STATE OF NEW MEXICO

ENERGY, MINERALS AND NATURAL RESOURCES DEPARTMENT OIL CONSERVATION COMMISSION

IN THE MATTER OF THE HEARING CALLED BY
THE OIL CONSERVATION COMMISSION FOR THE
PURPOSE OF CONSIDERING:

APPLICATION OF BRANKO, INC., et al.,
TO REOPEN CASE NO. 10,656 (ORDER NO.)
R-9845) LEA COUNTY, NEW MEXICO

REPORTER'S TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS

COMMISSION HEARING

BEFORE: WILLIAM J. LEMAY, CHAIRMAN
WILLIAM WEISS, COMMISSIONER
JAMI BAILEY, COMMISSIONER

January 16th, 1997

Santa Fe, New Mexico

This matter came on for hearing before the Oil Conservation Commission, WILLIAM J. LEMAY, Chairman, on Thursday, January 16th, 1997, at the New Mexico Energy, Minerals and Natural Resources Department, Porter Hall, 2040 South Pacheco, Santa Fe, New Mexico, Steven T. Brenner, Certified Court Reporter No. 7 for the State of New Mexico.

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REPORTER'S CERTIFICATE

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APPEARANCES

FOR THE COMMISSION:

LYN S. HEBERT
Deputy General Counsel
Energy, Minerals and Natural Resources Department
2040 South Pacheco
Santa Fe, New Mexico 87505

FOR THE OIL CONSERVATION DIVISION:

RAND L. CARROLL Attorney at Law Legal Counsel to the Division 2040 South Pacheco Santa Fe, New Mexico 87505

FOR THE APPLICANT:

STRATTON & CAVIN, P.A.
320 Gold Avenue, SW
Albuquerque, New Mexico 87102
P.O. Box 1216
Albuquerque, New Mexico 87103
By: HAL STRATTON

FOR MITCHELL ENERGY CORPORATION:

KELLAHIN & KELLAHIN
117 N. Guadalupe
P.O. Box 2265
Santa Fe, New Mexico 87504-2265
By: W. THOMAS KELLAHIN

* * *

1	WHEREUPON, the following proceedings were had at
2	3:10 p.m.:
3	CHAIRMAN LEMAY: Okay, we shall reconvene, and
4	call Case Number 11,510, which is the Application of
5	Branko, Inc., et al., to reopen Case Number 10,656, Lea
6	County, New Mexico.
7	Appearances in Case 11,510?
8	MR. STRATTON: Mr. Chairman, Hal Stratton for
9	Branko, et al.
10	CHAIRMAN LEMAY: Thank you, Mr. Stratton.
11	MR. KELLAHIN: Mr. Chairman, I'm Tom Kellahin of
12	the Santa Fe law firm of Kellahin and Kellahin, appearing
13	on behalf of Mitchell Energy Corporation.
14	MR. CARROLL: May it please the Commission, Rand
15	Carroll on behalf of the Oil Conservation Division.
16	CHAIRMAN LEMAY: Thank you, Mr. Carroll.
17	How many witnesses will you be presenting or I
18	understood there will be no witnesses?
19	MR. KELLAHIN: We have a surprise for you. There
20	are no witnesses.
21	MR. STRATTON: And no testimony.
22	CHAIRMAN LEMAY: And no testimony.
23	MR. STRATTON: And no argument, if you desire,
24	Mr. Chairman.
25	CHAIRMAN LEMAY: I don't know why we're here,

1	gentlemen. We should be
2	Mr. Chairman, if I might, I guess this is a de
3	novo hearing, so I suppose I don't know who you intend
4	to go first.
5	CHAIRMAN LEMAY: Well, generally the Applicant;
6	isn't that true?
7	MR. KELLAHIN: I'm the one stuck as the
8	appellant, Mr. Chairman
9	CHAIRMAN LEMAY: Uh-huh.
10	MR. KELLAHIN: and, you know, I'll defer to
11	Mr. Stratton if he would like to go first. I'm happy to go
12	first.
13	CHAIRMAN LEMAY: You can work that out,
14	gentlemen, but we don't care as a Commission.
15	MR. STRATTON: Why don't I go first, Mr.
16	Chairman, since
17	CHAIRMAN LEMAY: Okay, that would be fine.
18	MR. STRATTON: it's our de novo and it's
19	technically our motion to reopen?
20	What we've done is, we have agreed and stipulated
21	that we would introduce exhibits and testimony from the
22	previous two hearings in this case.
23	And the first thing and I think Ms. Hebert may
24	Do you have these now?
25	MS. HEBERT: We do have them.

MR. STRATTON: Okay. Can we use the originals for the record, or do want us to sub- -- I've got others here that we can use, but --

MS. HEBERT: No, I think we can just incorporate the hearing below. We have the record here.

MR. STRATTON: Okay. Well, let me -- What I'd like to do just for purposes of the record is to make clear what I understand is in the record. And Mr. Kellahin, I'm sure, will want to do that as well.

First of all, there's the January 21st, 1993, hearing transcript on the Mitchell application.

Then there's Strata's Exhibits 1 through 7 to that particular hearing.

Next, the transcript of the testimony for the May 2nd, 1996, hearing. That was our motion to reopen.

And then we have actually 44 exhibits from that particular hearing that we would like to submit, as well as one additional letter, which would be Exhibit 45, which we've stipulated to, for the record. And what we've agreed to do here today, Mr. Chairman, is to submit all of this on the record.

Just so the Commission will know, the Exhibits 1 through 16 are affidavits from our clients -- from my clients, indicating what they would testify about their interest in the property in this case. And we are

stipulating that that would be their testimony. We're not stipulating that, certainly, the Commission is bound by their conclusions. It's to what they own as -- that that's what they would testify to if they were here today, and there are no hearsay exceptions to that testimony.

And so those for the witnesses. We'd be traipsing in 16 witnesses here today if we didn't do that. So we've limited down their testimony to what's in the exhibits, and I believe -- It's what I think is relevant and what I want the Commission to have in regard to their testimony.

And also, just while I'm talking about affidavits, at the end of the last hearing, the hearing officer asked that we submit more exhibits from those individuals regarding when they knew about the previous Mitchell hearing and when they knew about Mitchell's Tomahawk well. And although that's not something I would have submitted, I did it in deference to the hearing officer, because he thought it was relevant, and I don't think it's relevant, but we submitted them and they're into evidence.

So I guess I'd like to formally move the admission of all those, and -- with the one other, which would be Exhibit 45 here.

CHAIRMAN LEMAY: For the benefit of my fellow

1	Commissioners, did you want to sum up the case in any way
2	or form?
3	MR. STRATTON: Sure.
4	CHAIRMAN LEMAY: Is that going to be a
5	presentation on your part?
6	MR. STRATTON: That's what I'm going to
7	CHAIRMAN LEMAY: Yeah, okay, that's fine. I
8	don't think Commissioner Weiss or Commissioner Bailey are
9	familiar with the case in any form or fashion.
10	COMMISSIONER WEISS: I have no idea.
11	CHAIRMAN LEMAY: Yeah.
12	MR. STRATTON: Well, I came here expecting no one
13	would be familiar with the case, but since we are on the
14	record, should there be an appeal, I wanted to make sure
1 5	that all the evidentiary matters were taken care of, since
16	we don't have any witnesses or exhibits, Mr. Chairman.
17	CHAIRMAN LEMAY: Right.
18	MR. STRATTON: Unless I think Mr. Kellahin
19	should
20	MR. KELLAHIN: I need to ask Mr. Stratton a
21	question.
22	(Off the record)
23	MR. KELLAHIN: A procedural matter, Mr. Chairman,
24	to complete the submittal formally of the exhibits.
25	It is our intention by what Mr. Stratton just

requested, is that the transcript of the original forcepooling hearing, back in 1993, which includes all the
Mitchell exhibits -- and they're identified in the
transcript -- all of those that are identified in the
transcript would be included before the Commission.

In addition, in the hearing on May 2nd of 1996, there was a package of correspondence, was marked as Mitchell Exhibit 1. We want that entire transcript and exhibits before you.

In addition, Mr. Stratton is correct, there were some supplemental affidavits that Examiner Stogner requested. There was some difference among counsel about what was to be contained in those affidavits, but they were submitted, and I believe they should be -- form part of the record.

In addition, there was an exchange of letters between Mr. Cavin and I. Mr. Stratton has introduced one of the letters.

And the last exhibit, then, would be my Mitchell Exhibit 2 to Case 11,510, which was my response to Mr.

Cavin. I don't think it's particularly important for discussion this afternoon, but that document would complete our presentation of evidence.

CHAIRMAN LEMAY: Will there be an opportunity anywhere here for questions of you gentlemen, or is that

just not --

MR. KELLAHIN: When we talk about how to organize this, I would be most delighted if I could attempt to answer questions as you had them.

Both of us have filed memorandums of law and arguments. If those copies are not available to you, I have additional copies for you to consider.

We have attempted to organize ourselves on both sides of this, so that we could give you the facts in a summary fashion. They're all detailed at great length in my memorandum, and my support for my position is included in that document. And if you would like, I have more copies of that.

CHAIRMAN LEMAY: Let me ask something here, just off the record.

(Off the record)

CHAIRMAN LEMAY: Because of the unusual nature of this case -- I have to admit, I have not had a *de novo* case presented where there have been no witnesses and just summaries by the attorneys. It's helpful for us to be able to ask you questions.

