gas he actually in good faith desires to purchase during the ensuing proration month from any gas pool regulated by this order. The Commission shall hold a public hearing between the 13th and 20th days of each month to determine the reasonable market demand for gas for the ensuing proration month, and shall issue a proration schedule setting out the amount of gas which each well may produce during the ensuing proration month along with such other

CASE No. 1937
Order No. R-1670

information as is necessary to show the allowable-production status of each well on the schedule. "Supplemental Nominations" shall be submitted on a form prescribed by the Commission.

RULE 7(B): The Commission shall include in the proration schedule the gas wells in the gas pools regulated by this order delivering to a gas transportation facility, or lease gathering system, and shall include in the proration schedule any well which it finds is being unreasonably discriminated against through denial of access to a gas transportation facility, which is reasonably capable of handling the type of gas produced by such well.

C. ALLOCATION AND GRANTING OF ALLOWABLES

RULE 8(A): The total allowable to be allocated to each gas pool regulated by this order each month shall be equal to the sum of the "Preliminary" or "Supplemental Nominations" (whichever is applicable) for each pool, together with any adjustment which the Commission deems advisable. A monthly allowable shall be assigned to each well entitled to an allowable by allocating the pool allowable among all such wells in that pool in accordance with the procedure set out in the Special Pool Rules.

RULE 8(B): Allowables to newly completed gas wells shall commence in accordance with the provisions of the Special Pool Rules. No gas well shall be given an allowable until Form C-104 and Form C-110 have been filed, together with a plat (Form C-128) showing acreage attributed to said well and the location of all wells on the lease.

RULE 9(A): A well's "Acreage Factor" shall be determined to the nearest hundredth of a unit by dividing the acreage assigned to the well by 160 acres. However, the acreage tolerances provided in Rule 5(A) shall apply.

RULE 9(B): If, during a proration month, the acreage assigned to a well is increased, the operator shall notify the Commission in writing (Box 2045, Hobbs, New Mexico) of such increase by filing a revised plat (Form C-128). The increased allowable assigned the gas proration unit for the well shall be effective on the first day of the month following receipt of the notification by the Commission.

RULE 10(A): A marginal well shall be assigned an allowable equal to its maximum production during any month of the preceding gas proration period.

CASE No. 1937
Order No. R-1670

RULE 10(B): The pool allowable remaining after deducting the total allowable assigned to marginal wells shall be allocated among the non-marginal wells entitled to an allowable in such pool as provided for in the Special Pool Rules.

RULE 11: After notice and hearing, the Commission may assign minimum allowables in order to prevent the premature abandonment of wells.

RULE 12: The full production of gas from each well shall be charged against the well's allowable regardless of what disposition has been made of the gas; provided, however, that gas used on the lease for consumption in lease houses, treaters, compressors, combustion engines and other similar lease equipment shall not be charged against the well's allowable.

D. BALANCING OF PRODUCTION

RULE 13: The dates 7:00 a.m., January 1, and 7:00 a.m., July 1, shall be known as balancing dates, and the periods of time bounded by these dates shall be known as gas proration periods.

RULE 14(A): Underproduction: Any non-marginal well which has an underproduced status as of the end of a gas proration period shall be allowed to carry such underproduction forward into the next gas proration period and may produce such underproduction in addition to the allowable assigned during such succeeding period. Any allowable carried forward into a gas proration period and remaining unproduced at the end of such gas proration period shall be cancelled.

RULE 14(B): Production during any one month of a gas proration period in excess of the allowable assigned to a well for such month shall be applied against the underproduction carried into such period in determining the amount of allowable, if any, to be cancelled.

RULE 15(A): Overproduction: Any well which has an overproduced status as of the end of a gas proration period shall carry such overproduction forward into the next gas proration period, provided that such overproduction shall be made up during such succeeding period. Any well which has not made up the overproduction carried into a gas proration period by the end of such proration period shall be shut-in until such overproduction is made up. If, at any time, a well is overproduced an amount equalling six times

CASE No. 1937
Order No. R-1670

its current monthly allowable, it shall be shut-in during that month, and each succeeding month until the well is overproduced less than six times its current monthly allowable.

RULE 15(B): Allowable assigned to a well during any one month of a gas proration period in excess of the production for the same month shall be applied against the overproduction carried into such period in determining the amount of overproduction, if any, which has not been made up.

RULE 15(C): The Commission may allow overproduction to be made up at a lesser rate than would be the case if the well were completely shut-in upon a showing at public hearing after due notice that complete shut-in of the well would result in material damage to the well.

RULE 15(D): Any allowable accrued to a well at the end of a proration period due to the cancellation of underage and the redistribution thereof shall be applied against the overproduction carried into said proration period.

E. CLASSIFICATION OF WELLS

RULE 16(A): After the production data is available for the last month of each gas proration period, any well which had an underproduced status at the beginning of the preceding gas proration period and which did not produce its allowable during at least one month of such preceding gas proration period may be classified as a marginal well, unless, prior to the end of said preceding gas proration period, the operator or other interested party presents satisfactory evidence to the Commission showing that the well should not be so classified. However, a well which in any month of said proration period has demonstrated its ability to produce its allowable for said proration period shall not be classified as a marginal well.

RULE 16(B): The Secretary-Director may reclassify a marginal or non-marginal well at any time the well's production data, deliverability data, or other evidence as to the well's producing ability justifies such reclassification.

RULE 17: A well which is classified as a marginal well shall not be permitted to accumulate underproduction, and any underproduction accrued to a well prior to its classification as a marginal well shall be cancelled.

RULE 18: If, at the end of a proration period, a marginal well has produced more than the total allowable assigned a non-marginal unit of corresponding size, for that period, the marginal well shall be reclassified as a non-marginal well and its allowable and net status adjusted accordingly.

RULE 19: A well which has been reworked or recompleted shall be classified as a non-marginal well as of the date of reconnection to a pipeline until such time as production data, deliverability data, or other evidence as to the well's producing ability indicates that the well should be classified as a marginal well.

RULE 20: All wells not classified as marginal wells shall be classified as non-marginal wells.

F. REPORTING OF PRODUCTION

RULE 21(A): The monthly gas production from each well shall be metered separately and the gas production therefrom shall be reported to the Commission on Form C-115 in accordance with Rule 1114 of the Commission Rules and Regulations, so as to reach the Commission on or before the 24th day of the month next succeeding the month in which the gas was produced. The operator shall show on such report what disposition has been made of the gas produced.

RULE 21(B): Each purchaser or taker of gas in each of the designated gas pools regulated by this order shall submit a report to the Commission so as to reach the Commission on or before the 15th day of the month next succeeding the month in which the gas was purchased or taken.

RULE 21(C): Such report shall be filed on either Form C-111 or Form C-114 (whichever is applicable) with the wells being listed in approximately the same order as they are listed on the proration schedule.

RULE 21(D): Forms C-111 and C-114 referred to herein shall be submitted in duplicate, the original being sent to the Commission at Box 871, Santa Fe, New Mexico, the other copy being sent to Box 2045, Hobbs, New Mexico.

G. GENERAL

RULE 22: No gas, either dry gas or casinghead gas, produced from the gas pools regulated by this order shall be flared or vented except as provided in the Special Pool Rules.

CASE No. 1937
Order No. R-1670

RULE 23: Failure to comply with the provisions of this order or the rules contained herein shall result in the cancellation of allowable assigned to the affected well. No further allowable shall be assigned to the affected well until all rules and regulations are complied with. The Proration Manager shall notify the operator of the well and the purchaser, in writing, of the date of allowable cancellation and the reason therefor.

RULE 24: All transporters or users of gas shall file gas well connection notices with the Commission as soon as possible after the date of connection, in accordance with the provisions of Rule 8(B) of the Special Pool Rules. (Rule 24 does not actually appear in pool rules, but is Commission policy and added for information and clarification.)

(See Special Pool Rules for each pool for orders applicable to that pool only. Special Pool Rules will be found in the same classification order as in the General section, and, unless the special rules conflict with the general rule, the general rule is also applicable.)

CASE No. 1937
Order No. R-1670

II. SPECIAL RULES AND REGULATIONS FOR THE BLINEBRY GAS POOL

(The Blinebry Gas Pool was created February 17, 1953, and prorationing was instituted January 1, 1954.)

A. WELL LOCATION AND ACREAGE REQUIREMENTS

RULE 5(A): A standard gas proration unit in the Blinebry Gas Pool shall be 160 acres.

(Also see Rule 29 below.)

C. ALLOCATION AND GRANTING OF ALLOWABLES

RULE 8(A): The pool allowable remaining each month after deducting the total allowable assigned to marginal wells shall be allocated among the non-marginal wells entitled to an allowable in the proportion that each well's acreage factor bears to the total of the acreage factors for all non-marginal wells in the pool.