And also, one of my Commissioners would like, as just an opening, to each one of you, for one sentence, tell him what this is all about. And then from there you can -- you kind of go into it. Because right now, they have no

idea what's going on.

MR. KELLAHIN: Well, perhaps -- May I suggest that Mr. Stratton go first with maybe a five-minute summary of the major points, and I'll take five minutes and try to give you a framework of really what this dispute is about, and then we can go in more detail as you begin to become familiar with what we --?

CHAIRMAN LEMAY: I think that would be helpful.

I mean, yeah, before we even get into any of this, they
can't see the significance of it until they know what this
is about.

So if you would do that, Mr. Stratton, we'd appreciate it.

MR. STRATTON: Your Honor, I'm not sure my presentation is much longer than that, so I think it will take me about two sentences to make things clear.

I might add that a first for me is also having the judge ask me if he can ask me questions. I wasn't quite sure how to respond to that. I thought about saying now, but obviously, you can ask us questions, and certainly I would hope that you would ask questions to clarify this, because this is — it is unusual. You're not seeing the witnesses, you don't have the testimony, I know you haven't had time to read it.

And so we're -- so we sort of have a duty, I

think, I to try to get you up to speed on this.

What this case is about is, we represent a number of 16 working interest and overriding royalty interest owners in a particular piece of property that Mitchell filed an application to pool, that were not given notice of the hearing and did not appear at the hearing and did not receive any notice of the order that was entered pursuant to that hearing.

So once they learned of that, they came and filed an application to reopen and say, due process has not been afforded us, the order is void as to us, and you need to reopen the case and have the matter heard with our interests before the Commission.

So that's -- in a couple of sentences, is what the whole case is about.

But the facts that we think are relevant began back on October 26th of 1992 when Steve Smith, a landman for Mitchell, called Mark Murphy, the president of Strata, and started talking about drilling this Tomahawk Well and tried to negotiate a deal.

Strata had some of the working interests, and when we looked at the real estate records, it appeared they had 25 percent of the working interest.

At that time, Mr. Murphy advised Mr. Smith that he would consider it, that there were other people who had

interests in the property, and he was going to talk to him, and that they would proceed to consider this.

There then were a number of telephone calls during this period as they negotiated this well. There were a number of pieces of correspondence that were passed back and forth, and we -- they're in the record, and they're in our briefs.

On December 9th, Mr. Murphy sent a letter,
Exhibit 19, that talked about the negotiations that were
involved.

The important issues, when it comes to these exhibits, from my client's standpoint, is whether Mitchell or their representatives knew about or had reason to know about or could have determined by due diligence whether their interests were -- whether they had interests in the property.

And we allege, and if you'll look at the record and testimony and also these exhibits, Exhibits 19, 20, 21 and 23, all of them had references to other individuals who had ownership in this particular piece of property, giving that to Mr. Smith.

It appeared that things weren't going well, so I think it was about December 8th, an application was filed for pooling, and an unconventional -- or an unorthodox site, or whatever you guys call it, as well.

Negotiations continued, and it continued, and then it appears that like on about January 12th -- actually January 13th, I guess, things broke down between the parties. And Mr. Smith from Mitchell said, Well now, who are these other interest owners that you have?

And then on the 13th, Mr. Murphy faxed to Mr. Smith Exhibit 24. And Exhibit 24 is a letter which lists each and every interest owner, their address, and their percentage of interest in the leasehold. And there's no dispute about that, Mr. Smith's got it, he was aware of it.

Now, the hearing on the Application was scheduled for January 21st. And so rather than continuing the hearing or rather than providing notice to the interest owners, they went ahead and had the hearing, and the pooling order was entered, and -- I think on February the 15th.

That order, then, was never sent to these working interest owners and overriding royalty interest owners.

And then finally the Tomahawk well was drilled on May 18th, 1993. And just for purposes of just a little preview down the line as to what the arguments may be and what really happened, the leases -- or the ability to drill the well under the leases, I understand, expired -- would have expired on October 31st.

So the issue is whether under due process of law,

the US Constitution and the New Mexico Constitution our clients got the requisite notice and opportunity to be heard at this particular hearing. Of course, we allege they didn't; we wouldn't be here if we did.

Now, sometimes in New Mexico law we have problems finding authority for things. Sometimes you have to look at a lot of different cases and in a lot of different places for authority. But in this particular case we're lucky, because we have one case that controls everything here. We have a lot of interesting US Supreme Court cases in the briefs. If you don't have anything else to do, they're interesting reading. They go back to notice issues, to 1915.

But it's all contained in Uhden vs. New Mexico
Oil Conservation Commission.

And the operative language -- There are two things I want to pass along to the Commission that are important in *Uhden*.

One is -- and it's hard to really believe they have to say this, but they say it and it's important -- Administrative proceedings must conform to fundamental principles of justice and the requirements of due process of law.

It seems odd, and I know this Commission finds it odd that they would have to say that. But when you look

across the breadth of administrative hearings, sometimes as an individual representing people before those, you wonder whether the administrative agencies really believe that.

So the New Mexico courts continue to tell us that you have the same due process rights when somebody's getting ready to deprive you of your property, when you come before an administrative agency as you do, before the courts in New Mexico.

And then they give us a paragraph here which is tremendous, and I hadn't read it before this particular case, but this says it all right here, and this can be used throughout New Mexico by administrative agencies, by courts or anybody else and throughout the country, for what the standard and what the rule is when it comes to due process and notice. And it's on page 531, and I just want to read it to you. It's very brief.

If a party's identity and whereabouts are known or could be ascertained through due diligence, the due-process clause of the New Mexico and United States Constitutions requires the party who filed the spacing application --

-- this happened to be a spacing application in this

case --

-- to provide notice of the pending proceeding by personal service to such parties whose property rights my be affected as a result.

That's the rule. It works in any forum in New Mexico, and I'm just briefly going to apply that to this particular fact situation, using the *Uhden* language.

First of all, the question who do you have to notify?

You have to notify those individuals in the property, who you know, or who you can ascertain through due diligence. They don't have to be recorded; there's no issue about that. Some people think that -- there's a lot of people that think that you have to have any interest in real estate recorded. That's not the case. The issue is knowledge, the issue is whether you know about that particular interest.

If I have a next-door neighbor who doesn't have his deed recorded but I know he lives there and I'm getting ready to do a foreclosure case or a quiet-title case, even though his interest is not recorded, since he lives there I know he has a claim to that property. I have to put him in the lawsuit. If I don't, then that lawsuit does not apply to him. Just like the Mitchell application hearing doesn't apply to our clients, that doesn't apply to him.

So it's not a question of recording. And that was one of the big arguments in the case. It's not in the most recent brief, but that was an argument down below, is that these interests weren't recorded, therefore, they're no good. That's not the case.

Uhden says, If a party's identity and whereabouts are known or could be ascertained through due diligence...

Here, Mr. Smith of Mitchell, on October 26th, 1992, was put on notice that there were other interests in this property that was going to be pooled, and he did nothing. At that time, under Uhden, he had a duty to ascertain those interests using due diligence. He could have done it then. He didn't, he didn't do it. There were more telephone calls, as I indicated, throughout the fall where they talked about these interests. There are exhibits that were exchanged where these interests are mentioned, and he still didn't do it.

And then finally, on January 13th, he was sent a letter where he didn't have to look anywhere for these interests. He had their names, telephone numbers, and the extent of the interests. And he still -- Still, no notice was given.

Now, there's been another issue here which really, when I conclude here, isn't that important, but I want to talk about it because it's going to be talked

about, and that is, who had the duty to give the notice?

There's been a lot of allegations, a lot of argument in this case, down below, that Strata had the duty to give notice, or that our clients had the duty to come talk to somebody and obtain notice themselves, or somebody other than Mitchell was supposed to give notice. Well, that's just not what the law says. Uhden says that the party who filed the spacing application must give notice. Your Rule 1207 says that the applicant has to give notice. And Mr. Smith, when he testified in our hearing here, from which this appeal emanates, said that it was the applicant who is supposed to give notice.

So one of the ruses that's been used so far is that, well, Strata knew about this; they should have told all these people about this hearing, and then they would have had proper notice. They didn't have a duty to do it, it wasn't them who were supposed to do it.

But more importantly, the real point is, it doesn't matter to our clients who was supposed to give notice, because they don't care, they need the notice. And if this Commission doesn't have -- If they are not served by somebody -- it doesn't matter who it is, but if they're not served by somebody, this Commission doesn't have jurisdiction over their property rights.

So it really doesn't matter who was supposed to

give notice to us. We weren't given notice. And it's clear the applicant is supposed to give notice. You all know that. You sit through these cases all the time, so you know who gives the notice in these particular cases.

The next issue -- this maybe isn't an issue here; it's just slightly an issue -- is, what type of notice do you have to give? What type of notice does the Commission have to give?

Well, you can't do it by publication. I mean, you know that because you've had *Uhden*. *Uhden* -- The New Mexico Supreme Court has told you in *Uhden* that you can't use publication for notice when it comes to due-process rights and protective property interests.

Most places in the country -- and this has been approved by the United States Supreme Court -- will allow notice by mail. But I'm afraid that in New Mexico, due to Uhden, mail isn't even good enough. Uhden says that to provide notice, the Commission, in a Commission proceeding, must be by personal service to the parties.

And I've had people in the industry say, Personal service? Oh my gosh. There's hundreds, there's thousands of interests. Or, There's a whole lot of interests in these cases.

Well, there might be, and it might be burdensome.

But that's what the New Mexico Supreme Court says has to be

done. And it seems rather -- it does seem harsh but, you know, that is the rule, as you're well aware, in the court system. If you're going to serve somebody in New Mexico, you can't mail it to them, you can't call them on the phone, you can't publish it in the newspaper. You have to give them personal service. And the New Mexico Supreme Court now says the Commission now has to give personal service.

Here, you know, it doesn't matter. No service was given whatsoever. There's no allegation that any service was given, whether it was by mail or personal or whatever. There was publication, I think, although I don't know that. But publication certainly doesn't work.

And then finally -- I mean, the only issue that really remains at this point is, then, well, what type of people do you have to give it to? And you have to give it to people who have interests in the property.

And in this particular piece of property, all 16 of our clients had interest, which they all acquired in 1989, which was three years -- three years before the application. And they are working interest owners. We have, I think -- 14 are working interest owners and I think two are overriding royalty interest owners. That's in the affidavits.

But what type of interest it is, it really

doesn't matter, as long as it's an interest that is protected, it's a property right. And when I say "property", I don't necessarily mean real property; it's a property right.

So that's what happened in this case, and that's why we're here today, is because we didn't get notice of that previous hearing. We're entitled to it, and we're here asking the Commission -- We asked the Division to reopen the case, which they did, and we're asking the Commission at a de novo hearing now to reopen the case.

Now, what is the effect of not giving notice?

That question always arises when it comes to notice cases.

People say, Well, maybe we would have gone back and -
Well, let's go back and we'll do the same thing. Or, Let's

-- We would have done the same thing anyway, even if they

had been here. Or something like that.

Doesn't work, because the order is not effective. It's totally ineffective.

The words that Uhden used -- We're back to Uhden again, which is the case that has everything in it. Uhden found that the orders entered by the Commission without notice to Ms. Uhden are hereby void as to Uhden.

"Void" means as if it had never happened, when it comes to these particular individuals. It's not voidable.

You hear "voidable" and "void". "Voidable" means unless

"Void" means void from its inception, as if it never happened; the order is ineffective to the people who were not given notice. And that's clearly the case.

And the United States Supreme Court has also defined it as -- "void" as being that, and meaning that you have to come back and start all over.

So that's the issue.

And I just want to point out a couple of things, and I'm finished here today, with the exhibits and everything you have, certainly with my opening. But I'm, once again, certainly happy to open or answer questions.

There were -- I'm not quite going to try to quantify it, but there were many things that could have happened in this case, short of personal service or anything else, that would avoid us being here today. There are plenty of opportunities to avoid this.

I mean, first of all, on October 26th, Mr. Smith could have gone out and done the right thing. I mean, he could have gone out, ascertained the interests and then provided notice when a hearing came up, or any time after that.

The same thing could have been done on January

13th. You know, it's my understanding that if that hearing
had been delayed, it would have been a two-week delay. The

well wasn't drilled until May, and the well didn't have to be drilled until October. So it seemed like a very small thing to -- in order to get the right people before the Commission, to delay the hearing.

Next, and this wouldn't have been

Constitutionally firm, but practically we wouldn't be here

if after the order was entered it had been sent to these

individuals. But even on February 15th, the order didn't

get sent. Does that cure the Constitutional infirmity of

the hearing? No. Would that have practically taken care

of things? Very well -- Very well might have.

And Mr. Smith, in our last hearing, testified as to the real reason this doesn't happen, and he actually testified to it, and I think he was honest about it. He said they didn't want to be delayed in doing this, that stopping and waiting two weeks and providing notice to all these people — they just didn't want to be delayed by it.

And I think it's just slightly more -- I think not only did they not want to be delayed, they didn't want to have to deal with my clients who had these interests.

And I think he believed that that was a good enough reason to do this.

But I can tell you, when it gets to the New
Mexico Supreme Court, they're not going to agree with that.
They're not going to say, Well, because it inconvenienced

you we're not going to afford these people these dueprocess rights.

Those of us who engage in litigation in

Constitutional cases and all types of litigation do

everything we can to get everybody we can, in front of the

court, so we can get them bound. I mean, we serve people

we shouldn't even serve.

Here, it appears to me that it's just the opposite, that the idea is, if an applicant comes in and they can get away with not serving people and slip things through, that that's the way to do it.

That doesn't work in the court system. And I can predict for you that when this gets to the court system, the court is going to look at it and use its standards and say, My goodness, you knew about all these people and you didn't notify them? What are you thinking about? Get in there and notify them and get it over with, just as the case in Uhden.

So Mr. Chairman, that's my presentation. I'm happy to answer any questions.

I've got two briefs in -- before the Division,
and what I'd like to do is leave those with you. Mr.
Kellahin has filed another brief with the Commission. I
think everything is covered, so I wouldn't intend to reply
to that, but I would like to just leave you the briefs that

I did before the Division.

CHAIRMAN LEMAY: Okay, it still may be helpful if we hear Mr. Kellahin's presentation, and then we could ask some questions of either one.

COMMISSIONER WEISS: Yeah, yeah.

CHAIRMAN LEMAY: Is that okay?

COMMISSIONER BAILEY: Fine.

CHAIRMAN LEMAY: Mr. Kellahin?

MR. KELLAHIN: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The brief I've handed out, filed earlier is the one in the -- it's got a plastic cover sheet and it's got a spiral on it, and it should be on top of that stack in front of you, Mr. Chairman, there's a case file. Farther ahead, towards me, sir. Yes, sir.

CHAIRMAN LEMAY: Okay.

MR. KELLAHIN: Let me describe for you how it's organized.

In the back end I've attempted to separate by a blue tab -- and I may have missed it in some of the booklets, but there will be an Exhibit A which represents Examiner Stogner's order in 1993 on the Mitchell forcepooling application. So you'll have that to look at.

The next order that's in the book is marked Exhibit B, and that's Mr. Stogner's decision from the May, 1996, hearing which was issued on October 2nd of 1996.

The brief is organized so that commencing on page 6, there is the start of numbered paragraphs, which are numbered 1 through 33. And I've attempted to outline for you in detail the chronology of the specific events.

Ahead of the factual summary is about five pages in which I have cited to the transcript, and I have written in paragraph 4 the basic argument of our position and why we disagree with Branko's position.

And then after that I have subdivided the memorandum to deal with the specific topics that have been discussed, and this is my effort to consolidate, revise, analyze and provide footnotes for you so that this document, if read by itself independent of anything else, would represent Mitchell's position.

The fundamental issue that you have before you is the question of when the Strata partners acquired a property interest that needs to be protected. We contend that unfortunately for Strata and Mr. Murphy and all his partners, that that interest did not arise until November 6th of 1995, some 32 months after Strata was force-pooled. How could that be? Well, let me tell you how.

In 1992, when Mitchell is beginning to propose the well, Mr. Steve Smith commences discussion with Mark Murphy of Strata, and Mr. Murphy tells Mr. Smith that he is dealing for and on behalf of a bunch of partners. He

characterizes them as long-term investors.

In October of 1992, Mr. Smith has conducted a title search of the county records, and he has determined that the federal lease for which he's attempting to get Strata's cooperation and support is a federal lease held by Strata.

Strata has the record title, they have the operating rights, they have the entire 25 percent of what turns out to be a 320-acre spacing unit. Mr. Smith has consolidated all the rest of the interest, and this is the outstanding interest remaining. He has gotten Santa Fe Energy and Maralo and others to buy into it.

So he's got 75 percent of the interest in the spacing unit, and he's going out and looking for the balance. And he makes a contact with Mr. Murphy who, of record through Strata, has the remaining 25 percent.

So from October 26th of 1992 to January 23rd of 1993, Mr. Murphy is characterizing these people as his partners and his long-time investors.

Prior to January 13th -- and that's a significant date because it's just a week before the hearing -- January 13th, 1993, Mr. Murphy has told Strata that he's got partners, long-time investors, but he doesn't disclose that they, in fact, own an interest, that -- doesn't disclose their identity, who they are, what percentage they have or

how to contact them.

In November of 1992, Mr. Murphy tells Smith that Strata will defend itself and all its partners during a proceeding, including force-pooling. And there's numerous phone calls, and there's lots of correspondence back and forth.

Finally, on November 20th, 1992, Mitchell formally proposes the Tomahawk well to Strata and to Murphy.

On December 7th, Mitchell files its compulsory pooling application, which is set for hearing on January 7th. It later gets delayed.

But on December 9th, 1992, in accordance with how we practice the notifications, Strata is served and signs the green card, receiving notice of the hearing and a copy of the compulsory pooling application.

Even after that date, Mr. Murphy continues to deal on behalf of his partners and on behalf of Strata to sell or farm out the interest to Mitchell.

In fact, you'll find in the transcript, and we've cited the document, on December 30th, 1992, Mark Murphy has signed a letter, and he communicates it to Mitchell, and he talks about his undisclosed owners. He even characterizes them as undisclosed owners. And he says, Strata hereby represents and warrants unto Mitchell that it has the

power, the right and authority to sell 100 percent of the subject lease for benefit of the undisclosed owners.

Mr. Mitchell -- I'm sorry, Mr. Smith, on behalf of Mitchell, attempts to accept the proposal from Strata.