RULE 8(B): Allowables to newly completed gas wells shall commence on the date of connection to a gas transportation facility, as determined from an affidavit furnished to the Commission (Box 2045, Hobbs, New Mexico) by the purchaser, or the date of filing of Form C-104 and C-110 and a plat (Form C-128), whichever date is the later.

(Also see Rule 29 below.)

RULE 12: The production of intermediate or low pressure gas derived from the staging of the well fluids need not be charged against the well's gas allowable, provided that the said intermediate or low pressure gas is utilized in accordance with the provisions of Rule 34 below.

G. GENERAL

RULE 22: No gas, either dry gas or casinghead gas, shall be flared, vented or otherwise wasted in the Blinebry Gas Pool at any time after ninety (90) days from the date of completion of a well in said pool.

Any operator desiring to obtain an exception to the foregoing provision of this rule shall submit to the Secretary-Director of the Commission an application for such exception accompanied by a sworn statement setting forth the facts and circumstances which justify such exception. The Secretary-Director is hereby authorized to grant such exception when the granting of such is necessary to protect correlative rights, prevent waste, or prevent undue hardship on the applicant. The

CASE No. 1937
Order No. R-1670

II. SPECIAL RULES AND REGULATIONS FOR THE BLINEBRY GAS POOL
(CONT'D)

Secretary-Director shall (a) grant the exception within 15 days following receipt of the application and statement, or (b) set the application for hearing before the Commission at a regularly scheduled monthly hearing; provided, however, that no such applicant shall incur any penalty by reason of a delay in setting the application for hearing. Public notice of the hearing of the application shall be published in the manner provided by law.

Should the Secretary-Director grant an exception to the provision of Rule 22, notification of such exception shall be distributed to the Commission's regular mailing list.

H. MISCELLANEOUS SPECIAL POOL RULES

RULE 25: The vertical limits of the Blinebry Gas Pool shall extend from a point 75 feet above the "Blinebry Marker" to a point 300 feet below the "Blinebry Marker."

The "Blinebry Marker" shall be that point encountered in the Humble Oil and Refining Company State "S" Well No. 20, SW/4 NW/4 of Section 2, Township 22 South, Range 37 East, NMPM, at a depth of 5457 feet (Elevation 3380, Subsea Datum Minus 2077).

RULE 26: Any well drilled and completed in good faith prior to April 11, 1955, which well is situated within the horizontal boundaries of the Blinebry Gas Pool as herein defined, but which produces gas from a depth interval exceeding the vertical limits of the Blinebry Gas Pool as herein defined, is hereby validated and shall be classified as a gas well in the Blinebry Gas Pool, provided that said well conforms to the definition of a gas well in said pool as set out in Rule 27(A) of these rules, and provided that the well is classified as a gas well in the Blinebry Gas Pool under the rules, regulations and orders in effect on April 10, 1955.

RULE 27(A): A gas well in the Blinebry Gas Pool shall mean a well producing from within the vertical and horizontal limits of the Blinebry Gas Pool which:

1. Produces liquid hydrocarbons possessing a gravity of 51⁰ API or greater, or
2. Produces liquid hydrocarbons possessing a

CASE No. 1937
Order No. R-1670

II. SPECIAL RULES AND REGULATIONS FOR THE BLINEBRY GAS POOL
(CONT'D)

gravity of less than 51° API but with a producing gas-liquid ratio of 32,000 cubic feet of gas or more per barrel of liquid hydrocarbon.

RULE 27 (B): A well producing from within the horizontal and vertical limits of the Blinebry Gas Pool and not classified as a gas well, as defined in Section (A) of this rule, shall be classified as an oil well in the Blinebry Oil Pool.

RULE 28: The Proration Manager may reclassify a well under Rule 27 if production data, gas-oil ratio tests or other evidence reflects the need for such reclassification.

For proration purposes, the effective date of such reclassification shall be the first day of the next succeeding month.

The Proration Manager will notify the operator of the reclassified well of such reclassification and the effective date thereof; provided, however, that operator may appeal such reclassification to the Secretary-Director of the Commission in writing.

RULE 29: In the event an oil well in the Blinebry Oil Pool is reclassified as a gas well in the Blinebry Gas Pool, the operator of such well will be afforded the opportunity to form a non-standard gas proration unit for the well; provided, however, that, until such unit is formed, such well shall be allocated a gas allowable commensurate with the acreage contained in the unit formerly dedicated to the oil well in the Blinebry Oil Pool.

In the event such reclassification should cause the occurrence of two gas wells producing from the Blinebry Gas Pool within a single proration unit, the sum total of the allowables allocated to the two wells shall be equivalent to the volume of gas allocated to a single proration unit; provided, however, that the operator of such wells shall have the option to determine the proportion of the assigned allowable to be produced by each individual well.

RULE 30: Acreage dedicated to a gas well in the Blinebry Gas Pool shall not be simultaneously dedicated to an oil well in the Blinebry Oil Pool, and the dual completion of a well so as to produce gas from the Blinebry Gas Pool and oil from the Blinebry Oil Pool is hereby prohibited.

CASE No. 1937
Order No. R-1670

II. SPECIAL RULES AND REGULATIONS FOR THE BLINEBRY GAS POOL
(CONT'D)

RULE 31: At no time will the horizontal boundaries of the Blinebry Gas Pool conflict with or overlap the horizontal boundaries of the Terry-Blinebry Oil Pool.

RULE 32: Gas-liquid ratio tests and determination of the gravity of that liquid hydrocarbon recovered from wells in the Blinebry Gas Pool shall be conducted semiannually during the months of May and October on all wells located in and producing from the Blinebry Gas Pool. Results of such tests will be reported to the Commission on Form C-116 on or before the 15th day of June and the 15th day of November of each calendar year.

RULE 33: Bottom-hole pressure tests will be conducted semiannually during the months of May and October on all gas wells located to the north of an east-west line coinciding with the north lines of Sections 21, 22, 23 and 24, Township 21 South, Range 37 East, NMPM, Lea County, New Mexico, such wells to be producing from within the vertical and horizontal boundaries of the Blinebry Gas Pool and classified as gas wells under the rules contained in this order. Results of such tests will be reported to the Commission on Form C-124 on or before the 25th day of June and the 25th day of November of each calendar year.

All bottom-hole pressure tests, except tests on dually completed wells producing from the Blinebry Gas Pool, will be conducted in accordance with Rule 302 of the Rules of the Commission. Shut-in period will be 48 hours, datum elevation will be 2400 feet subsea, (-2400), and base temperature will be 100° Fahrenheit.

Bottom-hole pressures on dually completed wells producing gas from the Blinebry Gas Pool may be calculated from a 72-hour shut-in pressure at the wellhead, provided that an accurate determination of the fluid level in the hole is made employing sonic or other methods of equivalent accuracy. The gravity of the fluid in the hole shall be that gravity determined by averaging the gravities of those fluids produced on official test in the Blinebry Gas Pool during the regular semiannual gas-liquid ratio and gravity testing period next preceding the subject bottom-hole pressure test period. The gravity to be employed in the calculation of bottom-hole pressures during a particular testing period shall be determined by the Commission. All interested operators shall be duly notified of such determination by the Commission.

CASE No. 1937
Order No. R-1670

II. SPECIAL RULES AND REGULATIONS FOR THE BLINEBRY GAS POOL
(CONT'D)

RULE 34: The following shall apply to all producing wells in the Blinebry Gas Pool:

(A) Gas produced from each well shall be produced into a separate high-pressure separator. The high-pressure gas shall then be metered separately prior to its entering a gas transportation facility.

(B) The distillate separated from the high-pressure gas in the high-pressure separator shall then be directed into a low-pressure separator. The distillate may be commingled with other distillate produced by any other well or wells producing from the Blinebry or Tubb Gas Pools following its separation from the high-pressure gas in the high-pressure separator, provided gas-distillate test facilities are available and periodic tests are made.

Following the separation of distillate and low-pressure gas in the low-pressure separator, the low-pressure gas shall be directed into a low-pressure gas gathering system, and said low-pressure gas need not be measured separately from other low-pressure gas produced on the lease, provided that certain test facilities are available and certain periodic tests made.

(C) Each year during the months of June and July each operator of each gas well producing from the Blinebry Gas Pool shall cause to be taken an annual gas-distillate ratio test. The results of such test shall be submitted to the Commission office (P. O. Box 2045, Hobbs, New Mexico) on or before August 15 following the test. The test shall outline the amount of high-pressure gas produced during the 24-hour test period, the amount of low-pressure gas produced during the test period, the high-pressure gas-distillate ratio, and the low-pressure gas-distillate ratio.