There's a difference between Smith and Mitchell about what the deal is, and it finally falls apart.

And so the afternoon before the hearing, 30 days after Strata has been served, then we receive notification that Mr. Cavin is going to enter his appearance for Strata, and we continue the case.

The case is continued. And then in January, on the 12th of January, 1993, Strata sends Mitchell this list of partners. The problem is that Mr. Murphy doesn't sign and deliver the assignments until November 7th of 1995. Thirty-one months later, he delivers the assignments, puts them of record, and writes them a letter to the effect, Dear partners, it's come to my knowledge that Mitchell's Tomahawk well has now paid out, and you might have a claim against them to recover your proportionate share of the risk-factor penalty.

Mr. Murphy, after the pooling order was issued, wrote Mitchell and said, I'm going to communicate all this stuff to my partners. And then apparently he doesn't do it, because he waits and it doesn't happen.

In fact, February 24th, 1993, Murphy advises

Mitchell, It is my -- Mr. Murphy's -- intention to discuss Mitchell's proposal with the other lease owners, and it goes on and on.

So here's the problem. The fundamental issue is to decide -- someone decide, maybe not us, but eventually we have to decide for force-pooling cases, and in this case, when do the undisclosed Strata partners have a property interest that needs to be protected?

We look at the statutory language. Under New Mexico law it says all assignments and other instruments of transfer are supposed to be recorded. And it says, No assignment or other instrument affecting the title -- in this on we're talking about royalties, but there's an applicable provision with regards to interest -- it says, Such royalties not recorded are herein provided shall -- no assignment shall affect record unless they're of record or without knowledge of the existence of such unrecorded instrument.

Mr. Stratton wants to charge Mitchell with notice of a document before it's even executed, much less recorded, and the question is, how is Mitchell supposed to know this unrecorded instrument exists until the instrument is executed and recorded?

Branko maintains that simply by telling somebody you've got partners and investors should trigger an

obligation on Mitchell's part to go out and look for all these people. And yet when you look, you can't find them of public record.

And therein lies the dilemma, I think, for all of us that do this kind of work, is that after a party is served with a compulsory pooling application, that service taking place on December 9th, 1992, thereafter, the following month and the next year, Mr. Murphy discloses a list of what he says is his partners.

And the issue is whether or not that should cause Mitchell to engage in anything else. We believe the law of New Mexico requires us to do nothing else, that having found and determined and served the parties at the time those interests were known and of record to everyone else, is the time you fix for notification.

The Division has agreed with us on that issue.

They have characterized this in one of the orders as a cutoff date for notification.

You may investigate and examine that decision, but I'm in agreement with what the Division did with regards to notice -- notice of hearings for the cutoff date, and that's the notice you're served for hearing.

What has occurred is that after the force-pooling order was issued, Mitchell made the choice to provide the election to the parties post-order to Strata. And you can

look at Mr. Stogner's first order, and he goes on at incredible length, talking about this issue.

We spent a lot of time back in 1993 with Mr.

Cavin and Mr. Murphy, talking about their desire to

continue the case, so that Mitchell would be required to

provide notice to all these interest owners. It was

debated, discussed and decided. Their motion to continue

was denied and we went forward.

The order was entered. Subsequent to the order, Strata was notified. We did not choose to chase after all the rest of these 15 investors. It's our position that we have no obligation to chase after them until an instrument is executed and delivered to us, to let us know that they have that interest.

You're not required to record it, necessarily, but if you have an instrument, an assignment that's signed, appears valid on its face, notarized and signed by the right people and they deliver it to you, then at that point you have an obligation to substitute them in. And we would have substituted them in, in the shoes of Strata, and then we'd go forward and, we contend, still be subject to the 200-percent risk factor.

So what's occurring here is, Mr. Murphy chooses not to tell his partners, apparently -- although it's hard to believe that they did not know until a year after the

lease in which they held an interest expired, but that's the position they take, that they didn't know. He chooses not to tell them; he says he's going to.

And then the assignment is 31 months later, after the well is paid out conveniently, and he knows that. He tells them, Here's your assignment, I've placed it of record, you have it now, and by the way, you now have a claim against Mitchell to recover some of the penalty.

Mr. Stratton wants to rely on the *Uhden* case. I think his reliance is misplaced. Let's talk about that case. It's a starting point for convenience.

You may remember the *Uhden* case. It had to do with Cedar Hills, the first coal gas pool we adopted up there in the San Juan Basin. Amoco had done a couple of wells in Cedar Hills and were running some interference tests, and had originally developed it on statewide 160 gas spacing, because it was the appropriate rule to apply. It had some initial wells, two of which were on 160-acre spacing units, in which Mr. *Uhden* had an interest.

And how did we know she had an interest? She was Amoco's lessee. Amoco had replaced her original lessee, and Amoco knew Mrs. Uhden. They knew where to find her, they knew her interest was of record, it was an assignment to their company. You could check public records and find out who she was. They were paying her money. She had an

interest in the spacing unit.

Substantial difference between Mrs. Uhden and the Strata undisclosed partners. You can't find them by public record, they're not your payees, you're relying on Strata and they tell you, Hey, we defend for these people, we represent these people, they're our long-time investors, and we deal with Strata.

Mrs. Uhden was being paid on 160-acre spacing for the wells on her unit.

After Amoco developed the interference test, they developed enough science to demonstrate to the Division that we could temporarily expand spacing in Cedar Hills and go to 320 gas spacing. And Amoco filed the application to do that.

They did not choose to notify Mrs. Uhden, one of their payees. They argued that under her lease they had the right to change the spacing because there was a clause provision in her lease that let them change the spacing to conform to New Mexico Oil Conservation Division rules.

So they ignored her, changed the spacing, got it approved by the Division and went to 320 spacing. Do you see what happened to her interest? Divided right in half. And all of a sudden, Mrs. Uhden's nice check got cut in half, and she says, What are you people doing to me?

And they said, Well, we changed the rules.

She said, You should have told me, you affected my interest.

The New Mexico Supreme Court says this woman has a property interest, you can find it, it's there, it's vested in her, and she's entitled to notice as one of these payees.

I think there's a substantial difference in Mrs. Uhden who, you know, you find, her interest is by a conveyance, it exists, and yet Strata partners want to be in Mrs. Uhden's shoes. And I think what happens is, the system gets manipulated, we get taken advantage of, and we run the risk of having this game played before the Division in terms of compulsory pooling orders.

The problem is this: Once you serve the individuals, then the obligation shifts to those individuals served, to either defend their interest or, if they assign their interest, to make sure the parties they assign their interest to are properly substituted.

And that's the way it goes in district court.

You can file quiet-title suit, and if I look in the records and I find that Commissioner LeMay has a house over next to me and he's affected, then I'm going to serve him. And I may not know he's got investors, and I may not know that he just agreed and took a check to sell his house to somebody else. I don't know about that person at all. But once

I've served him, the obligation is upon Commissioner LeMay to get his purchaser, his grantee, his assignee, the person he's going to convey the property, notified and properly substituted. Why should I chase after your assignee? And what happens if you decide, in order to defeat the pooling process, to assign your interest to everybody in the Artesia phone book? Now what happens? I'll never get this pooled. I'll never find all these people.

The dilemma with what we have before us now is that the Division has established a cutoff date, for which I have no disagreement. I think it's fair and appropriate for the Division to say that when a party is served, that party is the party. And if it's to be somebody else, they need to figure out how to substitute them in.

What I disagree with for the Division is that they have fixed another point in time to set up a different set of people to be served with the elections after the order. And I don't think they intended to do that; it's simply the way the order got drafted.

And here's what's the problem with the order:
We've got the parties fixed as of the date they receive
application, go through the hearing process, get an order.
You then, under what the Division has told us to do, must
again search the record, you must again go out and find all
the things that may have happened between the date the

application is served and the order is issued for which you're going to serve people again.

I don't think that should be our burden. I'm not sure it helps Branko, because the search doesn't tell us anything. What we did know is, here's a list of investors.

If you decide that that list of investors being told to Mitchell is enough, that we should have done something else but we didn't do it, we don't think it's wrong, but you'll have to decide that issue, because that's what Mr. Stratton is debating.

My problem is, with the Division order, is, they say, All right, you knew that these people existed. You may not know of what they had, but you should have given them the order and given an election after the order.

It begs the question. It lets Strata do exactly what the Division was trying to preclude when they fixed the cutoff date for notification. It just shifts the point in time where you get to manipulate and play the game of who gets notice and what happens, when.

And look how far they played the game. They waited 31 months. And why? Well, because the well paid out. And we're talking about big bucks. This is a million-dollar well. Twenty-five percent of a million dollars is a bunch. And it's paid out one time, and it's moving towards twice. We're looking at \$300,000 in dispute

here, and that's why we have got people coming out of the woodwork after the fact, wanting their money back.

This is a matter of policy for the Division, it's a matter of precedent and policy for the Commission, and you need to decide the fundamental issue, is, when and how is an applicant before your agency supposed to know and determine the individuals for which you're going to serve in order to commit their interest, in order that they share in the costs of the well?

It's our contention, as you can read in the brief, is that event did not occur until November 7th, 1995.

The Division order, as it now stands, unless modified, has required us to come back to a hearing to be scheduled at the Division level, to go through a hearing to talk about how the Strata partners are to share in the cost and what's supposed to happen.

We believe that that's not necessary. Our opinion and our position is that the Strata partners -- Strata went nonconsent. They were served. They received a small share, and they kept a small share, and they assigned the rest of it. And I forgot the percentages, but it's in the brief. They kept part of it and assigned the rest.

They were served with a notice. They failed to make the election.

Interesting thing happened after the Examiner order: They went de novo. We were ready to come before you, and the afternoon before the de novo hearing I got a transmission from Mr. Cavin, Mr. Stratton's partner, saying they were abandoning the appeal. You know, the issue that would have come before you in 1993 would have been the debate over these partners, and they pulled the plug on it, and it went away.

So we're saying that that interest, that 25 percent, stayed locked at that point in time, until such time as Mitchell recovers the 200-percent penalty that was awarded, that Strata and its undisclosed partners are not entitled to any other elections.

Interesting what's about to happen: The Morrow zone in the well is beginning to deplete. There's concern about how long the well is going to sustain itself. It's on compression now. The evidence would demonstrate that a decision has got to be made soon about election to perforate another Morrow interval. It will not surprise me to see Strata wanting to have a free ride on that election, and yet we need that production to pay off the penalty.

The position is, they're not entitled to any other elections until we get paid out, and they're not parties with an affected interest until they at least take the step of signing an instrument, making that interest

exist and giving us a way to find out about that interest.

The orders are interesting. You can see how hard Mr. Carroll and Mr. Stogner struggled with the order. It goes into incredible length, talking about how disappointed the Division is with the tactics that Strata has utilized here.

Ultimately, they decided to open the hearing for this election. And I think, in reflection, that that wasn't necessary, because you need to look to two things: One, when did the Strata partners get their interest?

November of 1995. And if you provide as a matter of policy that the notifications are tied back into the date the application is served on you, this is an effective and efficient means by which everyone's interest is protected, not only Mitchell's but Strata.

I can't imagine it would be any fairer than if you're the party of record, you're the party I'm dealing with, and you tell me you're going to defend and represent these interests, and I serve you, and you later tell me otherwise, it should be your obligation to get them into the hearing room, and not mine.

Thank you, that's all I have.

CHAIRMAN LEMAY: Thank you, Mr. Kellahin.

Okay, did you have anything to say, or is it -your presence here is to ask questions too or --

MR. CARROLL: Mr. Chairman, as you're probably well aware of, the Division is a very interested party in this case, and your decision in this matter is going to affect how we conduct our proceedings from here on out.

At the case heard in May where the Division reopened the case, we looked at the evidence and determined that there should be a cutoff date. And I could ask a million questions regarding the circumstances and pose scenarios to you as to the terrible outcomes that could occur before the Division, based upon similar-type factual situations.

For instance, if Strata said it had partners and in this case also represented -- it had partners in this lease it represented, it could also sell the lease on behalf of its partners, and they would represent the partners in a force-pooling proceeding and then said, Well, I'm not going to tell you who my partners are.

I mean, where does that leave an applicant? They know that there's partners out there, but they don't know who to serve, and the party won't tell them. Well, unless it's of record, they won't know who to serve, so they'll have to proceed just against the party of record.

Now, as to the second cutoff date -- The first cutoff date is for application for hearing, who should be notified of the hearing. And in the Division decision we

decided that the party of record and any other actual owners known to Mitchell should be notified. And at the time the application was filed Mitchell did not know the names of any of these undisclosed partners and relied upon representations of Strata.

The Division -- thing about the election period said that Mitchell had the names of the working interest owners in hand and did not notify them of their election rights.

Now, there's a bunch of questions regarding that too. For instance, a party could say, Well, my partners -- using Mr. Kellahin's example -- are those listed in the Artesia phone book. And then you'll notify all of them and say, Hey, these people in the Artesia phone book don't own an interest.

And then the party will say, Well, I made a mistake, I actually didn't convey all these interests. And a party could really impose a lot of obstacles to an applicant ever getting an order from the Division by playing a lot of games with notice.

I think what the Division would like from the Commission is definitely quidance and some firm rules.

In this situation what would help, I guess, is that the applicant stick with the parties of record unless they receive notice and an executed instrument showing that

a transfer actually occurred, rather than just a bald statement saying, These are my partners, whether it be 15 or the Artesia phone book, and here are the executed instruments that they have signed, even if they're not recorded. In this situation it wouldn't have helped because there was no executed instruments.

I could pose a number of other scenarios. We're just -- The Division is very wary, especially, of Mr. Stratton's suggestion that personal service would be required of all parties in our proceedings, and not service by mail, by certified mail.

I think -- I don't know the Constitutionality of providing notice just by certified mail, as we currently do, versus personal service. But as you well know, that would cost the industry many -- probably millions of dollars every year, hiring personal process servers.

So I guess the Division appears as an interested party, and a frightened party.

MR. STRATTON: Mr. Chairman, could I just -- I'll be very brief. I mean, I'd like to respond to a couple of those --

CHAIRMAN LEMAY: Sure.

MR. STRATTON: -- things and just a couple of...

I didn't suggest personal service. Uhden says personal service. I appreciate the elevation to the court,

but it wasn't me that did that; it's Uhden that says that.

I don't think personal service ought to be necessary, but
the New Mexico Supreme Court says it's necessary.

Secondly, I'm not representing Strata here. None of my clients are Strata, none of my clients are represented by Strata, none of my clients gave Strata any authority to accept service of process on their behalf.

And so Strata was here, they got notice, they made their election, they're out. But -- And so I know the attempt is to confuse Strata and impute everything that Strata did to my clients.

But a party can't come in here and say, Oh, I represent everybody in the Artesia phone book, and then accept service on behalf of everybody in the Artesia phone book. You've got to -- We have ways we do that in New Mexico. You file under the law. You get a registered service agent and you can serve him. Otherwise, you have to serve the party personally.

So to suggest that we are somehow bound because Strata had negotiations with these people is just ridiculous.

And then finally, I just want to say that every one of Mr. Carroll's suggestions fits under the *Uhden* rule. If a party's identity and whereabouts are known or could be ascertained with due diligence -- if I told you I had

undisclosed partners and I'm not going to tell you who they are, and the undisclosed partners -- we're really talking about investors, because that's the term that all these oil and gas guys use -- don't have their interests recorded, and I as an applicant can't figure out who you are, you're stuck, you don't deserve notice, because you couldn't have been found, you weren't known or you could not have been ascertained through due diligence.

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But that that's not what happened in this particular case. I mean, the want -- You can come up with all kinds of scenarios about that.

This letter listing the interest owner, their address and their leasehold percentage ownership over here, this is Exhibit 24, this is the one, when you look at this, you'll come to, was given to Mitchell. This is what they had. It wasn't undisclosed. This is disclosure if you ask me, not nondisclosure.

So if they're not disclosed and you don't have your interests recorded, then you have an interest at your peril.

I mean, you're going to have -- If Mr. Murphy hadn't have sent this letter, for instance, to Mitchell, then other than the fact that Mitchell had the duty to use due diligence, which they never did -- I mean, that's certainly an argument. But if this hadn't been sent to

them, we probably wouldn't be here today, because this is the notice that they got and this is the knowledge they had. To suggest they didn't know where to find them is just not right. You'll see that when you look at the exhibit.

So that's all I wanted to say.

CHAIRMAN LEMAY: I'm sorry, Mr. Carroll, do you want to say something?

MR. CARROLL: Mr. Chairman, I might interject. There's a lot of agency issues in this case. We didn't hear the testimony of these undisclosed partners. We do know that Strata represented that it could sell the lease on behalf of the partners and that it would represent its partners' rights in any force-pooling proceeding. So -- I'm just saying maybe there's some agency or partnership issues that are better decided by a court more familiar with such issues.

CHAIRMAN LEMAY: Okay.

MR. CARROLL: And to comment on Mr. Stratton's last -- holding up the letter, Strata always took the position that it had no duty to inform its partners. I guess the duty was to Mitchell in this case, to disclose the partners.

This is getting very esoteric legal theory, but who is the duty owed to? It seemed like Strata had a duty

to protect its partners by submitting this list of partners to Mitchell but had no duty to then inform its partners that there's a force-pooling proceeding.

And then -- To begin with, Mr. Stratton said, you know, once these partners became aware of the order and of the well, they came forward. Well, it was Strata that somehow had a duty arise to inform these partners of the proceeding. For a long time they said no duty to inform their partners. But then later they somehow had a duty to inform them they had a right against Mitchell.

And it's -- the agency issues are confusing and where the duties lie. If Mr. Stratton can answer those...

MR. STRATTON: Mr. Chairman, I didn't say that.

I didn't say that once they became aware, they came
forward. So I have a hard time answering that since I
didn't say that.

MR. CARROLL: Well, the transcript will say that.

MR. STRATTON: I don't see -- To me that's not an issue. I mean, we know when they became aware, because Mr. Carroll asked us to get affidavits from them, which we did, that indicated when each individual became aware of the well and when the proceedings occurred.

And those affidavits are in the record at -They're our last set of affidavits. I don't know, they're
the last 16 exhibits.