Failure to submit the required test by August 15 shall result in suspension of any further gas allowable until the date the required information is submitted.

(D) In submitting Form C-115 (Operator's Monthly Report) on wells producing from the Blinebry zone in which distillate is commingled and/or the low-

CASE No. 1937
Order No. R-1670

II. SPECIAL RULES AND REGULATIONS FOR THE BLINEBRY GAS POOL
(CONT'D)

pressure gas is commingled with other low-pressure gas produced on the lease, the operator shall estimate if necessary the volume produced by each well in each pool by using the ratios as reflected in the most recent tests submitted.

(E) The Secretary-Director of the Commission shall have authority to grant exception to the provisions set forth in Sections (A) through (D) of this rule, inclusive, where it can be shown that compliance with these rules is not economic or is impractical. Applications for exception shall be submitted in triplicate to the Oil Conservation Commission, P. O. Box 871, Santa Fe, New Mexico, with a copy of each application being furnished offset operators.

(General Pool Rules also apply unless in conflict with these
Special Pool Rules)

CASE No. 1937
Order No. R-1670

III. SPECIAL RULES AND REGULATIONS FOR THE CROSBY-DEVONIAN GAS POOL

(The Crosby-Devonian Gas Pool was created May 27, 1955, and gas prorationing was instituted April 1, 1957.)

A. WELL LOCATION AND SPACING REQUIREMENTS

RULE 5(A): A standard gas proration unit in the Crosby-Devonian Gas Pool shall be 160 acres. (Note: The General Rules regarding administrative approval of non-standard units do not apply to the Crosby-Devonian Gas Pool.)

C. ALLOCATION AND GRANTING OF ALLOWABLES

RULE 8(A): The pool allowable remaining each month after deducting the total allowable assigned to marginal wells shall be allocated among the non-marginal wells entitled to an allowable in the proportion that each well's acreage factor bears to the total of the acreage factors for all non-marginal wells in the pool.

RULE 8(B): Allowables to newly completed gas wells shall commence on the date of connection to a gas transportation facility, as determined from an affidavit furnished to the Commission (Box 2045, Hobbs, New Mexico) by the purchaser, or the date of filing of Form C-104, Form C-110 and Form C-128 or the approval of a non-standard proration unit or filing of an affidavit of communitization, whichever date is the later.

RULE 8(C): The allowable revision for a well after workover or recompletion shall become effective:

(a) On the date of reconnection after workover, such date to be determined from Form C-104 as filed by the operators, or

(b) A date 15 days prior to the approval of Form C-104 by the Commission's office, (Box 2045, Hobbs, New Mexico); (Form C-104 shall specify the exact nature of the workover or remedial work; if the nature of the work cannot be explained on Form C-104, in that event, Form C-103 shall be also filed in accordance with Rule 1106 of the Commission's Statewide Rules and Regulations.)

whichever date is later.

H. MISCELLANEOUS SPECIAL POOL RULES

RULE 25: The vertical limits of the Crosby-Devonian Gas

CASE No. 1937
Order No. R-1670

III. SPECIAL RULES AND REGULATIONS FOR THE CROSBY-DEVONIAN GAS POOL
(CONT'D)

Pool shall include all the formations that can reasonably be considered to be of Devonian age.

RULE 26: Gas-liquid ratio tests shall be taken in accordance with the provisions of Rule 301 of the Commission Rules and Regulations as scheduled by the Commission.

RULE 27: The casing program for the field shall include three strings of casing set in accordance with the following plan:

(A) The surface string shall be new or reconditioned pipe with a mill test of not less than two thousand (2,000) pounds per square inch and shall be set and cemented at a depth of approximately five hundred (500) feet, such depth being sufficient to protect the fresh water bearing sands of the Santa Rosa formation.

Cementing shall be by the pump-and-plug method, and sufficient cement shall be used to fill the annular space back of the pipe to the surface of the ground or the bottom of the cellar. Cement shall stand a minimum of sixteen (16) hours under pressure and a total of twenty-four (24) hours before drilling the plug or initiating pressure tests. Before drilling the plug, this string shall be tested by the application of at least one thousand (1,000) pounds per square inch and, if at the end of thirty (30) minutes the pressure shows a drop of one hundred fifty (150) pounds per square inch or more, the cementing job shall be condemned. After corrective measures have been taken, the pipe shall again be tested in the same manner.

(B) The intermediate string shall consist of new or reconditioned pipe that has been tested to two thousand (2,000) pounds per square inch and shall be set at approximately thirty-six hundred (3,600) feet. Cementing shall be by the pump-and-plug method, and sufficient cement shall be used to fill the calculated annular space back of the pipe to a point one hundred (100) feet above the top of the Salado formation. The cement shall stand a minimum of twenty-four (24) hours under pressure and a total of thirty (30) hours before drilling plug or initiating tests. Casing shall be tested by the application of at least twelve hundred (1,200) pounds per square inch pump pressure. If, at the end of thirty (30) minutes, the pump pressure shows a drop of one hundred (100) pounds per square inch or more, the cementing job shall be condemned. After corrective measures have been taken,

CASE No. 1937
Order No. R-1670

III. SPECIAL RULES AND REGULATIONS FOR THE CROSBY-DEVONIAN GAS POOL
(CONT'D)

the pipe shall again be tested in the same manner.

(C) The producing or oil string shall be new or reconditioned casing that has been tested to four thousand (4,000) pounds per square inch and shall be set at a depth not less than the top of the Devonian formation. Cementing shall be with a minimum of three hundred fifty (350) sacks of cement applied by the pump-and-plug method and shall stand a minimum of twenty-four (24) hours under pressure and a total of forty-eight (48) hours before drilling the plug or initiating tests. After cementing, the casing shall be tested by pump pressure of at least thirty (30) minutes. If, at the end of 30 minutes the pressure shows a drop of one hundred (100) pounds per square inch or more, the cementing job shall be condemned. After corrective measures have been taken, the pipe shall again be tested in the same manner.

(General Pool Rules also apply unless in conflict with these Special Pool Rules)

CASE No. 1937
Order No. R-1670

IV. SPECIAL RULES AND REGULATIONS FOR THE EUMONT GAS POOL

(The Eumont Gas Pool was created February 17, 1953, and proration was instituted January 1, 1954. The Eumont Gas Pool now includes portions of the acreage once included in the Jalco and Langmat Pools (now Jalmat) and all of the acreage formerly in the Arrow and Hardy Pools.)

A. WELL LOCATION AND ACREAGE REQUIREMENTS

RULE 5(A): A standard gas proration unit in the Eumont Gas Pool shall be 640 acres.

RULE 5(B): Any well drilled to and producing from the Eumont Gas Pool, as defined herein, prior to August 12, 1954 at a location conforming with the spacing requirements effective at the time said well was drilled, shall be granted a tolerance not exceeding 330 feet with respect to the required distance from the boundary lines.

C. ALLOCATION AND GRANTING OF ALLOWABLES

RULE 8(A): The pool allowable remaining each month after deducting the total allowable assigned to marginal wells shall be allocated among the non-marginal wells entitled to an allowable in the proportion that each well's acreage factor bears to the total of the acreage factors for all non-marginal wells in the pool.

RULE 8(B): Allowables to newly completed gas wells shall commence on the date of connection to a gas transportation facility, as determined from an affidavit furnished to the Commission (Box 2045, Hobbs, New Mexico) by the purchaser, or the date of filing of Form C-104, Form C-110, and a plat (Form C-128), whichever date is the later.

G. GENERAL

RULE 22: No gas, either dry gas or casinghead gas, shall be flared or vented from any well at any time after ninety (90) days from the date such well is completed. Any operator who desires to obtain an exception to the provisions of Rule 22 of Section I of this order shall submit to the Secretary-Director of the Commission an application for such exception with a sworn statement setting forth the facts and circumstances justifying such exception. The Secretary-Director is hereby authorized to grant such an exception whenever the granting of the exception is reasonably necessary to protect correlative rights, prevent waste, or prevent undue hardship on the applicant under all the acts and circumstances as set forth in the statement. The Secretary-Director shall either (a) grant

CASE No. 1937
Order No. R-1670

IV. SPECIAL RULES AND REGULATIONS FOR THE EUMONT GAS POOL (CONT'D)

the exception within 15 days after receipt of the application and statement or (b) thereafter set the application for hearing by the Commission at a regular monthly hearing; provided, however, that no such applicant shall incur any penalty by reason of a delay in setting the application for hearing. Notice of hearing of the application shall be published in the manner provided by law and the Rules of the Commission. If the exception is granted by the Secretary-Director, a list of such exceptions shall be distributed in the Commission's regular mailing list.

The flaring or venting of gas from any well in violation of any provision of this rule will result in suspension of any further allowable until further order of the Commission.

RULE 22(A): Within 15 days after any oil or gas well within the boundaries of the Eumont Gas Pool is connected to a gas transportation facility, the operator shall file Form C-110 designating the disposition of gas from the well.

RULE 22(B): No extraction plant processing any gas from the Eumont Gas Pool shall flare or vent such gas unless such flaring or venting is made necessary by mechanical difficulties or unless the gas flared or vented is of no commercial value.

H. MISCELLANEOUS SPECIAL POOL RULES

RULE 25: The vertical limits of the Eumont Gas Pool shall extend from the top of the Yates formation to the base of the Queen formation, thereby including all of the Yates, Seven Rivers and Queen formations.

RULE 26(A): A gas well shall mean a well producing with a gas-oil ratio in excess of 100,000 cubic feet of gas per barrel of oil.

RULE 26(B): A well producing from the Eumont Gas Pool and not classified as a gas well, as defined in Section (A) of this rule, shall be classified as an oil well.

RULE 26(C): Oil wells producing from the Eumont Gas Pool shall be allowed to produce a volume of gas each day not exceeding the daily normal unit oil allowable multiplied by 10,000; provided, however, that such well shall not be allowed to produce oil in excess of the normal unit allowable as ordered by the Commission under the provisions of Statewide Rule 505.

CASE No. 1937
Order No. R-1670

V. SPECIAL RULES AND REGULATIONS FOR THE JALMAT GAS POOL

(The Jalmat Gas Pool was created effective September 1, 1954 from a consolidation of the Jalco and Langmat Pools, which were created February 7, 1953. Gas prorationing was instituted in Jalco and Langmat January 1, 1954 and was continued after consolidation to form the Jalmat Gas Pool. The Jalmat Gas Pool now includes acreage that was formerly included in the Jal, Cooper-Jal, Eaves, Falby-Yates, Jalco, and Langmat Pools.)

A. WELL LOCATION AND ACREAGE REQUIREMENTS

RULE 5(A): A standard gas proration unit in the Jalmat Gas Pool shall be 640 acres.

RULE 5(B): Any well drilled to and producing from the Jalmat Gas Pool, as defined herein, prior to September 1, 1954 at a location conforming with the spacing requirements effective at the time said well was drilled shall be granted a tolerance not exceeding 330 feet with respect to the required distance from the boundary lines.

C. ALLOCATION AND GRANTING OF ALLOWABLES

RULE 8(A): 1. The pool allowable remaining after deducting the total allowable assigned to marginal wells shall be allocated among the non-marginal wells in the pool as follows:

(a) Twenty-five percent (25%) of the remaining pool allowable shall be allocated among the non-marginal wells in the pool in the proportion that each well's "Acreage Factor" bears to the total "Acreage Factor" for all non-marginal wells in the pool.

(b) Seventy-five percent (75%) of the remaining pool allowable shall be allocated among the non-marginal wells in the pool in the proportion that each well's "AD Factor" bears to the total "AD Factor" for all non-marginal wells in the pool.

2. A well's "AD Factor" shall be determined by multiplying the well's "Acreage Factor" by its "Calculated Deliverability" (expressed in MCF per day). The "AD Factor" shall be computed to the nearest whole unit. In those instances where there is more than one well on a proration unit, the "Calculated Deliverability" for the unit shall be determined by averaging the "Calculated Deliverabilities" of all the wells on the unit.

3. Annual deliverability tests shall be taken on all gas wells in the Jalmat Gas Pool in a manner and at

CASE No. 1937
Order No. R-1670

V. SPECIAL RULES AND REGULATIONS FOR THE JALMAT GAS POOL (CONT'D)

such time as the Commission may prescribe. The results of such tests shall determine a well's "Calculated Deliverability". The annual deliverability tests taken each year shall be used in calculating allowables for wells in the Jalmat Gas Pool for the succeeding twelve month period beginning July 1 of that year.

4. No well shall be assigned an allowable until a deliverability test has been filed with the Commission and approved.

5. The Secretary-Director of the Commission shall have authority to exempt marginal wells from the requirement of taking an annual deliverability test in those instances where the deliverability of the well is of such low volume as to have no significance in the determination of the well's allowable.

RULE 8(B): Allowables to newly completed gas wells shall commence:

1. On the date of connection to a gas transportation facility, such date to be determined from an affidavit furnished to the Commission (Box 2045, Hobbs, New Mexico) by the purchaser;

2. The latest filing date of Form C-104, C-110 or C-128; or

3. A date 45 days prior to the date upon which the well's deliverability and shut-in pressure test is reported to the Commission on Form C-122-C;

whichever date is later.

RULE 8(C): Retests and tests taken after recompletion or workover shall be taken in the same manner as provided in Rule 8(A) 3 above, and any change in the well's "Calculated Deliverability" resulting therefrom shall become effective:

1. On the date of reconnection after workover, such date to be determined from Form C-104 as filed by the operator; or

2. A date 45 days prior to the date upon which a well's deliverability and shut-in pressure test is reported to the Commission on Form C-122-C; or

3. A date 45 days prior to the receipt and approval of Form C-104 by the Commission Office (Box

CASE No. 1937
Order No. R-1670

V. SPECIAL RULES AND REGULATIONS FOR THE JALMAT GAS POOL (CONT'D)

2045, Hobbs, New Mexico). (Form C-104 shall specify the exact nature of the workover or remedial work. If the nature of the work cannot be explained on Form C-104, in that event, Form C-103 shall also be filed in accordance with Rule 1106 of the Commission's Statewide Rules and Regulations. Form C-128 (Well Location and Acreage Dedication Plat) shall be submitted by the operator at any time there is a change in the acreage dedicated to said well.),

whichever date is later.

G. GENERAL

RULE 22: No gas, either dry gas or casinghead gas, shall be flared or vented from any well at any time after ninety (90) days from the date such well is completed. Any operator who desires to obtain an exception to the provisions of Rule 22 of Section I of this order shall submit to the Secretary-Director of the Commission an application for such exception with a sworn statement setting forth the facts and circumstances justifying such exception. The Secretary-Director is hereby authorized to grant such an exception whenever the granting of the exception is reasonably necessary to protect correlative rights, prevent waste, or prevent undue hardship on the applicant under all the acts and circumstances as set forth in the statement. The Secretary-Director shall either (a) grant the exception within 15 days after receipt of the application and statement or (b) thereafter set the application for hearing by the Commission at a regular monthly hearing; provided, however, that no such applicant shall incur any penalty by reason of a delay in setting the application for hearing. Notice of hearing of the application shall be published in the manner provided by law and the Rules of the Commission. If the exception is granted by the Secretary-Director, a list of such exceptions shall be distributed in the Commission's regular mailing list.

The flaring or venting of gas from any well in violation of any provision of this rule will result in suspension of any further allowable until further order of the Commission.

RULE 22(A): Within 15 days after any oil or gas well within the boundaries of the Jalmat Gas Pool is connected to a gas transportation facility, the operator shall file Form C-110 designating the disposition of gas from the well.

RULE 22(B): No extraction plant processing any gas from

CASE No. 1937
Order No. R-1670

V. SPECIAL RULES AND REGULATIONS FOR THE JALMAT GAS POOL (CONT'D)

the Jalmat Gas Pool shall flare or vent such gas unless such flaring or venting is made necessary by mechanical difficulties or unless the gas flared or vented is of no commercial value.

H. MISCELLANEOUS SPECIAL POOL RULES

RULE 25(A): The vertical limits of the Jalmat Gas Pool shall extend from the top of the Tansill formation to a point 100 feet above the base of the Seven Rivers formation, thereby including all of the Yates formation, except,

RULE 25(B): In the area described immediately below, the vertical limits of the Jalmat Gas Pool shall extend from the top of the Tansill formation to a point 250 feet above the base of the Seven Rivers formation, thereby including all of the Yates formation:

TOWNSHIP 24 SOUTH, RANGE 36 EAST, NMPM

Section 13: SE/4 NE/4, SE/4
Section 23: E/2 E/2
Section 24: All
Section 25: N/2
Section 26: E/2 NE/4

TOWNSHIP 24 SOUTH, RANGE 37 EAST, NMPM

Section 18: SW/4 NW/4, W/2 SW/4
Section 19: W/2
Section 30: NW/4

RULE 26(A): A gas well shall mean a well producing with a gas-oil ratio in excess of 100,000 cubic feet of gas per barrel of oil.

RULE 26(B): A well producing from the Jalmat Gas Pool, and not classified as a gas well shall be classified as an oil well.