1 But why that is important I don't know, 2 because --CHAIRMAN LEMAY: Okay, I guess we can dig that 3 out of the record, what that says. It sounds like an open 4 5 issue. Are you ready to take some questions from the 6 Commissioners? I'd like to include Lyn Hebert in the 7 question-and-answer, and she can -- Since this is a lot of 8 legal issues, if you have a question, Lyn, I would 9 appreciate, on the legal side, you asking them for 10 clarification. 11 Start with Commissioner Weiss. 12 13 COMMISSIONER WEISS: Yeah, I don't hear any 14 issues here about correlative rights or waste. I think we 15 need to form a committee of law professors, is what I 16 think, and study this sucker. 17 CHAIRMAN LEMAY: There are some heavy legal issues involved. I --18 COMMISSIONER WEISS: I mean, this is... 19 20 CHAIRMAN LEMAY: Commissioner Bailey, with your 21 law hat on, do you --22 COMMISSIONER BAILEY: Did Strata receive any 23 disbursements from Mitchell or any billings concerning this 24 well? 25 MR. KELLAHIN: Yes, ma'am.

COMMISSIONER BAILEY: On behalf of its partners? 1 MR. KELLAHIN: Yeah, I can't characterize it on 2 behalf of their partners, but as information is distributed 3 it went to Strata, even after the -- We had the force-4 pooling application and the notice, and then they gave us 5 the list. But all the information has been sent to Strata. 6 7 COMMISSIONER BAILEY: And were there any moneys 8 paid to Strata? MR. KELLAHIN: No, ma'am, because we are still 9 trying to recover the penalty component of the Order. 10 we have recovered the costs of their share one time, and 11 12 we're moving towards the two-time number, and so we haven't 13 got to 300 yet. That's all I have. 14 COMMISSIONER BAILEY: 15 CHAIRMAN LEMAY: I guess I had a couple guestions about the structure of the partnership arrangement. 16 17 have been characterized as Strata partners. Now, these 18 Strata partners, I take it, are your clients, Mr. Stratton? 19 MR. STRATTON: I wouldn't characterize them as 20 Strata partners --21 CHAIRMAN LEMAY: Okay. 22 MR. STRATTON: -- Mr. Chairman, but --23 CHAIRMAN LEMAY: Well, how would you characterize them, then? 24 Working interest owners and 25 MR. STRATTON:

1	overriding royalty interest owners.
2	CHAIRMAN LEMAY: Okay.
3	MR. STRATTON: I think, Mr. Chairman
4	CHAIRMAN LEMAY: Is there a relationship between
5	these working interest owners and Strata?
6	MR. STRATTON: They know each other. But do you
7	mean is there a legal relationship between them
8	CHAIRMAN LEMAY: Both.
9	MR. STRATTON: like a partnership or
10	CHAIRMAN LEMAY: Okay, both.
11	MR. STRATTON: No.
12	CHAIRMAN LEMAY: No legal relationship
13	MR. STRATTON: No.
14	CHAIRMAN LEMAY: it's not a limited
15	partnership
16	MR. STRATTON: No.
17	CHAIRMAN LEMAY: it's not a There's no
18	corporate identity there, so they are working interest
19	partners?
20	MR. STRATTON: Some are individuals, some are
21	corporations, some are you know, all kinds of different
22	folks. But there is no legal relationship, whether it's
23	corporate, limited liability company, limited partnership
24	or partnership, between these individuals.
25	I find that oil men and oil people use the word

"partner" as "investor", and -- these are partners, they're 1 our partners in this well. They don't mean they have a 2 3 partnership --CHAIRMAN LEMAY: Okay. 4 5 MR. STRATTON: -- under New Mexico law; they mean they're investing in this well. 6 7 CHAIRMAN LEMAY: But they're partners in a lease, then; wouldn't they be that? Or co-owners in the lease? 8 9 MR. STRATTON: No. 10 CHAIRMAN LEMAY: How do they get their interest 11 in this 25 percent that became part of the proration unit? 12 MR. STRATTON: They go purchase an interest, and 13 then they get a percentage interest, like a 1-percent 14 interest, working interest, in the lease. 15 CHAIRMAN LEMAY: And who do they purchase that from? 16 17 MR. STRATTON: These -- Our clients purchased it from Strata --18 19 CHAIRMAN LEMAY: Okay. 20 MR. STRATTON: -- in 1989 and 1990. 21 CHAIRMAN LEMAY: Okay. Why didn't they receive 22 an assignment, then? 23 MR. STRATTON: You know, I don't know the answer 24 to that, Mr. Chairman. You mean a written assignment? 25 CHAIRMAN LEMAY: Well, something to show they

have interest. I mean, anytime you have a financial transaction, real estate transaction, there's usually some paper that's signed designating the interest if you pay money.

MR. STRATTON: They may have some of what you're

MR. STRATTON: They may have some of what you're talking about. I mean, not necessarily an assignment that occurred prior to this time.

But I find that that isn't always the case in the oil and gas industry. I see a lot of these deals where people are using -- where people don't have that right away, and they don't assign the interest right away. And I -- I mean, I see a lot of it; I'm surprised you all don't see it a lot.

Maybe by the time it gets here, we're at this situation and a lot of water has gone under the bridge.

But when -- I certainly know the deals I've been involved in and that my clients have been involved in, that that doesn't always happen right away.

CHAIRMAN LEMAY: Would you characterize these people, these investors, as knowledgeable oil people?

MR. STRATTON: Some of them certainly are, yes, sir, absolutely. Some of them are oil companies.

CHAIRMAN LEMAY: So they pretty well know what's going on in the patch and how things are done and --

MR. STRATTON: Some of them -- most -- I would

say most of them do. I would say most of them do. I'm not testifying here; I'm giving you my opinion.

CHAIRMAN LEMAY: Well, yeah, I'm trying to -We're trying to characterize --

MR. STRATTON: Right, I understand.

CHAIRMAN LEMAY: -- these partners, the relationship between Strata and the investors, working interest owners, partners, whatever. And that relationship, I think, is important to this Commission's deliberations. What constitutes a relationship -- What constitutes these relationships? They can be confusing, it sounds like.

MR. STRATTON: Well, the one thing I would say,
Mr. Chairman, is, the reason Uhden and other cases in New
Mexico have this fairly strict Constitutional notice
requirement is so that you don't have to do that. You all
have been very patient sitting here today, listening to our
esoteric legal arguments, and I know they're very
difficult, and they're very difficult for the best of
lawyers.

But what solves all of this is to make sure you have them here. I mean, what if, for instance, they had notified them and then somebody decided they didn't have to? I mean, that wouldn't have been the worst thing to happen in the world.

But the idea to try to get around notifying somebody is what puts us in these situations, where we're going to have to do that.

So my suggestion to you is, it almost doesn't matter how you characterize their interest. You can characterize it any way you want, but the fact is, they do have a protected property right, because they had purchased this interest back in 1989 and 1990.

And so they're entitled to notice, if somebody knows about their interest, only if they know about their interest. I will stipulate right here on the record that if it had never come to Mitchell's attention and Mitchell had used some -- if they had gone through the phone directory in Artesia, to use Mr. Carroll's example, and couldn't find the interests, then all of my clients are out of luck, because they're not recorded.

CHAIRMAN LEMAY: My question still is, what constitutes the interest? Strata saying they have interest or -- Normally interest becomes a definable interest when there's some document there to say they have an interest, because we can characterize a lot of things different ways, but without some kind of documentation -- I guess they should have taken the word of Strata on that, that they had interest, because Strata told them they had interest?

MR. STRATTON: They wouldn't be here today if

they had done that. They could have served them, and they would have found they had interests, and everything would have been litigated.

wouldn't say they should have taken their word. They should have taken the letter, and somebody should have called up Branko, or somebody should have called up Duane Brown, or somebody should have called up Chuck Wellborn and said, Now, we're informed you have an interest in this particular lease; is that true? They have a duty to use due diligence to ascertain this.

Strikes me, if they didn't believe Strata, which actually turned out to be true -- it would have been somebody they could have believed -- but if they didn't believe them, pick up the telephone and call them. And if that individual, if Mr. Brown, had said, No, I don't have an interest in that...

But if he says, I do have an interest in that, then they've used their due diligence to ascertain what interests there were.

But none of that was done. There was no attempt to do that.

CHAIRMAN LEMAY: All right, that helps clarify.

Did you have any questions, Lyn, concerning some of the legalities?

MS. HEBERT: Well, I did have a question, Mr. Kellahin. You indicated that you thought the date should be the date the party is served. But with more than one party -- So that would be a different date for every party prior to cutoff date, as opposed to having the date of the known interest owners be the date the application is filed with the Commission?

MR. KELLAHIN: I under -- Yes.

MS. HEBERT: You've got a sort of moving target, it seems.

MR. KELLAHIN: Yeah, it is a moving target, and it's bothered me, and I've thought about how convenient it would be for the agency and for the applicant to say the target is fixed when we file the application.

But if the application is filed and each of the parties to be pooled does not yet know that's happened, maybe it's fair that the target floats, so that by the time you come to the hearing you can fix that individual's involvement in the process with the date they sign the green card. And you're going to have different dates based upon service, but I think that's fair.

I don't think it would be fair to file a pooling application, serve Santa Fe Energy, get around to serving Burlington a few days later, and find that Burlington says, Hey, wait a minute, my interest has already been assigned

of record. And I think maybe we need to deal with the floating concept of actual service until we have a better sense of how cumbersome that might be.

MS. HEBERT: Well, to some extent it seems like the reason that the Division keeps all the voluminous records it keeps is because it becomes something of -- not like the county records, of course, but it becomes a source of notice for where things -- or for when things occurred that affect the property interests.