RULE 26(C): Oil wells producing from the Jalmat Gas Pool shall be allowed to produce a volume of gas each day not exceeding the daily normal unit oil allowable multiplied by 10,000; provided, however, that such wells shall not be allowed to produce oil in excess of the normal unit allowable as ordered by the Commission under the provisions of Rule 505.

RULE 27: That portion of the Rhodes Storage Area lying within the defined limits of the Jalmat Gas Pool shall be exempted from the applicable provisions of the Jalmat Gas Pool Rules. The Rhodes Storage Area shall include the

CASE No. 1937
Order No. R-1670

V. SPECIAL RULES AND REGULATIONS FOR THE JALMAT GAS POOL (CONT'D)

following described area:

TOWNSHIP 26 SOUTH, RANGE 37 EAST, NMPM

Section 4: W/2 NW/4, SE/4 SE/4, W/2 SE/4, SW/4
Section 5: All
Section 6: NE/4 NW/4, NE/4, SE/4 SE/4, N/2 SE/4
Section 7: NE/4 NE/4
Section 8: N/2, N/2 S/2, SE/4 SW/4, S/2 SE/4
Section 9: All
Section 10: W/2 NW/4, SE/4 NW/4, S/2
Sections 15 and 16: All
Section 17: E/2 NW/4, E/2
Sections 21 and 22: All
Section 23: SW/4 NW/4, SW/4
Sections 26, 27, and 28: All
Section 29: E/2 NE/4

CASE No. 1937
Order No. R-1670

VI. SPECIAL RULES AND REGULATIONS FOR THE JUSTIS GAS POOL

(The Justis Gas Pool was created January 1, 1950, and gas proration was instituted January 1, 1954. The standard proration unit was changed from 160 acres to 320 acres October 3, 1957.)

A. WELL LOCATION AND ACREAGE REQUIREMENTS

RULE 5(A): A standard gas proration unit in the Justis Gas Pool shall be 320 acres.

C. ALLOCATION AND GRANTING ALLOWABLES

RULE 8(A): The pool allowable remaining each month after deducting the total allowable assigned to marginal wells shall be allocated among the non-marginal wells entitled to an allowable in the proportion that each well's acreage factor bears to the total of the acreage factors for all non-marginal wells in the Pool.

RULE 8(B): Allowables to newly completed gas wells shall commence on the date of connection to a gas transportation facility, as determined from an affidavit furnished to the Commission (Box 2045, Hobbs, New Mexico) by the purchaser, or the date of filing of Form C-104, Form C-110 and a plat (Form C-128), or the date of application for a non-standard gas proration unit as provided in Rule 5-C, of the General Rules.

H. MISCELLANEOUS SPECIAL POOL RULES

RULE 25(A): The vertical limits of the Justis Gas Pool shall be defined as follows:

From the top of the Glorieta formation, found at a depth of 4599 feet (Elevation 3080, Subsea Datum - 1519) in the Gulf Oil Corporation McBuffington Well No. 8, located 350 feet from the South line and 1980 feet from the West line of Section 13, Township 25 South, Range 37 East, NMPM, Lea County, New Mexico, to a point 40 feet above the marker encountered at 4879 feet (Subsea Datum - 1799) in said McBuffington Well No. 8.

RULE 25(B): The Hamilton Dome Westates Carlson Federal "A" Well No. 1, located in the NW/4 of Section 25, Township 25 South, Range 37 East, NMPM, Lea County, New Mexico, as the completion existed on April 22, 1959, shall be considered to be completed within the vertical limits of the Justis Gas Pool.

(General Pool Rules also apply unless in conflict with these Special Pool Rules)

CASE No. 1937
Order No. R-1670

VII. SPECIAL RULES AND REGULATIONS FOR THE TUBB GAS POOL

(The Tubb Gas Pool was created February 17, 1953, and proration was instituted January 1, 1954.)

A. WELL LOCATION AND ACREAGE REQUIREMENTS

RULE 5(A): A standard gas proration unit in the Tubb Gas Pool shall be 160 acres.

C. ALLOCATION AND GRANTING OF ALLOWABLES

RULE 8(A): The pool allowable remaining each month after deducting the total allowable assigned to marginal wells shall be allocated among the non-marginal wells entitled to an allowable in the proportion that each well's acreage factor bears to the total of the acreage factor for all non-marginal wells in the pool.

RULE 8(B): Allowables to newly completed gas wells shall commence on the date of connection to a gas transportation facility, as determined from an affidavit furnished to the Commission (Box 2045, Hobbs, New Mexico) by the purchaser, or the date of filing of Form C-104, Form C-110 and the plat (Form C-128), or the date of application for a non-standard gas proration unit as provided in Rule 5(C) of the General Rules, whichever date is the later.

RULE 12: The production of intermediate or low pressure gas derived from the staging of the well fluids need not be charged against the well's gas allowable, provided that the said intermediate or low pressure gas is utilized in accordance with the provisions of Rule 27 below.

H. MISCELLANEOUS SPECIAL POOL RULES

RULE 25: The vertical limits of the Tubb Gas Pool shall extend from a point 100 feet above the "Tubb Marker" to a point 225 feet below the "Tubb Marker". Said "Tubb Marker" shall be that point encountered in the Humble Oil and Refining Company State "S" Well No. 20 at a depth of 5921 feet (Elevation 3380, Subsea Datum Minus 2541).

RULE 26(A): An oil well in the Tubb Gas Pool shall be defined as a well which produces hydrocarbons possessing a gravity of 45° API or less.

RULE 26(B): An oil well in the Tubb Gas Pool shall have dedicated thereto a proration unit consisting of 40 acres, more or less, being a governmental quarter-quarter section legal subdivision of the United States Public Land Surveys.

CASE No. 1937
Order No. R-1670

VII. SPECIAL RULES AND REGULATIONS FOR THE TUBB GAS POOL (CONT'D)

RULE 26(C): No acreage shall be simultaneously dedicated to an oil well and to a gas well in the Tubb Gas Pool.

RULE 26(D): The limiting gas-oil ratio for oil wells in the Tubb Gas Pool shall be 2000 cubic feet of gas for each barrel of oil produced.

RULE 27: The following shall apply to all producing wells in the Tubb Gas Pool:

(A) Gas produced from each well shall be produced into a separate high-pressure separator. The high-pressure gas shall then be metered separately prior to its entering a gas transportation facility.

(B) The distillate separated from the high-pressure gas in the high-pressure separator shall then be directed into a low-pressure separator. The distillate may be commingled with other distillate produced by any other well or wells producing from the Tubb or Blinbry Gas Pools following its separation from the high-pressure gas in the high-pressure separator, provided gas-distillate test facilities are available and periodic tests are made.

Following the separation of distillate and low-pressure gas in the low-pressure separator, the low-pressure gas shall be directed into a low-pressure gas gathering system, and said low-pressure gas need not be measured separately from other low-pressure gas produced on the lease, provided that certain test facilities are available and certain periodic tests made.

(C) Each year during the months of June and July each operator of each gas well producing from the Tubb Gas Pool shall cause to be taken an annual gas-distillate ratio test. The results of such test shall be submitted to the Commission office (P. O. Box 2045, Hobbs New Mexico) on or before August 15 following the test. The test shall outline the amount of high-pressure gas produced during the 24-hour test period, the amount of low-pressure gas produced during the test period, the high-pressure gas-distillate ratio, and the low-pressure gas-distillate ratio. Failure to submit the required test by August 15 shall result in suspension of any further gas allowable until the date the required information is submitted.

(D) In submitting Form C-115 (Operator's Monthly

CASE No. 1937
Order No. R-1670

VII. SPECIAL RULES AND REGULATIONS FOR THE TUBB GAS POOL (CONT'D)

Report) on wells producing from the Tubb zone in which distillate is commingled and/or the low-pressure gas is commingled with other low-pressure gas produced on the lease, the operator shall estimate if necessary the volumes produced by each well in each pool by using the ratios as reflected in the most recent tests submitted.

(E) The Secretary-Director of the Commission shall have authority to grant exception to the provisions set forth in Sections (A) through (D) of this rule, inclusive, where it can be shown that compliance with these rules is not economic or is impractical. Applications for exception shall be submitted in triplicate to the Oil Conservation Commission, P. O. Box 871, Santa Fe, New Mexico, with a copy of each application being furnished offset operators.

(General Pool Rules also apply unless in conflict with these Special Pool Rules)

DONE at Santa Fe, New Mexico, on the day and year hereinabove designated.

STATE OF NEW MEXICO
OIL CONSERVATION COMMISSION

JOHN BURROUGHS, Chairman

MURRAY E. MORGAN, Member

A. L. PORTER, Jr., Member & Secretary

S E A L

esr/

GOVERNOR
JACK M. CAMPBELL
CHAIRMAN

State of New Mexico
Oil Conservation Commission




LAND COMMISSIONER
E. S. JOHNNY WALKER
MEMBER

P. O. BOX 871
SANTA FE

STATE GEOLOGIST
A. L. PORTER, JR.
SECRETARY - DIRECTOR

TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN


I, A. L. PORTER, Jr., Secretary-Director of the New Mexico Oil Conservation Commission hereby certify that the attached is a true and correct copy of Commission Order No. R-1670-C.


A. L. PORTER, Jr.
Secretary-Director

FEBRUARY 28, 1964



IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have affixed my hand and notarial seal this 28th day of February, 1964.


Notary Public

My Commission Expires:

September 22, 1965

BEFORE THE OIL CONSERVATION COMMISSION
OF THE STATE OF NEW MEXICO

IN THE MATTER OF THE HEARING
CALLED BY THE OIL CONSERVATION
COMMISSION OF NEW MEXICO FOR
THE PURPOSE OF CONSIDERING:

CASE No. 2095
Order No. R-1670-C

APPLICATION OF THE OIL CONSERVATION
COMMISSION ON ITS OWN MOTION TO
CONSIDER PRORATING THE GAS PRODUCTION
FROM THE DAKOTA PRODUCING INTERVAL,
SAN JUAN AND RIO ARriba COUNTIES,
NEW MEXICO.

ORDER OF THE COMMISSION

BY THE COMMISSION:

This cause came on for hearing at 9 o'clock a.m. on
October 13, 1960, at Farmington, New Mexico, before the Oil
Conservation Commission of New Mexico, hereinafter referred
to as the "Commission."

NOW, on this 4th day of November, 1960, the Commission,
a quorum being present, having considered the testimony presented
and the exhibits received at said hearing, and being fully advised
in the premises,

FINDS:

(1) That due public notice having been given as required by
law, the Commission has jurisdiction of this cause and the subject
matter thereof.

(2) That by Order Nos. R-1287 and R-1287-A, the Commission
created and defined the Dakota (gas) Producing Interval, San Juan
and Rio Arriba Counties, New Mexico.

(3) That the producing capacity of the wells in the Dakota
Producing Interval is in excess of the market demand for gas from
said common source of supply, and that for the purpose of preventing
waste and protecting correlative rights, appropriate procedures
should be adopted to provide a method of allocating gas among pro-
duction units in the area encompassed by the Dakota Producing
Interval, commencing February 1, 1961.

(4) That since the evidence presented established that there
is a general correlation between the deliverabilities of the gas
wells in the Dakota Producing Interval and the recoverable gas in
place under the tracts dedicated to the wells, the gas allocation
formula for the pool should be based on seventy-five (75) percent
acreage times deliverability plus twenty-five (25) percent acreage.
Such a formula will protect correlative rights and will, insofar as

is practicable, prevent drainage between producing tracts which is not equalized by counter-drainage.

(5) That after three (3) months production history under the allocation formula mentioned above, a hearing should be called to determine whether a minimum and maximum per well allowable is necessary to protect correlative rights and prevent waste.

(6) That the provisions set forth in Order No. R-1287 and Order No. R-1287-A relative to acreage dedication, well location requirements, and vertical and horizontal limits should be incorporated in this order.

(7) That the common source of supply presently classified and defined as the Dakota Producing Interval should henceforth be denominated the Basin-Dakota Gas Pool.

(8) That special rules and regulations governing the drilling, spacing and proration of wells in said Basin-Dakota Gas Pool should be promulgated.

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED:

(1) That Order Nos. R-1287 and R-1287-A be and the same are hereby superseded.

(2) That the following Dakota gas pools be and the same are hereby abolished:

Angels Peak-Dakota
Blanco-Dakota
South Blanco-Dakota
West Blanco-Dakota
Companero-Dakota
East Companero-Dakota
Huerfanito-Dakota
Huerfano-Dakota
West Kutz-Dakota
Largo-Dakota
North Los Pinos-Dakota
South Los Pinos-Dakota
Otero-Dakota

(3) That a new gas pool for Dakota production be and the same is hereby created and designated as the Basin-Dakota Gas Pool with the vertical and horizontal limits as shown in Rule 25 below, and which shall be prorated commencing February 1, 1961.

(4) That the General Rules applicable to prorated gas pools in Northwest New Mexico, as set forth in Order No. R-1670, shall apply to the Basin-Dakota Gas Pool, unless in conflict with the

Special Rules and Regulations for the Basin-Dakota Gas Pool herein-after set forth, in which event the Special Rules shall apply.

(5) That Special Rules and Regulations for the Basin-Dakota Gas Pool be and the same are hereby promulgated as hereinafter set forth.

SPECIAL RULES AND REGULATIONS FOR THE
BASIN-DAKOTA GAS POOL

A. WELL LOCATION AND ACREAGE REQUIREMENTS

RULE 2: That all wells drilled to or completed in the Basin-Dakota Gas Pool shall be located no nearer than 790 feet to the boundary line of the proration unit and shall be located no nearer than 130 feet to a governmental quarter-quarter section line or subdivision inner boundary line.

In the event any such well is completed as an oil well at a location nearer than 330 feet to a governmental quarter-quarter section line, said well shall not be produced unless and until such time as the unorthodox oil well location has been approved by the Commission after notice and hearing.

RULE 3: The Secretary-Director of the Commission shall have authority to grant an exception to Rule 2 without notice and hearing where an application therefor has been filed in due form and the Secretary-Director determines that good cause exists for granting such exception.

Applicants shall furnish all offset operators and all operators within the section in which the subject well is located a copy of the application to the Commission, and applicant shall include with his application a list of names and addresses of all such operators, together with a stipulation that proper notice has been given said operators at the addresses given. The Secretary-Director of the Commission shall wait at least 20 days before approving any such unorthodox location, and may approve such unorthodox location only in the absence of objection from any offset operator or any operator within the section in which the well is located. In the event such an operator objects to the unorthodox location, the Commission shall consider the matter only after proper notice and hearing.

RULE 5(A): A standard gas proration unit in the Basin-Dakota Gas Pool shall be 320 acres.

RULE 5(B): The Secretary-Director of the Commission shall have authority to grant an exception to Rule 5(A) without notice and hearing where an application has been filed in due form and

where the unorthodox size or shape of the tract is due to a variation in the legal subdivision of the United States Public Lands Survey, or where the following facts exist and the following provisions are complied with:

1. The non-standard unit consists of contiguous quarter-quarter sections or lots.

2. The non-standard unit lies wholly within a single governmental section.

3. The entire non-standard unit may reasonably be presumed to be productive of gas.

4. The length or width of the non-standard unit does not exceed 5280 feet.

5. That applicant presents written consent in the form of waivers from all offset operators and from all operators owning interests in the section in which any part of the non-standard unit is situated and which acreage is not included in said non-standard unit.

6. In lieu of Paragraph 5 of this Rule, the applicant may furnish proof of the fact that all of the aforesaid operators were notified by registered mail of his intent to form such non-standard unit. The Secretary-Director of the Commission may approve the application, if, after a period of 30 days following the mailing of said notice, no such operator has made objection to the formation of such non-standard unit.

E. CLASSIFICATION OF WELLS

RULE 16(A): After the production data is available for the last month of each gas proration period, any well which had an underproduced status at the beginning of the preceding gas proration period and which did not produce its average allowable during the preceding six-month gas proration period may be classified as a marginal well, unless, prior to the end of said preceding gas proration period, the operator or other interested party presents satisfactory evidence to the Commission showing that the well should not be so classified.

H. MISCELLANEOUS SPECIAL POOL RULES

RULE 25: The vertical limits of the Basin-Dakota Gas Pool shall be from the base of the Greenhorn Limestone to a point 400 feet below the base of said formation and consisting of the Graneros formation, the Dakota formation and the productive upper portion of the Morrison formation.

The horizontal limits of the Basin-Dakota Gas Pool shall be San Juan and Rio Arriba Counties, New Mexico, with the exception of the Barker-Creek-Dakota Gas Pool and the Ute Dome-Dakota Gas Pool together with any extensions thereof.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED:

That the foregoing Special Rules and Regulations shall have no application in any area which is now or may hereafter be classified by the Commission as an oil pool in the Dakota formation.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED:

That all purchasers of gas in the Basin-Dakota Gas Pool shall file preliminary nominations for the purchase of gas from said pool during the initial six-month period commencing February 1, 1961, said nominations to be filed with the Santa Fe office of the Commission on or before December 9, 1960.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED:

That a case is hereby docketed for the Regular Commission Hearing in June, 1961, at which time the Commission will consider the necessity or desirability for establishing a maximum and minimum per well allowable in the Basin-Dakota Gas Pool.