So it just occurred to me that the filing of the application would be of notice to people in the oil and gas industry. If they knew that that was the case, they would check the dockets. And they do check the dockets. I mean, I believe they do.

MR. KELLAHIN: And that's a decision for you to make. I'm not debating one or the other. And I think there's a range of choice in there that's reasonable in any extent.

But it's troublesome to have investors for an opponent and not receive documentation as to their property interest. And to equate the fact they may have sent a check to Strata with having that property interest vested at that point in time, I think, fixes the property interest too soon.

MS. HEBERT: Well, I also had a question for Mr.

Stratton. 1 You said that their working interest, their 2 ownership interests, those weren't in writing until 1995? 3 MR. STRATTON: I didn't say that. That's what 4 Mr. Kellahin said. I think --5 MS. HEBERT: Well, I think Mr. LeMay did ask if 6 7 they had any written documentation. MR. STRATTON: Oh, okay, of record in this 8 9 particular case. The only thing that I know of -- Are the assignments in the record? 10 11 MR. KELLAHIN: Yes. 12 MR. STRATTON: Okay. -- are the assignments that 13 did take place in -- whenever the date was. If it was 14 1995, it was 1995. 15 MS. HEBERT: Are you aware of any of your 16 clients had any kind of limited partnership or other 16 17 partnership agreement with Strata prior to that? 18 MR. STRATTON: I'm aware that they don't. 19 MS. HEBERT: They don't? 20 MR. STRATTON: No. 21 MS. HEBERT: There was nothing in --MR. STRATTON: There's no evidence in the record 22 23 that they do, and I'm telling you as an officer of the Commission, or whatever you call people here, that they 24 don't have any such relationship, certainly not in regard 25

to this, but no other relationship like that.

CHAIRMAN LEMAY: Mr. Carroll?

MR. CARROLL: Let me bring up another issue that hasn't been touched on, and that is actual notice and whether actual notice can cure any absence of Constitutional or statutory notice.

At the hearing in 1993, a George Scott testified as the consulting geologist for Strata. There's a number of Scott interests, but Mr. Scott testified at that hearing that he was the owner of Scott Exploration, and Scott Exploration is one of these undisclosed partners.

Now, the owner of one of these partners was at the hearing and did not enter an appearance as a partner. He was a consulting geologist. So for sure, at least Scott Exploration had notice of the hearing. And I notice one of the affidavits is signed by a geologist with Scott Exploration, and they said they had notice back in 1993.

I was wondering if Mr. Stratton could address whether actual notice could substitute for lack of statutory notice, because I found a couple cases in Oklahoma where an Oklahoma court said in a compulsory pooling case -- in two cases -- that parties cannot, you know, even if they haven't received statutory notice, can't stand by and wait to see whether the well is good and then elect to join in after the fact.

MR. STRATTON: Mr. Chairman, I'd be pleased to address that --

CHAIRMAN LEMAY: Okay.

MR. STRATTON: -- if you would like me to.

First of all, I regret I can't -- Being from Oklahoma, I'd like to agree that that is what they did, but it's not. The United States Supreme Court, however, did address the issue in 1915, cited in our brief, Coe vs.

Armor Fertilizer Works, a 1915 case.

And the United States Supreme Court held that extra-official or casual notice for a hearing granted as a favor of discretion in proceedings for taking one's property -- that means, if you messed up and you just granted them a new hearing -- is not a substantial substitute for the due process of law, which the 14th Amendment of the US Constitution requires. The notice must be formal and provided within the context of the proceedings.

So what we're saying is, if I'm in the barber shop and my barber says, You know, Mr. Carroll was in here the other day and he says that there's a hearing going on over there at the Commission and it's going to affect a whole gunny sack full of your oil and gas interests, that's not good enough, because you have to have personal service under Uhden. The US Supreme Court says casual or extra-

official notice is not good enough. 1 So... CHAIRMAN LEMAY: But that's just a -- I'm not 2 sure we're talking about the same thing. I understood it 3 to say that it wasn't casual, but actually one of the witnesses at the hearing was also one of the partners? 5 MR. CARROLL: That's correct. 6 7 CHAIRMAN LEMAY: So it's --8 MR. STRATTON: I think that's not correct. CHAIRMAN LEMAY: -- casual notice of the --9 10 MR. STRATTON: I don't think Mr. Scott actually 11 is one of the interest owners. 12 MR. CARROLL: He testified he owned Scott 13 Exploration. Scott Exploration is one of the partners. 14 MR. STRATTON: I'd have to check that, but I'm not sure that that is correct. 15 CHAIRMAN LEMAY: Okay, but the fact that if 16 17 they're there and it's obvious or would appear obvious to us that they knew about it there, then -- and they were a 18 partner, that wouldn't be constructive notice? Or --19 20 MR. STRATTON: Constructive notice --21 CHAIRMAN LEMAY: -- we would assume that he didn't know, even though he knew? 22 23 MR. STRATTON: Constructive notice doesn't work. 24 CHAIRMAN LEMAY: I don't know what I'm talking about, saying "constructive notice". I mean, I pulled 25

"constructive" out of the air. I mean, if he knows, he 1 knows, doesn't he? Or not? 2 MR. STRATTON: I'm going to say, I don't have a 3 case on that, and I don't think there is a case on that, 4 because I don't think that happens very often. But I'm not 5 6 going to concede it, because I haven't looked -- That's one 7 out of 16 people, so --CHAIRMAN LEMAY: Well, what's the relationship of 8 9 these people? Are they interrelated, are they brother-inlaws or --10 11 MR. STRATTON: Well, I don't know. 12 CHAIRMAN LEMAY: -- or neighbors, or do they all 13 live in one town, or are they scattered throughout the 14 country, or --15 MR. STRATTON: They're scattered. We have 16 somebody in Salt Lake City, we've got somebody in Canada, 17 we've got some people in Roswell. Some of then know each 18 other, some of them are related. But I'll tell you what you have. I mean, if 19 that's a serious concern, if you don't believe the US 20 Supreme Court and you don't want to look at Uhden, go look 21 22 at their affidavits. They have filed, under the --23 CHAIRMAN LEMAY: We'll look at those, because I think --24 25 MR. STRATTON: -- they have filed, under the

penalty of perjury, affidavits saying they didn't know about the hearing. Now, if Mr. Carroll can come prove that they did, then he can go over and see the US Attorney or the district attorney and talk to him about it.

But once again, I want -- When you're doing this and when Mr. Carroll says, I don't know what is Constitutional notice, that really concerns me as a litigant here.

But please, when you do this, make sure -- And when you decide what a cutoff date is -- this question wasn't asked for me -- please try to make sure you do it in accordance with what the courts say and not just what is convenient for an applicant. Because that, when it gets to court, like in Uhden -- I mean, that's what they're going to look at. They're not going to look at what's convenient for Mr. Kellahin's clients. They're going to look at what they think the Constitution requires, even if it's a little bit burdensome, like personal service.

MR. KELLAHIN: One footnote to that, if I might.

CHAIRMAN LEMAY: Well, I was going to say

first --

MR. KELLAHIN: Yeah.

CHAIRMAN LEMAY: -- because he was -- and then

24 you.

Go ahead, Rand.

MR. CARROLL: Yeah, there was some recollections 1 that some of the partners showed up at the hearing, besides 2 just being a witness there. In fact, some of the partners 3 may be in the audience here -- it appears so --4 CHAIRMAN LEMAY: Uh-huh. 5 CHAIRMAN LEMAY: -- and maybe they can be put on 6 the stand. 7 MR. STRATTON: Well, I'm not calling them to the 8 9 stand, Mr. Chairman. CHAIRMAN LEMAY: Mr. Kellahin? 10 11 MR. KELLAHIN: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 12 I would refer Ms. Hebert to page 18 of my brief. There are some Oklahoma cases that we have found. T think 13 this one is interesting. It helped me work my way through 14 15 it. And it simply says, The Supreme Court of Oklahoma 16 held in Chancellor -- talking about a 1982 case -- that the 17 18 notice requirements were not intended to compel the unit operator to check county records from the date of the 19 Application until the Commission order to assure that all 20 interest owners had been notified. Such a ruling, the 21 court noted, would permit an adverse party to defeat an 22 application by simply transferring ownership after the 23

What we're contending here is that we had notice

24

25

hearing.

of these people only after the application was filed. Their interest is not even of record.

The point in time to fix is the date we filed the application and served Mr. Murphy. And if you adopt that date, I think that fixes the problem, because their property interest does not occur and is not known to us until after that date.

MR. STRATTON: Mr. Chairman, can I go back to your other point, because you -- I mean, it's an interesting point, and I'm thinking about it.

You know, if I was in a lawsuit and there were four or five people that should have been served and I didn't get served, for instance, and I show up and watch the trial, I'm not bound by what they do there. Nobody ever got personal service.

If somebody calls me to the witness stand and I testify, I'm not bound by what occurred at the proceeding, because the court doesn't have jurisdiction over me.

And it works the same way here, that unless you obtain jurisdiction -- and that's probably a better way to think about it and look at it -- over the individual, they can come frolic around all they want, listen to the hearing, do whatever they want; but you don't have jurisdiction over them to affect their rights.