DONE at Santa Fe, New Mexico, on the day and year hereinabove designated.

STATE OF NEW MEXICO
OIL CONSERVATION COMMISSION

JOHN BURROUGHS, Chairman

MURRAY E. MORGAN, Member

A. L. PORTER, Jr., Member & Secretary

S E A L

esr/

GOVERNOR
JACK M. CAMPBELL
CHAIRMAN

State of New Mexico
Oil Conservation Commission



LAND COMMISSIONER
E. S. JOHNNY WALKER
MEMBER

P. O. BOX 871
SANTA FE

STATE GEOLOGIST
A. L. PORTER, JR.
SECRETARY - DIRECTOR

TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN


I, A. L. PORTER, Jr., Secretary-Director of the New Mexico Oil Conservation Commission hereby certify that the attached is a true and correct copy of Commission Order No. R-2259-B.


A. L. PORTER, Jr.
Secretary-Director

FEBRUARY 28, 1964



IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have affixed my hand and notarial seal this 28th day of February, 1964.


Notary Public

My Commission Expires:

September 22, 1965

BEFORE THE OIL CONSERVATION COMMISSION
OF THE STATE OF NEW MEXICO

IN THE MATTER OF THE HEARING
CALLED BY THE OIL CONSERVATION
COMMISSION OF NEW MEXICO FOR
THE PURPOSE OF CONSIDERING:

CASE No. 2504
Order No. R-2259-B

APPLICATION OF CONSOLIDATED OIL & GAS, INC.,
FOR AN AMENDMENT OF ORDER NO. R-1670-C,
CHANGING THE ALLOCATION FORMULA FOR THE
BASIN-DAKOTA GAS POOL, SAN JUAN, RIO ARriba
AND SANDOVAL COUNTIES, NEW MEXICO.

ORDER OF THE COMMISSION

BY THE COMMISSION:

This cause came on for rehearing at 9 o'clock a.m. on February 14, 1963, at Santa Fe, New Mexico, before the Oil Conservation Commission of New Mexico, hereinafter referred to as the "Commission."

NOW, on this 3rd day of July, 1963, the Commission, a quorum being present, having considered the testimony presented and the exhibits received at said hearing, and being fully advised in the premises,

FINDS:

(1) That due public notice having been given as required by law, the Commission has jurisdiction of this cause and the subject matter thereof.

(2) That Order No. R-1670-C, entered by the Commission on November 4, 1960, established Special Rules and Regulations for the Basin-Dakota Gas Pool and adopted, by reference, Rule 9(C) of the General Rules applicable to prorated gas pools in Northwest New Mexico, as set forth in Order No. R-1670.

(3) That Rule 9(C) of the General Rules applicable to prorated gas pools in Northwest New Mexico, as set forth in Order No. R-1670, allocates production on the basis of 25 percent acreage plus 75 percent acreage times deliverability, hereinafter referred to as the 25-75 formula.

(4) That the applicant, Consolidated Oil & Gas, Inc., seeks amendment of the Special Rules and Regulations for the Basin-Dakota Gas Pool to allocate production on the basis of 60 percent acreage plus 40 percent acreage times deliverability.

(5) That the initial recoverable gas reserves in the Basin-Dakota Gas Pool, insofar as can be determined, total approximately 2.255 trillion cubic feet, of which approximately 96 billion cubic feet is attributed to marginal wells, which are permitted to produce at capacity.

(6) That the initial recoverable gas reserves underlying each non-marginal tract in the Basin-Dakota Gas Pool are as shown in Column C, Tract Reserves, of Exhibit A attached hereto and made a part hereof.

(7) That the percent of the total pool reserves attributable to each non-marginal tract in the Basin-Dakota Gas Pool is as shown in Column D, Percent of Pool Reserves, of Exhibit A.

(8) That it is impracticable to allocate production solely on the basis of the percentage of pool reserves due to the continuous fluctuation in reserve computations resulting from new completions in the pool and re-evaluation of reserves of existing wells.

(9) That the tract acreage factor for each non-marginal well in the Basin-Dakota Gas Pool is as shown in Column A of Exhibit A; that the deliverability for each non-marginal well, insofar as can be determined, is as shown in Column B of Exhibit A.

(10) That in the Basin-Dakota Gas Pool there is no direct correlation between deliverability and reserves, or acreage and reserves, and that, therefore, neither should be used as the sole criterion for distributing the total pool allowable among the tracts.

(11) That the most reasonable basis for allocating production in the Basin-Dakota Gas Pool is to determine, for each proposed formula, the percentage of total pool allowable apportioned to each non-marginal tract as compared to its percentage of total pool reserves, said relationship hereinafter referred to as the tract's A/R Factor, and to select the allocation formula that will allow the maximum number of wells in the pool to produce with an ideal tract A/R Factor of 1.0, or with a tract A/R Factor of from 0.7 to 1.3, which, due to inherent variance in interpreting and computing reserves, is within a reasonable tolerance.

(12) That the percentage of deliverability and the percentage of acreage included in the allocation formula affect the percentage of the total pool allowable assigned to each non-marginal well in the pool, thereby affecting the number of wells in the pool producing with a tract A/R Factor of from 0.7 to 1.3.

(13) That under the present 25-75 formula, correlative rights are not being adequately protected; that the protection of correlative rights is a necessary adjunct to the prevention of waste, and that waste will result unless the Commission acts to protect correlative rights.

(14) That, based upon the December 1962 pool allowable, a comparison of the number of non-marginal wells producing with a tract A/R Factor of from 0.7 to 1.3 under each formula as identified by an asterisk in Columns G and J of Exhibit A, and of the total volume of gas allocated to the wells in the 0.7 to 1.3 range under each formula, establishes that the proposed formula of 60 percent acreage plus 40 percent acreage times deliverability will more adequately protect correlative rights and prevent waste by permitting more wells to receive their just and equitable share of the gas in the pool, insofar as can be determined.

(15) That numerous wells in the Basin-Dakota Gas Pool are capable of draining more than their just and equitable share of the gas in the pool, and that an allocation formula of 60 percent acreage plus 40 percent acreage times deliverability will, insofar as is practicable, prevent drainage between producing tracts which is not equalized by counter drainage.

(16) That an allocation formula of 60 percent acreage plus 40 percent acreage times deliverability will, insofar as it is practicable to do so, afford to the owner of each property in the pool the opportunity to use his just and equitable share of the reservoir energy.

(17) That Order No. R-1670-C should be amended to provide an allocation formula for the Basin-Dakota Gas Pool in San Juan, Rio Arriba, and Sandoval Counties, New Mexico, based 60 percent on acreage and 40 percent on acreage times deliverability.

(18) That, due to the time required to administer a new allocation formula for a prorated gas pool, this order should not be effective until August 1, 1963, the beginning of the next six-month proration period for the Basin-Dakota Gas Pool.

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED:

(1) That the Special Rules and Regulations for the Basin-Dakota Gas Pool, as promulgated by Order No. R-1670-C, are hereby amended by adoption of the following:

RULE 9(C): The pool allowable remaining each month after deducting the total allowable assigned to marginal wells shall be allocated among the non-marginal wells entitled to an allowable in the following manner:

1. Forty percent (40%) of the pool allowable remaining to be allocated to non-marginal wells shall be allocated among such wells in the proportion that each well's "AD Factor" bears to the total "AD Factor" for all non-marginal wells in the pool.

-4-

CASE No. 2504

Order No. R-2259-B

2. Sixty percent (60%) of the pool allowable remaining to be allocated to non-marginal wells shall be allocated among such wells in the proportion that each well's acreage factor bears to the total acreage factor for all non-marginal wells in the pool.

(2) That Order No. R-2259 is hereby superseded.

(3) That jurisdiction of this cause is retained for the entry of such further orders as the Commission may deem necessary.

(4) That this order shall be effective August 1, 1963, the beginning of the next six-month proration period for the Basin-Dakota Gas Pool.

DONE at Santa Fe, New Mexico, on the day and year herein-above designated.

STATE OF NEW MEXICO
OIL CONSERVATION COMMISSION

JACK M. CAMPBELL, Chairman

E. S. WALKER, Member

A. L. PORTER, Jr., Member & Secretary

S E A L

esr/

ORDER NO. R-2259-1-B

AND

BASIN DAKOTA TRACT/POOL RESERVES AND ALLOCATION

ARRANGED IN THE ORDER OF PIPELINE AND OPERATOR

PAGE 1

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DESIGNATION	UNIT	DESCRIPTION	AMOUNT	CURRENCY
1. SALARY	100	1000000	1000000	USD
2. BENEFIT	50	500000	500000	USD
3. TRAVEL	20	200000	200000	USD
4. MEAL	10	100000	100000	USD
5. LODGING	10	100000	100000	USD
6. MEDICAL	10	100000	100000	USD
7. DENTAL	10	100000	100000	USD
8. OPTICAL	10	100000	100000	USD
9. PHYSICAL	10	100000	100000	USD
10. PSYCHOLOGICAL	10	100000	100000	USD
11. SOCIAL	10	100000	100000	USD
12. CULTURAL	10	100000	100000	USD
13. RECREATION	10	100000	100000	USD
14. EDUCATION	10	100000	100000	USD
15. TRAINING	10	100000	100000	USD
16. CONFERENCES	10	100000	100000	USD
17. PUBLICATIONS	10	100000	100000	USD
18. EQUIPMENT	10	100000	100000	USD
19. SUPPLIES	10	100000	100000	USD
20. MAINTENANCE	10	100000	100000	USD
21. SECURITY	10	100000	100000	USD
22. INSURANCE	10	100000	100000	USD
23. LEGAL	10	100000	100000	USD
24. ACCOUNTING	10	100000	100000	USD
25. INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY	10	100000	100000	USD
26. COMMUNICATIONS	10	100000	100000	USD
27. TRANSPORTATION	10	100000	100000	USD
28. UTILITIES	10	100000	100000	USD
29. FOOD AND BEVERAGE	10	100000	100000	USD
30. OTHER	10	100000	100000	USD

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PLATEAU	ARTES	GAS	PIPELINE	SYSTEM	SYSTEM				
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GOVERNOR
JACK M. CAMPBELL
CHAIRMAN

State of New Mexico
Oil Conservation Commission




LAND COMMISSIONER
E. S. JOHNNY WALKER
MEMBER

P. O. BOX 871
SANTA FE

STATE GEOLOGIST
A. L. PORTER, JR.
SECRETARY - DIRECTOR

TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN

I, A. L. PORTER, Jr., Secretary-Director of the New Mexico Oil Conservation Commission hereby certify that the attached is a true and correct copy of Commission Order No. R-2259-C.




A. L. PORTER, Jr.
Secretary-Director

FEBRUARY 28, 1964



IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have affixed my hand and notarial seal this 28th day of February, 1964.



Notary Public

My Commission Expires:

September 22, 1965

BEFORE THE OIL CONSERVATION COMMISSION
OF THE STATE OF NEW MEXICO

CASE No. 2504
Order No. R-2259-C

APPLICATION OF CONSOLIDATED OIL & GAS, INC.,
FOR AN AMENDMENT OF ORDER NO. R-1670-C,
CHANGING THE ALLOCATION FORMULA FOR THE
BASIN-DAKOTA GAS POOL, SAN JUAN, RIO ARriba
AND SANDOVAL COUNTIES, NEW MEXICO.

ORDER OF THE COMMISSION

BY THE COMMISSION:

This cause came on for reconsideration upon Applications of El Paso Natural Gas Company, Pan American Petroleum Corporation, Marathon Oil Company, Sunset International Petroleum Corporation, and Southwest Production Company for Rehearing in Case No. 2504, Order No. R-2259-B,

NOW, on this 1st day of August, 1963, the Oil Conservation Commission, a quorum being present, having considered the Applications for Rehearing,

FINDS:

(1) That the Applications for Rehearing do not allege that the applicants for rehearing have new or additional evidence to present in this case.

(2) That the Commission has carefully considered the evidence presented in this case and is fully advised in the premises.

(3) That Order No. R-2259-B is proper in all respects.

(4) That the Applications for Rehearing should be denied.

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED:

That the Applications of El Paso Natural Gas Company, Pan American Petroleum Corporation, Marathon Oil Company, Sunset International Petroleum Corporation, and Southwest Production Company for Rehearing in Case No. 2504, Order No. R-2259-B, are hereby denied.

DONE at Santa Fe, New Mexico, on the day and year hereinabove designated.

STATE OF NEW MEXICO
OIL CONSERVATION COMMISSION

JACK M. CAMPBELL, Chairman

S E A L

E. S. WALKER, Member

esr/

A. L. PORTER, Jr., Member & Secretary

GOVERNOR
JACK M. CAMPBELL
CHAIRMAN

State of New Mexico
Oil Conservation Commission




LAND COMMISSIONER
E. S. JOHNNY WALKER
MEMBER

P. O. BOX 871
SANTA FE

STATE GEOLOGIST
A. L. PORTER, JR.
SECRETARY - DIRECTOR

TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN:


I, A. L. PORTER, Jr., Secretary-Director of the New Mexico Oil Conservation Commission hereby certify that the attached is a true and correct copy of Commission Order No. AG-N-18-B.


A. L. PORTER, Jr.
Secretary-Director

MARCH 3, 1964



IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have affixed my hand and notarial seal this 3rd day of March, 1964.


Notary Public

My Commission Expires:

September 22, 1965

BEFORE THE OIL CONSERVATION COMMISSION
OF THE STATE OF NEW MEXICO

ORDER NO. AG-N-18-B

SUPPLEMENTARY GAS PRORATION ORDER FOR THE MONTH
OF MARCH, 1964

The Commission held public hearing at Santa Fe, New Mexico, on February 13, 1964, at 9 o'clock a.m., pursuant to legal notice, for the purpose of setting the allowable production of gas from the following nine gas pools in San Juan, Rio Arriba, and Sandoval Counties, New Mexico, for the month of March, 1964.

Blanco-Mesaverde, Basin-Dakota, Aztec-Pictured Cliffs, Ballard-Pictured Cliffs, South Blanco-Pictured Cliffs, Fulcher Kutz-Pictured Cliffs, West Kutz-Pictured Cliffs, Tapacito-Pictured Cliffs, and Devils Fork-Gallup.

NOW, on this 19th day of February, 1964, the Commission, a quorum being present, having considered the supplementary nominations of purchasers, the capacity of producing wells, and being otherwise fully advised in the premises,

FINDS:

(1) That the total nomination of purchasers of gas produced from the above-listed nine gas pools for the month of March, 1964, is 35,634,122 MCF. The individual pool nominations, which total 35,634,122 MCF, are as follows:

Blanco-Mesaverde	14,678,850 MCF
Basin-Dakota	14,129,150 MCF
Aztec-Pictured Cliffs	781,600 MCF
Ballard-Pictured Cliffs	760,200 MCF
South Blanco-Pictured Cliffs	3,423,500 MCF
Fulcher Kutz-Pictured Cliffs	365,800 MCF
West Kutz-Pictured Cliffs	328,500 MCF
Tapacito-Pictured Cliffs	1,012,900 MCF
Devils Fork-Gallup (adjusted)	153,622 MCF

(2) That the potential producing capacity of all gas wells in the nine gas pools listed above is in excess of the nominations of purchasers of gas, and in order to prevent waste and protect correlative rights, the production of gas from the above-listed nine gas pools should be limited, allocated, and distributed during the month of March, 1964.

(3) That all the producing gas wells, together with the expected completed or recompleted wells in the nine gas pools listed above, can produce a total of 35,634,122 MCF without causing waste during the month of March, 1964, and an allocation based upon such production would be reasonable and protect correlative rights.

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED:

(1) That for the month of March, 1964, the allowable production to be assigned the nine allocated gas pools in San Juan, Rio Arriba, and Sandoval Counties, New Mexico, is as follows:

Blanco-Mesaverde	14,678,850 MCF
Basin-Dakota	14,129,150 MCF
Aztec-Pictured Cliffs	781,600 MCF
Ballard-Pictured Cliffs	760,200 MCF
South Blanco-Pictured Cliffs	3,423,500 MCF
Fulcher Kutz-Pictured Cliffs	365,800 MCF
West Kutz-Pictured Cliffs	328,500 MCF
Tapacito-Pictured Cliffs	1,012,900 MCF
Devils Fork-Gallup	153,622 MCF

(2) That the allocation hereby set for the month of March, 1964, in the nine allocated pools in San Juan, Rio Arriba, and Sandoval Counties, New Mexico, shall be in accordance with the Commission Rules and Regulations, and Orders.

(3) That a proration schedule, duly prepared by the Commission and thereafter adopted for the month of March, 1964, is hereto attached and made a part hereof; it distributes and allocates the allowable production among the gas wells in the nine gas pools listed above for the period stated, in accordance with the Commission Rules and Regulations, and Orders.

The foregoing order shall remain effective until further order of the Commission.

DONE at Santa Fe, New Mexico, on the day and year hereinabove designated.

STATE OF NEW MEXICO
OIL CONSERVATION COMMISSION

Jack M Campbell

JACK M. CAMPBELL, Chairman

E. S. Walker

E. S. WALKER, Member

A. L. Porter, Jr.

A. L. PORTER, Jr., Member & Secretary



esr/