So in thinking -- I mean, it's an easy answer in

I know we tend to think about 1 a judicial context. administrative proceedings as being more informal and 2 having different rules. But when it boils down to 3 Constitutional considerations, technically we don't here. 4 5 So I guess in thinking about that, I'd answer 6 that it didn't matter who was here if they hadn't been 7 served appropriately under the Uhden standard. MR. CARROLL: Mr. Chairman, one more note. 8 9 It's my recollection that you don't represent all the undisclosed partners? There's a couple that did not 10 11 join in this action? MR. STRATTON: I don't subscribe to the 12 undisclosed partner theory, so I don't know who you mean, 13 14 Mr. Carroll, when you say that. 15 MR. KELLAHIN: It's Warren and Arrowhead. 16 MR. CARROLL: Do you represent all the partners 17 or the working interest owners besides Strata in this? MR. STRATTON: No, I don't. 18 19 MR. CARROLL: Who don't you represent? 20 Well, maybe I should tell you who MR. STRATTON: 21 I do represent, and then you can determine for yourself --MR. CARROLL: Is it Warren and Arrowhead? 22 MR. STRATTON: -- because I don't know who all 23 24 the working interest --25 MR. CARROLL: Warren and Arrowhead that --

1	MR. STRATTON: I don't know who all the working
2	interest owners are. I don't represent Warren and I don't
3	represent Arrowhead. They're not parties to this
4	proceeding.
5	MR. CARROLL: Do you know why?
6	MR. STRATTON: I don't. And I would say once
7	again, Mr. Carroll, I can't think of anything more
8	irrelevant as to why they're not here. Just because
9	they're not here doesn't mean that the Commission can
10	violate the Constitutional rights of the people that are
11	here.
12	CHAIRMAN LEMAY: So Branko is who? Is that Is
13	one of the investors, is that who Branko is?
14	MR. STRATTON: Yes, Branko, Inc.
15	CHAIRMAN LEMAY: Is it a corporation?
16	MR. STRATTON: Branko, Inc.
17	CHAIRMAN LEMAY: Is it a corporation?
18	MR. STRATTON: Uh-huh.
19	CHAIRMAN LEMAY: And you're representing them?
20	MR. STRATTON: Correct, yes.
21	CHAIRMAN LEMAY: Okay.
22	MR. STRATTON: Do you want a rundown who I'm
23	representing?
24	CHAIRMAN LEMAY: That would help, probably.
25	MR. STRATTON: It's listed Well, it's listed

in the motion --1 2 CHAIRMAN LEMAY: Okav. MR. STRATTON: -- but I can run down it. 3 Branko, Inc.; Duane Brown; S.H. Cavin -- that's 4 not my law partner -- Robert Eaton; Terry Kramer; Landwest, 5 which is a general partnership out of Utah; Candace 6 7 McClelland; Permian Hunter Corporation; Scott Exploration, Inc. -- and I believe that the actual owner of that is 8 9 Charles Warren Scott and not the Mr. Scott that Mr. Carroll is talking about -- Chuck Wellborn; Winn Investment, Inc.; 10 Lori Worrall; Xion Investments; George Scott, III -- who is 11 12 also not the Mr. Scott that Mr. Carroll was talking about 13 -- Stephen Mitchell; and Scott Exploration, Inc. 14 CHAIRMAN LEMAY: Okay, probably helps. A lot of 15 this information, I'm sure, is in there, but --16 MR. STRATTON: And you haven't seen it and it's 17 unusual. And we appreciate your patience. We hope the Commission doesn't mind us. We could have taken two days 18 19 to do this. We hope this is better; I don't know. 20 CHAIRMAN LEMAY: Okay, any more questions? Do 21 you have anything? 22 Are you going to make a motion to incorporate the 23 record of the previous hearing into our record and we work 24 with that, plus what you've supplied us today? 25 MR. KELLAHIN: If we have not already

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accomplished that, Mr. Chairman, we, I think, jointly so
 1
 2
     move.
 3
               CHAIRMAN LEMAY: Any objection?
               If no objection, then the record of the previous
 4
 5
     hearing will be introduced into this record, and --
               MR. KELLAHIN: There's two hearings, Mr.
 6
 7
     Chairman.
               CHAIRMAN LEMAY: Or both hearings. And you want
 8
 9
     to introduce the record of both those previous hearings?
10
     We're talking about the force-pooling hearing initially --
11
               MR. KELLAHIN: Right.
               CHAIRMAN LEMAY: -- back in 1993 or --
12
13
               MR. KELLAHIN: Yes, sir.
14
               CHAIRMAN LEMAY: -- 1992 --
15
               MR. KELLAHIN: Yes, sir.
               CHAIRMAN LEMAY: -- plus the one we just heard.
16
17
               Okay, without objection, the record of those
     hearings will be entered into this record.
18
19
               Anyone else?
20
               MR. KELLAHIN: I'd like to take a moment and
21
     introduce my guest. Bobby Hickman is a petroleum engineer.
22
     Mr. Hickman is responsible for this project for Mitchell
23
     Energy, and he's come from Houston today to be the
24
     representative of my client, and he's come a long way in
25
     bad weather, and I'd like to introduce him.
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MR. HICKMAN: Thank you. How you doing? 1 CHAIRMAN LEMAY: Welcome, Mr. Hickman. Sorry you 2 didn't have more to say. 3 4 MR. HICKMAN: Don't be. 5 CHAIRMAN LEMAY: Usually people like you are 6 sworn in, and we ask you questions. 7 Does anybody else want to make a statement or... 8 MR. CARROLL: I'd just ask the Commission again 9 whether they want to ask any questions of any partners that are in the audience. 10 MS. HEBERT: I just kind of think -- I'll 11 12 interrupt. I think the understanding was, there wasn't going to be any testimony in this hearing. I mean, that 13 was the --14 15 MR. STRATTON: That was our stipulation, Mr. Chairman. 16 17 CHAIRMAN LEMAY: Sure. I mean, this is 18 voluntary. I wasn't -- you know, anyone wants to -- We can 19 always ask for statements and things. If there's anyone 20 that wants to say anything, they can do so and -- if that's the case. 21 22 Do you all have anything you want to add to what 23 you've told us already? 24 MR. STRATTON: Us, Mr. Chairman? 25 CHAIRMAN LEMAY: Yes.

1 MR. STRATTON: Oh. CHAIRMAN LEMAY: I mean, I'm ready to sum it up 2 3 and take the case under advisement unless you have anything else to --4 MR. KELLAHIN: Mr. Chairman, I've written 28 5 It's probably ten too many. I don't know what else 6 7 to tell you. CHAIRMAN LEMAY: I don't know what's in those 28 8 9 pages, Counselor. It can't be that --10 MR. KELLAHIN: Oh, it's good stuff, Mr. Chairman. 11 I've got some briefs myself that MR. STRATTON: 12 I've made copies of, Mr. Chairman. 13 CHAIRMAN LEMAY: Okay. Sounds like a very -- a 14 case laden with very heavy legal issues. And recognizing 15 that I'm a geologist, that Commissioner Bailey is a 16 geologist, Commissioner Weiss is an engineer, that we --17 Fortunately, we have Lyn Hebert here as our Commission 18 counsel. 19 We'll certainly look at the legal issues. We 20 have to, as I understand this case, the way it's 21 formulated. 22 And I understand what you're trying to say to us. 23 If I'm -- Besides the case you're making for your clients, 24 you also would like to have some direction from this 25 Commission as to what we consider a good policy for

notification would be, that conforms with the Uhden 1 decision, as interpreted for us, I quess. I know these 2 decisions can have more than one interpretation, so... 3 You're making a face there, Mr. Stratton, like 4 5 there's no -- there's only one interpretation of Uhden? MR. STRATTON: Well, on that issue, you know, 6 7 reading the rules, you have a provision for actual notice in your rules, and it just doesn't -- it just doesn't 8 comply with Uhden, and it's going to be in the future 9 10 unless that gets taken care of. I know I'm risking upsetting the Commission. 11 not meaning to; I'm trying to be helpful. Unless that gets 12 taken care of, then anybody who didn't receive personal 13 notice is going to be able to come in and do what we're 14 15 doing here today. So I would suggest to the Commission that that be 16 looked at and Ms. Hebert look at it -- she's as capable as 17 18 anyone that I know of to do that -- and try to get that --CHAIRMAN LEMAY: You understand she used to work 19 20 for you back in the old days. MR. STRATTON: I have no comment for the record, 21 Mr. Chairman. 22 23 CHAIRMAN LEMAY: Sorry, I just know your previous position --24 25 MR. STRATTON: Thank you.

CHAIRMAN LEMAY: -- and I know that's not an issue in this case. I wasn't saying that because of that. I didn't mean to imply anything like that. But I do think there's some heavy issues involved here, and Uhden certainly has been an issue that's been with us for a long time. Does anyone else have anything further to add in Case Number 11,510? If not, this Commission will take that case under advisement. Thank you. Thereupon, these proceedings were concluded at 4:40 p.m.)

CERTIFICATE OF REPORTER

STATE OF NEW MEXICO SS. COUNTY OF SANTA FE

I, Steven T. Brenner, Certified Court Reporter and Notary Public, HEREBY CERTIFY that the foregoing transcript of proceedings before the Oil Conservation Commission was reported by me; that I transcribed my notes; and that the foregoing is a true and accurate record of the proceedings.

I FURTHER CERTIFY that I am not a relative or employee of any of the parties or attorneys involved in this matter and that I have no personal interest in the final disposition of this matter.

WITNESS MY HAND AND SEAL January 22nd, 1997.

STEVEN T. BRENNER

CCR No. 7

My commission expires: October 14, 1998